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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books



Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

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GREEK POEMS TO THE GODS: HYMNS FROM HOMER TO PROCLUS translated by Barry B. Powell [University of California Press, 9780520302877]

The ancient Greek hymnic tradition translated beautifully and accessibly.

The hymn—as poetry, as craft, as a tool for worship and philosophy—was a vital art form throughout antiquity. Although the *Homeric Hymns* have long been popular, other equally important collections have not been readily accessible to students eager to learn about ancient poetry. In reading hymns, we also gain valuable insight into life in the classical world. In this collection, early *Homeric Hymns* of uncertain authorship appear along with the carefully wrought hymns of the great Hellenistic poet and courtier Callimachus; the mystical writings attributed to the legendary poet Orpheus, written as Christianity was taking over the ancient world; and finally, the hymns of Proclus, the last great pagan philosopher of antiquity, from the fifth century AD, whose intellectual influence throughout western culture has been profound.

GREEK POEMS TO THE GODS distills over a thousand years of the ancient Greek hymnic tradition into a single volume. Acclaimed translator Barry B. Powell brings these fabulous texts to life in English, hewing closely to the poetic beauty of the original Greek. His superb introductions and notes give readers essential context, making the hymns as accessible to a beginner approaching them

for the first time as to an advanced student continuing to explore their secrets. Brilliant illustrations from ancient art enliven and enrichen the experience of reading these poems.

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Excerpt: A hymn is a song to a god, originally sung, usually to a lyre. The meaning of hymn is unclear and it may have a foreign origin. The word occurs only once in Homer (Odyssey 8.429), and Hesiod

speaks of winning a prize for a hymnos (Works and Days 651), but it is unclear what he meant by hymnos. Early hymns seem to have been composed in hexameters (see below), but later poems appear in other meters. The standard form was to list the god's names, thus invoking his or her presence, then to continue with some event from the god's career, often the god's birth, and to conclude with a prayer, a reference to the god, or a declaration that the hymnist would now proceed to another song. Hymns to the gods must have been widely circulated in antiquity but, puzzlingly, they are not often referred to by other ancient writers.

A remarkable collection of Greek hymns, by a range of authors, survives in twenty-nine manuscripts, none older than the fifteenth century AD. They are among our most important sources for our knowledge of Greek myth. The collection was evidently made in the early Middle Ages and included, in this order: the anonymous Orphic Hymns (c. AD second/third century?); the Hymns of Proclus, an important Neoplatonist philosopher of late antiquity (AD 412-485); the anonymous Homeric Hymns (eighth/seventh centuries BC-fifth century BC, with one exception), our earliest surviving hymns; and the Hymns of Callimachus (c. 310—c. 240 BC), from the Hellenistic Age (323-c. 30 BC); Callimachus was a poet, critic, and scholar at the Library of Alexandria, one of the most influential intellectuals of his day. The collection also includes an anonymous Orphic Argonautica from the fifth or sixth centuries AD that tells the story of Jason with an emphasis on the role of Orpheus, but it is not a hymn and is not translated here.

One of these manuscripts, discovered in Moscow in 1777 and now in Leiden, is unique in containing a portion of a "Homeric Hymn to Dionysos" and the long "Homeric Hymn to Demeter," poems not included in other versions of the collection. Several papyrus fragments also preserve portions of the Homeric Hymns. The manuscripts of the collection are not nearly so well preserved as texts of the Iliad and the Odyssey and there are many corruptions, some incurable, and occasionally misplaced lines. The collection (missing only the hymns to Dionysos and Demeter) was printed in the editio princeps of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, published in Florence in 1488 by Demetrios Chalkokondyles, one of the most eminent Greek scholars working in the West, tutor to the sons of Lorenzo de Medici.

This book will contain translations of most of these hymns, arranged not as they are in the collection, but according to each individual deity. In this way the reader can see how Greek poets, during a period of over one thousand years, conceived and celebrated their gods, allowing the reader to form an impression of how notions of each god evolved over nearly a millennium. All the hymns of Callimachus and Proclus are included, together with twenty-eight of the thirty-four Homeric Hymns, and thirty-two of the seventy-eight Orphic Hymns; hymns to minor gods, such as the Orphic Hymns to Justice, Misê, the Seasons, Leukothea, and the like, are omitted. The hymns will be cited in rough chronological order: first the Homeric Hymns; then the Hymns of Callimachus; then the Orphic Hymns; then the Hymns of Proclus.

Proclus Hymn 4: To All the Gods

Proclus invokes the gods as a body to provide protection and guidance for the soul's ascent to the intelligible realm of the Demiurge.

Listen, O gods, who sit at the helm of wisdom, who kindle
the fire of the spirit in the souls of mortal men, drawing
them up to the deathless ones, out of the shadowy hole,
purified by the secret rites of hymns.
Hear, mighty saviors!
5 Scatter the mist and grant me your holy light that comes

from sacred books, that I might know well the difference
between a man and an immortal god. And do not allow
a spirit, doing evil things, to hold me down in the streams
far from the blessed ones. And let not cold Punishment
10 bind me in the bonds of life, fallen in the waves of cold
becoming, unwilling to wander long.
But gods, masters of bright
shining wisdom, hear! Reveal to me, as I ascend the path
that leads upwards, the rites and initiations of sacred words!
<>

Ficino and Fantasy: Imagination in Renaissance Art and Theory from Botticelli to Michelangelo by Marieke J.E. van den Doel [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004459670]

Did the Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) influence the art of his time? Art historians have been fiercely debating this question for decades. This book starts with Ficino's views on the imagination as a faculty of the soul, and shows how these ideas were part of a long philosophical tradition and inspired fresh insights. This approach, combined with little known historical material, offers a new understanding of whether, how and why Ficino's Platonic conceptions of the imagination may have been received in the art of the Italian Renaissance. The discussion explores Ficino's possible influence on the work of Botticelli and Michelangelo, and examines the appropriation of Ficino's ideas by early modern art theorists.

'Anyone who enters upon that rough, arduous, and long journey which barely, at last by continuous hardship leads through to the high temple of the nine Muses, seems to need exactly nine guides in this journey. The first three lead us in the heavens. The next three in the soul, the last three on earth.' These are the opening lines of Ficino's book *De vita.*

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Ficino's influence on Renaissance art and art theory has long been the subject of a heated scholarly debate. At the beginning of this book the goal was set to discuss Ficino's ideas concerning inspiration and imagination and furthermore to reinvestigate the possible reception of these ideas in Renaissance art and art theory. This supposed connection was examined in a number of limited case studies, which involved comparing and contrasting textual material to a selection of artworks,

charting possible routes for the transfer of Ficino's ideas and considering the context in which they were produced.

Ficino seems to have played an important part in the development of theories concerning the imagination. At least, the modern cliché of (the poet and) artist as an inspired visionary burdened with a difficult character appears to have originated (at least in part) in Ficino's thinking, as he contributed substantially to further developing the original Aristotelian notion on the melancholic disposition. Ficino's writings, which enjoyed immediate reception in Florentine circles of humanists and artists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were widely emulated and appropriated, and spread via diverse routes of transmission up to the late seventeenth century. Ficino's specific interpretation of the imagination and the survival of his ideas among readers of various backgrounds contributed to Early Modern interest in the power of this faculty, particularly in discussions about art among painters and their public. In addition, this study reveals interrelations between theories on, for example, the various powers or faculties of the soul, mental states such as frenzy and melancholy, the mediating role played by *spiritus,* and the position of vision among the senses.

Within Ficino's philosophical system his writings on the power of imagination are wide-ranging and diverse; there is no unequivocal development within his ideas on this subject. Since his works were distributed widely and remained popular for a long time, they may be considered a focal point that sparked great interest in this subject among many later authors.

The first part of this book is dedicated to a discussion of Ficino's sources, his own works and the writings of those who read his work, charting the origin of ideas about the power of imagination in philosophical, religious and literary texts from Classical Antiquity onwards. Theories about the imagination are studied as part of a complex tradition in which psycho-physiological ideas are interwoven with religious and philosophical notions.

In this context, three main currents may be discerned: Aristotelianism, Galenism and (Neo)platonism. The Aristotelian tradition in particular, in which imagination is seen as a mediating faculty situated between the senses and the intellect, found the most adherents. According to this tradition, the imagination transforms sensory perceptions into mental images called *phantasmata,* which are transported by means of *spiritus,* a partly material and partly immaterial substance, through the various faculties of the soul. The Galenic tradition adds to this that the imagination is influenced by changes in the balance of different bodily fluids; for example, an abundance of black bile in the body supposedly increases the acuity of the imagination, but an excess results in hallucinations.

ATTRIBUTED TO MICHAEL COXIE, PLATO'S CAVE, C. 1540, OIL ON PANEL, 131 × 174 CM, MUSEE DE LA CHARTREUSE DE DOUAI, DOUAI

Ficino's interest in the imagination can be situated within the context of (Neo-)platonism which, based on Plato's *Timaeus*, considers man capable of using this faculty of the soul to access the divine. Inspiration is seen as a possible side effect of a specific state of madness; in *Phaedrus* the mental state of frenzy is also connected to love and the perception of beauty. Within the framework of a religious system, Neoplatonists attributed to the imagination a mediating role between the material and the divine. As a result, the imagination was viewed in an ambivalent way. On the one hand, it connects the human soul to matter; on the other hand, it enables the soul to ascend to the divine. In this context, Neoplatonists theorised about inspiration, prophecies, visions and divination through dreams.

Some texts, including those originating in Arabic science and philosophy, present the imagination as an instrument used by the soul to exercise influence over the subordinate realm of matter. Throughout the Middle Ages, the imagination was a recurring theme within Scholasticism. The wide range of discussions on this issue also had an effect on literature, especially texts on love. This even resulted in a new literary genre, the *trattato d'amore.*

Ficino's *De amore,* a commentary on Plato's *Symposium,* was an influential example of this genre. In this text, Ficino discusses how man can be reminded of his divine origin when beholding (earthly) beauty. This visual (or auditive) stimulus could activate the memory of the beauty of the ideas imprinted in man's soul, which could trigger a state of frenzy, and make man's soul receptive for inspiration. Ficino's treatment of themes such as love and beauty in *De amore* was emulated widely in

literary writings, especially in texts about love, and also made a mark on art theory and the visual arts.

Furthermore, in *De vita libri tres* Ficino postulates that melancholic people possess a vivid imagination and are therefore best disposed to attain states of frenzy and inspiration. As said, this model of the melancholic is an important basis for thinking about the artist's temperament among later authors. Moreover, in the third part of *De vita* Ficino explains how forces from the World Soul can be manipulated, channeled and attracted by means of the omnipresent *spiritus* in order to favourably influence earthly objects. This power of attraction can be exerted through images, food, odours and music, and in each case the power of the imagination can play an significant supporting role.

In *Theologia Platonica* in particular, Ficino devotes pages and pages to the extraordinary effects that the imagination can have on body and soul, but ultimately concludes that reason and intellect must be valued more highly. The original Neoplatonic ambivalence towards the imagination thus manifests itself in Ficino's philosophy. These ideas were also imitated and contradicted by scholars in the context of 'natural magic' (*magia naturalis*). Agrippa von Nettesheim and Paracelsus, for example, studied Ficino's theories in order to place them within their own world views. As said earlier, Ficino's interest in the power of imagination has functioned as a prism for traditional ideas, whereby his works engendered both a continuation and a transformation of his predecessors' ideas.

The second part of this book introduces various case studies in order to examine how the philosophical ideas formulated by Ficino were received in artistic contexts. It was mentioned earlier that the response of Ficino's thought in Renaissance art has been the topic of a long art-historical controversy. Cultural historians, mainly active in the first half of the twentieth century, saw connections between developments in Renaissance literature and philosophy and innovations in contemporary art, and Ficino was considered a key figure in a transfer of ideas. This resulted in a fashion for demonstrating Ficino's influence on Early Modern artists and artworks that sparked numerous publications. As a reaction to this, from the 1980s onwards, Ficino's influence on art became considered by post-modernist researchers a metanarrative that needed deconstruction, and the art-historical literature from this time on shows a clear tendency to relativize, or deny entirely the existence of Platonist influences in Renaissance art. Some of the formulated criticism was justified; nevertheless, the tone of the discussion became so polarized that it actually came to a dead end and a taboo emerged on the whole topic.

This study aims at reopening a deadlocked debate and to reassess the possible reception and active appropriation of Ficino's ideas by artists within the context of the production of specific works of art or patronage situations. Here, I have tried to be precise and exhaustive in reconstructing lines and connections between the supposed influencer – Ficino – and the 'recipient'. Where this was not possible to trace, for example with regard to eventual textual references to Ficino's works in Renaissance art theoretical treatises, I hope to have been transparent about this. After all, within historical research, we have to deal with uncertain factors and untraceable facts; we try to reconstruct a no longer existent tree, on the basis of some remained leaves.

The first case study under investigation consists of an analysis of the iconography (and function) of Botticelli's *Primavera*. Gombrich and Wind explained the iconographical program of the painting in relation to Ficino's letters to one of his pupils, for whom the painting (most likely) was commissioned, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de' Medici. Gombrich' article was attacked particularly vehemently when an inventory of Medici property revealed that the dating of the painting used by Gombrich (1477 or 1478) and therefore the context of the patronage (inheriting and furnishing a country house) was incorrect. Other interpretations have focused on a relation to contemporary

poetry and public celebrations or have even led to a reductionist view centred exclusively on the painting's function as a decorative object.

A key to the interpretation put forward here is another date of the painting and its relation to the engagement or marriage of Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco – respectively 1481 or 1482 -, as a result of which it is possible to discuss the painting within the context of Ficino's correspondence of these years with this scion of the Medici family, and to relate it to important texts such as *De amore* and (in retrospect) *De vita libri tres*. As a refined love-gift the painting probably visualized the Ficinian dichotomy between heavenly and earthly love, which Wind had already linked to the painting's iconography; the figures depicted are interpreted as the senses, or the powers of the soul as defined by Ficino, and placed in a hierarchical order corresponding to the soul's journey towards the divine. In Ficino's correspondence with Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco from 1481–82, figures such as Flora or the three Graces are connected to Ficino's theory of the hierarchy of the senses. Ficino names the three Graces as the higher powers of the soul: hearing, vision and reason. Venus acts as a mediating force between the higher and lower senses; Mercury, as a representative of the intellect, points the way to more elevated planes.

De vita longa, which Ficino wrote a few years later than the *Primavera* is to be dated, repeats the ideas formulated in his earlier work and introduces Mercury and Venus in a comparable context: the dialogue between them suggests that readers should not focus on the 'lower' senses (touch, taste and smell), or on concomitant urges such as lust and procreation, belonging to Venus' domain, but should devote themselves to the higher powers of the soul, such as imagination and reason, connected to Mercury.

The *Primavera's* iconography thus represents how perceiving (looking at, hearing, contemplating) beauty may result in the soul's ascent. The hierarchical order of the powers of the soul, as depicted on the painting, appears to attribute the greatest value to the intellect – represented by Mercury – and to the intellectual contemplation of beauty. When looking at the *Primavera,* the beholder is supposed to be attracted to the exquisite colours and the idealized visual language, but finally completely forget the material aspects of the artwork and, instead, contemplate divine beauty itself. The *Primavera* is therefore a painting that helps viewers to contemplate the virtues of contemplation.

Accordingly, Ficino's philosophy offers a subtle framework for the notion that images are useful as objects of contemplation. On the one hand, properly made images may channel the World Soul and the planetary influences derived from it, a process facilitated by the power of imagination; on the other hand, images are deemed to exert a positive influence on the power of imagination. The question as to whether the viewers for whom the *Primavera* was painted truly believed in the planetary powers of the pagan gods is less relevant than the concrete observation that material objects were used in religious practices in which the powers of these gods were regarded as self-evident. The key tenet of this interpretation – the quest for higher (or divine) love through the contemplation of beauty – provides additional support for the hypothesis that the painting was intended as a refined marriage gift.

Other gifts of love that may have been intended as aids for contemplation are Michelangelo's *Presentation Drawings*. Like some of Botticelli's works, Michelangelo's oeuvre has often been the centre of debate concerning the question whether it contained Platonist references or not. Art-historical literature hardly considers the possibility of Michelangelo choosing to appropriate such concepts or not, for example depending on whether he was working on public commissions or developing private iconographies. His interest in literary, philosophical or religious subject matter has evidently shifted in the course of his long life. I have therefore not argued that Michelangelo's

whole oeuvre was permeated with Neoplatonic concepts, but solely focused on the interpretation of this set of drawings and the context for which they were made.

In this study, it is argued that two texts which summarise and simplify Ficino's ideas on love and the imagination, Diacceto's *I tre libri d'amore* and *Panegirico all'amore*, served as sources for the drawings' iconographies. In this context, the role of the *Accademia Sacra dei Medici* is also highlighted. Since Michelangelo and Diacceto were both members of this academy, it may have provided the institutional setting for discussions on the themes expressed in the drawings.

The iconographies developed in the drawings of *Ganymede, Tityus* and *Phaeton* refer in a generic way to Platonic ideas about love. The interpretation put forward here states that the *Ganymede* drawing represents the soul's intellectual journey as inspired by the sight of corporeal beauty. In the Ficinian context, the drawings of *Tityus* and *Phaeton* appear to contain an admonition: *Tityus* demonstrates the danger of addiction to bodily pleasures**;** the protagonist's torment, whose liver is devoured, symbolises how man is subjected to the 'confusions that plague the realm of the senses'. The *Phaeton* drawing may represent the fall of man as occasioned by an inability to deal with supreme beauty, as Diacceto described it in his summary of Ficino's ideas.

The *Children's Bacchanal* may visualise the theory described by Ficino and Diacceto about the influence of the spirit. This suggests that the drawing is primarily concerned with the 'vital' kind of *spiritus*, which is not only responsible for bodily functions such as nourishment and procreation, but is also the cause of deceitful phantoms in the imagination. The *spiritelli* represented in the drawing symbolise how man, whose reason has become stultified and who has become enslaved by the senses, ends life in a sleep 'constantly plagued by dreams'.

In addition, the elaborate allegories of *The Dream* and *Archers* contain detailed references to the sixth oration from Ficino's *De amore* – or to Diacceto's summary of this work. *The Dream* depicts a young man, who symbolises the melancholic temperament or the artist, and who is surrounded by references to the negative aspects of this temperament: gluttony, dipsomania, lust, anger and sloth. However, a positive side of the melancholic temperament is represented as well: the state of frenzied inspiration which is sparked by the vision of corporeal beauty or the experience of love. The 'genius' depicted on the drawing may thus be identified as a personification of love, which in the sixth oration of *De amore* is called 'a great demon' who 'inspires by divine goodness, awake or during sleep'. *The dream* may be interpreted as a complex visual construct that combines the themes of beauty, love, inspiration and divinely inspired artistry.

The *Archers* provides a stage for the negative aspects of earthly love, in precisely the same way as they are explained allegorically in the sixth oration of *De amore.* This oration describes how love is born from abundance and poverty, as a result of which it is 'poor', 'dull', 'unarmed' and 'humble'. Ficino explains Plato's Greek term for 'humble', *chamaipetes*, as 'low-flying'. The dynamic position of the archers in Michelangelo's drawing, who appear to be flying just above the ground, may be a reference to this explanation. The archers are also 'unarmed' due to their being 'susceptible to shameful desires', as Ficino put it. This is represented in the drawing by the archers lacking bows and arrows. What is more, Ficino calls lovers who give in to the baser kinds of desire 'dull', because they are 'so stupid that they do not know where love is leading them, and they remain on the road, and do not arrive at the goal': this also appears to be true of the archers.

In his *Presentation Drawings,* Michelangelo attempted to represent the themes of Platonic love and the sight of corporeal beauty in various ways. This view corresponds to their function as courtly and refined gifts of love. The complex subject matter of the iconography and the detailed and refined draughtsmanship of these works of art make them worthy of contemplation. The drawings may be seen as almost uniquely literal and detailed visualizations of Ficinian themes. Diacceto's work may

have served as a textual way station. Moreover, the drawings exemplify how Early Modern artistic theory was strongly influenced by general ideas about love and beauty.

The last chapter of this study traces the discussion about love and beauty, and the role that imagination plays in it, in a number of texts on art theory: it relates Ficino's ideas about the power of imagination directly to discussions about the visual arts. Apart from the explicit references to Ficino's writings by authors such as Lomazzo and Comanini, Ficino's influence on sixteenth-century art theory may be primarily discerned in the evident way in which a well-developed imagination is presented as an essential faculty for artists, and with which the concepts of melancholy and frenzy are associated. Biographies from Vasari to Baldinucci describe melancholy as the proverbial artists' illness, which goes in hand with a sharp or an overactive imagination. A highly receptive imagination may result in moments of extraordinary artistic inspiration and rapid inventions. An overdeveloped imagination leads to 'unnatural' works of art, but also to melancholy and the total consummation of *spiritus,* which brings about self-neglect and may ultimately lead to death. Because some texts do not refer to Ficino's writings directly, it is not always possible to demonstrate a direct literary correlation to them.

Be that as it may, the cultural policies adopted by archduke Cosimo i ensured that, within the context of art and art literature, Ficino's name was increasingly and explicitly connected to the study of Plato. As far as the iconography of love is concerned, Ficino was also seen as an authority, as references by Comanini and Ripa suggest. Traces of Ficino's ideas may be found in artists' studios up to the seventeenth century: one example is the sculptor Gian Lorenzo Bernini's copy of *De amore*; another, from the Netherlands,[1] is Rembrandt's pupil Samuel van Hoogstraten, who, in 1678, referred directly to *De vita* as a source that was recognised by, and known to his readers.

Considering this in conjunction with the Ficinian connotations in artistic iconography as developed by artists such as Botticelli and Michelangelo, the findings of this final chapter suggest that in the course of the sixteenth century it became a commonplace to ascribe an extraordinarily powerful imagination to artists and their putatively melancholic temperaments. In this context, the Platonic duality was applied to art theory: on the one hand, imagination was deemed to have the power to enable painters to rise to great artistic heights; on the other hand, it could also turn them into eccentric, socially isolated outcasts. Another view, which persisted in the background, was the Hermetic notion that man is able to occupy the border between the earthly and the divine through his ability to make lifelike images and recreate his likeness. These Ficinian concepts have clearly become rooted in art literature and developed into commonplaces. What is more, Ficino's ideas on inspiration and genius also played a role in emancipating the art of painting in the Early Modern period, when art theory had yet to prove that painting was a subject worthy of discussion.

JAN SAENREDAM, PLATO'S CAVE, 1604, ENGRAVING, 32.9 × 45.2 CM, RIJKSMUSEUM, AMSTERDAM

This study does not aim to provide a comprehensive or incontrovertible discussion of Ficino's importance for the visual arts and for art theory of the Renaissance and after. However, it does try to bring new clarity in historiographical debates about the significance of Platonism for Early Modern painting, which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, which formed an extremely popular topic from the 1950s until the 1970s, and was characterized by a strong counterreaction from the 1980s onwards. A close reading of relevant texts from Ficino's varied and voluminous work, combined with detailed iconographical analyses and with research into contextual factors, brings new material to the fore that sheds new light on old debates.

There are many uncharted paths to be explored by investigating the thinking and writing about the locus where we form our thoughts and visions, and how this thought place is imagined and represented: 'The Imagination which Liveth for Ever', as formulated by William Blake. We have seen that giving form to ideas concerning phantasy and imagination and the visualization of these ideas has been the cause and starting-point of much creativity itself – and this continuing process has a history in its own right. As historians, it is also our imagination that helps us to reach out for the past, and armed by facts and sources, makes us envisage 'how it really was', or how it could have been.

Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher edited by Albert Joosse [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Brill, 9789004466692]

This is the first collected volume dedicated to the work of the 6th-century CE philosopher Olympiodorus of Alexandria. His Platonic commentaries are rare witnesses to ancient views on Plato's Socratic works. As a pagan, Olympiodorus entertained a complex relationship with his predominantly Christian surroundings. The contributors address his profile as a Platonic philosopher, the ways he did and did not adapt his teaching to his Christian audience, his reflections on philosophical exegesis and communication and his thinking on self-cognition. The volume as a whole helps us understand the development of Platonic philosophy at the end of antiquity.

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Excerpt: About midway the sixth century CE, a student in Alexandria is taking notes. He and his fellow students listen attentively to the Platonist philosopher Olympiodorus, who has just introduced them to the writings of Plato. The student writes:

> Now if it is necessary also for us, who plead Proclus' cause, to bring Damascius into agreement with him, he [Olympiodorus] says that knowing oneself in a civic way is the target [of the *First Alcibiades*] primarily.
> Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς τῷ Πρόκλῳ συνηγοροῦντας εἰς σύμβασιν ἄγειν αὐτῷ τὸν Δαμάσκιον, φησὶν ὅτι περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολιτικῶς γνῶναι ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ὁ σκοπὸς προηγουμένως. *in Alc.* 5.17–6.1; tr. Griffin, mod.

This sentence serves as a window onto Olympiodorus' oeuvre, since it features several key elements of his profile as a philosopher. It is part of a commentary that, like all his works that have come down to us, is ἀπὸ φωνῆς, as its title says, i.e. consists of notes taken from lectures he gave. This formal feature of Olympiodorus' work foregrounds the didactic side of his activity, which is also present in frequent references to classroom settings. In the sentence cited above, Olympiodorus appears as a teacher who reflects on the aims of his instruction.

The sentence also takes us to the heart of Olympiodorus' conception of doing philosophy. His expression of intent here is specifically to bring Damascius into agreement with Proclus; this is part of an overall strategy in his work. He bases his philosophy on what his predecessors have said. He comments on Plato, Aristotle and possibly other authorities, seeking close alignment with commentators of previous generations like Proclus and Damascius.

Olympiodorus bases his philosophy on his predecessors' work not only because they provide the material with which to teach and think, but also out of the very desire to bring these predecessors into agreement with each other. Olympiodorus is deeply convinced of the importance of agreement as a criterion for knowledge and as a prerequisite for a happy life. If he can show the underlying unity of his predecessors' views, that will constitute evidence that they are correct and that their views are worth adopting in one's own life. Hence he recommends to his students (δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς) that *their* way to approach philosophy too is via a reconciliation of authorities.

The student continues to note that Olympiodorus then offers a position of his own, manifesting another basic element of his philosophical activity. It is of paramount importance to express your own judgement. If this judgement can show the underlying agreement between authorities, so much the better. Your judgement must be based on arguments, as he insists in a passage in the *Gorgias* commentary, even if your authority is Plato himself.

The chapters in this volume seek to flesh out this picture of a philosophical teacher who brings his own judgement to bear on views and arguments from a centuries-old Platonic tradition. In keeping with the focus of the majority of papers at the original Utrecht conference, the volume is devoted to the philosophical profile of Olympiodorus and to his Platonic commentaries.

To varying degrees scholarship has moved away from the view that Olympiodorus espoused a simplified metaphysics compared to his Athenian colleagues, had an attitude of compromise towards the Christian community of Alexandria, and a strong focus on Aristotle rather than Plato—as, in this view, befits a member of the Ammonian school of Alexandrian philosophy.

Of particular value about this earlier approach to Olympiodorus is the focus on the strong continuities between his work and that of his teacher Ammonius, whom Olympiodorus cites approvingly, especially in the *Gorgias* commentary. It is also true that Olympiodorus' work gives us no evidence that his teaching included as complex a metaphysical picture of the world as that of Proclus—though it remains subject to debate whether this applies only to his teaching for a wider audience (from which it seems his commentaries derive) or also to Olympiodorus' convictions and perhaps inner-circle teaching.

In the other respects, however, Olympiodorus does not fit into the picture of the Ammonian school as earlier historiography has presented it. His openness to Christian terminology is arguably not evidence of compromise but of a deep conviction that surface meanings from different traditions stand in different ways for the same underlying truth. On key aspects, moreover, he does not deviate from Platonic views, even where they are repugnant to Christian convictions.

Olympiodorus' treatment of Aristotle, furthermore, clearly does not take precedence over his Platonic teaching. The opening lines of his *Prolegomena* to the *Categories* and of his *Commentary on the First Alcibiades* are programmatic. In the former work, he states:

> Because we wish to benefit from the fount of goodness there is an eagerness among us to cleave to Aristotle's philosophy, which endows life with the source of goodness. *Prol. log.* 1.3–5, tr. Gertz

Olympiodorus refers back to these lines when he starts the *Commentary on the First Alcibiades* by saying:

> Aristotle begins his own *Theology* with the statement that 'all human beings naturally reach out for knowledge; and a sign of this is their love of the senses'. But in beginning Plato's philosophy, I would go a step further and say that all human beings reach out for Plato's philosophy, because all people wish to draw benefit from it; they are eager to be possessed by its streams, and to render themselves full of Plato's inspirations. *in Alc.* 1.3–9, tr. Griffin, mod.

Aristotle's philosophy serves as the source (or starting point, ἀρχή) for making life good, but Plato's philosophy fills us with inspiration. The language of inspiration used here expresses Olympiodorus' conviction that we must turn to Plato for knowledge of higher truths. But he displays an uncritical attitude to Aristotle nor Plato, correcting each if need be.

Rather than focusing on reasons for rejecting an earlier paradigm, however, this volume presents a constructive picture of the Platonic aspects of Olympiodorus' teaching. Recent work on Olympiodorus has already done much towards this aim. The field owes a great deal to the work of Harold Tarrant, who not only collaborated with Robin Jackson and Kimon Lycos on a fully annotated translation of the *Gorgias* commentary over twenty years ago, but has continued to work on the form and arguments of Olympiodorus' commentaries. The Utrecht conference too benefited greatly from his participation. Scholars in this field also owe a large debt to Leendert Westerink (1913–1990), whose editorial and interpretive work on Olympiodorus remains indispensable.

In general terms, Olympiodorus has profited from increased scholarly interest in Late Antiquity and in Late Ancient Philosophy in recent years. We are fortunate to have three excellent recent overviews of his thought and work. (Rather than giving another summary in this introduction, therefore, I will highlight key elements directly pertinent to the chapters in this volume in the sections below.) A number of annotated translations of Olympiodorus' works have appeared in recent years. Interest in the persona of Socrates has stimulated study of his Platonic commentaries, the *Gorgias* and *Alcibiades* commentaries being respectively the only and only complete treatment of these Socratic works in the Neoplatonic curriculum to have come down to us.

The detailed scrutiny of Olympiodorus' work undertaken in this volume roughly revolves around four areas of interest: the profile of the philosopher that we find in Olympiodorus' work; his interest in perception and knowledge of oneself; his concern with the form of philosophical communication; and his position vis-à-vis his Christian surroundings.

Philosophical Profile

The figure of the philosopher appears in two guises in particular in this volume: in what his interests and materials are and in the ideal that he tries to embody. To start with the former, it is probable that Olympiodorus taught more than the core philosophical material conveyed in the Aristotelian and Platonic commentaries. For instance, his commentary on Paulus of Alexandria's Εἰσαγωγικά concerns astrological matters. It is likely that he also taught rhetoric. Scholars have also cautiously suggested that he provided training in medicine. Cristina Viano's contribution concerns his interest in chemistry. This is evident already from the *Meteorology* commentary. But Viano reopens the question of Olympiodorus' possible authorship of the alchemical commentary on a work by Zosimus, *On Action*. Viano agrees with the majority view that this commentary is not the work of Olympiodorus as it stands. The hypothesis she advances here, however, is that the first part of the work does substantially derive from Olympiodorus' pen, as comparisons with the *Meteorology* commentary show. In Viano's view, this layer of the text was updated (much) later by means of interpolations and of an additional second part consisting of citations from other philosophers and alchemical authors.

While Olympiodorus' range of interest was broad, the material he was able to work with was not always as extensive as was the case for, for instance, his contemporary Simplicius. Take

the *Alcibiades* commentary, where scholars even doubt whether Olympiodorus had access to Proclus' treatment; and it is fairly clear he did not have access to earlier thinkers. In the commentaries on the *Categories* and the *Gorgias* there is no trace of direct knowledge of authors before Ammonius. Anne Sheppard shows that a similar situation holds for some of the literary works of which we find frequent citations in Olympiodorus. Sheppard finds no evidence that he knew much about the comedies and tragedies he cites. She also argues that the way in which he cites them shows that Olympiodorus did not have much interest in them either (I will return to Sheppard's contribution below on p. 9, in considering Olympiodorus' interest in the formal aspects of philosophical communication).

Working from a material basis that was in many ways restricted, Olympiodorus tried to pursue and to convey an ideal of what it is to be a philosopher. An important instrument for communicating this to his audience is the sketch of Plato's life which we find at the beginning of the *Alcibiades* commentary. Anna Motta argues that this presents a unity of doctrine and biography. The philosopher's biography offers a model of philosophical excellence for students to aspire to (and so as a point on the horizon to guide them through their reading of his work). It specifically turns the students towards themselves, Motta argues, which shows that the presence of the *Life of Plato* at the beginning of the *Commentary on the Alcibiades* is not incidental, but expresses a unity of purpose. But even before serving as a model for the students to aspire towards, the *Life of Plato* presents the ideal in virtue of which the master himself, Olympiodorus, is able to teach Platonism to the next generation.

Key in the portrait of Plato is the range of virtues it incorporates. Olympiodorus adopts from his predecessors an account of the degrees of virtue that ranges from the qualities that we are born with through the conditions of the soul informed by reason to the suprarational virtues in which the human soul is united with the divine. We thus get the series natural—ethical—civic—purificatory—theoretical—paradigmatic—and perhaps hieratic, which features in a number of the chapters in this volume. Michael Griffin highlights the psychological development of the student as he ascends along this series to become a more and more perfect philosopher, or, as Motta points out, more and more like Plato. In the first stages, this is a process of increasing psychological organisation, which paves the way for a liberation that leads to identification with the divine. Griffin emphasizes the inclusive nature of the higher stages of this scale. The philosopher operating at the theoretical level can still engage in civic matters. He also notes that the highest stages still contain specificity. In accordance with the *Phaedrus* (252d–253c) Olympiodorus envisages the philosophical ideal as assuming the character of the particular god to which we severally belong.

Self-Cognition

Crucial to the progress from natural virtue towards philosophical virtue is the turn towards ourselves. It is a main ethical concern for all Neoplatonists to turn us away from concentrating on the sensory dimension of reality, which is merely the product of soul, and to encourage us to identify with the highest aspects in ourselves, this being the route through which we can rejoin our origin. This explains the pivotal role of the *First Alcibiades*, which as the first dialogue of Olympiodorus' Platonic curriculum is the text in which students are encouraged to come to know themselves. It is not only in the commentary on this dialogue, however, that we find Olympiodorus to have a sustained interest and an approach of his own to self-cognition. In his comments in the *Phaedo* commentary, Olympiodorus seems to restrict self-cognition to the rational soul: only it is able to revert to itself. Péter Lautner argues that this makes any kind of awareness of our perceptions that includes ourselves as subjects of that perception the province of the rational soul. Lautner also argues that Olympiodorus advances a rich view of perception in another respect. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he attributes perception of universals to animals.

Olympiodorus also seems to restrict the range of self-knowledge at the other end of the philosopher's development. As Danielle Layne points out, he speaks positively of a kind of ignorance of one's ignorance which besets the soul at the theoretical stage. This double ignorance, which involves the soul's unawareness of its embodiment, is superior to knowledge. Olympiodorus' remarkable conception of ignorance of oneself, Layne argues, involves a kind of reversal between those at the lowest and those at the highest end of the ladder of philosophical development. Alcibiades identifies with his body and reputation. He needs Socrates' method of purification to realize that his desires aim at real power rather than the images of power which he now focuses on. In this process of realizing what he really wants, Alcibiades comes to know his soul. The philosopher described in the *Theaetetus*, on the other hand, knows himself as soul but does not even realize his ignorance of his body and of life in the body.

Alcibiades, it seems, never actually achieves self-knowledge, even if Socrates puts him in the way of it. The aim of Olympiodorus in teaching the *First Alcibiades*, however, is very much for his students to reach civic self-knowledge. Olympiodorus' nuanced presentation of the aim (σκοπός) of the dialogue as civic, rather than theoretical self-knowledge or self-knowledge *simpliciter* raises the question of what distinguishes civic from other types of self-knowledge. My own chapter addresses this question. For Olympiodorus, civic self-knowledge involves embodiment, *metriopatheia*, and ourselves as individuals with particular interests. But even if civic life is responsible for our individuation, civic self-knowledge is not enough to know ourselves *as* individuals. This ambivalence about civic (self-)knowledge surfaces elsewhere: Olympiodorus affirms and denies that the civic knower is a philosopher. This shows, I argue, that Olympiodorus uses 'civic self-knowledge' as a transitional notion, not one that captures one precise stage of knowledge. Cognition and ignorance of oneself, then, are not necessarily fixed notions in Olympiodorus, but can be used at different places in his conceptual scheme.

Form of Philosophical Communication

Like other Neoplatonists before him, Olympiodorus is aware of the importance of formal aspects of philosophical writing and teaching. He works with the interpretive assumption, standard since Iamblichus, that every aspect of a text should contribute to the one target (σκοπός) of that text. That makes him particularly sensitive to literary and dramatic features of Plato's dialogues, which Olympiodorus attempts to explain no less than argumentative elements in one comprehensive view of the respective dialogue. He also has a keen eye for the various ways in which Plato has Socrates adapt his words to the character of his interlocutor. For Olympiodorus, this is part and parcel of the life of the philosopher in the city. For the philosopher who operates at the civic level not only has knowledge of himself as an individual embodied being, but also engages with his fellows, leading them to the good life. As Bettina Bohle shows in her analysis of the *Gorgias* commentary and Hermias' *Commentary on the Phaedrus*, this involves rhetoric. According to both Olympiodorus and Hermias, Plato recognizes a true rhetoric that aims at the good, is able to explain itself, and pitches its message depending on the kind of soul with which it communicates. These high demands mean that true rhetoric is inseparable from philosophy. And in fact, Bohle argues, we would do best to view the rhetorician as the philosopher in his role of persuading, or rather teaching, others. Olympiodorus and Hermias' favoured rhetoric turns out to be the dialogue that Socrates is engaged in with his fellow citizens.

François Renaud zooms in on a specific instrument of communication in the dialogues: myth. Even though, as often, it is hard to gauge Olympiodorus' originality due to the loss of earlier *Gorgias* commentaries, we do find in his commentary a nuanced hermeneutic of myth. Olympiodorus distinguishes between philosophical myths and poetic myths. For both types of myth the important thing is to uncover their deeper meaning. The advantage of philosophical myth,

however, is that their surface meaning does not harm those incapable of digging deeper. The temporal aspect of the final myth of the *Gorgias*, for instance, must be taken as part of the surface meaning. When the myth speaks of punishment after death, its deeper meaning concerns the here and now and involves, Renaud argues, the practice of Socratic dialectic. Myth thus has a double function: it stimulates the thought of those capable of unearthing deeper meanings and it appeals to all souls because it is an image of the truth. (I return to Renaud's chapter below, p. 10.)

Anne Sheppard's chapter, which we looked at before, also explores Olympiodorus' reflections on the dramatic form of Plato's works and the ethical function of literature, in relation to the views of his predecessors. In both cases, she argues, Olympiodorus' work helps us understand Neoplatonic views but does not constitute evidence that Olympiodorus' interest in the literary side of philosophy was exceptional.

His interests in the literary aspects of philosophy and the modes of its communication may have led Olympiodorus to find a new use for the idea that Plato employed different registers of writing, as Harold Tarrant suggests. Earlier commentators related the style of discourses in Plato's works to their subject matter (following *Tim*. 29b4–5), weightier styles being used to treat weightier matters, or alternatively simple styles to speak of higher, and more simple, beings. Olympiodorus, Tarrant argues, seems to repurpose the characterization of discourses as 'inspired': it is no longer the subject matter but the divine person who speaks through the mouth of Platonic characters that determines whether a discourse is inspired.

Attitude towards Christians

The attitude which Olympiodorus takes towards his Christian contemporaries may provide an important background to these observations of philosophical style and its interpretation. Olympiodorus may have been the last pagan head of the school of Alexandria, which lends particular interest to the question of his attitude.[21] Moreover, his work features a number of striking passages that present Greek notions in terms that are acceptable to a Christian audience.[22] In view of that background it is remarkable, Tarrant notes, that the figures whose discourses Olympiodorus mentions as inspired at the beginning of the *Alcibiades*commentary do not seem to be very senior (with the exception of the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, harmless in a Christian context). Tarrant suggests that this may point to Olympiodorus' efforts to neutralize any threat a Christian audience may have felt at inspired pagan discourse in Plato's works. As talk of wine and aulos music as having inspirational effects may also indicate, Olympiodorus no longer seems to treat inspiration as very significant. And this, according to Tarrant, is not only a matter of communication but a matter of (a lack of) conviction.

A stronger emphasis on the communicative aspect of Olympiodorus' attitude emerges from François Renaud's analysis of how Olympiodorus characterizes Plato's mode of writing. The prominence of myths in Plato's writing are part of an overall esoteric strategy, which hides the truth from those who cannot understand it and stimulates those who can to search for it. Olympiodorus' own teaching too, Renaud suggests, can profitably be viewed as to some degree esoteric: it combines caution with an exhortation to come closer to the knowledge in ourselves.

There are, however, a number of issues on which Olympiodorus' open adherence to orthodox Platonism has long been recognized. Simon Fortier analyses what is perhaps the most remarkable of these: the doctrine of transmigration. Fortier substantiates the idea that this doctrine was eminently unacceptable to Christians. Olympiodorus' overt exposition of this doctrine is therefore clear evidence of his unwillingness to compromise on his Platonic views and may even have become a trademark of his Platonism for himself and his environment as well.

Some of the chapters assembled here argue that Olympiodorus developed novel ideas and approaches. In others the emphasis is rather on the continuity between his ideas and those of his predecessors. To some extent, this difference is of secondary importance. Olympiodorus is a representative of Neoplatonism precisely because he combines use of and deference to authorities with a strong conviction that arguments must carry the day and with enough independence of thought to offer solutions of his own, to forge new concepts and to put old ones to new purposes.

In these pages Olympiodorus emerges as a thinker interested in the formal aspects of philosophical communication and in issues of self-cognition, a thinker moreover who directs his efforts to finding the best stance between his old and broad tradition and new circumstances. This picture reflects interests in scholarship today. Present-day interests in turn help us see better what concerned Olympiodorus. <>

Essay: *Olympiodorus and Greco-Alexandrian Alchemy* by Cristina Viano from Olympiodorus of Alexandria

The Alchemical Commentators or the Age of Systematisation

The Byzantine period in Egypt starts with the death of Theodosius I in 395 and ends under the reign of Heraclius with the Arab conquest in 640. Byzantine Egypt enjoys a period of peace from the fifth through the seventh century, in the course of which Alexandria finds itself at the centre of intense intellectual and spiritual activity. Philosophical and scientific debates continue, fierce doctrinal disputes emerge around Christian dogmas, in engagement also with gnostic and hermetic doctrines.

In this intellectual cauldron, Greek-language alchemy is at a crucial moment in its development: this period sees an elaboration and definition of its doctrines and operations, as well as the conceptual tools to think about them, to provide the foundations for all successive periods.

For typical of this period is a generation of 'commentators' like an 'Olympiodorus' (6th century) and a 'Stephanus' (7th century). Their writings, intended to clarify the thought of the great figures of previous generations and in particular of pseudo-Democritus and Zosimus, represent the most advanced stage of theorization of ancient alchemy.

The period witnesses a real process of definition and systematization of alchemical doctrine, which takes place by means of the intellectual instruments of philosophy available to these writers. This process, begun by previous authors, now finds its full realization. Thus, the empirical literature of recipes, characteristic of the first phase of alchemy, is integrated through systematic reflection on the causes of operations. And so we find a transition from *historia* to *theôria*. Indeed, these authors lay the groundwork for reflecting on the possibility and nature of alchemy as an autonomous branch of knowledge, insofar as they aim to develop the connections between theory and practice, nature and *technê*, between, on the one hand, the doctrine of transmutation and philosophical theories of matter, and technical methods on the other.

It is also towards the 7th century that the corpus of alchemical writings starts being organized into its very specific form of an anthology, composed basically of extracts. The anthology is thought to have been compiled at Byzantium, in the age of the emperor Heraclius (610–641), by a certain Theodorus, who may also have been the author of its verse introduction. This anthology is found in a large number of manuscripts. The most important of these are the *Marcianus Graecus* 299 (M) (10th–11th century), the oldest and most beautiful, brought from Byzantium by Cardinal Bessarion in the 15th century and currently held in the St Mark's library at Venice; the *Parisinus Graecus* 2325 (B) (13th century); and the *Parisinus Graecus* 2327 (A), copied in 1478.

Historians of alchemy have at a very early stage posed the question of the identity of the 'commentators' Olympiodorus and Stephanus with their Neoplatonic commentator namesakes. Pseudepigraphy is indeed a frequent phenomenon in alchemical literature. Among the alchemical authors in the corpus we find mention of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus and Theophrastus. But from a chronological point of view Olympiodorus and Stephanus constitute limiting cases between these obviously wrong attributions and authentic attributions to well-known figures, such as Psellos (11th century).

In the corpus of the alchemists these two authors are defined, among others, as 'the all-praiseworthy and world-wide masters, the new exegetes of Plato and Aristotle' (CAAG 26.3: οἱ πανεύφημοι καὶ οἰκουμενικοὶ διδάσκαλοι καὶ νέοι ἐξηγηταὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους). This is one of the main reasons in favour of the attribution of the works of this Olympiodorus and of this Stephanus to their Neoplatonic namesakes, or at least of the original versions of these works. Nevertheless, while recent studies on Stephanus incline more and more toward the hypothesis of identity, in Olympiodorus' case the hypothesis of pseudepigraphy remains the most common among scholars.

Owing to the particularly composite and discontinuous form of Olympiodorus' work, the question of attribution is indeed more complex and delicate than in the case of Stephanus, who by contrast presents a more homogeneous collection of treatises. As we will see, it constitutes an exemplary product of alchemical literature, a literature that in large part is composed using parts that derive from the dismemberment of lost texts.

I would like to advance a new hypothesis about the authorship of the commentary attributed to Olympiodorus and about the fundamental role of Olympiodorus in the process of its composition. In so doing my aim will be to bring to light a new facet of the complex philosophical personality of Olympiodorus.

Olympiodorus and the Commentary on the Book **On Action**

'Olympiodorus' is one of the most interesting authors of the alchemical corpus. The issue of the attribution of the commentary on Zosimus' book *On Action* to his namesake the Neoplatonic commentator touches on two vital questions for understanding Greco-Alexandrian alchemy: the constitution of the treatises in the corpus and the relevance of contemporary philosophy for alchemy.

We know that Olympiodorus the Neoplatonist is a rich source of information about the cultural conditions and the educational methods of 6th-century Alexandria. His commentaries exhibit a very typical form: they are structured by a certain number of lessons (*praxeis*), each containing the general explanation (*theôria*) and the particular explanation (*kata meros* or *kata lexin exêgêsis*) of a section of text from Aristotle or Plato (generally referred to as *lexis*). In keeping with the tradition of the Alexandrian school, Olympiodorus is interested in Aristotle's logic and philosophy of nature. His commentary on the *Meteorology* in particular is a work of the greatest interest for the history of science. In completing and fixing the Aristotelian classifications of meteorological and chemical phenomena, Olympiodorus undertakes a formidable work of systematization of concepts that Aristotle had hardly delineated, such as that of the 'chemical analysis' (*diagnôsis*) of homogeneous bodies of book IV (*in Mete.* 274.25–29). He partakes of debates among commentators about difficult and problematic issues in the *Meteorology*, for instance about the theory of vision, about the manner in which the rays of the sun heat up the air, or about the origin of the sea's salinity. Finally, he provides much information about the state of science and technology of his time, such as mathematics, optics, astronomy, medicine, agriculture and metallurgy. As to the commentary on book IV of the *Meteorology*, the first 'chemical' treatise of antiquity, Olympiodorus' systematic contribution is fundamental: it helps in great measure to constitute a new field of research into the

properties, conditions and transformations of sublunary matter. His commentary is the most frequently used not only by Arab and Renaissance authors, but also by Greek and mediaeval alchemists.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that one of the most 'philosophical' works of the Greek alchemical corpus has come down to us under the name of Olympiodorus. It presents itself as the commentary on a (lost) treatise of Zosimus and on sayings of other ancient alchemists (CAAG 69.12–104.7) In the principal manuscript of the corpus, *Marcianus Graecus* 299 (M) and in its copy (*Parisinus Graecus* 2249 = K), this treatise bears the title: 'Olympiodorus, philosopher of Alexandria, on the *On Action* of Zosimus ⟨and⟩ all that has been said by Hermes and the philosophers' (ΟΛΥΜΠΙΟΔΩΡΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΩΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΚΑΤ' ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ ΖΩΣΙΜΟΥ ⟨ΚΑΙ⟩ ΟΣΑ ΑΠΟ ΕΡΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ ΗΣΑΝ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΑ).

Content and Structure of the Commentary

The author explicitly presents his commentary as both exegetical and doxographical. One of its most characteristic features is its appropriation of Greek philosophy, and particularly of Presocratic philosophy, as the epistemological foundation of the transmutation of metals. Towards the middle of the commentary (CAAG 79.11–85.5; §18–27), Olympiodorus reports the views of nine Presocratic philosophers (Melissus, Parmenides, Thales, Diogenes, Heraclitus, Hippasus, Xenophanes, Anaximenes and Anaximander) on the single principle of all things. He subsequently outlines a comparison between these tenets and those of the principal masters of the art of alchemy (Zosimus, Chymes, Agathodemon and Hermes) on the efficient principle of transmutation, which he refers to as 'divine water' (*theion hudôr*).

Like most texts in the corpus of Greek alchemists, Olympiodorus' commentary has a composite and seemingly unstructured character. The title of M seems composed of two parts but without any sign of punctuation or connecting particle which would allow us to understand their relation. It has no introduction nor conclusion, it starts and ends *ex abrupto*.

We can divide the text into two sections. Only the first (CAAG 69.12–77.14; §1–14) exhibits a coherent structure: the author starts by commenting on a phrase of Zosimus on the operation of extracting gold particles from ore, by means of 'maceration' (*taricheia*) and 'washing' (*plusis*) (§1–7). He does so according to Olympiodorus' typical scheme: first the *lexis*, the phrase from Zosimus that is commented on, then a general explanation (*theôria*), and subsequently the detailed exegesis of terminology (*exêgêsis kata lexin*). The general explanation also introduces the theme of the obscurity (*asapheia*) of the 'ancients', widened to include Plato and Aristotle, which served the double purpose of hiding doctrine from the uninitiated and of exhorting students to investigate for themselves. The text then introduces the 'welding' (*chrysokollê*) of gold (§8–11), which involves the assembly of the acquired gold particles into a homogeneous body. These two specific operations of separation and reunification are interpreted in the text as allegories of the transmutation of metals. Next come the three types of dyeing of ancient alchemists (§11–14): the type which evaporates, that which evaporates slowly, and that which does not evaporate. The third bestows an indelible character onto the metals. In operative terms this means fixing the colouring of a metal in such a way as to give it a persistent character.

The second section—the longest part of the text (77.15–104.7; §15–55)—is composed of an unstructured series of *excerpta* and of digressions accompanied by remarks on the main alchemical operations.

§16 concerns fire, since according to Zosimus, moderate fire has a fundamental role to play in the practice of the art of transmutation, since it is its prime agent. Reflection on fire leads the author to consider the function of the four elements and the views of the Presocratics on the principles. §18

begins the doxographical exposition of Presocratic doctrines concerning the single principle, which extends from §19 through §25. The author subsequently (§25–27) compares the principles just identified to the principles of the ancient alchemists. The second half of the treatise (§28–55) revisits arguments from the first section (§1–14), followed by a description of the stages of transmutation and the theorization of first metallic matter. §28 considers the status of the elements in the ancient alchemists: they constitute dry, hot, cold and wet bodies. §32 takes up the distinction between stable bodies and instable bodies that was outlined in §15. Olympiodorus now distinguishes between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances, i.e. between meltable metallic substances and ores that cannot be treated by fire. Linked to the discussion of ores is a passage of the *Final account* of Zosimus which concerns the role of alchemy among the kings of Egypt (§35). From §36 onwards, focusing on first metallic matter, Olympiodorus relates the dialogue between Synesius and Dioscorus on mercury.[11] After considering the separative function of white and the 'comprehensive' function of black in colouring (§38), Olympiodorus follows Zosimus in identifying first metallic matter with black lead. §43, presents 'divine water' as responsible for transmutation. In §44, Zosimus defines lead by means of the symbol of the philosophical egg composed of the four elements. The subsequent sections discuss the 'powers' of lead and the stages of transmutation, each linked to particular colours (black, white, yellow and red). In §54 we find a consideration of the art of transmutation, which is said to be *eidikê* ('specific') and not *koinê* ('common'). The conclusion (§55) sums up a number of essential notions in the work: substances responsible for transformations, like *chalkomolybdos* and etesian stone, the melting and production of gold, the causal activity of fire in the various stages.

Beyond this appearance of disorder, however, we can detect a rational and coherent design in the way the treatise unfolds, which reveals itself in two factors. The first is the logical sequence that ties together the alchemical operations, the principles and fundamental substances. This sequence exhibits a development through the presentation of the constituent elements of alchemy, from the fundamental operations (grinding, melting, dyeing) to its active and material principles, ending with epistemological considerations on this discipline as a *technê*.

The second factor that renders the work coherent are phrases that one might call 'connective and associative'. Here the author speaks in the first person and marks the transitions between different sections as well as the aim, method and internal organization of his text. His work thus turns out to be an *epitomê*, a summary with protreptic intent, providing a selection of testimonies, with commentary, taken from the writings of the ancient alchemists, but also of philosophers properly speaking, on the basic elements of the art (operations, ingredients, and also its history). It seems to be addressed to a young man of high rank with the aim of providing him with 'an overview of the preliminary general knowledge of the art' (*tês enkukliou technês hê sunopsis*) (§38).

I think that the text we possess is based on a work by Olympiodorus, now lost, composed in a more structured way. The text we possess would be composed of at least two layers: Olympiodorus' commentary on Zosimus' *On Action* and the arrangement of a compiler. The latter copied Olympiodorus up to a point and then added a sequence of remarks on the main alchemical operations, accompanied by *excerpta* from Zosimus and other alchemical authors, organizing the whole work by the double criterion just mentioned.

In other words, I think that the opening sections (§1–7) as well as a sizeable part of the doxography on the Presocratics (§18–27) derives directly from Olympiodorus' commentary on *On Action*. It is also very probable that the compilation has been superimposed on the run of the commentary. That is to say, the compiler has inserted other *excerpta* and digressions but could return to Olympiodorus' commentary on *On Action* and copy and/or paraphrase other parts from it, such as the doxographical part which, in my view and at least as far as the Presocratics are concerned, is the

work of Olympiodorus. It is also quite plausible that Zosimus' *On Action* itself was already a doxographical work as far as the opinions of the alchemists are concerned, and that Olympiodorus' commentary added a doxography on the Presocratics, which is structured according to the characteristic scheme of Neoplatonic commentaries.

Convergences

The parts which we can see as deriving directly from Olympiodorus' commentary are, in fact, characterized by formal, terminological and conceptual similarities with the commentary on the *Meteorology* and other works by the Neoplatonic Olympiodorus.

The most striking formal similarities are: the typical commentary structure divided into *lexis, theôria, exêgêsis kata lexin* which one finds at the start of the treatise, and the typically Neoplatonic arrangement of the Presocratic doxography. At the very beginning, furthermore, one encounters the theme of Aristotle's obscurity (*asapheia*) illustrated by the distinction between that which is in a subject (substrate, *en hupokeimenôi*) and that which is not (*ouk en hupokeimenôi*). These terms are used to refer to substances and accidents at the beginning of the *Categories* (1a20–1b9); commentators considered them an instance of Aristotle's obscurity. The issue of obscurity was one of the ten questions that constituted the introduction to the exegesis of Plato and Aristotle and which all Neoplatonic commentaries to the *Categories* featured in their opening pages.

The terminological and doctrinal convergences with the commentary on the *Meteorology* are frequent. I will mention a number of examples. Olympiodorus the alchemist uses the adjective *drastikos* to refer to the fire of Heraclitus (82.18), the same way Olympiodorus the commentator calls active causes *poiotêtai drastikai*(275.33) and speaks of the *drastikê dunamis* of fire (18.14).

Olympiodorus the alchemist defines white and black as extreme colours: white as 'that which dilates' (*diakritikon*) and black as 'that which contracts' (*sunektikon*, 92.5–6); similarly we read in Olympiodorus *in Mete*. 314.25–26 (this is in the course of a discussion of the effect of active qualities on the senses): 'For these things act on our senses: white dilates (*diakrinon*) while black contracts (*sunkrinon*) the organs of sight, and the others similarly act on each sense'.

In our alchemical text, smoke (*kapnos*) and humid vapour (*atmos*) are presented as *metaxu* items between the elements. Now, it is an interpretation of Olympiodorus' to assign to exhalations an intermediate status between the elements. He defines exhalations as 'contiguous' (*prosechê*, 16.15; 40.13) elements, 'intermediate' (*metaxu*), 'half-kinds' (*hêmigenê stoicheia*, 16.17–19), 'analogous' (*analogounta*) to earth and water (314.18). He identifies them with transitory states, manifestations of elements themselves by means of which transformations between elements occur. Humid exhalations, for instance, are an intermediate (*metaxu*) state between water and air, and dry exhalations are intermediate between fire and earth (16.15–22). This interpretation allows Olympiodorus to erase, at least in part, the gap between the meteorological phenomena that result from exhalations in books 1–3 and the return, in book 4 of Aristotle's *Meteorology*, to the elements in their role in transformations of bodies.

In fact we can use a passage from Olympiodorus, *in Mete*. 16.19: 'For vapourous exhalation is intermediate between water and air and smoky exhalation is intermediate between fire and earth' (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀτμιδώδης μεταξὺ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος, ἡ δὲ καπνώδης πυρὸς καὶ γῆς), to correct a passage in the alchemical commentary, rendering it more comprehensible: 'Anaximander said that the principle is the intermediary, referring to the intermediary constituted by vapours or smoke. Vapour is indeed intermediate between ⟨air and water, while smoke is intermediate between⟩ fire and earth. And to put the point in general terms, every intermediary between hot and humid things is vapour. As to the intermediary between hot and dry things, this is smoke.' (Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ τὸ

μεταξὺ ἔλεγεν ἀρχὴν εἶναι · μεταξὺ δὲ λέγω τὸν ἀτμὸν ἢ τὸν καπνόν · ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀτμὸς μεταξύ ἐστιν ⟨ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος, ὁ δὲ καπνός ⟩ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς, καὶ καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ θερμῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν ἀτμός ἐστι · τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ θερμῶν καὶ ξηρῶν, καπνός, 83.11–14)

Moreover, in the alchemical treatise, double exhalation and so the *metaxu* too, is associated with the dry and humid 'sublimate': 'Smoke is intermediary between the hot and the dry. And here it is the sublimate and all that results from it. Vapour, on the other hand, is intermediary between hot and wet things. It stands for wet sublimates such as come out of alambics and what is similar to them' (ὁ γὰρ καπνὸς μεταξύ ἐστιν θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ · κἀκεῖ μὲν ἡ αἰθάλη, καὶ τὰ δι' αἰθάλης πάντα · ὁ δὲ ἀτμὸς μεταξύ ἐστιν θερμῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν. Καὶ σημαίνει αἰθάλας ὑγρὰς, οἷον τὰ δι' ἀμβίκων καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια, 85.2–5). Now, the term *aithalê*, which is rare and does not occur in Aristotle, occurs in Olympiodorus' commentary on the *Meteorology* and refers to smoky exhalation (*aithalôdês anathumiasis*) which contains an earthy residue (literally 'soot'). When this has gone up and mixed itself with the humid exhalation, it condenses and precipitates into the sea, producing salinity (160.7; 152.37; 157.15).

As Brisson (1992) has noted, this term *aithalê* also occurs in Olympiodorus in a context that is not specifically meteorological. In the *Commentary on the Phaedo*, the generation of human beings is described as resulting from 'sublimate of vapours' (*ek tôn tês aithalês tôn atmôn*), which are released from the Titans' bodies after they have been struck by Zeus' lightning bolt. Brisson sees this account as using an intentional alchemical metaphor, which would confirm that the author of the alchemical commentary on Zosimus is indeed the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus. In my view, this is not an alchemical metaphor, but rather a term borrowed from the chemico-meteorological vocabulary used to single out a very specific substance that is the result of a process of combustion.

In the alchemical treatise (103.22–23) we find the same list of metals that Olympiodorus establishes in the commentary on the *Meteorology*: gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and tin (cf. for instance 321.1). Furthermore, Olympiodorus also presents a different classification, attributed to Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*, which establishes the following correspondences between metals and planets:

Saturn: lead (heavy, somber, cold)
Jupiter: *êlektron* / *migma* (temperate)
Mars: iron (cutting, sharp)
Sun: gold (light)
Venus: copper (splendour)
Mercury: tin (translucid and bright)
Moon: silver (receives its light from gold)

This list as reported by Olympiodorus (which incidentally is more complete than what we find in Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*) establishes precisely the same correspondences between metals and planets as the (anonymous) list which occurs at the beginning of *Marcianus* 299 (f. 6), the most ancient and important alchemical manuscript:

Sun, gold
Moon, silver
Saturn, bright (*phainon*), lead
Jupiter, radiant (*phaeton*), *electrum*
Mars, enflamed (*puroeis*), iron
Venus, luminous (*phôsphoros*), copper
Mercury, glittery (*stilbôn*), tin

The correspondence between metals and planets is a more ancient doctrine than the commentaries of Proclus and Olympiodorus, probably dating back to the Chaldaeans. But in my view, this exact

correspondence constitutes important evidence of the influence exercised by Neoplatonic thought on Greco-Alexandrian alchemical knowledge, or at least of the fact that they occupied common cultural ground.

Now, if my hypothesis about the composition of the commentary on *On Action* is true, we can explain how, subsequently, this text was attributed to Olympiodorus of Alexandria in its entirety, by a kind of 'attraction' of the initial section. We can exclude the possibility that the compiler of the patchwork intended to claim the name of Olympiodorus for himself. If my reconstruction is correct, the title reflects precisely what the work is: the commentary of Olympiodorus on Zosimus *and* a collection of *excerpta*. As to the compiler, we should probably consider the same Theodorus who is said to have assembled the whole collection of alchemical texts at the time of the emperor Heraclius and to have composed the introduction in verse which we find at the beginning of the manuscript *Marcianus Graecus*299 (f. 5v).

Thus the whole debate on the work's authenticity must be seen from a new perspective. The circumstances of this text are not those of a pseudepigraphic text in the ordinary sense but those of a typical product of that *sui generis* scientific literature that is Greco-Alexandrian alchemy.

Olympiodorus the Commentator and Alchemy

We are left with the question, however, of why the Neoplatonic philosopher Olympiodorus, commentator of Plato and Aristotle, would have been interested in alchemy. The question is tricky. Even though we can easily detect the influence of contemporary philosophy in the Greek alchemists, evidence of alchemy is very rare in the writings of philosophers of the period and particularly in Neoplatonic commentators. Likewise, even though the alchemical commentary of Olympiodorus shows many convergences with the *Meteorology* commentary and with other texts of the Neoplatonic Olympiodorus, we would be hard pressed to find explicit references to the art of transmutation in the commentary on the *Meteorology*.

We can escape this impasse by considering that it is very likely that what we nowadays label 'alchemy' would not have been seen the same way in the age of Olympiodorus and Stephanus. When we speak of alchemy, we immediately think of transmutation, of a well-defined branch of knowledge characterized by a particular goal, e.g. the transformation of lead into gold etc. However, while this may be true for the alchemy of the Middle Ages, both in the West and in the Arab world, the boundaries of this knowledge appear to have been much vaguer in the Greco-Roman world.

First of all, the proper name of this knowledge: *al-kîmiyâ* is an Arab term, made up from the article *al* and a Greek term of uncertain etymology: *chêmeia, chumeia*. It is also a late term, used by the Byzantines. The Byzantine lexicon of Suda (10th century) defines *chêmeia* as the craft of producing silver and gold (X.280). The alchemical authors speak rather of 'divine craft', of 'excellent science', of 'philosophy'. Its domain of application is not only the production of gold, of noble metals, or the method of self-transformation, but the first recipes also concern the dyeing of stones and fabrics, and the production of dye pigments. Hence we find in them a whole range of organic and inorganic substances and processes revolving around matter and its transformations. The revolutionary notion—revolutionary in the Greek world—of transmutation is absent in the first 'technical' treatises. It occurs in more philosophical 'authors' like Zosimus (4th century) and subsequently in the 'commentators'. And even in those authors who do mention transmutation, we also find concrete substances and procedures which we can clearly identify and which are in no way mysterious or metaphysical. This holds for the descriptions of distillation devices in Zosimus, including the *ambix* (from which the well-known alembic is derived via the Arabic intermediary *al-anbîq*); for the recipe for the production of 'black bronze' which we find in the Syriac fragments of Zosimus; and for the operation of 'maceration' (*taricheia*), the paradigmatic operation of gold ore,

which involves multiple stages, and which we find mentioned in the first lines of Olympiodorus' commentary on *On Action*.

Here, as we have seen, Olympiodorus comments on Zosimus' *lemma* concerning the operation of extracting gold flakes from ores by means of the process of 'maceration' (*taricheia*) and of 'washing' (*plusis*) (§1–7). This is followed by a description of the process of 'welding' (*chrysokollê*) gold (§8–11), which involves the assembly of the acquired gold particles into a homogeneous body. The text interprets these two specific operations of separation and reunification as allegories of the transmutation of metals. In fact, however, and despite a number of obscurities, Olympiodorus' exegesis appears in essence to be technical, with reference to real procedures concerning the stages, times, instruments and phases of the levigation of gold ore.

Now, among the non-alchemical evidence, these technical stages of the extraction of ores and their treatment down to their transformation into gold are described in detail by Agatharchides the geographer, praeceptor of Ptolemy III (2nd C BCE), of whom we have a very vivid account of mining activities in the Eastern desert (cf. Diodorus Siculus 3.12.1–14.5; Strabo XVI.4.5–20 and Photius, *Bibl.* chapter 250). In fact, this evidence is not at all exterior to the alchemical corpus, since we find a summary of it in *Marcianus* 299 (f. 138–141).

Agatharchides' precise descriptions of the four fundamental technical operations of the transformation of ores—crushing, grinding, washing (or levigation) and refining—allow us to confirm that the passage from Olympiodorus refers to actual procedures. These had been established for a long time, and would have constituted the technical basis for theoretical reflection on the part of alchemists, both with respect to the theorization of methodological principles and to allegories of transmutation.

However, we also possess very recent and very concrete evidence of the procedure of extracting and washing gold ore. This is of great importance for us in reconstructing the operations of Greek alchemists. I refer to the findings of a 2013 excavation campaign of the French mission of the Eastern desert in Egypt, which concentrated on auriferous mining sites at Samut dating back to the Ptolemaic era (from the end of the 4th through the middle of the 3rd century BCE).

Clear surface traces reveal installations that testify to the different phases of the process: first the mechanical phase of selection, the crushing of auriferous blocks of quartz, and the transformation into ore powder using millstones, then the washing phase in washing facilities, in order to separate the metallic particles to be melted, and finally the metallurgical phase of on-site refining, evidenced by the presence of an oven.

The evidence from Agatharchides has been essential in interpreting the traces of these installations. The four fundamental technical operations of ore transformation at the end of the mining process, as Agatharchides describes them (crushing, grinding, washing and refining), could indeed be localized on this site.

This helps us to understand that Olympiodorus, commentator on the *Meteorology*, could very well have been interested in the texts which we classify in the category of Greek alchemy, in order to update the Aristotelian material, particularly that concerning artisanal skills found in book 4. Olympiodorus mentions, for instance, glass craftsmen (*in Mete.* 331.1) while Aristotle nowhere mentions artisanal glass. Olympiodorus describes techniques of purification and refining of metal that effect a separation of the metal from its impurities, which are basically earthy in kind, or a separation of one metal from another, as in the case of silver and gold. In particular, he explains the metaphorical 'boiling' of gold of *Mete.* 4.3, 380b29, in terms of a technique that has been identified as 'cupellation' (by which metals are separated by oxidation, during which impurities are absorbed in

part by the cupel into which the mixture has been poured) (292.6). It is worth noting that for Olympiodorus each metal forms a different kind. He cites the separation of silver and gold by heat as an example of the principle that heat unites things of the same kind (*homoioeidê*) but separates things of different kinds (*anomoioeidê*) (274.39–275.1).

It is therefore not outlandish to suppose that Olympiodorus, commentator on Aristotle, would have wanted to go further and comment on a work by one of the most eminent authors of this budding science, i.e. the lost *On Action* by Zosimus of Panopolis, which probably was already a doxographical and protreptic work on the foundations of alchemy itself.

For this reason I think that Olympiodorus is an emblematic example of Alexandrian alchemy and constitutes a fundamental stage in the epistemological identification of this knowledge-in-flux and in the transition from the chemistry of the *Meteorology* to alchemy. This transition would subsequently be theorized and rendered official in the Middle Ages by authors like Albertus Magnus, Avicenna and Averroes. <>

Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato by Ilsetraut Hadot [Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, Brill, 9789004280076]

Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato by I. Hadot deals with the Neoplatonist tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. It shows that this harmonizing tendency, born in Middle Platonism, prevailed in Neoplatonism from Porphyry and Iamblichus, where it persisted until the end of this philosophy. Hadot aims to illustrate that it is not the different schools themselves, for instance those of Athens and Alexandria, that differ from one another by the intensity of the will to harmonization, but groups of philosophers within these schools.

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Excerpt: The research I am presenting on the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato in Neoplatonism follows chronologically upon the excellent book by G.K. Karamanolis, entitled Plato and Aristotle in agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. For my part, I would like to show that this harmonizing tendency, born in Middle Platonism, as G. Karamanolis and also M. Zambon have proved, prevailed in Neoplatonism from Porphyry and Iamblichus, and that it persisted in this philosophy until its end without any known exception, but with some nuances, which are due both to the proper personality of each of the Neoplatonists and

to the stage of development of their doctrines. I therefore protest against an opinion that is still widespread, based ultimately on a paper by K. Verrycken, according to which it was the late Neoplatonist Ammonius of Alexandria who introduced "an instrinsic simplfication" into the Neoplatonism of Alexandria. From the period of Middle Platonism, we will mention, very briefly and in an introductory way, only a few characteristic elements of the harmonizing tendency that emerged in this interval, particularly those that lasted down the end of Neoplatonism. As far as Neoplatonism, the final period of Platonism, is concerned, I propose to give a significant, but by no means exhaustive, overview of the manifestations of this harmonizing tendency in its various representatives (including Themistius), beginning with Porphyry. It is true that the latter's position on this question has been studied in great detail by G.K. Karamanolis in his aforementioned book, but (on a rather important point) I will set forth a divergent opinion.

The present study thus has as its subject the extent and the limits of the Neoplatonist tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and it leaves aside the question of whether or not this tendency can be objectively justified: an important theme, for which I refer the reader to L.P. Gerson's book entitled Aristotle and other Platonists.

Closely linked to the problematic of the harmonizing tendency is the question of whether there exists a general, striking difference between the theologies and religious practices of the Neoplatonists teaching at Alexandria and those who were professors at Athens. I will answer this question in the negative, although emphasizing that the very meager documentary material available to us for the three centuries of Neoplatonism taught at Alexandria and Athens allows us to perceive only a tiny fraction of its history.

Some Characteristic and Permanent Features of the Tendency toward Harmonization of the Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle in Middle-and Neoplatonism

In fact, the tendency toward harmonization was already born in Middle Platonism, and emerged victorious beginning with Porphyry. The title of a lost treatise by the Middle Platonist Atticus, Against those who claim to interpret Plato by means of Aristotle, is enough to attest the existence of such a trend among the Middle Platonists. M. Zambon's book **PORPHYRE ET LE MOYEN-PLATONISME** provides ample documentation on the beginnings of this tendency in the Middle Platonists Plutarch of Chaeronea and Alcinous, among others, and on its completion by Porphyry. There can be no question here of repeating all that Zambon has excellently written on this subject, which researchers who wish to study the commentaries of the late Neoplatonists should begin by reading, along with the book by G.K. Karamanolis, which has already been mentioned.

I shall note only three typical features of this nascent procedure of harmonization, features that we shall encounter once again later on in the introductions to the Alexandrian commentaires on Aristotle's Organon. As Zambon points out: "in the face of the objections raised by Aristotle's detractors, the strategy of Platonists who favored his integration into Platonic doctrine often consisted in 'backdating' Aristotelian innovations. If the ten categories are already identifiable in the Platonic dialogues, they are not an anti-Platonic innovation, but are an integral, original part of the Master's doctrine.'" A flagrant example of the tendency to backdate Aristotelian doctrines is provided to us by the treatise you attributed to Archytas, a pseudo-Pythagorean treatise of the 1st century B.C., in which the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories is 'ennobled' by its attribution to an illustrious contemporary of Plato. The author of this treatise clearly wished to set forth a doctrine of the categories that answered the objections raised by the critics of Aristotle". The first known use of this treatise in the sense indicated is by Iamblichus in his lost commentary on Aristotle's Categories. This is attested by Simplicius, who, according to the affirmations in his own commentary on the

Categories, followed Iamblichus' commentary very closely. Olympiodorus and David (Elias) also refer to this pseudonymous Archytas in their commentaries on the Categories, as does Simplicius in his commentary on the Physics.

The other recurrent feature in late Neoplatonism is the affirmation of the superiority of Plato over Aristotle in everything having to do with questions of metaphysics and theology, an affirmation that is implicit in Plutarch and broadly developed by the anti-Aristotelian Atticus: Aristotle privileged the senses as compared to reason, and he "relies on sight" (Atticus, fr. 3.94 des Places). He possesses an intelligence that is "capable of penetrating earthly phenomena and perceiving their reality, but incapable of contemplating the authentic 'plain of truth'" (Atticus, fr. 9,10-13 des Places). Zambon remarks quite rightly that Atticus, "in a caricatural and excessive way, nevertheless proposes an image of Aristotle that was widespread at the time", and that "it was precisely by invoking its presumably propadeutic and complimentary nature that Aristotelian philosophy was to be integrated within Platonism". And it was for the same reasons, we might add, that, in an attenuated form, the same arguments over Plato's superiority over Aristotle reappear once again, as we shall see, in the commentaries by Philoponus, Olympiodorus, Elias and David from the school of Ammonius, and in Simplicius, the student of Ammonius and Damascius. This belief in Plato's superiority does not, moreover, rule out that occasionally, especially in questions connected with the sensible world, Aristotle was vindicated against Plato.

Another constant feature in the Middle- and Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle derived its origin in Pythagoreanizing Platonism, which saw a divine revelation in the philosophy of Pythagoras, which could be transmitted only to those who were worthy. Rightly or wrongly, it was thought that the famous Pythagorean symbola or ainigmata (enigmas) had been deliberately uttered in a language with double meanings. Let us cite Iamblichus in this regard:

> And if someone, after making a choice among the symbols in question, did not interpret them and did not (include) them by means of an interpretation that is not open to sarcasm, what they say would appear to the common man ridiculous and worthy of old wives' tales, full of foolishness and idle chatter. In contrast, when they are decrypted as symbols must be, instead of remaining obscure, as is the case for most people, they become transparent and luminous, comparable to prophesies or the oracles of the Pythian Apollo. They reveal an astonishing thought, and produce a demonic inspiration in those lovers of study who have taken the trouble to understand them.

Plato being viewed as the distant successor of Pythagoras, his myths, and in a certain sense his 'oral teachings'. had been taken as equivalent to the `symbola', and as far as Aristotle was concerned, it was declared, from the same perspective, that in his treatises that were not intended for the broad public, the "esoteric writings", he had intentionally practiced an obscure style to dismiss undesirable readers. <>

A Text Worthy of Plotinus: The Lives and Correspondence of P. Henry S.J., H.-R. Schwyzer, A.H. Armstrong, J. Trouillard and J. Igal S.J. edited by Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Kevin Corrigan, and José C. Baracat Jr. [Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf Mansion Centre, Series 1, Leuven University Press, 9789462702592]

How Plotinus and later Platonism became central to the study of ancient philosophy

A Text Worthy of Plotinus makes available for the first time information on the collaborative work that went into the completion of the first reliable edition of Plotinus' *Enneads*: *Plotini Opera*, *editio maior*, three volumes (Brussels, Paris, and Leiden, 1951-1973), followed by the *editio minor*, three volumes (Oxford, 1964-1983). Pride of place is given to the correspondence of the editors, Paul Henry S.J. and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, with other prominent scholars of late antiquity, amongst whom are E.R. Dodds, B.S. Page, A.H. Armstrong, and J. Igal S.J. Also included in the volume are related documents consisting in personal memoirs, course handouts and extensive biographical notices of the two editors as well as of those other scholars who contributed to fostering the revival of Plotinus in the latter half of the 20th century. Taken together, letters and documents let the reader into the problems – codicological, exegetical, and philosophical – that are involved in the interpretation of medieval manuscripts and their transcription for modern readers. Additional insights are provided into the nature of collaborative work involving scholars from different countries and traditions.

A Text Worthy of Plotinus will prove a crucial archive for generations of scholars. Those interested in the philosophy of Plotinus will find it a fount of information on his style, manner of exposition, and handling of sources. The volume will also appeal to readers interested in broader trends in 20th century scholarship in the fields of Classics, History of Ideas, Theology, and Religion.

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Reprint: The critical edition of Plotinus' works by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, published in 1951, 1959 and 1973 in three volumes of the*editio maior* (Leuven, Museum Lessianum) and in 1964, 1977 and 1982 in three volumes of the*editio minor* (Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts), was certainly a major event for research on ancient philosophy in general and for Plotinian studies in particular. From 1492 to 1835, in printed form, plotinus' *Enneads* were available in the Latin translation of Marsile Ficin, accompanied, since 1580, by a Greek text prepared for his *editio princeps* at Petrus Perna in Basel. The nineteenth century produced four new editions, that of Friedrich Creuzer and Georg Heinrich Moser in 1835 (republished in 1855), that of Adolf Kirchhoff in 1856, that of Friedrich Hermann Müller in 1878/1880 and that of Richard Vollkmann in 1883/1884. The first half of the twentieth century added, between 1924 and 1938, that of Émile Bréhier.

One would have thought that a century of editorial activity should have resulted in a reliable text of Plotinus' *Enneads*. In fact, this was not the case. At the very time that saw the birth of three excellent translations of Plotinus in modern languages, that of Stephen MacKenna in English, that of Émile Bréhier in French and that of Richard Harder in German, a Jesuit of twenty-six years, studying in Paris, having realized, "thanks to the edition of Creuzer of 1835, that the edition Bréhier, in the collection Guillaume Budé, was not valid", embarked on an extraordinary adventure that was to lead to the two critical editions of *the Plotini Opera* by himself and by the eminent Swiss Hellenist Hans-Rudof Schwyzer.

This is the "Plotinus-worthy text" to which the title of this volume refers and to which most of the documents it brings together relate in one way or another. The core of these documents consists of the letters found among the papers of Arthur Hilary Armstrong, author of a new translation of Plotinus into English, contemporaneous with the two Henry-Schwyzer editions and published, accompanied by the Greek text established on their authority, from 1966 to 1988, in the Loeb Classical Library. It was in 1953, the date of the publication of his *Plotinus: A Volume of Selections in a New English Translation,*that Paul Henry's oldest letter to Armstrong dates back. Those of Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, Jean Trouillard and Jesus Igal follow. However, the letters that A. H. Armstrong himself addressed his four colleagues have unfortunately not been found. The editors of this volume have divided the collection of preserved letters according to the senders, preceded them with biographical notes and followed by the complete bibliographies of their authors and added other documents both epistolary and biographical. To the missing letters of A. H. Armstrong, they supplemented by the inclusion of two parts of letters he addressed, in 1988, to Gregory Shaw and,

from 1994 to 1997, to Kevin Corrigan, adding elements of biography and bibliography similar to those surrounding the epistles of his four long-time Plotinian correspondents. This is how the present volume took its form. The main body of the text consists of five chapters devoted to Paul Henry (ch. 2), Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (ch. 3), Arthur Hilary Armstrong (ch. 4), Jean Trouillard (ch. 5) and Jesus Igal (ch. 6), to which are added, by way of opening, a chapter which retraces, in its broad lines, the history of the text of Plotinus from Ficin to Henry and Schwyzer (ch. 1) and, as an appendix, a chapter containing biographical notes on Émile Bréhier, Willy Theiler, Betram Samuel Page and Evanghelos Roussos (ch. 7). At the end of the volume, there is an *Index locorum* and an *Index nominum*.

The content of the book is nevertheless quite variegated. In particular, he mixes documents concerning textual criticism and the interpretation of particular passages from Plotinus' *Enneads* with biographical portraits of the personalities who dealt with them. The very letters that constitute the red thread of this volume differ greatly in nature from one correspondent to another. Two of them entrust to stationery, in good standing, only scholarly commentaries. This is the case of Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer and Jesus Igal. These two epistolary collections deserve the attention of anyone who is plagued by the difficulties of Plotinus' text, as editor, translator, or interpreter. The*Index locorum* will allow him to quickly identify whether it is mentioned, in these letters, of this or that particular passage of the *Enneads.*

The letters of Jesus Igal, in particular, contain long lists of notes on the text of the *Enn.* IV, 3-7; V, 3; V, 6; V, 8; VI, 6-8. We can only regret that the list of notes on the *Enn.* VI, 1-5 could not be found; it seems, however, that Armstrong's remarks reproduced on pp. 337-338 relate to her. In addition, some particular passages are commented on at greater length (IV, 4, 35, 3-4; IV, 4, 41, 10-11; IV, 4, 28, 32-33; V, 7, 2, 12; VI, 5, 8, 28-33). Igal's letters 14 to 17 are in fact a long development on chapter 16 of*Ennead* III, 2, with, as an appendix, the outline of an article on "Plotinus on the Genesis and Nature of the Primary Logos (III 2, 16, 12 ff.)" (pp. 306-312). This article has, alas, never appeared: "*the severe punches you have hammered on my head,*" Igal wrote to Armstrong, "*have at least made me realize that I have either to abandon some or most of [my views] (the most probable course) or make a great effort to prop them up*" (pp. 312-313). The pages of Igal, however, remain of great interest. They contain a lucid summary of his views on the object of contemplation (non-discursive) of the higher soul, that is to say, of the intellect of the soul, as well as on the surpassing, by the human soul, of this level of contemplation in the identification with the Intellect and in that with the One. Opposing Henry Blumenthal that Plotinus blurs the distinction between the Intellect and the soul, Igal argues that the higher soul contemplates the *logoi,*derived from the intelligible Forms, while the hypostatic Intellect contemplates these Forms themselves and that, therefore, the difference between the two lies on the side of the contemplated object. From the contemplation of *the logoi,*immanent to the higher soul, it is nevertheless necessary to distinguish the strictly "mystical" state from the identification of the soul with the Intellect. Another letter (n°18) contains Igal's criticism of the interpretation of the τολμηρὸς λόγος of the*Enn.* VI, 8, 7 proposed by Armstrong.

Paul Henry's letters concern rather the circumstances than the questions of establishing Plotinus' text. We learn, among other things, the role that Father Henry played in the organization of the Interviews on *plotinus' Sources* (although we feel embarrassed when we learn of the things that were to remain "absolutely *between us two*",). The letters of A. H. Armstrong respond to questions of interest to their addressees. This is particularly the case of the letters to K. Corrigan in which Armstrong sets out his views on matter and evil in the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition. Jean Trouillard's letters present the milieu of French researchers engaged in the study of Neoplatonism, contemporaries of plotinus' work on the critical edition.

The volume contains many biographical and commemorative pages written by different authors. Among other things, there are interesting lines, by Martin Schwyzer, on his father's family background or the memories, by Christopher J. R. Armstrong, of the years that the Armstrong family spent, from 1935 to 1943, in Malta, including the Battle of Malta. Most touching are the passages in the "Souvenirs d'un jésuite itinérant" where Father Henry evokes the work on Plotinus manuscripts and on the indirect tradition carried out in his youth. "Even today, I am astonished to have been able to do what I did" (. "It was the grace of my life and marked me indelibly," he remarks about his stay in Lebanon and Palestine where he went to learn Arabic – "because I needed it for the Arabic Plotinus" – and "to wander, with my beard, my *keffie* (silk shawl) and *Agul* (band at the forehead), circulating on foot and on the back of donkeys or mules". Fortunately, these extracts are published in French. For the rest, the publishers of the volume took the decision to translate into English everything that was written in another language, except Greek. This is regrettable for the German of Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer and for the French of Jean Trouillard.

The volume also contains the English translation of the proceedings of the*editio maior* of *the Plotini Opera* by Evanghelos Roussos (pp. 358-364) as well as the letters of the latter and Paul Kalligas to H.-R. Schwyzer (to be found between pp. 112 and 149). He also paid tribute to the contribution of Bertram Samuel Page, from whom he brought back a letter to E. R. Dodds and a list of notes on the*editio maior* (pp. 354-357). Through the scattered remarks of Paul Henry, in his "Memories" and in his letters, the book also recalls the history of the *Lexicon Plotinianum* of John Herbert Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet, more fortunate in the success of this project than were P. Henry himself in 1932 (pp. 35 and 42) and E. Roussos in 1960. — Filip Karfik, University of Fribourg

Excerpt: Plotinus long remained the poor relative of ancient philosophy. He no longer is. To account for this happy change of affairs is the object of our book.

Symptomatic of the disregard in which Plotinus was held in the Anglo-American philosophical world was the absence of the Enneads from the Loeb Classical Library. When E. R. Dodds (1893-1979), then in the first flush of his scholarly enthusiasm, approached the General Editor, T.E. Page, to enquire whether a translation of Plotinus would be a welcome addition to the series, he was told that the Loeb library “was interested only in authors for whose works there was some foreseeable demand.” Also symptomatic was the lack of a reliable English version of the Enneads until Stephen MacKenna, in 1908, embarked on what he anticipated would be a lifelong commitment: “I am interested in Plotinus”, he wrote, “to translate him into beautiful English and then to interpret him and press him into the use of this century seems to me, has always seemed to me, really worth a life.” If we are to judge by his diaries and letters, the endeavour involved considerable hardship on his part

and may well have seemed to him to have taken over his life. But, as the volumes came out under the imprint of the Medici Society Ltd, they were hailed as masterpieces of English prose and remain, to this day, unsurpassed as a rendering into English of the most intricate philosophical system to have come out of the ancient world. Sadly, the literary merits of the translation did not compensate for the deficiencies of the text on which it was based. Not being scholarly trained, MacKenna could not have known that the Creuzer edition that he had picked up in a second-hand bookshop in St Petersburg was unreliable until E.R. Dodds and B.S. Page drew his attention to the fact when they helped him to make sense of difficult passages in the sixth Ennead. Sad also in a way is the fact that MacKenna's superlative translation of the Enneads made little impression upon English-speaking philosophers, who are used to more sober language in the expression of philosophical thought.

The philosophically educated public was better served on the Continent, where translations of the Enneads had been forthcoming in French, German and Italian throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Each translation has merits of its own. Bréhier's lucid and fluent French translation (1924-1938) remains to this day a point of anchor for those seeking an overview of the problems dealt with in individual tractates. Rather than simply relying on previous editions, Bréhier had collated readings from the two manuscripts to be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale (Parisinus A and Parisinus B) whilst also taking some account of the indirect tradition. In 1924, it could still be said of his apparatus criticus that "it is the most useful that we have." In addition to his translation of Plotinus—Bréhier was a historian of philosophy—his seven-volume history of the subject long held authority and, in 1941, made him an obvious choice to succeed Bergson at the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. Together with Bréhier's authority as a historian, Bergson's own interest in the Enneads explains why Plotinus has remained to this day a presence in mainstream French philosophy.6 Almost contemporary with Bréhier's translation came Richard Harder's German rendering of the Enneads (1930-1937). Although Pierre Hadot praised it for the "unhoped for clarifications" that it brought to the understanding of Plotinus' philosophy, Harder himself had been less than sanguine in his assessment of the then current state of Plotinian studies: "We have no adequate text, no commentary, no grammar, no lexicon; no other great author of antiquity has been neglected to this degree." Like Harder, Cilento was highly conscious of the parlous state of the text that he was endeavouring to translate into Italian and, whenever possible, he, too, took account of variants found in the manuscripts that he had been able to consult, justifying his choice of readings in the critical commentary that accompanied his translation (1947-1949).

The major obstacle to the in-depth study of Plotinus' philosophy, therefore, was the lack of a serviceable text of the Enneads. Dodds bluntly summed up the situation in the review of the first volume of Henry and Schwyzer's editio maior that he wrote for The Classical Review:

> The condition of the text of Plotinus has long been one of the scandals of scholarship ... until today it has remained impossible to ascertain with any approach to accuracy what the

> manuscript evidence is for any particular passage in the Enneads. Moreover, the nineteenth century editors embellished the text with a steadily growing accretion of false emendations, based sometimes on a mistaken attempt to atticize Plotinus, sometimes on a failure to understand his argument, and always on an imperfect acquaintance with the manuscript tradition. Many of these blunders have remained to this day part of the textus receptus, though a certain number were removed by Bréhier. This discreditable state of affairs will be ended for good when Henry and Schwyzer have completed their monumental task.

The "monumental" task in question turned out to be a labour of twenty-four years. Both men were well prepared for the task. By 1930, Paul Henry S.J., as his memoirs testify, had already read the whole of the Enneads in Greek and acquainted himself with Ficino's translation. The two manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Nationale that he had consulted, possibly on the advice of Bréhier, whose doctoral student he had been, had further aroused his interest and, in 1932, he spent four months trawling through the libraries of Italy in search of more manuscripts. Of the forty-five manuscripts that he found and collated, ten were trustworthy enough to make him confident of being able to reconstruct the archetype. He also used the indirect tradition to striking effect. Having found in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica a quotation matching the lacuna in Ennead IV 7 [2], he inferred the existence of a pre-Enneadic edition of Plotinus that would have been in the possession of Eustochius, the doctor who attended Plotinus on his deathbed. Lastly, in 1937, he spent ten months in the Lebanon and Palestine (as it was then called), in search of manuscripts of the Theologia Aristotelis, which provides an indirect source for the writings of Plotinus. The results of his investigations were published in 1941 as Les manuscrits des Ennéades. Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, for his part, had been working independently on the text of Plotinus by examining and assessing the reliability of a number of manuscripts as well as developing an interest in the reception of Plotinus in the Arab world. The outcome of his researches had appeared in learned journals from 1934 onwards. They reveal his complete agreement with Henry on matters of methodology. Like Henry, Schwyzer was committed to the austere application of the method of textual criticism in the study of ancient texts, as opposed to Theiler's method of choice, which admitted a large number of editorial conjectures into the text, as well as being more reliant on Quellenforschung.

The two men, who had only met once, briefly in 1938, got together again in 1946 for a trial run of a couple of weeks, to test their scholarly compatibility before embarking on the long-term project of producing a full critical edition, with apparatus criticus, of the Enneads. Upon successful completion of the trial run, which had them working jointly on the text and apparatus of a short tractate (IV 2 [4] On the Essence of the Soul II), Henry and Schwyzer agreed to spend together four months every summer in Schwyzer's Zürich house for as long as it took to produce the full critical text of the Enneads that they planned. The work took almost a quarter of a century to complete (1951-1973), at the end of which they had produced, not only the editio maior of the Enneads, but had also started the editio minor in 1964, the last volume of which was published in 1982. It contained revisions of the maior as well as an enlarged apparatus fontium.

The partnership appears to have been untroubled by serious scholarly disagreements; holding each other in high intellectual esteem, the two men respected each other's life choices and modus vivendi. In some ways, the enterprise could almost be described as business-like: since editing Plotinus was what had got them together, they ensured that no outside distraction would divert them from their common task. The reviews that greeted the completion of the first volume were largely eulogistic: the greatest specialists of late antiquity, Harold Cherniss, Werner Beier waltes, Vincenzo Cilento and Eric Dodds, all warmly saluted the achievement. Reviews of the later volumes were equally complimentary.

The letters reproduced in this volume all date from after the publication of the first volume of the editio maior and concern either the edition itself or the scholarly debates, large and small, that ensued. They enable us vicariously to share the elation that greeted the long overdue critical edition of Plotinus' text and give us insights into the personalities of the writers. Schwyzer (1908-1993), the steady hand behind the partnership, was a meticulous scholar who rarely allowed his correspondents into his private life or let slip his mask of detached courtesy. Henry (1906-1984), on the contrary, was candid to the point of indiscretion, prone to anger and indignation, and seemingly impervious to hierarchical considerations. Being a typical "mover and shaker," he was the one who dealt with publishers, generated funding and organised conferences, including the famous Entretiens Hardt 1957 meeting on Les Sources de Plotin.14

In contrast with Henry's forceful personality, Trouillard, a Sulpician priest (1907-1984) who had been influenced by the Christian philosophy of Maurice Blondel, was all priestly serenity and open-mindedness. Less concerned with exegetical precision than the others, he imperturbably pursued his interest in Proclus and dealt with the philosophical problems posed by the Christianisation of Neoplatonism. The letters of Fr Igal S.J. (1924-1986) are wholly taken up with textual and exegetical problems.

Unconcerned with the practicalities of publication, he never hesitated to acquaint Schwyzer, who had to deal with the practicalities of preparing a manuscript for publication, with his second (or third) thoughts and his successive misgivings over editorial decisions—his own as well as those of his colleagues. Fascinating also are the letters of those who, at the time, were budding students of Neoplatonism and have become today's foremost Plotinian scholars. Although none of Armstrong's letters have survived, other than very few personal ones of moderate interest, he is the filter through which readers of this volume will get to know his fellow Plotinian scholars. As the recipient of most of the letters, he also provides the time-frame covered in the volume.

At this point, a double note of caution must be sounded. First, let readers be aware that although we have reproduced the great majority of the letters that have been passed on to us, we are conscious of offering only a percentage of the letters likely to have been addressed to Henry, Schwyzer and Armstrong. The dispersion of Henry's belongings at the time he was recalled to Belgium for medical treatment means that his correspondence is likely to be irremediably lost. Fortunately, his memoirs and the regular letters he sent to Armstrong provide us with a record of what he considered to have been his main activities and projects. Second, for all our indebtedness to Armstrong, it must be borne in mind that the letters that have come down to us are those that he either chose to keep or—almost equally likely— managed not to lose in the course of a busy academic life that involved extensive travelling. The one-sidedness of the correspondence makes Armstrong the great absent of this volume. He never went to the trouble of making copies of his replies to his colleagues, save for jotting down brief notes for future use in the margins of Igal's notes and letters, all of which are here reproduced. As a result, the glimpses we get of his personality are through Henry's trust and friendship. Luckily, in view of the fact that most of the letters were handwritten, there are only very few references and individual words that we have not been able to identify or decipher.

The publication of the maior and minor editions restored Plotinus to what ought to have been all along his position as one of the major philosophical figures of the ancient world. The re-drawing of the philosophical map of late antiquity that followed the critical edition of the Enneads did not happen overnight. Indeed, it remains ongoing seventy years later. The first task was to translate the revised text and analyse it tractate by tractate by relying on the tools of classical textual exegesis. The first volume of the revised edition of Harder's Plotin, Schriften by Beutler and Theiler came out in 1956, the year before the Foundation Hardt seminal meeting on Les Sources de Plotin took place. This was followed by other new translations or re-translations of the corpus either in its entirety or

of individual tractates. While A.H. Armstrong's 1966-1988 Loeb translation continues to be a standard work of reference for many English-speaking readers, an entirely new translation came out in 2018 by a team of translators working under the general editorship of L. P. Gerson (Cambridge University Press). Another completely new translation, tractate by tractate and with accompanying commentaries, is currently under way under the joint editorship of John Dillon and Andrew Smith (Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas/Zurich/Athens). In French a re-translation of the Enneads was undertaken in 2002 under the joint direction of L. Brisson and J.-F. Pradeau and finally brought to completion in 2010 (Garnier-Flammarion). Two more French re-translations are ongoing, the one started by Pierre Hadot (Editions du Cerf 1984-2015, now moved to Vrin under the directorship of D. O'Meara, G. Aubry, J.-F. Balaudé and A.-L. Darras-Worms). The latest in date proceeds under the direction of J.-M. Narbonne, the first volume of which came out in 2012 (Collection des Universités de France). Like their Dillon-Smith counterparts, all three new French re-translations are accompanied by extensive commentaries. Last but not least, a full translation into modern Greek with the most extensive commentary so far of all six Enneads has recently been completed by Paul Kalligas (Vivliothëkë A. Manousë, 1997-2018).

In addition to these re-translations, many individual tractates have more lately been the object of detailed studies in German, French, English, Italian and Spanish. Being on the whole more purely philosophical in tone and content than the above-mentioned translations cum exegetical commentaries, such studies give us hope that Plotinus' Enneads might henceforth be studied also for the philosophical insights that they contain on such issues as selfhood and subjectivity, consciousness, time and eternity (and sempiternity), freedom of the will and human agency. Let it be hoped that the philosophy of Plotinus, who regarded himself as a philosopher (philosophos) rather than a philologist (philologos) will continue to be studied in its various aspects by philosophers of all schools and persuasions. <>

Rome and the Near Eastern Kingdoms and Principalities, 44-31 BC: A Study of Political Relations during Civil War by Hendrikus A.M. van Wijlick [Series: Impact of Empire, Brill, 9789004441743]

The study presents a critical analysis of the political relations between Rome and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities during the age of civil war from the death of Julius Caesar in 44 to Mark Antony's defeat at Actium in 31 BC. By examining each bilateral relationship separately, it argues that those relations were marked by a large degree of continuity with earlier periods. Circumstances connected to the civil war had only a limited impact on the interstate conduct of the period despite the effects that the strife had on Rome's domestic politics and the *res publica*. The ever-present rival Parthia and its external policies were more influential in steering the relations between Rome and Near Eastern powers.

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More than twenty-five years have passed now since the publication of **THE ROMAN NEAR EAST 31 BC–AD 337**, Fergus Millar's ground-breaking work on the social and political history of the Levant and its hinterland during the Principate and the successive period of the tetrarchs up until the death of Constantine. As prophesied by Michał Gawlikowski in a review at that time, the book still stands as the best analysis of Near Eastern society during the Roman imperial era, not only in that it exposes the variety in civilisation and culture across the entire region in question, but also in that it demonstrates how changes in political circumstances—more specifically Rome's eastward expansion and the interplay with the Parthians and (later) the Sassanians—influenced social life within the area. Pioneering as this work thus is, Millar chose not to trace Rome's presence in the Near East to its initial stages in the 60s BC, but instead to begin his analysis at the Battle of Actium, judging that a stretch of the chronological confines as far back as Pompey's intervention into the affairs in Syria "would have either taken up too much space or failed to reveal much about the Near East itself, or probably both". Undeniably, there is much to say in favour of a beginning in 31 BC, besides constraints of time and space: the end of a more than thirteen years lasting period of civil war—and prior to that intermittent flares of political unrest—the emergence of an emperor at the head of the Roman state and the ensuing changes in governance and political culture. Yet, given the fact that the work does not merely aim to unveil the geography, languages, social life and local identities of the region in question, but also the gradual progress of Roman direct rule over the Near East as well as the resultant political relations which Rome had with Parthia and minor kingdoms and principalities situated in the Levant and in the Euphrates catchment basins, a more elaborate discussion on the political events of this region prior to Actium would have been welcomed—even if in a separate publication. Moreover, I am unable to concur with Millar when he asserts that the period from Pompey's administrative reorganisation of the Near East up to Octavian's decisive victory in the civil war in 31 BC would fail to bring about relevant insights into the area in question. Indeed, if one has a predeliction for history of the *longue durée*, then an excursion into the Late Republic may not reveal

much of the Near East. But if other more contingent aspects of the past are observed, such as political structures and interstate relations maintained by Rome—issues which Millar *does* consider in his work—then it is hardly convincing that an appraisal of the source material for the outgoing years of the Republic would *not* unveil a great deal, in particular when one considers that the period of civil war from 44 until 31 was characterised by institutional novelties, deviant administrative practices—especially with regard to the provinces—armed clashes, and by an almost continuous movement of troops and military personnel. Reflecting on these developments should we not expect these changes to have had some effect on Rome's affairs in the Near East where the easternmost stretches of its empire were situated, on political relations with Near Eastern powers as well as on the administrative landscape of the region?

The present work aims to redress the balance somewhat, not by considering the entire political and interstate history of the Near East from Pompey up to Actium, but by providing a critical analysis of the political relations maintained by Rome on the one hand and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities on the other hand during the era of civil conflict from 44 until 31. In the light of the developments just described it is to examine whether the relations between Rome and royal powers in the Near East—the area that more than once would function as the main stage of the civil war—also underwent any changes. In the field of cultural anthropology, processes marked by an overturn of existing structures, institutions and practices, as a result of which all those participating or involved in these changes enter a state of liminality, are attractive objects of study. Societal changes not infrequently are associated with an erosion of certainties, with strife and violence. The famed symbolic anthropologist Victor Turner once provided a justification for why analyses of such processes of change are invaluable:

> Conflict seems to bring fundamental aspects of society, normally overlaid by the customs and habits of daily intercourse, into frightening prominence. People have to take sides in terms of deeply entrenched moral imperatives and constraints, often against their own personal preferences. Choice is overborne by duty.

The present study will more than once provide the reader with instances whereby Near Eastern powers had to choose, confronted as they were by Roman internal discord, the origins of which lay far beyond most them both in physical distance and in responsibility. Thus far, no publication has specifically focused on Rome's interstate transactions with the Near East during the thirteen years that marked the transition from Republic to Principate. Although the French historian Maurice Sartre deals in his *opus magnum* with the political and socio-cultural history of the Levant from the era of Alexander the Great until the demise of the Palmyrene Empire in AD 273, his study is limited in geographical terms to the Levant, and does not deal, for example, with Egypt. Michael Sommer's monograph from 2005, on the other hand, is a cultural history of the Near East and as such does not specifically treat interstate relations in our period of civil war. Yet, even Adrian Sherwin-White and Richard Sullivan, who both *do* cover bilateral interactions in their respective works, have focused predominantly on the period prior to the civil war, and less so on the period of Roman civil war from 44 until 31—Sullivan mainly with reference to the dynastic relations in Asia Minor and the Near East. This disparity is odd given the fact that the evidence for Rome's affairs with foreign powers in the Near East during this era of civil strife is not necessarily inferior to the source material for Pompey's reorganisation of Asia Minor and the Levant. Even studies that do concentrate on the age of internal strife have neglected Rome's foreign affairs in the Near East.

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The period of civil war between Caesar's assassination in 44 and the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra in the Battle of Actium in 31 did not merely see armed clashes between Roman armies, but also a proliferation in new administrative practices, especially following the enactment of the Triumvirate in

November 43 by the *lex Titia*. It is well-known that during the period of the Triumvirate, many measures were taken against traditional custom. Not only were the proconsuls appointed by the triumvirs themselves, they even controlled the selection of other magistrates to a large extent. Nevertheless, in spite of all the unlawful and despotic measures taken by the triumvirs, Fergus Millar has argued convincingly in a classic article from 1973 that "the Triumvirate was an institution which was created by a form of law, and which was superimposed on, but did not replace, the institutions of the *res publica*". Numerous indications in our extant source material indicate, for example, that the people's assemblies were still summoned for the passage of laws, or that the magistrates were not all directly appointed by the triumvirs. The administrative institutions of the *res publica* did thus not cease to function in the age of Roman civil war that lasted from 44 until 31. Whether a similar continuity can be detected in the conduct of Rome and Near Eastern kings and princes towards one another, is an issue that needs to be examined at present. In order to determine the extent to which this behaviour altered during the period of civil strife, the political interaction between Rome and Near Eastern rulers in the period from 44 until 31 shall be compared with the bilateral relations between these two parties in the period before this civil war. Such a comparative analysis, on the one hand from the perspective of the Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities (chapter 14) and on the other hand from the perspective of Rome (chapter 15), will shed light on the extent to which the conduct of each of the parties towards one another between 44 and 31 was typical of our period of civil war and, consequently, facilitate a better understanding of the civil war's impact on the political interaction between Rome and Near Eastern rulers. <>

Arrian the Historian: Writing the Greek Past in the Roman Empire by Daniel W. Leon [University of Texas Press, 9781477321867]

During the first centuries of the Roman Empire, Greek intellectuals wrote a great many texts modeled on the dialect and literature of Classical Athens, some 500 years prior. Among the most successful of these literary figures were sophists, whose highly influential display oratory has been the prevailing focus of scholarship on Roman Greece over the past fifty years. Often overlooked are the period's historians, who spurned sophistic oral performance in favor of written accounts. One such author is Arrian of Nicomedia. Daniel W. Leon examines the works of Arrian to show how the era's historians responded to their sophistic peers' claims of authority and played a crucial role in theorizing the past at a time when knowledge of history was central to defining Greek cultural identity. Best known for his history of Alexander the Great, Arrian articulated a methodical approach to the study of the past and a notion of historical progress that established a continuous line of human activity leading to his present and imparting moral and political lessons. Using Arrian as a case study in Greek historiography, Leon demonstrates how the genre functioned during the Imperial Period and what it brings to the study of the Roman world in the second century.

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In the foregoing pages, I have followed a single author through the experience of writing history in the second century CE, always with an eye to illuminating the intellectual atmosphere in which he was working. Along the way, I have shown how he defined himself against popular cultural trends by appealing to a particular vision of research that elevated the study of history above other types of scholarly activity. This vision also posited a separation between the historian's idealized future audience and inferior contemporary audiences who preferred flashy performances over serious historical conversations, a rhetorical gambit with deep roots in Classical Greek historiography. The ancient rivalry between historians and virtuoso literary performers helped Arrian and his colleagues claim ownership of a body of knowledge that intellectuals working in other disciplines clearly valued, even as they refused to compete on the chosen playing field of their rivals. At the same time, I have shown how Arrian deployed narrative techniques and intellectual discourses that were current in his own day to improve the methodologies available to those who wished to master the study of history. In so doing, he not only provided a model for emulation but also authorized continued attempts to create meaningful narratives of real past events, whether recent (as in his history of the Parthian Wars) or ancient (as in his history of Alexander). The field of historical inquiry remained vigorous across the second century and into the third, and whether later historians consciously drew inspiration from Arrian or not, the persona he crafted for himself seems to have worked for others as well.'

I began by exploring the relationship between sophistic oratory on historical themes and narrative history in the Imperial period. This discussion looked at definitions of historical practice used both by authors who considered themselves historians and by authors who did not. The discourse of history that emerged exhibits for historians a parallel strand of literary development of which both groups were aware. The superiority claimed by historians and the anxiety displayed by nonhistorians underscore the epistemologically distinct motives of the former. Arrian, who so often claims to be driven by questions about how it is possible to know anything about the past, served as a prime example of someone who actively theorized history amid its narration. A survey of his work made clear that his approach to the past relied upon his awareness of the passage of time, both because the consequences of events become evident through knowledge of their aftermath and because contemporary methods of studying history allowed him to construct better arguments than his predecessors had. Arrian argued that his present built upon the achievements of the past.

Two extended case studies showed the dynamics of these processes in a focused way. Using the tools available to him from contemporary rhetorical education and political culture, Arrian crafted an incisive commentary on government as he narrated Alexander's inspiring yet troubled rise to fame, emphasizing the importance of personal responsibility in a system of government centered on a single individual. He also explored the problems of adapting a culturally specific set of political practices to a large multicultural empire. These issues were relevant to his contemporary audience, and through his narrative of past events he offered that audience a set of abstract principles with which to understand their own world. Nevertheless, by stepping into a crowded field of Alexander historians, Arrian also staked a claim to supreme authority on one of the most consistently popular historical themes of Greek and Roman literature, thus attempting to establish himself as a canonical author. His attempt seems to have been successful, since no analytical history of Alexander produced after Arrian's has survived from antiquity, and those that are known have not left a strong impression.' Furthermore, while locking down such a popular topic, he also placed himself in rivalry with the greats of his discipline by discussing and adapting their methods and by questioning some of

their most lasting conclusions. In this way, he claimed a position in the canon of historians deemed worthy of sustained study. In the words of the influential medieval critic Photius, Arrian was "second to none of those writing history best."

It has been said that "a valuable commentary on the mentality of an age is usually to be found in the sort of history it chooses to write and read and the manner in which the chosen themes are treated..." The preceding study has taken up this invitation to dive deep into the work of a historically minded author who was unusually forthright about the problems he encountered in his research and his attempts to solve them. Through him and the discourse of history to which he and his contemporaries repeatedly appealed, it has been possible to observe the concerns of a group of intellectuals who tried hard to separate themselves from popular trends and create a counterculture of sorts. Centering those characters who reveled in forcing problems ahead of enjoyment and constructed a parallel literary universe for themselves and their readers can shed new light on the complexity of intellectual culture in Imperial Greek literature. <>

Porphyry's On the Cave of the Nymphs in its Intellectual Context by K. Nilüfer Akçay [Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, Brill, 9789004407596] Open Access

Neoplatonic allegorical interpretation expounds how literary texts present philosophical ideas in an enigmatic and coded form, offering an alternative path to the divine truths. The Neoplatonist Porphyry's *On the Cave of the Nymphs* is one of the most significant allegorical interpretation handed down to us from Antiquity. This monograph, exclusively dedicated to the analysis of *On the Cave of Nymphs*, demonstrates that Porphyry interprets Homer's verse from Odyssey 13.102-112 to convey his philosophical thoughts, particularly on the material world, relationship between soul and body and the salvation of the soul through the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus. The Homeric cave of the nymphs with two gates is a station where the souls descend into genesis and ascend to the intelligible realm. Porphyry associates Odysseus' long wanderings with the journey of the soul and its salvation from the irrational to rational through escape from all toils of the material world.

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Excerpts: The Neoplatonic philosopher, Porphyry, was born in Tyre in Phoenicia, probably in 234 CE. According to Porphyry's own Life of Plotinus and Eunapius' report, he had distinguished ancestors, and his original name (in Phoenician) was Malchus, meaning 'king.' He studied rhetoric and grammar with Longinus in Athens before joining the circle of Plotinus (204/5–270 c.e.) in Rome in 262–268 C.E. Porphyry collected and edited the works of his teacher Plotinus under the title, Enneads, and divided them into six books, consisting of nine treatises each, prefaced by his own Life of Plotinus. He himself is believed to have written sixty works, but, unfortunately, most are lost or survive only in fragmentary form. Fully or substantially extant works include, apart from On the Cave of the Nymphs and Life of Plotinus (Vita Plotini), also a large excerpt of a Life of Pythagoras (Vita Pythagorae), Homeric Questions, Letter to Marcella (written to his wife, Marcella, Ad Marcellam), On Abstinence from Killing Animals (De Abstinentia), Starting-points Leading to the Intelligibles (Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, Sententiae in short), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aristotle's Organon, Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos and a Commentary on Aristotle's Categories. In addition, Porphyry is often credited with the authorship of an anonymously transmitted Commentary on Plato's Parmenides and he almost certainly wrote a likewise anonymously transmitted work on embryology, attributed in the manuscripts to Galen, and entitled To Gaurus on How Embryos Are Ensouled (Ad Gaurum). There are also fragments of many lost works such as a history of philosophy, a Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Letter to Anebo (Epistula ad Anebonem), several treatises, such as On Images, On the Styx, Philosophy from Oracles (De Philosophia ex Oraculis), On the Return of the Soul (De Regressu Animae), On What Is in Our Power (or On Free-will), and a large work Against the Christians (Contra Christianos).

As this corpus suggests, Porphyry had very broad interests, covering fields as diverse as grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, logic, music, religion and literary criticism, and his work had a deep impact on his contemporaries and successors. The fourth-century historian and sophist, Eunapius, praises Porphyry as a polymath (VS 4.2.2-3), and, in his City of God, Augustine (354–430 c.e.) calls

him 'the most learned of the philosophers' (doctissimus philosophorum, Civ. Dei 19.22). In the translation of Boethius, Porphyry's Isagoge was used as a standard textbook on logic until the end of the Middle Ages. Because so much of his output does not survive, it is difficult to establish to what extent Porphyry generated original philosophical ideas, particularly ideas independent of his teacher Plotinus. There is a common tendency in modern scholarship to see him primarily as a follower on the path set out by Plotinus. Hadot argued nearly forty years ago that Porphyry is a much more original thinker than has been thought, despite earlier claims that his thought lacked originality, and there has been a growing consensus that this assessment is correct. One of my aims will be to show that, at least in his approach to poetry, myths, religion and rituals, Porphyry went well beyond Plotinus, developing original ideas that are on a par with those of his contemporary, Iamblichus (c. 250–330 CE.), a pupil of Porphyry.

As for existing scholarship on the Porphyrian treatise to which this book is dedicated, On the Cave of the Nymphs in the Odyssey, *De Antro Nympharum*; hereafter *De Antro*), Laura Simonini's L'antro delle Ninfe, in 1986, is an extensive annotated edition, with an Italian translation, whose text and apparatus are taken over from the Arethusa Monograph edition in 1969. Simonini situates De Antro within a wide range of disciplines and offers a commentary of the treatise at large and makes references to various ancient sources. Simonini's references related to Porphyry's other works are compatible with those in this book, e.g., her reference to Sententia 20 for the definition of Matter, to Sententia 29, Ad Gaurum 11.3 and De Regressu Animae for the theory of pneuma-ochema, to Sententia 32 for the connection of the cathartic virtues with the image of the goddess Athena (phronesis) and Odysseus sitting under the olive tree. In her article 'Homers Nymphengrotte in der Deutung des Porphyrios,' Karin Alt does not present a detailed interpretation of the treatise, but rather provides the outline of each section; she argues that, although Porphyry's interpretation is based on a plan, it lacks consistency – a claim which is at odds with what I here attempt to show. This book considers the treatise as a coherent and consistent literary project with its thematic subjects indicated below, its aim, Porphyry's other works, and his intellectual style. The treatise indeed looks like a reflection of the material world that contains dichotomies, such as dark vs beautiful; Platonic cave vs Mithraic cave; southern region vs northern region; the gate for mortals vs the gate for immortals; summer solstices vs winter solstices; genesis vs apogenesis, etc., where Porphyry brings together different allegorical interpretations that project his overall aim.

A significant recent paper on De Antro is Mark Edwards' 'Porphyry's 'Cave of the Nymphs' and the Gnostic Controversy.' Edwards, here, compares certain features of De Antro, particularly Porphyry's employment of Zoroaster, Mithras as the Maker and Father of all and the Mithraic cave, with Plotinus' Ennead 2.9, a treatise written against a group of Gnostics, Christian Heretics, while Porphyry was a member of Plotinus' school. He concludes that Porphyry intended to write the treatise, not only as a work of interpretation, but as a manual for interpreters, directed in particular against the Gnostics, showing that the truth is reached, not immediately, but gradually. Edwards also discusses Homer's influence on the writings of Plotinus and Porphyry in his paper 'Scenes from the Later Wanderings of Odysseus,' in which he connects the Delphic Oracle in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 22) with De Antro and shows that the oracle, which reveals the fate of Plotinus' soul after his death, bears resemblance to the description of Odysseus' arrival in Phaeacia. In contrast to Plotinus, who is never deceived by tricks of the material world, as Edwards points out, Porphyry's Odysseus in De Antro achieves his ultimate goal only when he gets rid of his earthly life.

De Antro has also regularly been discussed by scholars interested in the field of ancient allegorical interpretation, most prominently by Peter T. Struck, in Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, and Robert Lamberton, in Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition, and other works. Struck offers a wide-ranging assessment of allegorical interpretation from the Presocratics to the Neoplatonists, along with the

development of the concept of the 'symbol' as an authentic token or divine sign, from passwords used by the Pythagoreans and initiates of the Orphic, Dionysian and Eleusinian mysteries, via an ontological concept in Stoic language theory, to a sign of divinity itself in Iamblichus and Proclus (412–485 CE.). Lamberton's Homer the Theologian, meanwhile, focuses on how the Neoplatonists read Homer in line with their own philosophy, and particularly how they interpreted Odysseus as a symbol of the descended soul trying to return to the intelligible realm. The most recent monographs that touch upon De Antro in the context of a discussion of allegory are Crystal Addey's Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods, in which she explores Porphyry's method of allegorical exegesis in De Antro while examining the common features of allegory and oracles; and Aaron P. Johnson's Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity, in which he compares De Antro with another Homeric study by Porphyry, On the Styx, pointing out their structural and methodological similarities. All of these works throw important light on Porphyry's allegorical method and the place of De Antro in the history of allegorical interpretation.

Scholars of Mithraism have likewise shown a great interest in De Antro, because it offers the only reliable cosmological discussion of a mithraeum, the 'cave' where the followers of Mithras worship, to which Porphyry refers in De Antro 6 and 24. De Antro 6 provides significant information about the function of the cave in the mysteries of Mithras and De Antro 24 mentions the seat of Mithras at the equinoxes in relation to the solstitial gates of the soul. The state of the question and what can, and cannot, be safely inferred from De Antro regarding Mithraism is most clearly laid out in Roger Beck's most recent work, **THE RELIGION OF THE MITHRAS CULT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE,** in which he builds on ideas expounded in many earlier publications. Beck posits that in a mithraeum, the place of cult worship that represented the Mithraic cosmos, the initiates acquired information about the process of 'soul journeying,' the descent of one's soul at birth and its ascent at death, through a ritualised execution of the soul's heavenly journey. Beck convincingly argues for close analogies between Mithraic doctrine and the Neoplatonic ideas of Porphyry while avoiding speculative reconstructions of the precise relationship between the two paradigms. Such constructions were attempted most prominently by Robert Turcan in his Mithras Platonicus, in which he posits influence of the cult of Mithras on the Platonic tradition from the first century BCE. onward and uses the references to Mithraism in De Antro to argue that Mithraism and Neoplatonism are, in essence, the same. My analysis of De Antro here is compatible with Beck's argument and puts it on more solid ground by situating De Antro more comprehensively within Porphyry's wider philosophical thought.

There are two modern English translations of De Antro, whose dates are indicative of the lack of scholarly attention for the treatise in his own right: one was produced by a postgraduate seminar class in 1969, conducted by the distinguished Neoplatonic scholar, L.G. Westerink,17 the other by Robert Lamberton in 1983. These and earlier versions (such as the one published by Thomas Taylor in 1823) include little or no annotation and there is no comprehensive analysis of the entire treatise. Throughout the book, I will use the Greek text produced by the 1969 Postgraduate Seminar, which is based on a comprehensive consideration of the manuscript tradition. Earlier Greek editions of the treatise were published, in many cases with Latin translations, by J. Lascaris (1518), Lucas Holstenius (1630), J. Barnes (1711), R.M. Van Goens (1765), R. Hercher (1858), and A. Nauck (1887).

De Antro has been generally given little attention in discussions of Neoplatonic philosophy, as it is deemed to be of little importance for establishing Porphyrian doctrine. Scholarship on this doctrine, however, has thrived over the last decade or so. A number of important studies18 have centered on the religious philosophy of Porphyry and Porphyrian soteriology, as expounded, for example, in his On the Return of the Soul (De Regressu Animae) and in his Philosophy from Oracles (De Philosophia ex Oraculis), both works which also enlighten his stance on traditional religious

practices. The philosophical analysis of De Antro in this work builds on this recent scholarship, as it aims to place the treatise within the context of Porphyry's other works and proposes that it contains significant philosophical ideas, particularly on the relationship between the soul and body, embodiment, demonology and the concept of salvation of the soul. Apart from these, there are a number of major studies addressing the question on Porphyry's reconciliation of Aristotle with Platonism.

Porphyry starts his allegorical exegesis of Homer's description of the cave of the nymphs in which Odysseus places the gifts he has received from the Phaeacians at Odyssey 13.102-112, a passage cited in full at the beginning of the treatise after the briefest possible indication of the project on which Porphyry is embarking:

> (1.1-13) One wonders what the cave in Ithaca symbolises for Homer,
>
> the one which he describes in the following verses:
>
> At the head of harbour there is an olive tree with acuminate leaves,
>
> and near it, a lovely and dark cave,
>
> consecrated to the nymphs called Naiads.
>
> In the cave are mixing bowls and amphoras,
>
> made of stone. There, bees store up honey.
>
> In the cave, there are very high stone looms, where the nymphs
>
> weave garments of sea-purple, a wonder to be seen,
>
> and in it there are ever-flowing waters. It has two entrances:
>
> one is northerly, for humans to descend,
>
> the other, southerly, is more divine; through that entrance
>
> men do not enter, but it is the way of immortals.

In his exegesis of Homer's cave 'at the head of the harbour' and its elements and attributes – that is, the olive tree, the Naiad nymphs weaving sea-purple garments on stone looms, ever-flowing waters, stone mixing bowls and amphoras, bees storing up honey, and the two entrances, one oriented towards the South for the immortals to ascend and the other towards the North for the mortals to descend – Porphyry touches on a remarkable number of philosophical concepts. These include, for example, Anaximander's apeiron, Heraclitus' flux theory, the Pythagoreans' orderly arrangement of the cosmos, and Plato's doctrine of participation in the Forms. Porphyry uses these concepts to define the characteristics of the material realm, which is the inferior principle in the process of the creation of the cosmos, symbolised by the cave of the nymphs. Interpretations of this kind are in line with Plotinus' view that the doctrine of Plato should be explained and clarified through the teachings of other philosophical schools, including the Stoics. Furthermore, the treatise is also a clear manifestation of Porphyry's great interest in the association and dissociation of the soul and body. In his Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 13), Porphyry tells how he interrogated Plotinus for three days about the precise association of the soul with the body. In De Antro, he provides a wide range of philosophical and astrological explanations of these processes through the concepts of pneuma, genesis, apogenesis, and the gates of heaven, including the gates of the Sun, the gates of the Sun and the Moon, and the solstitial gates.

In comparison with his Homeric Questions, a more philological interpretation of passages in Homer's poems, Porphyry's Homeric interpretation in De Antro shows his transformation from a literary critic into a Neoplatonic philosopher. In this regard, De Antro can be deemed to be part of a corpus of Porphyrian philosophical writings on the salvation of the soul, aimed partly at the Neoplatonic philosophers, partly at a more general audience. Porphyry seems to have been engaged in enquiries to find the way(s) for salvation of the soul during his life, and to develop this topic in different ways throughout his works.

In Sententia 32 (Lamberz), on the other hand, we find that Porphyry provides guidance for the purification of the soul through his classification of the Neoplatonic virtues, that is, the political, the cathartic, the theoretical, and the paradigmatic virtues. All these virtues are related to the purification of the intelligent part of the soul. The political virtues, for example, teach us to live up to the laws of human nature by moderating passions, whereas the aim of the cathartic virtues is the complete removal of passions from the soul. As Rappe observes, in Sententia 32, 'these virtues are defined in terms of the soul's ability to direct its attention inwardly, to abide in a state of contemplation, and to become one with the object of contemplation.'

As we have seen, Edwards has argued that Porphyry 'meant to write, not only a work of interpretation, but a manual for interpreters.' I would take this in a somewhat different direction and think that Porphyry uses De Antro to educate his disciples. Porphyry's scattered quotations, e.g. his quotation of Plato's Republic 7 in De Antro 8, brief statements such as his definition of matter in De Antro 5, and the plurality of subjects, give the impression that he wrote the treatise for presentation to and discussion in lectures. Of course, symbolism also enables Porphyry to convey his religious and philosophical ideas to his disciples by elaborate explanations. There is already a general consensus among scholars that there is a close connection between De Antro and the myth of Er in Republic 10, and that De Antro is to be read as an ethical text, as will be seen later. In addition to this, I shall seek to demonstrate that De Antro is closely connected with Porphyry's philosophical works, particularly passages of his Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Sententiae and De Abstinentia. It is primarily in its readings of individual sections of De Antro against these philosophical works that the original contribution of this work resides. I will, for example, consider the perception of the darkness of the material realm in De Antro in light of the noetic triad in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides; read his assignments of the different regions to the gods, daimones, mortals and more divine beings against his commentary on the story of Atlantis in the Timaeus; situate Porphyry's description of Homer's Naiad Nymphs weaving a sea-purple garment vis-à-vis Ad Gaurum; interpret the 'divinities' shedding of powers' in the context of Sententia 37 and De Abstinentia; place the gates of the Sun and the Moon in the context of Porphyry's commentary on Timaeus 36d2-7 (F 72 Sodano) and 38c9-d6 (F 79 Sodano); relate his identification of the goddess Athena to the doctrine of virtues in Sententia 32.

De Antro as the product of a highly intelligent thinker (not an undisciplined or chaotic mind, as might appear on first reading), proves that symbols and images are a key language and tool for the Neoplatonists to reveal their doctrines, similar to the Pythagoreans' use of dual discourses, direct and symbolic. According to reports by Porphyry (VP 37) and Iamblichus (VP 18.81), the Pythagoreans divided their disciples into Learners and Hearers, the former being given elaborate explanations and the latter assumed to be capable of studying philosophy from mere maxims without arguments. In his Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 7.1-2) , Porphyry's division of Plotinus' disciples into two groups as 'hearers,' and 'zealous students,' seems to imply that the Pythagorean tradition was maintained in Plotinus' school in Rome. Porphyry interprets the literary symbols in De Antro both as transcendent being and as natural realities. Following, apparently, the Pythagoreans' mode of examination, Porphyry calls them 'images' (^^^^^^^) when he explains principles perceived by the senses, and 'symbols' (^^^^^^^), when his intention is to explain abstract principles. Thus, symbols

function as contemplative objects for the students, and their meanings allow them to develop philosophical awareness and consciousness through the use of sensual and mental powers.

Starting from the assumption that Porphyry uses De Antro to explain his philosophical ideas, and to educate his disciples through allegorical interpretation, my overarching aim is to offer an exegesis of Porphyry's De Antro against the backdrop of his wider philosophical oeuvre. Inspired most likely by Numenius, Porphyry's allegorical method attempts to unfold the deeper meaning of Homer's text by asking meticulous questions about the literary symbols of his verses and elaborately examining them in light of these questions. In this book, I have chosen and organised my topics of discussion in accordance with Porphyry's questions as they emerge from De Antro. These are the nature, method and purpose of allegorical interpretation, the features of the material realm symbolised by Homer's cave of the nymphs, the association of the soul with the body, and the ways of descent and ascent of the soul.

In accordance with, on the one hand, my aim to situate De Antro within the context of Porphyry's works and, on the other hand, the reading of the treatise's central interests as the association and dissociation of the soul and the body, and, above all, the salvation of the soul, the discussions focus on a specific set of Porphyry's philosophical works, namely relevant passages of De Abstinentia and Sententiae, surviving fragments of Porphyry's commentaries on the Timaeus, the Parmenides and the Republic, Ad Gaurum, and other fragmentary works that are related to sections of De Antro. I hope that this first detailed and thematic study of De Antro in English will contribute to a recognition of Porphyry as a complex, original and interesting thinker and will demonstrate that, for Porphyry, allegorical interpretation is an important tool to teach Platonic 'philosophy,' and the 'philosophical way of life,' at the meeting point of muthos and logos.

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As generally agreed, Porphyry's purpose in explaining the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus is mainly to develop parameters for the salvation of the soul, and throughout his various works, this purpose manifests itself in his ethical concern for the soul. The concept of the salvation of the soul is associated with the purification of the soul, and this purification is dependent on what part of the soul is targeted. For example, according to Porphyry, theurgy and rituals play significant roles in the purification of the lower (spiritual) part of the soul. On the other hand, a life dedicated to philosophy and its ethical practice, allows the soul to attain the intelligible realm and permanently escape from the cycle of genesis.

Beginning from the assumption that Porphyry uses his allegorical interpretations in On the Cave of the Nymphs to convey his own thoughts and to educate his disciples, most likely prospective philosophers, in important philosophical ideas, throughout this book I have offered an exegesis of De Antro in the context of his wider philosophical oeuvre. More precisely, I have endeavoured to show how the treatise fits in with his other more straightforward philosophical works, particularly with respect to his interests in the salvation of the soul and the relationship between the soul and body. Like Cornutus, Porphyry might have used De Antro for didactic purposes. The treatise is a perfect example of Porphyry's approach to the allegorical interpretation of the Homeric verses, in which he questions all the inconsistencies and paradoxes of his verses and provides various allegorical interpretation for them.

Reading De Antro as part of Porphyry's corpus of works relating to the salvation of the soul, I have systematically compared it to his other works that mainly deal with this issue and are complementary to De Antro. In particular, I have proposed that relevant sections of De Antro should be read alongside, not only Porphyry's commentary on the myth of Er, but also his commentary on the Timaeus, De Abstinentia and Sententiae.

Chapter 1 has examined the textual structure and composition of the treatise. As an introductory section, rather than summarising a long and rich tradition of allegorical exegesis and allegorical thinking, followed by many eminent literary critics, grammarians, and philosophers, my intention here has been to highlight those who were influence on Porphyry's exegetical approach and methodology in treatise. Most important among them – and therefore discussed in a separate section – were the Stoics, including Cornutus and Crates of Mallos, and the Neopythagoreans, Numenius and Cronius, who are Porphyry's main sources in De Antro and highly influential figures in Neoplatonism.

In agreement with Dillon and Edwards, I have suggested that De Antro is a complementary text to Porphyry's commentary on the myth of Er in Republic 10, based upon the idea that De Antro and the Republic share two common key symbols, the cave and Odysseus. This affinity is reflected in the basic theme of the treatise and Porphyry's overarching aim: the ultimate goal of the treatise is to show the way of salvation for the individual soul, which is to lead a philosophical life. This implies that Porphyry's aim in De Antro is ethical – his common attitude in other commentaries, as I have here shown at various places – and is compatible with Plato's aim in the myth of Er.

I have then analysed the two key concepts of Neoplatonic allegory, image and symbol, which Porphyry also uses for the cave and Odysseus. These two concepts are in fact used by the Pythagoreans for educational purposes: the natural reality perceived by the senses is introduced through images, the abstract principles perceived by mind through symbols. I have argued that the cave bears both of these aspects: on the one hand, it is a natural reality, but on the other hand, with its mystical elements, it is an abstract principle grasped by the mind. The discussion has included Porphyry's methodology, particularly how he justifies interpreting Homer's verses by raising issues which are thought to be contradictory. I have also discussed an important point of De Antro: Porphyry's identification of Homer as a theologian, an idea being rooted in the view that texts are written by 'divinely inspired' poets whom Porphyry considers as theological authorities, thus turning Homer's verses into divine oracles.

In De Antro 5 to 9, Porphyry explores the philosophical and religious precedents of viewing the cosmos or material world as a cave, the identification that lies at the basis of his allegorical interpretation of Homer's lines. The image is a common one, which is found, for example, in the Pythagoreans, the Orphics, Plato, Empedocles and in the cult of Mithras; and Porphyry elaborately argues its appropriateness (whence its popularity). In the first part of Chapter 2, under the title 'The Cave as Symbol and Image of Cosmos,' I have examined key relevant philosophical concepts relating to the material world in the Presocratic tradition such as Anaximander's apeiron, the flux theory of Heraclitus, and Plato's treatment of caves and caverns as hollows in the Phaedrus.

I have then analysed Porphyry's discussion of two ostensibly contradictory features of the cave in Homer's description: its loveliness and its darkness. I have examined the loveliness of the cave with reference to the material realm's 'participation in the Forms' in De Antro 6.5, starting from Plato's idea that the cosmos is generated from the Form of Good in Timaeus, alongside the relevant parts of Porphyry's and Proclus' commentaries on the Timaeus. I have sought to show a connection between the material world and the second One at the level of Life in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides, an issue that could be developed further in future research. I have made a connection between the darkness of the cave, resulting from the fact that it is perceived by Intellect, and Plotinus' and Porphyry's conceptualisation of Matter and its participation in the Forms, and I have concluded that the cave's darkness reflects the ontological relation, immediate or mediated, between substrata of the cosmos from top to bottom, that is, from the intelligible realm to Matter.

The second part of Chapter 2 opened with an exploration of Porphyry's references to the Mithraic cave in the context of his De Abstinentia and Origen's Contra Celsum. The main concern of this part was to examine Porphyry's identification of Mithras as the Maker and Father of the cosmos with the Platonic Demiurge in the Timaeus in comparison with Numenius' ontological principles. Taking into account how the epithet 'Maker and Father' operates in the Neoplatonic metaphysical and cosmological scheme in accordance with Por-phyry's commentary on the Timaeus, I have concluded that Porphyry's Mithras is a demiurgic god whose creative aspect is predominant. Lastly, I have ventured to argue that Mithras, as Master of genesis, as he is portrayed in De Antro 24.13, may be considered to have a cosmological aspect at the lower ontological level.

In the final section of Chapter 2, I have discussed Porphyry's references to the cave in Empedocles and the cave of Plato's Republic in De Antro 8. Porphyry's quotation from the Republic ensures that the cave in question is the material world as a prison-like cave, filled with shadows, from which one must escape in order to access the intelligible realm that lies beyond it. I discussed the fact that Porphyry's implication of analogies of the divided line and the Sun is an allusion to the movement of the state of minds from the visible realm to the intelligible realm, which we may associated with his doctrine of virtues, the political, the cathartic, the theoretical and the paradigmatic virtues in Sententia 32. This association is also deemed to be the beginning stage of enlightenment, that is, the realisation of the darkness of the cave or the material realm through intellect in De Antro 6.5-6.3

Chapter 3 has investigated the sections of De Antro which deal with the body-soul relationship against the background of Porphyry's metaphysics but also of common Greek symbolic thinking, which underlies Porphyry's associations and identifications of genesis with wetness and pleasures. Porphyry identifies the Naiad nymphs as daimones who preside over genesis, De Antro 12.5), and similarly, he speaks of a certain 'daimon of genesis' (De Antro 35.7) – whom Odysseus must appease due to his blinding of Polyphemus, namely Thoosa.

Those brief statements, along with Porphyry's multifaceted identification of the Naiad nymphs as souls in the process of falling into generation, and dunameis that preside over genesis (De Antro 10.8-9), give an impression of Porphyry's demonology, but a rather inadequate one. In order to elucidate this, I have discussed the dual aspects of daimones in De Antro, based on the assumption that Porphyry's interpretive practice should be read from both a macrocosmic and a microcosmic perspective. True in essence to Plato's description of daimones in Timaeus 40d6-9 as the invisible gods, daimones, figuratively as Naiad nymphs, are closely related to entities which cause the descent of souls in Porphyry's commentary on the story of Atlantis in Timaeus 20d8-9 (F 10 Sodano), which is preserved in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (In Tim. 1.77.624 Diehl). I have related Porphyry's tripartite division of daimones and souls, some of which are in the process of genesis, others in the process of ascending to the higher realm, to the celestial regions distinguished in De Antro 29.1-3. Another key issue discussed in the section of De Antro is the distinction between the guiding spirit and the idea of humans' souls as their daimones, the former having its source in Timaeus 90a, the latter in Timaeus 90c. Thus, I have suggested that Odysseus might be deemed one of the heroic or divine souls allocated to the South in De Antro 29.2, whereas Athena is his guiding spirit allocated to the East, ruling the rational part of Odysseus' soul and leading him to the divine. Based on the idea that 'the individual souls have received a daimonic lot' in F 10.8 of Porphyry's commentary on the Timaeus, Athena might operate as Odysseus' rational principle, since he has not, as yet, completed his self-improvement. This aspect of Athena is compatible with Ennead 3.4.3, in which Plotinus deems to be the guiding spirit an entity superior to us. The assignment of the goddess Athena to Odysseus' rational principle is also in accordance with her identification with phronesis, as discussed in Chapter 4.

According to Porphyry's treatment of the female mythological divinities, Amphitrite and the Naiad nymphs – as generative powers in On Images, as well as in De Antro, I have analysed the possible function of the Naiad nymphs as dunameis in the process of body-creation, De Antro 14.3), based on the fact that the formation of flesh proceeds 'through blood and from blood' (De Antro 14.10-11). The statement 'blood and moist seed are dear to [the souls]' (De Antro 10.20-11.1), has prompted me to examine the formation of flesh with reference to Porphyry's conception of the development of embryos in Ad Gaurum. Because in Ad Gaurum the formation of flesh belongs to the first stage of the formation of the embryo in the womb before limbs and organs are articulated, I have come to the conclusion that Porphyry's interpretation of the Homeric image of the Naiad nymphs weaving a sea-purple garment reflects the creation of the embryo and the physiological phase.

Another philosophical concept in the context of embodiment in De Antro is the pneumatic body, an intermediary link between the soul and the body. To complement and explain De Antro 11.8-12.1, I have used Sententia 29, in which Porphyry classifies the four major phases of the pneumatic body, as the soul obtains different substances. According to Sententia 29, the aethereal body is generated from the substances of the first five planets, and the solar and lunar bodies are obtained from the Sun and Moon. The earthly body consists of heavy and moist pneuma generated from exhalation (^^^^^^^^^^^, De Antro 11.3-6) in the sublunary region, reflecting the process of embodiment of the soul, as presented in De Antro. Lastly, in this Chapter, I have discussed the Orphic poem preserved in De Antro 16 in order to analyse how Porphyry evaluates the deception of the divine principle through honey as a symbol of pleasure. Porphyry's analogy between Poros in Plato's Symposium and Kronos, who become inebriated by nectar and honey, respectively, indicates the dominance of irrationality in the soul.

In the first part of Chapter 4, I have discussed the various exegeses of Homer's double gates provided by Porphyry, which is relevant to the journey of the soul through the sensible world. They are variously called the gates of Cancer and Capricorn or solstitial gates in the Mithraic cosmological model, the gates of the Sun by Homer, and the gates of the Sun and the Moon by the theologians. I have mainly examined the gates of the Sun and the Moon in De Antro, which have received less scholarly attention. Regarding their astrological aspect, as presented in De Antro 22.2-6, I have argued that the gates of the Sun and the Moon are related to the diurnal and nocturnal rotations of the seven planets according to the planetary order. I have compared the ascending path of the soul towards the Sun to the escape of the liberated prisoner from the Platonic cave, which can be interpreted as the soul's union with the intelligible realm. At the microcosmic level the path towards the Sun refers to the soul guided by rationality, whereas the path towards the Moon refers to the soul under the guidance of its irrational part. Taking a further step, the discussion brought Porphyry's comments on the gates of the Sun and the Moon within the scope of his division of the triad Being-Intellect-Life at the celestial level in his commentary on the Timaeus (F 79 Sodano), in which Porphyry mentions the dominant principles and goals of the Sun and the Moon.

In the second part of Chapter 4, I have examined the significant philosophical concepts in Porphyry's allegorical interpretation of Homer's image of Odysseus and Athena sitting under the olive tree and Odysseus' being stripped of his garments. I have argued that the core message of the treatise reflects Porphyry's identification of the goddess Athena with phronesis, along with the olive tree, which Homer puts near the cave, symbolising nous, the intellect that generates the cosmos and permeates it. At the microcosmic level phronesis, by which the rational part of the soul is guided, inspires the soul to incline towards the level of Intellect that is, away from damaging influences of the body to which the soul is enslaved and which confuses it with desires, passions, fears and illusory impressions, and prevents it from attaining the intelligible realm. The body and its desires lead us to conflict and unjust behaviour in order to gain wealth, status, power, and pleasure. Following

Numenius, Porphyry with Plotinus reads the Odyssey as a whole in which Odysseus' laborious journey back to Ithaca and his escape from dangers, pleasures and other distractions along the way, symbolise the successful journey of the human soul to return to the 'fatherland' that is the realm of the intelligible. Homer's elaborate description of Odysseus' meeting with Athena, and of the cave of the nymphs and its surroundings, comes at an especially significant point in the poem. Having completed his long and laborious journey with the help of Athena/phronesis, Odysseus has returned to the place from which he started and in which he was born, and at Athena's suggestion he leaves all his material wealth and clothes in the cave. The Homeric hero, a soul who has stripped off his garments, is enlightened and liberated by wisdom, the ultimate goal of Neoplatonic philosophy.

I have suggested that Porphyry's identification of the goddess Athena with phronesis is best seen against the backdrop of the doctrine the levels of virtue of Sententia 32, in which Porphyry discusses the four stages of the Neoplatonic system of virtues. These stages gradually lead the soul to achieve human excellence through distinct mental endeavours. According to this doctrine, the cathartic virtues guide the soul away from bodily concerns. At this stage, phronesis directs the soul towards suppressing bodily thoughts and weaknesses, and operating in an introverted manner.

I have also examined two significant phrases in De Antro in connection with the purification of the soul or the ascent of the soul through the intelligible. The first phrase 'stripped of garments' (De Antro 35.13) is a metaphor also used in De Abstinentia, meaning the soul's freedom from corporeal things. I have demonstrated that this phrase is closely connected with the soul's 'self-detachment' from the body, while still living its corporeal life, which Smith calls 'spiritual death,' as being in the state of impassivity in this life. The second phrase, 'the inexperienced or ignorant souls in the deeds of the sea and matter' (De Antro 35.15-16), hints at a conditional situation which Porphyry interprets as Odysseus or the soul being no more subjected to embodiment only when he has got rid of sea and matter. In this context, I have investigated to what extent one should detach oneself from the earthly life according to Porphyry, who endorses a simple and self-sufficient life, and the minimum involvement with material things. Lastly, I have discussed Porphyry's doctrine of free-will according to Porphyry's fragmentary treatise (F268 Smith), On What Is In Our Power, in which although only human souls have the power to choose the self-determined life, this life is not fully under our control because of the influences of inherited and acquired features in this world.

Having followed the journey of the soul from the realm of Matter to the intelligible realm, I have demonstrated the philosophical aspect of De Antro and Porphyry's ultimate aim of showing that 'philosophy is a way of life.' Whoever our guiding spirit be, whether Athena, Homer, or Porphyry, philosophy will make us better persons if we learn to perceive truths beyond what is said. <>

Essay: Porphyry and 'Neopythagorean' Exegesis in Cave of the Nymphs and Elsewhere by Harold Tarrant and Marguerite Johnson [Méthexis 30 (2018) 154-174 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/24680974-03001009]

Abstract

Porphyry's position in the ancient hermeneutic tradition should be considered separately from his place in the Platonic tradition. He shows considerable respect for allegorizing interpreters with links to Pythagoreanism, particularly Numenius and Cronius, prominent sources in On the Cave of the Nymphs. The language of Homer's Cave passage is demonstrably distinctive, resembling the Shield

passage in the Iliad, and such as to suggest an ecphrasis to early imperial readers. Ecphrasis in turn suggested deeper significance for the story. While largely content to follow Numenian trends in interpreting Homer's cave symbolically and in relation to multiple belief-systems, Porphyry shows occasionally signs of wanting to adhere more closely to Homeric evidence, resorting to symbolic interpretation mainly when no more straightforward truth is on offer.

Porphyry and Traditions of Interpretation

While one is speaking of the history of doctrines there is no difficulty about speaking of 'Porphyry's Place in the Platonic Tradition'. It is easy to think of Porphyry as occupying a pivotal position, linked closely to Plotinus, in a chain that moves from Plato, to the Old Academy, to the Middle Platonists, and on to the Neoplatonists. Yet when we tackle his contribution to exegesis, in which area one could argue that he was equally pivotal, we need to consider whether we should think of him in terms other than those that apply to doctrine— and other than those that are restricted to a Platonic tradition. At times 'Pythagorean' would seem as appropriate a term as 'Platonic', but, apart from being potentially misleading owing to the variety of 'Pythagorean' writings, that term is also too restrictive, given the variety of exegetical tasks that Porphyry undertakes, even in extant works or fragments. Perhaps none of the authors that he is known to have interpreted was as important to Porphyry as Plato, but we must view his approach to interpretation more generally, and as part of a history that is distinct from the history of Platonism. It is particularly important that Porphyry is comfortable with the application of allegorical interpretation to both Homer and Plato, whereas Plutarch (Moralia 19e) had resisted such interpretation as applied to Homer, and, like Atticus and many other Platonists, tended to discourage the interpreter from straying far from the text of Plato.1

Naturally, not all Porphyrian interpretation was allegorical, given the wide variety of texts that he interpreted. In extant work ascribed to Porphyry, not necessarily correctly in every case, we find most obviously the interpretation of Aristotle (centred on the Categories); the presentation of Ptolemy's harmonics and in particular of Pythagorean musical theory that was part of its background; perhaps too interpretation of Ptolemy's astrology; and the interpretation of Homer, fragmentary for the most part but containing also his brief but illuminating work on just a few lines of the Odyssey. Three fragments survive of his interpretative work on a text of just two words: the Delphic inscription 'Know Yourself' (frr. 273F–275F Smith). Material from his extensive commentaries on Plato usually survives only in paraphrase, and that is better than anything from his work that interpreted Plotinus (189T–192T Smith). In one very important way Porphyry followed his early teacher Longinus—he was a scholar and polymath, spreading his interests much wider than would be required of a Platonist. As a scholar he set out to interpret both the encoded messages of myths and what he deemed to be the veiled utterances of philosophers. It is doubtful whether at any stage of his life he ceased to be a polymath, widely engaged with the Greek intellectual tradition. And presumably he had, at some stage, also been a teacher of the texts upon which he commented, some for a limited time only, and others perhaps for most of his adult life.

One question that should concern us is how Porphyry himself viewed the scholarly and interpretative tradition of which he was part. In this context it may first be useful to consider fragment 39 of Against the Christians, quoted word for word by Eusebius (he 6.19.7–8) from book 3 of that work. Here he is complaining that Origen's Christian lifestyle is at odds with his deep-rooted intellectual commitment to the Greek tradition:

For he constantly engaged with Plato and with the writings (syngrammata) of Numenius, Cronius, Apollophanes and Longinus, Moderatus, Nicomachus and the celebrated men from the Pythagorean school, and he also made use of the books of Chaeremon the Stoic and Cornutus, from whom he

learned their manner of adapting the secret rites of the Greeks before applying this to the writings of the Jews.

The figure of Ammonius, who perhaps commands most respect of all in this passage and to whom Porphyry attributes 'the greatest advance in philosophy in our time' (he 6.19.6), is probably another whom Porphyry would associate with these authors, but the list (at least if one excludes the two Stoics, and possibly Apollophanes) is surely designed to catalogue those Greek authors dear to Origen whom Porphyry too found particularly congenial—beginning with Plato but continuing chiefly with those whom one could somehow associate with the Pythagorean school. Origen is being praised for his intellectual commitment to the same tradition of religious philosophy with which Porphyry would wish to associate himself.

Another clue concerns the predecessors that Porphyry attributed to Plotinian metaphysics. Here one must note his approval of Longinus' picture of Plotinus, a picture to which he had actually contributed (Life of Plotinus 19). Longinus, quoted in Life of Plotinus 20, compared Plotinus with four earlier figures when noting his detailed exegesis of Pythagorean and (as he thought) Platonic metaphysical principles (ibid. 20.71–76), a comparison which Porphyry endorsed (ibid. 21.1–9). Thrasyllus, Moderatus, Numenius and Cronius were assumed by both Longinus and Porphyry to be driven by the same kind of interest as Plotinus, and, while their precise affiliations may be debated, all seem to be linked with some kind of Pythagoreanism. On the other hand, Plotinus only refers to Pythagoras or Pythagoreans on six isolated occasions, and might have been less approving of this comparison. He certainly never mentions any of his four alleged predecessors, even though the works of the last two were read at his classes; but then he usually avoids names anyway, except that of Plato, which occurs 56 times. There is little doubt that Plotinus saw himself primarily as a Platonist, exploring Platonist principles above all. But when

inclining towards vegetarianism and other restrictions. The problem arises from the acceptance of several influential Platonic texts as reflective of a Pythagorean-Eleatic tradition, most obviously in the new Apuleius 14 (Stover 2016, 110), encouraging exegetes among those who styled themselves 'Pythagoreans' too. Porphyry reiterates the points made by Longinus, he curiously mentions only Pythagorean doctrine, and does nothing to discourage the belief that his later mentor worked in the same tradition as the four persons mentioned—all persons whose work Porphyry used. One may suspect that this is linked with Porphyry's tendency to focus on a rather different type of tradition from the philosophic traditions that occupied Plotinus.

Of the four who were compared with Plotinus all were well known to Porphyry. Only the earliest, Thrasyllus, was not mentioned in relation to Origen, but his name occurs four times as a source in the Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics, and once in the Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos (assuming that this was genuine Porphyry). Of the others, besides being named in the contra Christianos, Numenius was referred to three times in On the Cave of the Nymphs, once in To Gaurus, and twice more in the fragmentary On the Powers of the Soul (252.1 and 253.19F Smith); Cronius is central in On the Cave of the Nymphs but receives criticism in On the Styx (fr. 1 = 372F), while important material from Moderatus is mentioned in the Life of Pythagoras. While not placed in this tradition in the Life of Plotinus, Nicomachus is mentioned twice in the Life of Pythagoras.

A Neopythagorean Allegorical Tradition

Porphyry, then, seems often to work in what one might call a quasi-Pythagorean tradition, and he encourages the view that even Plotinus did so. But what was the connecting link in his mind? We find material in Diogenes Laertius that is mainly derived, directly or indirectly, from Thrasyllus, which suggests that Plato varied his terminology for the specific purpose of concealing his detailed system

from the ignorant.12 Numenius likewise has Plato choosing a cryptic path so as to keep his doctrine safe, somewhere between making things plain and concealing them (fr. 24.61–62). Indeed, Thrasyllus may have been among the first to stress the importance of cryptic passages in followed Pythagoras (fr. 24.19–22, 57–79), and he contents himself with noting, in a vague and difficult passage (cf. Atkinson 1983: 208–211), that, of the ancients, those who followed Pythagoras and Pherecydes had come closest to 'this nature' (v.1.9.27–32). of Phaethon, related within the story (Tim. 22c3–d3). The Porphyrian side had taken it as hinting at the right way of approaching the Atlantis story—allegorically: the priest had said that it takes the shape of a myth Tim. 22c7), whereas its true reference is to astronomical matters and their terrestrial effects (cf. in Tim. i 129.23–31).

At the beginning of Porphyry's On the Cave of the Nymphs the same inference is being drawn from the impossibility of our taking the story at face value to its functioning as a riddle or allegory. Porphyry is here quoting Cronius (fr. 9) and doing so with approval. There is no evidence in accounts of the island of Ithaca, nor any way that Homer could have been exercising good poetic judgment in expecting us to believe that any such cave could have come about either through human construction or through nature's own powers. Hence, Cronius thought, it was rather obvious even to the layman that a different meaning was to be found. There follows in Chapter 3 a long list of questions that the account of the cave and of the nymphs leaves us with, later described as ('points needing clarification', 4). As a result of these Cronius found it possible to rule out (i) that it was simply a fiction designed to charm us into acceptance, and (ii) that it was a description of any geographical inquiry. Hence it was an allegory. Of those who were literalists on the question of Atlantis, Crantor had taken the view that it was merely a story arising from inquiry (in Tim. i 76.1–2), since he affirmed that the Egyptians still had a story like this to tell in his own day (in Tim. i 76. 8–10); whereas Longinus opted for its being an encouraging charm prior to a long dry exposition (in Tim. i 83.19–25 = Longinus fr. 32; cf. i 129. 20–21). Hence one can see the same ways of explaining something unbelievable being considered in the case of Plato's long story of Atlantis as in the case of Homer's brief description of the cave. They are the options that something was being reported, that it was being invented for our delectation, and that it was intended to teach us some obscure meaning. One can imagine that the first two options would not require a great deal of explanation, whereas the final one necessitated the introduction of a variety of hermeneutic tools and would indeed be time-consuming as the Atlantis-literalists taunted, making special reference to suffering 'the same fate as those who waste time with the tricky minutiae of Homer' in Tim. I 129.22–23). If, as Tarrant has contended, the arguments against allegorical interpretation here are derived from Longinus, then one may imagine that he had been criticizing those who followed Numenius and Cronius. These two can be associated with allegorical interpretation on a variety of questions. Besides Atlantis and the Cave of the Nymphs, the fragments of Numenius make it clear that other aspects of the Odyssey such as the figure of Odysseus himself and the Gates of the Sun at 24.12 were being treated metaphorically, and that various passages of Plato's Phaedo, Timaeus, and Statesman were being treated as having cryptic meanings too. By comparison Porphyry was a less committed practitioner of allegory, for Porphyry's Homeric Questions do not suggest that he regularly subjected the text to the same level of deep investigation. He at least required good reasons to resort to allegorical interpretation, and in the Cave of the Nymphs he set out to explain many of those reasons from the very beginning, with help from Cronius. However, we may ask why it was that this passage attracted attention in the first place, for it is likely that the fascination came first, and the hermeneutic dilemma second.

What Was Special about Homer's Description of the Cave?

In order to explain why this was a special passage for Porphyry one has to examine the description of the Cave of the Nymphs in some detail.

> On the head of the harbour
> an olive-tree with long-pointed-leaves,
> and near it a lovely, misty cave
> sacred to the nymphs they call naiades.
> Within there are both mixing-bowls and amphorae
> of stone: and there bees store-up-honey.
> Within are tall, stone looms, and there the nymphs
> weave cloth of sea-purple, a wonder to see:
> Within water flows. And there are two doors, one
> in the direction of the north, through which men descend,
> and the other in the direction of the south is for the divine:
> men do not enter by this one, for it is a path for the immortal-ones.
> [Odyssey 13. 102–12; trans. Johnson]

The most noticeable feature of the passage is the repetition of the phrase especially given that its second word is used a further four times. While the conjunction introduces every second line here, the combination ^^ ^^ introduces the description of three of the features of the Cave: (i) the stone basins and amphorae where the bees store honey; (ii) the tall stone looms where the nymphs weave extraordinary cloth; and (iii) the flowing water. Here its use is adverbial, meaning 'within.' One should note also that (and there') also reinforces the effect, and that then recurs with ^^, another conjunction that is prominent in the passage. In the instances where functions on the concerns of Parry and Lord, Segal (1988) maintains that the 'poets of early Greece, down through the fifth century, were keenly aware of and sensitive to the incantatory effects of ritualized sound' (61).

Finally, from a narratological perspective, the passage interrupts or, in keeping with the theories of description by Hamon (2004), suspends the narrative by means of its descriptive nature – in this sense it achieves a structural result very much in keeping with the effects of ecphrasis. With its mandatory quality of vivid description, its enargeia and resultant 'pausing' effect on a narrative, ecphrasis, like the digression of the Homeric Cave, causes the audience to stop and consider, even meditate upon, its content. What is particularly striking in this moment of narratological pausing is the provision of details to the audience that the protagonist never receives; we are told of what lies within the Cave, including the two mysterious doors, yet Odysseus remains 'in the dark.' In this sense, the use, indeed repetition of ^^ ^^, reinforces the notion of something hidden or something not easily perceived by the senses.

If, on the basis of these three considerations – the use of ^^ ^^, its repetition and the suspension of narrative – the Homeric poet achieved an attraction to the passage, scholars of allegory such as Numenius, Cronius or Porphyry should be able to traverse the Cave and emerge from one of the two doors with something of interest to show. In view of their date, the most significant word that we have used might be 'ecphrasis'. The importance of ecphrasis in the Greek and Roman novels was not long ago demonstrated by Bartsch (1989), and among the most important ecphraseis are the Actaeon sculpture described by Apuleius, a Platonist himself, at Metamorphoses 2.4, and the Europa, Prometheus/Andromeda and Tereus ecphraseis that occur early in books 1 (1.3), 3 (3.6–8) and 5 (5.3–5) of Achilles Tatius, who also seems to have known Plato rather well. There is no doubt that these passages were meant to make one think deeply about what was being described, and to allow one's thoughts to colour one's reading of the novel as a whole. Furthermore, there is no doubt that they stand out linguistically, and cluster analysis separates them reasonably well, along with other passages of special interest, from Achilles' or Apuleius' regular narrative. So ecphraseis were expected to be especially significant, and the question must be asked whether the extract on the cave was the equivalent of a Homeric ecphrasis.

There is one passage in Homer that obviously set out to do something very close to what the novelists were attempting when offering ecphraseis, and that is Homer's attempt to describe and explain the Shield of Achilles in Iliad 18. Of the vocabulary that is of interest to us we found that the conjunction, normally about 5.6% of Homer's total word-count, increased to 10.6% (8.7% in the Cave passage); the preposition ^^, normally 1.15%, increased to 3.8% (4.35% in the Cave passage); the adverb, normally about 0.26%, increased to 0.66% (1.7% in the Cave passage); and ^^, normally about 2.0%, increased more modestly to 2.7% (2.6% in the Cave). Other words reduced in frequency, of which the most significant was ^^^, down from a normal figure of 2.6% to 1.3% (0.9% in the Cave passage); other words that tended to disappear in the descriptive passages were perhaps to be anticipated, such as negatives, normally around 0.95% but dropping to 0.22% in the Shield, as well as certain other conjunctions.

The differences from regular Homer are easily visible when one employs cluster analysis or principal component analysis to compare the Shield passage with other blocks of Homeric prose. The passage is 916 words long, and is able to be compared usefully with other passages from Homer of between five hundred and two thousand words. The Cave passage is much more problematic. The lines quoted above amount to only 75 words, and though we could add the previous six lines that were already describing the harbour of Phorcys in which the cave is found, we still had only 115 words with which to work. However, when it came to comparing the percentages of the words that were found to be of interest, the results for the 115–word Cave passage were clearly similar in many ways to that for the Shield. Here is a table that gives the average figures for some of the commonest function-words in Homer, ignoring all verbs, nouns, adjectives and conjugating pronouns.

Of 31 words that qualified only eight failed to show a trend that was common to both of these highly descriptive passages, or, in other words, the rates for the Cave passage and the Shield passage usually differed from that for normal Homer in the same way. In spite of the obvious difficulties caused by the small size of the Cave extract,26 the information regarding the frequencies of the 31 words was quite sufficient for cluster analyses to recognize the similarity between the Cave and Shield, and the difference of these two from all other Homer tested. An initial analysis that asked for all material available to be separated into four clusters placed the two blocks into a cluster of their own, cluster three, while 65 blocks of at least 800 words were placed in cluster one, 21 in cluster four, and 42 in cluster two. Because a total of 128 blocks of text, 74 from the Odyssey and 54 from the Iliad were being compared, the results were not easily legible,28 and a graph was prepared limiting the material analysed to Odyssey 10–17 and Iliad 15–19.

The new results, divided into five clusters, are still not easy to read, but the shape of the graph is easily appreciated.29 While the related clusters 1 (red, 25 blocks) and 2 (green, 7 blocks) at the left both consist of a mix of Odyssey and Iliad material, clusters 3 (blue) and 4 (yellow), again quite closely related, achieve much better separation: the former contains only two blocks of Iliad material out in its 15 blocks, while the latter had only two from the Odyssey in a total of fourteen blocks, so that this analysis was also achieving some degree of separation between the two epic poems. This partial discrimination is perhaps what one could expect of two epic poems with different but interrelated histories, but it is the radical separation of all these blocks from the Cave and Shield passages (cluster 5: magenta, far right) that is particularly noticeable.

When one knows that one has at least one stylistic difference attributable to descriptive technique, and another attributable to the subtle differences between the vocabularies of the two poems, it is logical to resort to principal component analysis, which has the ability to separate out two or more types of difference found across a range of materials. So this analysis was applied to exactly the same data. Here are the results (table 2), giving the values for each block according to principal components 1 and 2.

The first and most important component places both Shield and Cave (italicized) at the extreme of the positive scores,30 and there is little suggestion of of the Iliad blocks. So, in this case there is still a similarity between Cave and Shield relative to the poem of which each forms a part.

The point of all this is to demonstrate that the Cave passage would have been recognized in antiquity as applying a distinct ecphrastic style, a style that would have suggested to antiquity's more sensitive critics that there was something special about it. Both Cave and Shield passages are highly descriptive and prominently involve supernatural elements. The former opens, and the latter closes, the third quarter of the poem of which it is part, so one might reasonably claim that both are critically placed. In this respect they resemble the ecphraseis of Achilles Tatius and Apuleius, both from the second century CE and both with Platonizing elements. Cluster analysis easily demonstrated that the ecphraseis of Achilles Tatius are stylistically different from the majority of the novel. We offer for example, a cluster analysis based on the rates of occurrence of 49 function words, without standardization of data, meaning that the commonest words count for relatively more in the analysis. Most blocks of text are of 800 words, with five special passages from books 1, 3 and 5 analysed separately. The three principal ecphraseis were placed in the fifth of five clusters, a small group in magenta at the far right, and the only other passage to be incorporated into this cluster was the intense passage at the end of Book 1, a passage that describes the garden and therein tells tales of the power of Eros, which like the Cave passage may be described as ecphrasis-like, and foreshadows what is to follow in the novel in rather a different way from the initial Europa ecphrasis. Like the Cave, it may not technically be an ecphrasis, but it combines vivid description with supernatural content in such a way as to suggest some wider relevance for the development of the story. We would argue that there is an ecphrastic register that determines certain common features of the vocabulary of these passages, probably more recognizable to the ancient reader than to ourselves. The importance of ecphrastic material lies precisely in the way that it uses detailed images to hint at factors controlling the development of the narrative.

Porphyry and His Sources on the Cave

So Cronius, Numenius, and Porphyry, one might argue, instinctively feel that the Cave passage is one that requires deeper explanation, aided no doubt by a knowledge of the popular Mithraic religion that chose either natural or artificial 'caves' for its worship. Porphyry, whose Homeric Questions on the Iliad do not employ allegorical interpretation though the dedication hints that he may do so later,34 was more cautious than Cronius in allowing for a fictional origin, possibly in deference to Longinus; he argues that even if one were to allow that there had been some ancient cave of this sort, it could only have been the seat of ancient religion, which would still require the same deep interpretation of its symbolism (4, cf. 21). Such comments about the interpretation of religious practice may remind one somewhat of Plutarch's liking for interpreting rites, and his occasional remarks that justify such a practice.

The cave itself is treated as a symbol of the universe, as is supported by a list of ancient authorities that one might also have expected from Plutarch: Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Plato, Empedocles (6–8). And it was seen perhaps not wholly as a symbol of the material universe, but also of the unseen intelligible world (9). The Naiads are associated specifically with water, and for the relevance of their name to human souls, in need of water as they descend into generation, Porphyry appeals to Numenius (10 = Numenius fr. 30), so that we now meet an authority that sounds less Plutarchian—Moses. Numenius also referred to the Egyptians generally and to Heraclitus B62, before adding a contentious reference to Homer, presumably Odyssey 6.201 (rather than 9.43), which must also have been interpreted allegorically.

At this point we should pause for a moment, since it has come almost as a surprise that an appeal is being made to Homer himself. So far we have scarcely seen a trace of the conservative principle of

interpreting Homerum ex Homero, and we have run through quite a list of authorities including ancient sages, early philosophers, and whole peoples. Yet of course Numenius, in spite of his general statement about bringing in Brahmans, Jews, Magi and Egyptians (fr. 1a), does not shrink from interpreting one Platonic passage in the light of another where it suits him. It is rather a matter of the relative value that the interpreter puts on the internal as opposed to the external evidence. The assumption that the author is human, and is using his own special human powers to generate a very particular set of thoughts in the mind of his auditors, leads one naturally to want to compare and contrast him with the literary achievements of others. But if one believes that he is merely the conduit of an inspired vision that had also informed the works of others before and after, then it is surely legitimate to compare all manifestations of that vision.

That is what lies behind Numenius' treatment of Platonic works and Cronius' treatment of Homer, but it does not have the unequivocal support of Porphyry as is shown by fr. 1.6–12 of On the Styx (= Cronius fr. 8 Leemans):

> Consequently, of those who attempted to unravel the deep implications in his [Homer's] works, the Pythagorean Cronius, though he seemed to achieve this most capably, nevertheless in most cases fits other material in with the material proposed for discussion whenever he is unable to fit Homer's in with it, and instead of aiming to bring his views into line with the ideas of the poet he strives to bring the poet into line with his own ideas.

Obviously this is no attack on allegorical interpretation of Homer, but an attack on the undisciplined use of such interpretation, particularly the kind that forgets to keep the distinctive views and communicative strategies of the poet in mind. Rather, one suspects that by the time he wrote On the Styx, Porphyry felt that Cronius had come to have too much overall influence, and one wonders how what he says here is to be reconciled with his friendlier attitude to Cronius and Numenius in On the Cave of the Nymphs. Take the long discussion of the two entrances into the cave that lasts from 21 to 31 that we know to be partially dependent upon Numenius and Cronius, and which gives rise to Numenius frr. 31 and 32, the latter without any further mention of Numenius' name (!). The passage is introduced by the repetition of Porphyry's suggestion that the passage needs deep investigation as to whether it is ancient fact or Homeric fiction, but straight away we are plunged into the Neopythagoreans' theory that the cave is a symbol of the cosmos, and into a description of the heavens, zodiac, and tropics, a discussion which seems to make little sense except on their supposition that Homer's cave stands as a symbol for something else. Authorities again include races as well as philosophers, and as it moves to its climax (29–31) Plato dominates, while appeal is also made to Homer, Hesiod, and finally to the obscure Pherecydes, whose hollows and gates are supposed to symbolize the passing of souls into and out of generation (31).

Finally, at the end of 31, Porphyry declares the examination of 'ancient philosophers and theologians' sufficient, but instead of reverting to a completely different approach, he simply moves to the next symbols, the olive tree and the name of the harbour of Phorcys, and for these he requires little but an interpretation of the Odyssey as a whole, which again takes its cue from Numenius (fr. 33), and approvingly so. Odysseus himself is, in this work, a symbol of the soul that traverses stages of generation, often laid bare in the process, frequently overcoming its passions, and returns eventually to its starting point. So too Porphyry, after journeying through the Numenian cosmos and through some ancient system of secret doctrine only partially revealed in the works of philosophers and theologians alike, returns to his own starting point in the wisdom of Homer—and how such interpretations are not just forced and ingenious (whatever Longinus would believe), for the poet's success must be built on some kind of truth. <>

PLUTARCH: ON THE FACE WHICH APPEARS IN THE ORB OF THE MOON INTRODUCTION, EDITION, ENGLISH TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTARY TO THE CRITICAL EDITION by Luisa Lesage Gárriga [Brill's Plutarch Studies, Brill's Plutarch Text Editions, Brill

In **PLUTARCH: ON THE FACE WHICH APPEARS IN THE ORB OF THE MOON,** Luisa Lesage Gárriga offers a new critical edition with English translation of one of Plutarch's most fascinating treatises, and yet one of the least known to the wider public. Dealing with the nature and function of the moon from multiple perspectives, this treatise offers a comprehensive overview of scientific knowledge and religious-philosophical thought from the first centuries CE. The difficulty of Plutarch's style, the shortage of manuscripts, and the numerous text-critical interventions have often obscured the meaning of central passages of the treatise. By means of a new approach to the manuscripts' readings and a more lenient use of editorial interventions and conjectures, Luisa Lesage Gárriga manages to bring innovative solutions to many of the problematic passages.

Audience: All interested in Ancient astronomy and the philosophical-religious thought of Late Antiquity, and anyone concerned with Plutarch Studies, his work known as Moralia, and Greek textual criticism.

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Bibliography
Index Nominum et Locorum

On the Face which Appears in the Orb of the Moon— in its Greek version and De facie quae in orbe lunge apparet in Latin (De facie from now on)—is one of the treatises included in Plutarch's Moralia. Its content deals exclusively with the moon, covering nearly every topic concerning its nature and function. No single aspect has been neglected, all of the following questions are treated in this work: the features of its surface; its movements, size, and distances to other astral bodies; the phenomena of phases, eclipses, and reflection of light; and its function both in the universe and in human life.

The fascinating topic of the treatise has attracted the attention of a wide range of scholars throughout history: philologists from Nicolas Leonicus to Harold Cherniss revised and corrected its text; astronomers as Johann Kepler or mathematicians as Lucio Russo commented on the theories included in the treatise; historians of religions and of philosophy as Franz Cumont and Pier Luigi Donini placed it in the wider cultural context of its time.

The Lost Beginning

There is general agreement that the beginning of the treatise is mutilated: the opening ex abrupto and the lack of any sort of introduction evince that at least a short part must have been lost during textual transmissions

Notwithstanding this, there is no consensus regarding the content of the lost portion. Cherniss suggested that Sulla arrives right at the moment in which the company is about to recapitulate an earlier conversation, and promises to tell a story afterwards if he is allowed to listen.52 Hubert Jr. Martin, more cautiously, suggested that "enough background information" must have been provided, although it cannot be known which details exactly were included.

Composition of the Text

For the date of composition, the treatise provides no internal evidence. The identification of some of the characters as historical, however, enable us to search in other writings for evidence in order to advance a probable date of composition. The information provided by two sources is determinant: on the one hand, we have the dinner in Plutarch's Quaest. cony. 8, organized in Rome around 98 c E, which included Sulla, Lucius, and Theon as guests; on the other hand, according to Ptolemy's Almagest, Menelaus was in Rome in 98 for astronomical observations. This allows for the assumption that the meeting of these four people, together with Plutarch and perhaps his brother Lamprias, could have taken place that same year, in Rome. Two of the three remaining characters seem to be literary creations and provide no additional information—only Apollonides, if historical, would remain un-situated. This sets a terminus post quern: it is plausible to think that Plutarch wrote the treatise not long after the meeting. Consequently, against hypotheses regarding earlier dates, my contention is that the composition of De facie should be roughly dated to the turn of the 1st century into the 2nd century.

Date and Location of the Dramatic Action

The evidence to date and locate the dramatic action is scant, and only two passages provide some hints. While the second passage (937D) simply mentions the participants' decision to stop their promenade and sit, and does not help to narrow down the place of the action, the first passage (931DE) describes a total solar eclipse that supposedly occurred not long before the meeting of the interlocutors of the dialogue. Some of the suggested eclipses are those of April of 59, March of 71, January of 75, December of 83, and June of 113. While the identification of the eclipse helps us set the date of the dramatic action, it doe not, however, provide any evidence to determine the

location. Against the tra ditional claim that the location of the eclipse and that of the meeting had to be one and the same, there is no internal evidence in the text which supportd this view. It is more reasonable to assume that Plutarch recalls a total sola eclipse that some characters might have seen and others could have heard of. In order to narrow down the location, resorting to sources other than Defacie is necessary. On the basis of Quaest. conv. 8 and of Ptolemy's testimony (above), the most reasonable conclusion is that the meeting took place in Rome, where many of the characters seem to have been around 98CE.

Characters

A total of eight characters appear in the dialogue, even though not all of them participate equally. The first speaker in the manuscript, as we have it, is Sulla. After briefly alluding to "his myth," he immediately declares his interest in a lecture about the moon to which he did not attend.

After Lamprias completes his account of that lecture, he asks Sulla to tell a story that he had promised as a requisite to participate as listener. At this point, the reader finds out that Sulla's presence is, as a matter of fact, the literary device that enables the development of the whole treatise: both the recapitulation and the narration of the myth depend on his participation. However, the participation of another character, Theon, will delay Sulla's myth once again 940F, moment in which Sulla finally intervenes, closing the treatise with a myth.

Through Sulla's intervention, we discover that he is Carthaginian (942C). according to Raingeard, the references to the musicality of the spheres in 944A.B and to Persephone "counter-earth" in 944C, both of Pythagorean tone, denote his adherence to this philosophical school. However, the fact that the content of Sulla's myth derives from another person, the Stranger, as he warns the audience (943A, "Well, I am only the narrator"), should prevent us from iating its content with Sulla.

The Sulla of De facie appears to be the same character as the Sulla presented Romulus 15: a Carthaginian and a man of culture and grace. The description fits the personality of our Sulla, who, albeit presenting himself as a layman, are to have quite extensive knowledge of optics when he discusses the lem of the half-moon in 929E-930A.

Additionally, Sulla also appears in other treatises such as De cohibenda ira, re he discusses with Fundanus the matter of the control of anger; Quaest. conv. 8.7-8, where he organizes a welcome dinner for Plutarch and where agorean topics are discussed; and most probably Quaest. conv. 2.3 and 3.3. The main interlocutor of the dialogue fulfills Sulla's wish to hear the different opinions about the moon. It is not until 937C that the reader can identi this character as Lamprias, Plutarch's brother. While it is true that keeping his name hidden could very well be a literary device—an anonymous narrator whose identity as Plutarch's own brother is revealed halfway throug the treatise—it might also be that Lamprias' name was mentioned in the los beginning.

Be that as it may, his name is explicitly mentioned three times in the treatise and all three cases are structurally important, since they mark the closure of a narrative block. In 937D, Theon addresses him after the end of the discussion In 940F Lamprias is interrupted by Sulla, when begs him to stop his speech, in order to allow him to finally narrate the myth And, in 945E, at the very end of the treatise, as Sulla finishes his myth, he addresses Lamprias one last time.

Besides being the moderator, Lamprias voices ideas associated to Platonism which may grosso modo be those of Plutarch himself. His position is perception, from the very beginning (921D) when he confronts the hypothesis of the earthy and heavy nature of the moon with that of the ethereal and luminous star,

Throughout the treatise, Lamprias is a man that enjoys provoking his interlacutordrs, especially Pharnaces, who represents the rival philosophical school par excellence, the Stoa: in 921F Lamprias qualifies the Stoic theory as abstain. Furthermore, he does not mince his words when referring to the cornments of other characters, such as that of Apollonides in 935E. His straightforwlard attitude softens when it concerns Lucius, however. In several cases Lamprias proves to be attentive and caring towards Lucius: in 923E and 928D "des him with time to prepare a refutation; and in 931D he congratulates his colleague for the nice argumentation he just developed.

Plutarch's brother appears in several other treatises. The theory that he died young presumes the writings come from Plutarch's youth. This view is nowadays dismissed, since his archonship in Delphi in 115 is attested in an inscription.76 In any case, the life or death of the real Lamprias does not necessarily imply a connection with the literary device created by Plutarch in his works.

In De defectu he plays the prominent role of narrator, as in De facie. In De E apud Delphos (485D) and several scenes of Quaest. conv. (1.8; 2.2; 8.6 and 9.14) he is presented explicitly as Plutarch's brother. In Quaest. cony. some traits of his personality are described: he is said to be quite intelligent, as well as witty and fond of teasing people.

A third character, Apollonides, intervenes in 920F in order to ask what Clearchus' position was. Lamprias answers that Apollonides more than any other person should know it since it is related to geometry, a discipline in which he is said to be versed. A little later he is presented as having knowledge in the fields of both optics and astronomy.

From his many interventions, Apollonides does not appear as the kindest or the brightest of the participants. He interrupts speakers a few times, and on one occasion he jumps in together with Pharnaces. In this latter case, his objection regarding the term "shadow" provokes a harsh remark on the part of Lamprias, who plainly accuses him of being more interested in semantic details than in serious discussion. In this line, it is interesting to note that his knowledge or intelligence is questioned more than once: he is unaware of a theory closely related to his field of expertise—as seen above in 920—; and in 935CE his proclamation that the moon's craters and elevations must be gigantic given the size of the shadows casted is quickly ridiculed by Lamprias. This sarcastic and well-argued answer makes Apollonides' last intervention more modest and relaxed than the previous ones: in 936CD he kindly suggests a problem that to be shared by him and Lamprias and asks his colleague what solution could be found.

A certain Apollonides appears in Quaest. conyv. 3.4. Since he is labelled as, there are no strong proofs to claim he is the same char-actor in Defacie. The theory of one and the same Apollonides also receives (circumstantial) support from the fact that the scene in which he appears 3-4 also includes Sulla.

The next character taking part in the conversation is Lucius (921E).86 He has the highest degree of participation after Lamprias, with whom he recapitulates the previous lecture. His opinions seem to present him as a Pythagorean but given the many points in common between Pythagoreans and Platonists, he tends to agree with Lamprias.

We have already seen that Lucius enjoys continuous support from Lamprias, as if he were his protégé; he also seems to share the witty and ironic personality traiits of Plutarch's brother. In 921EF, he asks Lamprias not to forget to mention. the Stoic theory, taking the chance to condescend and mock this schoo1.87 In 922 F, he answers Pharnaces with a laugh and an affectionate expression clearly used sarcastically, and, in 923C, he mocks Pharnaces' fear that the moon could fall onto people.88 Furthermore, from Lucius' interventions it can be inferred that he is confident in his knowledge and the ideas he defends, and that he knows how to expound them, wining the general

approval of the participants. Also, he proves to be reasonable, asks for help when needed, and is thankful afterwards. It is almost certain that the Lucius from De facie is the same as one of the guests in Sulla's welcome dinner (Quaest. cony. 8.7-8), wherein a character called Lucius, a disciple of Moderatus the Pythagorean, appears.

Pharnaces intervenes after Lucius' first intervention, in 922E, although a reference was made to him before, in 921E. In his first intervention, he attacks the Academy and its methods. He clearly represents Stoicism and advocates the moon's semi-igneous nature, which makes him the target of most of the criticisms in De facie. Besides being the target of heavy criticism he also has to endure Lamprias' and Lucius' friendly expressions, which are used ironically and with the intention to soften their following statements." However, he rarely reacts against the offenses and only speaks three times in the course of the discussion, one of them in indirect speech. Due to his scarce participation he has often been considered a fictional character. His purpose in the narration might have been simply a placeholder for all criticisms directed against Stoicism.

Next is Theon, who intervenes in indirect speech in 923F to answer Lampris' question about a quotation of a tragedian.95 He is said to be from Thebes and he is presented as an expert in literature, as can be seen in 931E and which mention his ability to quote numerous poets. He also seems to have some astronomical knowledge, as becomes apparent from his admiration of Aristarchus and from the explanation of eclipses he provides in 932DE—description, true, which seems to corroborate his secondary role in ion about the moon. To him we owe the second deferral of Sulla's When Lamprias decides, in 937C, that every topic discussed in the previ-lecture has been covered and that it is time to hear Sulla's narration, Theon -enes raising the question regarding the habitability of the moon. This is beginning of a section that enables a smooth transition from the dialogue in Sulla's monologue.

'While it is sure that this Theon is not the same as Plutarch's great friend, present in numerous passages of Quaest. cony., there are two cases (Quaest. conv.1.9 and 8.8) in which the description of one character as allows for the conclusion that both are the same person. This might also be the case with the Theon participating in De Pythiae, given that in both this treatise and the above mentioned Quaest. cony. 8.7-8, he appears together with Ptutarch's friend, Philinos.

In 920E, Lamprias addresses Aristotle, but he will not speak until 928DE. Then, Aristotle laughs at the criticisms directed against the Stoics, because he feels unaffected by them. His intervention, however, expresses his frustratio for the central role attributed to Stoicism, in an attempt to claim attention fo the Peripatos.

Little is known about this character, due to both his discreet presence in De facie and to the fact that he appears nowhere else in Plutarch's oeuvre. Most probably, this character is fictional and Plutarch used him as a symbol for the Aristotelian school. He is associated to Aristotelianism from the very beginning, and he will continuously defend the position of this school regarding the moon, in particular regarding its ethereal nature and the circular movement of the astral bodies.

Another character present at the meeting is Menelaus. He never speaks and is therefore sometimes omitted by scholars in their lists of characters. He is referred to in 930A, where Lucius qualifies him as an astronomer, before proceeding to discredit a theory pertaining to this field.

He might very well be Menelaus of Alexandria, whose work has been pre served only through an Arabic translation.'" Ptolemy mentions him by the epithet and states that he visited Rome to make astronomical observations during the first year of Trajan's reign in 98 CE. If this is indeed the case, the plural pronoun used in 939C should be taken a second reference to Menelaus, which classes him together with Theon as a native from Egypt.

Two other characters, although absent from the meeting do have a relevant role the development of the narration. One of them is the omnipresent figure, the comrade that conducted the lecture that Lamprias and Lucius summarizing. He is cited three times. On the first occasion he is referred to Lamprias (921F); in the second by Lucius (929B); and finally by Sulla (929E).

is also indirectly present throughout the discussion in the references made Lamprias and Lucius when referring to the previous lecture. it is plausible to think that is no other than Plutarch; and that a encounter between some of the characters and the author took place, on occasion in which he lectured on the subject matter of the moon, and that treatise, as we have it, is the result of adapting that lecture into a work of fiction after having organized the ideas and topics discussed.

The second absent character is the Stranger, whom Sulla met in Carthage and who is the source of the narration Sulla shares with the other participants of De facie. From the very moment Sulla begins his tale, he presents elf as a simple narrator transmitting the words of this person (941A), and only clearly states the identity of the author in 942A.

He first refers to him in indirect speech, but from 942D onwards he narrates the rest of the story in direct speech. He concludes his narration with a last reference to the Stranger in 945D. The characterization as him, as opposed to peasant, suggests the high esteem with which the Stranger is considered. He is presented as a man of culture, instructed both in philosophy and in mystery rites, which allows him to convey a type of knowledge not yet acquired by the participants: a knowledge strongly linked to the divine.

Regarding all the characters listed above, whether fictitious or not, none of them—not even Lamprias or Lucius, who defend the theories closest to Plutarch's thought—should be regarded as a spokesperson of the author.

Plutarch's Religious Landscapes edited by Rainer Hirsch-Luipold and Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta [Brill's Plutarch Studies, Brill, 9789004443525]

A Platonist philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi, Plutarch (ca. 45-120 CE) covers in his vast oeuvre of miscellaneous writings and biographies of great men virtually every aspect of ancient religion, Greek, Roman, Jewish, Egyptian, Persian. This collection of essays takes the reader on a hike through Plutarch's Religious Landscapes offering as a compass the philosopher's considerations on issues of philosophical theology, cult, ethics, politics, natural sciences, hermeneutics, atheism, and life after death. Plutarch provides a unique vantage point to reconstruct and understand many of the interesting developments that were taking in the philosophical and religious world of the first centuries CE.

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The border between philosophy and religion was never clear-cut in ancient Greece. In the first centuries CE, however, the religious becomes an integral part of philosophical reasoning to the extent that philosophy is even presented in the categories of a mystery-like initiation. At the end of this initiation the neophyte achieves the desired reunion with the divine. Plutarch is the prime exponent of this development in the Greek "pagan" sphere (complementing Jewish authors like Philo and Christians like Clement, Justin, and Origen). His Moralia and Lives provide ample witness of both philosophical approaches to religious issues and religious approaches to philosophical matters. As a Platonic philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi, he knew and viewed the ancient religious world both as a scientific observer and as an actor. In this sense, Plutarch provides a wide overview of what has been called the religious philosophy or philosophical religion so characteristic of the time.

Plutarch's writings, however, do not only provide an outstanding testimony regarding the religious landscape of the time. The material presented in both Moralia and Lives are shaped by Plutarch's own religious and philosophical agenda and convictions as well. Plutarch offers, on the one hand, first rate testimony of the theological discussions that were taking place within and without Platonism, as well as his own view of religion(s), theology, and his conception of the Divine.

This rich testimony regarding the "ancient religious Landscape" was the focus of two consecutive conferences bearing the title "Plutarch and the Ancient Religious Landscape" at the Universities of Groningen (27-29 September 2017) and Bern (28-30 June 2018), respectively. In order to enrich the discussion and exchange, as well as the quality of the presentations, the papers were first presented in Groningen, then reworked and improved before being presented again in Bern. During the presentation of the papers at the Bern conference, the author's short exposition was followed by a critical response and a plenary discussion.

The nineteen papers cover a wide range of issues related to Plutarch's testimony and have been organized into three parts following an introductory "survey" by Rainer Hirsch-Luipold ("Religions, Religion and Theology in Plutarch"), presenting both Plutarch's broad phenomenology of lived religion (including views on mythology, rituals, cultic images, symbols, iconography, architecture) and his theoretical reasoning regarding religion, god(s) and theology. The three parts are devoted to Plutarch's theology, notion of religion, and ethics (2), Plutarch's testimony of ancient religion (3), and some glimpses of the reception of Plutarch's religious thought.

Inger N.I. Kuin's "Deaf to the Gods: Atheism in Plutarch's De superstitione," opens part 2 ("Plutarch's Theology, Notion of Religion, and Ethics") by exploring Plutarch's understanding of atheism. In De superstitione, Plutarch compares deisidaimonia to atheotes, traditionally translated as `superstition' and `atheism, respectively, even if both words in Plutarch's works represent complex phenomena that do not map well onto modern categories. Kuin focuses on the comparative element of the treatise in order to investigate how Plutarch characterizes atheism and how he represents atheists. Why do some people stop believing in the existence of the gods? Or, why do some individuals—`born atheists' perhaps—never start believing in the existence of the gods in the first place? This chapter investigates in detail how Plutarch characterizes atheotes and its alleged representatives (atheoi) in De superstitione with particular attention to his understanding of atheotes as an affliction of the senses.

Michiel Meeusen's contribution, "Plutarch on the Platonic Synthesis: A Synthesis," analyses how Plutarch presents Plato as a turning point in the history of ancient Greek philosophy who developed the rivalling theological and naturalist worldviews of earlier thinkers into a harmonious synthesis. This chapter substantiates how this Platonic synthesis serves as a recurrent theme in Plut-arch's writings and usefully contributes to our better understanding of the pagan landscape against which his world should be read and interpreted.

Peter Lotscher's paper, "Plutarch's Monotheism and the God of Mathematics," deals with Plutarch as a central figure in recent discussions regarding the emergence of both a pagan monotheism and a religious branch of Platonism. Mainly based on an analysis of De E apud Delphos, especially its fourth and fifth speeches, Lötscher intends to show how, following Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, Plutarch associated belief in the existence of the one and only God, the "one being" in the true sense of the word, with the traditional religion of different peoples. The analysis of some relevant passages from De Iside et Osiride, on the other hand, serves to counter the objection made by some scholars who believe that Plutarch is a dualist who ultimately believes in two supreme beings.

The following two papers place Plutarch's ideas of homoiosis theo in the context of Early Christianity and the Gnostic traditions, respectively. The final goal of Plutarch's ethics is the

traditional ideal of "assimilation to the divine (as far as possible)," the well-known Platonic telos of homoiosis theo kata to dynaton. Geert Roskam's study "Plutarch's Theonomous Ethics and Christianity: A Few Thoughts on a Much-Discussed Problem," scrutinizes how the ethical doctrine of an assimilation to God according to Plutarch presupposes some knowledge and insight about the Divine. In a second part, the author compares Plutarch's position to that of early Christianity, particularly the Gospel of John. Similarities are to be found in the theonomous aspect of their ethics, for both indeed take their conception of God as the starting point for further moral reflections. Yet there also exist some basic differences between the two, both regarding their understanding of God and regarding the general orientation and concrete elaboration of their ethical thinking. In John, God is not just being, but love, with important consequences for his relation to the world and human beings. This also leads to a new conception of the idea of homoiosis theo. In conclusion, Roskam stresses the fundamental differences that would have led Plutarch to reject John's fundamental beliefs concerning God, Christ, and the need of salvation.

Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta's "An End in Itself, or a Means to an End? The Role of Ethics in the Second Century: Plutarch's Moralia and the Nag Hammadi Writings," focusses on the preparatory role of ethics in the individual's search for assimilation to the divine. Roig Lanzillotta contends that while some Middle Platonists and Nag Hammadi writings hesitated as to the moral or purely intellectual understanding of Plato's homoiosis theo (`likeness to God'), one finds in Plutarch an interesting combination of both aspects, since ethics provides the individual with the preparatory steps towards the higher visionary experience of the divine. Interestingly enough, this combination appears in several Nag Hammadi writings as well. By comparing the role of ethics in Plutarch and in the Nag Hammadi corpus, the chapter highlights their conspicuous parallelisms in the conception of the ethical path as being initiatory for achieving epoptic culmination. These similarities, Roig Lanzillotta observes, do not result from influences in either or both directions, however, but rather are simply expressions of the same cultural context Plutarch and the Nag Hammadi writers were part of, of the religious-philosophical continuum they shared.

The following two contributions deal with ethics and eschatology The importance of the former in Plutarch's eschatological views is assessed by Luisa Lesage Garriga ("Reincarnation and Other Experiences of the Soul in Plutarch's De facie: Two Case Studies"). Plutarch discerns several stages within the life of the soul. In each of them the ethical value of the soul is primordial and allows the discrimination of good and bad souls. Only those souls that show a constant control of the irrational part will be able to move forward to salvation, while the others that do not do so will go through a process of punishment and purification before being allowed to progress to the final desintegration into the moon's essence. Lesage explores the different groups and types of soul-intellects Plutarch envisages in De facie's myth in order to argue that the different locations allotted to them in the sublunary realm all emphasize the utmost importance of ethical values in the soul's life.

Plutarch's view of the human final encounter with the divine is dealt with by Israel Munoz Gallarte ("The Conception of the Last Steps towards Salvation Revisited: the Telos of the Soul in Plutarch and Its Context"). The chapter focusses on two difficult passages of Plutarch's Moralia describing the last steps before the reunion of human being with the divinity, namely Amatorius (766B) and De Iside et Osiride (374F-375A). While Plutarch regularly presents the achievement of the highest human goal in terms of the separation of soul and intellect, Amatorius and De Iside present it instead as a hieros gamos. With a view to explaining this alleged inconsistency Munoz Gallarte places both treatises in the wider cultural context in which Plutarch lived.

With Delfim F. Leäo's chapter, "Gods, Impiety and Pollution in the Life and Death of Phocion," we turn to the Lives. In the analysis of the Life of Phocion, Ledo shows how Plutarch insistently interprets human deeds and historical developments with references to the divine. Besides the

operative interactions of such concepts as ('fortune'), ('proper time') and ('time') in the outline of the biography, as well as omens and other signs, the Mysteries of Eleusis are particularly mentioned in articulation with important events that mark both the emergence and the decline of Phocion's military and political career. The most striking example, however, is given in the description of Phocion's death, whose execution is depicted as an ('impious crime'; Phoc. 37.2) and is explicitly compared to the trial and execution of Socrates.

In the same vein as the previous chapter, Serena Citro's contribution, "The Religiosity of Greek and Roman," examines some characters in Plutarch's works with a view to highlighting and understanding his view of the problematic relationship between human will and divine sanction. Does the favorable outcome of an action in the political or military sphere result from a weighted and thoughtful examination of the circumstances through the exercise of ? Or is it rather determined by a higher entity or a combination of both factors? While some characters show gratitude to different divinities, considering their contribution fundamental for the subsequent actions, others attribute the merit of important deeds exclusively to themselves. With a view to answering these questions, the present chapter compares Plutarch's presentation of Timotheos, the Athenian strategos, and Sulla, the Roman general.

Joaquim Pinheiro's, "La valeur de la tolma dans les Moralia de Plutarque," analyzes the concept of tolma in Plutarch, a concept that is closely related to questions concerning the soul, fate, the problem of evil, the Stoic acceptance of misfortune, and the (lack of) courage of human nature. Indeed, tolma not only expresses an ethical value but also reveals the voluntary or involuntary relationship of the human being both with the divine and the human world. In Plutarch, tolma might have a positive meaning when it reveals the virtue or heroism of human nature. But it also has a negative side, namely when it is associated with unsavory characters or actions. This chapter surveys the use of tolma in Plutarch's Parallel Lives and mainly focuses on contexts of action represented by the dynamism of courage, but takes also into consideration cases in which tolma involves attitudes marked by risk and irrationality.

Part 3 "Plutarch's Testimony of Ancient Religion" includes eight chapters charting various aspects of Plutarch's landscape of ancient religions in terms of individual religious traditions.

Fabio Tanga surveys "The Religious Landscape of Plutarch's Quaestiones Graecae". Of Plutarch's Quaestiones graecae 25 out of a total of 59 deal with religious issues. Tanga focuses on Plutarch's references to religious aspects in his description of the customs of cities, regions and islands: descriptions of gods, quotations of oracles, presentations of priests and priestesses, sacrifices made by gods' ministers or by entire cities, sacred cults and festivals, local customs or prohibitions, and sacred foods. Many of the episodes are situated in temples, sanctuaries, and sacred places. Thereby, the Quaestiones Graecae intermingle topics of knowledge, mysticism and revelation with historical, aetiological, literary and religious perspectives.

Human sacrifices are an especially problematic aspect of religious lore in Plutach's religious universe. Carlos Alcalde-Martin, "Human Sacrifices: Can They Be Justified?," analyzes several cases of human sacrifices as presented by Plutarch's Parallel Lives. The chapter focuses on Plutarch's views on this phenomenon and discusses his presentation of some human sacrifices that occur in life-and-death situations, or before imminent and decisive battles, in which such sacrifices aim to instill courage in the army or the people. This chapter pays attention both to the literary function of these episodes in structuring the biography and in characterizing the main protagonists, and to Plutarch's ethical and religious reflections.

The following four chapters are devoted to the portrait of individual deities in Plutarch: Hekate and Dionysos. Nerea Lopez Carrasco's contribution, "The Conception of the Goddess Hecate in

Plutarch," provides an overview of all references to the goddess Hecate in Plutarch's time and works. In order to do so, Lopez Carrasco organizes the materials in two different groups: references to Hekate included in ritual contexts and references to the goddess in astral conceptions (in which Hecate is presented as chtonian and ouranian). Her study shows that, building on tradition, Plutarch innovates considerably in the presentation of the goddess. In fact, Plutarch can be considered a turning point in the development of Hecate's cult in Greco-Roman literature. He marks the beginning of Hecate's vertiginous and expansive development after the first century CE, especially in its Neoplatonic conception, something that explains its appearance in the Chaldean Oracles, where Hecate becomes the World-Soul.

The first chapter on the god Dionysus is Paola Volpe's "Plutarch and the Ambiguity of the God Dionysus". It approaches the god from the perspective of myth and assesses the numerous names given to him. He is the god "of the orgiastic cry, exciter of women, Dionysus, glorified with mad honours" (Quaestiones convivales 671A).

Approaching the god Dionysus from a different angle, Soraya Planchas Gallarte's chapter, "Interpretations of Dionysus in an Orphic Ritual (Plutarch, De E apud Delphos 389A)", applies Plutarch's testimony to parse the meaning of a particular epithet of the god. She does so by means of an analysis of Plutarch's De E apud Delphos (389A), the only passage that interestingly links the use of the epithet to an orphic ritual. On the basis of a survey of all references to in Greek literature, Planchas Gallarte attempts to overcome the lack of interpretive consensus in the search for a new interpretation of the Dionysian epithet that suits this context.

Ana Isabel Jimenez San Cristobal's "The Epiphany of Dionysus in Elis and the Miracle of the Wine (Plutarch, Quaestiones graecae 299 B)," in turn, focuses on Plutarch's testimony of one particular Dionysian festival in which the women of Elis sung a hymn to Dionysus, invoking him to come to them "with the foot of an ox" (Chapter 16). The hymn in question was probably sung in a Dionysiac celebration called Thyia that took place in Elis, and during which—according to Pausanias (6.26.1)—the three empty cauldrons placed in a sealed room were miraculously filled with wine in a single night. This chapter discusses the relation between this festival and other Dionysiac festivities celebrated at Andros, Elis, Teos and Pellene where other wine-related miracles also took place.

The last chapter of the second part, Elsa Giovanna Simonetti's contribution, "Divination in Plutarch's Life of Cicero," focuses on Plutarch's presentation of Roman religion by means of analyzing Plutarch's Life of Cicero, a text that is rich in prophetic episodes. Cicero's birth is welcomed by positive presages (cf. Cicero 2.2), which he confirms in the best possible ways throughout his life and career, also thanks to his own natural talents. In the midst of his biography (5.1), the Delphic oracle intervenes to hinder his political ambitions. Divine agents save Cicero's life when it is threatened (14.4); his exile (32.4) is also marked by ominous signs, while nefarious omens accompany his death (47.8-1o). Simonetti inquires why and to what philosophical end Plutarch inserts all these divinatory episodes and references in the Life of Cicero—who, like Plutarch, was an expert on divination, and a follower of the Platonic Academy. Simonetti intends to understand the wider logic behind Plutarch's insertion of supernatural elements in his Lives. She does so by paying attention to Plutarch's strategic approach to Roman religious, cultural and divinatory customs; and to the specific ethical notions (e.g., those of virtue, nature, ambition) that help make sense of characters and circumstances utterly extraneous to Hellenic standards.

Part 4, "Some Glimpses of the Reception of Plutarch's Religion," consists of two studies devoted to the Early modern reception of Plutarch's religious ideas. Christina Harker's "The Reception of Plutarch's Universe" focusses on the reception of Plutarch's astronomical writing De facie in orbe lunae in astronomers like Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler. Plutarch functioned for these three

astronomers as inspiration, source, and literary model for their own work on a variety of subjects, including discussions of the heliocentric model of the solar system. This chapter explores in what ways these thinkers benefited from Plutarch's astronomical works and to what extent Plutarch influenced the course of scientific discovery some 140 years after his death, both as a scientific and literary forerunner.

S. Desmoulin's and O. Guerrier's contribution, "Les daimons de Plutarque et leur reception dans la Renaissance francaise," is devoted to one of the most difficult aspects of Plutarch's works midway between philosophical cosmology and religious mythology. Eusebius' Evangelical Preparation, which provides Plutarch's treatises dealing with demons a prominent place, was widely read in the first half of the 16th century. Due to Eusebius' impact, the notoriously problematic place and function of bad demons in Plutarch's oeuvre was interpreted by his translators of the 16th century in line with Christian apologists. According to Desmoulins and Guerrier, the tendency of these translators to Christianize Plutarch means that the translations tend to read Christian notions of the devil into Plutarch's demonology. <>

Olympiodorus of Alexandria: Exegete, Teacher, Platonic Philosopher edited by Albert Joosse [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Brill, 9789004466692]

This is the first collected volume dedicated to the work of the 6th-century CE philosopher Olympiodorus of Alexandria. His Platonic commentaries are rare witnesses to ancient views on Plato's Socratic works. As a pagan, Olympiodorus entertained a complex relationship with his predominantly Christian surroundings. The contributors address his profile as a Platonic philosopher, the ways he did and did not adapt his teaching to his Christian audience, his reflections on philosophical exegesis and communication and his thinking on self-cognition. The volume as a whole helps us understand the development of Platonic philosophy at the end of antiquity.

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Excerpt: About midway the sixth century CE, a student in Alexandria is taking notes. He and his fellow students listen attentively to the Platonist philosopher Olympiodorus, who has just introduced them to the writings of Plato. The student writes:

> Now if it is necessary also for us, who plead Proclus' cause, to bring Damascius into agreement with him, he [Olympiodorus] says that knowing oneself in a civic way is the target [of the *First Alcibiades*] primarily.
> Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς τῷ Πρόκλῳ συνηγοροῦντας εἰς σύμβασιν ἄγειν αὐτῷ τὸν Δαμάσκιον, φησὶν ὅτι περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολιτικῶς γνῶναι ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ὁ σκοπὸς προηγουμένως. *in Alc.* 5.17–6.1; tr. Griffin, mod.

This sentence serves as a window onto Olympiodorus' oeuvre, since it features several key elements of his profile as a philosopher. It is part of a commentary that, like all his works that have come down to us, is ἀπὸ φωνῆς, as its title says, i.e. consists of notes taken from lectures he gave. This formal feature of Olympiodorus' work foregrounds the didactic side of his activity, which is also present in frequent references to classroom settings. In the sentence cited above, Olympiodorus appears as a teacher who reflects on the aims of his instruction.

The sentence also takes us to the heart of Olympiodorus' conception of doing philosophy. His expression of intent here is specifically to bring Damascius into agreement with Proclus; this is part of an overall strategy in his work. He bases his philosophy on what his predecessors have said. He comments on Plato, Aristotle and possibly other authorities, seeking close alignment with commentators of previous generations like Proclus and Damascius.

Olympiodorus bases his philosophy on his predecessors' work not only because they provide the material with which to teach and think, but also out of the very desire to bring these predecessors into agreement with each other. Olympiodorus is deeply convinced of the importance of agreement as a criterion for knowledge and as a prerequisite for a happy life. If he can show the underlying unity of his predecessors' views, that will constitute evidence that they are correct and that their views are worth adopting in one's own life. Hence he recommends to his students (δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς) that *their* way to approach philosophy too is via a reconciliation of authorities.

The student continues to note that Olympiodorus then offers a position of his own, manifesting another basic element of his philosophical activity. It is of paramount importance to express your own judgement. If this judgement can show the underlying agreement between authorities, so much the better. Your judgement must be based on arguments, as he insists in a passage in the *Gorgias* commentary, even if your authority is Plato himself.

The chapters in this volume seek to flesh out this picture of a philosophical teacher who brings his own judgement to bear on views and arguments from a centuries-old Platonic tradition. In keeping with the focus of the majority of papers at the original Utrecht conference, the volume is devoted to the philosophical profile of Olympiodorus and to his Platonic commentaries.

To varying degrees scholarship has moved away from the view that Olympiodorus espoused a simplified metaphysics compared to his Athenian colleagues, had an attitude of compromise towards the Christian community of Alexandria, and a strong focus on Aristotle rather than Plato—as, in this view, befits a member of the Ammonian school of Alexandrian philosophy.

Of particular value about this earlier approach to Olympiodorus is the focus on the strong continuities between his work and that of his teacher Ammonius, whom Olympiodorus cites approvingly, especially in the *Gorgias* commentary. It is also true that Olympiodorus' work gives us no evidence that his teaching included as complex a metaphysical picture of the world as that of

Proclus—though it remains subject to debate whether this applies only to his teaching for a wider audience (from which it seems his commentaries derive) or also to Olympiodorus' convictions and perhaps inner-circle teaching.

In the other respects, however, Olympiodorus does not fit into the picture of the Ammonian school as earlier historiography has presented it. His openness to Christian terminology is arguably not evidence of compromise but of a deep conviction that surface meanings from different traditions stand in different ways for the same underlying truth. On key aspects, moreover, he does not deviate from Platonic views, even where they are repugnant to Christian convictions.

Olympiodorus' treatment of Aristotle, furthermore, clearly does not take precedence over his Platonic teaching. The opening lines of his *Prolegomena* to the *Categories* and of his *Commentary on the First Alcibiades* are programmatic. In the former work, he states:

> Because we wish to benefit from the fount of goodness there is an eagerness among us to cleave to Aristotle's philosophy, which endows life with the source of goodness. *Prol. log.* 1.3–5, tr. Gertz

Olympiodorus refers back to these lines when he starts the *Commentary on the First Alcibiades* by saying:

> Aristotle begins his own *Theology* with the statement that 'all human beings naturally reach out for knowledge; and a sign of this is their love of the senses'. But in beginning Plato's philosophy, I would go a step further and say that all human beings reach out for Plato's philosophy, because all people wish to draw benefit from it; they are eager to be possessed by its streams, and to render themselves full of Plato's inspirations. *in Alc.* 1.3–9, tr. Griffin, mod.

Aristotle's philosophy serves as the source (or starting point, ἀρχή) for making life good, but Plato's philosophy fills us with inspiration. The language of inspiration used here expresses Olympiodorus' conviction that we must turn to Plato for knowledge of higher truths. But he displays an uncritical attitude to Aristotle nor Plato, correcting each if need be.

Rather than focusing on reasons for rejecting an earlier paradigm, however, this volume presents a constructive picture of the Platonic aspects of Olympiodorus' teaching. Recent work on Olympiodorus has already done much towards this aim. The field owes a great deal to the work of Harold Tarrant, who not only collaborated with Robin Jackson and Kimon Lycos on a fully annotated translation of the *Gorgias* commentary over twenty years ago, but has continued to work on the form and arguments of Olympiodorus' commentaries. The Utrecht conference too benefited greatly from his participation. Scholars in this field also owe a large debt to Leendert Westerink (1913–1990), whose editorial and interpretive work on Olympiodorus remains indispensable.

In general terms, Olympiodorus has profited from increased scholarly interest in Late Antiquity and in Late Ancient Philosophy in recent years. We are fortunate to have three excellent recent overviews of his thought and work. (Rather than giving another summary in this introduction, therefore, I will highlight key elements directly pertinent to the chapters in this volume in the sections below.) A number of annotated translations of Olympiodorus' works have appeared in recent years. Interest in the persona of Socrates has stimulated study of his Platonic commentaries, the *Gorgias* and *Alcibiades* commentaries being respectively the only and only complete treatment of these Socratic works in the Neoplatonic curriculum to have come down to us.

The detailed scrutiny of Olympiodorus' work undertaken in this volume roughly revolves around four areas of interest: the profile of the philosopher that we find in Olympiodorus' work; his interest in perception and knowledge of oneself; his concern with the form of philosophical communication; and his position vis-à-vis his Christian surroundings.

Philosophical Profile

The figure of the philosopher appears in two guises in particular in this volume: in what his interests and materials are and in the ideal that he tries to embody. To start with the former, it is probable that Olympiodorus taught more than the core philosophical material conveyed in the Aristotelian and Platonic commentaries. For instance, his commentary on Paulus of Alexandria's Εἰσαγωγικά concerns astrological matters. It is likely that he also taught rhetoric. Scholars have also cautiously suggested that he provided training in medicine. Cristina Viano's contribution concerns his interest in chemistry. This is evident already from the *Meteorology* commentary. But Viano reopens the question of Olympiodorus' possible authorship of the alchemical commentary on a work by Zosimus, *On Action*. Viano agrees with the majority view that this commentary is not the work of Olympiodorus as it stands. The hypothesis she advances here, however, is that the first part of the work does substantially derive from Olympiodorus' pen, as comparisons with the *Meteorology* commentary show. In Viano's view, this layer of the text was updated (much) later by means of interpolations and of an additional second part consisting of citations from other philosophers and alchemical authors.

While Olympiodorus' range of interest was broad, the material he was able to work with was not always as extensive as was the case for, for instance, his contemporary Simplicius. Take the *Alcibiades* commentary, where scholars even doubt whether Olympiodorus had access to Proclus' treatment; and it is fairly clear he did not have access to earlier thinkers. In the commentaries on the *Categories* and the *Gorgias* there is no trace of direct knowledge of authors before Ammonius. Anne Sheppard shows that a similar situation holds for some of the literary works of which we find frequent citations in Olympiodorus. Sheppard finds no evidence that he knew much about the comedies and tragedies he cites. She also argues that the way in which he cites them shows that Olympiodorus did not have much interest in them either (I will return to Sheppard's contribution below on p. 9, in considering Olympiodorus' interest in the formal aspects of philosophical communication).

Working from a material basis that was in many ways restricted, Olympiodorus tried to pursue and to convey an ideal of what it is to be a philosopher. An important instrument for communicating this to his audience is the sketch of Plato's life which we find at the beginning of the *Alcibiades* commentary. Anna Motta argues that this presents a unity of doctrine and biography. The philosopher's biography offers a model of philosophical excellence for students to aspire to (and so as a point on the horizon to guide them through their reading of his work). It specifically turns the students towards themselves, Motta argues, which shows that the presence of the *Life of Plato* at the beginning of the *Commentary on the Alcibiades* is not incidental, but expresses a unity of purpose. But even before serving as a model for the students to aspire towards, the *Life of Plato* presents the ideal in virtue of which the master himself, Olympiodorus, is able to teach Platonism to the next generation.

Key in the portrait of Plato is the range of virtues it incorporates. Olympiodorus adopts from his predecessors an account of the degrees of virtue that ranges from the qualities that we are born with through the conditions of the soul informed by reason to the suprarational virtues in which the human soul is united with the divine. We thus get the series natural—ethical—civic—purificatory—theoretical—paradigmatic—and perhaps hieratic, which features in a number of the chapters in this volume. Michael Griffin highlights the psychological development of the student as he ascends along this series to become a more and more perfect philosopher, or, as Motta points out, more and more like Plato. In the first stages, this is a process of increasing psychological organisation, which paves the way for a liberation that leads to identification with the divine. Griffin emphasizes the inclusive nature of the higher stages of this scale. The philosopher operating at the theoretical level

can still engage in civic matters. He also notes that the highest stages still contain specificity. In accordance with the *Phaedrus* (252d–253c) Olympiodorus envisages the philosophical ideal as assuming the character of the particular god to which we severally belong.

Self-Cognition

Crucial to the progress from natural virtue towards philosophical virtue is the turn towards ourselves. It is a main ethical concern for all Neoplatonists to turn us away from concentrating on the sensory dimension of reality, which is merely the product of soul, and to encourage us to identify with the highest aspects in ourselves, this being the route through which we can rejoin our origin. This explains the pivotal role of the *First Alcibiades*, which as the first dialogue of Olympiodorus' Platonic curriculum is the text in which students are encouraged to come to know themselves. It is not only in the commentary on this dialogue, however, that we find Olympiodorus to have a sustained interest and an approach of his own to self-cognition. In his comments in the *Phaedo* commentary, Olympiodorus seems to restrict self-cognition to the rational soul: only it is able to revert to itself. Péter Lautner argues that this makes any kind of awareness of our perceptions that includes ourselves as subjects of that perception the province of the rational soul. Lautner also argues that Olympiodorus advances a rich view of perception in another respect. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he attributes perception of universals to animals.

Olympiodorus also seems to restrict the range of self-knowledge at the other end of the philosopher's development. As Danielle Layne points out, he speaks positively of a kind of ignorance of one's ignorance which besets the soul at the theoretical stage. This double ignorance, which involves the soul's unawareness of its embodiment, is superior to knowledge. Olympiodorus' remarkable conception of ignorance of oneself, Layne argues, involves a kind of reversal between those at the lowest and those at the highest end of the ladder of philosophical development. Alcibiades identifies with his body and reputation. He needs Socrates' method of purification to realize that his desires aim at real power rather than the images of power which he now focuses on. In this process of realizing what he really wants, Alcibiades comes to know his soul. The philosopher described in the *Theaetetus*, on the other hand, knows himself as soul but does not even realize his ignorance of his body and of life in the body.

Alcibiades, it seems, never actually achieves self-knowledge, even if Socrates puts him in the way of it. The aim of Olympiodorus in teaching the *First Alcibiades*, however, is very much for his students to reach civic self-knowledge. Olympiodorus' nuanced presentation of the aim (σκοπός) of the dialogue as civic, rather than theoretical self-knowledge or self-knowledge *simpliciter* raises the question of what distinguishes civic from other types of self-knowledge. My own chapter addresses this question. For Olympiodorus, civic self-knowledge involves embodiment, *metriopatheia*, and ourselves as individuals with particular interests. But even if civic life is responsible for our individuation, civic self-knowledge is not enough to know ourselves *as* individuals. This ambivalence about civic (self-)knowledge surfaces elsewhere: Olympiodorus affirms and denies that the civic knower is a philosopher. This shows, I argue, that Olympiodorus uses 'civic self-knowledge' as a transitional notion, not one that captures one precise stage of knowledge. Cognition and ignorance of oneself, then, are not necessarily fixed notions in Olympiodorus, but can be used at different places in his conceptual scheme.

Form of Philosophical Communication

Like other Neoplatonists before him, Olympiodorus is aware of the importance of formal aspects of philosophical writing and teaching. He works with the interpretive assumption, standard since Iamblichus, that every aspect of a text should contribute to the one target (σκοπός) of that text. That makes him particularly sensitive to literary and dramatic features of Plato's dialogues, which Olympiodorus attempts to explain no less than argumentative elements in one comprehensive view

of the respective dialogue. He also has a keen eye for the various ways in which Plato has Socrates adapt his words to the character of his interlocutor. For Olympiodorus, this is part and parcel of the life of the philosopher in the city. For the philosopher who operates at the civic level not only has knowledge of himself as an individual embodied being, but also engages with his fellows, leading them to the good life. As Bettina Bohle shows in her analysis of the *Gorgias* commentary and Hermias' *Commentary on the Phaedrus*, this involves rhetoric. According to both Olympiodorus and Hermias, Plato recognizes a true rhetoric that aims at the good, is able to explain itself, and pitches its message depending on the kind of soul with which it communicates. These high demands mean that true rhetoric is inseparable from philosophy. And in fact, Bohle argues, we would do best to view the rhetorician as the philosopher in his role of persuading, or rather teaching, others. Olympiodorus and Hermias' favoured rhetoric turns out to be the dialogue that Socrates is engaged in with his fellow citizens.

François Renaud zooms in on a specific instrument of communication in the dialogues: myth. Even though, as often, it is hard to gauge Olympiodorus' originality due to the loss of earlier *Gorgias* commentaries, we do find in his commentary a nuanced hermeneutic of myth. Olympiodorus distinguishes between philosophical myths and poetic myths. For both types of myth the important thing is to uncover their deeper meaning. The advantage of philosophical myth, however, is that their surface meaning does not harm those incapable of digging deeper. The temporal aspect of the final myth of the *Gorgias*, for instance, must be taken as part of the surface meaning. When the myth speaks of punishment after death, its deeper meaning concerns the here and now and involves, Renaud argues, the practice of Socratic dialectic. Myth thus has a double function: it stimulates the thought of those capable of unearthing deeper meanings and it appeals to all souls because it is an image of the truth. (I return to Renaud's chapter below, p. 10.)

Anne Sheppard's chapter, which we looked at before, also explores Olympiodorus' reflections on the dramatic form of Plato's works and the ethical function of literature, in relation to the views of his predecessors. In both cases, she argues, Olympiodorus' work helps us understand Neoplatonic views but does not constitute evidence that Olympiodorus' interest in the literary side of philosophy was exceptional.

His interests in the literary aspects of philosophy and the modes of its communication may have led Olympiodorus to find a new use for the idea that Plato employed different registers of writing, as Harold Tarrant suggests. Earlier commentators related the style of discourses in Plato's works to their subject matter (following *Tim.* 29b4–5), weightier styles being used to treat weightier matters, or alternatively simple styles to speak of higher, and more simple, beings. Olympiodorus, Tarrant argues, seems to repurpose the characterization of discourses as 'inspired': it is no longer the subject matter but the divine person who speaks through the mouth of Platonic characters that determines whether a discourse is inspired.

Attitude towards Christians

The attitude which Olympiodorus takes towards his Christian contemporaries may provide an important background to these observations of philosophical style and its interpretation. Olympiodorus may have been the last pagan head of the school of Alexandria, which lends particular interest to the question of his attitude.[21] Moreover, his work features a number of striking passages that present Greek notions in terms that are acceptable to a Christian audience.[22] In view of that background it is remarkable, Tarrant notes, that the figures whose discourses Olympiodorus mentions as inspired at the beginning of the *Alcibiades*commentary do not seem to be very senior (with the exception of the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, harmless in a Christian context). Tarrant suggests that this may point to Olympiodorus' efforts to neutralize any threat a Christian audience may have felt at inspired pagan discourse in Plato's works. As talk of wine and aulos music as having

inspirational effects may also indicate, Olympiodorus no longer seems to treat inspiration as very significant. And this, according to Tarrant, is not only a matter of communication but a matter of (a lack of) conviction.

A stronger emphasis on the communicative aspect of Olympiodorus' attitude emerges from François Renaud's analysis of how Olympiodorus characterizes Plato's mode of writing. The prominence of myths in Plato's writing are part of an overall esoteric strategy, which hides the truth from those who cannot understand it and stimulates those who can to search for it. Olympiodorus' own teaching too, Renaud suggests, can profitably be viewed as to some degree esoteric: it combines caution with an exhortation to come closer to the knowledge in ourselves.

There are, however, a number of issues on which Olympiodorus' open adherence to orthodox Platonism has long been recognized. Simon Fortier analyses what is perhaps the most remarkable of these: the doctrine of transmigration. Fortier substantiates the idea that this doctrine was eminently unacceptable to Christians. Olympiodorus' overt exposition of this doctrine is therefore clear evidence of his unwillingness to compromise on his Platonic views and may even have become a trademark of his Platonism for himself and his environment as well.

Some of the chapters assembled here argue that Olympiodorus developed novel ideas and approaches. In others the emphasis is rather on the continuity between his ideas and those of his predecessors. To some extent, this difference is of secondary importance. Olympiodorus is a representative of Neoplatonism precisely because he combines use of and deference to authorities with a strong conviction that arguments must carry the day and with enough independence of thought to offer solutions of his own, to forge new concepts and to put old ones to new purposes.

In these pages Olympiodorus emerges as a thinker interested in the formal aspects of philosophical communication and in issues of self-cognition, a thinker moreover who directs his efforts to finding the best stance between his old and broad tradition and new circumstances. This picture reflects interests in scholarship today. Present-day interests in turn help us see better what concerned Olympiodorus. <>

Essay: *Olympiodorus and Greco-Alexandrian Alchemy* by Cristina Viano from Olympiodorus of Alexandria

The Alchemical Commentators or the Age of Systematisation

The Byzantine period in Egypt starts with the death of Theodosius I in 395 and ends under the reign of Heraclius with the Arab conquest in 640. Byzantine Egypt enjoys a period of peace from the fifth through the seventh century, in the course of which Alexandria finds itself at the centre of intense intellectual and spiritual activity. Philosophical and scientific debates continue, fierce doctrinal disputes emerge around Christian dogmas, in engagement also with gnostic and hermetic doctrines.

In this intellectual cauldron, Greek-language alchemy is at a crucial moment in its development: this period sees an elaboration and definition of its doctrines and operations, as well as the conceptual tools to think about them, to provide the foundations for all successive periods.

For typical of this period is a generation of 'commentators' like an 'Olympiodorus' (6th century) and a 'Stephanus' (7th century). Their writings, intended to clarify the thought of the great figures of previous generations and in particular of pseudo-Democritus and Zosimus, represent the most advanced stage of theorization of ancient alchemy.

The period witnesses a real process of definition and systematization of alchemical doctrine, which takes place by means of the intellectual instruments of philosophy available to these writers. This process, begun by previous authors, now finds its full realization. Thus, the empirical literature of

recipes, characteristic of the first phase of alchemy, is integrated through systematic reflection on the causes of operations. And so we find a transition from *historia* to *theôria*. Indeed, these authors lay the groundwork for reflecting on the possibility and nature of alchemy as an autonomous branch of knowledge, insofar as they aim to develop the connections between theory and practice, nature and *technê*, between, on the one hand, the doctrine of transmutation and philosophical theories of matter, and technical methods on the other.

It is also towards the 7th century that the corpus of alchemical writings starts being organized into its very specific form of an anthology, composed basically of extracts. The anthology is thought to have been compiled at Byzantium, in the age of the emperor Heraclius (610–641), by a certain Theodorus, who may also have been the author of its verse introduction. This anthology is found in a large number of manuscripts. The most important of these are the *Marcianus Graecus* 299 (M) (10th–11th century), the oldest and most beautiful, brought from Byzantium by Cardinal Bessarion in the 15th century and currently held in the St Mark's library at Venice; the *Parisinus Graecus* 2325 (B) (13th century); and the *Parisinus Graecus* 2327 (A), copied in 1478.

Historians of alchemy have at a very early stage posed the question of the identity of the 'commentators' Olympiodorus and Stephanus with their Neoplatonic commentator namesakes. Pseudepigraphy is indeed a frequent phenomenon in alchemical literature. Among the alchemical authors in the corpus we find mention of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus and Theophrastus. But from a chronological point of view Olympiodorus and Stephanus constitute limiting cases between these obviously wrong attributions and authentic attributions to well-known figures, such as Psellos (11th century).

In the corpus of the alchemists these two authors are defined, among others, as 'the all-praiseworthy and world-wide masters, the new exegetes of Plato and Aristotle' (CAAG 26.3: οἱ πανεύφημοι καὶ οἰκουμενικοὶ διδάσκαλοι καὶ νέοι ἐξηγηταὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους). This is one of the main reasons in favour of the attribution of the works of this Olympiodorus and of this Stephanus to their Neoplatonic namesakes, or at least of the original versions of these works. Nevertheless, while recent studies on Stephanus incline more and more toward the hypothesis of identity, in Olympiodorus' case the hypothesis of pseudepigraphy remains the most common among scholars.

Owing to the particularly composite and discontinuous form of Olympiodorus' work, the question of attribution is indeed more complex and delicate than in the case of Stephanus, who by contrast presents a more homogeneous collection of treatises. As we will see, it constitutes an exemplary product of alchemical literature, a literature that in large part is composed using parts that derive from the dismemberment of lost texts.

I would like to advance a new hypothesis about the authorship of the commentary attributed to Olympiodorus and about the fundamental role of Olympiodorus in the process of its composition. In so doing my aim will be to bring to light a new facet of the complex philosophical personality of Olympiodorus.

Olympiodorus and the Commentary on the Book **On Action**

'Olympiodorus' is one of the most interesting authors of the alchemical corpus. The issue of the attribution of the commentary on Zosimus' book *On Action* to his namesake the Neoplatonic commentator touches on two vital questions for understanding Greco-Alexandrian alchemy: the constitution of the treatises in the corpus and the relevance of contemporary philosophy for alchemy.

We know that Olympiodorus the Neoplatonist is a rich source of information about the cultural conditions and the educational methods of 6th-century Alexandria. His commentaries exhibit a very

typical form: they are structured by a certain number of lessons (*praxeis*), each containing the general explanation (*theôria*) and the particular explanation (*kata meros* or *kata lexin exêgêsis*) of a section of text from Aristotle or Plato (generally referred to as *lexis*). In keeping with the tradition of the Alexandrian school, Olympiodorus is interested in Aristotle's logic and philosophy of nature. His commentary on the *Meteorology* in particular is a work of the greatest interest for the history of science. In completing and fixing the Aristotelian classifications of meteorological and chemical phenomena, Olympiodorus undertakes a formidable work of systematization of concepts that Aristotle had hardly delineated, such as that of the 'chemical analysis' (*diagnôsis*) of homogeneous bodies of book IV (*in Mete*. 274.25–29). He partakes of debates among commentators about difficult and problematic issues in the *Meteorology*, for instance about the theory of vision, about the manner in which the rays of the sun heat up the air, or about the origin of the sea's salinity. Finally, he provides much information about the state of science and technology of his time, such as mathematics, optics, astronomy, medicine, agriculture and metallurgy. As to the commentary on book IV of the *Meteorology*, the first 'chemical' treatise of antiquity, Olympiodorus' systematic contribution is fundamental: it helps in great measure to constitute a new field of research into the properties, conditions and transformations of sublunary matter. His commentary is the most frequently used not only by Arab and Renaissance authors, but also by Greek and mediaeval alchemists.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that one of the most 'philosophical' works of the Greek alchemical corpus has come down to us under the name of Olympiodorus. It presents itself as the commentary on a (lost) treatise of Zosimus and on sayings of other ancient alchemists (CAAG 69.12–104.7) In the principal manuscript of the corpus, *Marcianus Graecus* 299 (M) and in its copy (*Parisinus Graecus* 2249 = K), this treatise bears the title: 'Olympiodorus, philosopher of Alexandria, on the *On Action* of Zosimus ⟨and⟩ all that has been said by Hermes and the philosophers' (ΟΛΥΜΠΙΟΔΩΡΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΩΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΚΑΤ' ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ ΖΩΣΙΜΟΥ ⟨ΚΑΙ⟩ ΟΣΑ ΑΠΟ ΕΡΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ ΗΣΑΝ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΑ).

Content and Structure of the Commentary

The author explicitly presents his commentary as both exegetical and doxographical. One of its most characteristic features is its appropriation of Greek philosophy, and particularly of Presocratic philosophy, as the epistemological foundation of the transmutation of metals. Towards the middle of the commentary (CAAG 79.11–85.5; §18–27), Olympiodorus reports the views of nine Presocratic philosophers (Melissus, Parmenides, Thales, Diogenes, Heraclitus, Hippasus, Xenophanes, Anaximenes and Anaximander) on the single principle of all things. He subsequently outlines a comparison between these tenets and those of the principal masters of the art of alchemy (Zosimus, Chymes, Agathodemon and Hermes) on the efficient principle of transmutation, which he refers to as 'divine water' (*theion hudôr*).

Like most texts in the corpus of Greek alchemists, Olympiodorus' commentary has a composite and seemingly unstructured character. The title of M seems composed of two parts but without any sign of punctuation or connecting particle which would allow us to understand their relation. It has no introduction nor conclusion, it starts and ends *ex abrupto*.

We can divide the text into two sections. Only the first (CAAG 69.12–77.14; §1–14) exhibits a coherent structure: the author starts by commenting on a phrase of Zosimus on the operation of extracting gold particles from ore, by means of 'maceration' (*taricheia*) and 'washing' (*plusis*) (§1–7). He does so according to Olympiodorus' typical scheme: first the *lexis*, the phrase from Zosimus that is commented on, then a general explanation (*theôria*), and subsequently the detailed exegesis of terminology (*exêgêsis kata lexin*). The general explanation also introduces the theme of the obscurity (*asapheia*) of the 'ancients', widened to include Plato and Aristotle, which served the double purpose

of hiding doctrine from the uninitiated and of exhorting students to investigate for themselves. The text then introduces the 'welding' (*chrysokollê*) of gold (§8–11), which involves the assembly of the acquired gold particles into a homogeneous body. These two specific operations of separation and reunification are interpreted in the text as allegories of the transmutation of metals. Next come the three types of dyeing of ancient alchemists (§11–14): the type which evaporates, that which evaporates slowly, and that which does not evaporate. The third bestows an indelible character onto the metals. In operative terms this means fixing the colouring of a metal in such a way as to give it a persistent character.

The second section—the longest part of the text (77.15–104.7; §15–55)—is composed of an unstructured series of *excerpta* and of digressions accompanied by remarks on the main alchemical operations.

§16 concerns fire, since according to Zosimus, moderate fire has a fundamental role to play in the practice of the art of transmutation, since it is its prime agent. Reflection on fire leads the author to consider the function of the four elements and the views of the Presocratics on the principles. §18 begins the doxographical exposition of Presocratic doctrines concerning the single principle, which extends from §19 through §25. The author subsequently (§25–27) compares the principles just identified to the principles of the ancient alchemists. The second half of the treatise (§28–55) revisits arguments from the first section (§1–14), followed by a description of the stages of transmutation and the theorization of first metallic matter. §28 considers the status of the elements in the ancient alchemists: they constitute dry, hot, cold and wet bodies. §32 takes up the distinction between stable bodies and instable bodies that was outlined in §15. Olympiodorus now distinguishes between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances, i.e. between meltable metallic substances and ores that cannot be treated by fire. Linked to the discussion of ores is a passage of the *Final account* of Zosimus which concerns the role of alchemy among the kings of Egypt (§35). From §36 onwards, focusing on first metallic matter, Olympiodorus relates the dialogue between Synesius and Dioscorus on mercury.[11] After considering the separative function of white and the 'comprehensive' function of black in colouring (§38), Olympiodorus follows Zosimus in identifying first metallic matter with black lead. §43, presents 'divine water' as responsible for transmutation. In §44, Zosimus defines lead by means of the symbol of the philosophical egg composed of the four elements. The subsequent sections discuss the 'powers' of lead and the stages of transmutation, each linked to particular colours (black, white, yellow and red). In §54 we find a consideration of the art of transmutation, which is said to be *eidikê* ('specific') and not *koinê* ('common'). The conclusion (§55) sums up a number of essential notions in the work: substances responsible for transformations, like *chalkomolybdos* and etesian stone, the melting and production of gold, the causal activity of fire in the various stages.

Beyond this appearance of disorder, however, we can detect a rational and coherent design in the way the treatise unfolds, which reveals itself in two factors. The first is the logical sequence that ties together the alchemical operations, the principles and fundamental substances. This sequence exhibits a development through the presentation of the constituent elements of alchemy, from the fundamental operations (grinding, melting, dyeing) to its active and material principles, ending with epistemological considerations on this discipline as a *technê*.

The second factor that renders the work coherent are phrases that one might call 'connective and associative'. Here the author speaks in the first person and marks the transitions between different sections as well as the aim, method and internal organization of his text. His work thus turns out to be an *epitomê*, a summary with protreptic intent, providing a selection of testimonies, with commentary, taken from the writings of the ancient alchemists, but also of philosophers properly speaking, on the basic elements of the art (operations, ingredients, and also its history). It seems to

be addressed to a young man of high rank with the aim of providing him with 'an overview of the preliminary general knowledge of the art' (*tês enkukliou technês hê sunopsis*) (§38).

I think that the text we possess is based on a work by Olympiodorus, now lost, composed in a more structured way. The text we possess would be composed of at least two layers: Olympiodorus' commentary on Zosimus' *On Action* and the arrangement of a compiler. The latter copied Olympiodorus up to a point and then added a sequence of remarks on the main alchemical operations, accompanied by *excerpta* from Zosimus and other alchemical authors, organizing the whole work by the double criterion just mentioned.

In other words, I think that the opening sections (§1–7) as well as a sizeable part of the doxography on the Presocratics (§18–27) derives directly from Olympiodorus' commentary on *On Action*. It is also very probable that the compilation has been superimposed on the run of the commentary. That is to say, the compiler has inserted other *excerpta* and digressions but could return to Olympiodorus' commentary on *On Action* and copy and/or paraphrase other parts from it, such as the doxographical part which, in my view and at least as far as the Presocratics are concerned, is the work of Olympiodorus. It is also quite plausible that Zosimus' *On Action* itself was already a doxographical work as far as the opinions of the alchemists are concerned, and that Olympiodorus' commentary added a doxography on the Presocratics, which is structured according to the characteristic scheme of Neoplatonic commentaries.

Convergences

The parts which we can see as deriving directly from Olympiodorus' commentary are, in fact, characterized by formal, terminological and conceptual similarities with the commentary on the *Meteorology* and other works by the Neoplatonic Olympiodorus.

The most striking formal similarities are: the typical commentary structure divided into *lexis, theôria, exêgêsis kata lexin* which one finds at the start of the treatise, and the typically Neoplatonic arrangement of the Presocratic doxography. At the very beginning, furthermore, one encounters the theme of Aristotle's obscurity (*asapheia*) illustrated by the distinction between that which is in a subject (substrate, *en hupokeimenôi*) and that which is not (*ouk en hupokeimenôi*). These terms are used to refer to substances and accidents at the beginning of the *Categories* (1a20–1b9); commentators considered them an instance of Aristotle's obscurity. The issue of obscurity was one of the ten questions that constituted the introduction to the exegesis of Plato and Aristotle and which all Neoplatonic commentaries to the *Categories* featured in their opening pages.

The terminological and doctrinal convergences with the commentary on the *Meteorology* are frequent. I will mention a number of examples. Olympiodorus the alchemist uses the adjective *drastikos* to refer to the fire of Heraclitus (82.18), the same way Olympiodorus the commentator calls active causes *poiotêtai drastikai*(275.33) and speaks of the *drastikê dunamis* of fire (18.14).

Olympiodorus the alchemist defines white and black as extreme colours: white as 'that which dilates' (*diakritikon*) and black as 'that which contracts' (*sunektikon*, 92.5–6); similarly we read in Olympiodorus *in Mete.* 314.25–26 (this is in the course of a discussion of the effect of active qualities on the senses): 'For these things act on our senses: white dilates (*diakrinon*) while black contracts (*sunkrinon*) the organs of sight, and the others similarly act on each sense'.

In our alchemical text, smoke (*kapnos*) and humid vapour (*atmos*) are presented as *metaxu* items between the elements. Now, it is an interpretation of Olympiodorus' to assign to exhalations an intermediate status between the elements. He defines exhalations as 'contiguous' (*prosechê*, 16.15; 40.13) elements, 'intermediate' (*metaxu*), 'half-kinds' (*hêmigenê stoicheia*, 16.17–19), 'analogous'

(*analogounta*) to earth and water (314.18). He identifies them with transitory states, manifestations of elements themselves by means of which transformations between elements occur. Humid exhalations, for instance, are an intermediate (*metaxu*) state between water and air, and dry exhalations are intermediate between fire and earth (16.15–22). This interpretation allows Olympiodorus to erase, at least in part, the gap between the meteorological phenomena that result from exhalations in books 1–3 and the return, in book 4 of Aristotle's *Meteorology*, to the elements in their role in transformations of bodies.

In fact we can use a passage from Olympiodorus, *in Mete.* 16.19: 'For vapourous exhalation is intermediate between water and air and smoky exhalation is intermediate between fire and earth' (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀτμιδώδης μεταξὺ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος, ἡ δὲ καπνώδης πυρὸς καὶ γῆς), to correct a passage in the alchemical commentary, rendering it more comprehensible: 'Anaximander said that the principle is the intermediary, referring to the intermediary constituted by vapours or smoke. Vapour is indeed intermediate between ⟨air and water, while smoke is intermediate between⟩ fire and earth. And to put the point in general terms, every intermediary between hot and humid things is vapour. As to the intermediary between hot and dry things, this is smoke.' (Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ ἔλεγεν ἀρχὴν εἶναι · μεταξὺ δὲ λέγω τὸν ἀτμὸν ἢ τὸν καπνόν · ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀτμὸς μεταξύ ἐστιν ⟨ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος, ὁ δὲ καπνός ⟩ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς, καὶ καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ θερμῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν ἀτμός ἐστι · τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ θερμῶν καὶ ξηρῶν, καπνός, 83.11–14)

Moreover, in the alchemical treatise, double exhalation and so the *metaxu* too, is associated with the dry and humid 'sublimate': 'Smoke is intermediary between the hot and the dry. And here it is the sublimate and all that results from it. Vapour, on the other hand, is intermediary between hot and wet things. It stands for wet sublimates such as come out of alambics and what is similar to them' (ὁ γὰρ καπνὸς μεταξύ ἐστιν θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ · κἀκεῖ μὲν ἡ αἰθάλη, καὶ τὰ δι' αἰθάλης πάντα · ὁ δὲ ἀτμὸς μεταξύ ἐστιν θερμῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν. Καὶ σημαίνει αἰθάλας ὑγρὰς, οἷον τὰ δι' ἀμβίκων καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια, 85.2–5). Now, the term *aithalê*, which is rare and does not occur in Aristotle, occurs in Olympiodorus' commentary on the *Meteorology* and refers to smoky exhalation (*aithalôdês anathumiasis*) which contains an earthy residue (literally 'soot'). When this has gone up and mixed itself with the humid exhalation, it condenses and precipitates into the sea, producing salinity (160.7; 152.37; 157.15).

As Brisson (1992) has noted, this term *aithalê* also occurs in Olympiodorus in a context that is not specifically meteorological. In the *Commentary on the Phaedo*, the generation of human beings is described as resulting from 'sublimate of vapours' (*ek tôn tês aithalês tôn atmôn*), which are released from the Titans' bodies after they have been struck by Zeus' lightning bolt. Brisson sees this account as using an intentional alchemical metaphor, which would confirm that the author of the alchemical commentary on Zosimus is indeed the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus. In my view, this is not an alchemical metaphor, but rather a term borrowed from the chemico-meteorological vocabulary used to single out a very specific substance that is the result of a process of combustion.

In the alchemical treatise (103.22–23) we find the same list of metals that Olympiodorus establishes in the commentary on the *Meteorology*: gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and tin (cf. for instance 321.1). Furthermore, Olympiodorus also presents a different classification, attributed to Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*, which establishes the following correspondences between metals and planets:

> Saturn: lead (heavy, somber, cold)
> Jupiter: *êlektron* / *migma* (temperate)
> Mars: iron (cutting, sharp)
> Sun: gold (light)

Venus: copper (splendour)
Mercury: tin (translucid and bright)
Moon: silver (receives its light from gold)

This list as reported by Olympiodorus (which incidentally is more complete than what we find in Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus*) establishes precisely the same correspondences between metals and planets as the (anonymous) list which occurs at the beginning of *Marcianus* 299 (f. 6), the most ancient and important alchemical manuscript:

Sun, gold
Moon, silver
Saturn, bright (*phainon*), lead
Jupiter, radiant (*phaeton*), *electrum*
Mars, enflamed (*puroeis*), iron
Venus, luminous (*phôsphoros*), copper
Mercury, glittery (*stilbôn*), tin

The correspondence between metals and planets is a more ancient doctrine than the commentaries of Proclus and Olympiodorus, probably dating back to the Chaldaeans. But in my view, this exact correspondence constitutes important evidence of the influence exercised by Neoplatonic thought on Greco-Alexandrian alchemical knowledge, or at least of the fact that they occupied common cultural ground.

Now, if my hypothesis about the composition of the commentary on *On Action* is true, we can explain how, subsequently, this text was attributed to Olympiodorus of Alexandria in its entirety, by a kind of 'attraction' of the initial section. We can exclude the possibility that the compiler of the patchwork intended to claim the name of Olympiodorus for himself. If my reconstruction is correct, the title reflects precisely what the work is: the commentary of Olympiodorus on Zosimus *and* a collection of *excerpta*. As to the compiler, we should probably consider the same Theodorus who is said to have assembled the whole collection of alchemical texts at the time of the emperor Heraclius and to have composed the introduction in verse which we find at the beginning of the manuscript *Marcianus Graecus*299 (f. 5v).

Thus the whole debate on the work's authenticity must be seen from a new perspective. The circumstances of this text are not those of a pseudepigraphic text in the ordinary sense but those of a typical product of that *sui generis* scientific literature that is Greco-Alexandrian alchemy.

Olympiodorus the Commentator and Alchemy

We are left with the question, however, of why the Neoplatonic philosopher Olympiodorus, commentator of Plato and Aristotle, would have been interested in alchemy. The question is tricky. Even though we can easily detect the influence of contemporary philosophy in the Greek alchemists, evidence of alchemy is very rare in the writings of philosophers of the period and particularly in Neoplatonic commentators. Likewise, even though the alchemical commentary of Olympiodorus shows many convergences with the *Meteorology* commentary and with other texts of the Neoplatonic Olympiodorus, we would be hard pressed to find explicit references to the art of transmutation in the commentary on the *Meteorology*.

We can escape this impasse by considering that it is very likely that what we nowadays label 'alchemy' would not have been seen the same way in the age of Olympiodorus and Stephanus. When we speak of alchemy, we immediately think of transmutation, of a well-defined branch of knowledge characterized by a particular goal, e.g. the transformation of lead into gold etc. However, while this may be true for the alchemy of the Middle Ages, both in the West and in the Arab world, the boundaries of this knowledge appear to have been much vaguer in the Greco-Roman world.

First of all, the proper name of this knowledge: *al-kîmiyâ* is an Arab term, made up from the article *al* and a Greek term of uncertain etymology: *chêmeia, chumeia*. It is also a late term, used by the Byzantines. The Byzantine lexicon of Suda (10th century) defines *chêmeia* as the craft of producing silver and gold (X.280). The alchemical authors speak rather of 'divine craft', of 'excellent science', of 'philosophy'. Its domain of application is not only the production of gold, of noble metals, or the method of self-transformation, but the first recipes also concern the dyeing of stones and fabrics, and the production of dye pigments. Hence we find in them a whole range of organic and inorganic substances and processes revolving around matter and its transformations. The revolutionary notion—revolutionary in the Greek world—of transmutation is absent in the first 'technical' treatises. It occurs in more philosophical 'authors' like Zosimus (4th century) and subsequently in the 'commentators'. And even in those authors who do mention transmutation, we also find concrete substances and procedures which we can clearly identify and which are in no way mysterious or metaphysical. This holds for the descriptions of distillation devices in Zosimus, including the *ambix* (from which the well-known alembic is derived via the Arabic intermediary *al-anbîq*); for the recipe for the production of 'black bronze' which we find in the Syriac fragments of Zosimus; and for the operation of 'maceration' (*taricheia*), the paradigmatic operation of gold ore, which involves multiple stages, and which we find mentioned in the first lines of Olympiodorus' commentary on *On Action*.

Here, as we have seen, Olympiodorus comments on Zosimus' *lemma* concerning the operation of extracting gold flakes from ores by means of the process of 'maceration' (*taricheia*) and of 'washing' (*plusis*) (§1–7). This is followed by a description of the process of 'welding' (*chrysokollê*) gold (§8–11), which involves the assembly of the acquired gold particles into a homogeneous body. The text interprets these two specific operations of separation and reunification as allegories of the transmutation of metals. In fact, however, and despite a number of obscurities, Olympiodorus' exegesis appears in essence to be technical, with reference to real procedures concerning the stages, times, instruments and phases of the levigation of gold ore.

Now, among the non-alchemical evidence, these technical stages of the extraction of ores and their treatment down to their transformation into gold are described in detail by Agatharchides the geographer, praeceptor of Ptolemy III (2nd C BCE), of whom we have a very vivid account of mining activities in the Eastern desert (cf. Diodorus Siculus 3.12.1–14.5; Strabo XVI.4.5–20 and Photius, *Bibl.* chapter 250). In fact, this evidence is not at all exterior to the alchemical corpus, since we find a summary of it in *Marcianus* 299 (f. 138–141).

Agatharchides' precise descriptions of the four fundamental technical operations of the transformation of ores—crushing, grinding, washing (or levigation) and refining—allow us to confirm that the passage from Olympiodorus refers to actual procedures. These had been established for a long time, and would have constituted the technical basis for theoretical reflection on the part of alchemists, both with respect to the theorization of methodological principles and to allegories of transmutation.

However, we also possess very recent and very concrete evidence of the procedure of extracting and washing gold ore. This is of great importance for us in reconstructing the operations of Greek alchemists. I refer to the findings of a 2013 excavation campaign of the French mission of the Eastern desert in Egypt, which concentrated on auriferous mining sites at Samut dating back to the Ptolemaic era (from the end of the 4th through the middle of the 3rd century BCE).

Clear surface traces reveal installations that testify to the different phases of the process: first the mechanical phase of selection, the crushing of auriferous blocks of quartz, and the transformation into ore powder using millstones, then the washing phase in washing facilities, in order to separate

the metallic particles to be melted, and finally the metallurgical phase of on-site refining, evidenced by the presence of an oven.

The evidence from Agatharchides has been essential in interpreting the traces of these installations. The four fundamental technical operations of ore transformation at the end of the mining process, as Agatharchides describes them (crushing, grinding, washing and refining), could indeed be localized on this site.

This helps us to understand that Olympiodorus, commentator on the *Meteorology*, could very well have been interested in the texts which we classify in the category of Greek alchemy, in order to update the Aristotelian material, particularly that concerning artisanal skills found in book 4. Olympiodorus mentions, for instance, glass craftsmen (*in Mete*. 331.1) while Aristotle nowhere mentions artisanal glass. Olympiodorus describes techniques of purification and refining of metal that effect a separation of the metal from its impurities, which are basically earthy in kind, or a separation of one metal from another, as in the case of silver and gold. In particular, he explains the metaphorical 'boiling' of gold of *Mete*. 4.3, 380b29, in terms of a technique that has been identified as 'cupellation' (by which metals are separated by oxidation, during which impurities are absorbed in part by the cupel into which the mixture has been poured) (292.6). It is worth noting that for Olympiodorus each metal forms a different kind. He cites the separation of silver and gold by heat as an example of the principle that heat unites things of the same kind (*homoioeidê*) but separates things of different kinds (*anomoioeidê*) (274.39–275.1).

It is therefore not outlandish to suppose that Olympiodorus, commentator on Aristotle, would have wanted to go further and comment on a work by one of the most eminent authors of this budding science, i.e. the lost *On Action* by Zosimus of Panopolis, which probably was already a doxographical and protreptic work on the foundations of alchemy itself.

For this reason I think that Olympiodorus is an emblematic example of Alexandrian alchemy and constitutes a fundamental stage in the epistemological identification of this knowledge-in-flux and in the transition from the chemistry of the *Meteorology* to alchemy. This transition would subsequently be theorized and rendered official in the Middle Ages by authors like Albertus Magnus, Avicenna and Averroes. <>

The Palgrave Handbook of Institutional Ethnography edited by Paul C. Luken and Suzanne Vaughan [Palgrave Macmillan, 978303054221 4]

A comprehensive guide to the alternative sociology originating in the work of Dorothy E. Smith, this Handbook not only explores the basic, founding principles of institutional ethnography (IE), but also captures current developments, approaches, and debates. Now widely known as a "sociology for people," IE offers the tools to uncover the social relations shaping the everyday world in which we live and is utilized by scholars and social activists in sociology and beyond, including such fields as education, nursing, social work, linguistics, health and medical care, environmental studies, and other social-service related fields. Covering the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of IE, recent developments, and current areas of research and application that have yet to appear in the literature, The Palgrave Handbook of Institutional Ethnography is suitable for both experienced practitioners of institutional ethnography and those who are exploring this approach for the first time.

Reviews

"In the past half-century, institutional ethnography has been arguably the most significant initiative in remaking sociology, and an important tool in remaking our troubled world. With illuminating contributions from seasoned practitioners and from innovative emerging scholars, this handbook will be an indispensable resource for critical sociologists, social-justice protagonists and progressive policy communities." —William K. Carroll, Professor of Sociology, University of Victoria, Canada, editor of Critical Strategies for Social Research (2004), and author of The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class (2010)

"Knowledge that makes a difference. Here finally is a comprehensive guide to institutional ethnography (IE), the approach that can help us discover the ruling relations within the very relations of our everyday world. And it covers it all: from theoretical foundations to current research areas, research application and political action. Studies that connect local and global relations of ruling relations but also combine IE with other approaches, concepts and methods. And all of it richly illustrated empirically, illuminating the very knowledge production in practice. Here's something for everybody—researcher, teacher or student. A gift to us all!" —Karin Widerberg, Professor of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Norway

"This is a wonderful book—lively, readable and instructive! Readers are drawn into institutional ethnographic efforts to understand today's ordinarily opaque ruling regimes. Some contributors introduce readers to research settings where IE's core concepts, e.g., 'standpoint' and 'ruling relations'— recognized as operative in particular people's lives—become more than theory. Knowing how things actually work provides new ideas for responding. The handbook displays IE's remarkable scope of topics, geographic diffusion, and developing analytic maturity." —Marie L. Campbell, Professor Emerita of Human and Social Development, University of Victoria, Canada, and co-author of Mapping Social Relations (2002) and Managing to Nurse (2006)

"Attractive, refreshing, readable and challenging. The handbook offers the reader an unparalleled opportunity to discover the width and depth of institutional ethnography that is not evident in any other books. This book is for those who seek ways of doing sociology to make changes." —Frank T. Y. Wang, Professor of Social Work, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

"The publication of this powerful collection signifies the culmination of decades of exciting interdisciplinary research that draws on the brilliant insights of Canadian scholar Dorothy E. Smith. Chapters include one by Smith and many contributions by the innovative scholars she mentored who, years ago, formed an activist-scholar collective dedicated to bringing this form of social inquiry into fields of sociology, health, education, comparative research, social policy, social activism and beyond.

As this extensive volume demonstrates, the influence of institutional ethnography has expanded from a challenge to ontological and epistemological assumptions of theory and methods in social science to a broader effect on transnational and applied approaches to social change and social justice. The authors represent several generations of researchers and scholar activists whose collective contributions in this book now form the basis of a resource for generations to come." —Nancy Naples, Distinguished Board of Trustees Professor of Sociology and Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies, University of Connecticut, USA, author of Feminism and Method (2003) and co-editor of Border Politics: Social Movements, Collective Identities, and Globalization (2014)

"The inclusion of theory and methodological concerns within a single text is welcome and will aid novice researchers seeking to understand and utilize IE. I think it is particularly important that the handbook includes contributions from students and neophytes as well as established researchers.

Indeed, I believe this to be a strength of the book." —James Reid, Senior Lecturer of Education and Community Studies, University of Huddersfield, UK

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Institutional Ethnography: Sociology for Today by Paul C. Luken

Over dinner at a meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association in 1996, Dorothy Smith mentioned that just before coming to the United States she read John Dos Passos' U.S.A. I had never read it, but then, a budding institutional ethnographer, I was motivated to get the book. It was first published in 1930, and the preface describes a young man who is walking city streets at night. He is alone but very attentive to the people around him and his "muscles ache for the knowledge of jobs" (Dos Passos, 1960, p. v). At first he seems like an unemployed man who is struggling to survive during the Great Depression, but later we learn that he does not want a job. He wants all jobs and more: "One bed is not enough, one job is not enough, one life is not enough" (p. v), we are told, and we realize that it is the knowledge, not the work itself, that he is seeking, that he is listening for.

I have read this preface many times, in part because Dos Passos is a wonderful writer, but also because the wanderer reminds me of so many people who have come to study and practice institutional ethnography (IE). Many, myself included, were not satisfied with the sociology or women's studies orientations that they learned in graduate school, and Smith's feminist alternative sociology provided us with the direction that we needed. Others were drawn to institutional ethnography's grounding in the everyday world with its commonplace and often hidden struggles. When we found institutional ethnography, we found what we were looking for.

I am also attracted to the preface of U.S.A. because of its final paragraph in which Dos Passos transitions from the man (small hero/ethnographer?) to a description of the United States:

> U.S.A. is the slice of a continent. U.S.A. is a group of holding companies, some aggregations of trade unions, a set of laws bound in calf, a radio network, a chain of moving picture theaters, a column of stock quotations rubbed out and written in by a Western Union boy on a blackboard, a public library full of old newspapers and dogeared history books with protests scrawled on the margins in pencil. U.S.A. is the world's greatest river valley fringed with mountains and hills. U.S.A. is a set of bigmouthed officials with too many bank accounts. U.S.A. is a lot of men buried in their uniforms in Arlington Cemetery. U.S.A. is the letters at the end of an address when you are away from home. But mostly U.S.A. is the speech of the people. (p. vi)

To borrow a phrase from the title of an old rhythm and blues song (Brown, 1966), "this is a man's world" that Dos Passos sketches, although I am certain women appeared on the screens in the theaters and some may have placed their own annotations in the history books. Matters of interest to men dominated, and how that domination could occur and where it would be evident was in the speech of the people, in varieties of discourse. But what are the connections of speech, of language, to the endeavors that Dos Passos alludes to—business, economics, law, media, education, politics, labor, and war—and what are the consequences of these connections? That is the province of institutional ethnography.

Now, as I write this introduction, there is a new discourse that appears ubiquitous. You recognize the words and phrases—facemask, pandemic, shelter in place, self-quarantine, disinfectant, social distance, confirmed cases, wash your hands for 20 seconds, lockdown, ventilators, stay safe—as part of the vocabulary of the COVID-19 discourse. You altered many of the patterns of your everyday life—the people you see, the work that you do, how you forage for food, what you eat, how much you drink—as you and others are affected by this discourse, as you take it up in your actions. To the best of my knowledge I have not come into contact with the virus that causes COVID-19 (and I hope you have not either), but we have been unable to avoid the COVID-19 discourse. It extends

beyond any particular speech acts or texts to all forms of communication. The discourse is not tied to any place or to any particular social institution. The language of COVID-19 is the new vernacular.

Many of the authors of the chapters in this handbook were still finishing their essays when the COVID-19 discourse became dominant in their lives. These authors are largely university faculty or advanced graduate students. Through emails I learned that some were having trouble finding opportunities to write because their children's schools were closed and the kids were at home; they became engrossed in the work of childcare and homeschooling. Many were also changing their university courses from face-to-face to online formats, and for several this was their first foray into distance education.

They were, in some instances, cut off from colleagues and the technology that their workplaces offered. Some, even when they had the time to write, said they found it difficult to concentrate and that frustration compounded the problem. As diverse as their experiences may be, I am confident there is something that they have in common. They know that we will need institutional ethnography to understand the social ramifications of the pandemic.

Purpose and Organization

Smith's early books are collections of articles she produced while developing what came to be known as Institutional Ethnography. These articles, along with her instruction, provided the basic ideas that her students had to work with while producing their theses and dissertations at the University of British Columbia and the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) of the University of Toronto. The research projects became outstanding pieces of IE that were worked into publications in various forms. Since that time there has been considerable development of IE, and it is impossible to keep up with everything that is being produced. Nonetheless, significant research was undertaken in the 1980s because the core ideas had already been developed. For this reason, I highly recommend that students of IE return to Smith's early collections: The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology; Text, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling; The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge; and Writing the Social: Critique, Theory, and Investigations. They contain all that one needs to engage in institutional ethnography.

As evidence of the value of these early writings, look to some of the books, chapters, and articles written by Smith's students and other institutional ethnographers decades ago. In Campbell and Manicom's 1995 collection Knowledge, Experience and Ruling Relations: Essays in the Social Organization of Knowledge you will find excellent institutional ethnography at a time when the link of Smith's work to the field of the sociology of knowledge was clearly evident. Timothy Diamond's landmark book Making Gray Gold: Narratives of Nursing Home Care (1992) is an outstanding experience-based account of the regulation of the work done by both nursing assistants and the residents of nursing homes. George Smith's groundbreaking article "Political Activist as Ethnographer" (1990) details how he used institutional ethnography while working as a political activist and how he used confrontation as a technique to discover ruling regimes work.

The chapters in this handbook are all original works and they are intended to extend rather than substitute for the existing institutional ethnography literature produced by Smith, her students, and other scholars over the past thirty years. The handbook serves as a comprehensive guide to the alternative sociology that began in Vancouver, Canada, as a "sociology for women" and grew into a "sociology for people" with global reach. Institutional ethnography provides the tools to discover the social relations shaping the everyday world in which we live; and it is widely utilized by scholars and social activists beyond sociology, in such fields as education, nursing, social work, linguistics, health

and medical care, environmental studies, and other social service-related endeavors. Covering the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of institutional ethnography, along with recent developments, and current areas of research and application, this handbook is suitable for both experienced practitioners of institutional ethnography and those who are exploring this approach for the first time.

This handbook is divided into six parts and, while we hope readers find the arrangement useful, we recognize that the problems inherent in categorization are here as well. First there is the problem of overlap. Many of the chapters could easily fit into multiple sections. Second, nothing in institutional ethnography demands that we organize the materials as we have. We settled on the schema we did because we felt that it covers basic and enduring topics along with those that have arisen more recently. We also felt that this organization would be appropriate for novice as well as experienced institutional ethnographers. We hope that this plan works for you.

Part I: "Exploring Historical and Ontological Foundations." These chapters provide readers with a basis in how institutional ethnography has developed, how its theory (of knowing) contrasts with other theories, and institutional ethnography's use of theory. The chapters by Marj DeVault and Liza McCoy provide a basis for understanding the underlying premises of institutional ethnography and how they guide research, its conceptual development, and possibilities for extension to new areas. Eric Mykhalovskiy and graduate students explore the situation of institutional ethnography as alternative sociology, its relationship to theory and to other research approaches, to politics and to critique. Dorothy Smith's chapter shows the value of the generalizing capacities of institutional language to institutional ethnographers as it is taken up in the process of defining actions as institutional.

Part II: "Developing Strategies and Exploring Challenges" continues the instructive mode elaborated in Smith's Institutional Ethnography as Practice (2006) and Incorporating Texts into Institutional Ethnography (2014) with chapters describing challenges and opportunities encountered in the process of producing research studies—copyright issues, mapping and visual approaches, reflexivity, institutional capture, among others. Readers can learn about the challenges they might contend with in the course of a research project. The challenges of teaching institutional ethnography to undergraduates are also discussed.

The four chapters in Part III: "Explicating Global/Transnational Ruling Relations" examine issues from standpoints on different continents, yet the problematics connect with discourses established by national and multinational organizations connected through professional and governmental networks. This section illustrates the ways in which ruling operates transnationally. The chapters demonstrate how particular people are caught in extensive, global social relations. This section is valuable in showing institutional ethnography's contribution to making visible how global ruling works and how remote ruling standpoints can be inserted into locally made decisions. The knowledge gained through these investigations can be used to critique aspects of global development.

Part IV: "Making Change within Communities" consists of three chapters that use institutional ethnography differently from one another in order to identify problems in their settings and to develop strategies designed to improve the existing textually-mediated social relations and, ultimately, the lives of people. For activist-oriented institutional ethnographers, they illustrate the value of a sociology that (1) begins in and remains in the everyday world and (2) is flexible enough to allow for innovation and adaptation to specific settings. Susan Turner and Julia Bomberry utilize collaborative mapping with a Haudenosaunee First Nations community in Canada to explore police investigations and services for Indigenous victims of sexual violence. Frank Ridzi develops maps of relations that establish and maintain unsafe housing conditions (lead-based paint). These are then

used for advocacy and for philanthropic interventions that make a difference to the subjects in his research. Ellen Pence and Praxis International's institutional analysis approach was designed to improve institutional responses to gender-based violence. The chapter describes how a team of community-based professionals can investigate work practices and policies and make systemic change in these areas.

The chapters in Part V: "Critiquing Public Sector Management Regimes" cover a wide variety of dilemmas faced by workers and clients in contemporary public institutions, a theme previously taken up by Griffith and Smith and associates (2014). In these chapters we learn how students with disabilities in the United States are burdened with additional work because of the institutional policies that are purported to assist them, how forms of knowledge grounded in evidence-based practices are both produced and resisted by workers in the criminal justice system in the United States, how regulatory practices in Canada related to substance use by nurses often caused problems rather than diminished potential dangers, and the documentation of functional equivalency undermines the work of sign language interpreters. The area of public management has attracted a great deal of interest by institutional ethnographers, and this sociology excels at examining how people's work lives are formed to fit the administrative demands of institutions, often at the expense of their clients.

The most controversial section of this handbook might be Part VI: "Bringing Together Different Approaches and Perspectives," since it takes up some challenging issues among institutional ethnographers. Is one still doing institutional ethnography if one supplements it with other sociological theory or other research practices? While the claim is made that institutional ethnography is not an "orthodoxy," can it be combined with other approaches that conflict with its ontological and epistemological commitments? Do those who say that institutional ethnography is insufficient really know all that IE has to offer? Should consistency be important to those social and political activists who see political value in using objectified forms of knowledge? If one's aims are broader than those of institutional ethnography, is it appropriate to shift in and out of IE?

In order to write institutional ethnography that will give readers a clear understanding of work processes and the social relations shaping them, Michael Corman proposes the use of composite accounts built from the data collected rather than the words and actions of any set of particular individuals. Karly Burch proposes vital institutional ethnography, a combination of IE and material semiotics, as a worthy approach to the study of ruling relations in the Anthropocene. This would allow scholars to discover the textually-mediated ruling relations in which their subjects are embedded while also examining other human and more-than-human involvements that contribute to our experiences of the messes we are in. Gerald de Montigny presents transcriptions of talk using conventions of conversation analysis in order to preserve the morphology of talk. This approach, he argues, allows us to see talk as more than words; rather, it remains an embodied social exchange which reveals socially organized practices. Naomi Nichols and Jessica Ruglis, maintaining compatibility with the ontological and epistemological stance of institutional ethnography, undertake techniques of Youth Participatory Action Research in order to engage youth as part of their research team. They argue that this combination can enhance critical analysis. It is doubtful that the chapters in this part will bring institutional ethnographers to consensus, nonetheless, they raise issues and suggestions that are worthy of discussion and debate.

Sociology for Today

While I was collecting signatures on a petition to form a Division on Institutional Ethnography within the Society for the Study of Social Problems, one supporter, someone familiar with institutional ethnography but not a practitioner, commented, "This division will spend the first five years trying to figure out what it is." I understood the remark to be a slight criticism of institutional ethnography,

but it did not irritate me. I was happy to hear that he thought the IE Division would last for five years. (That was in 2003 and the division is still going strong.) I also knew that institutional ethnography is not a fixed and finalized set of ideas and practices1 and so, yes, we would be figuring it out for some time to come. Furthermore, the conditions under which we work change as well and we must adapt to new circumstances.

Two years ago, I was investigating political practice from the ground up by taking up the work myself. I was going door-to-door canvassing for a candidate for the US Congress, joining meetings of the county Democratic Party, attending fundraising dinners, and serving as an observer at my county elections office for the local chapter of the League of Women Voters. I was also a poll worker, a clerk working 14-hour days whenever there was an election.

Two days from now, the time I am writing this introduction, there will be an election. I have not canvassed, attended Democratic Party meetings, or observed at the elections' office, and I will not be assisting voters who show up on Tuesday to cast their ballots. COVID-19 has disrupted my work, my research. Phone banking has replaced canvassing, the county Democrats no longer meet, and neither does the board of elections. Voters will not be required to wear masks, the incidence of COVID-19 cases is increasing in this area, I am 70 years old and under a stay-at-home order; therefore, I sadly opted out of poll work. Anyone who was engaged in fieldwork when the pandemic occurred is probably having similar problems. Fortunately, I also have a network of ethnographers with whom I can plot alternative avenues for my investigations. And I am mindful that Dos Passos also had to deal with a pandemic, and he was quarantined in 1918 because of the flu; so I will borrow from him as I close this introduction.

IE is an alternative sociology founded by Dorothy E. Smith. IE is a scientific method with feminist origins that always starts with real people's situations and always keeps the researcher as an active participant in the discoveries. IE is a growing literature describing how ruling operates through texts. IE is a compass used to create maps of social relations. IE is a dedicated network of scholars and activists. But mostly IE is doing the work.

Note

1. "What we all want, and cannot have, is the ideological equivalent of a Forever stamp, the assurance that our version of enlightenment will withstand the passage of years, without requiring ungainly supplementation" (Appiah, 2020, p. 19). When he writes "we," Kwame Anthony Appiah is referring to grand scholars or those who hope to be grand scholars. I think this statement is widely true, yet Dorothy Smith's institutional ethnography must be regarded as an exception. It was always a collective project, what she sometimes calls "the work," influenced by feminist activists, her graduate students, and others who took up "the work" as well. <>

MINDBOMBS: VISUAL CULTURES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE edited by Sebastian Baden, Larissa Diana Fuhrmann, Johan Holten with assistance by Katharina Jörder, Kunsthalle Mannheim, essays by Sebastian Baden, Robert Dörre, Larissa D. Fuhrmann, Sebastian Gräfe, Christoph Günther, Daniel Hornuff, Katharina Jörder, Maryam Kirchmann, Charlotte Klonk, Farhad Khosrokhavar, W.J.T. Mitchell, Simone Pfeifer, Sylvia Schraut, Verena Straub, Design by Jonathan Blaschke, Bruno Jacoby unter Mitwirkung von Anton Stuckhardt, Staatliche Hochschule für Gestaltung HfG Karlsruhe, Events: MINDBOMBS – Visuelle Kulturen politischer Gewalt // Visual Cultures of Political Violence Kunsthalle Mannheim, 10.09.2021-24.04.2022 [Kerber Verlag, 9783735608062]

RAF, NSU and IS are acronyms of terrorist groups whose extremist propaganda and political violence challenge the visual arts to react decisively. The exhibition therefore opens up a highly topical artistic perspective on the history and political iconography of modern terrorism. For the first time, three sections comparatively examine the effects of social revolutionary, far-right, and jihadist terrorism on visual culture. Twenty years after September 11, 2001, and ten years after the discovery of the NSU in the fall of 2011, the exhibition and publication together explore the question of how acts of political violence affect cultural memory through the media.

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Excerpt: MINDBOMBS AND TERROR: THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON VISUAL CULTURE AND THE HISTORY OF ART by Sebastian Baden

Twenty years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and a decade after the public appearance of a trio of German terrorists, the National Socialist Underground (NSU), on November 4, 2011, the exhibition titled MINDBOMBS is dedicated to the "thought bombs" of political violence in different areas of visual culture. The focus is on the question of how society and art react to attacks undertaken by political extremist groups or so-called lone perpetrators. This is not just a German issue; it amounts to a global phenomenon made up of political convictions expressed in acts of violence. Processed via a range of artworks, the media used in creating visual culture and political iconology are under observation here, seen from a perspective derived from the various modes of studying culture and images that comprise the field of Visual Culture Studies. On the one hand, media become a means of reflection involved in the processes of, for instance, memory, or learning to cope with trauma. On the other, though, media can provide topics, ideologies, images, texts, and propaganda material for methods of political radicalization.

This dualistic, basic principle of cultural-critical radicalization versus the cultural technique of art-critical enlightenment must be taken into account, which is why the title MINDBOMBS attributes a combined impact to the physical and the psychological aspects of violence. As "mindbombs", acts of violence imprint themselves on memory and can even influence entire so-called aesthetic regimes, meaning, the ways the world is perceived as reality.

Visual culture — and within it, the visual arts — are both therefore a central arena for sociopolitical conflicts, as a symbiotic partner in the transmission of attacks via media such as television, newspapers, and the Internet, on one hand, and on the other, as a zone of resistance and critical enlightenment in artistic works. The lives of individuals are endangered in an "age of anger," when hatred and images of the enemy divide societies despite all peace processes, and anger-driven, "thymotic energies" increase in spirals of violence towards terrorism. However, especially with regard to neo-fundamentalist, ethno-nationalist, and other political or religious radicalization processes, it is important to maintain an open contact zone for de-escalation and prevention, such as the museum, where a public discourse can take place.

The exhibition MINDBOMBS, therefore, introduces a highly topical, artistic perspective on the history and iconography of political violence, which is linked to the emergence of the modern and controversial concept of terrorism. This is the first time such a diversity of artistic confrontations, divided into three sections addressing the themes of the social revolutionary, the right-wing extremist, and jihadist ideologies and acts of violence as part of visual cultures will be presented.

Terror and Terrorism

In the case of politically motivated acts of violence, the words 'terror' or 'terrorism' are used when — beyond the destruction of an object or the killing of people — there is an intent to communicate an overriding demonstration of hatred and danger.

The definition of terrorism, according to sociology and communications studies, explains the psychological effect of terror as fear and dread aimed at affecting a certain audience or targeted group of victims via the "propaganda of the deed." Depending on the ideological motive, the terrorist communications strategy varies in order to address different audiences: the immediate victims, the general audience, and possible sympathizers. The fact that there are great differences here is clearly illustrated by both the expert essays in this book and the artworks in the exhibition.

Also relevant to the exhibition's concept is that it is about ways of constructing images of the 'enemy'; that the word 'terrorism' is also often selectively applied as a term for 'the others,' as seen from the perspective of the so-called Global North; and that white male assassins are often only referred to as individual perpetrators, while their motives for committing the crime — for example, ideologies such as misogyny, racism, or sexism — are not discussed. Collective awareness of the selective use of the term has increased only in recent years.

RAF, NSU, and ISIL are acronyms of groups whose extremist convictions and communications strategies, along with violence they have committed, have been perceived and labeled as terrorism for the past fifty years. Their political and ideological motives, as well as their use of media, reveal their differences and allow conclusions to be drawn about their addressees, supporters, and the construction of images of the 'enemy.'

Across the three sections of this volume, the exhibition explores the artistic view of political violence in the context of the battle cry of 'terrorism', with the aim of highlighting the transformation of the term itself from a motif of resistance to an apparatus of oppression.

Despite objections to the linguistic image of the 'enemy' that the terms 'terror' and 'terrorism' open up, the influence of the modern history of violence associated with them cannot be denied. In particular, the way that the French Revolution's concept of virtue couples 'terror' with a positive goal, or the process of transforming 'terror' into a purely destructive practice under the totalitarian

rule of dictatorships are important and even decisive features of change, as well as the position from which the concept of terrorism is applied.

The concept of terrorism has altered several times, from a label initially embraced by progressives, to a negative, pejorative epithet imposed from the outside. Even the modern social revolutionary and anarchist movements were unable to achieve a beneficial connotation of the term, despite their links to the avant-garde. The word denotes a relationship to society defined as enmity and marked by violence, regardless of whether terrorism is applied by individuals or collectives operating from the so-called underground or by representatives of the state. Nevertheless, the previously mentioned questions surrounding the definition of terrorism and who has the right to define it will be taken up again here. What are the intentions and messages associated with terrorist acts? How does political violence become terror? How does terrorism manifest itself in cultural memory?

Sociology has described terror as an autotelic kind of violence that threatens annihilation. Wolfgang Sofsky and Jan Philipp Reemtsma have offered detailed arguments for a modern history of violence in which terror plays a central role. Political violence in the form of terror has resulted in uncanny catastrophes. The murder of millions of people, the majority of whom were European Jews, by National Socialists represents a particular escalation of violence in modernity that can be characterized as state terror. The terror of the Nazi dictatorship was part of a modern totalitarianism, based on a primarily racist and ethnonational worldview whose goal was to destroy any life that deviated from it. "The dream of the absolute gives birth to absolute violence," Sofsky writes, concluding that "destruction is total, the destruction of people, of things, of foreign culture." Violence and terror shape "personal culture," the 'anthropological imaginary', while also affecting the visual culture that shapes habit.

In the age of digital media, terrorist messages spread even faster, are filmed 'live' and transmitted simultaneously to a global audience. Furthermore, political perpetrators of violence — as in the case of ISIL's propaganda or right-wing extremist attacks — make use of aesthetic practices from film and gaming culture, resulting in a semi-fictional situation in which levels of reality overlap. Pointing out the boundaries and transitions here is part of the artistic work in this exhibition.

Violence perpetrated by terrorist actions is not only physically but also mentally effective; it affects social structures and linguistic codes and disrupts communication processes. This is why scholars distinguish between old and new guerrilla strategies of action and communication used by terrorists. Franz Wördemann highlights the difference between the guerrilla operating locally and terrorists operating transnationally: "The new guerrilla tends to occupy space in order to capture thought later — the terrorist occupies thought because he cannot take space." Still under the impression of the terrorist media events of the early nineteen-seventies, the journalist and television program director Wördemann wrote, "a headline can explode more glaringly than a bomb." This metaphor corresponds to the "information bomb" in Paul Virilio's media theory, describing the same effect of media violence.16 The word 'terrorism' has become a limiting, judgmental, and controversial marker of political language, selectively appearing in the media whenever extreme violence is politically interpreted. Nevertheless, especially from the perspective of those affected, the topic of terrorism has become part of visual culture in the form of images and news reporting, which is why the visual arts and art history are also concerned with the iconography of extremist ideologies and the resulting attacks.

This companion volume to the MINDBOMBS exhibition introduces the political and ideological background behind the concept of terrorism, starting with the media revolution of the nineteenth century, and moving on to the historical change in the concept of terrorism, from its association with resistance struggles in the context of post-colonial and social revolt to Islamist-motivated attacks and the culture of extreme right-wing hate.

Whether assassinations are carried out by politically left-wing or rightwing groups, or by religious fundamentalist groups, terrorism is the term used to describe their effects, which cause violence, destruction, and both physical and psychological pain. In most cases, the intention is to put a political position on the agenda and to attract as much attention as possible — even if, as in the case of the NSU, the public has no knowledge of the perpetrators until later.

Unlike guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks have a much stronger impact due to the ways they are presented in the media. This kind of mental scattering can be described by the term "mindbomb," which comes from guerrilla marketing. It is understood to mean a psychological shock effect that is intended to influence the audience emotionally and turn them into sympathizers. Images and videos help to intensify the moment of shock.

Martin Hofmann, who bases his research on NGO marketing strategies, refers to the mental effect of images triggering strong emotions and affects as "mindbombing": "This is where the 'mindbombs' come into play, simple images for complex contexts that are transported by the media and have an emotional effect in people's minds — in other words: explode." The frightening mediation of terror and terrorist violence can thus be explained with a metaphor from the advertising industry.

In the attention economy, terrorists work with the principle of maximization, because they want their actions to be perceived as widely as possible. The physical explosive device finds its counterpart in the psychological attack. "For the art of mindbombing consists precisely in achieving the greatest possible public attention with a limited use of financial resources." Terrorist acts target social consciousness, or at the very least, a specific group of victims, whose perception is supposed to be threatened by fear and terror. This principle of "bombing into awareness" is a "media-theoretical construct," as Hofmann explains, with which commercial advertising campaigns also work, but in the case of terror, it is enhanced by the threat of violence or the use of violence.

Interesting and slightly provocative is the derivation of "mindbombing," which, Hofmann explains, is based on the communications strategy of the NGO Greenpeace and can be traced back to its founding figures, Rex Weyler and Bob Hunter. Hunter's manifesto The Storming of the Mind (1971) draws on Marshall McLuhan's theory of media and his concept of the "mind bomb," by which is meant that a radical public relations campaign is needed to raise awareness of social and ecological grievances in the world. In 1975, Hunter noted that, for the success of a worldwide anti-whaling campaign, "... emotional images ... served as evidence in a worldwide war. Mindbombs that ignited in the minds of newspaper readers and television viewers."

The drastic, spectacular actions of environmental activists are not terrorist acts, but they use the same communications strategy employed by political activists and perpetrators of violence. Their martial rhetoric and rigorous deployment of bodies act as disruptive factors and evoke an awareness of the problem. The media have become a means of emotionalization in asymmetrical warfare, notes Herfried Münkler, and terrorists, like NGOs, perfidiously exploit the effect of visual superiority by "staging events whose script is essentially oriented toward the production of the most spectacular images possible." Even in a case where terrorist communication is based on the premise of "deeds instead of words" — such as the series of murders by the right-wing extremist NSU — press reports are automatic messengers of an act without a letter of confession. Terrorist violence reproduces itself not only through mimetic imitation, but also by memes, i.e., on the basis of behaviors and cultural techniques that belong to a so-called meme-complex of terrorism.

The Exhibition Concept

Three important works of art from the collection of the Kunsthalle Mannheim contribute to the concept of the MINDBOMBS exhibition: The painting The Execution of Emperor Maximilian (1867-69) by Édouard Manet, which was the first painting of its kind to deal with an anti-colonialist theme

and the emergence of guerrilla warfare and its mediatization in the European press; the video installation dial H-I-S-T-O-R-Y. (1997) by Belgian artist Johan Grimonprez, which examines the media history of skyjacking and thus also international terrorism in the context of civil aviation; and the painting Deutscher Wald (German Forest, 1981) by Walter Dahn and Jirí Dokoupil, whose subject refers to the resurgence of National Socialist ideology in postwar Germany and warns against right-wing extremist acts of violence.

Section 1: Art and Political Iconography from the French Revolution to 9/11

In the first section, the fundamental conception of the exhibition is based on art-historical research that has focused on war, on the Red Army Faction, or on the culture of memory in relation to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The media-historical overview leads through the iconography of political violence from the French Revolution in 1789 to the "visual event" or "visual act" of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The artworks on display and contemporary documents explore the question of which strategies terrorist attacks use to assault cultural memory via the media. Artists critically portray the power of violence. In their work they refer to the cultural and ideological background behind the emergence of political extremism and radicalization in the popular culture of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as well as to the cultural techniques of propaganda.

Section 2; Contestations of the "War on Terror" and the So-called Islamic State in Art

The second section offers artistic perspectives on current phenomena of political violence in the context of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Yet, it is more than just an investigation of ISIL's communications and mediatized acts of violence. The artists also examine ISIL's practices of resistance against continuing colonial violence, anti-Muslim racism, modern military invasions, and the securitization of Muslims worldwide in the name of the "war on terror."

Since September 11, 2001, a distinct perception of terrorist attacks has emerged in the context of the instrumentalization of Islam known as jihadism. Contemporary media and youth cultures are appropriated for the online propaganda of jihadist groups such as ISIL, so that the accompanying aestheticization of ISIL's ideology must be examined from a cultural-historical perspective. In contrast to this, many commenters in both the press and academia interpret the concept of the "war on terror" as an irrational escalation in a "clash of civilizations." The artists here react to this situation with their works, which process the current war in Syria and the diverse, interwoven themes of ISIL's iconoclasm. At the same time, the artists offer a critical attitude of resistance and freedom of expression with their works – against violence, racism, and hegemonic claims.

Section 3; Artistic Reflections on the Continuity of Right-wing Extremism and Questions of Security

International daily news reports, especially in Europe, have predominantly focused so far on the propaganda of Islamist terrorists and related attacks in Europe. It is striking that the violence of an extreme right-wing scene, which is much larger, older, and also internationally networked, has received so little attention from these media organs. Yet right-wing groups have carried out attacks in post-war Germany and more frequently than ever since reunification. However, it was not until the group known as the National Socialist Underground (NSU) revealed itself that the attention of the general public was drawn to right-wing extremist violence — long after it had been pointed out by the victims' relatives.

Other countries in Europe, as well as the U.S. and New Zealand, have also seen a rise in right-wing extremist attacks in recent decades, testifying to a global phenomenon.

Therefore, in the third section, the artistic focus will be on right-wing extremist popular culture and the violence associated with it, including the social, legal, and political consequences of right-wing terrorist attacks. Right-wing extremist perpetrators or groups use Nazi ideology to justify committing their attacks, even in court, as Anders Breivik did after his assault on the island of Ut^ya on July 22, 2011.

The particularly racist, anti-Semitic, discriminatory, and ethnonationalistic character of right-wing extremist political violence threatens pluralistic democracy. Contemporary artists pay critical attention to the murder trails, the cruel concept of the death lists, the victims' families, and the court case against the network of perpetrators. In parallel, the artistic gaze turns toward the right-wing extremist lifestyles of so-called Reich Citizens. The works on display are intended to visualize the symbolism, the self-dramatization, and the design of living spaces occupied by groups of right-wing extremists. In addition, it becomes apparent that in the case of the NSU, for example, there has been no clarification in accordance with the demands of the joint plaintiffs and victims' families, despite many years of police work, and that state authorities are withholding important evidence. Here, it must also be mentioned that the German security agencies are themselves permeated by networks of right-wing extremist actors, while at the same time they also prevent any efforts to provide clarification.

In order to visualize the specifics of the violent phenomena presented, MINDBOMBS takes an artistic-scientific and curatorial approach that enables the historical and contemporary works to enter into dialogue.

For a better overview, the exhibition and the publication are divided into three thematic sections. Overlaps among the artistic positions emerge, however. The exhibition is not strictly divided but allows for cross-references, comments, and uncomfortable juxtapositions to surface. Thus, the presentation seems to become an "atlas" of the visual cultures of political violence and their artistic exploration.

Around thirty-seven international artists or collectives are represented with works in the exhibition, spanning about two centuries of experience with violence. Themes are articulated in diverse forms of contemporary art. Most of the works deal with commemorative culture formats or analyze methods for instrumentalizing propagandistic images. Images, videos, and objects show the different dimensions of "Mindbombs," always in connection with emotions and an appeal to make injustice visible.

Interventions

Interventions by thirteen students, alumni and guest artists of the Karlsruhe University of Arts and Design will be featured in the exhibition, on the accompanying app, and in other spaces at the Kunsthalle Mannheim. These works are the result of a direct examination of the exhibition's main themes, which took place in the seminar Brick by Brick under the direction of Professor Susanne Kriemann and Friederike Schäfer. The works of the young artists, created or adapted especially for the exhibition in Mannheim, assist in explaining backgrounds, perspectives, and perceptions with a view to a controversial, conceptual history of terrorism. The interventions are site-specific, and relating to other works in the three sections as a kind of commentary on the museological task of pointing out similarities and differences. Through their works, artists broaden the exploration; the exhibition itself offers a landscape of conceptual struggle, where political violence and the attribution of enemy images are subjected to critique in the double sense of "mindbombing." The interventions appear in the exhibition and in the catalog as re-contextualizations; as guerrilla communications, they are part of the curatorial practice and thus an institutionalized form of critique of the museum as a place where concepts are questioned by any means in order to gain new insights.

Essays and Section Overviews

The essays printed in this publication are organized according to the three sections of the exhibition. They precede each respective overview and introduce thematic focal points to the exhibition, some of which are only indirectly addressed by the artworks. The texts offer background information and discussion from a scientific perspective, which are relevant to the overall focus of MINDBOMBS.

This introduction, with its basic clarification of the definitions of terror and mindbombs, is followed by an essay by Friederike Schäfer and Professor Susanne Kriemann on the seminar project Brick by Brick and the interventions by the working group of the Karlsruhe University of Arts and Design (HfG). It ties the new works on exhibit to the seminar's findings, which were gained in a collaboration with the Office of the Attorney General in Karlsruhe. For the young artists, the exhibition offers an extraordinary opportunity not only to participate but literally to intervene, deconstructing the conventional fabric of curatorial practice and editorial work.

The initial section of the exhibition, is launched in the first essay written by Sylvia Schraut. She highlights historiography's gender-political perspective of research into terrorism and demonstrates not only that men and women are perceived and represented differently as political actors, but also that gender-specific discrimination takes place in two senses and must undergo historical revision. In The Gender of Terrorism, Schraut uses the figures of Charlotte Corday and Karl Ludwig Sand to show how the French Revolution had an impact on Germany and how an early assassination attempt on August von Kotzebue in Mannheim in 1819 prevented democratic change for many years to come.

Charlotte Klonk focuses on Édouard Manet's painting The Execution of Emperor Maximilian, presenting the history of the painting's reception in the context of art history, the media revolution of the nineteenth century, and as part of the artist's subversive political statement. Particularly with regard to the relationship between media and history images, Klonk makes clear how the narcotic effect of visual media has already manifested itself in Manet's work and continues to have repercussions up to the current visual practices related to terrorist attacks.

This section also contains an essay on Art and Political Iconography from the French Revolution to 9/11; in it, the works presented in the first part of the exhibition are discussed as an interrelated sequence and explained from the perspective of the exhibition's curator.

The second section is marked by a detailed examination of the term "jihadism," as well as by a further differentiation of a kind of Islamist extremism that had an impact through the formation of the so-called Islamic State. In The 'Jihadist Imaginary' of the New Caliphate among European Youth, Farhad Khosrokhavar elaborates on the sociological and political science findings that contribute to an understanding of the radicalization of European youth, as well as further prevention. From his sociological perspective, the author emphasizes that the experience of racist and social discrimination in particular leads young people to orient themselves toward utopian alternatives to a secular and so-called Western society and, in doing so, to become increasingly radicalized. Beyond Khosrokhavar's remarks on jihadism, it is interesting in the context of the exhibition that the scientific concept of the "social imaginary" can also be fruitful for an anthropological consideration of left-wing and right-wing extremist dispositions and the ways in which they construct their worldviews.

In her essay The Assassin Video in the Context of Digital Image Cultures: Computer Games, Selfies, and Livestreaming, Verena Straub addresses the consequences of political radicalization and cites examples of terrorist visual practices. The author sees the presence of digital media as an exponential source of danger in its dissemination of violent images, because social media and easy accessibility to image editing software or video production make it simple for assassins and

extremists to offer targeted propaganda. In addition, the aesthetics of contemporary propaganda in the field of extremism are strongly influenced by the visual habits of computer game culture and Hollywood aesthetics, and thus help to create fictional worlds of imagination, in which radical viewpoints seduce people into committing real acts of violence.

Simone Pfeifer, Robert Dörre, and Christoph Günther draw on this point and explain the challenges for editorial work in Journalism and Images of Violence – Ethical Perspectives. The authors are concerned with responsible reporting that does not allow itself to be hijacked by terrorist attacks and their attention economy. Contrary to the theory that "mindbombs" automatically achieve dispersion, the researchers from the junior research group Jihadism on the Internet argue for using pattern recognition to offer a reflective, indirect representation of previous reports on political violence, along with critical commentary of it.

The reflective use of media is also the basis for Maryam Kirchmann's presentation in Memes as an Expression of Visual Culture in Political Education Work with Young People. The Islamic scholar and media educator explains the use of memes as a prosumer, digital, cultural technique. Using workshops held by the ufuq.de group as an example, Kirchmann demonstrates the advantages of using young people's own visual designs as preventive measures against their political radicalization.

Larissa-Diana Fuhrmann, as a member of the junior research group Jihadism on the Internet and a co-curator of the MINDBOMBS exhibition, specializes particularly in the subject of the second section, and her text Contestations of the "War on Terror" and the so-called Islamic State in Art provides a profound overview of the artistic works in this part of the exhibition.

The third and final section offers a topical, culturally critical essay by W. J. T. Mitchell of Chicago. The art scholar offers an unsparing, fundamental critique of former President Donald J. Trump and how a radical attitude in some of the citizenry manifested itself in the storming of the Capitol at the end of his term. The Revolution was Televised can be read as a reckoning with Trump's symbolic politics and, at the same time, extends a warning to the current U.S. government, which is still confronted with right-wing extremists, some of them within its own ranks.

In his consideration of The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing? On the Aesthetics of the New Right, the art and design scholar Daniel Hornuff shows that it is necessary to keep a watchful eye on this topic in Germany as well. Right-wing extremism is not a sudden problem but a disposition that is already at work in the midst of society. Hornuff reveals how subtly and subversively right-wing demagogues use social networks, how neo-Nazi groups create their own haunts, and even how a right-wing, identarian popular culture has emerged that draws on other aesthetic fields to mask its messages with an ordinary appearance.

Finally, Sebastian Gräfe's political science essay, Right-Wing and Left-Wing Terrorism in Germany: A Comparison of the Communication Strategies of the NSU and the RAF introduces an examination of terrorism from the perspective of the security authorities. Gräfe's hypothesis is based on the fact that the communications strategy employed by left-wing extremist groups such as the RAF is directed at their own community, the so-called sympathizers, despite their widely publicized attacks and letters of confession. In contrast, communications with society from a right-wing extremist group like the NSU are reduced to the slogan "deeds instead of words," since their only intention is to strike at and destroy the groups they target entirely without commentary. <>

VICES OF THE MIND: FROM THE INTELLECTUAL TO THE POLITICAL by Quassim Cassam [Oxford University Press, 9780198826903]

Epistemic vices are character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles that prevent us from gaining, keeping, or sharing knowledge. In this book, Quassim Cassam gives an account of the nature and importance of these vices, which include closed-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, wishful thinking, and prejudice. In providing the first extensive coverage of vice epistemology, an exciting new area of philosophical research, **VICES OF THE MIND** uses real examples drawn primarily from the world of politics to develop a compelling theory of epistemic vice.

Cassam defends the view that as well as getting in the way of knowledge these vices are blameworthy or reprehensible. Key events such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2016 Brexit vote, and notable figures including Donald Trump, are analyzed in detail to illustrate what epistemic vice looks like in the modern world. The traits covered in this landmark work include a hitherto unrecognized epistemic vice called "epistemic insouciance."

Cassam examines both the extent to which we are responsible for our failings and the factors that make it difficult to know our own vices.

Review

"It is great to see philosophers paying more attention to vice, and Cassam has provided a compelling framework for epistemic vice that should prove both useful and fruitful for some time to come." -- Denise Vigani, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

"Cassam has laid the groundwork for future research on the nature, development, and expression of epistemic vice, and we may reasonably hope that subsequent work will make vice epistemology more thoroughgoingly social." -- Mark Alfano, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

"One of the book's many excellent features is its use of case studies from recent history." -- Alexandra Plakias, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

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In her book Thinking to Some Purpose, published in 1939, Susan Stebbing wrote, ‘There is an urgent need today for the citizens of a democracy to think well. It is not enough to have freedom of the press and parliamentary institutions.’ Our difficulties, she suggested, ‘are due partly to our own stupidity, partly to the exploitation of that stupidity, and partly to our own prejudices and personal desires’. Perhaps it didn’t need saying in 1939 which difficulties she was referring to. Her book is an attempt to encourage her readers to improve their thinking by alerting them to some of the varieties of flawed thinking to which we are prone. For example, there is what Stebbing calls ‘twisted thinking’. My thinking is twisted ‘when I believe I am thinking effectively and have discovered sound reasons for my conclusion but am mistaken in this belief’. Stebbing’s technique is to illustrate this and

other types of flawed thinking with examples taken from the political debates of her day, and this gives her book a practical focus to which she obviously attached great importance.

It isn't hard to understand why, writing on the eve of a world war, Stebbing thought it was important to identify the intellectual vices that contributed to the disasters of the 1930s. It would be naïve to suppose that improved thinking would have been enough to avert the rise of fascism but the idea that 'our difficulties' at that time were partly due to our intellectual defects and partly to the exploitation of those defects is one that will resonate with many readers today. It certainly resonated with me when I sat down to write this book in 2016. It would be fatuous to compare the historical significance of 2016 with that of 1939, though one might also take the view that it's too early to tell. Nevertheless, from my perspective and I suspect the perspective of many readers of this book, 2016 was a very bad year, a true annus horribilis which saw the rise of extremism in Europe and America, the political disintegration of parts of the Middle East, the Brexit vote in the UK, and the election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the United States.

Readers who are unconcerned about these developments will probably see no reason why they should be of any great philosophical, as distinct from political, interest. If, like me, you view these developments with dismay there is a pressing and obvious question: how on earth could such things have happened? The answer to this question is no doubt complex but—and this is in the spirit of Stebbing—it's hard not to think that stupidity and the exploitation of that stupidity have something to do with it. Stupidity in this context means foolishness, not lack of intelligence. It is one of the intellectual vices that Stebbing identifies. Others include prejudice and closed-mindedness. Prejudice is an attitude whereas closed-mindedness is most naturally understood as a character trait. Intellectual vices come in several different varieties and are not confined to flawed thinking. The relationship between thinking styles, attitudes, and character traits will come up several times in this book.

Intellectual vices or, as I prefer to call them, 'epistemic' vices are systematically harmful ways of thinking, attitudes, or character traits. Epistemic vices are, first and foremost, epistemically harmful and the other harms they cause—including political harms—are a consequence of their epistemic harms. Epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge. They obstruct the gaining, keeping, and sharing of knowledge and it's because they do that that they can have disastrous consequences in the political realm. The eight chapters that follow give examples of some of these consequences. Each chapter begins with a detailed description of a significant event or development—often a politically significant event or development—in the unfolding of which epistemic vices of one type or another appear to have played a not insignificant role. Like Stebbing, I use real-world events to build an understanding of the nature of epistemic vices. Vice epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of epistemic vices. In these terms, this book is an exercise in vice epistemology, but not a purely abstract philosophical exercise. Understanding epistemic vices helps us to understand our world and ourselves.

Indeed, it was an interest in self-knowledge, rather than an interest in politics, that got me going on the topic of epistemic vice. In my last book, Self-Knowledge for Humans (2014), I made the point that we don't always know why we believe the things we believe. I gave the example of Oliver, a believer in outlandish conspiracy theories, who thinks he believes his conspiracy theories because he has good reasons to believe them. In reality, his bizarre beliefs are more a reflection of his intellectual vices, his gullibility for example, than the evidence. I quoted Linda Zagzebski's list of intellectual vices: 'intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness'. I knew the study of intellectual or epistemic virtues was a thriving philosophical cottage industry and I assumed that those who had written so much about virtues of the mind would

have quite a bit to say about vices of the mind. Not so. In comparison to the vast literature on epistemic virtue the philosophical literature on epistemic vice is miniscule, though it does include some excellent contributions by Jason Baehr, Heather Battaly, Miranda Fricker, Ian James Kidd, and Alessandra Tanesini, among others.

The relative unpopularity of epistemic vice as a topic in philosophy came as a surprise as it seemed obvious to me that without a proper understanding of our epistemic vices there is little hope of a realistic understanding of how most humans actually think, reason, and inquire. For example, finding answers to questions is a fundamental human activity that goes more or less well depending on the extent to which how we go about doing this is influenced by our epistemic vices. In Chapter 1 I give the example of the disastrous attempts by senior members of the Bush administration to figure out how many troops would be needed after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Arrogance and overconfidence were two of the factors that caused Donald Rumsfeld and his colleagues to go so badly wrong in their thinking and planning. Arrogance and overconfidence are epistemic vices and the Iraq fiasco is an object lesson in how vices of the mind can obstruct our attempts to know things.

I call my view of epistemic vice 'obstructivism' to emphasize the fact that epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge. But not everything that gets in the way of knowledge is an epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are intellectual defects that get in the way of knowledge, and the point of calling them vices is to suggest that they are blameworthy or in some other sense reprehensible. In these terms, the intellectual arrogance that contributed to the Iraq fiasco was an epistemic vice but insomnia is not even if chronic lack of sleep makes us worse at gaining or retaining knowledge. Insomnia is neither an intellectual defect nor, at least in most cases, blameworthy. Even in the case of epistemic vices for which blame doesn't seem appropriate, there must be room for criticism. Intellectual flaws for which a person can be neither blamed nor criticized are mere defects rather than vices.

One of the dangers of using political examples to illustrate philosophical points is that it doesn't take long for these examples to become outdated. One of Stebbing's early examples is a speech given by the then British foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain in 1925. Reading Stebbing's account today, she might as well have been describing events on Mars. Politics is best avoided if one is writing for posterity but I'm not doing that any more than Stebbing was. Another concern about trying to explain political or historical events by reference to the epistemic vices of particular individuals is that such explanations are too personal and neglect more important structural factors. Structuralists think that people occupy places in complex networks of social relations and that this, rather than personal factors, explains their conduct. Another view is that flawed thinking has more to do with 'sub-personal' cognitive biases—the sort of thing described by Daniel Kahneman in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow—than with so-called epistemic vices.

I certainly don't want to downplay the explanatory significance of structural factors or cognitive biases. Nor is it my intention to suggest that the events described in this book can be adequately understood just by reference to epistemic vices. Satisfying explanations of our intellectual conduct are usually multidimensional, and structural and sub-personal factors are often a part of the explanatory story. But so, in many cases, are epistemic vices. There is more about this at the end of Chapter 1. As I argue there, when our thinking goes wrong or our inquiries fail to uncover obvious truths the explanation is sometimes personal. Having said that, I should also say that the examples I give are for illustrative purposes only, and that readers who disagree with my reading of them should still be able to see their philosophical point. I can well imagine some readers detecting in my discussion some of the very same vices that I attribute to others. I don't claim to be free of the epistemic vices described below.

The plan for this book is very simple. Chapter 1 sketches the fundamental tenets of obstructivism. Chapter 2 is a study of the vice of closedmindedness. I take this to be a character vice—an epistemic vice that takes the form of a character trait—and the example I give is the closedmindedness that led intelligence officers in Israel to dismiss evidence of an impending attack by Egypt and Syria in 1973. Chapter 3 is about thinking vices, as illustrated by some judicial thinking in the case of the Birmingham Six, who were wrongly convicted for terrorist outrages in the 1970s. Chapter 4 focuses on epistemic vices that are attitudes rather than character traits. One such attitude, which was on display in the runup to Brexit, is epistemic insouciance, which is a kind of indifference to truth. Chapter 5 gives an account of knowledge and how epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge. A key question here is whether epistemic vices like dogmatism can protect our knowledge when it is under attack. I found it helpful to think about Holocaust denial in this connection. Chapter 6 asks whether our epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible. Chapter 7 is about stealthy vices, epistemic vices that are inherently hard to detect. This stealthiness is what accounts for the difficulty that most of us have in knowing our epistemic vices. Finally, in Chapter 8, I conclude with a moderately optimistic account of the prospects of self-improvement in respect of our epistemic vices. <>

Reformation, Revolution, Renovation: The Roots and Reception of the Rosicrucian Call for General Reform by Lyke de Vries [Series: Universal Reform, Brill, 9789004250222] Open Access

At the centre of the Rosicrucian manifestos was a call for 'general reformation'. In Reformation, Revolution, Renovation, the first book-length study of this topic, Lyke de Vries demonstrates the unique position of the Rosicrucian call for reform in the transformative context of the early seventeenth century. The manifestos, commonly interpreted as either Lutheran or esoteric, are here portrayed as revolutionary mission statements which broke dramatically with Luther's reform ideals. Their call for reform instead resembles a variety of late medieval and early modern dissenting traditions as well as the heterodox movement of Paracelsianism. Emphasising the universal character of the Rosicrucian proposal for change, this new genealogy of the core idea sheds fresh light on the vexed question of the manifestos' authorship and helps explain their tumultuous reception by both those who welcomed and those who deplored them.

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> Whence it is right that deceit, darkness, and slavery withdraw, which, by the gradually advancing instability of the great globe, crept into the sciences, actions, and human governments, by which these have been for the better part obscured […]. When finally all of this will be removed, as we trust, we shall see it instead substituted with a similar rule that will perpetually remain equal to itself. — Confessio Fraternitatis

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, three mysterious texts stirred up much debate in the intellectual world: The *Fama Fraternitatis* (Fame of the Fraternity, 1614), the *Confessio Fraternitatis* (Confession of the Fraternity, 1615), and, different from but related to both, the *Chymische Hochzeit: Christiani Rosencreutz* (Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosencreutz, 1616). While the *Chemical Wedding* presents a fictional autobiographical narrative, the first two texts are manifestos, mission statements. Their authors remained anonymous, but claimed to be members of a secret fraternity founded by a Christian Rosencreutz in the early fifteenth century. Written during the third generation of the Reformation, in the midst of early modern scientific transformations, and on the eve of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), these two provocative manifestos called for a general reformation of religious, scientific, and political life and announced the coming of a new era.

No sooner had the manifestos been published than their call received responses from all quarters of Europe. In the years immediately after their publication, hundreds of letters, pamphlets, and books were written by enthusiasts who wished to come into contact with this elusive brotherhood, and all over Northern Europe authors claimed to be members of that enigmatic fraternity. They penned their support and admiration for these revolutionary texts and hailed the harbingers of a new time of prosperity. In response, academic authors, shocked and outraged by these subversive writings, wrote harsh letters and tracts fulminating against the Rosicrucian brethren, their paradoxical mission statements, and the followers that wrote in their wake. The Rosicrucian manifestos stirred up so much controversy that for over a decade they were the focus of a large international and intellectually pervasive dispute. By 1625, the Rosicrucian controversy had been discussed in over four hundred texts.

The Rosicrucian response had begun in a somewhat clandestine manner already several years before the first manifesto, the *Fama*, was published in 1614. The German Paracelsian theosopher and first commentator on the manifestos, Adam Haslmayr (ca. 1562–ca. 1631), gained access to this mysterious material as early as 1610, and soon wrote an *Answer* to the *Fama*. Printed in 1612, two years before that manifesto itself would appear in print, he claimed in his audacious reply that he awaited with anticipation the emergence of the brethren from their hiding place. 1610 was also the year that his friend, the German alchemist and editor Benedictus Figulus (real name Benedict Töpfer, 1567-after 1619), acquired a copy of the *Fama*, presumably thanks to Haslmayr, and ensured its wider distribution. Such was the allure of this manifesto that before long the German ruling elite became involved. In 1611, Prince August von Anhalt-Plötzkau (1575–1653) expressed an interest in the *Fama*. In a letter dated that year, he asked both Haslmayr and the collector of Paracelsian and Weigelian manuscripts, Karl Widemann (1555–1637), to write a public response to the text. Haslmayr's *Answer* was his fulfilment of this request, and was soon printed numerous times, first by an unknown and presumably secret press, but in subsequent years it was often republished together with editions of the *Fama* and the *Confessio*.

Meanwhile to the west of Plötzkau, in Marburg, the Paracelsian physician Johann Hartmann (1558–1631) read the *Fama* in 1611, in a copy apparently given to him by Figulus. Soon the text reached an international readership as Hartmann gave it to the Danish physician and antiquarian Ole Worm (1588–1655). Whereas the former might have taken a favourable view on the text, the latter was quick to dismiss the Rosicrucian message. Not much later a second Dane, Erik Lange (1559–1643),

brother-in-law of the famous astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), received a copy of this manuscript and rushed into writing a sympathetic letter in support, addressed to the "Lords and brothers of the fraternity and brotherhood of the admirable and everlasting Order of the Rose Cross" (1613).

After the publication of the Rosicrucian manifestos in 1614 and 1615, word of these inventive texts spread much more widely across Northern Europe. A large number of responses ensued to the Rosicrucians' call for reform and their appeal to readers "to examine their own arts precisely and keenly […] and reveal to us their thoughts in written form in print." Back in German lands, the anonymous author of the preface to a work entitled *About the Highest, Very Best and Most Expensive Treasures* (*Echo*, 1615), attributed to the alchemist Julius Sperber (ca. 1540–1610?), argued that the manifestos were echoes of Adamic and ancient wisdom recently voiced in the works of Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Agrippa von Nettesheim. In the same year, 1615, Rosicrucian texts appeared under the pseudonym Julianus de Campis, while in 1617 and 1618 the famous alchemist Michael Maier (1568–1622) defended the brotherhood against various attacks. In the meantime, the court astronomer and later physician Daniel Mögling (pseudonyms Theophilus Schweighart and Florentinus de Valentia, 1596–1635) discussed, extolled, and defended the manifestos in several of his writings.

Simultaneously in England, the manifestos found an early apologist in the prominent physician and astrologer Robert Fludd (1574–1637), who defended them against fierce attacks by the German physician and putative author of the first chemistry textbook, Andreas Libavius (1555–1616). A few years later Fludd found himself defending Rosicrucianism again, this time against the attacks of the French mathematicians and friends of the famous philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) and Marin Mersenne (1588–1648).

Shortly after the written debate between Libavius and Fludd, the tutor and travelling Rosicrucian prophet Philipp Ziegler (ca. 1584-?) came into the picture back on German soil, as he claimed to be a member of the brotherhood. Inspired by the Rosicrucian texts, in March 1619 he announced his arrival in the Bavarian town of Fürth, calling himself "[…] King of Jerusalem, Shiloh, Joseph and David, crowned by the grace of God, foremost brother of the Rosicrucians and invincible Scepter of the King in Sion." Further north, in the town of Giessen just a few years later, in 1623, the physician Heinrich Nolle (Nollius, 1583–1630?) published a work entitled *Mirror of the Philosophical Parergon*, which was inspired by the Rosicrucian *Chemical Wedding* and informed by the brethren's reform plans. Also in 1623, posters appeared on church walls across the Rhine, in Paris, proclaiming that the Rosicrucian brethren had now established a presence in the French capital. This was the year that Descartes had returned to Paris, and the philosopher was somewhat perturbed by false accusations of his being one of the Rosicrucian brethren and of having brought the Rosicrucian furore with him to that city.

The manifestos generated also a great deal of excitement in the Dutch Republic, with followers in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Leiden. The movement was thought to be propagated by the enthusiast Peter Mormius (ca. 1580-after 1632), the painter Johannes Symonsz van der Beek, known as Johannes Torrentius (1589–1644), and the printer Govert Basson (d. 1643), who published many Rosicrucian works and owned even more. Torrentius was arguably the best still-life painter of his age. His paintings puzzled all his colleagues and peers, none of whom could discover how they were made and which materials were used—qualities which combined to add to his allure as a mysterious Rosicrucian.

By 1626, the main Scandinavian advocate for the Rosicrucian cause was the Swedish antiquarian Johannes Bureus (1568–1652), who famously claimed that this new movement was in fact a new manifestation of ancient, divine wisdom. Bureus was in contact with the book collector and publisher

Joachim Morsius (pseudonym Anastasius Philaretus Cosmopolita, 1593–1653), who must also have been acquainted with Torrentius, as a portrait of the latter in Morsius' *album amicorum* testifies. Morsius had tried to contact the top-secret brotherhood in a public letter to which, against all odds, he received a reply—a *unicum* since none other elicited a response.

The overwhelming flood of heterodox tracts and pamphlets written in support of the Rosicrucian movement was met by an equally prolific current of authors, like Libavius and Gassendi, who were shocked and outraged by these outlandish texts and condemned their authors and supporters alike. But the reaction to Rosicrucianism was not limited to words alone, and soon authorities took legal action against its supporters. Even as early as 1612, Rosicrucianism was perceived as dangerous: in that year, Haslmayr's support of the Rosicrucians got him sentenced to the galleys. He had sent a letter to Maximilian III (1558–1618), Regent of Tyrol (1602–1612) and later Archduke of Austria (1612–1618), to ask for money to travel to Montpellier in search of the mysterious brethren. In response, Maximilian did send him to travel, not to Montpellier, but to the galleys departing from Genoa instead, to work as a galley slave for four and a half years. On the day he was sent to the galleys, 31 October 1612, the authorities in Tyrol also issued a warrant for the arrest of his friend Figulus, who was subsequently imprisoned until November 1617.

A few years later, self-professed Rosicrucians were investigated and tried by Lutherans and Calvinists alike. In 1619 the German engineer and Rosicrucian follower Johannes Faulhaber (1580–1635) was placed under investigation by the Lutheran university in Tübingen. In the same year, Philipp Homagius and Georg Zimmermann (dates unknown) were condemned by Calvinist prosecutors by the order of Landgrave Moritz von Hesse-Kassel (1572–1632). No sooner had Homagius found refuge in Giessen than he was investigated again, together with Heinrich Nolle, this time by Lutheran investigators of the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, Ludwig V (1577–1626).

Heterodox thinkers suspected of Rosicrucianism in the Dutch provinces were treated particularly harshly. Such was the fear of subversive views that when the Court of Holland examined the Rosicrucian matter, they made sure that Torrentius was also investigated, whereupon the artist was interrogated and brutally tortured. Shortly before the case against Torrentius, in 1625, Dutch translations of the *Fama* and *Confessio*, the *Echo* attributed to Julius Sperber, and other unnamed books were sent by the Court of Holland to Calvinist professors of Theology in Leiden for investigation of their "Rosicrucian teachings." In their report, the professors concluded that the Rosicrucian "sect" was an

error in doctrine […], possessed, superstitious and magical; in her philosophy she is a fabrication of an erratic mind and a monstrous spirit, vain, useless, and filled with deceit; lastly rebellious towards the state […].

Religiously, politically, and philosophically, the manifestos and their followers provoked the authorities and were to be condemned. For one reason or another, the Rosicrucian case truly became a Europe-wide controversy.

The Rosicrucian manifestos might easily have been overlooked or ignored, but instead their impact on early seventeenth-century Europe was enormous. What was the controversial message of these short texts that triggered such a passionate response? Literature on the Rosicrucian manifestos and the subsequent movement has largely been concerned with questions of authorship, the networks from which these pamphlets arose, and the early furore. While context is obviously important, the first place to look to understand these manifestos and their explosive aftermath are the contents of the manifestos themselves.

This book studies the manifestos' call for a general reformation in its historical context. This call emerged in a period, the early seventeenth century, that witnessed a large variety of calls for, and

attempts at, change. Yet, the "key-markers" of change in the scientific and philosophical realms are still Francis Bacon and René Descartes. In the religious world they are most prominently Martin Luther and John Calvin. But any understanding of early modern projects of change which relies on the figures just mentioned would be anachronistic. It would also rule out of consideration concepts of reform beyond the strict boundaries of science and religion, respectively. The Rosicrucian manifestos—as well as other texts and movements that call for change, but that are much less known than the heroes just mentioned—fit much less comfortably in, and often challenge, the strict boundary between science and religion. They require fresh investigation in order to further develop our understanding of early modern concepts of change and projects of reform.


Fama Fraternitatis
Oder
Entdeckung
der Brüderschafft
des löblichen Ordens deß
Rosen Creutzes/
Beneben der
CONFESSION
Oder
Bekantnus derselben Fraternitet,
an alle Gelehrte vnd Häupter in
Europa geschrieben.
Auch etlichen Responsionen von H.
Haselmeyern vnd anderen gelehrten Leu-
ten auff die Famam gestellet.
Gedruckt zu Dantzigk / durch Andream
Hünefeldt. Im Jahr/ 1615.

Fama fraternitatis and *Confessio fraternitatis* (1615), HAB Wolfenbüttel

The Rosicrucian Story

The Rosicrucian manifestos and the related *Chemical Wedding* give an account of the life of the well-travelled and highly-educated Christian Rosencreutz, who is described as the father of the Rosicrucian fraternity. Rosencreutz is said to have been born in 1378 and to have lived for 106 years, until his death in 1484. His message had been kept secret for 120 years until 1604 when, coinciding with the purported discovery of his vault, the Rosicrucian secrets would be revealed.

The *Fama* describes the life of the founder of the fraternity and the foundation of the Rosicrucian brotherhood. In his early years, Christian Rosencreutz travelled to the Arab world where he studied physics, mathematics, languages, magic, and Kabbalah. In the Arab cities Damcar and Fez he learned various secrets of nature and translated into Latin the mysterious "Liber M." After his travels in the East, Rosencreutz had become convinced of the necessity for a general reformation and felt compelled to teach others in Europe what he had learned in distant places. He visited several countries, but was disappointed at being unable to find anyone at the time willing to abandon their own teachings and philosophies, which Rosencreutz considered to be false. When he finally returned to Germany, he gathered around him three men who were to become the first brothers of the Rose Cross. Rosencreutz taught them the secrets of nature and worked with them in private in order to instigate the desired reformation. After four more companions had joined their cause, the eight brothers parted and went their separate ways throughout Europe to improve their knowledge. Once every year, on Rosencreutz's anniversary, they were to return to the house "Sanctus Spiritus," the house of the Holy Spirit, a building constructed by Christian Rosencreutz that was to become the Rosicrucians' sanctuary. They identified themselves as physicians, adapted to the style of dress of the country in which they worked, while each using as their secret mark "R.C." It was agreed that "none should practice any other profession than to cure the sick, without payment." The brethren were supposed to keep the brotherhood secret for 120 years after Rosencreutz's death, and to find a successor each so that the fraternity would continue to exist even after their own deaths.

In 1615, one year after the publication of the *Fama*, another provocative text issued from the printing presses, the *Confessio*. Christian Rosencreutz's hope for a general reformation was further developed in this closely related second manifesto, which had already been announced in the *Fama*. In this text, the authors discussed in more detail the philosophy of their fraternity. The brethren understood the workings of the world according to the hermetic analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, with humans as the microcosm of the universe. The macrocosm—the universe—was full of secrets that were to be revealed, and this revelation, the reader was told, would happen soon. The disclosure of secrets coincided with the dawn of the Rosicrucian philosophy, which was to replace traditional natural philosophy, to provide a new foundation for the sciences, and to form the basis of a broader reformation.

On the reverse side of the brethren's hope for a different future was their negative judgement on contemporary society. In their view, religion and philosophy were deeply rotten, and the contemporary state of affairs needed to be overhauled. At the time when the manifestos were drafted, the old worlds of Roman orthodoxy and of Aristotelian natural philosophy were irreversibly losing their foothold in the Western world. The Lutheran and Calvinist reformations had permanently changed the religious landscape, while the voices of so-called "novatores," challengers of Aristotelian natural philosophy and the medieval university curriculum in general, grew stronger. Religiously and scientifically, the world was undergoing substantial transformations. The authors of the manifestos observed and encouraged these changes, and spread the hopeful prediction of "a general reformation of divine and human things," to which they would eagerly contribute. Soon, so went their message, the world would be thoroughly transformed for the better.

Religiously, the brethren defined themselves in opposition to the Turks and the Roman Church, condemning "the blasphemies against our Jesus of both East and West (that is, Mohammed and the pope)," and claiming that they acknowledge only Christ. The manifestos unmistakably originated from the Protestant world, but argued that still further religious changes were necessary.

Scientifically, the academic institutions and their educational programmes were to be reformed and replaced. University scholars ("Gelehrte") were accused of being guided by "pride and ambition" in their studies, which led them to misinterpret the world, spread lies, and sow destruction. The brethren's critique included not only Aristotelian (natural) philosophy, but also academic medicine. Their commitment to medicine as their main task, and one that should be practiced without reward, was contrary to the traditional procedure of ordinary Galenic physicians. Most alchemical practice, too, was considered "an offence to the glory of God." Alchemy was not meant for the making of gold, the brethren insisted, but should instead be used for the production of medicine and the acquisition of knowledge.

The Rosicrucian notion of reform was inherently general: All arts were to be reformed, religion was to be sanctified, philosophy to be changed, and medicine and alchemy to be purified. This transformation was to be initiated by the Rosicrucian brotherhood, and the reader of the *Fama* was encouraged to reflect upon the arts himself and was hoped to be "sincere and heartfelt towards us," so as to potentially contribute to their reformation. But this reformation implied changes within the divine realm as well, since God was involving himself in new ways in earthly matters.

While the *Fama* and *Confessio* were overtly optimistic manifestos, designed to inspire hope, they were also highly enigmatic, and without any attempt to provide a clear explanation of the brethren's philosophy or a detailed description of the changes announced. But their general reformation entailed more than an interpretation of the contemporary situation and a call for action. The language of the reform that was about to take place was infused with what might loosely be called millenarian expectations of a new age. The brethren believed themselves to be living in the last days prior to a new era, which was to precede the Last Judgement and the End Times. These days witnessed the first signs of a hopeful future which would soon be made manifest. The brethren believed that they "may soon rejoice in a happy time." The imminent changes were not only an effectuation of Rosicrucian designs, but were also part of God's plan. The central theme in the Rosicrucian manifestos, the general reformation, is intimately related to the expectation that the end of the present age was at hand and that a new, perfected time would soon be upon us.

While these philosophical and apocalyptic aspects are clearly visible in the *Fama* and *Confessio*, the third text, the *Chemical Wedding*, is very different. The *Chemical Wedding* is presented as an autobiographical story from the perspective of Christian Rosencreutz. There are neither references in this text to the manifestos, nor do the manifestos refer to the *Chemical Wedding*, and the central element is no longer a general reformation but a description of a journey culminating in an allegorical alchemical wedding of the King and Queen. The story is divided into seven sections, each covering one day, over which the story plays out.

At the beginning of the story, the protagonist, Christian Rosencreutz, receives from an angel an invitation to the wedding of the King and Queen. He accepts, albeit hesitantly, and he sets out on his arduous journey the following morning. After a long and difficult walk on the second day and having overcome several hurdles, Rosencreutz arrives at the castle, his destination, only just in time. There, (the souls of) the guests will be weighed the next morning on a golden balance to determine whether they are allowed to enter the castle. To his merit, Rosencreutz passes the weighing test with such ease (he could carry eight weights instead of the requisite seven) that he is permitted the opportunity to bring with him into the castle a person of his own choosing. The person he chooses

is described as an emperor, "keyser." Together, they are two of the very few worthy ones allowed to attend the wedding of the King and Queen and to receive the Golden Fleece.

Leonhard Thurneysser, *Quinta essentia* (1574), fol. xxxvii

The days which follow are taken up with festivities, dinners, tours in the castle, and, most importantly, preparations for the wedding, during which the select few further demonstrate their worth. They engage in work of an alchemical nature. When six royal persons ("Königliche Personen") present at the castle are executed on the fourth day, as part of the wedding preparations, their heads are used for an alchemical preparation from which ultimately the King and Queen arise, brought to life through fire from heaven. On the fifth day, Rosencreutz secretly

observes the sleeping Venus, who was also in the castle but whom he was forbidden to visit. Rosencreutz's spying on Venus is revealed on the final day, and the book ends with his punishment for having seen her: he is condemned to guard the first portal to the castle until someone else commits the same offence and will have to take his place as guard. The text concludes with the statement that two folios—purportedly dealing with Rosencreutz's return home—are missing, thereby rendering the story incomplete.

Overtly allegorical in character, the *Chemical Wedding* is even more abstruse than the *Fama* and *Confessio*. It does not discuss the brethren's philosophical claims and apocalyptic predictions, and rather than a general reformation it describes an alchemical process that can perhaps be best interpreted as an individual transformation. Unlike the *Fama* and *Confessio*, it is not a manifesto in the sense of a mission statement, and hence it does not discuss the mission of the brotherhood to reform the world. For this reason, this book will make only passing references to the *Chemical Wedding*, while the focus will be on the two manifestos.

The Historiography

The Rosicrucian manifestos provoked much debate in the decades after their publication, and were soon used as founding texts for the many Rosicrucian societies that were established following the purported Rosicrucian fraternity of Christian Rosencreutz. Owing partly to their immense popularity, and partly to their enigmatic contents, the manifestos have been the object of numerous investigations throughout the intervening centuries. As early as 1720, Daniel Colberg included them in *Das Platonisch-Hermetische Christenthum*, while in 1729 Gottfried Arnold discussed the manifestos in his *Unpartheyische Kirche- und Ketzer-Historie*. Many other studies of early Rosicrucianism have followed. Some historiographies offered interpretative accounts of the Rosicrucian mission statements, while other historians embarked on a more serious quest into the early history of Rosicrucianism. The works of Richard Kienast and Will-Erich Peuckert have proven to be important sources, but in the past century the work of Frances Yates has been particularly influential not only within the historiography on the manifestos, but also in other areas of research. These sources have by now become largely outdated, while the scholarship has benefitted enormously from the paramount work of the foremost authority on Rosicrucianism, Carlos Gilly, as well as from such scholars as Donald Dickson, Didier Kahn, and Martin Brecht.

The past historiography is characterised by many different approaches to the Rosicrucian manifestos. The texts themselves and the furore they aroused have both received in-depth analysis and attention. Yet, much of this scholarship remains dominated by the question of authorship. Who wrote these elusive texts? Over the past four centuries, scholars have provided diverse answers to this question, making it a highly contested topic in the historiography.

One way of answering this question is by investigating the context in which the Rosicrucian manifestos came about. Scholars have thoroughly described this context and traced the networks from which these texts may have originated. Brecht, for example, approached the question of authorship by studying the early connections of the possible authors with one another. Gilly has also meticulously examined the early context of Rosicrucianism, including the origin of the manifestos themselves, the printing presses from which they were published, and the circles in which the manuscript versions of the manifestos, particularly the *Fama*, circulated.

A second way of dealing with this question, and the road most travelled, is to examine the contents of the manifestos and to compare these with the views of the presumed authors as expressed in other texts attributed to them. This method has been used both to point to certain possible authors and to eliminate suggestions proposed by others. Nearly a century ago, Peuckert discussed the manifestos in the beautiful prose of his *Die Rosenkreuzer* and concluded that the manifestos must have originated from a "pansophical circle." Having nominated a particular author, the hand of whom

they believe to have been at work in the manifestos, scholars have furthermore often interpreted and explained the contents of the manifestos themselves.

Another thread of scholarship focuses on the contents of the manifestos without the side-tracking involved in questions of authorship. Partly thanks to their cryptic nature and occult elements, historians have sought to explain the three Rosicrucian founding texts in relation to esotericism and Hermeticism (*Fama* and *Confessio*) and to alchemy (*Chemical Wedding*). They have described the occult meaning of Rosencreutz's wanderings, noting the Rosicrucians' indebtedness to hermetic currents, alchemical traditions, and even Kabbalistic views. This has led to a disparate range of interpretations of the texts. For example, Yates links them to Dee's *Monas hieroglyphica*; Roland Edighoffer's *Rose-Croix et société idéale* analyses the manifestos from the perspective of theology, theosophy, and (alchemical) symbolism; Christopher McIntosh's *The Rosicrucians* situates the manifestos in the context of esoteric traditions; and Susanna Åkerman's *Rose Cross Over the Baltic* associates them with esoteric, hermetic, and runic thought. Edighoffer furthermore reads the manifestos through a Paracelsian lens. Volkhard Wels, finally, associates the manifestos with Lutheran views.

In order to understand the subsequent Rosicrucian furore, its diversity, and the hermetic, theosophical, and prophetic elements inherited from the manifestos, some historians have sought to provide an overview of the early response to the manifestos. Hans Schick, for example, besides studying the authorship and interpreting the manifestos, has also analysed the work of proponents and opponents of the Rosicrucians, such as Joachim Morsius and Friedrich Grick. Gilly has provided an overview of numerous Rosicrucian responses in several studies. Other scholars focused on Rosicrucianism in one specific region: Yates analysed Rosicrucianism in the German-speaking lands, France, and England; Åkerman studied the Scandinavian response; Kahn analysed the hoax in Paris; and Govert Snoek traced the Rosicrucian episode in the Dutch regions. Finally, some scholars have narrowed their focus to specific authors involved in the Rosicrucian debate. For example, Gilly devoted an entire book to the early Rosicrucian protagonist Adam Haslmayr; Richard van Dülmen studied another supporter of the Rosicrucians, Daniel Mögling; while Bruce Moran focused on one of their critics, Andreas Libavius.

A Fresh Approach

The present study will take a very different approach from those that have dominated the scholarship, and will provide a fresh analysis of the Rosicrucian manifestos and their early aftermath. The question of authorship will deliberately be postponed, and the contents of the manifestos will not be analysed and interpreted through the lens of authorship. Nor will this book focus on the esoteric elements in the manifestos, or map the Rosicrucian furore. Instead, it will focus directly on the contents of the texts in order to answer the question of their explosive impact: Why were these manifestos so controversial in the decades after their publication? What did some readers find so attractive, and others so dangerous? The best way to answer these questions is to focus on what was most central to the Rosicrucian cause: the notion of a general reformation. This raises the key question to be pursued: Where did the call for a general reformation come from, and how was it interpreted in the early stages of the response?

The key concept contained in the manifestos—the general reformation—has remained virtually *terra incognita*. Its centrality has been acknowledged, and the manifestos have been associated with eschatology and apocalypticism, but an in-depth analysis of the texts in the context of the general reformation and of expectations of a new age has remained a *desideratum*. The call for a reformation, or a renovation, as the texts also phrase it, is not fully explored in the literature on the manifestos, but is more often mentioned either in the context of authorship or understood as part of the manifestos' esoteric inspiration. Conversely, numerous studies have been devoted to Jewish and

Christian apocalyptic and millenarian prophecies, the place and role of eschatology or hopeful expectations within the main confessions, and medieval and early modern thoughts on a (universal) reformation. Yet, most references within these texts to the Rosicrucian appeals for a general reformation are made only *en passant*. Current scholarship does not discuss the set of apocalyptic and prophetic ideas in the manifestos and their connection to previous traditions in any detail, and an in-depth study of the Rosicrucian concept of general reformation, its meaning, its origin, its position within Judeo-Christian eschatology, and its relation to the Lutheran context or more generally to a confessional understanding of history has been missing. The same is true for scholarship on the early responses to the manifestos, in which the notion of reform and its related apocalyptic elements have yet to receive the attention they deserve.

The point of departure for this book is the conviction that we need to meticulously study the call for change, which played such a prominent role in the Rosicrucian manifestos. More specifically, we need to investigate where this call came from, what role it played in the early positive response, and why it aroused so much controversy in the period directly following the publication of the manifestos.

By shedding light on an important body of early seventeenth-century ideas of reformation and reform, we will try to arrive at an understanding of early modern concepts of change as it was promoted and carried out by actors who have not become the heroes of history. In doing so, this study will take into account attempts at reform beyond the strict boundaries of science and religion. It will attempt to escape the confines of disciplinary history through the study of texts that were not themselves restricted to, and cannot be understood through, one specific discipline. The aim is to take a multidisciplinary approach that goes well beyond current disciplinary boundaries and to embrace a range of specialist fields, including the history of alchemy and medicine, the history of science broadly conceived, religious studies, and the history of philosophy.

In the past historiography, scholars have sometimes referred to Luther's Reformation as the first reformation and have regarded Calvinism as a second reformation; but such numeration oversimplifies the constant yearning for reform which started to emerge in the late Middle Ages and continued to develop at least until the second half of the seventeenth century. At the time the manifestos were drafted, there was a widespread but subterranean current of dissenting views and anti-establishment reformative zeal that diverged from orthodoxy, of which the Rosicrucian episode was one example. Some of these currents resulted in religious groups which are commonly categorised by historians under the heading "Radical Reformation." This broad rubric however covers a large number of heterogeneous groups, and even within the main Protestant confessions clusters of Lutherans and Calvinists endorsed a multiplicity of views in acute tension with the mainstream orthodoxies of their own confessions. The Reformation period therefore is increasingly seen not only from the perspective of the winners (Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin), but now includes those who have long been excluded from traditional accounts of "the Reformation." This involves also figures for whom religious reform was inextricably linked with the reform of alchemy, medicine, or spiritualism, for example, as can be observed in the cases of the Paracelsians, Weigelians, and Schwenckfeldians, and which may also be noted in relation to the Rosicrucians' general reformation. By acknowledging such a large range of reform plans, historians have shifted the meaning of the term "Reformation," as it has come to include figures preceding or opposing magisterial reformers as well as notions of academic, natural-philosophical, or political reform.

Notwithstanding this plurality of reformations, there were those who desired a general or all-embracing reformation, a striving that has come to be known as "universal reformation." Universal reformation is by definition all-embracing and encompasses a wide range of activities, including plans to reform, amongst others, religion, politics, philosophy, medicine, and education. Several figures who have been placed in that tradition include Theophrastus Paracelsus (1493/4–1541) and his

successors, the theosopher Valentin Weigel (1533–1588), and the Lutheran theologian Johann Arndt (1555–1621). Additionally, figures as diverse as Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), Jan Baptista Van Helmont (1579–1644), and Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638) have recently been put into this context; while also Jan Amos Comenius (1592–1670) and Samuel Hartlib (ca. 1600–1662) and their circle of friends have been studied from the perspective of universal reformation. Historian Howard Hotson especially has contributed extensively to the study of universal reformation.

Like their contemporaries, the authors of the manifestos and their followers appealed for what they called a general reformation, which was highly heterogeneous and not restricted to, or informed by, any one confession. According to Reformation historians, "confessionalization" was a widespread process between 1550 and 1650, linking religion and confession to society and politics through social discipline. The formation of confessions, the transformation of the state, and the use of social discipline are seen as interrelated processes, while early modern religion and confession structured, influenced, and transformed social and political life through indoctrination, education, and rituals. This, in turn, created social groups defined and divided according to their confession. This book aims to show how the Rosicrucian manifestos attempted to circumvent this contemporary process of "confessionalization," and in fact opposed confessional doctrines in their proposal of universal change.

The Rosicrucian reformation and its immediate aftermath should be understood against the background of this enlarged perspective of reformation. In the following chapters, several aspects of the manifestos' call for change—in the form of a reformation, a revolution, or a renovation—will be retraced to medieval and early modern traditions up to the start of the Thirty Years' War. Part One (Chapters One and Two) is devoted to the sources of the manifestos. In order to understand the Rosicrucian call for a general reformation, it is essential to study first the origins of this idea. Medieval and early modern interpretations of, and prophecies about, the course of history will be analysed and compared in order to clarify the theme of a general reformation in the Rosicrucian texts. In the first chapter, the manifestos will be compared with related medieval Catholic and early modern traditions and studied from the perspective of the (radical) Reformation. Chapter Two is devoted to Paracelsian themes. Although the Paracelsian inspiration of several of the manifestos' tenets has been investigated previously, here the Paracelsian impetus will be investigated specifically from the perspective of the notion of a general reformation and related apocalyptic expectations. The aim is to provide a fresh understanding of the Paracelsian influence on the manifestos. Likewise, not only genuine works of Paracelsus need to be reviewed but also early Paracelsian and pseudo-Paracelsian texts, which were published shortly before the manifestos were drafted and which are generally neglected in studies on Rosicrucianism.

Only after the origins of the *contents* of the manifestos have been sufficiently dealt with, is it appropriate to discuss the origins of the texts themselves and to return to the question of authorship. In Part Two (Chapter Three), we will first briefly review the question of authorship of the manifestos and, secondly, analyse the findings of Part One, and the key element of a general reformation in particular, in relation to the views expressed by the authors in other manuscript and printed texts. To what extent can the importance of the general reformation be observed in their other writings and what does this suggest about the manifestos' authorship and purpose?

Part Three (Chapters Four and Five) will in turn concentrate on the response to the manifestos. The aim of this part is not to trace the course of the Rosicrucian furore, but instead to analyse through several case studies specifically how the notion of a general reformation and related themes developed among the early readers of the manifestos. This approach will shed fresh light on the reasons for specific authors' support or dismissal of the Rosicrucian cause. To what extent was this theme appealing to Rosicrucian followers and controversial to those condemning the manifestos?

Chapter Four will specifically concentrate on the early Rosicrucian furore, in order to describe in detail the role of the Rosicrucian call for reform in the early welcoming response. Chapter Five will then study debates between authors vehemently attacking the Rosicrucian movement and authors defending it, in order to examine what was at stake in the views of both proponents and opponents of that movement. These texts will also be compared with formal reactions to Rosicrucianism within universities and courts, in which scholars were sometimes investigated and prosecuted for their Rosicrucian sympathies.

In the Conclusion, the findings of the previous chapters will be reviewed, analysed, and compared, and some thoughts on further research will be provided. <>

End to An Antisemitism!

Five volume series by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, and Lawrence H. Schiffman

Introduction to the series and the first volume in the series:

Eighty years after the 1938 pogroms and more than seventy years after the liberation of the Nazi concentration and death camps, yet again, attacking and killing Jews, regularly slandering and denigrating them have become a sad reality in Europe and in other parts of the world. This, together with calls to boycott the Jewish state and denying its right even to exist, can have grave implications for both Jews and society in general.

The situation is not new. World history does not lack examples of Jew-hatred and persecution either. Consider Tacitus, Augustine, and Justinian, the expulsion of the Jews from Medina at the time of Mohammed, the Crusades, the Granada massacre, Martin Luther, the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula and the Spanish Inquisition, the pogroms, Henry Ford, the Ku Klux Klan, the 1941 pogrom in Bagdad, Adolf Hitler and the Shoah. These are just a few names and events from only a few parts of the world. Today, Jew-hatred is no longer restricted to the extreme right and radical Islam but has spread across parts of the left and center of the political spectrum, as well as mainstream Christi and Muslim groups. Given this unacceptable reality, from February 18th through 22nd of 2018, approximately 1,000 scholars, activists, decision makers and influencers met in Vienna at the conference "An End to Antisemitism!"

The conference was jointly organized by the European Jewish Congress, New York University, Tel Aviv University, and the University of Vienna to study antisemitism with an unprecedented interdisciplinary breadth but also with historical depth. Over one-hundred and fifty presentations from all over the world engaged with all forms of antisemitism from antiquity until today from the perspective of numerous fields.

To each field, a separate panel was dedicated which was organized and headed by leading experts.

- Ancient History (Benjamin Isaac, Tel Aviv University)
- Medieval History (Simha Goldin, Tel Aviv University)
- Modern History (Klaus S. Davidowicz, Vienna University)
- Contemporary History (Dina Porat, Tel Aviv University)
- Bible, Christianity, and Antisemitism (Karin Finsterbusch, University of Koblenz-Landau and Armin Lange, Vienna University)
- Islam and Antisemitism (Esther Webman, Tel Aviv University)
- Judaism, Jewish Studies, and Antisemitism (Lawrence H. Schiffman, New York University)
- Israel Studies (Evyatar Friesel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

- Philosophy and Ethics (Julius H. Schoeps, Moses Mendelssohn Center for European Jewish Studies)
- Sociology and Social Sciences (Eliezer Ben-Rafael,Tel Aviv University)
- Psychology (Florette Cohen Abady,CUNY College of Staten Island)
- Pedagogy (Martin Rothgangel, University of Vienna)
- Media Studies,Journalism, and Visual Cultures (Frank Stern, University of Vienna)
- Internet and Antisemitism (Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Technical University of Berlin)
- Jurisprudence (Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias, Institute of Law Studies Polish Academy of Sciences)
- Political Studies (Karin Stögner and Stephan Grigat, University of Vienna, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

All of these scholars and two additional colleagues serve the editorial board of these proceedings ,aiding the editors in their work. For their work, suggestions, and support we are indebted to all of them.

The initial motivation for the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" was the need of Jewish organizations for strategic guidelines to combat antisemitism successfully. This is because the recent staggering increase of antisemitism has proven that existing strategies were limited in their success. The approach of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" was to combine the practical experience of decision makers and stakeholders with the input of academic specialists. One approach might therefore be described as applied humanities and applied social sciences. This new approach to the fight against antisemitism resulted into two major outputs of the conference's research. Therefore, the first volume of the conference proceedings publishes, on the one hand, keynote lectures based on practical experience and academic research as well as, on the other hand, policy recommendations regarding how to combat antisemitism distilled out of both practical and academic contributions to the conference. Itis in the nature of academic research that new insights are gained by a contradictory discourse. Hence, some of the presentations published in the present volume might disagree in some aspects with its policy recommendations. The present volume of the conference proceedings is structured to mirror this initial motivation of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" by grouping the academic research of the keynote lectures together with the corresponding recommended policies how to combat antisemitism.

1. A general audience, including decision makers and stakeholders in particular, is addressed bya catalogue of policy recommendations explaining how to combat antisemitism. Together, its policy recommendations are an original effort to take the fruits of our conference's scholarly research and turn them into a document of practical impact. While some of these policies are almost direct quotes of conference participants, others represent conclusions based on the combined research of the conference. We hope that the recommendations of this catalogue of policies combating antisemitism can be applied to help to eradicate and suppress antisemitism in all its forms globally. It is in the nature of research to gain new insights by constructive disagreement. Therefore, the policy recommendations this catalogue proposes will in some cases contradict the views of some presenters of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" and will find the support of others. Even those with whom we disagree were of great help as their arguments helped us to improve the policies regarding how to combat antisemitism.

2. An academic audience is addressed by the present conference proceedings, which will include both the recommendations of the catalogue of policies combating antisemitism as well as the research leading to them. The presentations of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" will be published in a total of five volumes. The first volume will include the published versions of all presentations and greetings by dignitaries, decision makers, and stake holders as well as all plenary

presentations by scholars. The volumes following the present first volume will include the published versions of the presentations given at the sixteen panels of our conference.

1. Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach
2. Confronting Antisemitism from the Perspectives of Christianity, Islam and Judaism
3. Confronting Antisemitism through the Ages—A Historical Perspective
4. Confronting Antisemitism from Perspectives of Philosophy and Social Sciences
5. Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds

The present first volume consists of five parts. An introduction reflecting the nature of antisemitism and strategies to combat it (I) is followed by the contributions of those political and religious decision makers who described their experiences in combating antisemitism at our conference.

II Leadership Talks by Decision Makers and Stakeholders

These practical experiences of decision makers and stakeholders form one important component of our endeavor to develop academically guided policy recommendations regarding how to combat antisemitism. The other component is the contributions of academics from a broad range of different specializations. At the conference, for each of the program units a keynote lecture was presented to set the tone for the overall discussion. The keynote lectures of each of the sixteen panels published in this volume represent this academic component. Only the combined approach of both components allowed us to develop policy recommendations regarding how to combat antisemitism. The published versions of the keynote lectures are structured into three parts.

III Religion

IV Culture, Education, and Research

V Politics, Business, and Jurisprudence

In these three parts, each set of keynote lectures is followed by the policy recommendations that thematically correspond to them.

Antisemitism has a history of more than 2,000 years. Combating antisemitism is complicated, and there are no easy solutions to it. The complexity of antisemitism requires complex answers to combat it successfully. The contributions to this volume and the policy recommendations regarding how to combat antisemitism reflect this complexity and do not attempt to give easy answers. Only a combined approach as outlined above holds promise of successfully combating this age-old hatred.

The first volume of our conference proceedings as well its policy recommendations as to how to combat antisemitism not only aim at reaching the attention of decision and opinion makers as well as stakeholders in many fields worldwide but also address a general interested public. While the contributions and policy recommendations of the present volume concern only antisemitism, we as editors and authors are fully aware that antisemitism as a unique cultural and religious category exists alongside a host of other hatreds and phobias, directed against a long list of minorities and victimized groups. We are well aware that Jews are not the only target of hatred but that they are the tip of the iceberg. Therefore, we hope that beyond the fight against antisemitism, this present volume combining practical and academic contributions with policy recommendations might serve as a model of how to combat these other forms of hatred or even be a starting point from which the work to eradicate other wrongs will continue.

Volume I Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach edited by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, and Lawrence H. Schiffman [An End to Antisemitism! De Gruyter, 9783110618594] Open Access

This volume provides a compendium of the history of and discourse about antisemitism - both as a unique cultural and religious category. Antisemitic stereotypes function as religious symbols that express and transmit a belief system of Jew-hatred, which are stored in the cultural and religious memories of the Western and Muslim worlds, migrating freely between Christian, Muslim and other religious symbolic systems.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: His Holiness, Pope Francis:

Dear friends,

I offer you a warm welcome and thank you for your presence here. I am grateful for the noble aim that brings you here: to reflect together, from varying points of view, on the responsibility of States, institutions and individuals in the struggle against antisemitism and crimes associated with antisemitic hatred. I would like to emphasize one word: responsibility. We are responsible when we are able to respond. It is not merely a question of analyzing the causes of violence and refuting their perverse reasoning, but of being actively prepared to respond to them. Thus, the enemy against which we fight is not only hatred in all of its forms, but even more fundamentally, indifference; for it is indifference that analyzes and impedes us from doing what is right even when we know that it is right.

I do not grow tired of repeating that indifference is a virus that is dangerously contagious in our time, a time when we are ever more connected with others but are increasingly less attentive to others. And yet the global context should help us understand that none of us is an island and none will have a future of peace without one that is worthy for all. The Book of Genesis helps us to understand that indifference is an insidious evil crouching at man's door (cf.Gen 4:7).Itis the subject of debate between the creature and his Creator at the beginning of history, as soon as the Creator asks Cain: "Where is your brother?" But Cain, who has just killed his brother, does not reply to the question, does not explain "where." On the contrary, he protests that he is autonomous: " Am I my brother's keeper?" (Gen 4:9). His brother does not interest him: here is the root of perversity, the root of death that produces desperation and silence. I recall the roar of the deafening silence I

sensed two years ago in Auschwitz-Birkenau: a disturbing silence that leaves space only for tears, for prayer and for the begging of forgiveness.

Faced with the virus of indifference, the root of hatred, what vaccine can we administer? The Book of Deuteronomy comes to our aid. After a long journey through the desert, Moses addressed a basic counsel to the Chosen People: "Remember your whole journey" (Deut8:2). To the people longing for the promised future, wisdom was suggesting one look back, turning one's glance to the steps already completed. And Moses did not simply say, "think of the journey," but remember, orbing alive; do not let the past die. Remember, that is, "return with your heart:" do not only form the memory in your mind, but in the depths of your soul, with your whole being. And do not forma memory only of what you like, but of "your whole journey." We have just celebrated International Holocaust Remembrance Day. In order to recover our humanity, to recover our human understanding of reality and to overcome so many deplorable forms of apathy towards our neighbor, we need this memory, this capacity to involve ourselves together in remembering. Memory is the key to accessing the future, an it is our responsibility to hand it on in a dignified way to young generations.

In this regard,I would like to mention a document of the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, whose twentieth anniversary of publication we celebrate this year. The title is eloquent: We Remember: a Reflection on the Shoah (16 March 1998).1 It was Saint John Paul II's fervent hope that it "would enable memory to play its necessary part in the process of shaping a future in which the unspeakable iniquity of the Shoah will never again be possible." The text speaks of this memory, which we Christians are called to safeguard, together with our elder Jewish brothers: "However, it is not only a question of recalling the past. The common future of Jews and Christians demands that we remember, for 'there is no future without memory.' History itself is memoria futuri."

To build our history, which will either be together or will not be at all, we need a common memory, living and faithful, that should not remain imprisoned in resentment but, though riven by the night of pain, should open up to the hop ofa new dawn. The Church desires to extend her hand. She wishes to remember and to walk together with our Jewish brothers and sisters. On this journey, "the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone."

Dear friends, may we help one another in turn to growa culture of responsibility, of memory and of closeness, and to establish an alliance against indference, against every form of indifference. The potentialities of information will certainly be of assistance; even more important will be those of formation. We need urgently to educate young generations to become actively involved in the struggle against hatred and discrimination, but also in the over reaching of conflicting positions in the past, and never to grow tired of seeking the other Indeed, to prepare atruly human future, rejecting evil is not enough; we need to build the common good together. I thank you for your commitment in all of these matters. May the Lord of peace accompany you and bless every one of your good intentions. Thank you.

Pope Francis (Jorge Mario Bergoglio) was elected Pope of the Catholic Church in 2013. He took the name Francis after Saint Francis of Assisi, who was known for his embrace of poverty and chastity.

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Volume 2 Confronting Antisemitism from the Perspectives of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism edited by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, Lawrence H. Schiffman [An End to Antisemitism! De Gruyter, 9783110671773] Open Access

This volume engages with antisemitic stereotypes as religious symbols that express and transmit a belief system of Jew-hatred. These religious symbols are stored in Christian, Muslim and even today's secular cultural and religious memories. This volume explores how antisemitic religious symbol systems can play a key role in the construction of group identities.

CONTENTS

Antisemitism, the "longest hatred," still flourishes in our societies. Itis not restricted to extreme right-wing movements and social groups, but it also flourishes in the political center and on the left. Political, religious, and lay groups alike continue a tradition of discrimination against Jews, insults, and antisemitic hate crimes every day. Given this unacceptable reality, in February 2018, approximately one thousand scholars, activists, decision makers, and influencers met in Vienna at the conference "An End to Antisemitism! " The conference was jointly organized by the European Jewish Congress, New York University, Tel Aviv University, and the University of Vienna to study antisemitism with an unprecedented interdisciplinary breadth and historical depth. Over 150 presents from all over the world engaged with all forms of antisemitism from a variety of perspectives. The present series, "An End to Antisemitism!" documents the conference's output and research results from various fields. Leading experts in Religious Studies, History, Political Studies, Social Sciences, Philosophy, Psychology, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies shed light onto antisemitic traditions from all their respective viewpoints. Together, they help to shape a discourse of understanding, knowing, and recognizing various forms of antisemitism in order to confront and combat them.

One of the aims of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" was, therefore, to create concrete policy recommendations regarding how to effectively combat antisemitism. These have been collected and published in a separate Catalogue of Policies, a document of practical impact. They also form one of the bases of the first volume of the present series. All subsequent volumes are addressed to an academic audience. They document the research leading to these policy recommendations.

The present volume is concerned with methods of confronting antisemitism in Christianity and Islam. As one of the pillars of cultural memory, religions have been contributing to and shaping images of "the Jew" from ancient and premodern into contemporary times. Fortunately, especially since the modern age, voices from inside these religions have been raised against these discriminatory images and age-old stereotypes that have served as justification for antisemitic hate crimes over and over again. In modern Christianity and Islam, important voices call for the tolerance, acceptance, and diversity of identities and opinions. The present volume not only responds to these calls but can also help strengthen the continuous effort to combat and eradicate antisemitism in both religions.

Unfortunately, as with most collective volumes, the present one does not document all the lectures in the field of Religious Studies that we delivered at the conference in February 2018. Not all colleagues were able to contribute due to a multitude of other obligations. However, the volume also includes some contributions from an earlier conference focusing on antisemitism in Islam. The conference "Islam and Antisemitism" was organized jointly by the University of Vienna and Tel Aviv University and held in Vienna, November 2016. We are grateful for the willingness of the participants in this conference to share their research results for publication in this volume.

The present volume consists of three parts. The first confronts Ancient and Medieval Religious Traditions of Antisemitism. The second part sheds light on Antisemitism in the Study of Holy Scriptures and Related Writings in the Modern Period. The third and final part confronts Antisemitic Traditions in Contemporary Christianity and Islam. The articles within the three sections follow a chronological order with regard to the time period with which they are concerned. A different sequence of articles was chosen whenever necessary to serve the overarching theme of the volume and its audience with regard to readability and accessibility. A general introduction to the volume tries to establish the notion of antisemitism as religion per se, as an integral component of self-definition for every religious and social group. ***

Introduction

To effectively counteract contemporary antisemitism, it is important to recognize the traditions that feed modern hatred of Jews. Manifestations of antisemitism in contemporary cultures and societies are manifold. They range from hate speech to actual physical violence and can be encountered in political or economic realms, in social discourses of nation and race, or on a meta-level both culturally and ideologically. Religious and theological antisemitism can be regarded as the source for most of the other forms of Jew-hatred, especially in its shaping of a canon of discriminatory images and perceptions of "the Jews" as essentially different from anyone not Jewish.

Many contributions to the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" confirmed that ancient and medieval religious traditions of Jew-hatred still have an impact today. Their canon of antisemitic traditions remains vivid, and it is necessary to first recognize the traditions in question to subsequently eradicate them from contemporary discourse.

Usage of Terms

The usage of the term antisemitism is as complex as the genesis of the term itself.1 This is why some of the contributions in this volume dispute that the texts they study are "antisemitic" in nature. They rather wish to apply amore general term of "Jew-hatred" that subsumes all different forms of polemics against and persecutions of Jews. Focusing on theological concepts, especial in Christian religious history, some of the contributions also claim that specifically religious stereotypes confirm a notion of "anti-Judaism" that is not necessarily connected with other discriminatory allegations against Jews other than them accepting a system of beliefs and practices differing from and competing with Christianity. However, these traditions are also in fact clearly polemical and express negative images of and attitudes against Jews that reach far beyond the scope of religious alterity.

This seeming contradiction to the above claim of the ancient and medieval roots of modern antisemitism in some of the present volume's contributions can be explained in two ways. (1) Not all of the ancient and medieval roots of modern antisemitism are perceived by all authors to be antisemitic in nature themselves but are regarded as expressions of the rejection of Judaism for other reasons than Jew-hatred.2 (2) Despite the conference being based on the IHRA's Working Definition of Antisemitism,3 several contributions employ different definitions of antisemitism. While some essays perceive all forms of Jew-hatred and anti-Jewish

discrimination as antisemitic, others are more restrictive in their use of the term antisemitism as mentioned above. The editors of the present volume have chosen not to unify the usage of the various terms mentioned above. However, each author has been asked to present a definition according to which they understand and usea respective term.

Symbols, Images, and Traditions in the Formation of (Religious) Group Identities

Both individual and group identities are constructed and maintained by way of distinction and differentiation. A child develops its identity by differentia self from its mother in a process of several years. The construction of a personal identity includes thus not only the recognition "I am I" but also the recognition "You are not me." Social and religious group identities are constructed and maintained in a similar way, that is, in differentiation from other social or religious groups implying thus the recognition "We are we but not you." Group identities are thus constructed by way of distinguishing an in-group from an outgroup, or—to say it in other words— a collective "I" from a collective "Other."

In the case of some religions, such a group identity is constructed by defining a unifying set of religious doctrines that distinguishes this religion from all other religions. In the case of other religions, the same goal is reached by a set of religious, moral, and ritual rules that achieve the same differentiation.

How religious identity is understood and constructed—both in terms of differentiating oneself from another ("I am not you") and understanding oneself as being part ofa distinct group ("We are not them")—is thus a process inextricably linked to how religions are shaped. In establishing a new system of beliefs, values, and moral codes, religions need an opposite against which to def these beliefs, values, and moral codes and to prove their validity. On the other hand, they help to form communal spirits, feelings of solidarity, and shared identity. When members of the same group are brought together and held responsible for by the same religious beliefs, values, and moral codes, a common sense of togetherness and identity is shaped. This is true for all major religions.

The construction of religious group identities in monotheistic religion qua definition is especially competitive. The claim that there would be only one god negates all other religions to a much larger extent than in the case of polytheistic religions. A polytheistic religion can differentiate itself from another polytheistic religion without rejection of their opposite religious group identity. As an example, the claim of a collective "We" to believe in Isis does not need to deny the veracity of veneration of Mithras in its differentiation from a collective "Them." The construction of the religious group identity of the Is mystery cult, therefore, did not depend solely on the differentiation from other mystery cults such as the Mithras cult. There is no need to fully negate another religious belief system in order to corroborate the very rationale of their own religious existence. Monotheism, however, beyond differentiation, implies rejection and condemnation of the religious "Other" against which its very own religious group identity is formed by default. If there can be only one god, then all other gods must be void.

This is even more so the case when a given monotheistic religion developed out of a preexisting one, that is, Christianity out of Judaism and Islam out of both Judaism and Christianity. Rejection, condemnation, and dismissal of a monotheistic ancestor religion is, if not a necessity, at least an obvious choice in the formation of the religious group identity of a newly born monotheistic religious group.

For the purpose of forming and maintaining their religious group identity in differentiation from Judaism, both Christianity and Islam constructed a set of religious symbols that guide their recognition of the Jewish out-group as to the Christian and Islamic in-group, respectively. Such symbols include the demonization of Judaism as purported, for example, in John 8:44 in Christianity5 or the supposed violation of the covenant of Medina by the Jews of Medina in Islam. The incorporation of antisemitic symbols into the religious canon of symbolism and imagery is thus inherent in and characteristic for both Christianity and Islam.

Volume 3 Comprehending Antisemitism through the Ages: A Historical Perspective

edited by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, Lawrence H. Schiffman, [De Gruyter, 9783110671995] Open Access

This volume traces the history of antisemitism from antiquity through contemporary manifestations of the discrimination of Jews. It documents the religious, sociological, political and economic contexts in which antisemitism thrived and thrives and shows how such circumstances served as support and reinforcement for a curtailment of the Jews' social status. The volume sheds light on historical processes of discrimination and identifies them as a key factor in the contemporary and future fight against antisemitism.

CONTENTS

The present volume focuses on the history of antisemitism. Its contributions document historical traditions that have fed contemporary antisemitism and unearth different motivations for antisemitic persecution through the ages. As such, they scrutinize antisemitism's versatile nature and multiple transformations. Following a five-part chronological structure, the articles in the present volume trace antisemitism from antiquity to the Middle Ages, from the eighteenth century to the Nazi era and the Shoah, from the end of World War II to the founding of the State of Israel, and well into our present time where the internet and modern media have contributed beyond measure to the increase of Jew-hatred.

The contributors' theoretical approaches vary in accordance with the topics and research fields their articles engage with and come from. Some contributions follow a classical historiographical path, working with original sources to trace historical traditions of antisemitism or document historical events and incidences. Other articles, however, chose a more meta theoretical approach, going beyond a documentation alone. Rather, they investigate historical manifestations of antisemitismtofindanswerstoquestionsaboutpre-modernperceptionsofraceand racism as well as to learn about different motivations for antisemitic discrimination in order to establish means for combatting current day Jew-hatred. A general introduction to the volume brings together these different approaches as well as theoretical aspects of the history and historiography of antisemitism.
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Comprehending Antisemitism through the Ages: Introduction

Robert Wistrich's definition of antisemitism as the "longest hatred" carries as much weight now as it did thirty years ago, when Wistrich published his landmark study. Today, in our contemporary societies and culture, antisemitism is on the rise, and its manifestations are manifold. Antisemitic hate crimes have spiked in recent decades, and antisemitic stereotypes, sentiments, and hate speech have permeated all parts of the political spectrum. In order to effectively counteract the ever-growing Jew-hatred of our times, it is important to recognize the traditions that have fed antisemitism throughout history. Antisemitism is an age-old hatred deeply embedded in societies around the globe. While the internet and modern media have contributed beyond measure to the increase of Jew-hatred in all parts of the world, the transformation processes that antisemitism has been undergoing through the ages remain the same. A core condition of antisemitism is its versatile nature and adaptability, both of which can be traced through all periods of time. Current-day antisemitism is shaped and sustained not only by powerful precedents but also reflects common fears and anxieties that our societies are faced within a world that is ever changing and where the changes run even faster today than ever before. Historical awareness of the nature of antisemitism, therefore, is more important than ever. The present volume, thus, wants to help raise this awareness. Its articles trace the history of antisemitism and the tradition of antisemitic stereotypes through the ages. It documents various manifestations of antisemitism over time and reflects on the varying motivations for antisemitism. As such, these contributions shed light on socio-cultural and socio-psychological processes that have led to the spike of antisemitism in various periods of time and in varying intensity. In this way, they can help to establish methods and policies to not only to counter current antisemitic manifestations but also to combat them.

Volume 4 Confronting Antisemitism from Perspectives of Philosophy and Social Sciences edited by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, Lawrence H. Schiffman [An End to Antisemitism! De Gruyter, 9783110671971] Open Access

The five volumes provide a compendium of the history of and discourse about antisemitism - both as a unique cultural and religious category. Antisemitic stereotypes function as religious symbols that express and transmit a belief system of Jew-hatred, which are stored in the cultural and religious memories of the Western and Muslim worlds. This volume explores the phenomenon from the perspectives of Philosophy and Social Sciences.

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More than three years have passed since approximately one thousand scholars, activists, decision makers, and influencers met at the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" in February 2018, in Vienna. The conference was jointly organized by the European Jewish Congress, New York University, Tel Aviv University, and the University of Vienna to study antisemitism with an unprecedented interdisciplinary breadth and historical depth.Over150presentersfromalloverthe world engaged with all forms of antisemitism from a variety of perspectives. The present series, An End to Antisemitism!, documents the conference's output and research results from various fields. Leading experts in religious studies, history, political studies, social sciences, philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, and cultural studies shedl ight on antisemitic traditions from their respective viewpoints. Together, they help to shape a discourse of understanding, knowing, and recognizing various forms of antisemitism in order to confront and combat them.

Unfortunately, today, antisemitism is still on the rise. TheCovid-19 pandemic has not only led to a spiking high rate of deaths among all nations of the world. Also, it has given rise to a multitude of conspiracy theories surrounding various topics. Antisemitism is often an integral part of those conspiracy theories, regardless of their origin. In the previous volumes of our series, researchers from a variety of scholarly and scientific fields have demonstrated how antisemitism's versatile nature and constant transformation throughout history has contributed to its unfathomable success. Sadly, this tradition continues even today. One of the aims of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" was, therefore, to create concrete policy recommendations regarding how to effectively combatant antisemitism. These have been collected and published in a separate Catalogue of Policies,n a document of practical impact. They also form one of the bases of the first volume of the present series. All subsequent volumes are addressed to an academic audience. They document het research leading to these policy recommendations.

The present volume concludes the series An End to Antisemitism! It brings together contributions from fields of the social sciences, including philosophy, ethics, psychology, and pedagogy. Together, they form an empirical underpinning for the previous volumes that have helped to unearth the different motivations for antisemitic persecutionthroughouttheagesandhaveemployeddifferentmetatheoretical approaches to and answers to questions of perceptions of race, racism, identity, indifference's historiography of antisemitism and its current-day transformations, especially in the modern media, are also in volume, which reflected on various newforms of Jew-hatred in political and legal realms of society and in the media. The contributions to the present and concluding volume try to close the loop by demonstrating the importance of a three-fold scheme in investigating antisemitism. First, they demonstrate how the assessment of the level of antisemitism in society is an important prerequisite for recognizing and understanding various forms of Jew-hatred. Articles using classical social scientific approaches to collect data and specific case studies thus form the first part of the present volume. In the second part, scholars from a philosophical and ethical background use collected data and case studies to discuss the heterogeneous nature of antisemitism. They perceive antisemitisms as negative trope responding to specific socio-political processes that put society into a crisis. Finally, the results of both the empirical studies and the theoretical reflection point the way to their implementation in the form of pedagogical studies and a best practice example. The third and final part of the present volume draws special attention to pedagogy and its importance in the fight against antisemitism. Educating the following generations, not only

about the history of Jew-hatred, but also about its multiple transformations and present manifestations, is of utmost importance in order to establish long-term means for combatting current-day Jew-hatred.

While the nature of many of this volume's contributions differs from articles in previous volumes as they present large quantities of scientifically collected data or develop concrete courses of action, they still forge links to the articles in the previous volumes. They address topics such as the BDS movement and anti-Zionism as contemporary and the most virulent new forms of antisemitism. Muslim antisemitism and antisemitism from the political left are discussed as dangerous chameleons, the mutability of which also fuels contemporary antisemitism. As such, these articles complement the topic of the "New Antisemitism" that volume focused on and, as such, pave the way for understanding it. The non-chronological order of the publication dates of volumes3, 4, and 5 is grounded in the research field itself: as antisemitism sever changing, findings from the modern media, too, can have a short life. This is why the editorial team chose to proceed first with the publication of volume 5, with its focus on antisemitism in the modern media and in the political and legal world, in order to avoid the obsolescence of these studies. However, the empirical articles of the present volume connect with the previous volumes. Contributions from the fields of philosophy, ethics and psychology, for example, refer back to earlier theoretical reflections presented in volumes 2 and 3.Most importantly, they engage with Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School in order to establish critical political and ethical responses to contemporary antisemitism.

It is in the nature of academic research that new insights are gained by a contradictory discourse. Hence, the articles in the present volume might sometimes give the impression of a variety of different textual strands bound together only loosely. Indeed, contributions light even seem to disagree with each other. They all, however, contribute to the series' aim to reflect on antisemitism from a variety of scholarly fields, to uncover its traditions, intentions, and manifestations and to, ultimately, find ways to both understand antisemitism and combat it

Volume 5 Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds edited by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, Lawrence H. Schiffman [An End to Antisemitism! De Gruyter, 9783110671964] Open Access

This volume documents the transformation of age-old antisemitic stereotypes into a new form of discrimination, often called "New Antisemitism" or "Antisemitism 2.0." Manifestations of antisemitism in political, legal, media and other contexts are reflected on theoretically and contemporary developments are analyzed with a special focus on online hatred. The volume points to the need for a globally coordinated approach on the political and legal levels, as well as with regard to the modern media, to effectively combat modern antisemitism.

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The present volume focuses on the history of the so-called "New Antisemitism." Its contributions try to trace the history of transformation of antisemitism after World War II and the Shoah and its continuing reshaping. Opposition to Zionism and criticism of the Israeli government, especially from the Muslim world, are often now the most visible representations of this new form of antisemitism. They flourish worldwide and are not restricted to the margins of the political spectrum. The first part of the present volume thus engages with the sociopolitical, socio-cultural, and socio-economic processes that led to this transformation of Jew-hatred and, on the other hand, identifies antisemitic elements that have an age-old tradition and that are reiterated in new contexts and in a new form. Manifestations of this new form of antisemitism can be encountered first and foremost in modern media. The internet and its worldwide accessibility contributed vastly to the spread of global antisemitism in its various forms. The second part of the volume thus provides some examples of how modern media serve as outlets of social, political, and economic discontent that is reflected back upon the Jews and often conflated with age-old stereotypes, narratives, and conspiracy theories. The last part, finally, presents our readers with ideas and proposals to strategically confront and, possibly, counter act Jew-hatred, both on an individual and a global socio-political level supported by international and intergovernmental organizations. Each of these three parts is preceded by a short overview of its articles that brings together different strands of the overarching topic of the transformation of antisemitism and manifestations of its various new forms. A general introduction to the volume brings together theoretical aspects and historical theories of "New

Antisemitism" that form the basis for the understanding of this new form of Jew-hatred and its subsequent manifestations both on-and offline, in both Muslim and Western societies. <>

THE "GOD OF ISRAEL" IN HISTORY AND TRADITION

by Michael J. Stahl [Series: Vetus Testamentum, Supplements, Brill, 9789004447714]

Author:

In **THE "GOD OF ISRAEL" IN HISTORY AND TRADITION**, Michael Stahl provides a foundational study of the formulaic title "god of Israel" ('elohe yisra'el) in the Hebrew Bible. Employing critical theory on social power and identity, and through close literary and historical analysis, Dr. Stahl shows how the epithet "god of Israel" evolved to serve different social and political agendas throughout the course of ancient Israel and Judah's histories. Reaching beyond the field of Biblical Studies, Dr. Stahl's treatment of the historical and ideological significances of the title "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible offers a fruitful case study into the larger issue of the ways in which religion may shape—and be shaped by—social and political structures.

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The cosmic, monotheistic God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam has a history, one which reaches back to a particular ancient people—Israel. Although destroyed almost three millennia ago, Israel's name and the worship of its god continue to shape religious identity among, and interreligious dialogue between, contemporary Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities. Yet, how did Israel's god first come to be worshiped beyond the people of Israel?

As known from historical sources, Israel was a relatively small kingdom in the southern Levant during the early first millennium, when it coexisted alongside the even smaller, independent kingdom of Judah to its immediate south.[1] Nevertheless, while Israel and Judah were two separate polities historically, the Judahite scribes who produced the Hebrew Bible ultimately claimed much of Israel's cultural and religious heritage—including the worship of deity under Israel's name—as their own.[2] As a subset of the larger historical problem of Judah's cross-cultural appropriation of Israel's identity, this study directly raises the specific religious-historical problem of Judah's worship of deity under Israel's name by critically examining the formulaic title "god of Israel" (אלהי ישראל) as it appears in the Hebrew Bible, setting it in the larger context of Israel and Judah's social and political histories down into the Persian and early Hellenistic periods. Nearly 200 times, Judahite biblical writing defines divinity by the epithet "god of Israel," even as the title's very formulation explicitly links deity and people using a named identity that, from a historical perspective, was originally

socially and politically distinct from Judah, namely Israel. In light of the epithet's ubiquitous yet anomalous presence in Judah's Bible, the title "god of Israel" thus warrants sustained critical attention, a desideratum in current scholarship.

In using the title "god of Israel" for the patron deity of Judah's most central political and religious institutions—the palace and temple at Jerusalem—the Hebrew Bible's Judahite authors engaged in an act of religious appropriation that asserts, at least in ideal terms, a fundamental social-political and religious unity between Israel and Judah. This ideological claim essentially represents the perspective and political interests of the Hebrew Bible's primary authors and editors, whose interests lay with Judah, not Israel. The pervasiveness of this biblical claim notwithstanding, Israel and Judah historically were two separate kingdoms/peoples, and the nature of the "relationship between these two kingdoms, along with their individual histories, must be considered matters for investigation." While Israel and Judah's populations undoubtedly shared much in terms of language and local culture—including the worship of the deity yhwh and other deities—Israel and Judah display important differences in terms of their large-scale social, economic, and political structures. At a basic level, Israel's political culture, even in the time of kings, appears to have been more decentralized than Judah's. Such differences in social structure and political economy underscore Israel and Judah's separateness and necessarily impact any reconstruction of their political-religious landscapes. In this broader context, the religious-historical problem of Judahite use of the title "god of Israel" looms large, even as it has largely escaped critical scholarly scrutiny.

Judah's claim on the title "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible has had a lasting impact on scholarly reconstructions of Israel and Judah's political and religious histories, including some of the basic categories that modern scholars use to classify their work in broad terms. For instance, the scholarly study of "Israelite religion" in fact often deals with matters of Judahite religious history and practice. With respect to the title "god of Israel" itself, scholars regularly employ the appellation "god of Israel" as a kind of transhistorical or universalizing identity to refer to the god of the Hebrew Bible, ancient Israel and Judah, and/or early Judaism. At times, scholars use the designation "god of Israel" when examining particular biblical texts, even when those texts do not actually use the epithet "god of Israel" to define the deity. Through such shorthand practices, modern scholarship reproduces the Hebrew Bible's ideological claim of one God, one people, thereby marginalizing the larger historical problem of when and how Judah—and later Judaism—came to see its own religious identity in terms of the worship of the "god of Israel." Moreover, when scholars reflexively use the appellation "god of Israel" as an almost automatic identity for the Hebrew Bible's deity, the historical significance of the epithet often remains untethered to ancient Israel's distinct social-political reality, particularly its robust political tradition of collective governance. At the same time, Judahite appropriation of the title "god of Israel" entails a shift in the social and religious politics of this divine identity on account of Judah's distinctive political history and religious culture, centralized around David's royal house and the temple at Jerusalem. In short, the title "god of Israel" in its ancient expressions embeds particular political, social, and religious meaning linked to the author's historical and social location. Unlike divine epithets that identify divinity by sacred locations, cities, or divine capacities, the epithet "god of Israel" brands the deity in relation to "Israel" as a social-political and/or literary-ideological community, without reference to a single fixed center. While a named deity, such as El, Asherah, yhwh or Baal, could be worshiped by more than one people, the title "god of Israel" is particularizing, characterizing the (unnamed) deity in terms of a specific community. For this reason, the title "god of Israel" carries social and political significances, and its use by different communities across time and space demands the investigation of its social and religious politics at every turn.

Finally, the recognition that the title "god of Israel" refers back to the deity of a social-political community originally distinct from Judah brings to the fore the historical problem of Judah's appropriation of the worship of divinity under Israel's name as reflected in biblical writing. Scholarly

reproduction of the Hebrew Bible's claim that the title "god of Israel" belongs to Judah has masked the need to analyze biblical usage of the title "god of Israel" and its relationship to Israelite and Judahite religious history. This observation may partially explain why, apart from one contribution in the early 1900s, there have been no systematic scholarly studies on the textual locations and literary usages of the epithet "god of Israel" in the biblical materials, nor any analyses of this important title's historical development and its evolving social, political, and religious significances. This study seeks to redress these scholarly desiderata by analyzing the Hebrew Bible's use of the title "god of Israel" and providing a critical history of its social and religious politics, both for Israel and Judah. ***

The Scope of This Study

Critical consideration of the title "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible raises important historical questions in the study of ancient Israelite and Judahite religion. What were the social and religious politics of the title "god of Israel" in ancient Israel? When did yhwh come to be known by the specific title "god of Israel"—and under what political circumstances? When and how did the epithet enter into Judah's internal political-religious discourse? In what ways did the title contribute to the religious construction of "Israelite" identity in postexilic Yehud?

This study addresses these and other important questions in five chapters. Together, these five chapters trace the Hebrew Bible's usage of the title "god of Israel" and the history of its politics in roughly chronological sequence, from the title's use in ancient Israel proper, to its appropriation in the kingdom of Judah, to its transformation as Judaism began to emerge in the course of the Persian and early Hellenistic periods. Because of the complexity and unevenness of the biblical evidence, the present study's historical reconstruction of the epithet "god of Israel" in Israel, Judah, and postexilic Yehud consists only of momentary glimpses into a long and complicated historical process, most of which can no longer be reconstructed with precision. If the history of the title "god of Israel" were a puzzle, the majority of the pieces have been lost, probably never to be recovered. For this reason, the present study cannot be considered definitive, the last word on the matter, even as it aims for rigor and comprehensiveness. Undoubtedly, other scholars will wish to rearrange some of the puzzle pieces, or clusters of puzzle pieces, into different arrangements, providing somewhat different images. Be this as it may, the foundational aims of this study remain unaltered, namely to explicitly raise the religious-historical problem of when and how the title "god of Israel" entered into Judah's internal political and religious discourse, to collect all the relevant data on the epithet "god of Israel," and to ask fresh historical questions of the data in the light of current issues in biblical studies and the history of ancient Israelite—and Judahite—religion.

Chapter 2 begins the study's historical investigation into the title "god of Israel." On the basis of Genesis 33:20 and other pertinent biblical texts, this chapter argues that the epithet "god of Israel" first belonged to the old Levantine god El in connection with the ancient cult center of Shechem in the Israelite central hill country, and that Shechemite El's cultic role as the "god of Israel" was traditionally embedded within ancient Israel's decentralized political economy. The god yhwh, in turn, may only have come to be identified as the "god of Israel" in the service of a royal centralizing program during the ninth and eighth centuries. Specifically, I argue that the application of the title "god of Israel" to yhwh first blossomed in the ninth century, as Israel's Omride kings sought to consolidate their power at the new royal capital of Samaria and expand Israel's political control north of the Jezreel Valley and east of the Jordan River. In making this argument, I propose that Judges 5:2–11* + 12–23* reflects this important moment in Israel's political and religious history, and I situate the composition of this important biblical text in the broader historical context of the ninth century. As evidenced by the archaeological and epigraphic records, particularly the Mesha Stele and Tel Dan Inscription, the ninth century was a watershed in the political and religious history of the southern Levant. A number of new minor kingdoms, backed by royal ideologies interlocking god, king, and people, come into view for the first time, if only dimly. For Israel, with its traditionally

decentralized political culture, the centralizing institution of kingship likewise emerges as a defining force in a new way during this period. I contend in Chapter 2 that the Song of Deborah was composed in the service of kingship as part of this ninth-century shift in Israel's political economy. Among other strategies for consolidating political power, the Omrides sought to disembed ("differentiate") the title "god of Israel" from Israel's collective cultic and political life and place it in the service of royal politics. If this reconstruction is correct, then the Omrides' political program in the ninth century offers one crucial context for the gradual equation of the gods yhwh and El in ancient Israel, connected in part to the epithet "god of Israel."

Chapter 3 then turns to the question of when and how the title "god of Israel" may have entered into Judah's own political and religious discourse. Among other biblical materials that may reflect this transition, Chapter 3 especially explores three groups of biblical texts from the books of Kings that use the designation "god of Israel" in politically significant ways: Solomon's dedication of the Jerusalem temple in 1 Kgs 8:14–21*, various royal evaluations that use the title "god of Israel," and the prophetess Huldah's two oracles to Josiah in 2 Kgs 22:15–20*. Based on the biblical evidence, it does not appear that the appellation "god of Israel" was a significant feature of Judah's political-religious landscape in the period of the two kingdoms—let alone in the time of a supposed "United Monarchy" under kings David and Solomon in the tenth century. Instead, the title "god of Israel" evidently first appeared in Judahite religious discourse in the seventh century, in connection with the (re)assertion of the political claim that Judah's kings once ruled Israel. The introduction of the appellation "god of Israel" into Judah's politics therefore appears to have occurred as part of a larger set of processes designed to further appropriate and transform Israel's identity in support of Judahite royal ideology following the kingdom of Israel's collapse in 722/720. As a rule, then, Judahite use of the title "god of Israel" begins no earlier than the late eighth century.

Furthermore, I argue that the programmatic identification of the Jerusalem temple as the site of yhwh's "name" in his identity as the "god of Israel" in 1 Kings 8:14–21* may reflect a novel palace perspective on the Jerusalem temple and its ideological significance that served certain royal political interests in the late monarchic period. As mentioned above, the title "god of Israel" does not appear in connection with the Jerusalem temple in early Isaiah materials, Jerusalemite royal psalms, the old building blocks of the David story, or early (albeit post-monarchic) Priestly materials in the Pentateuch. Rather, "yhwh of hosts" (יהוה צבאות) appears to have been the god of the Jerusalem temple and David's royal house during the period of the late Judahite monarchy. Moreover, the identity "yhwh of hosts" seems to have carried with it a highly distinctive political theology, one not clearly articulated in 1 Kgs 8:14–21*. The identification of the title "god of Israel" with the god of the Jerusalem temple in 1 Kgs 8:14–21*, without reference to "yhwh of hosts," therefore looks to be a novel claim, at least in the way it is asserted programmatically, and it is not at all clear that the Jerusalem temple's priestly establishment during the late monarchic period promoted this identification. In its wholly positive portrayal of Solomon and unqualified celebration of David's royal house and the Jerusalem temple as ostensibly living realities, 1 Kgs 8:14–21* deliberately identifies the Jerusalem temple as the location of yhwh's "name" as the "god of Israel," without any sense that the text forms part of a larger narrative meant to explain Judah's loss of monarchy and the temple. As a potentially late monarchic composition, I argue that 1 Kgs 8:14–21* rhetorically reaches back to the time of King Solomon, the legendary ancestor of Judah's kings, to assert a new political and religious reality, one in which yhwh as the "god of Israel" dwells in Jerusalem alongside David's royal house. In attaching the epithet "god of Israel" to the origins of Judah's central political-religious institutions—even as the first Jerusalem temple's cult historically does not appear to have venerated yhwh using the title "god of Israel"—1 Kgs 8:14–21* potentially functions as Judahite royal propaganda, appealing to older Israelite religious tradition to assert the Davidic monarchy's claim to Israel's name. If this reconstruction is correct, the use of the title "god of Israel" in 1 Kgs 8:14–21* can perhaps be seen as one ideological strategy to consolidate royal control over disparate

populations in Jerusalem, some of whose social backgrounds and political interests likely lay with the former kingdom of Israel. In this way, the text's association of the title "god of Israel" with Solomon and the Jerusalem temple may have offered one religious-ideological means for Judah's kings to (re)assert their claim to Israel's name and its people(s), thereby serving the political needs of Judah's kings in the wake of Israel's collapse.

Chapter 4, in turn, explores the title "god of Israel" in clearly post-monarchic biblical writing, focusing especially on the books of Ezra and Chronicles, which together account for almost a quarter of all the occurrences of the epithet "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible. While the appellation "god of Israel" proliferates in late biblical texts—in my estimation, at least 80–85% of the Hebrew Bible's references to the title "god of Israel" come from post-monarchic biblical writing—it does not do so uniformly. Many, if not most, late biblical texts and literary strata do not use the designation "god of Israel" at all or do so only sparsely. Rather, the sustained usage of the epithet "god of Israel" is limited to specific post-monarchic biblical books and literary strata, particularly late "deuteronomistic" and "post-deuteronomistic" writing in the Former Prophets, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Psalms, Ezra (but not Nehemiah), and Chronicles. Of these texts, Ezra and Chronicles particularly stand out on account of these books' use of this divine identity in their efforts to (re)define Jewish identity following the loss of Judah's monarchy.

For nearly a century, scholars have interrogated the uses and meanings of Israel's name in Ezra–Nehemiah and the books of Chronicles, yet the appellation "god of Israel" has typically received short shrift in these discussions. Chapter 4 therefore highlights the importance of this divine identity in Ezra and Chronicles, as well as its contribution for (re)constructing Jewish identity in the late Persian and early Hellenistic periods. In this era, the title "god of Israel" comes to be associated with the emerging twin pillars of later Jewish identity, namely Torah and Temple. Perhaps for the first time in history, the title "god of Israel" comes to be applied to the cultic worship of the god of the (second) Jerusalem temple, whose priests now occupied a primary place in Yehud's local political economy. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that the title "god of Israel" only came to be attached to the second Jerusalem temple cult and adopted by some segment(s) of the temple's priestly leadership at a secondary historical moment, which I connect with growing social-economic and political-religious competition between Yehud/the Jerusalem Temple and Samaria/the Mount Gerizim temple. In this way, collective "Israel's" worship of the "god of Israel," without reference to kings, reappears in the Second Temple period, even as its use still appears to have served centralizing political interests. Yet, because Chronicles and Ezra offer two different visions of what it means to be "Israel," these biblical books necessarily furnish two distinct conceptions of the "god of Israel" and what it means to be the "god of Israel's" people.

Finally, Chapter 5 considers how Jewish scribes in the late Persian and Hellenistic periods used the title "god of Israel" in the process of composing certain biblical books. In particular, later scribes responsible for the editing and transmission of certain books, such as Jeremiah and the Psalter, appear to have used this divine identity as part of their efforts to unify these biblical books as literary compositions. While this compositional activity likely served particular social and political agendas, which are briefly touched upon, Chapter 5 especially highlights the literary contribution of the title's use in these biblical compositions. In these biblical texts, the title "god of Israel" appears to function as a compositional link between disparate literary materials, a sort of *Leitwort* binding together large-scale biblical compositions into broader literary wholes. In this way, the title "god of Israel" comes to characterize the deity of particular biblical books and larger biblical corpora, an important step in the identification of the deity of the Hebrew Bible in its entirety as the "god of Israel."

The basic historical arguments of this study, then, are as follows: (1) the origins of the title "god of Israel" trace back to ancient Israel; (2) El was Israel's "original" or earliest god, and his role as the

"god of Israel" was traditionally embedded in Israel's decentralized political economy as maintained at the venerable cultic site of Shechem in the Israelite central hill country; (3) yhwh especially came to be identified by the title "god of Israel" within Israel during the ninth and eighth centuries, in connection originally with the Omride dynasty's centralization of political authority at the new royal capital of Samaria; (4) the title "god of Israel" appears to have only entered into Judah's internal political and religious discourse following the kingdom of Israel's collapse in 722/720, as Judah's kings sought to consolidate political power and (re)assert their claim on Israel's name; (5) the appellation "god of Israel" was not used in the Jerusalem temple's cult during the late Judahite monarchy, even as it appears to have been appropriated in the service of royal politics by palace-affiliated scribes; (6) the epithet "god of Israel" proliferated in post-monarchic biblical writing; and (7) the title "god of Israel" first came to be used in the cult of the (second) Jerusalem temple during the postexilic period, although evidently only at a secondary historical moment, perhaps due to increasing social-economic and political-religious competition with the Samarian temple on Mount Gerizim. <>

Lost Tribes Found: Israelite Indians and Religious Nationalism in Early America by Matthew W. Dougherty (University of Oklahoma Press)

The belief that Native Americans might belong to the fabled 'lost tribes of Israel' – Israelites driven from their homeland around 740 BCE – took hold among Anglo-Americans and Indigenous peoples in the United States during its first half century. In **Lost Tribes Found**, Matthew W. Dougherty explores what this idea can tell readers about religious nationalism in early America. Dougherty is Assistant Professor, Teaching Stream, in the history of Christianity at Emmanuel College of Victoria University in the University of Toronto.

Some white Protestants, Mormons, American Jews, and Indigenous people constructed nationalist narratives around the then-popular idea of 'Israelite Indians.' Although these were minority viewpoints, they reveal that the story of religion and nationalism in the early United States was more complicated and wide-ranging than studies of American 'chosen-ness' or 'manifest destiny' suggest. Telling stories about Israelite Indians, Dougherty argues, allowed members of specific communities to understand the expanding United States, to envision its transformation, and to propose competing forms of sovereignty. In these stories both settler and Indigenous intellectuals found biblical explanations for the American empire and its stark racial hierarchy.

Lost Tribes Found opens and closes with analyses of Israelite Indian stories in the context of national politics in the early United States. The first chapter analyzes how these stories emerged in and helped shape a national evangelical culture that supported missions to Indigenous peoples. The final chapter, similarly, discusses religious nationalism on a country-wide scale to explain the decline in use of Israelite Indian stories after 1830. In the intervening chapters, Dougherty explores more local and specific conversations that invoked Israelite Indian stories.

Chapter 1 discusses how the stories Levi introduced to Anglophone America went through a renaissance in the early United States. Working largely from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British sources, early American evangelicals from the 1790s through the 1820s transformed these stories and used them to support the idea that the United States must missionize Indigenous peoples in order to expand across the continent without losing the favor of God. With these stories, they sought to evoke sympathy for Indigenous people and anxiety lest God punish the nation for their persecution of his chosen people. At the same time, their versions of Israelite Indian stories depicted Indigenous people as inferiors to be pitied and suggested that, once Indigenous peoples converted to Christianity, they would joyfully leave the continent in White hands and 'return' to Palestine.

Early Mormons extended and elaborated these ideas. As Dougherty shows in chapter 2 of **LOST TRIBES FOUND**, between 1830 and 1847, Mormons understood themselves to be living in an age of millennial transformation, when God's purposes for the 'Lamanites,' or Israelite Indians, would be revealed. By encountering Lamanites in worship and recounting Lamanite histories, early Mormons cultivated the love for their new religion and wonder at living in an age of revelations that knit them together as a community. By discussing prophecies about an army of Israelite Indians or 'Lamanites' that would soon destroy the United States to make room for God's kingdom of Zion, they transferred their anger at the United States onto Lamanites and schooled themselves to patience. Because of this complex of feelings, the nationalism that bound Mormons together immediately before and after the death of Joseph Smith reached for both imagined Lamanites and actual Indigenous allies to help spark the creation of Zion.

Chapter 3 of **LOST TRIBES FOUND** analyzes two intellectuals who used Israelite Indian narratives to engage with the ascendant White supremacy and populist political rhetoric of the 1830s. One, the prominent Jewish newspaper editor Mordecai Noah, used these narratives to strengthen American Jews' claims to American citizenship and western territory. The other, the Pequot activist and preacher William Apess, used them to argue for the humanity of Indigenous people and to envision an 'Israel' of independent Indigenous Christians. For both men, these narratives allowed them to enlist the sympathy of evangelical reformers on behalf of their communities. They also attempted to use them, however, to evoke the pride and hope that might nurture new Jewish or Indigenous nationalisms.

The focus in chapter 4 is on a small group of Christian Cherokees who drew on missionary stories of Israelite Indians to identify their ancestors with the people described in the Bible. Their narratives argued that the Christian God had given the Cherokees their land, in part because they wanted to enlist missionary sympathies against the state and federal governments then pressuring the Cherokee Nation to give up its territory. Although the Cherokees who told these stories had reason to hope that they would help start a broader reform in their society, the genocidal Trail of Tears and the disarray that followed prevented their narratives from being published and distributed in the new Cherokee Nation.

Finally, chapter 5 of **LOST TRIBES FOUND** returns to a national focus to analyze the eclipse of Israelite Indian stories in American life. Dougherty tracks the rise of American secularism, a then-new way of relating religion to the state, and its effects on the articulation of religious nationalisms, including the much-discussed concept of 'manifest destiny.' In the process, Dougherty shows how new versions of Israelite Indian stories arose in the 1830s and 1840s that muted their emotional appeals to blend more seamlessly with the practices of secularism. At the same time, a new literature arose that emphasized both the danger and the inevitability of frontier settlers' thirst for violence. Only the state and Christianity working in concord, they implied, could restrain this violence. By the beginning of the Civil War, these new ways of relating feelings about religion and about the American state had supplanted older Israelite Indian narratives.

> *Matthew W. Dougherty calls forth a range of voices and `Israelite Indian' stories and uses them to dethrone historians' previous assumptions about religious nationalism and challenge an overemphasis on `manifest destiny.' Compelling, well written, and well argued.* – Tisa Wenger, author of *Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal*

LOST TRIBES FOUND goes beyond the legal and political structure of the nineteenth-century U.S. empire. In showing how the trope of the Israelite Indian appealed to the emotions that bound together both nations and religious groups, the book adds a new dimension and complexity to our understanding of the history and underlying narratives of early America. <>

A Life Devoted to Plutarch: Philology, Philosophy, and Reception: Selected Essays by Paola Volpe Cacciatore by Paola Volpe Cacciatore, edited by Serena Citro and Fabio Tanga [Series: Brill's Plutarch Studies, Brill, 9789004448452

Philology, philosophy, commentary and reception in Plutarch's work are only some of the main topics discussed within a large academic output devoted to the writer of Chaeronea by Professor Paola Volpe Cacciatore. The volume is divided into four sections: Plutarchean Fragments, Quaestiones convivales, Religion & Philosophy, and Plutarch's Reception from Humanism to Modern Times. The eighteen studies collected in this volume, originally published in Italian and here translated into English, concern the Corpus Plutarcheum, including Table-Talks, De Iside et Osiride, the treatises against the Stoics, De genio Socratis, De liberis educandis, De musica, and some Plutarchean fragments. The volume is a tribute to celebrate the lifelong study of Plutarch's work by Professor Paola Volpe Cacciatore, one of the most remarkable Plutarchean scholars of the last decades.

CONTENTS

Σπουδαίων περὶ τῶν τοῦ Πλουτάρχου Ἠθικῶν συνταγμάτων συναγωγή

This volume in the prestigious "Brill's Plutarch Studies" series, contains a small but significant part, worthy of greater diffusion, of the *Scripta minor* dedicated by Paola Volpe Cacciatore over this century to the work of the Chaeronean. These eighteen studies, published previously as journal articles or joint book chapters, have been revised and updated and now translated into English, they are presented here with a bibliography prepared by her former student and now Professor at the University of Salerno, Giovanna Pace.

Before a more detailed description of the structure and content of the book, it must be said that these eighteen philological jewels are a valuable testimony to the scientific and human personality of Paola Volpe. In them we can see her depth of thought; her art in transmitting that thought thanks to her literary mastery of linguistic expression, in which creative warmth prevails over rhetorical artifice; and above all, in the way that Plutarch's sail as it were propels the boat of her viewpoint. This vista often feels like a calm sea but sometimes, as if agitated by an impetuous swell like the Tyrrhenian Sea that she can see from the Amalfi slopes, her scholarship makes us vibrate with the reflections and tensions of her cognitive experience, moved by the literary winds of *Parallel Lives* and, especially in this case, of *Moralia*.

Her captivating and rich personality does not simplify the initial presentation of the author expected from the prologue of a book like this one. Nevertheless, Brill has entrusted me with this task, perhaps because of the friendship that I have had with her for some time, and I will try to respond to the expectations of the readers, describing the flowers of this anthology for the scientific community, especially for the Plutarchists. I asked Paola Volpe herself for help in this task and I think it is only right and proper that our reading should commence in her voice with her words following the route of the Homeric heroes proposed to Odysseus almost three millennia ago by the song of the Sirens, words with which our author inaugurated one of the many scientific meetings that she organized in her long academic career. So, with your permission, let the prologue of this prologue be the *Premessa* of the edition of the *Actas* from that seminar on the sea and the myth over which she presided in Positano more than ten years before:

Così cantavano, secondo il racconto di Omero, le sirene incantatrici che abitavano il tratto di mare tra Positano, Capri e Procida. E nelle parole che accompagnavano il loro canto si concentra mirabilmente la pluralità dei significati che si raccolgono nel mito, in ogni mito. È il mito della bellezza e delle sue manifestazioni fondative, il canto e la danza, è la tecnica della seduzione tra il dolce miele dell'attesa e l'amaro sapore dell'inganno. Infine è il mito del mare e la rappresentazione del suo duplice volto: quieto e rasserenante, terribile e tempestoso, segno di calma interiore, ma anche di turbolento spirito di avventura. La metafora della conoscenza, le incognite che si nascondono oltre i confini del mondo, ma anche l'inanità e la superbia di un sapere che si illude di possedere definitivamente le chiavi della realtà.

[Thus sang, according to Homer's story, the enchanting sirens who inhabited the stretch of sea between Positano, Capri and Procida. And in the words that accompanied their song is admirably concentrated the plurality of meanings that are gathered in the myth, in every myth. It is the myth of beauty and its founding manifestations, song and dance, it is the technique of seduction between the sweet honey of waiting and the bitter taste of deception. Finally, it is the myth of the sea and the representation of its double face: quiet and soothing, terrible and stormy, a sign of inner calm, but also of a turbulent spirit of adventure. The metaphor of knowledge, the unknowns that hide beyond the borders of the world, but also the inanity and pride of a knowledge that deludes itself into having the keys to reality definitively.]

Well, like Homer's Odysseus, Paola Volpe was seduced one day by the "Sirene incantatrici" of classical philology and took on the teachings—like those of Circe—of two great magicians of ancient culture: Antonio Garzya and Italo Gallo. Then she touched the fabric of the three Platonic Muses-Sirens to whom the author has entrusted herself at Plutarch's table with her most recent publication.[2] Finally, she cultivated all the meadows guarded by the nine Boeotian goddesses of Hesiod and Plutarch. Like the Byzantinist and the Plutarchist, Paola Volpe Cacciatore has sought the traces of the Graeco-Roman texts in the Eastern Empire: Agapetus Deacon, Agatias, John Mauropus, Nikephoros Basilakes, Nikephoros Chumnus, Thomas Magistros, and Makarios Chrysokephalos; and in modern culture: in European humanists such as Hadrianus Junius and, above all, in the Italians: Coluccio Salutati, Guarino Guarini, Pico della Mirandola, Torquato Tasso, Giambattista Vico, and Pietro Metastasio. Her classical philological activity also includes Latin authors: Seneca, Macrobius or Pacatus; but mainly she has edited, translated, analysed, commented and evaluated the works of tragic authors of the fifth century BC and of the poets of the *Palatine Anthology*, the medical treatises of imperial time, and the pagan and Christian rhetoricians from Dion of Prusa and Aelius Aristides to John Chrysostom. In that long stroll through the paths of knowledge, as a Spaniard my surprise changed to satisfaction when I read her valuable contributions to the knowledge of relevant figures of contemporary Hispanic culture, namely Luis de Góngora, Lorenzo Villalonga, Miguel de Unamuno, Eugenio D'Ors and María Zambrano, whose personality and work (the latter's) constitute an important part of her family environment.

However, if anything stands out with special brilliance in Paola Volpe's long philological career, it is her dedication to the work of the Chaeronean, whose *International Plutarch Society* she has headed as President for the last three years (2017–2020). She has made an important contribution to the dissemination of this author by organizing national seminars and congresses—as Italo Gallo's successor at the head of the *Sezione italiana della International Plutarch Society*—and international ones, including the one in Ravello in 2011; but specifically, because she has continued the important work begun some time ago by Italo Gallo at the University of Salerno. She accepted the torch from him and has not only maintained but increased the Salerno community of Plutarch scholars at the same time as leading the Plutarchists of Italy and completing the *Corpus Plutarchi Moralium*, a project started in the 1990's by our beloved Italo Gallo and Renato Laurenti.

From the more than fifty works on Plutarch, Paola Volpe has selected eighteen for this volume. Among them, there are some of the first fruits of her varied approaches to the reading of Plutarch's *Moralia* which include translation and critical commentary of the text, literary, scientific or philosophical interpretation, and monitoring of the deep impact Plutarch has left on European culture from Byzantium to the present day. The reader will find here examples from all these categories of Paola Volpe's skill as a reader of *Moralia* in each of the four Parts into which the editors have organized those eighteen chapters.

In the first part (Plutarchean Fragments), five important contributions focus on the textual problems and content of some fragments of Plutarch. In them the author shows her expertise, which always transcends the simple understanding of the Plutarchean text. She proposes methodological principles concerning the identification of the fragments ("For the Understanding of a Lost Text"); she discusses religious, iconographic and medical issues concerning Christian apologetics in the face of heresies ("Plutarch's fr. 24 Sandbach"); explains details of meteorological physics ("Plutarch and the Commentary on *Phaenomena* of Aratus"); and draws our attention to metaphysical problems (" 'Whatever Your Destiny, to Work is Best:' Plutarch, fr. 44 Sandbach") or to human psychology as understood by Plutarch ("The μεταβολή of the Soul [Frags. 177–178 Sandbach]").

In the second part, we have four pieces related to the *Quaestiones convivales*. They have their origins in Plutarch's curiosity about scientific subjects dealt with in some of his other works ("Plutarchus in

Plutarcho: *De primo frigido* and *Quaest. conv*. 6.4–5"); in matters more or less important to his religious culture ("Plutarch, *Quaest. conv*. 4.6: an Example of Religious Syncretism") and to the current life of his time (" 'Cicalata sul fascino volgarmente detto jettatura:' Plutarch, *Quaest. conv*. 5.7"); or they simply bring to the present some conversations—in this case about health—immortalised in his dialogues ("*Quaest. conv*. 6.8 on Bulimia: Plutarch's Explanation for a Current Problem").

With the exception of a chapter where Paola Volpe deals with Plutarch's conciliatory stance in the face of apparent incongruities between his religious thought and the reality of Greek myths ("Plutarch's *De Iside et Osiride*, a Reconciliation between Religion and Myth"), the third part highlights studies devoted to the Platonic polemic against the Stoics. Two of them have to do with questions of social and political ethics ("Plutarch's δικαιοσύνη in the Writings against the Stoics" and "The Justice of the Sage: a Polemic of Plutarch against the Stoics"); another one is framed in the theological-providentialist field ("Is the God of the Stoics a Philanthropist?"); and the last one concerns the controversial anthropological topic of the conflict between destiny and freedom ("Fate and Luck in Plutarch's Works against the Stoics: an Unresolved Issue").

Finally, the fourth part features four works on the reading of concrete moral treatises in Humanism, a subject to which the author has dedicated not a few chapters of her philological life. In this case, she opts for themes of a mainly philological nature in whose critique she makes evident her attachment to the virtues and vices of the Latin translations of three Greek texts by Plutarch or attributed to him: *De liberis educandis* by Guarino Guarini ("Reflections on the Translation of *De liberis educandis* by Guarino Guarini") and others ("Poetic Quotations in *De liberis educandis* in Some Humanistic Translations") and *De Genio Socratis* by Naogeorgus ("The Latin Translation of *De Genio Socratis* by Naogeorgus").

This last part closes the book with an interesting essay original to this volume in which the author highlights, still from the perspective of Plutarch's reception, the chameleonic capacity of the Chaeronean's writings to adapt to the cultural currents of the seventeenth century with the same freshness with which he surprised his readers at the beginning of Humanism. Now this follow-up to Plutarch's themes introduces us, at the hand of Paola Volpe, to the epistolary exchange of two theorists (Pietro Metastasio and Saverio Mattei) who, with the help of *De musica*, a treatise attributed to Plutarch, debate the eternal problem of whether old music or avant-garde music is better (" 'What is the best music, ancient or modern?:' Pietro Metastasio and *De musica*").

In short, Paola Volpe's distinguished career as a Plutarchist is well known, as are the varied nuances with which she always confronts the reading of *Moralia*, armed with a broad cultural understanding and her philological scalpel to unravel the secrets of the dialogues, theoretical treatises, and intellectual diversions of the author of *Lives* and *Moralia*. But I do not want to close my Preface without adding to these qualities the passion that not only Plutarch, but all of Greek literature has always awakened in this Italian Plutarchist accustomed to the sieve of modern prose writers and poets. May she, the one who opened these pages with her description of the encounter between Odysseus and the Sirens, be the same one who closes them, confirming her love for the classical tradition. In this case, she talks about Polyphemus who searches in Theocritus for the keys that turned Homer and Euripides's wild monster into that melancholic lover of Galatea rescued for modernity by one of the main Spanish poets of the 20th century, Don Luis de Góngora y Argote:

La degradazione (dovuta alla passione amorosa) del mostro si conclude anche nel poeta spagnolo con un atto feroce: egli che aveva esaltato la bellezza di Galatea, che aveva in ogni modo catturato l'attenzione della ninfa, malinconico, respinto (exclusus amator, 'amante cacciato') dà sfogo alla sua gelosia, ma non per questo potrà più essere considerato il mostro omofago ed antropofago dei

poemi omerici. Egli, nonostante le sue ricchezze, conosce la sconfitta in amore, quell'amore che egli aveva cantato nell'*Idillio* 11 di Teocrito.

[The degradation (due to the loving passion) of the monster also ends in the Spanish poet with a ferocious act: he who had exalted the beauty of Galatea, who had in every way captured the attention of the nymph, melancholy, rejected (exclusus amateur, ' lover hunted ') gives vent to his jealousy, but for this reason he can no longer be considered the homophagous and anthropophagous monster of the Homeric poems. Despite his riches, he knows the defeat in love, that love that he had sung in Idyll 11 of Theocritus.]

So, in conclusion, I congratulate Brill Publishing for their accomplishment in collecting and making more accessible to the English-speaking public these eighteen works by Paola Volpe Cacciatore. I am sure I have done my part by putting this monograph in the hands of all readers interested in the thought, literary art, and tradition of Plutarch. This volume far exceeds the high standards already demonstrated in the earlier volumes of "Brill's Plutarch Studies", for which I predict a continued success with this eighth volume.— Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, Professor Emeritus of Greek Philology, University of Malaga <>

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERTEXTUALITY IN PLUTARCH

edited by Thomas S. Schmidt, Maria Vamvouri, and Rainer Hirsch-Luipold [Series: Brill's Plutarch Studies, Brill, 9789004421707]

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERTEXTUALITY in Plutarch explores the numerous aspects and functions of intertextual links both within the Plutarchan corpus itself (intratextuality) and in relation with other authors, works, genres or discourses of Ancient Greek literature (interdiscursivity, intergenericity) as well as non-textual sources (intermateriality). Thirty-six chapters by leading specialists set Plutarch within the framework of modern theories on intertextuality and its various practical applications in Plutarch's Moralia and Parallel Lives. Specific intertextual devices such as quotations, references, allusions, pastiches and other types of intertextual play are highlighted and examined in view of their significance for Plutarch's literary strategies, argumentative goals, educational program, and self-presentation.

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The volume is divided into six sections meant to illustrate the various aspects and functions of intertextuality in Plutarch's works, as explained by Maria Vamvouri in the introduction (see below). Part i sets the general framework of intertextuality in Plutarch, Part 2 discusses intertextual links between Plutarch's works and specific authors (such as Homer, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Epicurus), whereas the other sections focus on further types of intertextuality such as intratextuality (Part 3), interdiscursivity (Part 4), intergenericity (Part 5) and intermateriality (Part 6).

Plutarch and the Academic Reader by Maria Vamvouri

It is widely recognised that Plutarch's works aim to invite his readers to reflect upon and thus improve their own existence and way of life' It is also well known that this educational goal is brought about by a descriptive and exploratory moralism that relies on references or allusions to philosophers, to historical and mythical figures, to authors and traditions that Plutarch invites the reader to (re)discover. Insofar as they integrate this rich historical, literary, philosophical, religious, medical and more broadly scientific heritage, Plutarch's works are a mine of knowledge about the past. For this reason, intertextuality is an indispensable part of the study of his works. Proof of this may be found in the numerous publications that have focused on the intertextual links between specific Plutarchan works and those of other authors or even some of his own works. Furthermore, several of the previous editions of the IPS conference and other collective volumes have periodically tackled some of the many aspects of intertextuality in Plutarch.

The special contribution of this volume, and of the conference that inspired it, lies in its systematic and theoretically informed exploration of intertextuality in Plutarch, in terms of its many aspects and functions. Epistemological precision justifies the emphasis placed on terminology in this volume. The meaning of the term intertextuality here is twofold. The term as used in the title of the volume is inclusive and refers to a constellation of different types of links that a text creates with other texts, discourses, genres, social traditions or materials. It refers to a linguistic and literary phenomenon that leads to two types of encounters: first, to an encounter, or a 'dialogue' in the Bakhtinian sense, between two or more intersecting texts, written or oral discourses or genres; second, to an encounter between the text and the reader well acquainted with Greek literature, who identifies and distinguishes the text's intertextual layers and patterns by means of his or her personal 'library' /memory and interprets it accordingly. Intertextuality in this broad sense includes intertextuality, inter-discursiviry, intergenericity, and intermaterialiry but also intertextuality understood in a narrower sense and referring to the ways an utterance or part of an oral or written text is embedded, transformed or re-written by another text.

The term intratextuality refers to a particular form of auctorial rewriting and relates to the genesis of a specific text that is enriched by references, quotations or allusions to other texts of the Plutarchan corpus. This kind of intratextual link is a useful heuristic tool that improves our comprehension of anecdotes, exempla, arguments, episodes, or terminology in Plutarch's works. The study of intratextuality allows a better understanding of compositional techniques and the ways in which auctorial authority functions within the intertextual material, of the topics this authority considers meaningful and of the context in which these topics are deployed.' It may also enable the reader to resolve textual problems by searching for answers within the very works of the Plutarchan corpus.

In some places, Plutarch's texts neither refer nor allude to a specific text or author but imply different identifiable discourses. In such cases, it is preferable to speak of interdiscursivity, a term that refers to certain types of discourses (medical, religious, judicial, political, etc.) which infuse his texts. These discourses reveal themselves in the use of specific lexical fields, metaphors, comparisons and other literary devices.

Moreover, Plutarch's works make use of or refer to different literary genres that enrich these very works. The notion of intergenericity that we use in the present volume refers to the multiple generic aspects of a text and to the multiple discourses included in it. Intergenericity, in other words, does not imply genre determination (structure, topics, audience, purposes, etc.) of a given text. It rather implies examination of generic directions and coloring in the form and content of a text and, in our case, a close look at the ways in which Plutarch's texts integrate, manipulate or subvert features attributed to different literary genres. The notions of genericity and intergenericity are more flexible than the traditional concept of 'genre, as they enable us to be released from essentialist conceptions of literary texts which focus on typologies and taxonomies. As far as the term intermateriality is concerned, it refers to interactions of Plutarch's texts with the cosmos of material and social realities, historical and cultural remains that make up the texture of his thoughts and argumentations.

The special contribution of this volume also consists in the focus placed on intertextuality as something that produces, rather than on intertextuality as something that is. This is the reason why the title of the volume uses the term `dynamics' borrowed from the field of physics, where it originally refers to the branch of mechanics concerned with the effects of forces on the motion of a body or system of bodies. The term dynamics is used here in a literary context to indicate the effects or functions of different aspects of intertextuality and the meaning that they produce. Some of the contributors look for references, quotations from or allusions to specific texts, discourses or genres that allow us to better understand Plutarchan thought or that contribute to Plutarch's educational programme and argumentation. Used in this way, intertextual material not only constructs an image of the Plutarchan Self—as a person, an author, a priest, a philosopher and so forth—but also creates a certain vision of the intellectual and social community of the Imperial period. Further, as a result of the above, Plutarch's allusiveness may create an impression of the ideal reader that the real reader may feel flattered by or be inspired to emulate. Some contributors are interested in the ways intertextuality engages with the delight of the readers or confuses them and invites them to evaluate conflicting intertextual evidence. Others tackle intertextuality as an interpretative tool able to resolve critical problems concerning the textual transmission of the text of Plutarch's works.

The term dynamics is also used in the volume to shed light on the dynamic, two-way and meaningful relationship between the text and the academic reader who reads it in relation to other texts. The aim of the volume is not only to highlight the scope of quotations, allusions and connotations of a controlling and conscious auctorial authority (either biographical or constructed within the text), or to identify the ways in which texts, discourses and genres are interwoven and transformed in Plutarch's works, but also to take into account the dynamics of the reading process itself. Intertextuality is seen as dialogical, given that the contributors to this volume both explore the explicit intertextual references of the auctorial authority and themselves participate in the creation of the intertextual network of Plutarch's works through their assumptions about the intertextual links they recognize.

The term intertextuality was coined by Julia Kristeva in her 1966 essay "Word, Dialogue and Novel," which was grounded on Mikhail Bakhtin's work and on the concept of dialogism that Valentin N. Voloshinov was probably the first to theorize. Since then, research has focused on the

literary relations, on the intersecting texts and voices within a text as well as on transtextuality, rather than on source criticism and the influence of biographical authors on other authors. Roland Barthes' thought-provoking essay "La mort de l'auteur" epitomized the tendency to shift attention from the author to the reader, while Michael Riffaterre's works have shown the ways in which a hint or a sign noticed by the reader may shed light on the structure of a given text." According to Riffaterre, the intertextual link may become perceptible through an agrammaticalité, that is to say, a semantic, syntactic or stylistic ambivalence or anomaly that invites the reader to engage in further investigation.

Intertextuality has been increasingly perceived as a phenomenon of reception and a reading process, not only because the auctorial authority is himself/herself a reader who incorporates in various ways his/her hearings/readings into his/her writings, but also because the intertextual links between texts, discourses or genres need the reader in order to be identified and deciphered. In effect, in cases where these links are not explicit but latent, the readers, based both on textual clues and on their own library and literary recollections, read a text in relation to other texts and make assumptions seeking to unravel not necessarily the 'true' intertextual connections, but those that are likely and appear convincing. Such assumptions are sometimes the only way to engage with ancient intertextuality since a significant number of oral and written texts and traditions interwoven in ancient literary works are either not preserved or only known in fragments. In this respect, the interpretation of intertextuality is part of an on-going process that goes beyond any attempt to standardize and unify the meaning of a given text.

The present volume does not deny the importance of source criticism, given that Plutarch was an erudite author who, as many other authors of the so-called Second Sophistic, constantly quotes other authors and anchors his works in specific literary and philosophical traditions. In this regard, some contributors try to identify Plutarch's sources and examine the ways these sources are integrated and re-used in the Plutarchan texts. They also make assumptions as to the meaning and the impact of such intertextual links. But this volume also addresses intertextuality that is less explicit and more difficult to unravel. It looks at the different voices involved in the act of writing or in the act of reading a given Plutarchan text. In such cases, the need for efficient tools to unravel intertextuality that is not explicit but concealed may be described by a meaningful image that comes to us from Plutarch and is known as Plutarch's stick, or simply skytale. According to Plutarch's Life of Lysander (19), the Spartans used a dispatch-scroll whenever they wished to send a secret message. They made a scroll of parchment, long and narrow, and wound it around their skytale. They then wrote whatever message they wished on the parchment, removed the parchment and sent it to the addressee without the piece of wood. Unless the addressee possessed his own skytale and wound the strip of parchment around it, he was unable to read the hidden message.

The skytale with which the academic readers are equipped is their own library, erudition and methodology, which enables them to unravel the multilayered intertextuality in Plutarch's works, to make assumptions about the compositional process of a specific work, to attempt to get in touch with the auctorial authority, and to slip into the very library that infuses a Plutarchan text and thus to better understand the lexical, syntactic, discursive, structural or other intertextual transformations. Contrary to the Laconic skytalae which were uniform, the tools of the academic readers vary, and so the message each reader will read is dependent on his/her own (different) equipment. As academic readers, armed with their own library and ideological commitments, the contributors to the volume dismantle and interpret the texts and their palimpsests, positioning themselves at the meeting point where the authorial creation ends and the reader's interpretation begins. Creativity is thus shared by both the auctorial authority and the reader. This sharing of the palimpsest was brilliantly described in 1822 by Thomas De Quincey, who equates the palimpsest with the human brain:

What else than a natural and mighty palimpsest is the human brain? Such a palimpsest is my brain; such a palimpsest, oh reader! is yours. Everlasting layers of ideas, images, feelings, have fallen upon your brain softly as light. Each succession has seemed to bury all that went before. And yet, in reality, not one has been extinguished ... Yes, reader, countless are the mysterious hand-writings of grief or joy which have inscribed themselves successively upon the palimpsest of your brain.

Intertextuality is undoubtedly a matter of memory, everlasting recollections and erudition, to which Plutarch's works bear witness. Indeed, the intertextual links with other texts that are quoted in Plutarch's works are often presented as the outcome of recollections and are introduced by the verb, together with its compounds and synonyms. In an analogous way, it is on our own library and memory that the (re)discovery of Plutarch's intertextuality relies.

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Aesopic Wisdom in Plutarch by Philip A. Stadter studies Plutarch's use of the life and fables of Aesop as an intertext in both his Moralia and Lives. The use of fables to make a point was recommended by ancient rhetoricians, and there seems to have been a revival of interest in Plutarch's time, as witnessed by the fables of Babrius and Phaedrus as well as by the fictional Life of Aesop. In his Banquet of the Seven Sages, Plutarch used the character Aesop to contrast with and debunk the sages. In other passages his intertextual references to Aesopic low discourse in the form of maxims and fables convey vividly simple truths concerning family life, politics, and tyranny. The use of these nuggets of the earthy and plebeian wisdom of Aesop allowed Plutarch to exploit the fruitful tension between high philosophy and popular insight. Moreover, by recalling fables familiar from childhood, Plutarch found an additional means of creating that easy dialogue with his readers which explains so much of his success.

Know Thyself

Fables often echo the Apollonian maxim, "Know thyself." A good example appears at the end of Crassus, after the Parthian commander, Surena, had defeated Crassus' invading army. As Surena returned triumphantly to Seleucia. he mocked the licentiousness of the Romans, one of whom had brought along in his baggage a collection of sexually explicit Milesian tales (Crass. 32.4-6).

> However (Plutarch writes), the people of Seleucia thought Aesop a wise man, seeing Surena wearing the knapsack of Milesian indecencies in front, and behind dragging along a Parthian Sybaris of so many wagons of concubines.

The reference is to the tale of the Two Packs, in which Prometheus gave men two knapsacks, one worn in front, full of other men's faults, the other worn behind, filled with one's own failings, so that men would see others' faults, but not their own. Surena could not see his own debauchery, but only that of the Romans. The fable was well known in Rome, found also in Phaedrus and Babrius, and alluded to by Catullus (22.21), Horace (S. 2.3.298-299), Persius (4.24), and Seneca (De ira 2.28.8). Plutarch's decision to mention it here diminishes the Parthians' victory. At the same time the fable leads the reader to consider Crassus' own lack of self-knowledge, which had led him to his reckless expedition and ultimate defeat.

In the *Banquet of the Seven Sages*, Aesop comments on another man's vanity by recounting the fable of the Mule, also found in Babrius: the mule, proud of the beauty and size of his body, began to run and toss his mane like a horse. Then the mule remembered that he was the offspring of an ass and abandoned his spirited whinnying.

Another fable urging self-knowledge appears as an anecdote recording Themistocles' snappy reply when his accomplishments were challenged. To a brash commander who boasted to be his equal, Themistocles told the fable of the Feast and the Day After, with its conclusion, "You would not exist without me." The fable reminds the boastful commander of his dependence on Themistocles' achievement. <>

PICASSO: PAINTING THE BLUE PERIOD edited by Kenneth Brummel and Susan Behrends Frank , Essays by Kenneth Brummel, Susan Behrends Frank, Patricia Favero and Sandra Webster-Cook, Marilyn McCully, and Eduard Vallès [DelMonico Books/Art Gallery of Ontario/The Phillips Collection, 9781942884927]

A catalogue to accompany Picasso: Painting the Blue Period, an exhibition of work by Pablo Picasso held at the Art Gallery of Ontario from October 9, 2021 to January 16, 2022 and at The Phillips Collection from February 26 to June 12, 2022.

New insights into Picasso's Blue Period, through innovative technology that reveals hidden compositions, motifs and alterations, plus hitherto unknown information on the artist's materials and process

This lavishly illustrated volume reexamines Pablo Picasso's famous Blue Period (1901–04) in paintings, works on paper and sculpture. Relying on new information gleaned from technical studies performed on *The Blue Room (Le Tub)* (1901), *Crouching Beggarwoman (La Miséreuse accroupie)* (1902) and *The Soup (La Soupe)* (1903), this multidisciplinary volume combines art history and advanced conservation science in order to show how the young Picasso fashioned a distinct style and a pronounced artistic identity as he adapted the artistic lessons of fin-de-siècle Paris to the social and political climate of an economically struggling Barcelona.

Essays, a chronology and a summary of conservation findings contextualize Picasso's experimental approach to painting during the Blue Period. A major contribution to the burgeoning field of technical art history, **PICASSO: PAINTING THE BLUE PERIOD** advances new scholarship on one of the most critical episodes in 20th-century modernism.

Excerpt: **PICASSO: PAINTING THE BLUE PERIOD** marks the first collaboration between The Phillips Collection and the Art Gallery of Ontario on a major international exhibition and scholarly publication. Together we have embarked on a groundbreaking project that provides new insight into the creative process of one of the twentieth century's greatest artists, just as he was beginning to define himself at the start of his long career. This exhibition is a unique combination of art historical scholarship and new information gleaned from advanced technical analyses of the three major Blue Period paintings in our respective collections: The Blue Room (Paris, 1901; The Phillips Collection); Crouching Beggarwoman (Barcelona, 1902; Art Gallery of Ontario), and The Soup (Barcelona, 1903; Art Gallery of Ontario). Picasso: Painting the Blue Period is the culmination of eight years of scientific and curatorial research that offers a significant reassessment of Picasso's working process during the years 1901–1904, with a new understanding of recurring motifs and their sources. It is the first exhibition to approach the Blue Period in this manner.

Concentrating on the years 1901–1904, Picasso: Painting the Blue Period shines new light on more than 100 objects from fifteen countries. The exhibition and the essays in this catalogue explore how Picasso developed his signature Blue Period style by engaging with the subject matter and motifs of the artists he encountered—Old Masters and contemporaneous artists alike—as he moved between Barcelona and Paris during the early part of his career. The Blue Period works also reveal Picasso's evolving and sometimes controversial approach to issues such as class and poverty. Picasso: Painting the Blue Period argues that the three Blue Period paintings in our respective collections mark pivotal moments in Picasso's artistic development during this critical stage of his career. Because these three paintings are foundational to the overall project, the exhibition's final section tracks how Picasso revisited and repurposed themes and motifs from these works into the late Blue Period and early Rose Period of 1905–1906.

In 1927, The Blue Room became one of the first Picasso paintings to enter an American museum when Duncan Phillips, founder of The Phillips Collection, acquired the work, which was sold to him as The Toilette. Phillips recognized the emotional power of this "succulent and sumptuous little picture" and retitled it The Blue Room in 1939, believing that the new title captured more clearly its "wistfully and poignantly blue interior." He saw a correspondence between Blue Period Picasso and the works of the sixteenth-century Spanish master El Greco, writing that "Greco and Picasso are of the same Gothic family." It seems fitting, then, that the exhibition includes two works by the great Spanish mannerist, including The Phillips Collection's The Repentant St. Peter (c. 1600–1605 or later; acquired in 1922), a version of which is in the collection of the Cau Ferrat in Sitges (Spain), where the young Picasso saw it and then, at some point, acquired a postcard of yet another version for the collection of reproductions he kept throughout his life.

The Art Gallery of Ontario is proud to highlight its two Blue Period masterworks. Bequeathed in 1963 to what was then the Art Gallery of Toronto, Crouching Beggarwoman was a gift by a woman who fled Europe during World War II. As Canada offered solace to the anonymous donor during a time of personal distress and international turmoil, she in turn intended her gift to provide a similar measure of calm and comfort to the residents of her place of refuge. Likewise, The Soup was donated to the Art Gallery of Ontario in 1983 by Margaret Dunlap Crang, who believed this small yet monumental picture of an individual act of charity should remain in Canada, specifically in Toronto. A gesture of civic generosity, Crang's gift encapsulates much of the painting's original meaning.

Toronto has a decades-long relationship with the work of Picasso, one that includes the landmark exhibition Picasso and Man (1964) organized by Jean Sutherland Boggs. That presentation included Crouching Beggarwoman and The Soup as well as other works in the current exhibition, among them Street Scene (Paris, 1900; San Francisco Museum of Modern Art), Nude with Cats (Paris, 1901; The Art Institute of Chicago), Woman with a Plumed Hat (Madrid, 1901; McNay Art Museum), Woman with Necklace (Paris, 1901; The Sam and Ayala Zacks Collection in the Israel Museum, Jerusalem, on permanent loan from the Art Gallery of Ontario), Nude with Clasped Hands (Gósol, 1906; Art Gallery of Ontario) and The Toilette (Gósol, 1906; Albright-Knox Art Gallery). These paintings are reunited in Canada in an exhibition that aspires to the rigour of Sutherland Boggs's achievement and stands as a testament to the Art Gallery of Ontario's long-standing commitment to the critical legacy of this iconic twentieth-century artist.

As Picasso: Painting the Blue Period is the first monographic Picasso presentation at the Phillips, it is fitting that conservation should be the cornerstone of this exhibition. The museum established its first in-house conservation studio in 1989, which was expanded in 2006 into a state-of-the-art facility thanks to the continued support of and continued investment from the Sherman Fairchild Foundation. Over the past twenty-five years, technical studies of permanent collection works have

informed and inspired exhibitions at the Phillips under the leadership of Elizabeth Steele, Head of Conservation. Picasso: Painting the Blue Period would not be possible without the work of Patricia Favero, Associate Conservator at The Phillips Collection, and Sandra Webster-Cook, Conservator Emerita, Paintings Historical and Modern, at the Art Gallery of Ontario.

Associate Conservator Favero undertook a new examination of The Blue Room in 2007. In 2012, with the support of the director's office and the curators, she initiated a multi-institutional collaboration that brought together scientists with expertise in physics and chemistry from Cornell University, the National Gallery of Art, Washington, and Winterthur Museum to employ not only pigment sampling analyses but a variety of cutting-edge technologies from the hard sciences and engineering newly adapted for use in museum painting conservation. A very small number of museums around the world have the capacity to embark on this sort of unique art-meets-science collaboration; the National Gallery of Art, our cross-city colleague, is one of those few. John Delaney, the National Gallery's senior imaging scientist, is internationally recognized as one of the leaders in this new field, having developed one-of-a kind multi-spectral imaging and reflectance imaging spectroscopy systems that can reveal in remarkable detail images that lie beneath a painted surface and illustrate pigment distribution in surface and underlying layers. Delaney, whom Favero initially consulted in 2008, returned to the Phillips four times between 2012 and 2019 to conduct additional imaging on The Blue Room, with increasingly detailed results. In addition, with the help of Jennifer Mass at Winterthur, Favero arranged for The Blue Room to travel to Cornell University in October 2012 to be scanned by an exceptionally sensitive prototype "Maia" X-ray detector at the Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source (CHESS). Each of these studies has brought forward important new information.

ANTONI TORRES FUSTER, PHOTOGRAPH OF PABLO PICASSO WITH PERE MAÑACH, ENRIC DE FUENTES, AND MADAME TORRES IN THE STUDIO AT 130 TER BOULEVARD DE CLICHY, PARIS, IN 1901. GELATIN SILVER PRINT, 12 × 8.9 CM (4 3/4 × 3 1/2 INCHES). MUSÉE NATIONAL PICASSO-PARIS.

Picasso in the Studio

The remarkable transition in Picasso's work in his first years in Paris—from flamboyant scenes of city life to the monochrome or muted colours of the emotionally charged Blue Period— can be

documented by the discoveries that have been made about his artistic procedures through a close study of the works themselves. While a biographical approach—naming the people, especially the women, identified in particular compositions1—has often predominated in exhibitions and writings about Picasso's art over the past twenty-five years, recent technical investigations have begun to shift the focus away from biography to a consideration of what we know about his practice: where and how he worked, and the methods and materials that he used.2 The following discussion focuses on Picasso's different studios and his exploration of new subjects, in order to understand, from a practical point of view, how he arrived at certain images and techniques. Evidence is drawn from contemporary photographs and descriptions as well as from the works of art themselves. This approach makes it clear that from the time he arrived in Paris Picasso was working toward recognition as an artist on the international stage, vying for leadership of the avant-garde.

In the spring of 1901, Picasso moved into a studio apartment in Paris on the Boulevard de Clichy, just below Montmartre. To help with the costs, he shared the place with the Catalan dealer Pere Mañach, who had acted on his behalf when he returned to Spain following his first brief visit to Paris the previous autumn. The top-floor apartment overlooked a courtyard in a complex of buildings where a number of artists had their studios. While Mañach occupied the smaller of the two rooms, Picasso took over the larger one, which served as both his atelier and his bedroom. This would feature, later in the year, as the setting for The Blue Room (Le Tub), in which some of the artist's own paintings as well as an Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec poster hang on the wall above his bed. Light pours in from the window at the left, highlighting the nude model, who is shown bathing in a tub in the foreground.

A photograph taken of the artist in this studio in the summer shows him posing with some of his Spanish friends. Standing on the right is Mañach, while on the left are the painter Enric de Fuentes and the wife of Antoni Torres Fuster. Picasso is seated in a wicker chair in front of an unfinished canvas, with a palette and brush in his hand. A sizable canvas is on the easel, and although we cannot see the work in progress, the artist himself described the subject as "a kind of Holy Family."3 In the foreground of the photograph is a small portrait of a man, thought to be the dealer Ambroise Vollard. In addition, other materials, including bottles (probably for turpentine and fixatives) and brushes, can be seen on the tabletop, while a box of paints and a second palette are piled up on the floor. The window at the upper left, which features prominently as a source of natural light in The Blue Room, is reflected in a mirror at the upper right. There would also have been gas light. As Picasso's friend Jaime Sabar tés noted, the artist often preferred to work at night.

In preparation for his show at Vollard's gallery, which Mañach had helped organize and which was scheduled to open in late June 1901, Picasso worked quickly, completing (it was reported in the press) up to three or four compositions a day. As far as materials were concerned, he worked principally in oils, and unlike many of his contemporaries, including Georges Braque, who prepared his own paints from pigments, he preferred to buy his paints in tubes. (Later he would also use ready-mixed non-artist's paints in cans.) Picasso's supplier was a nearby colour merchant in Montmartre called Léon Besnard. The fact that some of the paintings in the catalogue for Vollard's show are credited to the collection of Madame Besnard indicates that the artist may have exchanged works for paint supplies.

When he mixed his colours, Picasso usually started with white. As Sabartés observes:

> As a rule the palette was on the floor; white, heaped in the centre, constituted the basis of that type of mixture, which he prepared especially with blue. . . . I do not recall ever having seen Picasso holding the palette in his hand. He assures me that sometimes he does, just like everyone else. It may be so, but I have always seen him preparing his colours by leaning over a table, a chair or the floor.

Among the largest works in the Vollard show was the artist's confidently painted self-portrait, emphatically signed "I, Picasso". This dramatically conceived composition was intended as a kind of pictorial announcement of the 19-year-old artist's arrival on the Paris art scene. Here, the mustachioed painter is shown merged, as it were, with his broad palette (at the left), and both of his hands are obscured. The daubs of reds, yellows and a touch of white that appear on the palette reflect the colours that he used in other parts of the painting, especially for the face and the cravat that he wears. These contrast with the bravura strokes of white used in his shirt, the blue-black of his hair, and the dark, striated background. This painting did not sell from the show, and it can be seen framed and hanging on the wall of the Boulevard de Clichy studio in a photograph taken after the exhibition had closed. It was at this time, as if to signal a new stage of his career, that the artist now signed his work "– Picasso –", dropping both "Pablo" and his father's surname, Ruiz.



PABLO PICASSO, YO, PICASSO (SELF-PORTRAIT), PARIS, 1901. OIL ON CANVAS, 73.5 × 60.5 CM (29 × 23 7/8 INCHES). PRIVATE COLLECTION.

The bright range of hues and the freedom of paint application that characterized so many of the works that Picasso did in Paris for the show was certainly more "French" than the typically Spanish scenes of bullfights and majas that Vollard might have expected.7 Lively touches of crimsons, ochres, and viridians, as well as whites, Prussian blues, and ultramarines, animate Picasso's scenes of modern Parisian life, from street markets and race courses to children playing in the Luxembourg Gardens. While these paintings were carried out in his studio (and not outdoors), the subjects of many of them suggest that their inspiration came from direct observation. For example, in The Blond Tresses [Les Blondes chevelures], a work also known as Little Girls Dancing, which the critic Gustave Coquiot singled out in Le Journal for its "exquisite" colours, Picasso takes something he may well have actually seen—three children joined together in a wild dance—as a starting point for his composition. Although their heads are facing in different directions and they are not holding hands, each of the girls touches the next, and they are connected as a group by the thick and rhythmically applied paint that defines their red hair. The movement of the composition comes both from the posture of the girls, with their outstretched legs and arms, and from the sweep of paint-laden brushstrokes fanning out from the centre. In this way, Picasso captures the immediacy of a scene of Parisian children at play, achieving this effect through bold, painterly means.

While some of the paintings, such as Yo, Picasso and the portraits of Francisco Iturrino (who showed alongside Picasso at Vollard's) and Mañach (nos. 1–3 in the Vollard catalogue), were done on canvas, many others, including The Blond Tresses, were executed on cardboard. Given that the artist was working at speed and that he had limited financial resources, cardboard offered a cheaper alternative. In general, Picasso applied his paint directly on the support without a preliminary layer; in some cases, areas of the untouched board appear to have darkened over time, or subsequently applied varnish has changed the colour. If he made any underlying marks at all to sketch out a particular composition, these were usually done with dark paint or sometimes charcoal.

Drawings also provided source material for Picasso's compositions, especially for the people who he observed in Montmartre. In two sketchbooks he made quick, graphic notations that provide a record of the dancers and singers as well as of the clientele in the dancehalls and cabarets that he the frenetic scene below. Nonetheless, she is painted with the same energy and colours as the dance itself. As Barnaby Wright has pointed out, the way in which the paint was applied varies on different parts of the cardboard surface: in certain areas, including the foreground, the brown and dark blue paint was thinned, providing a contrast to other elements, such as the woman's hat, which are rendered in rich and saturated touches of colour." This painterly approach also drew Coquiot's attention, leading him to describe the young artist as "a passionate, restless observer [who] exults in bringing out his most sumptuous yellows, magnificent greens and glowing rubies."

A shift in mood as well as in form characterizes Picasso's work after the Vollard show, and in many respects the paintings from this time anticipate the radical changes of the so-called Blue Period to come. This is especially evident in La Gommeuse, where the nude is enclosed by a defining outline to emphasize her self-containment within the composition. Her naked body, with its ochre and greenish hues, is set against a flat background divided between light and dark in a way that recalls a similar formal device used by Gauguin. In Gauguin's 1896 Portrait of a Young Woman, Vaite (Jeanne) Goupil (fig. 9), for example, the girl is shown frontally and her body is rendered primarily as a flat plane of yellow colour.

The background is divided into areas of blue and pink, with the random wallpaper pattern animating and, at the same time, unifying the compressed space. Picasso adopted a similar approach to figure and ground by including a painting on the wall behind his subject (showing the lower half of a woman in red stockings). Although that composition appears not to have survived, its presence behind the model suggests that La Gommeuse was painted in the Boulevard de Clichy studio."

The "Blue Period" began in the early autumn of 1901. The phrase is associated with Picasso's predominantly blue palette and less animated paint surface and also with a focus on subjects of isolation and misery; "art emanates from apartment) in Barcelona. Although most of the earlier painting is covered over, an X-ray of Dozing Absinthe Drinker reveals traces of an academic composition featuring a male nude.18 Picasso often recycled canvases during the Blue Period for a variety of reasons, including lack of money, the availability of used canvases, and, possibly, dissatisfaction with earlier compositions.19 Another curious aspect of the canvas itself in this case is its original shape: close examination reveals that the curve above the slouched figure follows an actual, curvilinear cut, and that a separate piece was at some point added to make the canvas rectangular. We do not know if the cut was made when Picasso resumed work on the canvas in 1902, but its curvilinear shape seems to suggest that he might have had an arched, architectural setting in mind.



PABLO PICASSO, DOZING ABSINTHE DRINKER, BARCELONA, 1902. OIL ON CANVAS, 80 × 60.5 CM (31 1/2 × 23 7/8 INCHES). KUNSTMUSEUM BERN. THE OTHMAR HUBER FOUNDATION, BERN. INV. #: G79.048.

Many of the works done in Barcelona at this time also evoke aspects of earlier Spanish art. Picasso was well aware of sixteenth-century conventions in the work of painters such as Luis de Morales, in which dark, monochromatic backgrounds draw attention to the drama and "realism" of the saints or Madonnas that were depicted. When he took up the subject of an itinerant family on the beach in The Tragedy, he used blue not only to convey sadness but also to reflect that Spanish tradition. The space that the figures occupy in the painting is defined by three essentially flat bands of blue that indicate the sky, sea, and shore. The figures themselves are cloaked primarily in darker blues, which give emphasis to the lightened areas of their faces, feet, and, in the case of the boy at the right, his self-conscious, El Greco-like gesturing hands. The mother and father, who face each other in Picasso's composition, fill almost all of the available space, and their impressive stature, taken together with the blue colour that connects them, transforms the figures into a kind of modern-day Holy Family.

For some of his more complex Blue Period compositions, Picasso often worked out his subjects in drawings. In the case of La Vie, the setting is the artist's studio and several related drawings show that Picasso first thought of depicting himself as the artist, with his model draped on his shoulder. The figure at the right in the painting recalls the mothers with children that he had recently depicted. In the centre are two canvases set against the wall, which also echo Blue Period compositions. As he worked on the canvas, he changed the head of the painter to represent Casagemas—in a sense, a final tribute to his departed friend, painted in the studio that they had shared in Barcelona. X-rays have revealed an earlier, horizontal composition beneath La Vie, which turns out to have been the very painting, known as Last Moments, that had been featured in the Universal Exhibition of Paris in 1900. Picasso and Casagemas had travelled together to Paris to see the painting in place. After the canvas was sent back to Barcelona, it was probably kept by Picasso's father. Thus, when the artist decided to work on a new, vertical composition in 1903, he recycled the canvas, replacing the painting about death with an allegory of life—from birth to old age. When Picasso was asked about the symbolism of La Vie, he responded: "It isn't I who gave the painting that title. I did not intend to paint symbols: I

simply painted images that arose in front of my eyes. It's for others to find a hidden meaning in them." He might have added: it's for others to find the hidden images beneath the final one.

PABLO PICASSO, LA VIE, BARCELONA 903. OIL ON CANVAS, 196.5 ×129.2 CM (77 3/8 × 50 7/8 INCHES). THE CLEVELAND MUSEUM OF ART. GIFT OF THE HANNA FUND. 1945

When Picasso returned to the French capital in the spring of 1904, he took over a studio, previously occupied by a sculptor, in the celebrated Bateau Lavoir in Montmartre. A shift in his palette from dark blues to lighter tonalities at this time signals not only a new optimistic phase of his work but also the beginning of the Rose Period, which would last until 1906. The woman whose image is most frequently associated with these years was an artist's model known as Fernande Olivier, who was also living at that time in the Bateau Lavoir. She remembered her first visit to Picasso's place:

> I went with him to his studio, which is full of large unfinished canvases—he must work so hard, but what a mess! . . . His paintings are astonishing. I find something morbid in them, which is quite disturbing, but I also feel drawn to them.
> The furniture in the studio is very meagre. . . . There's a wicker chair, some easels, canvases of every size, tubes of paint scattered all over the floor, paintbrushes, containers with turpentine, a bath of etching acid. . . . He's working on an etching showing an emaciated man and woman seated at a table in a wine shop, who convey an intense feeling of misery and alcoholism with terrifying realism.

In addition to giving important details about the studio and its contents, Fernande, who did not move in with Picasso until 1905, also recalled that from the moment they met (August 1904) he was urging her to live with him, and that he was constantly doing portraits of her.29 She goes on to describe the changes that she saw from one year to the next:

> The paintings he's doing are quite different from those I saw when I first came to the studio last summer, and he's painting over many of those canvases. The blue figures, reminiscent of El Greco, that I loved so much have been covered with delicate, sensitive paintings of acrobats.

This change in subject matter and the fact that, according to Fernande, Picasso was painting out the Blue Period, can be associated with his preparations for another major exhibition, which was scheduled to open at the Galeries Serrurier in February 1905. Just as he had with the Vollard show, he embraced the project wholeheartedly and worked on numerous paintings, as well as on a series of prints. Only a few of the works listed in the catalogue can be identified with certainty, but many of them dealt with the theme of saltimbanques— itinerant troupes of acrobats, sometimes dressed in Harlequin's costume. Picasso later said that the idea came from watching a group of saltimbanques performing near the Invalides in Paris, most likely taking part in Christmas festivities.

This recollection gives us a pretty good idea of when he began to focus on these popular entertainers. Not only did Picasso change his subject matter, but he also switched from oils to gouache on cardboard for many of the works that he planned to include in the Serrurier show. While his choice of tones of

light blues and pinks can be associated with the acrobats' faded costumes, overall there is also a new poetic sensibility that can be found in much of the work of this period. Picasso's friendship with the poet Guillaume Apollinaire surely contributed to the mood in the saltimbanque compositions. Apollinaire wrote in his La Plume review (May 1905) of the Serrurier show: "The harlequins go in splendid rags, while the painting is gathering, warming or whitening its colours to express the strength and duration of the passions. . . . The colour has the flatness of frescoes; the lines are firm."

One of the large paintings that Apollinaire alluded to in his review was an impressive gouache (with added watercolour and India ink) on cardboard, known as Acrobat Family. Here, the artist's portrayal of an acrobat, his wife and child, and a performing animal, reflects the intimacy of their lives off-stage. The similarity of the long-fingered hands of the ape to those of the man and woman reinforces their familial ties. Judging from a related series of drawings, it is clear that Picasso used models and that he drew a mother and child from life. But in the final composition, none of the figures is intended as a portrait in the strictest sense. As far as the broader meaning of Acrobat Family is concerned, this depiction of a family group living on the margins of society is a well-balanced, almost Renaissance-like composition that has affinities with earlier Blue Period compositions, in which ordinary people are transformed into modern-day beggar-philosophers, Madonnas, or Holy Families.

Picasso never ceased to use sketchbooks to make observations, plan compositions, and experiment with variations, but his visual memory meant that, when he turned to the process of painting, he could internalize the physical features and likenesses of his "models" and sometimes merged them on the canvas. He also responded instinctively and spontaneously to what was on the picture surface, whether it was a new composition in progress or, when he used an old canvas, the marks, colours, or even subjects that he was hiding under the new paint. The events of his life, his friends, and his lovers always had a profound effect on Picasso, but an understanding of his working practices makes it possible to see how fully they were transformed in his art. <>

LITERATURE AS CULTURAL ECOLOGY: SUSTAINABLE TEXTS by Hubert Zapf [Bloomsbury Academic, 9781474274654]

Drawing on the latest debates in ecocritical theory and sustainability studies, **LITERATURE AS CULTURAL ECOLOGY: SUSTAINABLE TEXTS** outlines a new approach to the reading of literary texts. Hubert Zapf considers the ways in which literature operates as a form of cultural ecology, using language, imagination and critique to challenge and transform cultural narratives of humanity's relationship to nature. In this way, the book demonstrates the important role that literature plays in creating a more sustainable way of life. Applying this approach to works by writers such as Emily Dickinson, Edgar Allan Poe, Herman Melville, William Faulkner, Toni Morrison, Zakes Mda, and Amitav Ghosh, **LITERATURE AS CULTURAL ECOLOGY** is an essential contribution to the contemporary environmental humanities.

CONTENTS

This book offers a theory of imaginative literature based on the paradigm of cultural ecology. Cultural ecology is a new direction in recent ecocriticism which has found considerable attention in Europe and the German-speaking world but which is also beginning to be discussed in English-language publications in the field. 1 A paradigm in the sense used in this study is no totalizing or all-explanatory system but an explorative perspective on its subject. In its dictionary definition, a paradigm is "an example, pattern or model" (OED); a "narrative, story with exemplary, model-like character" (Duden . My trans.). In this sense of an explorative model and meta-narrative, a cultural ecology of literature proposes a transdisciplinary approach to literary texts, in which the interaction and mutual interdependence between culture and nature is posited as a fundamental dimension of literary production and creativity. Between an anthropocentric cultural studies perspective, in which nature is dematerialized into a discursive human construct, and a radical ecocentrism, in which cultural processes are basically subsumed under naturalist assumptions, cultural ecology looks at the interaction and living interrelationship between culture and nature, without reducing one to the other. Literature is seen as a cultural form in which this living interrelationship is explored in specifically productive ways, providing a site of critical self-reflection of modern civilization as well as a source of creative cultural self-renewal. This is not merely a question of thematic orientation or content but of the aesthetic processes staged in imaginative texts, which in this sense can be described as functioning like an ecological force within the larger system of cultural discourses.

A cultural ecology of literature is based on a functional-evolutionary view of cultural and literary history, in which literary texts as imaginative and artistic forms of textuality have acquired specific qualities, modes, and features of writing that are both interrelated with and different from other forms of writing. Literature is described as a transformative force of language and discourse, which combines civilizational critique with cultural self-renewal in ways that turn literary texts into forms of sustainable textuality. Literature uses the resources of language, imagination, and discourse for the creation of long-term, self-reflexive models of ecosemiotic complexity. If sustainability in a biological sense means the ways in which living systems remain alive and productive over time, then the cultural ecosystem of literature fulfills a similar function of sustainable productivity within cultural discourses. And if sustainability in a cultural sense means the ways in which the life of culture can be

kept in "equilibrium with basic ecological support systems" (Stivers), then this criterion applies in a special degree to literary culture, which is characterized in its functional dynamics by maintaining a deep-rooted affinity between its modes of (re-)generation and the ecological processes of life that it both reflects and creatively transforms.

On the one hand, this approach is grounded in a general theory of cultural ecology as a field of transdisciplinary studies that has gained considerable visibility in recent ecological thought, bringing together the formerly separate epistemic domains of ecology and culture, biological life sciences and the sciences of mind, systems theory and textual theory, natural and cultural evolution in manifold and promising new ways. On the other hand, the book adapts, translates, and integrates these insights from various disciplines into a more specific theory of literature itself as a medium of cultural ecology. It focuses attention on the forms, modes, and functions of representation and communication that have evolved in literary history as a generative potential of texts. A guiding assumption of this approach is that imaginative literature deals with the basic relation between culture and nature in particularly multifaceted, self-reflexive, and transformative ways and that it produces an "ecological" dimension of discourse precisely on account of its semantic openness, imaginative intensity, and aesthetic complexity. As I hope to show in the examples from various genres and cultures that make up the textual corpus of the book, this focus on imaginative, artistically complex texts doesn't imply any presumption of cultural elitism but rather an exploration of the critical-creative potential of the aesthetic as a vital mode of ecological knowledge and transformation. It resonates with Derek Attridge's notion of the "singularity of literature" (Attridge), even while acknowledging the indissoluble interdependence and semiotic co-agency of individual texts with its intertextual and historical-cultural environments. My attention is therefore not on a strict separation between genres or between fictional and nonfictional modes of writing but on the imaginative and artistic procedures with which they activate what seems to be a transculturally effective ecological potency of texts.

One fascinating but also disturbing implication of the recent explosion of productivity in ecocritical thought and of its expansion into more and more disciplines across the environmental humanities and beyond is the enormous challenge that it poses for individual scholars to integrate the vast, transdisciplinary but also highly specialized and differentiated knowledge that is relevant to the field. Ideally, a contemporary ecocritic would have to be conversant with the most recent state of knowledge in such diverse areas as scientific ecology, evolutionary biology, historical anthropology, social systems theory, environmental history, geography, geology, as well as phenomenology, history of philosophy, art history, media theory, gender studies, postcolonialism, globalization studies, and, of course, cultural and literary studies. The impossibility of coping as an individual with such a complex agglomerate of highly diversified forms of knowledge is self-evident. One consequence of this is that ecocritical scholarship must always be seen as part of an ongoing dialogue and cooperative form of work-in-progress between scholars rather than only an accumulation of singular isolated contributions of individual minds. Such a cooperative project corresponds to the idea of intersubjective communication circuits within an "ecology of mind" as proposed by Gregory Bateson, and it also underlies the cultural-ecological approach advocated here (Bateson 1973). The present book considers itself as part of such an ongoing dialogue. It is written from the awareness that its argument only lives from its constant exchange with other scholars, ideas, and, indeed, with the literary writers and texts that are the main source and inspiration of its cultural-ecological argument. Another response to the huge scope and complexity of the field is to narrow down the focus of investigation both in terms of discipline and of subject matter. This is what I am doing in the present study, whose focus is explicitly directed toward the ecological potential of literary culture , which comprises both the scholarly disciplines concerned with literary studies and the ecological knowledge provided by literary texts themselves. Even more specifically, I concentrate in my book on examples from American literature as my main field of specialization, even though texts from

other literary cultures are included as well to indicate the transnational and transcultural horizon of a cultural ecology of literature. Of course, when zooming in on such a more concrete research agenda, it turns out in the end that the multidisciplinary questions that have temporarily been bracketed, open up again on a different scale, especially in the case of the culture of literature, which is itself the site of a constant crossing of discursive boundaries and a complex fusion of heterogeneous domains of knowledge.

The argument of the book does not simply proceed in a linear way. It follows neither a merely deductive method, which would derive concrete observations from general premises of thought, nor a merely inductive method, which would develop ascending scales of generalization from the observation of concrete phenomena. It rather practices an "abductive" procedure in the sense described by Charles Sanders Peirce, which involves intuitive guesses and methodological leaps across different, heterogeneous domains of knowledge in order to establish new, hitherto unseen connections and analogies between them—in this case between the domains of ecological and literary knowledge (Peirce 1998 ; Wheeler 2011). The book proceeds in such a way that theory is related to texts and texts to theory in evolving feedback loops and spirals of reflexivity, in which the aim of new knowledge is successively validated by the mutually illuminating evidence of discursive argument and aesthetic concretization. Theoretical discussions alternate throughout with text-oriented analyses in the attempt to bring out the argument of a cultural ecology of literature in an ongoing dialogue between theory and text.

Nevertheless, the book follows a general structure which is organized in successive methodological steps. The first part, "Cultural Ecology and Literary Studies," introduces the aims, conception, procedure, and thesis of the book. It contextualizes its main assumptions with a view to the ecocultural potential of imaginative literature on the one hand and the current debate on sustainability as a cultural phenomenon on the other, and it exemplifies these assumptions in three poems from different periods of American literature. The second part, "Ecocriticism and Cultural Ecology," positions cultural ecology within the wider field of ecocriticism and ecological thought, relating it to the spectrum of ecocritical directions that have evolved between nature-oriented, culture-critical, and political forms of ecology. It argues that the initial antagonism between ecological thought and critical theory is currently opening up in favor of mutual dialogue and conceptual enrichment. The third part, "Literature as Cultural Ecology," presents the general approach of cultural ecology within bio-evolutionary, systems-theoretical, linguistic, and material-ecocritical frameworks. On its basis, it develops a specific theory of literature as cultural ecology and proposes a triadic functional model for describing the transformative role of imaginative texts within cultural systems and discourses.

The fourth part, "Transdisciplinary Contexts of a Cultural Ecology of Literature," discusses various transdisciplinary contexts, which are of relevance to a cultural ecology of literature and to the sustainable form of textuality that it provides for cultural criticism and self-renewal. It focuses not on isolated concepts but on patterns of relational polarities, in which the mutually defining movement between the constitutive terms, rather than any single semantic reference domains, are foregrounded. This will help to place the approach of a cultural ecology of literature within a number of widely discussed frameworks of ecocultural debates in order to demonstrate and further differentiate its transdisciplinary potential as a generative paradigm of literary and cultural studies. These relational polarities are "Text and Life," dealing with literature as a cultural-ecological form of "knowledge of life" that self-reflexively stages complex dynamical life processes, which are described in related but different ways in the life sciences; "Order and Chaos," discussing the necessary coagency of the forces of order and chaos in both ecology and in aesthetics; "Connecting Patterns and Creative Energies," exploring the interplay between "patterns which connect" (Bateson) and transgressive excess in creative processes; "Matter and Mind," examining the dynamic interactivity

between matter and mind in literary texts as exemplified in the poetics of the four elements; "Solid and Fluid," focusing on the beach as a liminal space between land and sea, culture and nature, as a particularly productive site of literary creativity; "Wound and Voice," mapping the outlines of a cultural ecology of literary trauma narratives; "Absence and Presence," placing a cultural ecology of literature within postmodern debates on absence and presence as discursive modes of texts; and "Local and Global," tracing conflicting orientations between the local and the global, and between postcolonial and transcultural-ecocosmopolitan models of ecological thought in contemporary texts within the frameworks of climate change and the Anthropocene. In all of these chapters, different dimensions of transdisciplinarity are explored, in which the epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic functions of literature as cultural ecology are demonstrated both on a theoretical plane and in textual examples.

These textual examples are taken from different periods and genres of literary history, and they especially revolve around a number of core texts which I believe are not only milestones in American literary history but also represent particularly rich models of a cultural ecology of literature. Among these are, besides the obvious case of Henry David Thoreau's Walden, Nathaniel Hawthornes' Scarlet Letter , Melville's "Bartleby" and Moby-Dick, Edgar Allan Poe's "Masque of the Red Death," Kate Chopin's The Awakening, William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury, Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony, and Toni Morrison's Beloved , along with poems by Emily Dickinson, Walt Whitman, Robert Frost, and more recent writers like Allen Ginsberg, Linda Hogan, Simon Ortiz, and A. R. Ammons. The book's argument circles back to some of these texts several times in order to establish a field of references in which various aspects and contexts of a cultural ecology of literature can be illuminated from within a network of shifting angles and frames. This textual corpus is deliberately heterogeneous and includes such aesthetically and stylistically diverse artistic models as represented by the writings of Thoreau and Poe, Frost and Hogan, Chopin and Morrison; the aim here is to pay due attention to cultural and aesthetic differences while at the same time emphasizing a shared code of literary productivity which seems to indicate a deeper, ecosemiotic potential of literature across such cultural and aesthetic boundaries. Examples from African American and Native American literatures are part of this network of core texts to indicate the transcultural and, indeed, ecoglobal implications of a cultural ecology of literature, which are underlined by intermittent references to various texts beyond US literature, including Indian, South African, British, and German literature. However, the main focus remains on US literature, which is considered not an exclusionary national phenomenon but a multiply connected, exemplary field of literary production in which the theory and aesthetics of a cultural ecology of literature can be paradigmatically explored.

While the book deals with examples from literary art, other forms of art and imaginative production in different genres and media could equally be included in such a cultural-ecological analysis—such as film, painting, the visual arts, theater, music, opera, and so forth. While such an analysis would evidently require genre- and media-specific modifications, some of the fundamental characteristics of an aesthetic transformation of knowledge and experience as described by cultural ecology are shared across the boundaries of these genres and media—as is evidenced in the many examples of intermedial and cross-medial forms of artistic production that characterize the modern and contemporary art world. While such extensions are clearly desirable, I will confine myself in this book to an analysis of literature, even though much of what will be said about the critical-creative potential of texts can also productively be transferred to other art forms and media. <>

Fictional Practice: Magic, Narration, and the Power of Imagination edited by Bernd-Christian Otto and Dirk Johannsen [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004465992]

To what extent were practitioners of magic inspired by fictional accounts of their art? In how far did the daunting narratives surrounding legendary magicians such as Theophilus of Adana, Cyprianus of Antioch, Johann Georg Faust or Agrippa of Nettesheim rely on real-world events or practices? Fourteen original case studies present material from late antiquity to the twenty-first century and explore these questions in a systematic manner. By coining the notion of 'fictional practice', the editors discuss the emergence of novel, imaginative types of magic from the nineteenth century onwards when fiction and practice came to be more and more intertwined or even fully amalgamated. This is the first comparative study that systematically relates fiction and practice in the history of magic.

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There is no such thing as magic Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone 2001

Fiction, so we read in a contemporary etymological dictionary, is "that which is invented or imagined in the mind" (Harper 2020a). The word goes back to old French *ficcion* ("dissimulation, ruse;

invention, fabrication") and from there to the Latin *fictio* (which implies two distinct meanings: (1) "the act of modeling something, of giving it a form"; and (2) "acts of pretending, supposing, or hypothesizing": Schaffer 2012), with its verb *fingere* ("to shape, form, devise, feign") which also means "to form out of clay." Practice, in turn, goes back to old French *practiser* and Latin *practicare*, with its root meaning of "to do, to perform." From the fifteenth century onwards, it also acquired the meaning of "to perform repeatedly to acquire skill, to learn by repeated performance" (Harper 2020b).

If we consider *fictional practice* to refer to a repeated performance which is based on, or strives towards, something that is invented or imagined in the mind, we might think of all sorts of things. Generally speaking, any fabrication of cultural symbols or artefacts may be interpreted as fictional practice in the sense that the symbols and artefacts originated in the human mind. For Ernst Cassirer, for instance, any type of cultural production was ultimately a fictional (or in his wording 'symbolic') enterprise (Cassirer 1944). Turning towards religion, 'new atheists' (who of course latch onto a much older debate) such as Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett consider basic religious tenets such as God/s, sin, karma, nirvana, or prophecy to be mere products of human fancy with no empirical correlate whatsoever (e.g., Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006). From their perspective, many different types of religious behaviour might be interpreted as fictional practices, including prayer, sacrifice, baptism, funerals, the Eucharist, meditation, divination, or the carrying of religious cloth, symbols, amulets, or mojos. And then there is magic.

Magic has often been interpreted as one of the most stereotypical types of fictional practice, insofar as it seems to rely on weird combinations of essentially powerless ritual ingredients, actions, or principles, which purportedly cannot, either by themselves or in combination, produce any of the effects envisaged by its practitioners. In fact, one of the first basic connotations of the 'magician' in classical Greece (where the Western concept of 'magic' was originally shaped: Otto 2011, 143f) was that of a 'fraud': a private ritual entrepreneur who tricks and deludes naïve clients for the sake of his own enrichment. The notion of fraudulence is one of three basic anti-magical stereotypes present throughout Western cultural history, flanked on the one hand by blasphemy and on the other by immorality (see further Otto 2019a, 199–202). The idea that magical practices are inherently fraudulent gained particular impetus during the European Enlightenment, when magic gradually ceased to be interpreted as a crime against God and turned instead into a crime against reason. The assertion that believers in magic are prone to irrational and deluded (or ultimately delusive) thinking and behaviour had a lasting influence on the scholarly discourse from the nineteenth century onwards, and informed important early theorists such as Edward B. Tylor and James G. Frazer (see also Pasi 2006, 1134f.). Tylor, for instance, claimed that man, "having come to associate in thought those things which he found by experience to be connected in fact, proceeded erroneously to invert this action, and to conclude that association in thought must involve similar connexion in reality" (Tylor 1903, 112). Frazer followed in Tylor's footsteps by arguing that magic is based on a false "association of ideas" and thus depreciated it as "a false science as well as an abortive art" (Frazer 1922, 11).

Magic was thereby turned into 'fictional practice' *by definition*, and continued to function as a contrasting foil for the scholarly understanding of what may be considered true or false, modern or obsolete, what may count as accurate, trustworthy knowledge or what should rather belong to the realm of mere fancy (or fiction). The paradigmatic conviction of magic's fictionality built one of the normative foundations of academia as such in that it "served as a potent tool for the self-fashioning of modernity" (Styers 2004, 224). In fact, most twentieth-century scholars who participated in the exuberant debate on magic took its inherent fictionality for granted and focused almost exclusively on explaining its purported effects by positing socio-psychological or cognitive 'make-believe'

processes. The only question that remained to be clarified was: why do practitioners of magic adhere to an apparently fictional enterprise?[1]

The present volume does not intend to follow along these argumentative paths. It moves beyond the question of whether magic is objectively or (only) subjectively real or efficacious, and approaches the matter instead from the perspective of cultural and discursive history, thus acknowledging magic as a complex, multifaceted, and powerful historical phenomenon that apparently had an enormous impact on Western history. Rather than engaging in the aforementioned debates on whether magic is factual or fictional, the volume instead poses a question that has occasionally been asked in the scholarly discourse but has never been explored in a systematic manner that encompasses a broad historical, geographical, and genealogical scope. We will pursue this goal by employing another meaning of *fiction* that is attested from the early nineteenth century onwards, namely that of "literature comprising novels and short stories based on imagined scenes or characters" (Harper 2020a; Schaffer 2012 speaks of 'fictional narrative'). We contrast this literary or narrative understanding of *fiction* with a notion of *practices* that refers, first and foremost, to the performance of rituals by people who have labelled these practices as 'magic' and/or who have adopted the title 'magician' when referring to themselves (that is to say, we employ a discursive understanding of 'magic': see concisely Otto 2018b). One of the editors of this volume has suggested that such actors and their practices can be subsumed under the analytical notion of 'Western learned magic' and has analysed this textual-ritual tradition over the past years (see Otto 2016; Bellingradt/Otto 2017; Otto 2018a–c; Otto 2019b). Based on these premises, the present volume explores the inter-relationship between, on the one hand, fictional narratives on magic (as they appear in myth, poetry, and literature, as well as in theological or historical texts) and, on the other, the ritual performances of practitioners of learned magic (as they are preserved in ritual scripts, whether in manuscript or printed form, or ego-documents such as experience reports or ritual diaries). To what extent were practitioners of learned magic inspired by fictional accounts of their art, and to what extent were fictional accounts of magic inspired by real-world practice/s? Are there types of 'fictional practice' in which fiction and practice came to be intertwined or even fully amalgamated?

Western Learned Magic and the Entanglement of Fiction and Practice

The volume thus ties in with recent works on the literary dimensions of Western esotericism (see, exemplarily, Partridge 2004, esp. vol. 1, ch. 6; Graf 2015; Wallraven 2015; Cusack/Kosnác 2017; Ferguson/Radford 2018; Roukema 2018; Bauduin/Johnson 2018; Bogdan 2020). In doing so, we also seize on the recent debate about 'hyper-real', 'invented', or 'fiction-based' religion (Possamai 2005; Cusack 2010; Davidsen 2013) and apply the research questions and perspectives of this debate to the study and history of learned magic. All chapters in this volume deal with sources that, in one way or the other, belong to the textual-ritual tradition of Western learned magic, whereas the main prerequisite for the authors was to include both fiction and practice on equal terms in their contributions. The volume thus adds to works in literary studies that have mainly dealt with magic in the sense of a narrative trope or plot device (e.g., Bottigheimer 2014; Feldt 2016; Zipes 2017; Patterson 2019). By highlighting the practical—especially ritual—dimension of learned magic, it likewise expands upon research perspectives on Western esotericism that remain predominantly focused on 'knowledge', whether deemed 'higher' or 'rejected' (see Asprem 2016a). Essentially, the volume advocates a 'practical turn' in the study of both esotericism and literature.

The textual-ritual tradition of Western learned magic is eminently suited for this endeavour, as its theories and practices were highly heterogeneous, hybrid, and constantly in flux over the course of history (see Otto 2016, 189f), features that led to a tendency to appropriate a great quantity of fictional elements. In contrast to the debate on 'fiction-based' religion, which mostly focuses on developments of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (with Jedi and Tolkien spiritualities as prime examples: see Davidsen 2016, 2019), 'fiction-based' magic is significantly older: it goes back to

the very roots of the concept. In fact, after 'magic' was detached from its Persian origins around 500 bce—where it had mainly referred to an Achaemenid priestly title (see Bremmer 2002)—the vast majority of sources that have discussed magic in the ancient Mediterranean world were authored by poets, lyricists, and satirists. Aesop, Sophocles, Euripides, Aischylos, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, or Lucian, to name only a select few, employed magical motifs in their works, thus significantly contributing to the concept's semantic—and especially polemic—foundations (see, exemplarily, Graf 1996; Dicki 2001; Ogden 2002; Stratton 2007; Otto 2011). It has also been argued that the world's very first 'novel' was Apuleius of Madaura's *The Golden Ass*, which, authored in the mid-second century ad (see Kenney 1998), is essentially a story about magic and a failed animal transformation spell.

The first fully-fledged corpus of texts written not from a philosophical, poetic, or literary perspective, but from the perspective of the practitioner—namely, the late ancient *Greek Magical Papyri*—emerged almost a millennium after magic had begun to circulate as a largely polemical concept in ancient discourses (Otto 2013, 338; see also Frankfurter 2019). Unsurprisingly, we find numerous fictional patterns and narratives interwoven into its ritual scripts. These include the instrumentalisation of fictional practitioners as pseudepigraphs (such as Solomon [pgm iv, 850f], Democritus [pgm vii, 168f], or Moses [pgm xiii, 1f]), or the use of so-called 'historiolae'—a ritual technique that implies the re-narration of a short mythical tale during the ritual (see, for instance, the love spell in pgm iv, 1471f). Kyle Fraser, in the first contribution to this volume, further demonstrates that the authors of the *Greek Magical Papyri* engaged not only in what he calls 'stereotype appropriation', but also in a 'strategic response' to fictional tropes that circulated in the ancient Mediterranean—by creatively re-interpreting (or even reversing) these stereotypes and adapting them to their own needs and beliefs.

Fraser's finding is representative of the history of Western learned magic at large. Fictional stereotypes, tropes, clichés, and narratives have—to a greater or lesser degree—influenced or inspired real-world practitioners from late antiquity up to the twenty-first century. Yet, the appropriation of fictional elements by practitioners of learned magic was usually highly strategic, in the sense that it served their self-protection (e.g., through pseudepigraphy), self-traditionalisation (e.g., through positing fictitious lineages), or self-legitimisation (e.g., through appropriating rhetorics of religious legitimacy and authenticity; see, for example, the case of John of Morigny, discussed by Claire Fanger in this volume). Eventually, fictional tropes or narratives make their way into ritual scripts, with the intention of heightening the perceived efficacy of the rituals. For instance, the early modern legendary practitioner 'Dr Faustus'—who became the prototype of a misguided demon-conjuror from the late sixteenth century onwards—turned into a spirit to be invoked in a Scandinavian invulnerability spell of the eighteenth century (see Owen Davies' contribution in this volume for further details). Wiccans of the twentieth century drew upon an ancient narrative trope about 'Thessalian witches' when referring to one of their most pivotal rites as 'drawing down the moon' (see Ethan Doyle White's contribution in this volume). Some modern 'Chaos magick' groups read the supernatural horror fiction of Howard P. Lovecraft before and during their ritual procedures, thus intending to invoke and embody the 'Great Old Ones' (see Justin Woodman's contribution in this volume). Clearly, Western learned magic has always resonated with fiction, a tendency that seems to reflect its century-long shady underground existence, as well as its constant challenging of the limits and boundaries of the human condition.

The flipside to such types of 'fiction-based magic' is to be found in fictional narratives about magic that have been inspired by real-world practices or practitioners: 'practice-based fiction', as it were. Yet, whereas fictional elements are rather easy to identify in practice-oriented texts of learned magic, the question of whether real-world practices or practitioners have inspired fictional narratives is often much harder to elucidate. There are cases where the reference is explicit—Hugh Urban, for

instance, in his contribution to this volume, discusses English novels of the 1920s and 1930 that are directly modelled on Pierre Bernard and Aleister Crowley. However, there are numerous fictional or legendary accounts of practitioners who may never have existed. Sometimes it is simply impossible to verify their historicity (as in the cases of Theophilus of Adana or Cyprianus of Antioch; on the latter see Ane Ohrvik's chapter in this volume); sometimes legendary practitioners are modelled after real-world persons (consider the early modern polemics surrounding Johann Georg Faust or Agrippa of Nettesheim), evidently not with the goal of providing a historically accurate account, but rather to promote fear- and fascination-driven stereotypes and clichés about magic (see Bernd-Christian Otto's chapter in this volume for further details). Finally, there is a vast corpus of legendary narratives about magical practices the historicity of which remains unclear. Aðalheiður Guðmundsdóttir, for instance, in her contribution to this volume, discusses the degree to which Icelandic legendary (*fornaldarsögur*) literature, especially legends that revolve around the utterance of a spell (*álög*), function as a historical window onto medieval and early modern Icelandic conceptions—and practices—of spell-casting. It is worth pondering whether her critical questions and findings can be made relevant to the study of other legendary texts that display magical motifs.

The Rise of Fiction

While the premodern history of Western learned magic is already full of examples of 'fiction-based practice' and 'practice-based fiction' (as well as back-and-forth movements between the two), the relationship between fiction and magic has become ever more dynamic in the modern era. A crucial trigger for this development was the emergence of a large-scale international market for fictional literature in which the creation, promotion, and distribution of literary works was more and more professionalised. By the nineteenth century, the main product for this market had become genre fiction: works of fiction that were easy to promote because they catered to the expectations of audiences who were already familiar with similar works. In the realm of magic, it is, above all, the genre of the so-called Rosicrucian novel that attests to the increasingly complex web of fiction-practice relationships.

The foundational texts of the Rosicrucian movement—namely, the *Fama Fraternatis* (1614), the *Confessio Fraternatis* (1615), and the *Chymische Hochzeit* (1616), all authored, in all likelihood, by Johann Valentin Andrae (1586–1654)—combined legendary narrative about the life and deeds of Christianus Rosencreutz and his alleged fellowship with references to practical arts, such as alchemy, kabbalah, or natural magic (see van Dülmen 1973, 18f.; Otto 2011, 510f.). Even though these texts sparked an intense public debate throughout the seventeenth century, the existence of non-fictional Rosicrucian groupings at that time is disputed in present-day scholarship and considered to be a literary trope. Yet the Rosicrucian legend not only led to the foundation of Rosicrucian orders in the 18th and 19th centuries—the earliest and most prominent example being the *Orden der Gold- und Rosenkreuzer*, founded in 1757 in Frankfurt am Main—but also to novel literary representations.

One of the first representatives, or even the prototype, of the Rosicrucian novel was Pierre-Henri de Montfaucon de Villars' widely read *Comte de Gabalis*, first published (anonymously) in 1670. Connecting into the Rosicrucian excitement of the seventeenth century, *Comte de Gabalis* was composed as a conversation, spread across five dialogues, between a *Comte* and his student (the narrator) about the so-called 'secret sciences'. Curiously, the bulk of these dialogues are almost exclusively concerned with the Paracelsian concept of the four 'elemental spirits' (gnomes/earth; nymphs/air; sylphs/water; salamanders/fire). It was especially the idea of a spiritually beneficial marriage to elemental spirits, put forth in dialogue four, that left an enduring imprint on European literature, theatre, and art from the late seventeenth century onwards. As a method for receiving supreme wisdom or achieving spiritual rebirth, this type of 'marriage' was also put into practice. For instance, a detailed recipe of the practical necessities involved in attracting and marrying a sylph survives in a German manuscript that is today preserved in the Leipzig collection of 'codices magici'

(Ms. Cod. Mag. 44; the recipe is outlined in detail in Bellingradt/Otto, 126–28). This text was written some time around 1700, that is, only a few decades after the first edition of *Comte de Gabalis*. From this first spark of 'fiction-based magic'—marriage with elementals—the Rosicrucian legend began to reveal further multi-layered interrelations between fiction and practice.

By the late 18th century, the burgeoning literary market had facilitated mass production and an increased access to formerly exclusive writings. Underpinned by changes in legal regulations with regard to blasphemy and censorship, the international book market now allowed for the wide distribution of material that had, until then, belonged to esoteric manuscript cultures. We see the effects of these developments in a new intertextuality created by new publication formats. Selective editions of esoteric writings, such as Francis Barrett's *The Magus or Celestial Intelligencer* (1801), suggested, already by way of compilation, occult connections between different textual traditions. The modern novel had likewise become a highly intertextual format, borrowing widely from disparate storytelling traditions and exploring their literary "reality effects" (Barthes 1969). At the interface of both developments, the Rosicrucian novel now became a standardised literary format with a growing popularity. Conceived of as a sub-genre of the gothic novel, works such as Shelley's *St. Irvyne the Rosicrucian* (1810), Ainsworth's *Auriol* (1814), or Bulwer-Lytton's *Zanoni* (1842) gained their fascination from firmly anchoring the storyworld of the Rosicrucian legend to the recent esoteric compilations, casually mentioning the names of authors and writings that Barrett and others had publicly promoted as part of a clandestine tradition.

The persuasiveness of this novel intertextual format became strikingly apparent in its impact on the constitution of a large number of self-proclaimed Rosicrucian societies from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, such as the *Fraternitas Rosae Crucis* (founded in 1858), the *Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia* (founded in 1865), the *Theosophical Society* (founded in 1875), the *Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor* (founded around 1884), the *Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn* (founded in 1888), or the *Ordre Martiniste* (founded in 1891). Many of these newly founded orders drew on the Rosicrucian novels for their backstories, and began to translate fiction into practice. The *Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor* and the *Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn*, for example, developed elaborate rituals for marrying elementals based on the *Comte de Gabalis* (see Godwin, Chanel, Deveney 1995, 107–120; Nagel 2007). In many strands of late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century occultism and learned magic, fiction became part of the curriculum (see, for example, Aleister Crowley's *A ∴ A ∴ Curriculum*, Crowley 1919, 22–26).[2] With fictional literature actively promoted as a source of occult knowledge and inspiration, we also see an increasing number of practitioners engaged in writing fiction (see Marco Frenschkowski's chapter on Helena Petrovna Blavatsky in this volume, and the overview of practitioner-novelists in Bernd-Christian Otto's concluding chapter).

The Power of Imagination

The enhanced entanglement of practice and fiction in learned magic from the nineteenth century onwards was, however, not only due to an increased access to esoteric sources and a growing market for occult fiction. Conceptual shifts happening in this period also allowed for a more theoretical alignment of magic and fiction. This alignment gave rise to what we, in this volume, identify as 'fictional practice' in a narrow sense, in which acts of engaging with or creating fiction, on the one hand, and magical practices, on the other, are in some form equated and coalesced. This somewhat counterintuitive blending of different cultural domains became possible through fundamental reconfigurations in the discourse on religion.

Conceptual historian Lucian Hölscher has shown how in the European political discourse of the transitional "Sattelzeit" between 1750 and 1870, the shift from the complementary "spiritual vs. temporal" dichotomy to a more conflicted "religious vs. secular" dichotomy gave the concept of religion a "contradictory" character (Hölscher 2015, 73). With religion being criticised for being

based on myth, notably by David Friedrich Strauss in his *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined* (1844 [1835–36]), and theorised as a human phenomenon, notably by Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), its object was denied relevance for the public discourse. However, religious belief remained a political factor to be accounted for, and religion's allegedly 'invented' (or fictional) character did not necessarily detract from its cultural and social role. The field of inquiry where this conceptual development had its most striking repercussions was the study of myth, the "remote reality" of which (Hölscher 2015, 87) became palpable in the nation-building endeavours of the nineteenth century—with the creation of political myths that connected modern nations to ancient cultural traditions. The theories proposed to explain the origin of myths in human minds and societies just added to their political relevance. Things declared to be based on 'objectively false' premises—such as religion, myth, or magic—could now be argued to be nonetheless of utmost cultural, social, and psychological efficacy.

These conceptual developments had a major impact on the general notion of fiction as well. By the early nineteenth century, fiction still simply denoted "something feigned or invented" or "the act of feigning or inventing" (Johnson 1805, "Fiction"). Over the course of the century, however, it became the core term of the literary craft, denoting "one of the fine arts", even the most ancient one (Besant 1884, 3). Fiction "suggests as well as narrates", Walter Besant (the brother-in-law of theosophist Annie Besant) famously declared in 1884; it is as creative as it is descriptive (Besant 1884, 16). Even if understood as pretence and make-believe, the art of fiction was of intrinsic value and had an important cultural impact (James 1888).

The specific ingredient that allowed for this conceptual alignment of the notion of fiction with the contradictory understanding of religion—as false, but effective—was the demarcation of fantasy and imagination. These terms had previously been widely treated as synonymous, deriving from the Greek *phantasía* and the Latin *imaginatio* respectively. Denoting an "interior sense" with an ambivalent function as a source of knowledge as well as illusions, both fantasy and imagination had been key terms in philosophical and religious discourses since antiquity (Traut & Wilke 2015, 23–32). In esoteric discourse, in particular, they gained a "functional role in magical practice" through the Neoplatonic theory of attraction that first emerged in Arabic traditions of learned magic (Doel & Hanegraaf 2006, 608), for instance in al-Kindī's treatise *De radiis stellarum*, which was also one of the foundational texts of the early modern discourse on 'magia naturalis' (Otto 2011, 442f.). From the twelfth century onwards, scholastic theories of imagination led to a proliferation of religious practices based on imagination in medieval Catholicism ('kataphatic spiritual practices' in Egil Asprem's wording: see Asprem 2016b). These have, however, been gradually "separated out by disjunctive strategies rooted in the policing of orthopraxy" over the following centuries (ibid., 29). As a consequence, the much-debated use of imagination in the Renaissance (see, e.g., Yates 1964), that is, "key practices that we now associate with Western esotericism," stand in direct historical continuity to "the kataphatic trend that has been dominant in Catholic spirituality" ever since the late Middle Ages and should thus rather be considered as "leaves on a major branch of European intellectual and religious history" (Asprem 2016b, 4–6). The association of the human faculty of *phantasia* / *imaginatio* with the creation of fictional literature, however, was mostly a later romanticist notion (Tarkka 2015, 19), and it was in the literary discourse of the nineteenth century that their demarcation came to take on a crucial importance. Suggested by Albertus Magnus (Asprem 2016b, 14) and later also by Paracelsus (Doel & Hanegraaf 2006, 612), the distinction between fantasy and imagination as two separate mental faculties was installed as a lasting discursive demarcation by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1817):

> Repeated meditations led me first to suspect,—(and a more intimate analysis of the human faculties, their appropriate marks, functions, and effects matured my conjecture into full conviction,)—that Fancy and Imagination were two distinct and widely different faculties,

> instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power. Coleridge 1817, 86–87

Coleridge disconnected fantasy from its etymology, stating that the "apposite translation of the Greek phantasia" needs to be the Latin *imaginatio* to allow for the differentiation between two distinct human faculties that produce formally similar results (notably: artistic expressions), but of fundamentally different quality. Whereas fantasy is merely associative, imagination is creative. The nature of this creation remained a subject of debate throughout the following decades, but the claim of an epistemological difference between fantasy and imagination remained a guiding principle. In the growing book market, assessing a literary trend as 'mere fancy' became a crushing blanket judgement. Claiming an 'imaginative' inspiration for a work of literary art, by contrast, valorised it. While still make-believe, 'imaginative fiction' could provide society with genuinely new ideas, tap into the soul of a nation, or express eternal truths.

The conceptual developments in various European countries of the time were not fully synchronised, which added additional layers of complexity to the theoretical blends of literature and religion that emerged in the nineteenth century. When Ludwig Feuerbach identified "die Phantasie" as "the original organ and essence of religion," he connected fantasy to Kant's "Einbildungskraft" and Hegel's "Vorstellung," all three of which, however, were translated as "imagination" in the first English edition of *The Essence of Christianity* (1854, 212). With religion thus being born from a romantically understood, genuinely creative and valuable notion of 'imagination', the prevalent critique of religion became religiously productive. By the end of the century, leading critics of religion such as Ernst Haeckel and leading evangelicals such as Henry Ward Beecher could agree, in a sense, that "the great schoolmaster of the soul, is the imagination, which the New Testament calls […] 'faith'" (Beecher 1904 [1873], 272), and that all faith was "a product of poetic imagination" (Haeckel 1905 [1899], 90). The imaginative artist had found a substantial theoretical foundation for claiming the status of a prophet, while the fanciful artist remained an entertainer, catering to the popular demand for distraction.

It is against the backdrop of such terminological repercussions that theories of imagination became core to the 'occult sciences' of the late nineteenth century as well. In the teachings of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, Coleridge's literary theory transformed into an underlying principle of all magic: "Imagination must be distinguished from Fancy—from mere roving thoughts, or empty visions […]. Imagination is the Creative Faculty of the human mind, the plastic energy—the Formative Power" (W. W. Westcott, *Flying Roll* v: King 1997, 51). Practitioners of learned magic were now able to resolve the inherent contradiction inscribed in the modern notion of religion, myth, and magic by advocating the "remote reality" of the imagination, with fiction being its "most ancient" manifestation: "The uninitiated interpret Imagination as something 'imaginary' […]. But Imagination is a reality" (E.W. Berridge, *Flying Roll* v, King 1997, 47).

Fictional Practice

With imagination re-interpreted as the creative faculty of the human mind—whereby the outer world was reduced to its mere 'canvas' (to use the famous wording of Henry Thoreau [1849, 306])—, with the Euro-American book markets thriving, and with an ever larger number of occult societies and fraternities blossoming, the relationship between fiction and practice took on a new dimension. Whereas until the nineteenth century this relationship was mostly one of mutual inspiration (with cases of both 'fiction-based magic' and 'magic-based fiction', as well as back-and-forth movements in varying degrees), fiction and practice now intertwined in such a way that the two could become more or less indistinguishable. In order to designate and analyse this novel development in the history of Western learned magic, we suggest the use of the term 'fictional practice'.

Going through the case studies in this volume, it seems that different types of fictional practices have emerged since the nineteenth century. The most obvious type pertains to the idea that the writing of fiction now came to be interpreted as a magical act in and of itself. Unsurprisingly, it was a well-known poet and practicing magician who first advocated this idea, namely William Butler Yeats. Yeats not only implemented Golden Dawn symbolism in his poetry of the 1890s, he also crafted it with the explicit intention of invoking certain 'moods' in his readers, and thereby affecting and literally enchanting them, creating nothing less than 'talismanic poetry' (see Johannsen's chapter for further details). Similar approaches were advocated by several practitioners of the twentieth century, among them pivotal figures such as Dion Fortune, Kenneth Grant (on whom see Christian Giudice's chapter in this volume), or Alan Moore.

From the interpretation of the creation of fiction as a magical practice, it was only a small step to interpreting the reading of fiction in a similar way, thus tying to the (now) stereotypical notion of fiction as 'a place for wonder', as a possibly enchanting process that may transform its readers or miraculously take them into another world. The contributions of Katheryna Zorya and Justin Woodman in this volume show, with examples drawn from post-Soviet practitioner milieus as well as contemporary London-based 'Chaos magick', that perceiving writing *and* reading of fiction as magical practices has become a standard trope in modern practitioner discourses. Both contributions also demonstrate that fictional practices may go so far as to affect the perception of one's everyday surroundings, as in the case of the Lovecraftian group *The Haunters of the Dark*. Its members not only strive towards 'Cthulhu gnosis' through invocations taken verbatim from Lovecraft's works, but also projectively re-imagine Lovecraftian themes within the urban cityscapes of London (see Woodman's contribution for further details). In such cases, fictional practices are not merely immersive, but can be discussed as attempts to create an 'augmented reality' constituted by blends of imagined storyworlds and the external world (Johannsen & Kirsch 2019).

Making a distinction between a mundane outer world and a hidden magical world has been a common strategy in the history of Western learned magic, but it was only during the late nineteenth century that the idea of blends or overlaps between the two worlds became a popular trope in fictional literature. During the late Victorian age, in particular, cross-world fantasy novels in which the protagonist discovers a portal to another realm or gains the ability to sense an alternative, underlying reality gained widespread popularity (in addition to the examples mentioned in Frenschkowski's contribution, see, for example, Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* (1865), William Morris' *The Wood Beyond the World* (1894), George MacDonald's *Lilith* (1895), Edith Nesbit's *The Story of the Amulet* (1906), or Arthur Machen's *The Hill of Dreams* (1907)). In occult practitioner milieus, such novels were read—as well as produced—as a form of instructive fiction that illustrated the imaginative practice of 'astral projection' (or 'astral vision') as a means of travelling on the 'astral plane'. It remains an open question as to whether the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn's 'tattwa' meditations, for example, in which painted symbols are used as portals to the respective element's 'astral plane' (see Otto 2011, 581f.), were partly inspired by fictional literature. The concepts of an 'astral plane' and 'astral projection' had become crucial elements within the practitioner discourse of the late nineteenth century, often with reference to the publications of Alphonse Louis Constant, alias Éliphas Lévi. In his widely read *Dogme et Rituel de la haute Magie* (first publ. in two volumes in 1854 and 1856), Lévi had popularised the notion of the 'astral light' ('lumière astrale') as the 'great magical agent' ('grand agent magique') which may be accessed and controlled by the magician's imagination. Indeed, the imagination was, for Lévi, an 'inherent property of our soul' (Lévi 1930, 167; see further Otto 2011, 520–21; Strube 2016, 527f.). Even though the formulation 'astral plane' was a later and somewhat curious theosophical amalgamation (given that Lat. 'astrum' literally means 'star' or 'celestial body') of a range of different concepts—among them Lévi's 'astral light'; Neoplatonic and Paracelsian notions of 'natural magic'; the Mesmerist concept of the magnetic 'fluidum'; and the Hindu doctrine of the three bodies ('Sharira Traya')—it created a

lasting connection between magical practice and fantasy literature. This is captured in the cover illustration of our volume, taken from one of the many publications of Gérard Encausse (Papus), who was an avid reader of Lévi and a former member of the Theosophical Society (Papus 1906 [1893], 429). The image, drawn by Louis Delfosse, displays a conjuration procedure in which the 'physical' and the 'astral' planes are portrayed as two complementary realms, making the magician a mediator between the worlds.

This is also mirrored in the most recent example covered in our volume, the *Grey School of Wizardry* (discussed by Carole Cusack), a case in which an amalgamation of Golden Dawn and Neopagan (Wiccan) practices is re-accessed through the lens of the *Harry Potter* novels and movies. The founder of the school, Oberon Zell-Ravenheart (born 1942), claimed in a vice interview in 2014 that the colourful energy-bursts that spout the wands of the protagonists of the *Harry Potter* movies reflect the imaginative reality of practicing magicians. There are surely contemporary practitioners who might consider the idea of energy-bursts spouting from their wands to be unrealistic and non-efficacious. For Zell-Ravenheart, however, it is nothing but a logical step towards resolving the boundaries between the 'fantasy' magic of the *Harry Potter* movies and the 'real' (that is, imaginative) magic of his kin, arguing that "we have always drawn from story to enhance our lives. […] Man's first magick was fire, but his second magick was story". The aesthetic of the Potter movies indeed mirror an aesthetic of magic that goes back to the aforementioned notion—and imaginative practice—of late nineteenth-century 'astral vision'. The foundation of the *Grey School of Wizardry* thus perfectly illustrates our understanding of fictional practice: here, magic, narration, and the power of imagination fully converge.

The Scope of the Volume

It goes without saying that the contributions to this anthology serve largely as examples. While the volume does include chapters from antiquity to the twenty-first century, there are huge gaps with regard to the premodern history of Western learned magic (e.g., with regard to Jewish or Islamicate discourses), but also pertaining to the potential—practical—roots of imaginaries of magic in modern fantasy literature (which could easily fill up several additional volumes). Nonetheless, the chosen case studies are telling insofar as they reveal basic types of magical tropes and fiction-practice relationships that have pervaded Western discourses of magic from antiquity to today. They also illustrate a specific development in the history of Western learned magic—and thus also of Western esotericism as its overarching category—that is tied to fundamental changes in the relationship between fiction and practice: namely the emergence of novel types of 'fictional practice' from the nineteenth century onwards through a re-interpretation of the human imagination. To further illustrate this significant shift, about half of the chapters deal with pre-modern material, whereas the other half deal with case studies from the nineteenth century onwards.

Instead of providing brief summaries of the contributions in this introduction, we have opted for a different strategy, namely to outline the general idea and rationale of the volume here while saving a more thorough survey and synthesis of all the chapters for Bernd-Christian Otto's concluding essay. This final chapter will attempt to weave red threads through the multifarious materials discussed in the individual chapters, to identify and trace specific developments in the history of Western learned magic in general, and to develop a synthetic narrative that transcends the individual chapters. Furthermore, all authors cross-reference other chapters in the volume, especially in cases where there are obvious historical connections or similarities, thus making visible hitherto unrecognised patterns in the history of Western learned magic. Fictional practices abound in modern magic(k) and esotericism, and we hope that the present volume provides a useful conceptual framework that may facilitate the future analysis of their many-faced manifestations.

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1 To name just four recent explanatory frameworks: for 'immunity to falsification', see, for example, Horton 1967 and Lehrich 2013; for an 'interpretive drift', see Luhrmann 1989; for 'conceptual integration', see Sørensen 2013; for 'predictive coding' in 'kataphatic practices' see Asprem 2017

2 The curriculum included a section on fiction "of a generally suggestive kind," ranging from Apuleius' The Golden Ass, through The Arabian Nights and works of Shakespeare, to contemporary French and English Rosicrucian and fantasy fiction, such as George MacDonald's Lilith, Bram Stoker's Dracula, Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, or the works of Arthur Machen. Of course, Crowley also included "the Bible" in the fiction section, right after W. Somerset Maugham's The Magician, in which Crowley himself served as the protagonist.

3 Browsing through digital archives of the nineteenth century, it is possible to trace the consolidation of the concept of an 'astral plane' on which it is possible to travel. This process appears to have taken place initially in the theosophical literature, starting from the early 1880s, with the first steps being taken in Anna B. Kingsford's and Edward Maitland's *The Perfect Way* (1882). The 'astral plane' was popularised in a fictional format shortly afterwards, notably in Alfred Percy Sinnett's novel *Karma* (1885). The term 'astral projection', denoting travels on this plane, also gained prominence in fiction during this time, e.g., in Perdicaris' *Mohammed Benani* (1887). It thus seems that both concepts were creative products of the theosophical discourse and from there inspired magical groupings of the time, such as the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn or the Ordre Martiniste. <>

Imagination and Fantasy in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Time: Projections, Dreams, Monsters, and Illusions edited by Albrecht Classen [Fundamentals of Medieval and Early Modern Culture, De Gruyter, 9783110692945]

The notions of other peoples, cultures, and natural conditions have always been determined by the epistemology of imagination and fantasy, providing much freedom and creativity, and yet have also created much fear, anxiety, and horror. In this regard, the pre-modern world demonstrates striking parallels with our own insofar as the projections of alterity might be different by degrees, but they are fundamentally the same by content. Dreams, illusions, projections, concepts, hopes, utopias/dystopias, desires, and emotional attachments are as specific and impactful as the physical environment. This volume thus sheds important light on the various lenses used by people in the Middle Ages and the early modern age as to how they came to terms with their perceptions, images, and notions. Previous scholarship focused heavily on the history of mentality and history of emotions, whereas here the history of pre-modern imagination, and fantasy assumes center position. Imaginary things are taken seriously because medieval and early modern writers and artists clearly

reveal their great significance in their works and their daily lives. This approach facilitates a new deep-structure analysis of pre-modern culture.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

Imagination, Fantasy, Otherness, and Monstrosity in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern World:

New Approaches to Cultural-Historical and Anthropological Epistemology. Also an Introduction by Albrecht Classen

The following is more than a mere introduction; instead, it represents a comprehensive analysis of what imagination and fantasy might have meant in the Middle Ages and beyond, touching on many different literary texts, art works, religious concepts, and philosophical notions past and present. As the issue at stake is so comprehensive, research has already been very active in coming to terms with it. Below I will provide an extensive literature review and present detailed and extensive discussions of many different relevant sources. To help the reader, I start with a table of content for this contribution only.

***

"Because you try to penetrate the shadows," he said to me, "from much too far away, you confuse the truth with your imagination." (Dante, Inferno, XXXI, vv. 22-24)

"Prove true, imagination!

That I, dear brother, be now tak'en for you!" (Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act 3, Scene 4).

Theseus: "More strange than true. I never may believe These antique fables nor these fairy toys. Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend More than cool reason ever comprehends. The lunatic, the lover, and the poet Are of imagination all compact. One sees more devils than vast hell can hold" (Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act 5, Scene 1).

Outline and Structure

In this 'introductory' study, in a way a little book by itself, I will create a mental roadmap for the entire volume by examining a wide range of documents, art works, theological reflections, and philosophical ruminations that allow us to examine critically the meaning of imagination, fantasy, otherness, and monstrosity as we can observe those aspects in the Middle Ages and the early modem age. As much as possible, I will also attempt to lay the foundation for theoretical reflections on those phenomena and to identify them as important elements for many scholars working in the pre-modern era. After all, human life is the result both of the material conditions we live in and of the projections of our own selves upon the world stage. Mind and matter are intricately intertwined

with each other, which cultural historians have always to keep in mind when they look at the phenomena of their investigation. We create our own lives and are the products of life itself, however we might want to define it (God, nature, life as an independent entity, the political system, the local community, school, etc.). We could hence postulate that imagination and fantasy represent the dimension behind the public stage where we normally operate, consciously and unconsciously, and yet we all know that it takes only a small step behind the scene to recognize the full scope of all existence comprising both the material and the immaterial aspect.

Most editors of other similar volumes containing the studies collected from a pool of papers presented at a conference or a symposium are normally content with outlining briefly the theoretical and cultural-historical framework relevant for the central topic, but then they step aside and give all the room to the contributors. My intention here, by contrast, as in all previous volumes in our series, is to go into detail, to stake out the entire field, to provide insights into the widest range possible of the critical documents and sources, to reflect thoroughly on the current state of research, and to outline how the subsequent contributions can be embedded in this framework. In a way, this is a broadly conceived attempt to establish the foundation for the investigation of this fundamental topic. A complete coverage of everything ever published on imagination and fantasy in the pre-modern world cannot, of course, be expected, but I hope to lead us deeply into this field by engaging with a vast gamut of relevant texts and images from that time period and by reflecting on the relevant international research literature from past and present.

To reflect on the workings of ideology and its mental grounding, it does not really matter what a politician, or even the pope, says in specific terms, but how the words resonate with the audience's fantasy and imagination. Throughout time, major leaders, kings, emperors, generals, dictators, or other types of rulers have been so successful in gaining control and command over their people not necessarily because of their physical might, intellectual ruse, or operational skills, as important as all those aspects might have been, but because of their charisma and thus their ability to reach out to people's sense of identity or lack thereof, whether we think of Alexander the Great, Charlemagne, or the fictional King Arthur. All those figures continue to evoke even modern fantasies and are the foundation of much historical imagination.

If a leader knows how to address deeply hidden desires, fears, or hopes, or understands how to stoke those artificially, then the masses have always willingly followed him/her, such as the Crusader knights or the absolutely loyal troops under the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan. Even though there is no room here to pursue this psychological-historical perspective at length, we can easily recognize the profound relevance of human imagination and fantasy which often drive cultural and political developments more extensively than rationality, mechanical processes, and physical objects, such as money.

Fear of immigrants, asylum seekers, new settlers, or outsiders/minorities, especially of Jews, has always been driven by nationalistic, in-group fantasies, both in the Middle Ages and today, as most dramatically illustrated currently by the fanaticism of the conservatives in the United States, especially under President Donald Trump, to 'defend' their country from that ominous 'wave' of `brown people' that seems to threaten the national identity or the existence of the entire country; and hence the desperate desire to build a wall that would stop all 'pathogenic' dangers arising from the south, a rhetoric we are, unfortunately, so familiar with from the time of the Hitler regime in Germany.

The masses, as Gustave le Bon had already observed a long time ago, have always been manipulable because they are dangerously subject to their own and alien emotions and dreams and need a leader who promises to actualize those for them if they only follow him/her. The pre-modern era was not an exception to this phenomenon, although we cannot simply equate the modern masses with the

people living in the Middle Ages within a feudal system. After all, every type of society depends on a strong leader who knows how to instrumentalize people's dreams and desires and to transform them into some kind of reality. Nevertheless, this is, basically, the stuff myths are made of, and they have worked just as well in antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages, not even to talk of the twentieth or twenty-first century. Both mass enthusiasm and mass panic (Crusades, anti-Judaism, Hussite wars, etc.) as well as political movements of many different kinds prove to be based to a large extent on emotions and imagination, which a ruthless and calculating leader knows exceedingly well how to utilize for his/her own purposes.

[Even though mostly self-published, Richard A. Koenigsberg various studies prove to be highly insightful in this regard; see his Hitler's Ideology: A Study in Psychoanalytic Sociology (New York: The Library of Social Science, 1975); id., The Psychoanalysis of Racism, Revolution and Nationalism (New York: The Library of Social Science, 1977); id., Nations Have the Right to Kill: Hitler, the Holocaust, and War (Elmhurst, NY: Library of Social Science, 2009). Cf. also Norman Oliver Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History (London: Sphere Books, 1970), who argues that all of human culture is a manifestation of the human subconsciousness, a process which he calls 'transference.' See also Caudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003). See now my own attempt to come to terms with this phenomenon, "Populismus, Nationalismus, Xenophobie und Rassismus: Das Massenproblem aus historischer Sicht. Von Walther von der Vogelweide und Heinrich Wittenwiler zu Thomas Mann und Gustave le Bon," Thalloris 3 (2018/appeared in 2019): 19-36. For a more political and postmodern perspective, see Serge Moscovici, The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de 1'Homme, 1985); Michael Gunther, Masse und Charisma: soziale Ursachen des politischen und religiösen Fanatismus (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Peter Lang, 2005); Dan Hassler-Forest, Science Fiction, Fantasy, and Politics: Transmedia World-Building Beyond Capitalism. Radical Cultural Studies (London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016). As to the operation of myths in history, see Albrecht Classen, "The Ambiguity of Charlemagne in Late Medieval German Literature: The De- and Reconstruction of a Mythical Figure," Medievalia et Humanistica, New Series, 45 (2019): 1-26. As to the role of a leader in the medieval context, see Albrecht Classen, "The Principles of Honor, Virtue, Leadership, and Ethics: Medieval Epics Speak Out against the Political Malaise in the Twenty-First Century. The Nibelungenlied and El Poema de Mio Cid," Amsterdamer Beitrage zur älteren Germanistik 79 (2019): 388-409. As to the negative role which Jews have always played in Christian fantasies, see the contribution to this volume by Birgit Wiedl.]

Once again, as in all previous volumes of our series "Fundamentals of Medieval and Early Modern Culture," while the focus here rests on the premodern age, the issues at stake prove to be of universal significance. By focusing on the specific documents chosen by myself and the contributors, we hope to open up a new chapter within the broad discourse of two of the most critical issues in human life.

Although these two terms, imagination and fantasy, have been discussed already from many different perspectives, involving philosophical and religious approaches, among many other schools of thought, here I will not distinguish between them strictly and will attempt to bring the various facets together for a collective whole, providing a variety of materials to illustrate the specific use of those concepts in their relevant contexts. For our purposes, it might suffice to observe that these two terms are not exactly the same, yet they function (or simply exist) in very similar fashions and deeply determine human existence collectively. For some thinkers, imagination is connected with divine inspiration (mysticism, Rosicrucianism, Romanticism, religious spirituality), whereas fantasy proves to be the product of the human mind, but I will leave all this deliberately vague because it would not be possible to draw clear-cut distinctions in face of a myriad of cultural manifestations of both forces,

including the imaginary (as seen by Wolfgang Iser, among others; cf. below). [See the contribution to this volume by Thomas Willard, focused on the works of Thomas Vaughan, a remarkable English Rosicrucian deeply invested in the meaning of imagination for spiritual purposes. The term 'imagination' has been used quite often in a variety of relevant studies, but then mostly in a rather vague, almost meaningless sense, referring to the phenomenon of literature and art as such, to paganism, superstition, faith in saints, daily rituals, ceremonies, etc.; see, for instance, Philippe Walter, Pam una arqueologia del imaginario medieval: Mitos y ritos pa-ganos en el calendario cristiano y en la literatura del medioevo (Seminaries en Mexico), ed. and trans. Cristina Azuela. Edicicione Especiales, 68 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 2013); Michael A. Vargas, Constructing Catalan Identity: Memory, Imagination, and the Medieval (Chain, Switzerland: Paigrave Macmillan, 2018).]

Modern research has tended to give considerable credit to the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle in their discussion of human mentality and then to dismiss the role of both forces (imagination and fantasy) in the pre-modern era, as if those issues had not been relevant in the Middle Ages. Instead, scholars have then regularly highlighted the efforts of thinkers and poets from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries only who were allegedly the first ones to develop specific aesthetic categories to describe these phenomena, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) (reproductive fancy, primary imagination, secondary imagination). We must always accept that imagination matters in almost every human dimension, whether in the arts or in the sciences, in philosophy or in medicine, in literature or in music, music or religion. [H. Mainusch, "Imagination," Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Grander. Completely new ed. by Rudolf Eisler. Vol. 4 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 217-20; Philipp Wolf, "Einbildungskraft," Metzler Lexikon: Literatur-und Kulturtheorie. Ansätze - Personen - Grundbegriffe, ed. Ansgar Nanning. 5th updated and expanded ed. (Stuttgart and Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 2013), 160-61. See also the contributions to Inventions of the Imagination: Romanticism and Beyond, ed. Richard T. Gray, Nicholas Halmi, and Gary J. Handwerk (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011); and to The Imagination in German Idealism and Romanticism, ed. Gerad Gentry and Konstantin Pollok (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). See also the contributions to Romantic Rapports: New Essays on Romanticism Across the Disciplines, ed. Larry H. Peer and Christopher R. Clason (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2017). Thomas Willard, in his contribution to this volume, offers a detailed examination of the meaning of imagination in the work of Thomas Vaughan, especially his Lumen de Lumine: Or a new Magical! Light discovered and Communicated to the World from 1651, but he clearly endeavors to keep in mind the origins of the philosophical discourse on this phenomenon. For a corrective view regarding the critical approaches to dreams, imagination, and fantasy in the early Middle Ages, see the contribution to this volume by David Bennett and Filip Radovic.

—Imagination: Cross-Cultural Philosophical Analyses, ed. Hans-Georg Moeller and Andrew Whitehead (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018). The contributors consider the role of imagination both in the East and in the West and study philosophers such as Zhuangzi, Plato, Confucius, Heidegger, and Nietzsche, along with imagination in Buddhistic thought and in Daoism.]

The Case of the Wunderer

However, we will observe further down that by the late Middle Ages already a stronger rift developed separating imagination as something powerful and real, from fantasy as something fanciful, playful, maybe even dismissible, such as in the case of the various stages of presenting dragons and other monstrous crea-tures.5 One interesting, heretofore hardly studied example would be the rather curious, maybe disjointed and illogical heroic epic, Der Wunderer (ca. 1550), where the monster/outsider, the Wonderer (or Wondrous Being), pursues a maid who had been promised to him as his future wife. Since she refuses now to grant him her hand, he intends to eat her up, a clear

case of cannibalism, a rare case for the Middle Ages (see, however, Grendel in Beowulf), but she is ultimately saved by the hero Dietrich of Bern who can overcome and kill the grotesque creature.

Ironically, the maid then turns out to be nothing but an ideal, an allegorical figure representing fundamental courtly values, who commands over three strengths or functions; first, she has the capability to perceive immediately the true character of an individual; second, to grant blessing to anyone and to guarantee his safety; and third, to transport herself to any location wherever she might want to be. It remains entirely unclear why she hence would not rescue herself from the Wonderer by teleporting herself to safety, but there are many other problems with that text anyway which would allow us to identify it as a literary failure of grand proportions.

Nevertheless, in our context, we only need to keep in mind that here we face an intriguing example of truly fanciful imagination, with all the elements of pure fictionality present because even the maid is nothing but an allegory, "fraw Seld" (stanza 5208, v.1; Lady Happiness).

For the subsequent investigations, however, all we need to know at this point is that these two elements are fundamental in creating human culture and are essential in areas of human life such as spirituality, the arts, but also in the sciences and medicine, whether we can identify theoretical discussions about them or not. As Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann notes:

> The worlds of spirituality are fantastical, deriving from revelations that cannot be critically investigated. Yet they must nonetheless be taken for real because of their impact on human behaviour, even if there is no other proof of their existence than the belief in their revelation. Their existence can only be proven in a logical circle: They are held to be real since they are believed to have effects. This belief may be the particular effect they have, and this is indeed precisely what believers attribute to the spiritual world. Thus there is no possible critical or emancipatory access to the world of spirituality. [Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought. International Archives of the History of Ideas, 189 (1998; Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 3. See also Thomas Willard's comments about Schmidt-Biggemann's observations in his contribution to this volume. Cf. also the profound insights into the role of the human soul with respect to the material existence and to God by Thomas Merton, No Man is an Island (New York: Harcourt, Brace World, 1955).]

In fact, medieval and early modern philosophers were deeply involved in the discussion about the origin of the world, the question regarding time and its limitation, and the relationship between God and creation. Scientific evidence was not available, and it is absent today as well.

Medieval Philosophy and Imagination

Philosophy, as practiced by Henry of Ghent (1217-1293), Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-Nov. 8, 1308), and William of Occam (ca. 1287-1347) focused deeply on issues pertaining to free will, contingency, and the conditions of the material existence, and much of this draws fundamental insights from imagination as the only possible source to draw some solid conclusions about the meaning of this life and about the relationship between the human individual and the Godhead.

The debate regarding the infinity of this world, necessity, and causation, as it raged throughout the Middle Ages, actually laid the foundation for similar probes of the mathematical theories of our own time. The severe condemnation of two hundred and nineteen theses or propositions allegedly developed by members of the Paris university, issued by Bishop Etienne Tempier in 1277, clearly indicates the extent to which the Church perceived the threat resulting from free imagination and open-ended philosophical discourse, all of which could no longer be clearly controlled by the clerical

authorities, deeply afraid of unorthodox thinking and revolutionary ideas developed by the rebellious philosophers. As the contribution by David Bennett and Filip Radovic will demonstrate, imagination mattered deeply for ancient, early medieval Arabic, and high medieval Christian philosophers, who regularly regarded it as a bridge to the divine.

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While many medieval writers simply dove into imagination and played with their fantasy, projecting those images as real onto their literary stage (romances, heroic epics, short verse narratives, etc.), seventeenth-century authors, such as Thomas Vaughan (1621-1666), more or less an apologist for the Rosicrucians originating in Germany, examined much more theoretically the meaning of the other dimension of human mentality in the abstract aspects of their works. However, as Thomas Willard indicates in his contribution to this volume, when Vaughan resorted to the genres of dream vision and commentaries, he certainly continued with a strong medieval tradition, best represented by the highly popular Roman de la rose (thirteenth century). Nevertheless, as Willard also hastens to alert us, Vaughan discriminated carefully between imagination and fantasy, the latter being a kind of delusion of significant danger for the human soul. Following the medical teachings of Paracelsus, Vaughan was keenly aware that false concepts in the mind could lead to physical or spiritual sickness. At the same time, he also accepted a higher form of imagination, that is, the vision that connects the imagination of the created human being to the imagination of God in creating the world. Here he followed the mystical tradition of biblical interpretation from the high Middle Ages.

In his *Lumen de Lumine: Or a new Magicall Light discovered and Communicated to the World* (1651), Vaughan endeavored to build a whole theory of imagination from a religious point of view - after all, he was an ordained priest of the Church of England - and to apply it to the magic and alchemy on which he wrote in earlier books. He argued that people gain divine illumination through God's grace and that even magic would have to be seen in that light, as divine inspiration through the natural world. People's pathway through life aimed ultimately at the final brilliance of the entire creation, and the steps toward that epiphany could be guided by magic, alchemy, astrology, and cabala.

God's secrets would be there for all to see by means of human imagination if the mind would be open enough to accept the individual approaches to a spiritual epistemology. In other words, the greatness of God's creation (the macrocosm) can be recognized here in the individual (the microcosm) by means of human imagination. As Willard then elucidates, Vaughan turned to much Rosicrucian and Paracelsian thinking when he elaborated his concepts of imagination as a key to divine illumination, and he drew heavily from the alchemical discourse to explain his ideas. The mystical visions developed by Vaughan, with the light of nature illuminating the darkness, thus prove to be significant forerunners of much psychological research by C. G. Jung and others because his notion of imagination as a stepping stone toward the ultimate level of understanding of God's view of the creation (anagogically) proves to be of universal value, echoing much late medieval theology (especially mysticism; see my comments about Hildegard of Bingen above) and magical thought, while foreshadowing dream analysis in the twentieth century. In many ways, then, Vaughan can be identified as a major path breaker who brought Rosicrucian ideas to early modern England. To gain understanding, according to Vaughan, it was necessary first to wander into the world of fantasy and dreams and there to search for guidance from above. In essence, every poet, composer, painter, or sculptor both then and today would agree with this observation because the material existence is only one aspect of the complete whole of life.

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There is no existence without ideas, images, concepts, or dreams, and those need, of course, the factual dimension to translate into something concrete. Every scientific discovery, for instance, is

mostly preceded by an idea, a concept, a vague notion, a flash of what could be possible, which subsequently is rendered into concrete reality. There is individual imagination and there is collective imagination, and both seem to work in tandem with each other. The cultural and material framework for this operation has certainly changed, but the actual findings by neuroscientists confirm that the processes in our brains have always functioned the same way.

Unfortunately, politicians and publicists have also realized the enormous potentials of imagination that can so easily be utilized for evoking fears, creating stereotypes, and producing hence aggression and hostility. The medieval and early modern examples reflecting imagination and fantasy have thus much to tell us today. The imaginary continues to rest at or in the borderlands, as contemporary comments about the alleged need to build walls to keep out illegals, migrants, asylum seekers, or generally foreigners have amply demonstrated. Monsters keep living with us because they illustrate and incorporate our mental concepts. <>

UNVEILING THE HIDDEN—ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: DIVINATORY PRACTICES AMONG JEWS BETWEEN QUMRAN AND THE MODERN PERIOD edited by Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum [Series: Prognostication in History, Brill, 9789004445062]

In **UNVEILING THE HIDDEN—ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: DIVINATORY PRACTICES AMONG JEWS BETWEEN QUMRAN AND THE MODERN PERIOD,** Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum collect ten studies based on primary sources ranging from Qumran to the modern period and covering Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The studies show Jews practising divination (astrology, bibliomancy, physiognomy, dream requests, astral magic, etc.) and implementing the study and practice of the prognostic arts in ways that allowed Jews to make them "Jewish," by avoiding any conflict with Jewish law or halakhah. These studies focus on the Jewish components of this divination, providing specific firsthand details about the practices and their practitioners within their cultural and intellectual contexts—as well as their fears, wishes, and anxieties—using ancient scrolls and medieval manuscripts in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Judaeo-Arabic.

Contributors are Michael D. Swartz, Helen R. Jacobus, Alessia Bellusci, Blanca Villuendas Sabaté, Shraga Bar-On, Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas, Amos Geula, Dov Schwartz, Joseph Ziegler, and Charles Burnett.

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Excerpt: Divination in Jewish Cultures—Some Reflections on the Subject of This Book by Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas

The Inevitable Presence of Divination in Culture

This monograph opens with a quotation from a Spanish contemporary poet in which the poetic *persona* complains about his inability to get good peaches from a market stall. He has never cared about distinguishing peaches by their visible colors—yellow and red—, so how will he be able to distinguish good from bad, these qualities being even less apparent to the eye? This inability to be mindful of visible details in order to discern hidden qualities—he confesses—is the root of all his misfortunes, but it does not prevent him from continuing to demand good peaches from other people, namely, the fruit seller. Is he wise in deeming the fruit seller an expert in distinguishing good from bad (fruit), or is he just leaving his decision to someone else? Whichever the case, is it not perhaps his attitude and corresponding assumption the root of all his misfortunes—namely, his dependence on the knowledge of others? The subject of this book, inquiring—from others or by means that are not entirely within one's reach—about what is hidden or unknown (whether these be the future, secrets, or far away things), reminded me of this poem and the paradoxical circumstances of its poetic *persona*.

Divination was a controversial subject in some religions and societies, but a careful eye cannot fail to detect the persistence of this phenomenon in most cultures. Why do people want to anticipate the future or uncover what is hidden? The answer is apparent: to avoid errors in the important decisions of life, to have some advantage over chance and the unexpected, to improve a given situation with reliable decisions, to make easy money, to keep only trustworthy friends, to choose the right partner, etc. Not all of those who practice divination or believe in omens and portents have the same understanding about the state of things in the world and the result of individual actions, what one might call fate. The divinatory phenomenon seems to work within different mental attitudes regarding past, present, and future events, for instance a *hard* or a *soft* version of fate as regards the future (using modern terminology and leaving room for a spectrum between the two). In the *hard* version nothing can be changed, while in the *soft* version there is a possibility of changing the outcome or of adapting or preparing oneself for whatever is anticipated. These different understandings of fate are usually not referred to explicitly or discussed in the context of the divinatory performance and are likelier to emerge in theological and philosophical discussions disconnected from actual practices. However, careful analysis of the specific divinatory practice and the use of the language and terminology of the practitioner and his/her client can reveal underlying beliefs and assumptions regarding fate and the role of human choices. The ancient *heimarmene* of the

early Stoics—"the compulsion/necessity" of the stars or "interdependence of causes" in the universe—left room mainly for a *hard* version, while the interrogational astrology outlined by Dorotheus Sidonius implied that individual fate is not completely determined and divination can help to mold it. This is not the place to discuss these long and contradictory traditions, which do not concern only Judaism or divination, but also other cultures and other human endeavors. Nevertheless, we can say that most Jewish divinatory practices presented and discussed in this book seem to work in a more or less *hard* understanding of fate, although—as several examples mentioned in its chapters show—the belief was that Jews can tip the balance to a *softer* version when they live within the path indicated by their religion.

MS London British Library Or. 10878, fol. 17v (Hebrew fortune wheel). Collection of brief texts on astronomy, mathematics, music, and astrology (parchment, fifteenth century, Ashkenazi semi-cursive script).

In the Middle Ages, astrology was classified among the empirical and mathematical sciences, although it was also frequently considered an art rather than a science. Along these lines, the Iberian astronomer Abraham bar Ḥiyya (twelfth century), considered astrology an art based on experience whose results are not always accurate. But astrology was also considered as one of the highest forms of divinatory technique, because it deals with signs coming from the highest levels of the universe (stars and planets). Similar classifications of divination are used in Christian Latin sources; for example, the twelfth-century Iberian translator Dominicus Gundisalinus defined divination as conjectural knowledge of the future based on human opinion (i.e., probable knowledge), and the Dominican Albertus Magnus (thirteenth century) interpreted prognostic knowledge as knowledge based on conjecture (conjectural knowledge). Fidora reflects on this classification in his interesting introduction to a monograph on the epistemology of medieval divination. As interesting as Fidora's study is, its understanding concerns a limited selection of Christian Latin authors, disciplines (astrology, medicine, and meteorology), and a very specific definition of divination (as only knowledge of the future).

Even a superficial glance at divinatory practices among medieval Jews reveals that not all practitioners and clients of divination undertook the divinatory performance with the same assumptions of what they were doing and why it might work. There are important differences in terms of the epistemology that underlies the different divinatory practices that were in use, an assertion that also applies to divinatory practices in other cultures and religions. Those practices based on randomness (bibliomancy), those based on technical knowledge (astrology, physiognomy, palmistry), and those based on a combination of both (for instance, astrological geomancy) evidently operated within different epistemological frameworks that need further study beyond the specific cases that have received scholarly attention so far. Differences also emerge in the gap between learned or sophisticated forms of practices (any of those previously mentioned) and folk or popular forms of them (e.g., onomancy, omens, etc.). Gundisalinus' and Albertus Magnus' understandings of divination do not do justice to the complex and multicultural phenomenon of divination and the different forms in which it was practiced in the medieval period. Their approach excludes inspired divination and divination based on randomness, as well as mixed forms of divination—all practices that were in use in the Middle Ages. These definitions also exclude a divination that is intended not to know the future, but rather what is hidden or unknown, whether it be something in the past, the present, or the future.

As for the specific nature of the divinatory signs, which are the stuff of all divination, technical or inspired—a sign or a message has to be interpreted not just in technical, but also in inspired divination when the message is not directly given. Depending on their understanding, signs determine whether divination is considered a non-science (in the Aristotelian understanding), or a conjectural or non-Aristotelian science (in Gundisalinus' view) in which the practitioners consider that divinatory/prognostic signs indicate but do not cause what they indicate. Nonetheless, divinatory signs deserve careful study, for their role in Jewish and non-Jewish sources is complex and at times even contradictory. It is clear that some signs are just signs (e.g., any geomantic figure) or symptoms (as in medicine), while others seem to have some causal role depending on the authors and the disciplines (e.g., stars can work as secondary or intermediate causes in astrology). Furthermore divinatory signs are more often than not perceived as unequestionable, unequivocal, and infallible in their roles either as signs or as causes, and thus human interpretation is considered the main reason for mistakes in judgments related to divination. It is possible to classify divinatory practices according to the sign that is observed or perceived and then interpreted. The sign can be natural, spontaneous, or constructed or sought (as in lecanomancy, referred to in Chapter Seven of this book). It can be normal (the regular periodical movements of the stars, or non-periodical like the croaking of a raven) or abnormal (like monsters, comets, etc.). It can be established as a sign *a priori* (a pre-coded sign), *a posteriori* (one decides that something is a sign after perceiving it), or simultaneously. The

semiology of divination is a topic that rarely emerges in scholarship, except in the form of case studies, which gives a very partial and biased insight into their nature and status.

We need more sources to be edited and published and more case studies analyzed before we can obtain a more accurate general picture of this intriguing human inclination to fathom the unknown by pushing the limits of human knowledge, especially now that divination and other *dark* disciplines have become a licit (if not *respected*) scholarly subject.

Criteria and Limitations of the Approaches in This Book

At the end of the long process that is reading, properly understanding, organizing, and creating a common structure from the different subjects collected in this book, we realized two paradoxes: first of all, it is not at all easier to be a historian than a diviner; and secondly, somehow it is a less complicated task to write a book than to edit one. We can predict with a high degree of accuracy that not everybody (authors, editors, and readers) will find what they are expecting here, but let us hope that ultimately we are better historians than diviners!

As previously said, this monograph emerged from a workshop, with most of its chapters stemming from the papers presented at it; other papers were requested and added later during the collection of the contributions in an effort to reflect as much as possible the catalogue of divinatory practices available and used in Jewish cultures. We were more interested in actual divinatory practices, both the variety of ways used to unveil what is hidden and unknown, and with how Jews understood their divinatory pratices within the frame of contemporary religion, philosophy, and science. I think both aspects are well (though partially) reflected in this book (the former in Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five, Eight, and Nine, the latter in Chapters One, Six, and Seven). It is, however, apparent that further research in both dimensions must be pursued in order to get a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the divinatory phenomenon in pre-modern societies, cultures, and mentalities.

Given that divination seems to be a human phenomenon in all periods and cultures, the choice of the papers was determined—following the workshop—by the focus on what might be specifically Jewish about the forms of divination that Jews practiced, some of which are still in use. Divination, prognostication, and manticism are used in this book as synonyms. Bar-On (Chapter Five) and Ziegler (Chapter Nine) are the only ones to use the term "manticism" to denote divination, perhaps because the authors of these chapters are aware of certain connotations in the root of the word "divination" that they prefer to avoid. Prognostication, as Ziegler uses it (Chapter Nine), is a term more connected to medicine and related to physiognomy and its non-divinatory aspects.

The field of Jewish divination has inherent limits but also a huge scope, and is still barely explored, as Villuendas Sabaté (Chapter Four) makes clear in relation to dream divination: her account implies that between the Babylonian Talmud, the first example of a Jewish dream book, and the last, most famous, dream handbook by Solomon Almoli (1516), the study of Jewish medieval dream books remains virtually unexplored. She concludes that more critical editions and further study are necessary to understand the transmission and connections of dream divination in medieval Arabic and related cultures. A similar conclusion can be applied to the remaining forms of divination described or mentioned in this book: we need to collect and analyze more case studies in order to understand how, why, and what for.

In this monograph, two necessary self-restrictions are evident in the table of contents and the titles of the different chapters. One restriction is temporal and relates to the decision to exclude the Biblical period and its contexts, which are so rich in this respect. Divinatory practices in the Bible have long been discussed in the context of Biblical scholarship, as well as in books and articles dealing with ancient Near Eastern religions, though this should not imply that there is nothing left to

refute, confirm, or discover: for instance, the highly relevant connection of prophecy with divination, and especially with inspired divination might need further research. Notwithstanding the stated omission of Biblical divination, forms of divination mentioned in the Hebrew Bible are still present everywhere in this monograph within the context of discussions about the legitimacy of divination in Jewish religion, and Biblical sources are quoted, cited, and used with this purpose in several chapters of this book (notably, Chapters Three and Seven). The convenor of the workshop is a medievalist, and medieval divinatory practices, underexplored in Jewish culture, were her main interest, though some latitude was allowed for studies dealing with antiquity (Chapters One and Two) and the modern period (Chapter Five). Readers should keep in mind that this is the first book in the field of Jewish studies dealing exclusively with divination among Jews, as its title makes clear, and only for that it is already an important contribution.

The other self-restriction is methodological, resulting from the absence in this book of any discussion about the definition of divination and its relation to magic. Magic is a popular subject in the field of Jewish studies, perhaps due to the long historical association of Jews with it. Possibly divination's neglect in general scholarship is exacerbated by its overlapping with magic, which in some cases is clearly indistinguishable, and not only in Jewish sources. The end of Chapter One discusses this overlap of magic and divination, which might have been customary in ancient and medieval times (see also Chapter Eight), but the fact is that some medieval Jewish authors saw them as very different fields (see Chapters Six and Seven), at least in the intention of the practitioner and the forces being put to work. Bellusci, following Gideon Bohak and others, considers dream-requests and divination in general to be a branch of magic (she calls dream-requests a "magical technique" several times in her chapter). The relationships of divination and magic need further clarification, especially regarding certain forms of divination in which non-human or angelic revelation plays no role at all (for example, astrology as in Chapters Six and Seven, physiognomy as in Chapter Nine, geomancy, etc.), though divination always operates in Jewish cultures within a more or less theocentric understanding of the universe. Did ancient and medieval practitioners consider both kinds of practices—magical and divinatory—as identical, similar, or just related? This is a highly complex question that indirectly emerges in this book and awaits further research.

A few excellent monographs dealing with magic in Judaism have been cited in this book (these can be found in the general bibliography); however, none of these books extensively discusses the relationship between magic and divination, considering both as one single category, magic. Though this assumption could be questioned, most authors wrote their chapters with the understanding that there is no separation between magic and divinatory practices, but the author of the twelfth-century Hebrew text translated in Chapter Seven was very concerned with this separation.

In theory, magic and divination might look like closely related fields separated only by their goals. On a simplistic level, one might say that knowledge is the purpose of divination, even if its acquisition is frequently intended to change things in the world, while action/change/control of the world and its beings would be the main purpose of magic. However, magic and divination historically frequently overlapped in practice, for instance in astral magic or in the knowledge of the hidden and the future attained by revelatory means (for instance, in dream-requests and bibliomancy). Magic and divination can both be considered forms of technology; some form of control is the intended purpose in both and their knowledge is built upon experience and tradition, though also upon divine inspiration. Hence, they are both technical knowledge in different degrees, depending on the specific form of the practice and the expectations of the practitioners and their clients. They can also be understood, in certain cases, as forms of science, especially considering that in ancient and medieval times *science* denoted just *knowledge*, any knowledge, contrary to the very specific meaning of the modern concept, based in mathematics (measure) and the experimental method (repeatability of the same phenomena under the same conditions).

Many of the chapters let us glimpse how intrinsic the assistance of non-human or spiritual beings might be to the diviner in attaining the desired knowledge about the future or the hidden. All the divinatory techniques explained in this book are either forms of technical or deductive (also known as artificial or mechanical) divination, and natural or emotive (also known as inspired) divination (for example, divination by possession or oracles), or a combination of both. What separates technical from natural is the training required by the performer of technical divination, who needs the tools of deductive thought to attain a result and, above all, his/her independence from non-human beings and means to achieve the intended knowledge. Nevertheless, inspired or natural divination also requires some sort of technique or experience in order to get an answer (as in Chapter Three). These questions should be considered in more depth in future research, for they concern not only Jewish divinatory practices but the phenomenon of divination in general in all cultures and periods. Diviners are technicians, just like magicians.

The diviner who forecasts when possessed by the god has no possibility of being wrong (only of being misunderstood, as many examples in ancient sources show), while technicians of any sort can always make mistakes either in the procedure or in the interpretation, so that they need a long training period to become experts through study and experience. Diviners perform their art and display their expertise and knowledge before clients but also before their peers, other fellow diviners, who confirm or refute their expertise. Certain divinatory performances (like astrology, geomancy, dream interpretation, etc.) imply some sort of negotiation of meaning, just as in any dialogic situation between people. If the speech of the diviner turns out to be unrelated to the circumstances of the client, it is always possible to work retrospectively and correct previous inaccurate or wrong answers in the light of the new information provided by both, or by changing the questions, for wrong questions can invalidate the whole process. It is unfortunate (but significant) that most of the time this dialogical process, and, in general, the process of interpretation is neither written nor described in manuscripts or printed texts. We frequently are given just a few sentences that do not help much in reconstructing the actual scenario and dialogue of the divinatory seance. The dialogic character of technical divination allows us to consider it a form of rationality, just as Marcel Sigrist holds for magic.

It is also pertinent to keep in mind that there is an important body of material culture that illuminates different and unexpected aspects of divination that do not emerge in textual sources and frequently escape the attention of scholars. An attentive reader will notice the explicit mention or the silent necessary presence of divinatory artifacts in some of the chapters, though almost all the studies take a textual approach to their respective subjects. As Chapter One (Swartz) enunciates it, divination is "a quest of meaning" and it looks for signification in everyday objects and events, but most material aspects of divinatory practices are not to be found in texts. Notwithstanding, the physicality of the divinatory act is, in some practices, very clear, for instance in the handling of books in bibliomantic contexts (Chapter Five) or in the use of specific materials and their handling in magical performances (Chapter Ten), in horoscopes calculated and frequently drawn on paper or parchment for astrology (Chapters Six and Seven); as well as, in other senses, in the facial and corporeal signs that have to be interpreted in physiognomy (Chapter Nine), or the lists of specific signs and their corresponding specific meanings in dream handbooks and lottery books (Chapters Three and Five, respectively). Chapter Ten focuses directly on the materiality of its topic, with a complete immersion in the most material aspects of the kind of magic that relies on writing names (using skins, inks, writing tools, etc), a practice which seems to be especially associated with Jews or Jewish figures (notably, King Solomon).

Comparative approaches are frequent, especially with Christian and Islamic cultures. Chapter Three gives keys for understanding the historical background of dream-requests in antiquity (notably the Greek and Demotic magical papyri) and in the Middle Ages in both Jewish and non-Jewish sources

(Arabic *istiḵāra* in *ḥadīth* literature and dream requests in magical Latin texts). Dream-requests can be studied not only in the long tradition of dream divination in ancient and medieval Near-Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations, but in the context of an extensive tradition of interrogational systems for decision-making, in which the Arabic *masāʾil* and the Hebrew *šeʾilot* (both of which deal with different systems to get an answer) are clearly placed. Further research could explore this approach, with possible roots in Babylonian sources of the second millenium BCE: one of the Akkadian words denoting a diviner is *šaʾilu* ("one who asks or questions"), which suggests that *the art of divining* might have started and developed as *the art of inquiring*, the art of "framing a question" in such a way that the given answer would be clear and unambiguous. With this in mind, a clear difference should also be made among divinatory practices according to the kind of answer they can provide: a yes or no answer to a definite question resulting from a procedure based on revelation or randomness, or a more complex answer resulting from a more or less long and complex interpretational process performed by a specific diviner. As Guillaume put it: the former can only answer the question *shall*, while the latter can answer the question *what*. It was not infrequent in medieval divination for the client to ask the diviner to provide not only the answer to a question, but sometimes also the question itself, often with the intention of testing the expertise of the diviner, as Judah al-Ḥarizi's *maqama* shows.

Physical books and written words are read or heard in different divinatory contexts (Chapters One, Three, and Five), and these could be combined. Thus it is possible to find bibliomancy at the heart of an oneirocritic episode, so that the forecast would be given by a Biblical verse heard during a dream (examples in Chapters Three and Five). Astrology is present in our volume under different aspects (Chapters Two, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight), and a physical artifact associated with its practice (an astrolabe) is briefly mentioned in Chapter Six. Chapter Two gives an idea of how astrological anticipation was dependent on tables and written calculations, which are, in the end, artifacts of a written variety. Chapter Six mentions the use of astronomical data in Bar Ḥiyya's *Letter*, which must have been available in the form of tables or through the use of an astronomical instrument. Furthermore, instruments in Chapter Two are mentioned as evidence. Qumran scrolls 4Q208–4Q209 present "gates" numbered 1 to 6 that Jacobus contends are here synonymous with the zodiac signs. She completes the fragmentary calendar in these scrolls and proposes that it synchronizes a lunar year of 354 days with a solar year of 360 days. The gates of this calendar refer to twelve points of a local horizon where the sun rises, which—using the astrological notion of the ascendant—she makes equivalent to the twelve zodiac signs, i.e., the horizon-based zodiac system of Babylonian MUL.APIN astronomy. Jacobus underpins her hypothesis with evidence found in astronomical Greco-Roman instruments. One of the editors is working on medieval scientific instruments and is familiar with the use of different devices in prognostication and divination contexts. The use of instruments in these contexts can give us an insight into the actual practice that very frequently is not in texts and can confirm how *real* the actual practice was, as well as providing daily-life details about the specific performances.

This book cannot and did not intend to examine all the forms of divination practiced among Jews, so that some widespread practices are mentioned only briefly (palmistry, geomancy, scrying, etc.). However, the second part of Bar Ḥiyya's *Letter* translated in Chapter Seven constitutes a treasure of divinatory practices certainly known if not practiced by many of Bar Ḥiyya's contemporaries (both Jews and non-Jews). Some of these missing practices are shown in images as they appear in Hebrew manuscripts (notably, geomancy and palmistry, see Figures in pp. 260 and 332, respectively).

It is possible to find underlying epistemological connections among different prognostication practices. In Chapter One Swartz, who follows Richard Gordon's four characteristics for building the authority of a practitioner in a healing event—namely, empirical knowledge, prestige of traditional knowledge, ritual actions, and verbal utterances or charms—finds an identity between the

states of the person consulting a healer and the person consulting a diviner. Furthermore, the Jewish text translated in Chapter Seven compares the practice of astrologers choosing the right moment to perform an activity with that of physicians who choose the right drug to treat an illness. It is relevant to remember that medicine was likewise considered a prognostic art or science.

Swartz, who approaches ancient and early medieval Jewish divination within the larger framework of ancient divination, underscores our reliance on textual sources to know and understand divination in the ancient world (Chapter One). The exclusively textual approach of this book allows readers to realize some linguistic aspects of Jewish divinatory texts (though not exclusive to Jews). Chapter One opens with the frequently under-acknowledged fact that divination is also "a field of literature," which Swartz confirms with examples taken from Qumran to the medieval period, notably through the introductions and preliminary prayers distinctive of magic and divinatory texts, which root them in a long and legitimate Jewish tradition. The language and style of these texts and what they might have in common with similar texts in other cultural and lingüistic traditions are sources about the nature, scope, and roles of these practices in Jewish societies.

Chapters Three and Four, dealing with dream divination, are, consequently, focused on the philological: they include the edition and translation of several Genizah fragments in Hebrew and Judaeo-Arabic, respectively, but they also analyse the language and the structure of these specific divinatory texts. Chapter Three (Bellusci) considers Hebrew recipes (instructions) and finished products (part of the ritual) of the dream-request, which are equally based on ritual sleep (the necessary condition for experiencing the ritual dream) and linguistic magic (adjurations, invocations, magical formulae, and prayers, many of them consisting of clusters of Biblical verses). This linguistic aspect of dream-requests allows Bellusci to make an illuminating analysis of the language, verbal constructions, and prayers that are distinctive of these Genizah texts, pinpointing their proximity to the language of mysticism, liturgy, and magic. Chapter Four (Villuendas Sabaté) presents the topic in the context of a "cross-cultural written legacy of dream symbol codification" dating back to 2000 BCE, which also shares the linguistic expression of dream *omina* in the form of conditional sentences ("if you see x, y will happen"), also noticed by Bellusci in the expression of dream-requests. Villuendas Sabaté disinguishes between earlier dream books (lists of symbols and their meanings in conditional form) and later dream treatises (expanded versions of the former that include more materials related to the interpretation of the dream). Villuendas Sabaté perceptively notes that dreambooks are composed of "units that can be easily isolated and then relocated elsewhere within the text or transferred to others," which is explained by their formulaic language, the recurrence of lists, and the weakness or absence of textual coherence that characterizes this literary genre. This structure might be applicable to most kinds of divinatory texts and their formulae, but this remains the subject of future research.

Finally, is there something specifically Jewish in the divinatory practices described and analysed in this book? Chapter One (Swartz) is quite right in not placing any emphasis on differences between cultures and religions regarding divinatory practices, although he points out that, in contrast to other ancient civilizations that institutionalized divination, Jewish divination (except for a short period with the *ʾurim* and *tummim* of the high priest) was always a private business. It remained a private business throughout the Middle Ages, even when divination was performed in courtly contexts for the sake of rulers and princes. Bar-On forthrightly acknowledges "the inevitable presence of manticism in the Jewish tradition" in Chapter Five: divination and prognostication are an ubiquitous phenomenon in Jewish cultures, from Biblical times up to the present, albeit with bans, discussions, nuances, and conflicts that depend on the author and the period. However, it is still clearly a Jewish phenomenon, too, because it happens among Jews and in distinctive Jewish contexts. Bar-On, Bellusci, and Villuendas Sabaté underscore the persistence of these divinatory techniques even up to present times. Are there specific Jewish forms of divination? This is another topic needing further research.

Some chapters (One, Three, Five, and Nine) suggest that certain divinatory practices have a long tradition among Jews and might have an origin in Biblical times, but most practices seem to be Jewish adaptations or Jewish developments of divinatory practices that were not originally Jewish; more research would clarify their history. These adaptations or developments took on a Jewish flavor to fit Jewish religious and customs, possibly to escape religious and social polemics and elude halakhic bans. Bar Ḥiyya (Chapter Seven) echoes the Jewish belief that Abraham was an astrologer, which certainly presents astrology as a distinctively Jewish science and art. The patriarch Joseph and the prophet Daniel practiced dream divination (Chapters Three and Four), which also presents this practice as genuinely Jewish. The *Book of Daniel* seems to be of paramount importance in the Jewish tradition (Chapters Three and Seven) and is frequently quoted in the context of dream-requests, though it remains uncertain whether there was a established Second Temple period tradition of Jewish oneiric divination.

Preliminary prayers and invocations (Chapters Three and Five) addressed to the God of Israel somehow made the practices *Jewish* and licit and certainly gave them a Jewish flavor. What is more concretely Jewish is the introduction of certain sources (Hebrew Bible, Talmud, Rabbinic literature) and figures (Moses, Abraham, King Solomon, etc. and later figures like Ḥai ben Sherira Gaon and Elijah Gaon of Vilna) in the discussion and the practice of divination. Another intriguing and distinctive feature of Jewish divination is the belief that Israel is entitled to a special comunication with God, which separates it from the other nations of the world, as mentioned in Chapter One. This topic also figures prominently in Chapter Seven regarding the talmudic question about whether Israel has a star. As Bar Ḥiyya states in his *Letter*: "*Israel does not have a star*. This means that the righteous ones of Israel can nullify the stellar decrees that act upon them, by their righteousness and their prayers. The other nations of the world cannot do this." Specifically Jewish ritual aspects are also fundamental in establishing the Jewish character of the practice (Chapters One, Three, and Five), even if ritualistic aspects in divinatory performances generally are present in all cultures and religions. These established ways of performing and validating the practice usually include preliminary prayers and serve to legitimate it. Bar-On (Chapter Five) classifies the ritual as "magical pietism" following a expression coined by Swartz (Chapter One), which Bellusci (Chapter Three, "magical piety") also uses to denote the religious attitude of the practitioner of divination. It should be noted that prayer is especially important in the preparatory rituals preceding those forms of divination that rely more on revelation and randomness than on the technical and professional expertise of a diviner, though it can be found everywhere.

Arrangement of the Chapters and Overview of Their Contents

As for the arrangement of the chapters, the order is roughly chronological according to their contents. Chapters One (Swartz) and Two (Jacobus) discuss the oldest forms of divination in Judaism presented in this book, namely Second Temple practices dating before or around the turn of the eras—leaving aside references to divinatory practices in the Hebrew Bible that surface many times in different chapters (notably, Chapter Seven and Bar Ḥiyya's discussion on Biblical terms related to divination and magic). Chapter One takes a theoretical and general approach which justifies its introductory position and gives context for the topics that follow. Chapter Two discusses Aramaic calendars in the fragmentary scrolls of Qumran. These calendars (which Jacobus has reconstructed) are based on a luni-solar cycle that considers the days of the lunar month that the sun and the moon entered the different signs of the zodiac and constitute a schematic zodiac ephemeris that can be easily adjusted for any date for all time. Jacobus' proposal is that this ephemeris was used by the sectarians of Qumran to construct simple horoscopes using just the positions of the sun and the moon in the zodiac across a year of three-hundred and sixty days with twelve months of thirty days each. Most of the remaining chapters deal with the description of specific divinatory practices.

Thus Chapters Three and Four deal with dream divination. Bellusci (Chapter Three) studies Hebrew dream-requests in fragments of the Cairo Genizah, in which the client, after performing certain preparatory rituals (concerning the body of the sleeper and the sleeping place), inquires about a subject with an answer expected during the dream. This answer may come from a divine or angelic source, or from the interpretation of certain codified signs perceived in dreams. Villuendas Sabaté's study (Chapter Four) focuses on a fragmentary dream handbook attributed to Ḥai ben Sherira Gaon in its Hebrew versions (Pseudo-Ḥai's *Pitron ḥalomot*), which she reconstructs from eleven Judaeo-Arabic Genizah fragments, providing the edition, Hebrew parallel version, and English translation of the chapter dealing with bloodletting.

Chapter Five (Shraga Bar-On) discusses the divinatory practice known in Hebrew as *goralot*, an ambiguous Hebrew term that here denotes, specifically, bibliomancy, in the form that was most widespread among Jews, namely the use of the Hebrew Bible for decision-making.[25] Bar-On (quoting Van der Horst) shows that some form of bibliomancy might have been used in Qumran, but it remains unexplored how and why Jews passed from a specific and limited "Lot of the Torah" to broader and unspecific "lottery books" that seem to be a whole literary genre, expanding the use of Biblical texts to include other literary pieces of different (and perhaps non-Jewish) provenances. Though Bar-On states that bibliomancy was the most accepted form of divination among Jews, this is perhaps something to be discussed and explored in more detail given, for instance, the frequent occurrences of dream divination (Chapters Three and Four) and astrology (Chapters Two, Six, Seven, and Eight) in Jewish cultures.

Chapter Six (Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas) presents an introduction to the *Letter* (a *responsum*) that Abraham bar Ḥiyya addressed to Judah bar Barzillai, with the personal purpose of defending himself from an accusation of "consultation of Chaldeans" for supporting the use of electional astrology to choose the hour of a wedding. The broader and more ambitious purpose of the *Letter* is to defend astrology as a legitimate, beneficial, and required knowledge and practice for Jews. Because it uses halakhic language and arguments, this *Letter* becomes a very important document in the history of divination among Jews. Judah ben Barzillai is doubtless the addressee of the Letter, but he has been also identified as the objector by most scholars. Rodríguez-Arribas refutes this identity and concludes that the objector must have been a foreigner who attended the wedding.

Chapter Seven (Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Amos Geula) presents an English translation of Abraham bar Ḥiyya's *Letter* to Judah bar Barzillai, whose basic features the previous chapter has already introduced. This *Letter* is an essential document to understand the halakhic strategies that allowed medieval Jews to learn and practice astrology.

Chapter Eight (Dov Schwartz) is a good companion piece to Chapters Six and Seven. While Chapters Six and Seven deal with the defense of astrology and the illicit character of other divinatory practices for Jews (those related to magic and some forms of *qesamim*), Chapter Eight deals with Maimonides' refutation of any form of divination and magic based in stellar knowledge. According to scholars, Maimonides forbade all kinds of magic in his halakhic works and in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, but Schwartz argues for some nuance in this position. Maimonides differentiated between professional (astral magic) and popular magic (non-astral magic); the former was the only one targeted in Maimonides' condemnation, but he did accept experiential science (*segullot*), whose knowledge can only be attained by experience, as long as it was unrelated to astral magic. The double classification of magic extends to idolatry, which also presents two forms, one learned (which involves astral magic) and the other popular (with no knowledge of astrology and relying only on the tradition or authority of others). The former is actual true idolatry while the latter is not, only resembling true idolatry. In Schwartz' view, Maimonides' major challenge was refuting the first form. Maimonides made a separation between *segullot* (true and halakhically permitted) and "the ways of

the Amorite" (imaginary and banned) in the efficacious character of *segullot* confirmed by experience and unrelated to astrology with respect to Amorite practices.

Chapter Nine (Joseph Ziegler) deals with physiognomy in medieval Jewish and non-Jewish sources and discusses the increasing non-mantic character of this discipline, which places this practice closer to the fields of medicine, natural philosophy, and psychology than to divination. There is textual evidence that the Second Temple community at Qumran imported physiognomical knowledge which was clearly divinatory from Babylonia, and used it together with the zodiac sign of the person to determine the adequacy of candidates for membership in the sect. Similar practices, as well as chiromancy and metoposcopy, were also used among Merkavah and Hekhalot mystics to determine the qualities of applicants, in the Zohar and later kabbalistic movements, and among the *Ḥasidei Ashkenaz* to determine not only a man's character but also his future. These practices relied on mastering the techniques of the art but also on religious intuition and union with the divine intellect. Ziegler notes the "skewed understanding of Hebrew physiognomy by modern historians of Jewish thought and science, who stressed its mantic character and transposed it entirely to the realm of esoteric magic."

Chapter Ten (Charles Burnett) introduces the consideration of the material aspects of books of magic, namely the different skins and writing supports, inks, writing instruments, and bindings used in the making of these books and the ways in which these materials were selected and handled. The focus is on Latin books of magic dealing with those practices that the *Magister speculi* in the *Speculum astronomiae* considers "detestable," i.e., "spirits, demons, or jinns are summoned with these names." King Solomon appears especially associated with this category of talismanic magic that relies on "the writing of characters which have to be exorcised through certain names," i.e. magic that works through "writing names" rather than "speaking names out loud," which links this chapter with Jewish culture, as well as the use of magic to foretell future. The chapter closes with an Appendix by Nicholas Pickwoad on the making of a grimoire as described in *The Four Rings of Solomon*, pinpointing the very specific material steps that underlay the process of making the grimoire. Burnett concludes that "the emphasis on writing … is likely to reflect the character of the works originally written in Hebrew."

In conclusion, in spite of necessary omissions of content, what is covered in this book makes an intriguing and variegated display of what divination meant and implied in Jewish cultures (though not all Jewish cultures are equally represented here). With this volume we hope to open a window on some illuminating views, even if partial, of this enticing and neglected landscape of Jewish culture.

More than a Womb: Childfree Women in the Hebrew Bible as Agents of the Holy by Lisa Wilson Davison [Cascade Books, 9781498285513]

This book lifts up women of the Hebrew Bible who, working with the Divine, play amazing roles in the stories of Israel—prophet, judge, worship leader, warrior, scholar, scribe. They helped people celebrate the Divine's triumph over oppression. They spoke boldly to those in power. They went into battle to secure their people's safety. They gave wise judgments in important legal matters. They authenticated sacred texts and inspired a reform to help Israel return to the way of Torah. In roles that were not tied to their wombs or fertility, these women made Israel's story possible and helped it to continue to future generations.

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A Story

While it may not seem that not being a mother should be a big deal in our postmodern twenty-first century world, you would be surprised at the negative reactions I receive from folks when they learn that I do not have children: they range from pity to outright disgust. Certainly, the church is one of the realms where I receive the most negative responses from well-meaning people who indicate what a shame it is that I will never know the joy (and the pain) of being a parent. However, even in the secular and scientific world my decision is viewed as selfish or even unnatural. When my companion and I decided to finalize our decision not to have children, he spoke to his doctor about getting a vasectomy. The physician responded that he was much too young (under forty) to make such a permanent choice. My doctor, likewise, advised me to wait because I could (or perhaps would) change my mind. Eventually, when he was thirty-eight, my husband found a urologist who would perform the procedure. We have never regretted our choice.

When the local paper in the town where we lived ran a story about our decision to be what it called "childless by choice," the reporter sent to interview us asked how we could reconcile our choice with the Bible's teaching that children are a blessing from God, referencing Ps 127:3. She didn't acknowledge verse 4, where the psalmist describes sons as arrows in their father's quiver—an image evoking the fragility of life in the ancient world. Obviously the newspaper reporter did not realize or remember that I teach the Hebrew Bible for a living. The reporter went on to inquire about whether we were worried that without children we would not have anyone to take care of us in our old age. And I am the one who is considered selfish? Not to pick on an unknowing newspaper reporter, some of my friends who would consider themselves enlightened and feminist, and who have children of their own, indicate that I have missed out on some necessary experience for me to be a fulfilled woman. Clearly there is something wrong with me. But as Betty Rollins puts it, "Women have child-bearing equipment. For them to choose not to use the equipment is no more blocking what is instinctive than it is for a man who, muscles or no, chooses not to be a weightlifter."

My experience is not unique. I have heard similar stories from other women who are not mothers about being judged harshly for not having known the "joy" and "fulfillment" of being a mom. The association of "true womanhood" with motherhood is prevalent in the United States even with our twenty-first-century "wokeness" about sexuality and gender. Even I have been influenced by the presumption that whatever I do accomplish must fit within the broad category of "reproduction." In the preface to my first book, Preaching Women of the Bible, I wrote these words, "While writing the book has felt like birthing a beloved child, the book's completion does not mean the end of this phase of study. There are too many women whose stories have yet to be studied and preached. This book is but my firstborn." When I wrote the book, my companion and I had already decided not to have children, yet the only vocabulary I had for describing the writing process evoked the birthing of

children. With these words, I had unintentionally "motherized" myself. "Motherize" is a word that I use (and probably coined) to describe the process by which a woman who is not a mother is made to become like a mother so that others feel more comfortable. This has happened to me numerous times in churches, where on Mother's Day "all mothers" are recognized (usually by receiving a flower), and I'm included because no one knows what to do with me and others like me. While those who recognize "all mothers" have good intentions for the most part, I am not a mother and have no desire to be treated like a mother.

Studying and Teaching Women of the Hebrew Bible

One of the difficulties in studying the women of the Hebrew Bible with a feminist perspective (seeing women as equal with men) is the male focus within the ancient texts. Most female characters in the stories are identified by their relationships to males. They are mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, and concubines. While I am intentional in focusing on the women, the spotlighting of men in the biblical stories, along with the sexism of the twenty-first century, has shaped me in ways that for quite some time I did not recognize. The first few times I taught a course on women in the Hebrew Bible, the syllabus was arranged by grouping women as mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, and other women. When I finally saw how my course was reinforcing this male bias, I was shocked and disappointed. The next syllabus was completely revised to present the stories of the Hebrew Bible by following a female chronology.

Sexism and stereotypes continued to show up in unexpected ways as I taught about women. My practice has been to ask students to name their favorite female character from the Hebrew Bible. After recognition by some that they really didn't know the names of female characters, their answers usually included some of the more obvious women: Ruth, Naomi, Miriam, Sarah, Rachel, Rebekah, and so forth. I remember one time when a student said their favorite character was Deborah, and my first response was to say that I really did not like Deborah. When I was asked for a reason, I said I do not really like her because she acts "like a man." As the words came out of my mouth, I could not believe what I was hearing. Where did I, a proud feminist, get the idea that fighting or engaging in violence, or both are male behaviors and not appropriate for females?

The purpose of sharing these stories is to make clear that everyone is shaped by cultural ideals and stereotypes about women and men, despite their best intentions not to be. Identifying incidents within my life and scholarship is to assure readers that I am not judging others' interpretations of female characters in the Hebrew Bible without admitting my own shortcomings. As all biblical interpreters do, each scholar brings a perspective shaped by their reading location and contributes in new ways to our understanding of texts. What I offer in this book is another possible lens through which we can read the stories of women in the Hebrew Bible, with particular attention to female characters who are not framed by their reproductive potential or failure. By no means is this the only or even best interpretation of the texts; however, this angle does contribute to our ongoing conversations about the Hebrew Bible and issues of biological sex and gender identity. Hopefully, it is a new and helpful offering.

This book lifts up women who, working with the Divine, play amazing roles in the stories of Israel: they are prophets, judges, worship leaders, warriors, scholars, and scribes; they help people celebrate their God's triumph over oppression; they speak boldly to those in power; they go into battle to secure their people's safety; they give wise judgments in important legal matters; they authenticate texts and inspire reform to help Israel return to the way of Torah. In ways that were not tied to their wombs/fertility, they make Israel's story possible and help it to continue to future generations.

For Whom Is This Book Intended?

The most obvious answer would be that this book is for those who wish to study the women in the Hebrew Bible. Particularly, though, the gleanings from the study that follows are for women, who by choice or circumstance, are not mothers and are seeking a way to claim a place in the stories of their faith. Perhaps, like me, they are tired of being judged by others for what is seen as a lack or of being "motherized" so that their lives align with others' concepts of womanhood. This book is also for anyone frustrated by having their identity defined by whether or not they put their reproductive organs to use and have children. Ultimately, what I present here is for everyone who holds the stories of the Hebrew Bible as important to their faith and wishes to expand their own ideas about sexuality and gender identity. Whatever your reason for reading the book may be, my wish is that you will find the material enlightening and the time you invest in it well spent. <>

THE END(S) OF TIME(S): APOCALYPTICISM, MESSIANISM, AND UTOPIANISM THROUGH THE AGES edited by Hans-Christian Lehner [Series: Prognostication in History, Brill, ISBN: 9789004461024]

In times of crises, be it about climate change, the pandemic corona virus, or democratic struggles, there is an unwaning interest worldwide in the end of times and related themes such as apocalypticism, messianism, and utopianism. This concerns scholarship and society alike, and is by no means limited to the religious field.

The present volume collates essays from specialists in the study of apocalyptic and eschatological subjects. With its interdisciplinary approach, it is designed to overcome the existing Euro-centrism and incorporate a broader perspective to the topic of end time expectations in the Christian Middle Ages as well as in East Asia and Africa.

Contributors include: Gaelle Bosseman, Wolfram Brandes, Matthias Gebauer, Jürgen Gebhardt, Vincent Goossaert, Klaus Herbers, Matthias Kaup, Bernardo Bertholin Kerr, Thomas Krümpel, Richard Landes, Zhao Lu, Rolf Scheuermann, and Julia Eva Wannenmacher.

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Excerpt: An interesting failed concretization of the end times can be found in a Latin chronicle that was compiled at the Alsatian abbey of Marbach, probably during the 1230s. This document reports that, in 1185, a Toledan astronomer named John sent out letters to the world claiming that, in the following year, around September, the planets would all gather together into one house, and a wind would arise that would destroy almost all human structures. In addition, death, famine, and many more calamities were predicted, together with the end of the world and the arrival of the Antichrist. Regarding this, all astronomers, other philosophers, and magicians were agreed, whether Christians, Gentiles, or Jews. This led to a great fear among many, such that some built a shelter underground while, in many churches, fasting, processions, and litanies were held. At the predicted time, however, there was good cheer and calm in the air, as none of the prophesies had come true, thereby proving, according to the chronicler, that the wisdom of this world was foolishness before God, as stated in 1 Cor 3:19. This rejection encompassed Christian, Jewish, and pagan predictions, whether based on astronomy, philosophy, or magic. However, speculation about the end of times is not merely a medieval issue. In early 2003, US President George W. Bush reportedly asked his French counterpart Jacques Chirac to support his campaign in the Middle East, using one argument in particular that struck Chirac as odd. War is inevitable, Bush allegedly said, because a prophecy is being fulfilled: Gog and Magog are at work in the Middle East. This bewildered Chirac: *Is this guy for real*? Chirac's staff called on Thomas Römer to provide Chirac with a brief exposé on the biblical roots of Bush's allusion. While this anecdote has been challenged recently, and despite being widely repeated, it must be admitted that this is usually with the intention of making Bush appear ridiculous. Nevertheless, the story also confirms that the apocalyptical motifs, here in the form of the evil empires or individuals Gog and Magog, best known from Ez 38–39 and Rev 20, remain with us and, through them, a certain fascination for speculations, theories, and interpretations concerning the end times also persists.

Much work on apocalyptic beliefs and the end of times has been undertaken in recent years. Groundbreaking monographs by Bernard McGinn, Richard K. Emerson, and Robert E. Lerner have had an immense impact on the study of the European Middle Ages. The advent of the new millennium provided the occasion for a number of academic events on this theme, and many proceedings of these conferences were subsequently published. This led to the well-deserved acknowledgement of individuals or collectives regarding the influence of their thoughts on the end of times, and continues to inspire academic discourse in more recent studies, such as the publications in the *Cultural History of Apocalyptic Thought* series, the proceedings of the workshop *Forming the Future Facing the End of the World*, the *Companion to the Premodern Apocalypse*, the interesting and inventive examination of the gender aspect within the context of the apocalypse presented in the collected volume *The End of the World in Medieval Thought and Spirituality*, and *Geschichte vom Ende her denken: Endzeitentwürfe und ihre Historisierung im Mittelalter*. In addition, large-scale studies have provided the impetus for further detailed analysis, such as the monograph *Heaven on Earth* by

Richard Landes, *Weltuntergangsphantasie und ihre Funktion in der europäischen Geschichte* by Peter Dinzelbacher, and the essay "Dies irae" by Johannes Fried. Stephen J. Shoemaker's excellent book, *The Apocalypse of Empire*, examines the development of eschatological anticipation among the followers of early Islam, placing it in continuity with the other main late ancient Near East religious traditions; namely, the Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian. Special attention has been paid to aspects like apocalypticism and messianism. Research on the end of times has mainly dealt with Jewish-Christian ideas, whilst the traditions lying outside the monotheistic religions have been assessed comparatively rarely.

A conference was held at the International Consortium for Research in the Humanities (ICRH) at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg on December 11–13, 2017 to overcome the existing Euro-centrism and incorporate a broader approach to the topic. The majority of contributions provided here originated from this conference. The titular focus of the ICRH conference on "Fate, Freedom and Prognostication: Strategies for Coping with the Future in East Asia and Europe" has shaped the selection of articles presented here, which concentrate mainly on East Asian religions and Christianity, while being enriched by investigations into Old Norse Religion, Sufism, and the Bahá'í Faith. Still, there remain gaps in the range of possible cultural background contributions. Unfortunately, the papers on the end of times in the Islamic traditions that were presented at the conference were not written out—which is the reason why Islam is not addressed in general but picked up by one of the contemporary themes. Likewise, this volume cannot offer an article on the end of times according to Jewish belief. Even within the cultural traditions assembled here, however, gaps remain, such as regarding the apocalyptic notions that appeared in Shangqing Daoism. Those were further developed by the Lingbao School and also shaped by the interchange with other religious traditions, especially Buddhism. In these texts, the end of the world was motivated both cosmologically and morally. It was preceded by catastrophes, such as wars, fires, floods, and numerous diseases, with only a small number of people being chosen as survivors and "seed people" to live in the renewed world.

Terminology proved to be an issue during the conference. Like any current research that investigates differences and similarities between cultures, the participants faced the dilemma that, on the one hand, the examined subject can sometimes only be described by using the terminology and conceptions of its own tradition, whilst on the other hand it is clear that the thought patterns put forward for this purpose are shaped by historically contingent images and metaphors that are at times no longer recognisable as such. Richard Landes outlined a number of key terms, but it was agreed that the authors of the single contributions were not obliged to employ these definitions. Hence, for instance, the central term "apocalyptic" is not used consistently throughout the volume. Besides cultural differences, it is especially when we approach modern times that it drops its original denotation (the Greek word for "revelation", basically meaning "uncovering") and becomes charged with the meaning of (final) terror and destruction in a more general way.

While it makes no claim to be comprehensive, this volume reflects the current state of research on the end of times in the represented fields, at least to the extent of providing an impetus for further exploration.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first presents a broad overview of the concepts related to the end of times in different cultural traditions. The second offers detailed, in-depth analyses of more specific issues found in medieval Latin Christian eschatological contemplations. The three contributions that form the third part of this volume all address modern themes in different ways, whilst the concluding chapter provides a summary of the whole by zooming in on apocalyptic millennialism.

Part One begins by presenting a survey of Christian perspectives on history, eschatology, and transcendence by Klaus Herbers and Wolfram Brandes. Herbers' recapitulation of the relevant Biblical sources concludes that the words of the Old Testament, the Gospels, and Revelation on the end of times cannot be reconciled. Then, the medieval concepts of the end of times are discussed. Commentaries on Revelation are assessed chronologically. By the 12th century, the idea that Revelation was structured in a recapitulative manner had been established. Subsequently, the Calabrian abbot Joachim of Fiore, the principal medieval theologian of history (d. 1202), interpreted the Book of Revelation as a continuous prophecy of the entire history of the church, and apocalyptic personnel and events became historicized. The article concludes by reviewing the practical consequences of the concepts of the end of times for individuals. This was considered especially important for the salvation of the soul.

Brandes sketches three waves of characterizations of the end of times in Byzantine literature. Some calculations date the end of the world to around 500, but Brandes shows that these apocalyptic expectations were not general. As the end of the first millennium approached, a multitude of texts that were deeply concerned with the end of times appeared. A third wave emerged after a series of disasters struck the Byzantine Empire in the 15th century.

The following articles by Zhao Lu and Rolf Scheuermann turn the debate to concepts related to the end of times in Asia. Lu considers the pre-Buddhist Chinese conceptualizations of time in a very fundamental way, by focusing the debate on the seemingly dichotomic cyclical and linear conceptualizations of time. He identifies the perception of political time, the succession of dynasties, as an essential way to present the simultaneous functioning of cyclical and linear time. The dynasties succeed each other in a cyclical way, each having a linear lifespan with the overall theme of a deteriorating world. The end of political time is marked by heavenly portents in the form of natural disasters and social breakdown. The focus lies on Han apocryphal texts from the first two centuries CE. Lu shows how the utopian concept of a Great Peace (*taiping*) emerged in the first century CE as a powerful tool for legitimizing political rule and as a flexible answer to the contemporary crises. Rather than a state, the Great Peace was imagined to be in the process of gradual achievement, accommodating the political fears of radicalism while offering an appealing vision of social harmony and political stability.

Scheuermann presents insights into Tibetan Buddhism, a syncretic form of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Here, the conceptions of different eons and the devolution of the Buddhist dharma are closely intertwined. Scheuermann points to the pedagogical use of the threat of a dystopic society to force reform while also demonstrating how the devolution of Buddhist doctrines sparked translation projects to preserve the Buddhist faith. The idea of the end of times is also found to surface in everyday contemplative practices, such as meditation on the precariousness and impermanence of human existence. Scheuermann underlines that, although Tibetan Buddhism can be classified as an apocalyptic movement, there has never been a reaction to failed prophecies about the end of time. In that sense, Tibetan Buddhists find themselves in continuous periods of apocalyptic ascent.

Two most welcome additions to the volume are the articles by Thomas Krümpel and Bernardo Bortolin Kerr. Krümpel investigates Old Norse ideas of *Ragnarök*, which can be understood, in a broader sense, as the end of the world. In a narrower sense, pointing to the actual demise of the world, the *Ragnarök* myth contains three motif-cycles: cosmic catastrophes, the collapse of social order, and the struggle of the gods. The theme is mainly outlined in the 10th century text "Prophecy of the Seeress" from the *Poetic Edda* as well as in the so-called *Snorra Edda*, presumably compiled by the Icelandic poet Snorri Sturluson in the early 13th century. This latter text is best known from its adaptation by the composer Richard Wagner (d. 1883) in his *Götterdämmerung*. Krümpel presents a variety of interpretations of these texts, concluding that a fate-determined understanding might best

reflect the Old Norse beliefs. In a second step, the *Ragnarök* traditions are described in the context of a deduced Indo-European myth-complex of the downfall and renewal of the world. The hints at the cyclical character of the Old Norse notions of the world's end and renewal remain controversial, since one passage suggests that the renewed world is subjected to new destruction.

Kerr addresses the (chronologically) young Bahá'í Faith and offers a broad overview of its conception of the apocalypse. Although the term "apocalypse" itself is rarely found in texts of the Bahá'í Faith, the notion of unveiling is important for the Bahá'í conception of a continual process of divine revelation. Kerr substantiates an active component in all forms of teaching by highlighting five strands that form the conception of the Apocalypse, combining historical and theological-mystical interpretations. The first strand is the eternal apocalypse, referring to God's eternal presence. From this follows the eternal presence of revelation, which is constantly happening in all things. This ties in with the manifestations of God, each of which reveals God's eternal presence. The fourth strand is more progressive—here, it is asserted that each new manifestation of God marks the day of judgement for the preceding dispensation. Finally, the fifth strand describes the manifestations of God's revelation in historical events and their result in either salvation or calamity, which is connected to a strong admonition to the faithful actively to prosecute the noble duty in order to achieve ultimate peace. It is noteworthy that we find another pedagogical-didactical aspect here: The descriptions of the Apocalypse, referencing the Bible and the Qur'án, encompass both: calamity—in the shape of an earth-shattering, catastrophic event—and salvation. Ultimately, they can be regarded as a call for an active response—individually as well as collectively—to serve humanity and channel the salvific character of Revelation.

Part Two provides three conceptualizations of the end of times from the Latin Middle Ages, picking up themes that had been addressed in Herbers' survey. Gaelle Bosseman reviews the case of Béatus of Liébana, whose allegorical understanding of the apocalypse formed a moral discourse of penitence. In his commentary from 776–786 CE, Béatus provided numerous calculations, including a discussion of the symbolic value of numbers, which are intended to prove both that the end of times will come and that its advent cannot be predicted precisely. Still, as Bosseman demonstrates, Béatus insinuates that these calculations were somewhat superfluous, with the aim of inciting the faithful to repent before it is too late. Through this, Béatus maintained a positive—almost utopian—mentality concerning the end, as Bosseman observes. The commentary remained very popular in monastic contexts on the Iberian Peninsula until the tenth century.

Julia Eva Wannenmacher discusses the role of Muslims in the (apocalyptic) writings of Joachim of Fiore. Joachim's perception of history was based on his profound studies of the Bible and the rule of *recapitulation*. Whilst this was in line with previous authors, Joachim was unique in incorporating Islam and the apostate Christian empire into his historical scheme. Mohammed was primarily presented not as a military leader but rather as the deviser of a heresy and as one of the persecutors of Christians within the system of recapitulating persecutions. Joachim was wary, however, of demonizing Mohammed or Muslims in general, or using them in a political manner. Here, Wannenmacher draws an arc to the contemporary political use of eschatological personnel. This is not only present in the Christian traditions, but also has a place in the Islamic culture.

Matthias Kaup introduces two tracts from the little-known *Anonymus Bambergensis*, who, at the beginning of the 13th century, made the most influential German contribution to the development of the high and late medieval theology of history; it was received in large parts of Europe, and in fact attributed to Joachim of Fiore. Up to this point, the Bamberg Anonymous, still unedited and therefore only known superficially, has been renowned only for his singular letter mysticism, which for the first time led to the subdivision of history into centuries. Matthias Kaup now shows the extraordinary importance of Satanology in *Anonymus*' historical thought, especially his remarkably

inventive diabolotrinitarianism. This takes Satan's guiding principle of *perversa imitatio Dei* to its extreme, which leads to a unique historical periodization according to the changing grade of passivity of the three persons of the Devilhood.

Part Three addresses specific aspects of the end of times in the modern era. Vincent Goossaert uses the term apocalypse in a rather modern way with the meaning of catastrophic events. He investigates eschatological production during the time of the Taiping War, a massive rebellion that occurred in China from 1850 to 1864. He stresses that the belief that disasters such as war could end a cosmic cycle was dominant among eschatological beliefs in the Chinese traditions. During the Taiping war (and the various other brutal conflicts that broke out all around the Chinese Empire), people attempted to make sense of the chaos surrounding them, expressing their eschatological ideas in essays, diaries, poetry, and, most articulately, divine spirit-writing revelations. These texts were reprinted after the war, showing that this eschatological thinking persisted. The apocalypse of the Taiping war came to be conceived of as a herald of even worse apocalyptic events. Like many of the texts presented in this volume, the didactical function is important: the respective authors proclaimed that a moral reform could reverse the end of the world or, at least, save the righteous individual.

The final two articles as well as the concluding chapter decisively deal with a special aspect of the end of time; namely, millennialism.

Jürgen Gebhardt proposes a comparative analysis of the ideas and semantics of modern millennialism, which he describes as being marked by a combination of typical features: a teleological reading of history incorporating a belief in a progressive movement of time toward an ultimate goal of perfection, linked with a utopian image of an idealized final state of humanity.

Matthias Gebauer turns the focus to the African continent and the presence of conceptions of the end of times within Murabitun Sufism. The Murabitun, under their spiritual leader Abdalquadir as-Sufi, are one of the new, contemporary mystic Islamic orders. Gebauer bases his assumption on field studies as well as on the writings of as-Sufi. He proposes the category of *indigenous millennialism* to describe the concurrence of the end of times with hope for a new social order. This is influenced by the ideology of Black Consciousness and, hence, this millennialism is ultimately seen as bringing an end to the longing for stability to the "African self" and establishing a Black and Muslim society. Political change, according to as-Sufi, will not happen due to religious practice alone, but is seen as being rooted in political action.

In the concluding chapter, Richard Landes draws on the results of his long-standing engagement with millenarianism to clarify several of the central terms and concepts. In particular, he distinguishes between millennialism, eschatology, and apocalypticism. For him, millennialism refers to the advent of a perfect society on earth and is, therefore, always political. Landes pays particular attention to the variety of millennial movements, differentiating between particularistic and universalistic variants and also between progressive and restorative ones. Landes further describes the reasons leading to the emergence of such movements and points to the longer historical trends and the role that prophets play, as well as discussing specific dates that have special significance.

The papers presented here show that an orientation toward the end of times has been a basic component of the pre-modern mindsets (and, in some cases, under different conditions concerning the media, even contemporary ones) in different religious movements. Religions clearly have the potential to shape the future. Thus, apocalyptic ideas have a considerable impact on believers' thinking and conduct in this world and are a major driving force for the social, political, religious, and cultural reforms of the past and present.

All contributions address the main questions of the book but do so, necessarily, in different ways, considering the different cultural background with which they are dealing. Several approaches focus on an individual eschatology, while others consider the issue more universally. This raises the question of what to expect after the end—a fresh new world or a state of eternity? The definitiveness of the end seems to be a major element within this discourse. Dealing with death and the afterlife is still an important issue.

The question of the definiteness of the end also plays a role in the context of the imagination of a utopian society. This theme appears as a side issue in a number of articles in this volume (Lu, Scheuermann, Bosseman, Goossaert) or even as an essential argument in the presentations of Gebhardt and Gebauer. Broader comparison could be drawn at this point, considering the question, if the perfect society will become manifest in a purified world or in a completely new world, etc.

Cyclical and linear conceptualisations of time seem to be dichotomic, but the example of the apocrypha shows that they can function simultaneously. Moreover, it must be added that cyclical time concepts are not exclusive to the mindsets of Asian culture. They can be found in medieval Christian contexts, too. Structurally corresponding processes and cyclical repetitions, which through the eschatological tension can express both temporary decline as well as final progress, are prominently described by Rupert of Deutz, Hildegard of Bingen, Joachim of Fiore, and others. Also, the suggestively cyclical character of the Old Norse notions of the world's end is broached in the corresponding article.

Clearly, on a synchronic and systematical level, patterns exist within the narrative structures of the end of time. As noted, these narratives often react to the perception of crises. Due to the different cultural contexts and historical observation periods of the subprojects, the term 'crisis' seems to be an extremely useful point of reference on which to base a comparative analysis without having prematurely to hypostatize a certain crisis or experience as the cause. It seems worthwhile to elaborate further on the connection between the emergence of apocalyptic ideas and social crises. On the other hand, end of time phenomena can also be regarded as prefiguration, which only reveals a crisis within a specific interpretive framework.

Another issue is the moral-didactical-pedagogical aspect that is connected with the end of times. Across cultures, this aspect is inherent to most of the sources presented here. The impending doom and allegedly undefined end form a good basis for calling for amendment and (moral) reform.

These similarities and differences might prove fruitful ground for further comparison. Future endeavors may add greater detail and systematization to the debate. Since the climate debate, the corona virus crisis, or the struggles of democracy at the latest, it has been shown that end of time semantics is by no means limited to the religious field of action—although religious interpretative models predominate. The relationship between religious and secular end of time modulations could be another candidate for drawing further contrasts.

Also, an integration of the specific theme of the end of time into the scientific discourse on the concepts of time appears potentially rewarding: a theoretical framework has been provided by research on the philosophy and psychology of time, with special reference to the works of Paul Ricoeur. Likewise, narratological analyses in the field of literature show great promise regarding further investigations of the end of time. <>

What is Authorial Philology? by Paola Italia, Giulia Raboni [Open Book Publishers, 9781800640245]

A stark departure from traditional philology, **What is Authorial Philology?** is the first comprehensive treatment of authorial philology as a discipline in its own right. It provides readers with an excellent introduction to the theory and practice of editing 'authorial texts' alongside an exploration of authorial philology in its cultural and conceptual architecture. The originality and distinction of this work lies in its clear systematization of a discipline whose autonomous status has only recently been recognised (at least in Italy), though its roots may extend back as far as Giorgio Pasquali.

This pioneering volume offers both a methodical set of instructions on how to read critical editions, and a wide range of practical examples, expanding upon the conceptual and methodological apparatus laid out in the first two chapters. By presenting a thorough account of the historical and theoretical framework through which authorial philology developed, Paola Italia and Giulia Raboni successfully reconceptualize the authorial text as an ever-changing organism, subject to alteration and modification.

What is Authorial Philology? will be of great didactic value to students and researchers alike, providing readers with a fuller understanding of the rationale behind different editing practices, and addressing both traditional and newer methods such as the use of the digital medium and its implications. Spanning the whole Italian tradition from Petrarch to Carlo Emilio Gadda, this ground-breaking volume provokes us to consider important questions concerning a text's dynamism, the extent to which an author is 'agentive', and, most crucially, about the very nature of what we read.

CONTENTS

Almost a century after its birth, and after the publication of many editions across the whole gamut of Italian literature, authorial philology has only recently been recognized as an autonomous discipline — as one separate from traditional philology (philology of the copy, which specifically studies variants introduced through transmission); as having its own history and its own methodologies; and as able to provide increasingly refined research tools that can deepen our knowledge of texts through the analysis of their internal history. In this way, authorial philology has led to critical achievements of major note.

This renewed interest is due, on one hand, to the high degree of theoretical evolution achieved by the discipline in the context of Italian literature, in which pioneering critical editions have been produced and have established themselves as effective reference models even with regard to the European scene. This interest is also due, on the other hand, to the ever-growing technical developments in the methodologies by which variants are represented and in the tools for reproducing manuscripts. In recent years, such tools and methodologies, with the introduction of the digitalization of images, have revolutionized the work of philologists, offering far superior fidelity compared to the physical reproductions of the past, and giving the possibility to work interactively on the image, not only by enlarging single papers or details, but also through the synoptic vision of witnesses housed in archives and libraries that are often very far apart. Also notable here are innovations in applying graphic contrast filters that allow the researcher to achieve visual results that are far superior even to those provided by the direct consultation of the manuscript.

This book aims to provide the first synthetic overview of this discipline, charted through its history (see Chapter 1), which has not yet been systematically investigated so far, through the methods (see Chapter 2) used in daily philological work, and above all through concrete examples set out in chronological order (see Chapter 3). We will examine the problem of authorial variants in critical editions of some of the most important works of Italian literature, from the fourteenth to the twentieth century, from Petrarch's Codice degli abbozzi to the Rime d'amore by Torquato Tasso, from Giacomo Leopardi's Canti to Alessandro Manzoni's Fermo e Lucia, and onto Carlo Emilio Gadda's novels and short stories. In an Italian context, these authors' names are intricately bound up with the work of the philologists Gianfranco Contini and Dante Isella, who promoted a fruitful interaction between criticism of variants and authorial philology, with Isella developing this interaction into a full-fledged philological discipline with its own system of representation in his

philological work and teaching. The development of this discipline is also indebted to the major achievements of the philological school of Pavia. We, the authors of this book, carried out our training in Pavia, where we found a stimulating environment enlivened by the contributions of major scholars such as Cesare Bozzetti, Franco Gavazzeni, Luigi Poma and Cesare Segre. There, with many of our fellow students we gathered the fruits of that active decade between the end of the sixties and early eighties, a period recalled by Isella himself in a lecture held in Pavia in 1999.

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At a time when written creativity no longer manifests itself through pen, but rather through keyboard, the growing interest inspired by authorial variants has led us to promote the English translation of the manual which, in 2010, first presented the history, methods and most significant cases of authorial philology, the branch of philology that deals with variants due to the author's intentional desire to change the text, rather than with its transmission.

Before authorial philology was 'officially' founded by Dante Isella, and even before Gianfranco Contini theorized and practiced his 'criticism of variants' in the 1930s by working on autographs by Italian authors such as Petrarch, Ludovico Ariosto and Giacomo Leopardi, but also on Marcel Proust and Stéphane Mallarmé, the existence of authorial variants had already been recognized in classical texts by Giorgio Pasquali.

The peculiarity of the 'Italian case' has two main bases. The first is the existence of a large number of autographs bearing authorial variants, starting from the 'Codice degli abbozzi' (the twenty pages that testify to the first version of Petrarch's Canzoniere, containing corrections to 57 of the 365 poetic texts of the collection, which Petrarch decided to keep 'non illorum dignitati, sed meo labori consulens' ('not for their merit but for my effort'; Rerum Familiarum Libri, I, 1: 10). The second and more substantive is the fact that, since the seventeenth century, these materials have been preserved and considered objects of worship, as can be seen in Federico Ubaldini's 1642 edition of the Canzoniere, which contained not only the final version of the text, but also its drafts found on the 'Codice degli abbozzi', rich with corrections and variants, which were later contemptuously defined by Benedetto Croce 'scartafacci' ('a scratchpad', implying the lack of any literary interest). One could therefore say that genetic criticism was born in Italy in 1642 and developed, from the very beginning, a very sophisticated technique of representing authorial variants, which later found an effective system of formalization in the method elaborated by Dante Isella.

This pioneering book offers a history of authorial philology, as well as a methodical set of instructions on how to read critical editions, and a wide range of practical examples. The volume expands upon the conceptual and methodological basis laid out in the first two chapters, and applies the 'authorial philology method' of representing variants not only to the most important Italian authors — from Petrarch to Carlo Emilio Gadda — but also to some significant examples taken from European Literature: from Lope de Vega to Percy B. Shelley, from Jane Austen to Marcel Proust to Samuel Beckett.

In introducing to an international audience the method of editing authorial variants, we thought it would be useful to broaden the view to European examples (Chapter 4), and to propose cases of authorial philology taken from the most significant poets, novelists and playwriters of modernity, whose chapters have been written expressly for this edition — and we are particularly grateful to them — by their specialists: Marco Presotto and Sònia Boadas (Lope de Vega), Margherita Centenari (Shelley), Francesco Feriozzi (Austen), Carmela Marranchino (Proust), Olga Beloborodova, Dirk Van Hulle and Pim Verhulst (Beckett).

For this new edition, we have also updated the chapter devoted to the innovations represented by the digital environment (Chapter 1.6: 'Authorial philology in the digital era') and written a new chapter on the developments of the discipline in the last ten years and its future prospects (Chapter 1.7: 'Authorial philology in the latest decade').

By presenting a thorough account of the historical and theoretical framework through which authorial philology developed, this book reconceptualizes the authorial text as an ever-changing organism, subject to alteration and modification. At the same time the account allows us to extend to other literatures (and to other disciplines which deal with autographs bearing authorial variants) a philological and critical method that has developed in Italy and which prompts us to consider important questions concerning a text's dynamism, the extent to which an author is 'agentive' in his/her gesture on the white page, and, most crucially, concerning the very nature of what we read.

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A definition of authorial philology

Authorial philology — a felicitous term coined by Dante Isella (Isella 1987) — differs from philology of the copy (which studies variants introduced through transmission) because it examines the variants introduced by the author himself/herself on the manuscript or on a print. These are variants that bear witness to a change in the author's will, to a more or less significant change of perspective regarding a specific text. Hence, the object of study of authorial philology, on the one hand, consists in the study of how a text is elaborated, a text whose autograph has come down to us and which bears traces of authorial corrections and revisions (and is therefore an in fieri opus) and, on the other hand, the object of study involves the examination of the various editions themselves, be they handwritten or printed, of a work. Of course, from a material point of view, very different situations can arise. The most emblematic case of authorial variants is an unpublished manuscript, but there can also be authorial variants on printed copies or on apograph copies (made, for example, by a copyist), or we might find that the traces of the reworking process may not be directly testified by the autograph interventions but 'recorded' by the non-authorial manuscript tradition or by the prints.

The critical edition in authorial philology

In philology of the copy, setting up a critical edition means creating a text that comes as convincingly close as possible to the lost original. In authorial philology, instead, it means deciding which text to pick as copy-text and reconstructing, through appropriate systems of representation, the corrections made during the gestation or revision of the work. When confronted with a text, therefore, the philologist's work has two aims:

- establishing the critical text, that is, to decide which reading to pick as copy-text;
- reconstructing and representing in the clearest and most rational way the process of correction of the text itself.

Authorial philology therefore takes us directly into the writer's workshop, leading us to know their secrets, their 'recipes', and allowing us to penetrate the inner workings of their texts. It is similar to the evidential process, in which we have objective data offered by our witnesses that must be connected and understood in the most rational and logical way possible, using all the elements we have at our disposal: letters, notes, other texts, knowledge about the literary environment, about the author's linguistic skills, style, etc. This is a sort of ex-post reconstruction of what happened in the author's mind to bring the work to fruition.

What is the purpose of this reconstruction? Given that we already have the text and could base our study on this alone, what other information can allow us to know about the factors that preceded or accompanied the text during its history? This is the key question which leads us to consider the critical implications of this branch of philology, the so-called criticism of variants.

(Authorial) philology and critics (of variants)

If, then, authorial philology investigates the process of how a text is elaborated, criticism of variants represents the critical application of the results of such philological study. Both disciplines focus their attention on the creative moment concerning the genesis of the text or its evolution, and both make assumptions, on the basis of the extant materials, about the relationship between the author and the text. The study of this relationship does not only concern the time of the creation of the work, but also what follows its printing, including the more or less numerous and complex revisions which affect the printed text.

Philology is concerned with the representation of a text along with its corrections and variants; criticism deals with the interpretation of this collective information. Both modes of enquiry, description and interpretation, are closely intertwined, not least because the descriptive process is neither neutral nor limited to the literary aspect of the text, but requires one to take into account many different factors — historical, cultural and linguistic — that contribute to how we interpret and connect up the data in a reconstruction which is, in itself, an act of critical interpretation. We will see how the very evolution of the discipline leads to an increasingly interpretative philology, moving from the preference for synchronic and photographical apparatuses (i.e., methods for the representation of corrections) towards a diachronic and 'systemic' apparatus.

As we can see, then, we are dealing with a new way of looking at the texts, a new kind of approach which has only recently become an autonomous discipline. What distinguishes authorial philology and its critical application from other methods of literary criticism? The answer is, above all, the consideration of the text as a living organism that can evolve. In the past, the text was considered as a fixed, unmoving object, the result of a moment of creative genius that cannot be explained rationally and has to be evaluated largely as an artistic product according to different aesthetic canons. In authorial philology and criticism of variants, the text is instead considered as an expression of a process of research, whose final product is simply the result of subsequent 'approximations to a value' (according to a well-known phrase by Contini) — a value which is not absolute but relative, dependent on the relationship with the preceding texts.

This new approach modifies the aesthetic evaluation of a text as well. The text is not sharply judged according to the simple alternative 'poetry'/ 'non-poetry' as proposed by the idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather, the text is constantly related to its internal history, which is embedded in its existence as a final product. It might be useful to start with a definition given by the founder of criticism of variants, Gianfranco Contini (in 1947; see now Contini 1982: 233–34):

> What significance do the authors' corrected manuscripts have for the critic? There are essentially two ways of considering a work of poetry. One is a static perspective, so to speak, that thinks of the work as an object or result, giving a characterizing description of it. The other is a dynamic one, which regards it as a human product or a work in progress and dramatically represents its dialectic life. The first approach evaluates the poetic work in terms of a 'value'; the second perspective evaluates it in terms of a never-ending 'approximation to a value'. This second approach, compared to that first, 'absolute' one, might be defined as 'pedagogical', in the most elevated meaning of the word. The interest in later versions and authorial variants (as with the pentimenti and repaintings of a painter) fits

into this pedagogical vision of art, since it replaces the myth of the dialectic representation with more literal and documentarily-founded historical elements.

As we can see, this is not solely a philological problem, but also a philosophical one, even though it is striking that the critical, ideological and philosophical implications only began to be discussed after some tangible attempts had been made to prepare editions based on authorial philology.

From Petrarch's Canzoniere to modern texts

The study of the elaboration of a text — from the first idea and the drafting of early preliminary sketches to the construction and refining that accompanies its genesis and subsequent evolution — is the critical approach that brings us closest to the author's choices, eventually allowing us to evaluate more deeply his/her poetics. This is difficult to do for ancient and medieval texts, where the 'vertical' transmission — i.e., based on copies made from the original manuscript, which is lost — has cancelled and blurred the possible traces of any different authorial will. On the contrary, the reconstruction of the development of the variants — i.e., the adjustments and corrections made to the text while it was first being written, or later in time — is possible when the autograph documents have been preserved. In Italian literature, this means from the time of Petrarch's Canzoniere (Rerum vulgarium fragmenta), of which we possess not only the idiograph of the final version, but also the so-called Codice degli abbozzi, which is a composite autograph manuscript preserving both initial and intermediate redactions of various poems in different stages of their elaboration. The Codice degli abbozzi is a fundamental testimony, not only because of the importance of the documentation it preserves and of the canonical value of Petrarch's Canzoniere for the whole development of Italian literature, but also because the Codice shows an awareness of the act of writing literature that differs from that seen in previous medieval literature (including Dante, for whom no autograph is preserved). Such awareness implies on the author's part a special care for the preservation of his/her own papers and for their dissemination.

The presence of autographs — accompanied or replaced after the invention of printing in the 1450s by printed editions that the author may or may not have edited — is increasingly attested from this period onwards, and reaches its peak in the modern age, becoming the norm in twentieth century, when specific conservation centres have been established for autograph manuscripts, developing proper storage spaces and consultation policies and criteria for such purposes.

History, methods, examples

This work aims to follow the developments of the discipline of authorial philology, developments which have been fully clarified only recently, after almost a century of its history, thanks to a theoretical effort that has resulted in a substantial bibliography over the last few years. The main purpose of this book, in accordance with its introductory and didactic character, is however to provide a clear account of the methods of this discipline in its practical application by listing the fundamental elements of the critical edition and analysing some relevant cases.

The choice of the editions that we will analyze in their chronological order is based on the principle of presenting a case history of circumstances and critical methodologies that is as broad as possible, in order to offer innovative proposals regarding at least one of the following problems that the editor faces in dealing with a text:

- Defining a base-text (what redaction should be privileged? Should we take the one corresponding to the first authorial intention or to their final intention?): there are many different proposed solutions, as we can see by comparing the two cases of Pietro Bembo's Prose della volgar lingua (see section 3.2 below) and Giacomo Leopardi's Canti (see section 3.5);

- Distinguishing writing stages (to be represented in the apparatus) and intermediate versions (which have to be published in full): this is the problem raised by the so-called Seconda minuta of I promessi sp^ osi (see section 3.4);
- Dealing with the problem of the 'untouchability' of the text and of finding criteria for representing the variants (as can be seen again in the critical edition of Bembo's Prose della volgar lingua);
- Explaining the relationship that a single text can have with a greater textual 'whole' as in the case of organized collections of poems, such as Petrarch's Canzoniere and Tasso's Rime d'amore (for which see section 3.3).

In each of these examples we have tried to highlight the advantages and possible side effects of the editorial choices undertaken, so as to encourage a reflective approach and offer further points for consideration. In this context, it is important to remember that the perfect critical edition does not exist, but within certain established criteria (coherence between text and apparatus; the need to avoid contamination between different chronological writing stages; the rationale for every editorial intervention on the text, etc.) each edition raises specific issues that can be resolved through individual philological solutions.

One discipline, ***different*** skills

We have already said that, as with philology of the copy, the practice of authorial philology requires different skills related to the author and his/her time. Useful information for interpreting and therefore properly 'restoring' a text includes both data that is historical, documentary and biographical (dating of the versions and their chronological sequence as they can be assessed through external elements) and a close knowledge of the genre (metrics, stylistics, etc.). Palaeographic expertise (the ability to assess the authorship of the autograph and knowledge of the author's graphical habits, etc.), archival expertise (an understanding of whether, for instance, the order of the papers is original or has been modified) and knowledge of the history of the language (the usus scribendi and the evolution of the author's linguistic habits) are fundamental as well.

In this regard, the philologist also has to be a literary historian, a scholar of metrics and stylistics, a palaeographer and codicologist, an historian of language, one able to combine a very careful and detailed analysis of the object of study with an understanding of the general historical context, including the history of culture, of literary production and also publishing production, of the printing practice of the time, etc. In many specific textual cases (e.g., as with part of the witnesses of Petrarch's Canzoniere), the interweaving of both a given author's own innovative re-working and of textual tradition often makes it necessary to use both the methods of authorial philology and of philology of the copy. Likewise, for texts dating from after the introduction of printing, a particularly important contribution has been made by Textual Bibliography, a discipline with origins in Anglo-Saxon scholarship that was later introduced and developed in Italian Studies.

The study of how printed editions were prepared, and above all the acknowledgement of the existence of different exemplars of the same edition, testified to by so-called stop-press corrections, allow the editor to establish the author's degree of involvement in the printing process. As a consequence, it is possible to evaluate how reliable an edition is both in its overall structuring of the text and in its single readings (editor's interventions and possible censorship or alterations must be carefully taken into consideration), as well as with regard to the linguistic aspects of the text, which are often affected by a process of normalization which is not always due to the author.

> Obviously, the more complex the textual circumstances are, the more difficult it will be to include in a single visual representation the whole set of information. For instance, when we

> are dealing with macro-organisms such as collection of poems or short stories, or epistolaries, there may be, just like in philology of the copy, organic witnesses (i.e., manuscripts or print copies that contain the entire collection of texts) and disorganic witnesses (i.e., copies with single texts in earlier versions that are sometimes autonomous from the overall project of the collection). There are also particular interventions connected to wider projects of revision which require us to evaluate the relationship between the individual correction and the wider writing phase. In this case, too, two different perspectives have to be combined: one 'from afar', which allows us to embed the single text in an organic whole, and the other 'from close up', which analyzes the single text as an autonomous organism. The case-study of Petrarch's Canzoniere and its different forms over time is the most conspicuous example in this sense. It is no accident that, even though various studies in the last decades have been devoted to its structure, no critical edition has been produced so far that is able to embrace the entire process of its elaboration. Similar problems arise in many other traditions, and, in several instances, modern editors have introduced unacceptable contaminations between global structure and single adopted readings of the poems, or have largely deliberately ignored the author's ordering.

Digital editions and common representations

One possible solution to these problems might come from digital editions, which allow us to represent the textual tradition in ways that enable a focus on specific elements as well as the textual whole, for a more direct and, at the same time, more synoptic representation of the textual tradition. Digital editions are able to visually render the passage from one 'system' to another, by means of virtual technologies that simulate the gradual increments made to a text.

The above-mentioned idea of a text in progress suits very well a representation in fieri as offered by hyper-textual editions. In this way, the various 'movements' of the text can be visually represented through specific uses of space and colours.

Nevertheless, even though the value of studying the Italian scartafacci is well established nowadays (see Chapter 2 for the debate about this at the beginning of the twentieth century), the study of variants is in fact deeply conditioned by the lack of shared editorial criteria, both within Italy and outside. This makes it difficult to use editions, since with each edition, one has to deal with a new system of diacritical marks and symbols, without being able to rely on any form of standardization.

One consequence here is that, whereas the Italian philological school is undoubtedly very active in preparing critical authorial editions, the use of variants as a way of making incisive comment on texts is still lacking, although it has become more and more popular in the last few years. At the same time, far less use is made in Italy compared to France of various kinds of apparatus in order to characterize the author's modus operandi and the creative and elaborative mechanisms underlying the text (for the critique génétique, see Chapter 3).

A judicious balance between a practical approach and a more general critical concern is the best way to create more accessible and readable editions, above all with the aim of clearly offering the largest amount of available data, by having recourse as far as is possible to common systems of textual representation, while at the same time respecting the fact that every text is singular and unique. According to Isella (2009a: 245):

> the critical edition of an in fieri text is different from time to time: it depends on the different materials on which we work (loose papers, notebooks of any kind, autographs, idiographs, copies made by others — for instance, some lines and redactions by Montale are only known through photocopies, and so on). Because the phenomenology of the text that

has multiple redactions or is in fieri extremely varied and articulated, it is necessary to establish common rules, as with classical philology. <>

RENÉ SCHOEMAKERS: WELT-GEIST/WORLD SPIRIT

edited by Christian Waldo, Jens Stöcker [Museum Für Kunst Und Kulturgeschichte, Kerber; Bilingual Edition, 9783735606815]

This book gathers works by German painter René Schoemakers (born 1972), whose figurative works have lately examined the extremisms of today, including treatments of attempted murders by the Nationalist Socialist Underground. Schoemakers dares to take on existential questions with art-historical references, mocking humour and individual mythologies. Schoemakers‘ multi-layered paintings combine varying levels of representation using a naturalistic technique reminiscent of the Old Masters . Arranged in series and supplemented by wall drawings, text and symbols, the result is a complex general context.

INHALT / CONTENTS

With René Schoemakerrs, the "World Spirit" is moving into the Museum of Art and Cultural History. We are once again offering a critical and playful view of cultural history and the people of its time. The exhibition is an education in seeing, shaking up some of our certainties. Nothing is as it seems at first glance.

In his work, René Shoemakers confronts us with quotations and symbols He draws on art history, Christian iconography, literature, and philosophy, and he does not shy away from symbols and signs that have been appropriated by radical ideologies. At the same time, he overwhelms with his

hyperrealistic painting style that veers between documentary and narrative. His paintings can be read like experimental arrangements - attempts to understand the world. The "world spirit" got its name more than two hundred years ago from one of the most influential works of We stem philosophy, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Fledges The Phenomenology of Spirit. With the exhibition World Spirit, the artist and the museum have undertaken nothing less than engaging with different concepts of reality. Both do this with an attitude of playful subversion. In doing so here—al with all attempts—there is also the possibility of failure. But it is precisely this possibility that leads to insight and a new reality. To put it very simply; Rages central idea is one of the wishes for our exhibition. Seen in this light, one could also view this exhibition as a further step toward the world spirit finding itself via dialectical detours.

Schoemakers' works are full of his love of detad and clear form. At the same time, his paintings and drawings oar a clear-cut-outline and distinctly thematize what is not captured. In this way, the viewers sense how deficient their own vision is. The sheer inconceivability of Schoemakers' realistic painting style and the incomprehensibility inherent in his depictions become an education in seeing, leading us to the limit. The works challenge us to sharpen our gaze and look close. The truth behind what we see can be quite different from what we first thought.

So the right-wing extremist, inhuman, murdering NSU makes use of the Pink Panther, and the mass murder Anders Breivik dresses himself in bizarre fantasy uniforms Indeed, other protagonists assume their roles in the exhibition.

These breaks and reflections fascinate us because of their in-comprehensible reality, their apparent playful lightness, and their inherent chasms. At the end of the day, these are first and foremost magnificent works of art, which, as if by chance, show us the nonsense of radicalism detached from the world. The spirit flashes again and again, the (world-destroying) ghost of National Socialism, racism, right-wing extremism.

And suddenly, the moment in time when the exhibition and the catalogue come into existence has been certainty Doubters of a functioning, living democracy use this make themselves heard. Conspiracy theorists demonstrate downtown, skeptics of society's diversity and vitality present their radical simplifications. endure nor deal Dortmund and our museum stand for cosmopolitanism an embracing of the world, for open discourse and content-based debate This is why Rene Schoemakers and his "World Spirit" an so at home within our walls.

The fact that here, at the Museum of Art and Cultural History, ideas can also turn into an exhibition and consequently become reality is thanks to a wonderful museum team. I would therefore like to thank my colleagues at the Museum of Art and Cultural History for constantly urging us to pant amid all the obligatory tasks in our day-to-day routine, to turn to the important areas of our museum work and thus to social issues. For in our classic duties of collecting, preserving, researching, and communicating, there is also the obligation to take a critical and profound view of art and cultural history we all, I would like to express my special thanks to Rene Schoemakers and his willingness to engage with the and Dortmund. He tailor-made the catalogue and exhibition for us. My thanks equally go to Christian Waldo, who, as curator of the exhibition, discovered the artist for our museum and developed the exhibition and catalogue together with him.

Christian Walda: World Fear: Rene Schoemakers' Anti-Idealist Aesthetics

This essay is only an indirect introduction to Rene Schoemakers' art. I would already be very pleased ifit succeeds in creating a suitable intellectual framework that can convey the context of and essential motivation behind this art. With the self-chosen exhibition title WELTGEIST (World Spirit), the philosophically oriented and deeply reflective visual artist provides a roadmap for philosophical classification. We connect this term with a concept by the idealistic philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel from the nineteenth century. In the following essay, I would like to focus on an anthropological aspect from this, and relate it to Schoemakers' art. This is namely the human side that enables us to both achieve cultural accomplishments as well as commit crime: the human capacity to emancipate ourselves from reality and to create virtual counter-worlds and substitute worlds. When I call this ability idealism, it's not usually meant to refer to utopia, where idealism functions as ethics or a guide to action (that is to say, not the question of what the world we are working towards should look like), but rather idealism in epistemological terms (as a question of what the world should look like).

THE HUMAN CAPACITY TO IDEALIZE THE WORLD

Creating new, virtual worlds is part of human nature and has been the driving force behind our cultural creation since our very beginnings. This tendency is not negative per se—quite the contrary. The German-American philosopher Hans Jonas defines the difference between man and other animals directly in terms of their ability to create images. He sees man as a "symbolical being." (Jonas 1962, 202) Humans are capable of creating images that are of no direct use, thus appropriating the world in a "nonpractical" way. (Jonas 1962,203) Jonas describes the capacity for abstraction inherent in image-making as "idealization." (Jonas 1962, 205) He distinguishes among three things associated with abstraction: the object that finds its way into the depiction (say, an apple), the depiction (for example, oil on canvas in a still life), and lastly imagination in the human mind. An imagined image in the viewer's brain differs from representation in art, and both in turn differ from the depicted object itself. Jonas speaks of a "double distinction." (Jonas 1962, 209) It is a matter of representation, which may be understood anthropologically: "The principle here involved on the part of the subject is the mental separation of form from matter. It is this that makes possible the vicarious presence of the physically absent at once with the self-effacement of the physically present." (Jonas 1962, 212) With other animals, only the present reality counts, but for us humans, what is made up counts at least as much. Jonas speaks of the human capacity for "separating eidos from concrete reality, or form from matter." (Ibid.)

Reality and the human perception of reality (i.e. its representation in the human brain) are not the same thing. Banal as this statement maybe, it is necessary to emphasize this difference. This insight is perhaps the greatest legacy of Immanuel Kant, who succeeded in bringing together Western intellectual history's two great schools of thought—rationalism and empiricism. He carries this out as a dual critique of both doctrines, postulating that without empiricism reason receives no data, and without rationality the senses alone are insufficient for knowledge: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts)." (Kant CPR, A 52) The central thesis of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason belongs to this combination of apparently incompatible epistemological views—the divergence between the thing in itself and the thing as recognized by the human senses and represented in the mind. In his more succinct and understandable Prolegomena, he says: "Accordingly, I by all means avow that there are bodies outside us, i.e., things which, though completely unknown to us as to what they may be in themselves, we know through the

representations which their influence on our sensibility provides for us, and to which we give the name of a body — which word therefore merely signifies the appearance of this object that is unknown to us but is nonetheless real. Can this be called idealism? It is the very opposite of it." (Kant Prol, 4: 289; A 63/64) Kant does not claim that reality exists only through the intellectual (ideas); rather, he relates the ideal sphere only to the forms of human perception. Thus, in contrast to the philosophers of German Idealism who followed him, Kant possesses a completely different view of reality in terms of time and also ostensibly in terms of content. Kant is no Idealist.

Homo sapiens' ability to see things as true that do not exist is the foundation of civilization, urbanity, art, and culture. We humans invest considerable cost, time, and labor in producing imaginary worlds. Literature, theater, fine arts, films, computer games, and much more enable us to transcend our everyday lives, to regard things from a distant perspective, to anticipate better conditions and thus strive for them in the first place. Looking from the point of view of evolutionary history, this separation of real and virtual worlds and their obvious dependence on each other is the most likely reason that humans have made the greatest biological progress compared to all other animals. It hinges on our capacity for abstraction, our ability to both look back and anticipate, to plan and develop scenarios. The development of writing in and of itself is perhaps the most important system of abstraction, which nevertheless reflects its relationship to reality, ranging in activities from descriptions of goods in trade to romantic poems.

The German scholar Karl Eibl, who reasons through an evolutionary-biological lens, describes the human product of virtualization, which is relevant to our context, as an "inbetween world." (Eibl 2013, 134) Along with visualizing facts that do not currently exist, it could allow people to accumulate a huge reservoir of collective memories. This "in-between world" has an enormous influence on our ideas about the future, because prudent and provident Homo sapiens thinks first and foremost of danger. The accumulated dangers in his own and the collective past could take on gigantic proportions in the human imagination. The existing fear of concrete dangers becomes a permanent fear of the diffuse. Humankind has now developed several strategies (Eibl 2013, 136-138) to dial fear back to anxiety, such as by personalizing dangers (for example, through gods) or simulating dangerous situations (for example, through art). Religion, Eibl says, is a reduction of fear of the unknown to fear of the known; works of art show us forms in which we virtually play through threatening situations. Eibl's epistemological concept of the in-between world corresponds nearly exactly to Jonas' aesthetic concept "Differentia." The crucial reference that I would like to borrow from Eibl's biological perspective is that of play. This is perhaps most evident in art.

Artistic products are graphic, depicted, written, or similar forms through which we are able to playfully reflect reality. Friedrich Schiller (for example, Schiller 1845) addressed nothing else. Art enables us to distance ourselves from the necessities of living. Hans-Georg Gadamer says that playing is even "the mode of being of the work of art itself" (Gadamer 1989, 102) The lack of an immediate need for art can create a space of freedom that few human products can provide. Experiencing art is not only enjoyment, but through engaging with it like a human counterpart with its (dialogic) unpredictability, it also becomes life experience and worldview. This works through the freedom inherent in art, which represents an "offered view" for Max Imdahl (Imdahl 1994, 318): "The image is a visual model invented from the ground up in order to experience an insurmountable powerlessness of disposal." (Ibid.) The essentially distanced approach to art is the prototype for respectful interaction with other people, but less dangerous. Art is the playful response to every form of fear of the world. However, whether this strategy of mitigation down to aesthetic anxiety succeeds depends above all on whether the virtual world created to mitigate fear is permanently recognized as a form of play.

IDEALISM AS DISPARAGEMENT OF REALITY

Placing actuality in opposition to virtual worlds is therefore a deeply human need and an important way of creating distance from reality In contrast, there is an unhealthy and dangerous way of dealing with these in-between worlds, specifically when they do not function as playful relief for the psyche but are themselves seen as reality (and thus completely lose their playful character). Ideal worlds that are permanently perceived as reality may be called ideologies, I think.

In 1945, George Orwell published his treatise Notes on Nationalism, in which he dealt with the events ofwar and genocide occurring at the time. As part of the definition of "nationalism," Orwell includes all closed systems such as National Socialism, political Catholicism, and Communism, i.e., ideologies that are all-encompassing in their self-understanding, lay claim to every aspect of every person's life, and, if possible, use a single source to explain all phenomena. Orwell recognizes three commonalities among the specific differences, one of which is particularly important for our context. Aside from the obsession and instability inherent in the construction of such a closed worldview, the author emphasizes an "indifference to reality" (Orwell 1945, 20) as a nationalist's fundamental psychological characteristic: "All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts." (Ibid.) Whereas the nationalist may condemn crimes committed in another country, for example, he may still view them as necessary in his own country. The nationalist (popularly: ideological) view of a crime is not about its objective evaluation, but rather always about who is responsible. In such worldviews, morality depends on one's own affiliation. If we read Orwell correctly, it means that first comes the examination of belonging, from which morality is derived, on

which in turn knowledge depends. If morality and reality were not to match up, any reasonable and open-minded person would question morality and, in case of doubt, adjust it. In Orwell's view, however, the nationalist prefers to change or reinterpret reality immediately—the present as well as the past. (Ibid.) This isolation from the direct evidential power of the empirical world is an important prerequisite for nationalism to function. (Ibid.) It is easy to cast doubt among those who wish to doubt that nothing can ever be proven: "Since nothing is ever quite proved or disproved, the most unmistakable fact can be impudently denied." (Ibid.) Orwell recognizes a pathological trait in this kind of world perception:

"Some nationalists are not far from schizophrenia, living quite happily amid dreams of power and conquest which have no connexion with the physical world." (Ibid.)
For the philosopher Hannah Arendt, people's emotional and rational relationship to reality is the point of reference for how social life is shaped. In her view, the foundation for politically motivated crimes lies in people's ability to believe an idea more than the reality around them. To the topic of "ideological argumentation, always a type of logical deduction," Arendt speaks ofits "emancipation from reality and experience." (Arendt 1951, 471) Some people tend toward a higher degree of abstraction than others in their perception of the world; for them, ideals are more important than reality. Arendt sees the basis for the totalitarianism of our world in this human trait, namely not using reality as a measure of knowledge and justice, but rather debasing it relative to ideas.

As already mentioned, essential anthropological equipment makes up the basic prerequisite for forming virtual realities. The fact, however, that people become permanently blind to empirical reality is certainly based on a centuries-old tradition. The first thinker to systematically work out this shifted relationship to actuality to the detriment of reality, and to place the idea of reality above reality as such, is Plato, who in doing so demonstrated the greatest influence on an idealistic world relationship. Plato grows up an aristocrat in a world of civil war, losing status with each social upheaval; during his own lifetime, Attic democracy rises in influence. His recipe against these changes is "the arrested state" (Popper 1994, 20) of a hermetic caste system, as Karl Popper underlines, who interprets Plato's experience of fear as the reason behind his search for a closed and unchanging world.

Plato perfectly masters the transformation of world fear into art—in his case, literature. For him, any kind of change is decay, which also makes him an ancestor of the saying "everything used to be better before," which can be heard from many of those who lose through social change. In a

patriarchal culture, the losers are above all men, older people, and established people (mixable in any combination) who are challenged by the new. Out of the need to keep change at bay, Plato develops a theory of why the world is immovable in its true sense, namely his theory of forms. The idea of the forms is then in turn the model for the State. As communities—the younger they are, the greater the effect—move away from the imagined archetype of the State, they automatically descend from good government to tyranny. (Plato Republic, 544-69) In Plato's hierarchy, democracy takes third place out of four, undercut only by tyranny. This is the State, "...full of freedom and frankness—there a man may do as he likes." (Plato Republic, 557) That tyranny emerges from democracy as the worst form of government seems clear in these circumstances: "Then tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty." (Plato Republic, 564)



Plato is probably the most influential thinker to preach a reactionary worldview as a strategy to reduce uncertainty, that is to say, engaging in a virtual reduction of overwhelming diversity. It is about escaping the world, about turning away from reality (which everyone can grasp with their hands) in favor of an afterlife (which nobody knows and, in a practical sense, no one can verify). Plato's ideas are said to have such a great influence, especially in Europe, thanks to Paul, the founder of Christianity, who was molded by Hellenic thought. Several centuries after Plato, Paul took up this theory of forms and developed it into a doctrine of salvation that separates the human body and the soul. Without Platonism, Christianity would likely have developed completely differently, and without Platonic Christianity, continental Europeans would probably never have become so idealistic.

Since then, Idealism has been an important strand of European thinking alongside realistic schools of thought. There have been remarkable high points. Idealism's second exuberant epoch begins around 1800 with German Idealism and culminates in the figure of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who coined the title of our exhibition. For Hegel, the "world spirit" is reason that has formed throughout history. However, much we associate the term with Hegel, though, it appears only thirty-seven times in his complete works of twenty volumes. Moreover, Hegel stole the idea practically verbatim from his Idealistic colleague Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, who in 1798 wrote an entire treatise entitled Von der Weltseele (From the World Soul). (Schelling 1798) Schelling explains the organization of nature, both living and inorganic, in his thoroughly dualistic methodological approach,

returning to an ancient philosophy of nature through the interaction of two opposing forces: first the force that expands, and then a second force that contracts. Schelling imagines an overall system of movement, an alternating principle, a force of nature. The world soul is the concept behind these processes: "These two conflicting forces, represented simultaneously in unity and in conflict, lead to the idea of an organizing principle that shapes the world into a system. It is such a principle, perhaps, that the ancients adumbrated in their notion of the world soul." (Schelling 1798) "System" is the key word here; the German Idealists interpret the world as a closed and regular whole. In his knowledge of nature in a time of emerging natural science, Schelling resorts to pure speculation. This form of argumentation may have been groundbreaking in antiquity, given the state of knowledge of the natural world then, but in Schelling's time it is nothing more than sheer fantasy and completely anachronistic, more in keeping with a longing for times past.

Schelling thus tells us nothing new. This main idea of the philosophy of Idealism—a systematic connection between everything—is more than two thousand years old. In what is probably Plato's most authoritative writing of all, the late dialogue Timaeus, he sketches a harmonious cosmological worldview. The mutable (necessary) world, which we can perceive with our senses, is merely the image of the unchanging and eternally existing (rational) being. But the world is an image of the forms, and the connection between the ideal and the real is the world soul. The macrocosm is analogous to the microcosm of humanity, which also possesses a soul and is guided by it. The universe is "a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God." (Plato Timaeus, 30) In his late dialogue Laws, Plato describes the soul as motion that moves itself. (Plato Laws, 895-96) (World-) soul is the driving engine of the world and its connection to the higher plane, the form. In this view, which contradicts every empirical observation and which therefore nobody can prove — let alone refute —there are two aspects that are supposed to be of decisive importance for Christianity's intellectual history and formation over centuries. First is the view that the movements of the objective world (history, nature, thoughts) are subject to a recognizable natural law, so that these movements even become predictable. This is accompanied by the almost self-evident vilification of the objective world, of this world in favor of an ideal beyond. The Platonic dialogues are highlights of literature, fantastic—but pure fiction. It does this literature an injustice to follow the author's suggestion that they are really about reality, about a view of nature.

What is the difference between virtual worlds (art and culture) and dangerous Idealism? Idealizations, as already explained, are anthropologically anchored. They are a fact and therefore neither good nor bad. They can become dangerous when the benchmark is lost; some people do not take what is imagined, invented, and fantasized as such, but rather as reality. The decisive difference seems to me to be attitude. Some people have a rather playful relationship to things, others a deadly serious one. The gradual differences naturally produce a spectrum. Just as fundamentalist Christians sometimes take the Bible literally and can't recognize any summarization, art, or exaggeration in Scripture, nationalists, fascists, and terrorists have no distance whatsoever from the object of their identity. Lack of humor is perhaps the most unmistakable sign that we are dealing with radicals. To this day, this is the most reliable litmus test for me. An ideological world relationship is a radical lack of distance in recognition and a pattern of overaggressive action. If the term didn't sound so euphemistic, since it has an extremely positive connotation in Germany, then I would like to call the radicals "Romantics." That is taking the world as an art world, because it provides the explanation for a made-world, not a random one. This is a deeply romantic tradition.

There are innumerable examples of what is merely invented, which can nonetheless become more important to people than life itself, and I will pick out just one. What should one think of a man who hears voices ordering him to kill his son? With all due justification, this father would be sent to a

psychiatric hospital as a schizophrenic threat. In this story (Bereschit/Genesis 22, 1-19; Surah 37, 99-113), the son merely figures as currency for another human being's loyalty to God (that is to say, to an idea). This story is not told as the aberrance of a schizoid man, whose imagined ideals are more important than an extremely close and beloved human life. Instead, it serves to demonstrate depth of faith. The narrative is a successful artistic summarization of the world's humane idealization, viewed without values. The story is not odd in that it reflects an archetypal reality; what is odd is when a Jew, a Christian, or a Muslim still sees a good demonstration of faithfulness in it. Reality is not taken seriously, but a fantasized "truth"—highly subjective, justifying everything, and not verifiable by anyone.

IDEOLOGY AND RENÉ SCHOEMAKERS

It is precisely in this sensitive area of human weakness that Rene Schoemakers applies his art. In my opinion, the leitmotif of his oeuvre is the human idealism described above, i.e., humankind's constant search for more than something as banal as reality. Human restlessness and the accompanying primacy of the ideal over the material, of the imagined over the real world, of the "higher" over the human needs shared by all can sometimes result in fatal consequences for us as people. Schoemakers humorously contrasts all the pathetic ideas from many centuries of body-hostile tradition and every form of detachment from the world with the simplest force: that of our world as we all know it, in its confusing, diverse, and chaotic character, and from which we —when its complexity exceeds our comprehension, and its demands overwhelm our strength—escape into plain ideas. This aesthetic approach, the subject of the following text, has two sides or is the combination of two different worlds. One side is the graphic means, the other is Schoemakers' central method.

Schoemakers' graphic means is the form of representation and its subject matter, subject matter being always what you see, what is represented. Schoemakers paints so clearly that most people assume his paintings are large photographs. This superficial naturalism is so exact that the things and people portrayed seem familiar and their depiction seems completely real; the works are precisely painted arrangements. Schoemakers creates the greatest possible visibility at this level. His most important component is the figure, that is, the human body abstracted into art—that's as close as we can get.

The central method is the production of context and its contents; unlike the subject matter, content comprises everything that is known and connoted, associated and described, implied and indicated. It is then represented together with everything that invisibly belongs to it. The jumble of levels of meaning in Schoemakers' work appears chaotic, barely defined, diffuse, multi-layered, and enigmatic, in stark contrast to the subjects' representation. Everywhere you look there are clues to meaning like pitfalls, the manifold hooks and eyes of art historical tradition, graphic anchors of collective images. Schoemakers' most important component is irony—that's as distanced as we can get.

This is, in other words, a close link between proximity and distance. Schoemakers plays a game with us, usually one of confusion as he generously scatters hints in his works. Irony, of course, carries this confusion conceptually within itself . The artist's goals are distortion and ambiguity, indeed the playful reflection of the world's chaotic diversity. In other words, it is the opposite of simplifying difficult reality into an ideal formed from a single mold. Schoemakers' works grandiosely shatter the ridiculous attempts to construct our inescapable reality as flimsy ideas, that is, to escape the world. Here are a few examples:

The human desire to see meaning behind everything, the omnipresent inability to see the world as just existing and not as meaningful, and thus the valorization of mere existence by a higher origin (which must be better than the perceived miserable reality), are the themes of CARNE LEVALE (BUTTERBERG) from 2012 (p. 8). What does the artist mean by all his artificially assembled scenes? What does the artist want to tell us? The four panels have the plotted addition: "Do you want the total metaphor?" Most people, if they were honest, would have to answer this tricky Goebbels-like question with a resounding yes. Schoemakers is playing on our need to interpret.

Particularly in works from recent years, the impulse to caricature the human search for the ideal has become ever greater. In THE UNENCUMBERED SELF (DIE TAT-HANDLUNG) from 2018 (p. 28) the artist quotes a passage translated into English from a tract known as "The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism." This is a double-sided handwritten text, certainly written by Hegel, possibly together with Schelling and Friedrich Holderlin, probably in Tubingen in 1797. The essay outlines the transition from Kant's Critiques to a system that encompasses the whole world, reading: "The first idea is naturally the conception of myself as an absolutely free being. Along with the free, self-conscious being an entire world emerges simultaneously—out of nothingness—the only true and conceivable creation out of nothingness." (Systematic Program 1797, 5) In this document, the young idealists assume the existence of a self-conscious being before all things, actively creating. Freedom is the most important motif of German Idealism. In the end, however, what is meant is not political freedom through revolution, but freedom (of the idea) from all things of the reality surrounding us, an emancipation from reality in favor of the absolute sphere of freedom in the virtual world. As the title of a series, "Unencumbered" perhaps also refers to being unburdened by reality. Constructed as a triptych, the middle section shows a scene in which a girl holds a red thread leading to spindles lined up like batteries in a white (!) vest, worn by a cardboard silhouette—an act of terror that is not depicted, but nevertheless hinted at by the images that prevail within us. Terror is the violent attempt to intimidate the civilian population for the purpose of destabilizing societies. The people (those who

are threatened and those who must carry out acts of terror) play no part whatsoever in ideologies that call for these crimes for a higher purpose. It is simply a matter of implementing a figment. Or one could also say a ghost or spirit—the spirit as the non-world.

The reality to which Schoemakers refers is one entity; there are no good or bad examples for art. When he encounters something meaningful, he weaves it into his art. His TROTZIKOTZI from 2019 (p.16) shows a meme deployed —not just, but also—by the right wing: a puking emoji, the so-called "face vomiting." The artist found the sentence be- low it in a bathroom and transferred it here. The phrase "Poor Germany" written in Fraktur takes up the decay of our country as claimed by right-wing radicals.

One could label it irony a la Thomas Mann, along with his ambiguity and dismantling of greatness. Radicals' nationalistic pride usually bears the pathos of the strong eagle before it. Next to the lion, the eagle, meant to express strength and superiority, is the second most common heraldic animal, thanks to Charlemagne's introduction of it. The Federal Republic of Germany and the city of Dortmund also use the eagle as an emblem. The eagle on the German Empire's flag is a popular, often-used reference among right-wing radicals. Schoemakers satirizes the infantile demonstration of strength, and one rightly wonders why states do not choose peaceful animals as symbols. In his works PROMETHEUS STRIKES BACK I and II from 2014 (p. 25), he shows two puny birds. They are run-down, Disney-like creatures that no one would take seriously, plastic yet gold-plated. Through the signal word "Prometheus," the titles immediately produce a chain of associations in culturally inclined viewers, because Prometheus — literally the "foresighted" one — brought fire (culture) to mankind. Zeus severely punished him for this, tying him up and letting an eagle eat his regenerating liver. According to the legend, the hero Heracles delivers Prometheus from his torture. The rest is interpretation. But maybe we should look at another bird in LET THE POWER FALL II from 2019 (p. 17). In front of an Iron Cross — the pride of right-wing nationalists as much as the imperial eagle — on a heraldic shield, we see a headless, smashed sparrow. The heroic eagle becomes a squashed dickey bird. From "power-full," which one might easily hear from the title, the opposite quickly becomes the case. The symbol, valorized in a strongly elevated ideal, crashes down hard on the ground of reality.

Finally, we should turn our attention to the pair of paintings ANDERS (MUMMENSCHANZ) and KARL-HEINZ (MUMMENSCHANZ), both from 2019 (pp. 68/69). In both, uniforms (the "masquerades" called out in the titles) play the leading role as an expression of ideological worldview. The first painting deals with the Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Breivik, who, motivated by racism, murdered seventy-seven people in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011. Breivik's abnormal psychiatric state was already evident in childhood, and he later became active in Islamophobic organizations. In the painting, a girl is wearing Breivik's fantasy uniform, decorated with various orders of chivalry. "Karl-Heinz" in the second painting refers to Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, the Bavarian right-wing radical who founded the "military-sportsgroup" named after him (banned in 1980), and whose role model, according to his own statement, is Adolf Hitler—a fellow misunderstood artist. From the ranks of the Hoffmann Wehrsportgruppe, a Jewish couple was murdered in Erlangen and the Oktoberfest bombing in Munich was carried out. Hoffmann made public appearances in Wehrmacht uniforms at an early age. In this pair of paintings, too, the figure is nothing but alienation; it is about the uniform and the worldview arising from childish fantasies of omnipotence. The figures symbolize the degradation of real life in yet another way. One holds a brush in her right hand, the other a fake mustache and a toy machine gun. For Breivik as for Hoffmann, other people's lives are no more material than a game one can end at any time.

CONCLUSION

In his art, Schoemakers takes aim at the soft underbelly of the human psyche, especially at cases of world fear. World fear is nothing other than the inability to endure contradictions (and so an intolerance of ambiguity), from which sometimes radical simplification strategies result in both recognition as well as action. Not all of us can take a joke and not all of us can tolerate equivocality when it comes to the big picture, when a crisis occurs and we cannot distance ourselves from the world because of a dramatic situation. The difference between hysterics and world conspiracy mystics and more balanced natures is not this somatic disposition, but how they each interpret the world's processes. Radical ideologues constantly claim that everything is at stake, that we are always at war, that everything depends on right now. It is for this reason that they offer unambiguity. One is only capable of humor if one can endure a certain degree of contradictions and ambiguities. Fear, however, is the total presence of anxiety. Whoever fears diversity fears the world, because the world can only be simplified or arranged to one's liking to a very limited extent.

Schoemakers' artistic strategy is his worldliness, his attitude humanism. His art centers the human body and its needs as a benchmark for knowledge and morality within his painted and drawn dismantling of ideals. <>

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