RTReview.org

SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
3-15-2022

New Series Number 096

EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.

Each issue should surprise.

Contents

NEVER FORGET YOUR NAME: THE CHILDREN OF AUSCHWITZ by Alwin Meyern translated by Nick Somers [Polity, 9781509545506]

The children of Auschwitz is the darkest spot in the ocean of suffering that was the Holocaust. They were deported to the concentration camp with their families, with most being murdered in the gas chambers upon their arrival or were born there under unimaginable circumstances. While 232,000 children and juveniles were deported to Auschwitz, only 750 were liberated in the death camp at the end of January 1945. Most of them were under 15 years of age. Alwin Meyer's masterwork is the culmination of decades of research and interviews with the children and their descendants, sensitively reconstructing their stories before, during and after Auschwitz. The camp would remain with them throughout their lives: on their forearms, as a tattooed number, and in their minds, in the memory of heart-rending separation from parents and siblings, medical experiments, abject confusion, ceaseless hunger and a perpetual longing for home and security. Once the purported liberation came, there was no blueprint for piecing together personal biographies after the unthinkable had happened. Many of the children, often orphaned, had forgotten their names or ages, and had only fragmented understandings of where they came from. While some struggled to reconnect to the parents from whom they had been separated, others had known nothing other than the camp. Some children grew up without the ability to trust and to play. Survival is not yet life – it is an in-between stage which requires individuals to learn how to live. The liberated children had to learn how to be young again in order to grow into adults like others did. This remarkable book tells the stories of the most vulnerable victims of the Nazis' systematic attempt to extinguish innocent lives, and rescues their voices from historical oblivion. It is a unique testimony to the horrific suffering endured by millions in humanity's darkest hour.

Reviews

'This is a compelling book, magnificently researched and fluently written. The testimony of child survivors, on which the book heavily draws, is heart-rending; the sense of loss, and of being lost, that it conveys is haunting. The extraordinary range of primary documentation is matched by the swift passage of many stories, which makes this book an absorbing read – eloquent, powerful and abounding with humanity.' — Monica Tempian, Victoria University of Wellington

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Children in Auschwitz: the darkest spot on an ocean of suffering, criminality, and death with a thousand faces — humiliation; contempt; harassment; persecution; fanatical racism; transports; lice; rats; diseases; epidemics; beatings; Mengele; experiments; smoking crematorium chimneys; abominable stench; starvation; selections; brutal separation from mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, grandmothers, grandfathers, aunts, uncles and friends; gas …

In 1940, a first camp by the name of Auschwitz, later to be known as the Main Camp or Auschwitz I, was erected by the Nazis on the outskirts of the Polish town of Oswiecim (65 kilometres west of Krakow). The first transport of Polish inmates arrived from German-occupied Poland in mid-1940. In 1941, the Nazis planned and built the killing centre (extermination camp) Auschwitz-Birkenau, also known as Auschwitz II, on the site of the destroyed village of Brzezinka.

From March 1942, Jewish children and their families were transported to Auschwitz from almost all German-occupied countries, for the sole reason that they were Jews. There were already a large number of Jewish boys and girls in the first transports to Auschwitz from Slovakia. Well over 200,000 children were to follow, and almost all of them were murdered.

Them Auschwitz complex consisted of forty-eight concentration and extermination camps. Auschwitz-Birkenau has become the unmatched symbol of contempt for humanity, and a unique synonym for the mass murder of European Jewry. It was the site of the largest killing centre conceived, built and operated by the Germans, and played a central role in the Nazi 'Final Solution',' the systematic extermination of Europe's Jewish inhabitants.

By far the largest group of children deported to Auschwitz were thus Jewish girls and boys (see also page oo). Most of them were transported with their families in packed, closed and sealed freight cars, mercilessly women alike. Pregnant women from other concentration camps were also transferred to Auschwitz exclusively to be gassed.

A stay of execution was granted only to those condemned to heavy physical slave labour inside and outside the camp. These men and women were physically and psychologically exploited in road building, agriculture or industrial and armaments factories, in which inmates from the satellite camps in particular were forced into slave labour.

Sometimes children aged between 13 and 15 were also 'selected for work' and allowed to live, usually only for a short time. For example, a large group of children and juveniles were assigned to the `Rollwagen-Kommando', where they pulled heavy carts in place of horses, transporting blankets, wood or the ashes of incinerated children, women and men from the crematoria. They were highly mobile and had plenty of opportunity to see the atrocities taking place in the camp.

Some sets of twins up to the age of 16 were also kept alive for a time. SS Doctor Mengele exploited and misused both Jewish and Sinti and Roma twins for pseudo-medical experiments. They were selected, measured, X-rayed, infected with viruses or had their eyes cauterized, and then killed, dissected and burned.

Throughout the five years of its existence — from the first to the last — however, the main purpose and primary aim of the killing centre was extermination. All other aims by the Nazis — such as

exploitation of the children, women and men as slave labourers, or the criminal, socalled `medical', experiments by SS doctors — were of secondary importance.

- The children and juveniles transferred temporarily to the camp soon became acquainted with the reality of Auschwitz. They didn't know whether they would still be alive from one day to the next. No one could foresee how the same situation would be dealt with by the SS the next day, the next hour or the next minute. Any act could mean immediate death. Apart from extermination, nothing in Auschwitz was predictable. The children were permanently confronted with death and knew that they had to be on their guard at all times.

- More than 1.3 million people were deported to Auschwitz between 1940 and 1945. Among them were at least Li million Jews. They came from Hungary, Poland, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Czechoslovakia, exposed to the summer heat and freezing winters. They had to relieve themselves in buckets that were soon full. Because the wagons were so packed, many couldn't even reach the buckets in time and the floors were swimming in urine and excrement. The stench was overwhelming. In many cases, the deportees had little or nothing to eat or drink. Although especially the small children begged constantly for water, their entreaties went unheard. Many — particularly infants, young children and elderly persons — died during the journeys, which often lasted for days.

- The Jews were deliberately kept in the dark about the real intentions of the Nazis. Before the deportations, they were told that they were being resettled in labour camps in the East, where they could start a new life.

- The opposite was true. The Jewish children, women and men were destined to be murdered. They were 'welcomed at the ramp in Auschwitz with the bellowed order: "Everyone out! Leave your luggage where it is!" The few people who were initially kept alive never again saw the possessions they had been allowed to bring with them.

- Selections began sporadically from April 1942, and then regularly from July of that year. They were carried out on the railway ramp, usually by SS doctors but also by pharmacists, medical orderlies and dentists. Young, healthy and strong women and men whom they considered 'fit for work' were temporarily allowed to live and were separated from the old and invalid, pregnant women and children. Germans randomly classed around 80 per cent of the Jews — often also entire transports — as 'unfit for work', particularly during the deportations to the Auschwitz-Birkenau killing centre of 438,000 Hungarian Jewish children, women and men from May 1944. These people were marched under guard or transported in trucks by the SS to one of the crematoria, where they were ordered to undress. Under the pretext that they were to be showered, the SS herded them into the gas chambers disguised to look like showers. The poisonous gas Zyklon B was then introduced, and those inside suffered an agonizing death by suffocation. It took 10 to 20 minutes for them all to die.

- Small children in Auschwitz were almost all killed on arrival. If a mother was carrying her child during the initial selection, they were both gassed, however healthy and 'fit for work' the young mother might be. This was irrelevant. Pregnant woman also suffered a terrible fate in Auschwitz. They were 'automatically' killed by phenolin injection, gassed or beaten to death. This applied initially to Jewish and non-Jewish Romaniae, the Soviet Union (especially Byelorussia, Ukraine and Russia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Norway, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latavia, Austria, Germany and elsewhere.

- The Auschwitz Complex complex consisted of three main units. The Main Camp Auschwitz I, held up to 20,000 people. The killing centre Birkenau, or Auschwitz II, was the largest unit of the camp complex, containing as many as 90,000 children, women and men. Birkenau was divided into ten sections separated by electrified barbed-wire fences. For example, there was the Women's Camp, the Theresienstadt Family Camp, the Men's Camp and the Gypsy

Family Camp, where Sinti and Roma were interned. In Auschwitz III (Monowitz), IG Farbenindustrie AG (headquarters Frankfurt am Main) employed Auschwitz concentration camp inmates as slave labour to make synthetic rubber (Tuna') and fuel. There were also forty-five satellite camps of various sizes, such as Blechhammer, Kattowitz or Rajsko.

- At least 1 million Jewish babies, children, juveniles, women and men, mostly in Auschwitz-Birkenau, were starved to death, killed by injections into the heart, murdered in criminal pseudo-medical experiments, shot, beaten to death or gassed.
- Between 70,000 and 75,00o Poles, 21,000 Roma and Sinti, 14,000 Soviet prisoners of war and 10-15,000 inmates speaking many languages were murdered in Auschwitz.'
- At least 232,000 infants, children and juveniles, aged from i day old to 17 years, were deported to Auschwitz, including 216,000 Jews and 11,000 Roma and Sinti. At least 3,00o were Poles, more than 1,000 Byelorussians, Russians and Ukrainians, and a number from other nations.
- On 27 January 1945, only 750 children and youths aged under 18 years were liberated; only 521 boys and girls aged 14 and under,' including around 6o new-born babies, were still alive, and many of them died shortly afterwards.

Very few of the children deported to Auschwitz remained alive. To some extent, the survival of every child was an anomaly unforeseen by the Nazis, a type of resistance to the only fate that Germans had planned for the children — namely, extermination. Very many of the children and juveniles in this book are fully aware that their survival was a matter of pure luck.

In some cases, comradeship and solidarity among the camp inmates helped them to stay alive. For example, some women relate how their pregnancy remained undetected because of the starvation rations in the camp, enabling them to give birth in secret. Once the child was born, it had practically no chance of survival. SS doctors, medical orderlies and their assistants took the mother and child and killed them. Sometimes, however, the mother managed, with the aid of other women inmates, to hide and feed her baby for a while. This was particularly true of the infants born in the last weeks and days before Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated.'

Others are convinced that they survived through their belief in God. Otto Klein, who, at the age of 11, was claimed with his twin brother Ferenc by Mengele for pseudo-medical experiments, for example, never dared to doubt in God. 'That would have been the end. Deep down in my heart, I always remained a Jew. No one and nothing could beat that out of me. Not even Auschwitz.'

For the few children who were liberated, the pain is always there: before breakfast, during the day, in the evening, at night. The memory of mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, the grandparents, girlfriends, boyfriends, aunts and uncles, killed in the camps. For a lifetime and beyond, the pain is ever present, not only in their lives but also in those of their own children and grandchildren.

Even if the number tattooed on the forearm, thigh or buttocks is often the only outward sign that they were in Auschwitz, they bear the traces of suffering on their bodies and in their souls.

The older liberated children of Auschwitz talk about their happy childhoods at home, about school, life in a Jewish community, the relationship between Jewish and non-Jewish children, the arrival of the Germans, the growing apprehension, the refugees, the chaos prior to deportation, the end of playing, the transport in cattle wagons, the arrival in Auschwitz, the mortal fear.

The children remember the gnawing hunger; the experiments carried out on them; the cold that pierced to the bone; the constant selections by the SS; the fear that their number would be called out; the longing for their parents, a good meal, an eiderdown, warmth. They were torn between despair and hope. They wanted to see their mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters again. They

wanted to go home. They wanted their old and happy lives back. They wanted to be able to be children again.

Only a few survived Auschwitz and the other camps where they were interned. The children rescued from the camps were just skin and bone. The people caring for them feared that they would not live. They looked like skeletons, with bite wounds from the dogs, bodies covered in sores, eyes stuck together with pus; for a long time, anything they ate went in one end and straight out the other; they had tuberculosis, pneumonia and encephalitis.

Some had no idea where they were from. Practically all of them were orphans. The smaller children in particular were marked by their life in the camp. They spoke a mixture of languages. For a long time, the girls and boys lived in fear that something — particularly food and clothing — would be snatched away from them. Hiding food was part of their survival strategy. They defended it with their lives, because in the camp even the smallest possession had had inestimable value. Every small piece of bread meant survival for one or two days or more. Even spoiled food was not thrown away. When adults who had not been in the camp suggested this, they would look at them incredulously and think to themselves: 'You have no idea what life is really like!'

The small children were incapable of playing. When they were presented with playthings, they gave them a cursory glance or threw them away. They didn't know what they were or what to do with them. These children had first to learn how to play. They were irritable and mistrustful. Dogs, rats and uniforms caused indescribable anxiety. When someone left them, some of the smaller children assumed they were dead. Others couldn't believe at first that people could die of natural causes.

The children of Auschwitz were free, but how could they live after what they had been through? It took them years of painstaking work to learn to see life from a perspective other than that of the camp. They had to learn to survive the camp emotionally. They had to learn to be young again so as to be able to grow old like others.

As they grew older, those children of Auschwitz were increasingly motivated to find out where they came from. In searching for their parents, the number tattooed on their arm often helped, because their numbers were tattooed at the same time — first the mother, then the daughter with serial numbers from the Women's Camp; or the father, then the son, from the Men's Camp.

Only a few were reunited, years later, with their parents. They were soon conflicted as to who their real mothers and fathers were. In the experience of the author of this book, the answer was always the adoptive parents. They went back to the place where they had experienced most warmth in their lives. For the biological parents, this was a bitter disappointment, losing a son or a daughter for a second time. The others never stopped asking whether their families had been killed in the gas chambers, or had perhaps survived somewhere. They continued to look for their parents, siblings, grandparents and friends — at least in their dreams.

Those who survived Auschwitz as children or juveniles continued to wonder whether their families had really died in the gas chambers. They would come across newspaper articles reporting on the return of people thought dead. Hope made it possible for them to continue living. It was just a dream that they would wake from. Then everything would be fine again. But no one came back.

The survivors' children and grandchildren can sense how their parents and grandparents suffer. They often know much more than their parents and grandparents think — despite their having done everything possible to protect them from the consequences of Auschwitz.

The children of Auschwitz had to show supreme resolve to make their way in the world. They sought and found new lives, went to school, studied, married, had children, pursued careers and

created new homes. But as they got older and no longer had to concern themselves as much with their own families, the memories of Auschwitz returned with a vengeance. Every day, every hour, the pain is there: the memory of their mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, all murdered. Many can still remember them quite clearly. How they would love to hear their voices again. How they would love once again to speak to their parents and siblings, or to hug them.

The ancestors and descendants of the children of Auschwitz who tell their stories in this book lived and live among us in Bçdzin, Békéscsaba, Berlin, Bilky, Budapest, Csepel, Czaniec, Davos, Delvin, Dimona, El Paso, Esslingen, Frankfurt am Main, Gdynia, Geneva, Givat Haviva, Haifa, Hajdüboszormény, Hartford, Herzliya, Hronov, Jerusalem, Kansas City, Kaunas, Konstanz, Krakow, Kutná Hora, London, Los Angeles, Lubin, Miskolc, Montreal, Mukachevo, Naples, New York, Odolice, Orsha, Oslo, Ostrava, Paris, Prague, Providence, Sárospatak, Thessaloniki, Topol'cany, Toronto, Turany nad Ondavou, Vel'ky Meder, Vienna, Vilnius, Vitebsk, Warsaw, Yad Hanna, Yalta, Yenakiieve, Zabrze, Zurich.

When the persecutions by Nazi Germany began throughout Europe, the children of Auschwitz featured in this book were babies, toddlers and children up to 14 years old. When they were forced to work as slaves or were interned for the first time in ghettos or camps, they were all children. When they were transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau, four were juveniles, none of the others older than 15. Four of the children were born in Auschwitz.

The children of Auschwitz interviewed for this book are among the very last survivors. Herbert Adler, Yehuda Bacon, Halina Birenbaum, Robert Buehler, Gabor Hirsch, Lydia Holznerová, Krzysztof J., Otto Klein, Kola Klimczyk, Josif Konvoj, Eduard Kornfeld, Heinz Salvator Kounio, Géza Kozma, Ewa Krcz- Siezka, Vera Kriegel, Dagmar Lieblová, Dasha Lewin, Channa Loewenstein, Israel Loewenstein, Mirjam M., Jack Mandelbaum, Angela Orosz-Richt, Lidia Rydzikowska, Olga Solomon, Jiri Steiner, William Wermuth, Barbara Wesolowska and other children of Auschwitz were willing to tell the story of their survival, and life afterwards.

The life stories of the children of Auschwitz are based above all on numerous lengthy interviews with them, their families and friends. This book could never have been written without the willingness of the children of Auschwitz to provide information, without their hospitality, their openness and their trust. It is their book first and foremost. It contains the life stories of people who know more than others what life means. <>

MULTIPLITISM: SET THEORY AND SOCIOLOGY by Eliran Bar-El [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783030870515]

This book presents a set theoretical approach to sociological research. It performs this presentation by revisiting existing sociological approaches and discussing their limitations, before suggesting an alternative. While the existing canonical approaches of Positivism, Conflictualism and Pragmatism are based on biology, history and physics, respectively, the set theoretical approach is based on mathematics. Utilising its philosophical exploration delineated by Alain Badiou, the book further translates his work into the field of social science. The result of this translation is termed Multiplitism, which evades the limiting contradictions of existing approaches. Drawing on the mathematical notion of 'set' and relating it to recent sociological turns such as the relational and the ontological, the book proposes a scale-relativity through which researcher (as subject) and researched (as object) are integrated. This dialectical approach diagonally cuts across the analytic/continental divide by combining science (and formalism) with critique (and values), thus resolving common

conceptual and methodological issues such as the qualitative/quantitative, subjective/objective and universal/particular divides.

Reviews

"Deploying the work of Badiou and Greimas, Bar-El advances a new approach to the reconciliation of objective and subjective orientations in social scientific enquiry. This is an important contribution to the resolution of an ongoing problem." - **Derek Robbins**, Emeritus Professor, University of East London, UK and author of *The Bourdieu Paradigm* (2019).

"*Multiplitism* is an important intervention into contemporary sociological theory. I see it as contributing to the development of a new paradigm. We will need to see more scholarship in this area -- scholarship that opens sociology up to other perspectives such as this one -- in the coming years if sociology is to remain relevant." --**Duane Rousselle**, Professor, School of Advanced Studies, University of Tyumen, Russia

CONTENTS
Excerpt:

> With each epoch-making discovery, even in the sphere of natural science, materialism has to change its form. ~ Friedrich Engels, 1886

At the very end of the nineteenth century, soon before his death, French sociologist Gabriel Tarde opened his book The Social Laws with an intriguing reflection. According to him, when the first herdsmen looked up at the sky and wondered upon the stars' movements and positions, the idea that all that vastness and complexity could be explained with a small number of laws—nowadays called astronomy—would have seemed to them as utter farcical. Tarde felt that his fellowmen treated the social world, no less complex or irregular than the natural world, with the same herdsmen-bewilderment that precluded any rational attempt to generalise sociological laws.

From Tarde's perspective, it seems that we have not made much progress. Many of today's sociologists and socially informed individuals still deny that the social world can be explained by a small number of laws; 'It's just too complex', the postmodern-herdsmen would say. Alternatively, opposing such common defeatist tendency this short and trans- disciplinary book is based on a simple affirmation: Georg Cantor's invention (also from the late nineteenth century), his mathematical 'transfinite' revolution of the pure multiple and its very few laws, was an epoch-making discovery after which materialist sociology must change its form.

Admittedly, this affirmation is far from being self-evident. Other inventions compete over the status of 'epoch-making'; chief among them are physical quantum mechanics and neuro-biological theories of the mind. While prominent scholars such as Slavoj Zizek and Adrian Johnston opted for these theories, respectively, I decide to follow philosopher Alain Badiou in opting for the mathematical set

theory and to consider it as the proper ground for current materialist scientific thought. The underlying reason is that mathematics has the highest level of abstraction, making it the basis for all other more concrete sciences such as physics, biology and, indeed, sociology.

Two immediate (elitist) objections could be raised here: firstly, that mathematics has nothing to do with 'matter' (i.e. against grounding materialism on the most abstract mathematics); and secondly, that mathematics has nothing to do with 'the social' (i.e. against drawing social and political conclusions from mathematics). As for the former, the response is empirical. Some argue that materialism—thinking reality at the level of vulgar, robust 'matter'—should be based on the concrete, and what can be more concrete than physics? However, paradoxically, it is precisely the current advent in the sub-atomic study of quantum physics that facilitates the most effective 'deconstruction' of matter, without any linguistic sophistries. 'Matter' today is not raw and tangible as we used to think. Rather, it turns out to be formalistic, compositional and, hence, mathematical.

As for the second objection, regarding drawing real-world conclusions from mathematics, the response is decisional. Once we see that any description of reality essentially rests on an axiomatic decision rather than on any empirically or linguistically given, the question becomes how to make such a decision most consistently with the given? This question is all the more burning in light of Susan Buck-Morss' claim (from her 2011 lecture on Commonist Ethics):

> Today's philosophically naïve social sciences purport to be objective as they splinter reality into self-referential, academic disciplines that argue from present-day 'givens' as a quasi-natural base (rather than dynamic, unstable structures that depend on human action). Both approaches—thought without empirical understanding and empirical understanding without thought, without critical reflection—are extremely susceptible to reification.

Here, I argue, it is only the mathematical rigour itself that can guide us all the way from the abstractness of concepts to the concreteness of things, and actually reveal that, as put by Badiou, the concrete is more abstract than the abstract. As he explained in his 1988 magnum opus Being and Event: 'We must always bear in mind that the ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but that they are always "there" already, even when that empirical material simply gets collected'. Therefore, this book is about the consequences of deciding upon set theory, and mathematics more broadly to be the epoch-making discovery that re-forms the materialist thinking of reality and society.

In doing so, this book sets out against both contemporary idealist tendencies: the religious infinity of God on the one hand, and the capitalist, secular infinity of Money on the other hand. These two tendencies are the most prevalent orientations to social life, shared worldwide by professionals and laypersons alike. What they share is the defeatist approach to real, actual and material infinity. Believing that infinity can be either religious or secular keeps thought idealist and prohibits it from really, actively, thinking the infinite. It is also why we experience the contemporary hegemony of cultural relativism, by which any kind of absolutism immediately sounds oppressive. Contrarily, a materialist thought that begins with an absolute decision on what matters, seems like the proper place from which to launch our inquiry into a new approach to sociology; one that is all about pure multiplicity in its irreducibility to any One. ***

The four approaches to sociology

	Positivism	Conflictualism	Pragmatism	Multiplitism
Main thinkers	Martineau, Spencer, Saint-Simone, Comte, Durkheim	Marx, Weber, Deleuze, Simmel	James, Dewey, Cooley, Mead, Goffman,	Bourdieu, Zizek, Latour
Sociological imagination	Positive: society as organic body striving for homeostasis	Negative: society as battle-ring wherein different groups struggling over (im/material) resources	Society as stage and there is no society as such beyond symbolic construction and interpretation	Society as multiple multiplicity (of multiples), a set with parts and subsets with no set of all sets
Level of analysis Focus of interest	Macro Universal functional patterns	Macro Universal, social and structural relations	Micro Particular interactions and encounters	Scale-relativity Topological relations, within and between subsets: between empty set and power set, infinite set and generic set
Main research question	For what? What is the social function? Is the phenomenon functional or dysfunctional for society?	For whom? Qui bono? Which groups benefit?	How does it work? What is the performance, stage, audience etc.	Part of what? What are the relations of inclusion and belonging (presentation and re-presentation) between the subsets of the set?
Conception of history and change	History is a natural evolutionary process; change is to be avoided for it destabilises the social body	History is a product of inter-groups struggles; change is affirmative and imperative	No real universal history; change is context-dependent	History is a relative transformation of count-as-One of multiples; change is either regular or singular
Methodology	Dualist, deductive (statistics)	Triadic, historical materialism	Dualist, inductive (interviews)	Quadruple, retroductive (set and topos theory)

Introduction and Retroduction: The Logic of the Social explores the current formation of modern science and the relations between its various disciplines. It focuses on sociology and mathematics and explains how these disciplines were developed into opposing positions: the former being considered as least scientific, while the latter is considered its pinnacle. However, a closer look reveals that this tension between science and social science is redoubled from within sociology itself, in the form of methodological divides such as the (in)famous qualitative (inductive logic) and quantitative (deductive logic). Retroduction is a method of conceptualising which requires the researcher to identify the circumstances without which something (the concept) cannot exist. Used in conjunction, these forms of inference can lead to the formation of a new conceptual framework or theory. Retroduction is the kind of reasoning involved in discovery and invention. We could not get along without it. The Syllogistic Model: In a retroduction the minor premise is an OBSERVATION, usually of a surprising fact, i.e. something that catches our attention and demands an explanation. It is here that retroductive logic mediates the tensed relations between sociology (or words) and mathematics (or numbers) demonstrating the multiple as the shared, intuitive basis for both.

The Antinomies of the Social: Self-reference, Identity and Society identifies the main theme that has distinguished natural science from social science, namely self-reference. It shows how self-reference has been a foundational scientific antinomy, and how the notion of 'identity' was used to resolve it. Nonetheless, in social science the notion of identity only aggravated the (self-referential) problem. Thus, a new way of sociological thinking is needed, one that accommodates the fact that every individual, including scientists, belong to and interact with the societies they study.

Problems Abound: Multiplicities—Beyond the One and the Many expands on how sociology's existing ways of dealing with self-reference have varied, depending on the paradigm used. It claims that although innovative ways were developed to deal with self-reference, problems remain. The reason for this is shown to be a conceptual misuse of 'multiplicity'. Since existing sociological paradigms are based on other sciences, their utilisation of multiplicities is still confined to the restricting duality of the One and the Many (ones). The mathematical notion of 'set', as pure multiple (of multiples), illuminates a new avenue for research, which goes beyond both One and Many.

1 → 2: From Science to Social Science—Positivism In order to reach the proposed fourth approach, this chapter begins the (ordinal and cardinal) count at the beginning of social science, as an offshoot of natural science. It shows that this beginning of social science is found in the paradigm of Positivism. The chapter details how Positivism drew from biology and relied heavily on its functionalist-organist nature, maintained through boundary-work. Philosophically, such a base for sociology is dualistic and dichotomist and counters the very multiple essence of the social.

2 ^ 3: From Kant to Hegel—Conflictualism follows the positivist, biological and dualistic basis of sociology, this chapter explores the reactions against it from the second sociological paradigm of Conflictualism. Although its beginning with Marx preceded Positivism, it was only linked to sociology as a reaction against the latter and an attempt to revive the negative, critical reasoning of social science. Unlike Positivism's relation with Kantian philosophy and biological science, the diverse conflictual paradigm is based on history and therefore appeals to Hegel. While Marx is the most identified with this paradigm, he is accompanied by surprising thinkers such as French structuralists given their shared adherence to triadic logic.

3 ^ 2: American Interlude—From James (Back) to Kant: Pragmatism looks at what was happening sociologically in the US rather than in Europe. It shows how the American tendency in the early twentieth century was to distance itself from both positive-functional and negative-

conflictual paradigms and to establish its own. Found in the form of Pragmatism, this third paradigm was novel in its micro- perspective, which refreshingly took on the old battle of previous macro-paradigms. The chapter shows that the rise of Pragmatism was, dialectically, a return to the dualistic logic of the Two, based this time on physics instead of biology. While this third paradigm developed novel methodologies such as symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, it left behind the macro-ontological questions regarding society at large.

3 ^ 4: From Hegel to Badiou—Ontology of the Void articulates the contours of a

fourth approach to sociology, Multiplitism. In doing so, it traces the shift from Hegelian and Marxist, but also Structuralist triadism, to the quadruple or squared logic of Badiou. The chapter explains how Badiou's translation of the mathematical set theory includes all other scientific bases such as those of previous sociological paradigms, and grounds a new direction to sociology of multiplicities based on the notion of the void. This evasion of the One (and the other, Two), as anti-social foundation that pervades previous social paradigms and approaches, leads to the new materialist, scientific and critical thinking of the social.

Four Examples of Squared Analysis turns to the practical aspects of the fourth approach of

Multiplitism, by examining the Greimasian Semiotic Square as a conceptual and methodological tool of constructing infinites around a void. This tool's application is exemplified with regard to four scientific disciplines: philosophy, mathematics, epistemology and sociology. Their examination reveals that, counter-intuitively, a materialist thought of the social must go through a specific, infinitesimal abstraction in order to unearth its dialectical, open-ended and multiple natures.

Societies, Multiplicities, Sets: From Typology to Topology traces the attempts made

in recent decades to incorporate mathematical thinking into sociology. Anticipating Multiplitism, social thinkers such as Pierre Bourdieu and Annemarie Mol have tried, with varying levels of success, to apply spatial and relational mathematical concepts to sociological and anthropological inquiries. While contributing much to the advance of social theory beyond dualisms such as structure and subject their attempts nonetheless remain partial. They do not include the broader, ontological and mathematical contexts of these concepts, thus leading to further inconsistencies. The chapter argues that incorporating mathematics means drawing ontological consequences for the very being, and, distinctively, the appearance of social phenomena. It suggests a topological thinking, now grounded on mathematical ontology of multiplicities, in order to transcend the linguistic limitation and materialistically think the infinitely diverse spaces, positions and relations of the social.

Multiplitism and the Singular concludes the several means and ends of Multiplitism by

comparing it with the existing approaches to sociological research. Paradoxically, it locates the aim of Multiplitism in the notion of the singular, which stands outside the universal-particular dualist division. The chapter argues that only an ontological conception of multiplicities can include the empty-place of a 'generic' as singular, indiscernible set by constructible representational mechanisms such as the dominant language. It shows that the act of including the singular unifies theory and practice, and in doing so reconciles the observer, objective position of the scientific researcher with the participant, subjective and critical position of the researched. ***

In his famous lecture from 1918, Science as a Vocation, Weber rhetorically raised the following question: 'how should a devoted Catholic, on the one hand, and a Freemason, on the other, in a course on the forms of church and state or on religious history ever be brought to evaluate these subjects alike?' His answer was, 'this is out of the question'. On this point I differ from Weber, and insist that through the dialectical—not rhetorical—way delineated thus far, all the way to the Four, social scientists are no longer obligated to assume that some values are beyond factual change.

Only through a shared subtraction of such values and facts, stemming from every particular perspective whatsoever, will it ever be possible to share experiences with regard to our common existence founded on the void. If both the Catholic and the Freemason were to subtract their own systems of thought, subtracting their self with the knowledge and language of the represented situation, they were to find, as scientists sometimes do, the generic of the situation which is also its truth. This way the particular questions themselves are inverted to the universal and absolute extent that they are related to all.

Multiplitism is a retroductive way to explore and change the count-as-one of every phenomenon by moving from its appearance to its being. To fully appreciate this way, we must clarify the road taken from the inception of sociology through its pendulum movement between being and appearance. Prior sociological approaches, namely the Positivist, Conflictualist and Pragmatist, rely on linguistic definitions, such as the self, class, structure or society. In this they remain confined to the dominant knowledge/ power which forbids the production of new knowledge and novel hypotheses. This is why they employ deductive or inductive logics, rather than retroductive. Based on their respective philosophies and scientific disciplines, they inherited the formers' antinomies such as dualist separation on the one hand and triadic negativity on the other.

Unlike Positivism and Pragmatism that identify with Kant's ontological separationist and correlational thesis, and unlike the Marxist inverted fidelity to Hegel, the Fourth approach of Multiplitism is based on the mathematical philosophy of Alain Badiou, and in that allows for transitional sociology of multi-scaled compositions or countings of any phenomenon. Thus, it merges individual, group and societal levels of analysis, with diverse methodologies organised along the semiotic square of the Four. This approach does not rely, as the prior ones do, on biology, history or physics, but on mathematics and specifically set theory and topology, which Badiou translated to philosophy.

Consequently, I proposed to go further in this translation from philosophy to social science and sociology. In accordance with Badiou's philosophical system, I focused on one truth-procedure, the scientific, in addition to the other three of love, art and politics. This inquiry concentrated in the a-mystical and non-religious relations between the sciences and their objects and disciplines, as well as the implications on social sciences in general and specifically for sociology.

The social sciences have been torn by the dualistic, Kantian and religious tendency of the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband. His distinction between the nomothetic and universal law and the particular or idiosyncratic case has laid the foundations for the qualitative versus quantitative quarrel, which still persists today. Opting for the general side of the law, early sociologists adopted a functional and positivist perspective of society and the social. But to express the multiplicity of the social this dual insufficiently remains within the confining framework of the Two. Thus Marxism and Structuralism challenged this form of thought, and replaced it with their use of triadic logic. Pragmatism, with its withdrawal from the formers' universality and an emphasised empiricist and particularistic approach, did not bring the general question of society to its end.

The suggested approach of the Four differs dramatically from its predecessors in its fidelity to actual infinity, the being-multiple as such. Its anchoring point is the common ground for all beings: if they are, they are multiples. It is thus claimed that universality (as validity) and particularity (as taking-sides) are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary: only from an engaged and subtractive position can one arrive at a universal truth of the situation. Responding to all four core issues in the heart of social reason, this fourth approach, or approach of the Four as in quadruple dialectic, envisions society as a multiple multiplicity, a set with subsets and elements. The sociological imagination in Multiplitism is that of connections and unions composing reality as such, which makes any reality social. The level of analysis is multi-scaled, and encompasses both macro- and micro-levels. Scale-

relative and multi-dimensional, any society is in becoming as an infinite world, with, on the one hand, an internal order of appearance and relations between its objects (sets) and things (subsets), and on the other an external relation of belonging to something else, another (set as) situation, world, or universe.

These relations are the focus of interest, operative in localising, ordering and identifying counted subsets. As a set, the relations in every society are between the subsets and their social order, between the empty set and the power set and between the generic set and the infinite. The main question for analysis is the relations of belonging and inclusion, presentation and re-presentation, between the elements and the subsets. Laws of repetition, appearance and construction must be traced for any phenomenon, to explore its internal and external variations. This should be accomplished through relational approximations and distanciations, differences and similarities, along diversely changing borderings.

The summation of these sociological approaches, questions and parameters, as explained thus far, is given in Table 10.1. It shows that the common three approaches are based on entities or identities, and exclude either the logic of appearance or the logic of being. In the Fourth paradigm, the paradigmatic question regarding the studied phenomenon is what is it a part of? This is always what lies in front of set-oriented researcher. For him or her, history is a relative change to a world and a situation. Accordingly, change is in-itself beyond good and evil, and could be regular as change in location within the same situational order, or, as in singular change which exposes the void of the situation—a change of the law and order of world itself.

Badiou, in his Being and Event (2005), discusses rigorously the possibility of translating set theory to philosophy. Every axiom of the theory has an immediate analogy in ontology, the study of being-as-being. In this work he explains further the consistent ontology of set theory and its formulated axioms. Ontology is important for it enables sociologists to engage more productively with other scientific disciplines and also to enrich its own thinking with regard to methodological consistency of social beings. Yet, this consistency is built and constructed, not given. It is actually counted and re-counted, and then accounted (for), often by policing and more rarely by forcing. This re/count is internally split because:

> In set-theoretic ontology, the determination of the One (this multiple, such that it can unequivocally receive a proper name) is strictly immanent, because a set is identified by its elements, by the sets that belong to it. Such is the foundational character of the sign of belonging, ^, which is the veritable index of being qua being. On the other hand, being-in, as general form of immanence (i.e. the modalities according to which one multiple can be said to 'in' another) is radically split:
> 1. There is the foundational relationship of belonging, which states, for example by writing e ^ E, that the multiple e is an elementary constituent of the multiple E.
> 2. There is the derived relation of inclusion, which states, by writing A ^ E, that A is a part or a subset of E.
>
> Between these two relations through which being-in is formalised there is a crucial disjunction, which is like the real of being qua being. The second in fact exceeds the first in an errant or immeasurable way. Because the power (the pure multiple-quantity) of the set of its parts surpasses in a properly unnamable way the power of the set of elements, which in effect constitutes the initial set itself as One. (2014, p. 55)

According to Badiou, this 'disjunction' is constitutive to any situation, be it political, scientific, economic, familial or technological. We find in this expositional activation of set theory, its ontologisation, a response to all four core issues relevant for social sciences: 'every element of a set

is itself a set' (2005, p. 46). But this self-reference is only terminological relation. The real one is that of the event. These are events of self-presentation, and are thus rare moments of social action. The event occurs when being is presented and not re-presented by its appearance. As such, the event breaks the laws of representation. In science it may introduce a new theory whereas in politics a revolution; in both cases a new truth is forced onto the situation and affects all its inhabitants.

In Badiou's mathematical definition of the event (ex = {x ^ X, ex }), the response of this sociological approach to the problem of self-reference is clearly shown. For the event is a set which includes, or is composed of, itself and its site-elements. This process of forcing the situation to change through self-presentation amounts to the suspended breaking of the Axiom of Foundation, in order to impose another situational foundation, or minimally included and previously not included element. This is the operation of vanished-causality. The process of forcing (a generic set) is what creates novelty that was undetected prior to the event of research, an indiscernible part of the researched situation, as its unknown or repressed (and voided) Other. Also, by designating itself with a 'name', the event conditions being and calls its own existence and appearance in the world where it occurred (and dis-appeared with a trace). This is the existence of what will have taken place, as the event's own re-mark of the historical situation that will, according to its truth, have just been decided and transformed. As Badiou puts it in his Mathematics of the Transcendental, 'existence names exactly that which, ontologically, is not: a degree of being. Nor does this degree affect in any way the being of being. It is an index of its appearance (in a situation)' (2014, p. 166). Without the overconcretisation of the additive conventional methodologies, the nonobservables are revealed in the actual subtraction of any predicate of existing knowledge and language of the situation, while going through them point-by-point. Jason Barker elaborates on that disjunctional relationship, in a political framework, and claims that:

> The dialectic [of algebra and topology] is the venue for submitting logic— since there is no One—to the test of concrete situations, or to de-totalisation. In the case of algebra first, the requisite condition is one of 'belonging', or set membership, where e ^ E. Here we encounter a universe structured by its elements. On the other hand, in the case of topology, the requisite condition is one of 'inclusion', where P ^ E. Here we encounter a universe structured by its subsets, or parts, such that what belongs to the subset will also belong to the initial set, thus: e ^ P ^ e ^ E. The insurmountable 'paradox' of set theory emerges from the precise point of non-correlation of the two universes, which in this case states there will always be an excess of subsets over elements. Cantor's 'heavenly' discovery of multiple infinities means that there is no set of sets, no one universe within which all parts are parts can belong. (Barker, 2003, pp. 62–64)

It is in these conditions that the ambiguities of language should be analysed. This 'excess' of representation (of subsets, or part) is also immeasurable in infinite sets, and hence language or any symbolic mechanism reveals its limit point. Together with the axioms of the infinite, the empty and the power-set (full or definable), the knot of language and being (qua multiplicity) is dealt with in Zermelo's Axiom of Separation. Generally, it states that 'with regard to the multiple whose existence is affirmed, language has the power to discern a subset, or a part' (Badiou, 2014, p. 85). This separation of existence in a given domain is ontological, for it exposes the (algebra of) set theoretical ontic to the topological. Language inserts differences, order and (some) coherence into situations, which are, ontologically in-themselves, indifferent inconsistent multiplicities. According to Badiou, 'this is why it is so important to hold steadfastly to the multiple as such—the inconsistent composition of multiples-without-oneness—which identifies the singularity from within, in its strict actuality, stretching thought to the point at which there is no difference between difference and identity. A point where there is singularity because both difference and identity are indifferent to it' (2005, p. 79). It is thus possible to bring together Durkheim and his rival Tarde and overcome their substantial rivalry (society as a body vs. a body as a society) by way of the generic as singular. In

order to understand and undermine their rivalry, it is important to note the neo-Kantian background of Durkheim against Tarde's Leibnitzian one (Tarde, 2012). While Durkheim only treated ever-growing particulars and Tarde opted for singularities, what they both neglected is the actual possibility of universal singularity, ultimately excluding the void in their dualist or atomist reasoning.

First, let us claim with Badiou that 'every universal is singular, or is a singularity. It is not of the order of being, but of the order of a sudden emergence' (Badiou, 2005, pp. 144–145). Universal claims are rare these days precisely because of the rejection of the multiple as such. Unlike particularity, which is anything that can be discerned by knowledge and its descriptive, linguistic predicates, universality is 'both what determines its own points as subjects-thoughts and the virtual recollection of these points' (Badiou, 2009, p. 29). Universality refers to the entire elements of a set, to the entire field; but the set or field, in themselves, is singular. Hence, 'universality is nothing other than the faithful construction of an infinite generic multiple' (Badiou, 2005, p. 151).

The generic is that which Durkheim aspired to describe, and Tarde was all too familiar. As the singular is that which is subtracted from all describable means of the being-multiple, it is still sensible and operative in a situation. For example, while 'the cultural traits of populations are particular, that which traverse these traits and deactivating every registered description, universally summons a thought-subject, is singular' (Badiou, 2009, p. 28). This is how subtraction is operative in sociological reason. With the deactivation of 'registered descriptions' the remains are generic and the act of their re-construction is forcing it onto the situation and its encyclopaedic knowledge. In fact, this act of forcing realises the universal singularity. This is the act in which a subject (-thought) bound up as part of the procedure radically modifies the topological being of every-thing around it. It is an event that changes the rules of appearance, the measure of identity and the evaluative functions operative in any social situation.

Akin to Goffman's changing definition of the situation and the set theoretical Axiom of Foundation, an eventual, singular change establishes a novel foundation to the situation with the insertion of non-existing elements, previously undefined from the objective perspective of the situation. An event, amorous, political but also scientific, thus suspends the situational known foundation and installs a new one instead, as 'maximal' element: the new body of the couple, society or theory. This way social theory can trace singularities and sustain the existential gap that tore sociology three-way with every separatist approach. In this sense Zizek posed the question of why count to four?

> The Particular is always deficient and/or in excess with regard to its Universal: in excess, since it eludes the Universal; since the universal—in so far as it is 'abstract'—cannot encompass it; deficient, since—and this is the reverse of the same predicament—there is never enough of the Particular to 'fill out' the Universal frame. (1999, p. 43)

Following Hegel's triads but transgressing them with Lacan's Foursomes, it is possible to locate this gap within the thing-in-itself, not only between it and its phenomenological appearance. This means challenging Aristotle's identity principle and touching upon self-difference. By way of subtraction, the thing in-itself is exposed. No matter how much more information and data will be collected regarding it, the researcher will not break its conceptual walls of seclusion, as semantic and illocutionary actions. This is why, in effect, 'the point of subtraction is to reduce the overall complex structure to its antagonistic minimal difference' (Zizek, 2012, p. 33).

Sociology of the multiple aims at these singularities subtracted from any situation, which as such are constitutive of it. Along this line of questioning and reasoning, Thatcher's proclamation can be completed dialectically. While society as a whole may not exist, neither do any individuals nor families. Set theory reveals the crucially immanent and dialectical relationships regarding any appearance of some being in a situation: society, individuals or families. Any part of such sets is also a

set, and there is no whole. But there is a hole, an empty set, a void which on its edge we find the minimal existence.

This mathematical thinking enables sociology to enrich its explications of multi-scaled phenomena, as it could be, through the investigated situation, included in many worlds. In Plotnitsky's words:

> One might, accordingly, want to rethink the political and the spaces of the politics, or the politics (plural) of space, on the model, [that] defines any spatiality or ontology sociologically and hence when it comes to cultural spaces, politically by relations of a given space or ontology with other spaces or ontologies. At stake is a new, experimental onto-topology and thus, also, geo-topology, which defines the architecture of these relations, rather than only geo-graphy, which conventionally maps these spaces, although such mappings, too, have their place in this geo-topology of culture. An intrinsic structure—set-theoretical or other, say, topological, as the number of holes in a given space—is then derived from this 'sociology'. (2012, pp. 357, 367)

Only by retroductively tracing the composition of any situation, along its homo- and isomorphisms, where action meets structure, could the relations of inclusion and belonging be fully explored. This process also leads to revealing the operations of measurements according to which decisions are taken in 'real-life'. It adds a solid theoretical basis for sociological research with ontological 'glue' for diverse methods, thus turning their competition to cooperation. That is the role of this multiple ontological grounding provided by set theory and topos theory. Thus Plotnitsky concludes that:

> The working slogan is 'points come later', that is, after the architecture of space is socio-logically defined via a topos of other spaces over a given space. From this viewpoint, rather than a given point's point-like nature according to the conventional topology (which makes all points the same), it is the mathematical architecture that can be associated with a given point that defines it, which no longer makes all points the same. It is not unlike the situation in geography when the meaning of a physically spatial point depends on what kind of map (physical, economic, political, or other) or, closer to a topos, atlas of maps is associated with it. (ibid., p. 358)

Now, then, it is time to decide. Despite the scientific conventional wisdom according to which science is only about experiments and not decisions, if we choose not to decide on positions and possibilities, on axioms and presumptions, we simply let the decisions be made for us by the ideological configuration of (scientific) space to which we belong. That is what happens if social scientists become technicians of the social and nothing more than experts for politico-economical hire.

The a-subjective scientists are considered as separated from reality and their objects of study. Alas, the sociology of the multiple admits the dialectic of the ontological and not only the epistemological; in science it affirms with mathematics (not physics, biology or history) the foundations of set theory; in itself, it adopts a courageous position of the subtractive, in the continuous search and re-search for the undecided, the indiscernible, the unnameable and (hence) the generic of every investigated situation. Each of these is a dynamically and intrinsically comparative operation, including to itself with internal variation and inner-context. Multiplitism is both historically educated and synchronically motivated. It does confirm some parts (or rather, elements) of reality which are unknown in any given situation and are covered or represented, not counted and presented. It presents a sociological approach that is not fixed on the universal, as in the cases of Positivism and Conflictualism, but also not on the particular as with Pragmatism. Multiplitism is always attentive to its unobservable and multi-scaled surroundings, including empirical, theoretical and conceptual ones.

The suggested approach radicalises, not contradicts Positivism, in order for the latter to stretch its borders and include also the void of any real situation, making it detectable. Appealing also to the conflictual Marxism, 'it's remarkable that what will serve to sustain negation in the order of appearance is the first consequence of the transcendental operations, and in no sense represents an initial parameter. Negation, in the extended and 'positive' form of the existence of the reverse of a being, is a result' (Badiou, 2005, pp. 214–5). This kind of borderless Positivism can be useful even for critical analysis, against the positivistic original institutional affiliation with the status-quo. Multiplitism haunts the rule of repetition and its reoccurring exceptional transgressions. It is precisely the relations between these two modes of sociability that lies at the centre of the de-totalised infinite social.

Whether statistics, interviews, newspapers, blogs, movies and TV shows, internet networks and so on—this question, in itself, does not matter. What matters is the singular aggregation of this or that multiple data which transforms it into the one-corpus, in the form of a meaningfully consistent and logical system such as the semiotic square. This operation first examines a certain antagonism along a quadruple matrix of positive and negative, universal and particular. If this system is able to include, and make part of every element of this or that situation, then it is evaluated as being true (and itself as part of forcing this truth). That is, of course, until another universal singularity is found, forced and proved to be generic in including the previous one in its ever-growing comprehension of novel situations and their intelligent apprehensions. <>

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE OBJECT AND HUMAN POSITIONING: HUMAN, NON-HUMAN AND POSTHUMAN edited by Calley A. Hornbuckle, Jadwiga S. Smith, William S. Smith [Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Springer, 9783030664367]

This edited volume explores the intersections of the human, nonhuman, transhuman, and posthuman from a phenomenological perspective. Representing perspectives from several disciplines, these investigations take a closer look at the relationship between the phenomenology of life, creative Event: 'We must always bear in mind that the ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but that they are always "there" already, even when that empirical material simply gets collected'. Therefore, this book is about the consequences of deciding upon set theory, and mathematics more broadly to be the epoch-making discovery that re-forms the materialist thinking of reality and society.

In doing so, this book sets out against both contemporary idealist tendencies: the religious infinity of God on the one hand, and the capitalist, secular infinity of Money on the other hand. These two tendencies are the most prevalent orientations to social life, shared worldwide by professionals and laypersons alike Introduction and Retroduction: The Logic of the Social explores the current formation of modern science and the relations between its various disciplines. It focuses on sociology and mathematics and explains how these disciplines were developed into opposing positions: the former being considered as least scientific, while the latter is considered its pinnacle. However, a closer look reveals that this tension between science and social science is redoubled from within sociology itself, in the form of methodological divides such as the (in)famous qualitative (inductive logic) and quantitative (deductive logic). It is here that retroductive logic mediates the

tensed relations between sociology (or words) and mathematics (or numbers) demonstrating the multiple as the shared, intuitive basis for both.

What they share is the defeatist approach to real, actual and material infinity. Believing that infinity can be either religious or secular keeps thought idealist and prohibits it from really, actively, thinking the infinite. It is also why we experience the contemporary hegemony of cultural relativism, by which any kind of absolutism immediately sounds oppressive. Contrarily, a materialist thought that begins with an absolute decision on what matters, seems like the proper place from which to launch our inquiry into a new approach to sociology; one that is all about pure multiplicity in its irreducibility to any One. ontopoiesis, and otherness; technology and the human; art and the question of humanity; nonhumans, animals, and intentionality; and transhumanism. Ontological positioning of the human is reconsidered with regard to the nonhuman, transhuman, and posthuman within the cosmos. Further examination of the artificial and object in the lifeworld is also explored. This volume also pays tribute to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and her methodical contributions to phenomenology. This text appeals to students and researchers of phenomenology worldwide.

Contents

Part VI Human/Nature/Cosmos
Towards a Hermeneutic of the Artificial by Marie Antonios Sassine
Apeiron Civilization: The Irruption of Infinity in Science and the Universe by Ion Soteropoulos
Man as the Ambassador of the Cosmos: Henryk Skolimowski's Concept by Anna Malecka and Katarzyna Stark

This volume covers six topics from a Husserliana phenomenological perspective:

Part I Homage to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka:

The Subject/Object Relationship According to the Phenomenology of Life of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka: Discovering the Metamorphic Logos of the Ontopoiesis of Life by Daniela Verducci

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka did not limit herself to extending the field of phenomenological inquiry to the phenomenology of life. Her phenomenology of life opens a new horizon of meaning for facing the serious problems of our times, connected with the dis-communication between subject and object, such as the questions related to environmental sustainability and post-humanism. Practicing the phenomenology of life, A.-T. Tymieniecka discovered both, life as the objective interweaving between human condition and nature, and the auto-individualizing logos of life as the formative and propulsive force, which is intrinsic to becoming in all its forms. This logos is creative and po(i)etic, according to the terminology of Aristotle's Poetics (1996), or better, it is onto-poietic, because it gives rise to the creation-of-being, activating the dynamics of self-individualization of being itself at every level. In the perspective of life, the subject-object dualism appears recomposed, as we can phenomenologically show that there is a unique auto-individualizing logos/force, which leads the becoming in every its forms. The logos of life as sentient and metamorphic is different from the modern rationalistic logos, which, on the contrary, is fixed and extrinsic to life, limited to imposing reduced frameworks to cage the infinitely faceted fluidity of living. However, the logos of life is equally capable to weave that web of meaning that "saves" the new phenomena that appear before our eyes from the dispersion and senselessness to which they are condemned by postmodern deconstructionism and nihilism. Effectively, Tymieniecka, focusing the ontopoietic logos of life, was able to exhibit a real—not only logic—poietic continuity between the constructivism of natural life and the creative evolution of human life. But, despite having achieved such a metaphysical maturity of the logos, a further dualism between nature and super-nature challenged the phenomenology of life. At this point, the metamorphic quality of the logos of life played a decisive role, because it allowed the unique logos to vary its own form according to the vectors that support its enaction, be they the laws of physics, the animal instinct or man's creative imagination and will. It was precisely by assuming the human will as its new vehicle that the ontopoietic logos of life was able to advance from the vital/ ontopoietic round of significance into two new dominions of sense: that of the creative/spiritual and that of the sacred. Herefrom, the ontopoiesis of life opened to the transformative advance of the Great Metamorphosis, that completes life's meaning in a transition from temporal life to hyper-temporality, combining every residual dualism. The path of a New Enlightenment opens out before us and the metaphysical enterprise is once again within our grasp.

Part II Transcendental Idealism: Investigation Continues

Puzzles in Phenomenology by Lucian Delescu:

The challenge phenomenology must overcome is the integration of conscious intentional experiences within a scientific framework. In order to do that, two painfully entangled aspects must be clarified. The first is the epistemological aspect which is concerned with setting out a proper theoretical framework. The second is the ontological aspect and is concerned with the explanation

of conscious intentional experiences. Ideally, one should begin with the ontological aspect. However, one becomes aware of conscious experiences when noticing the ontological implications of the "peculiar pattern of combination of the concepts, and truths which form the ideal unity of a particular science" (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b, 115). To be sure, higher-order propositions are not be taken as sole hints to the existence of consciousness. One is also right if arguing that consciousness can be inferred from the pattern of the simplest propositions such as "I am" or even from the pronoun "I." In other words, consciousness is involved in generating propositions with lower and higher epistemic values and anything in between at the same time. This is to say that, in order to explain consciousness, it is required to set out the proper epistemic conditions. By that, I mean conditions for unraveling the ontological implications of lower and higher-order propositions beneath which runs the conscious stream. In the last decades, there was a lot a debate regarding this matter. The result is a growing number of phenomenologists attempting to explain consciousness from an emotivist perspective. By "emotivism," a term first coined by A. J. Ayer, I mean the view according to which all mental activities arise at the intersection between senses and the external reality. The quest of emotivism is to realistically solve the problem of consciousness. But in doing away with cognitive processes, emotivism ends up from an ontological point of view by denying a fundamental feature of mind without accounting for sense-making (traditional emotivism) or by redefining it from a sense-interactivist perspective (phenomenological emotivism) which is the same. From an epistemological point of view, emotivism (re)commits itself to subjectivism which goes against its own realist claims. My claim is that reason is "the key feature of conscious life" (Husserl, 1970, 338). It is by explaining reasoning, no matter how difficult that might be, that we can begin to unravel the mystery of consciousness. In what follows, I deal with some differences between reason and emotion within phenomenology and argue for the need to reinstate reason as a key feature of consciousness.

Part III Politics/Social Issues/Question of Universality

Brave New World: A Confinement Between Mythical and Behaviourist World-Views by Aydan Turanli

Progresses in computer science and biotechnology pave the way for the construction of developed robots and enhanced human beings. In the transitionary epoch we live in, we talk about not only the possibility of universal Turing Machine in the near future, but also the possibility of enhanced and super-intelligent human beings. These thoughts, in turn, lead a discussion about how we are going to interact with non-human but "intelligent" machines on the one hand, and enhanced post-human beings on the other hand.

As is well known, these issues are also thoroughly discussed in science-fiction books and films. Isaac Asimov's book I Robot and the film Gattaca are chief examples examining these issues. The first one primarily focuses on what kind of relations we will develop with non-human, but "intelligent" entities, the second one, on the other hand, concentrates on post-humans, perfect in health and appearance, with high IQ and long life-span, created through genetic engineering in the test tube. In the brave new world of the film Gattaca, there is the clash between biologically formed post-human beings, who are selected and reserved for superior jobs and naturally born human beings, who are assigned to carry out unqualified jobs.

These reflections on issues related to human, non-human and post-human of the future lead us to think about Aldous Huxley's Brave New World because it is also a science-fictive novel referring to the problems, which will be created in the future through the developments in biotechnology. The book is, on the one hand, critical of modern societies through allegorical associations and on the other hand, it draws our attention to a new world, which would be created through the developments in technology in the future. One of the problems considered in the book is related to

the interaction between, human and post-human. The second problem is linked to the issue whether rational means are adequate to overcome clashes between different points of view, depending on different forms of life. In this article, I discuss these problems especially by focusing on the second problem within the context of Brave New World and Island.

As is well known, Brave New World is a futuristic novel, which describes a dystopian World State in the sixth century A.F (after Ford) in which genetic engineering and biotechnology are highly developed. Most of the human beings living in the state are born from human eggs; human eggs are treated by scientists and made clever, stupid, and average. There is a eugenically stratified caste-system of the society in which there are five divisions: Alphas are at the top, and then there are Betas, Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons. There is no family, there are no ancestors, and the primary motto of the World State is epitomized in three simple words: "Community, Identity and Stability." The first one implies that people should be at peace with one another and serve the state. The second one is that everyone in one social group should be exactly like everyone else and should not try to be different, and thanks to the conditioning systems they have, they cannot be different. The third one, on the other hand, requires citizens in the World State to be content and do not try to change society in any way. Because "History is bunk," there is no appeal to history, literature, art or even science. Hence, citizens of the World State are illiterate of the past cultures.

The principles of the State are inculcated into citizens by conditioning, which is a significant part of training. There is a wide-range of training methods, extending from sleep-teaching conditioning to even electro-shock conditioning.

On the other side of the coin, we see another part of the World State, in which there are savage Reservations isolated from the rest, surrounded by electric fences. Savages living there are at the bottom of the hierarchical caste system and there is no escape from a savage reservation. People, who are born there, have to die there. As they are different from genetically designed human beings, savages in the old world have ancestors. They keep their habits and customs such as marriage, religion, rituals, diseases, and wild animals.

The clash between the "civilized world" and the old world comes to the fore especially when John the Savage is taken to the civilized world and exhibited as if he is a cage-animal. The Savage's emotionality, beliefs, traditions, and rituals are in discord with the pragmatist, utilitarian and behaviorist way of living of the inhabitants of the New World. The conflict between the two different world-views reaches its peak when Mustapha Mond explained to John the Savage the reasons why the civilized world is designed in the way it is. This disagreement ended with a tragedy. Is this inevitable?

Along with other novels such as George Orwell's 1984, Brave New World parodies, in Martin Heidegger's term "enframing" that is created in modern societies. Even the characters' names in the novel are inspired by 1900s world: "Ford," "Mond" have reference to actual industrialists of the time.

The New World is based on a form of life, in which human beings are insensitive, pragmatically driven and free of emotions. This reminds us of the material culture of modern societies in which one-dimensionality eliminates creativity, art, values, beliefs, sensitivities, and even science.

Part IV Art and the Question of Humanity

Paul Klee's Ad Parnassum and the Reworking of Consciousness by Bruce Ross

The tumult in modern art at the beginning of the twentieth century centrally incorporated redefinitions of painterly treatment of form and color and, moreover, subject matter. It could easily be stated that a new form of consciousness was being expressed, most likely because of the

undermining of the established empires by World War I, resulting in the phenomenological experience of an almost inhuman transformation. More than a simple reaction to long standing points of focus, including structural arrangements, in cityscape, landscape, or portraiture, some deep phenomenological connection to the nature of art was being uncovered. Explorations of primitive art, metaphysical understanding of time and space, and spiritual concepts like the aura were supporting Pointillism, Cubism, and "pure painting." The result was a repudiation of mental or painterly stasis as the nexus of art, with perhaps a reconsideration, in some cases, of the aesthetic idea of the sublime, as in Paul Klee's Ad Parnassum (1932) (Partsch, 2003, 65). The importance of these directions in Klee's art, and specifically, this painting, is examined in Hajo Düchting's study of Klee's understanding of music: "Klee saw polyphonic painting as superior to all other arts, because he felt that spatial and temporal dimensions can be given visual expression in a two-dimensional representation as two intersecting planes. His masterpiece Ad Parnassum constitutes the great synthesis of this endeavor" (Düchting, 2002, 78).

This paper examines Klee's use of structure, color, language as language, North African visits, and symbolism of the sun and moon as a project to reorient consciousness and the nature of painting itself as it impinges upon Ad Parnassum to reveal an unstated relation to prehistoric art, the shamanic trance state, pre-Socratic issues of flux and stasis, a neo-Platonic interest in pulsing energy, and Orphism's understanding of natural form, all to the emphasis in Klee of a lyrical use of color and form to evoke an affect, in this painting, of metaphysical sublime.

Part of this revolution was making painting a vehicle of its own aesthetic intentions as opposed to being a subject to pre-modern orientations to so-called objective reality. Structure as structure and color as color became a central focus. Klee's early Dogmatic Composition (1918) gives us a re-thought cityscape dominated by vertical patches of color and a density of x's and some asterisks within squares and rectangles, and a few arches, all in a richer color hue to designate buildings, a red roof at the lower left, a pale yellow moon or sun in the upper right gives a spatial orientation. Humor is introduced with a bright red heart, the name Maria in capital letters, and an abstract drawing of a woman below the name. The later Individualized altimetry of layers (1930), with its horizontal arrangement of different blocks of color in darker and lighter hues and its humorous title referring to measuring elevation, here to reflect an internal emotion, prefigures as "pure painting" modern abstract expressionist art.

Klee was a member of The Blue Four group (1923) and probably learned from group member Wassily Kandinsky abstract form technique and from Lyonel Feininger abstract architectural form. Klee was also probably influenced by Robert Delaunay's approaches to Cubism which revolutionized form, color, and subject. Klee would learn to create abstract structures and to illuminate such structures through color. Düchting notes: "Klee used the musical term 'polyphonic' (many-voiced) in titles to draw attention to the simultaneous sounds created by the various pictorial elements and stylistic devices in his painting" (Düchting, 2002, 48). Düchting noted Klee used the term in relation to Delaunay's paintings and quotes Klee on one of these paintings: "Polyphonic painting is superior to music in so far as the temporal element has more of a spatial quality. The sense of simultaneity emerges in an enriched form. With his choice of an over-sized horizontal format, Delaunay endeavored to accentuate the temporal dimension of the picture in the manner of a fugue" (Düchting, 2002, 27–28).

The proposed metaphoric relation of music and painting, the subject of Düchting's study, gives some purchase to one of the aims of Cubism. Not unrelated, Edmund Husserl somewhere noted the way to look at a plant was to look at it from all directions, a kind of polyphony of natural entities. So, out of a breaking down of structure, there may be an illumination of a given painterly subject, as in the metaphoric music structure equivalent, supported by the emotional effect of color and form.

Certainly there is an evident rhythm to be seen in Cubist paintings, including Klee's. Many of Klee's paintings have apparent connections to representational subjects. For example, in Mountain Village (1934), there is verticality offered by the painting's orientation and hints of the mountain forest in the upper left quarter with light green openings beyond the many shapes and bright colors of the village itself, both producing a kind of rhythm. Revolution of the Viaducts (1937) presents a cartoonish rhythmic procession of brightly colored viaducts. Park near Lucerne (1938) is dreamlike with abstract black plants, trees, and, perhaps, paths, each surrounded by different pale colors, possibly a kind of aura. These objects are seemingly floating in a pale blue backdrop of sky or perhaps consciousness itself. Highways and Byways (1929) is a construction of a countryside, an abstract landscape of delicate colors and various small rectangular shapes organized projecting a subtle rhythmic quality through form and color. Approaching modern abstract art in its forthright use of bright color (here crayon on burlap) and rhythmically grouped, variously sized, squares and rectangles, Glass Façade (1940), with its façade whimsically backed by slight sections of the chartreuse element, perhaps the true self, behind the façade, has an upbeat feel.

Klee developed several distinct approaches to color and form, usually extensions of other painters' work. He had his own theory of complementary colors and their emotional qualities as color. Blossoming (1934) is constructed entirely of squares and rectangles. The larger ones in more somber hues surround a section of brightly colored small forms, creating an expression of burgeoning life. Harmony of rectangles with red, yellow, blue, white and black (1923) also offers various shaped squares and rectangles on a black background. All the colors are in dull hues and overall produce a somber painting. Such patterns of brightly colored checkerboard and simple geometric patterns occur in prehistoric cave art, such as the colored squares at Lascaux or the engraved grid at Grotte de Bara-Bahau and in Southwest pictographs of Native North America suggesting a tantalizing commonality of discovery. The Day in the Forest (1935) prefigures Park near Lucerne with stark black trees and some of their shadows lodged near boulders of pastel colors or overhanging an open area in pale orange, perhaps a huge boulder, pond, or open earth, and perhaps a lake in pale blue at the painting's top, the rhythm here created by color. The approach of blocks of non-representational color on representational form here is indebted to The Blue Rider (1911) approaches of Kandinsky and Franz Marc, such as Marc's blue horse paintings. Klee was also influenced by Pointillism which he renamed "divisionist painting." Düchting describes the process: "A coloured ground is applied either in a cloud pattern or divided into rectangles and covered by a grid of dense dots of contrasting colours, giving the image depth and transparency. In these pictures the contrast between the coloured ground and the pattern of dots results in an intense luminosity" (Düchting, 2002, 68–69).

In Palace Garden (1931), the abstract spires, roofs, and supporting structures are highlighted in such clouds and rectangles of pale pink and dark brown dots within the overall mosaic-like pattern of dots. The interaction of these elements produce a sparkling effect, as if patches of light flicker in, perhaps, a night scene here. Düchting cites Klee's own understanding of this process: "this work was created by placing a highly dynamic, individual element based on colour on a tonally-dynamic structural rhythm" (Düchting, 2002, 70). In Tendril (1932), the pastel pink and blue cloudlike patches of dots provide the dynamic background for the static abstract black or blue forms reminiscent of rock art geometric shapes and a bright sun made up of minute yellow dots, almost pulsing energy to the tendril below it. This kind of construction is the central building block of Ad Parnassum and produces the mesmerizing effect in the painting. Painted 3 years after this work, Light and Sharpness (1935) is a compressed version of the key aspects of Ad Parnassum, as if Klee wanted to point to the centrality of "divisionist painting" in his masterwork...

Part V Human/Beast/Object
The Situation of Human Being in Nature According to Fedor Dostoyevsky, Thomas Mann, and Robert Musil: A Paradoxical Builder, Self-Enhancing Being and Speaking-Animal by Michel Dion

We should be very cautious, when exploiting natural resources since we cannot weight up natural phenomena. Although we cannot presuppose that some natural laws are undecipherable, we cannot be ensured that we will know enough about natural processes to prevent disasters (Dostoïevski, 1972, 375). Abused nature impose much more severe punishment than human justice. Human justice could release people (particularly criminals) from despair. However, it partially releases humankind from the atonement of Nature (Dostoïevski, 1973, 883). Dostoyevsky interpreted human rebelling against Nature as an existential fight against death itself (Lamblé, 2001, 113). As a ghastly phenomenon, death is contradicting the beauty of Nature. An anthropocentric attitude toward Nature implies that the whole Nature has been created for the sake of humankind. Is human being the measure of everything (Mann, 2010, 451–455, 763)? Such anthropometrism has been originally asserted by Protagoras (Theaetetus, 152a: Plato, 2011, 1904). Plato's philosophy was focusing on God-knowledge rather than the knowledge of Nature and of natural processes.

What is the situation of human being in Nature? From the midst of the nineteenth century to the mid of the twentieth century, three well-known novelists have deepened their philosophical questioning and adopted very different approach of human-Nature relationships. Questioning the place of human and non-human beings in Nature inevitably unveils the relationships between humans and their gods. Fedor Dostoyevsky used two meanings for God's existence. Firstly, God's existence could refer to Divine Life. Secondly, God's existence could be reduced to the idea of the Infinite as it is present in human mind and society. If the Infinite overcomes the finite, while being present in the finite, then the Infinite should be transhistorically rooted. Overcoming the finite makes impossible for the Infinite to have any historical situation. Otherwise, being-historical would be meaningless. Can we really know the Divine Life? I cannot know what it means to live for a mouse. I cannot seize how a mouse actually feels it own life processes. I will always be unable to grasp to what extent a mouse perceives its own life. In the same way, I cannot understand how God feels its Divine Life, and if God gives any meaning to Divine existence. Some believers claim that in their after-life, dead people will know what the Divine Life is all about. But this belief would imply that knowledge processes are still going on, after one's death. As dead people, do we still have memory, imagination, desires and needs? Nobody knows if dead people are able to know anything in their after-life, and thus if they are able to know the Divine Life. The only thing I know is what it means to live, as human being. And even that remains unclear. I could believe that my own existence is meaningful, while later on I could perceive it as being meaningless. Human existence gives birth to multiple interpretations. According to Dostoyevsky, human being cannot be perfect, and thus infinite. Only transhistorical beings which do not live (like gods) could be perfect and infinite. Referring to the first meaning of God's existence, we could say that God does not live at all, or at least, that we cannot perceive it. If God is a transhistorical being, then God must not be subjected to life processes. Being-historical is required to exist. God cannot be subjected to existential predicament. If there is any Divine Life, then we will never know to what extent it could be compared to life processes in the whole Universe. But we could certainly say that life processes are not expressing perfection at all. Dostoyevsky explained how human being could be the builder who has the power to destroy everything-that-is (the paradoxical character of the builder). Dostoyevsky was not deeply convinced that human being could love Nature, except if he/she looks at it as the Divine Creation. In his Notes from the Underground (1864), Dostoyevsky addressed the issue of the paradoxical builder. In a

godly-focused perspective, Dostoyevsky asked the following question: Can a paradoxical builder love natural beings?

Thomas Mann unveiled the deep influence of the unconscious as well as the subconscious, especially in The Magic Mountain (1924) and The Doktor Faustus (1947): both components of human psyche must be taken into account, when exploring the mystery of human being. Human psyche is self-enhancing. In a psychologically- focused perspective, Mann asked the following question: How could a self-enhancing being be champion of life processes?

Robert Musil's literary works (particularly The Man Without Qualities, 1930–1933) focused on commonalities between animals and human beings, that is, their similar instincts. Musil adopted a naturally-focused perspective, although human being is defined as the speaking-animal (Aristotle Politics, 1253a10: Aristotle, 1943, 54). Musil was promoting a new morals, as it is grounded on instinctive life. Can a speaking-animal overcome its natural instincts?

Fedor Dostoyevsky was confronted to the ideal of the pure builder, that is, the homo faber who could use natural resources in a very productive/creative way. Only human being could live mystical experiences. Human being is the homo religiosus, that is, the being who has created the idea of God. Human being is also the builder who has the power to destroy everything-that-is. Human being can curse everything. Human being can love natural beings, but in a paradoxical way. Human being can love animals and plants, while exploiting them for his/her own self-interest. Human being is the paradoxical lover of Nature. Dostoyevsky made the ideal of a pure builder totally disappear.

Thomas Mann was dealing with the Nietzschean ideal of a Champion of life processes. Human will to live is deeply influenced by the unconscious as well as the subconscious. Insofar as he/she is led by unconscious/subconscious processes, human being is a self-enhancing being. Could self-enhancing being be a champion of life processes? Not at all. A self-enhancing being is focusing on its self-interest. Being a champion of life processes would imply to radically criticize the situation of human being in Nature, and to get rid of anthropocentric/anthropometric attitudes. Mann unveiled the vicious trend of a self-enhancing being. Any ideal notion of Champion of life processes is disconnected from human existential predicament.

Robert Musil analyzed the ideal self-perception of a speaking-animal. Musil was dreaming about personal ethics that has nothing to do with rationalized and static morality (Dahan-Gaida, 1994, 125–126). Musil was not convinced that evil could be inherently linked to human nature (Vatan, 2000, 68–70). The existential task is not to identify any natural goodness, or maliciousness. Rather, we must understand why human being could be as much good as malicious. Animals and human beings share same instincts. However, unlike animals, human beings actually speak. Human being is a being who is in-language. He/she is the speakinganimal. Musil was promoting a new morals, grounded on instinctive life. Can a speaking-animal exploit its natural instincts to deeply understand every natural being? Not at all. The ideal self-perception of speaking-animal could give birth to a new morals. However, unlike animals, human being is the speaking-animal, so that he/she cannot avoid the multiple interpretations of natural instincts. The gap between human existential predicament and the situation of non-human beings in Nature cannot be overcome.

Dostoyevsky, Mann and Musil agreed that human being is prone to consider himself/herself as an infinite being. Firstly, human being destroys Nature and justifies himself/herself through technocratic and anthropometric/anthropocentric worldviews (Nietzsche, 1966, 215–221). Secondly, human beings forget the situation of nonhuman beings and put the emphasis on their privileged position in the Cosmos. Thirdly, human being looks at language as the supreme quality of living beings and makes human language the ultimate parameter for any other form of language. The way those three

aspects of human being and existence are idolized strengthens a mindset focusing on the infinite character of humankind, when compared with the situation of nonhuman beings.

Part VI Human/Nature/Cosmos
Apeiron Civilization: The Irruption of Infinity in Science and the Universe by Ion Soteropoulos

- **THE EXPANDING SPHERE. (COURTESY OF VASSARELY)**

Human Progress: The Infinitization of Our Nearby Finite World

We conceive the progression of our human civilization as an infinitization process that consists of expanding the finite sphere of our surrounding observable world to the farthest point in the infinite universe. The infinitization of our nearby finite world—which we take to be coextensive with our local biological and terrestrial worlds hierarchically ordered by Euclidean time—had already begun in in the fifteenth century with the work of the great rationalist philosopher Nicolas of Cusa. He was followed by the philosophers Giordano Bruno (sixteenth century), René Descartes (seventeenth century), Henry More (seventeenth century), Baruch Spinoza (seventeenth century), Isaac Newton (seventeenth to eighteenth century), and Pierre-Simon de Laplace (eighteenth to nineteenth century).

Regardless of the different conceptions of infinity held by these rationalist thinkers—that infinity is reduced into a finite world varying indefinitely with time (Nicolas of Cusa, Bruno, Descartes) or that infinity is the maximum or infinite universe that has the ontological properties of the Divine Being and is given at once to our infinite reason (More, Spinoza, Newton, Laplace)—they had the following common aim: to open and extend the hermetically closed frontiers of the narrow sphere of the familar world of our finite particular senses via the expansive and creative power of the apeiron.

Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the infinitization process of our finite world forces us to enter its second phase: the decline of the finite analytic paradigm on which our finite civilization (including our positivist science, hierarchical society, and finite neuronal brain) is based and its gradual replacement with the infinite synthetic paradigm conceived by our infinite mind (the Greek nous, vo^S) and its faculty of infinite synthetic reason.

By extending our finite world to the farthest point, which is the limiting boundary of the infinite universe, human existence aims to reach the level of completeness (reXet6rqra) the infinite universe principally has without losing its human individuality. The term we use to designate this cosmic end of completeness via the infinitization process is the Pythagorean project of human development. However, insofar as human progression takes place within the Euclidean finite analytic paradigm, it is an indefinite progression deprived of the capacity to reach the limiting boundary of the infinite universe. Despite the successive infinitization of our finite world, we are still inside our indefinitely expanding finite world and at an infinite distance from the limiting boundary of the infinite physical universe.

To break free of the incompleteness of our indefinitely progressing finite world and effectively reach the completeness of the infinite universe, we must transform the Euclidean finite analytic paradigm of our finite civilization into its antithesis, the non-Euclidean infinite synthetic paradigm on which the emerging apeiron civilization will be based. <>

PHILOSOPHISCHE NOTIZBÜCHER / PHILOSOPHICAL NOTEBOOKS by Kurt Gödel, translated by Merlin Carl, edited by Eva-Maria Engelen [De Gruyter]

- First complete, historical-critical, bilingual edition of Kurt Gödel's philosophical notebooks
- Each volume includes a carefully edited German text with annotations, also an English translation with abbreviated editorial notes and commentary
- An as yet unknown philosophical account of one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century
- For everyone interested in philosophy this series releases a volume annually until completed.

BAND 1 PHILOSOPHIE I MAXIMEN 0 / PHILOSOPHY I MAXIMS 0 by Kurt Gödel, edited by Eva-Maria Engelen, English translation from the German by Merlin Carl [De Gruyter, 9783110583748]

Over a period of 22 years (1934-1955), the mathematician Kurt Gödel wrote down a series of philosophical reflections, the so-called Philosophical Remarks (Max Phil). They have been handed down in 15 notebooks written in Gabelsberg shorthand. The first notebook contains general philosophical reflections. Notebooks two and three consist of Gödel's individual ethics. The notebooks that follow clearly show that Gödel had designed a philosophy of science in which he placed his discussions of physics, psychology, biology, mathematics, language, theology, and history within the context of a particular metaphysics. For the first time, the Kurt Gödel Research Center of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences is preparing a complete, historical-critical edition of Gödel's philosophical notebooks. A volume will published each year as a part of this edition. Volume 1, which Gödel entitled "Philosophy I Max 0," covers Gödel´s own philosophical reflections as well as those of other authors that were important to him. These were placed by Gödel at the beginning of his overall philosophical project. The introduction of the editor Eva-Maria Engelen provides an overview of this particular body of work.

INHALT – CONTENTS
KURT GÖDEL – PHILOSOPHISCHE NOTIZBÜCHER
Vorwort
Dank

Editorial Notes

The present transcription is a reconstruction of the text written in the German shorthand Gabelsberger. This requires grammatical and other additions, which are pointed out for the interested reader in a way that does not impede the reading experience.

The present volume contains an extensive bibliography of works that Gödel read and used for his notes. Details are provided in the bibliography, while brief information is given in the comments. As a rule, I refer to the first edition of the work in question, except when it is apparent which edition Gödel himself used, in which case that edition is given. The literature referenced in the introduction is given separately at the end of the introduction, but does not appear again in the references.

Detailed information on the persons to whom Gödel refers directly or indirectly can be found in the index of persons and occasionally in the comments.

In the translation, logical symbols are given in modern notation, whereas in the German original text, Gödel's notation is preserved for the benefit of research on the history of logical notation.

The English translation is typographically similar to the German text. The following are omitted, however: Uncertain readings/the distinction between longhand and shorthand/the optical highlighting of added words and parts of words/the marking of illegible text/the marking of insertions/all non-explanatory comments in the critical apparatus…

Editorial Principles for the Translation of Gödel's Notebooks

In contrast to the German version, multiple underscores are reproduced as single underscores throughout. Words and passages that were crossed out by Gödel are mostly omitted, as are the editorial comments from the German version concerning alternative readings of certain passages.

Gödel's pagination of the manuscript pages is reproduced in square brackets. When editorial reference is made to specific places in the notebook, this pagination is used…

Kurt Gödel's philosophical notebooks and the tradition of notebook writing

Notebook Writing

One will not be able to categorize and understand Gödel's philosophical notebooks unless one considers them in the context of the tradition of notebook writing. This tradition produced a type of text with specific characteristics. For an appropriate reading of the notes, one should keep in mind those characteristics as well as the function of notebooks for an author's thinking and for their

creative process. This helps to avoid misinterpretations as well as rash (mis)judgments and (mis)readings.

A notebook allows the writer to develop his or her own tentative perspective by addressing the positions of other writers: In a notebook, it is easy to take up or discard other people's thoughts.' Hence, philosophical and scientific notebooks often have an exploratory character. Ideas are tried out and developed, repeated and observed from a different perspective, or simply crossed out and considered no further. In private, it becomes possible to develop ideas at length on and investigate new connections. The thoughts of other authors can be picked up or unscrupulously critiqued. One can drop one's own approaches or come up with counter-positions in a playful manner.

Clearly, this is not a method of writing that leads to a systematically argued work. Nevertheless, Gödel enumerated his philosophical notebooks, and arranged them subsequently in a wellthought order, which suggests that he based his philosophical notebooks on a conception that he considered to have a guiding and enduring significance. This last point is further supported by the fact that his philosophical remarks come first in a list by which he ordered his unpublished notes written between 1940 and 1970 (My notes 1940-70) and thereby also evaluates them.

The tentative character of notebooks

The repetitions that are typical of notebooks point further to the essentially tentative character of this medium of reflection. Of course, these are not mere repetitions by an author who is forgetful or given to insisting, but rather different facets and perspectives with respect to one and the same train of thoughts. The various perspectives that result from orbiting one's intended meaning open up new lines of thought and associations and can likewise lead to new problems and their formulation, as well as to new strategies for solving these or older questions.

It is hard to find a "through-line" in these cases. Only by putting the various topics together can one determine the author's positions and organize the different aspects into a thematic complex. The author circles around a subject as if there were many theories about it, each with a different standpoint. This practice is inherent to the notebook as medium, and it enables the writer to record philosophical thoughts for reflective consideration. Circling around philosophical questions and problems helps to sharpen the view on

them and to prepare a fruitful way of dealing with them.

The entries in Gödel's philosophical notebooks should not, therefore, be read as if they represented his respective standpoint. Sometimes indeed they present the opposite of his aims. A reading based on the assumption that one is dealing with a systematically argumentative text would be rash and would only lead to a dead end. Gödel's remarks will appear merely self-contradictory if one fails to appreciate the tentative, meandering character of this form of writing and to trust in the fruitfulness of its characteristic approach. The goal is a slow and steady development of thoughts. A reading that insists on systematic closure and results that have further theoretical use will be unable to appreciate an intellectual quest whose purpose is the manifold exploration of trains of thought.

The notebook as a thinking space

Notebooks offer an open space that invites us both to record a quick idea and to return to it over and over again, to approach it and to distance ourselves from it, to absorb it and to objectify it. By opposing contrasting points, the writer allows them to have an effect on his or her own thinking, and by evaluating them afterwards, it becomes clear that thinking takes time. The open space offered by a notebook thus fuses two different temporal forms of thinking, namely: the thought that appears suddenly, and the extensive quest for an adequate expression and a convincing solution. Hence a

notebook can comprise aphorisms as well as dialogical thinking. Its use thus depends heavily on the personality of the thinker using it. The thinking space thereby offered is an open space.

It is thus by no means the only or primary goal of notebook writing to record one's thoughts. The focus often lies much more on a process of transmission aimed at the contemplation of citations and the development of one's own thinking. In this way, keeping a notebook — a scholarly technique for producing knowledge and strengthening one's intellect — can become a tool of philosophical and scientific research. Gödel opens up a thinking space with the help of his notebooks by opposing different systematic positions concerning a question and by taking up different disciplinary perspectives.

The notebook as an archive

Such a space can be shaped and reshaped. For the writing subject, it functions additionally as an archive, since keeping a notebook allows the writer to comprehend his or her own intellectual development in its genesis.5 This is another sense in which taking notes is a cultural technique as well as a technique of self-fashioning that can be used to develop one's own thinking and personality as a researcher. Entries and references in Gödel's notebooks show that he indeed used them in this way...

Development of the thinking process

Similarly illuminating is the reference, in the notebook Max V, to independent thinking without recourse to what one has read. Here, Gödel explicitly distinguishes the engagement with other authors from his ideas that arose without such a stimulation and that thus exclusively reflect his own thinking. Nevertheless, considerations issuing from the occupation with and depending upon the thinking of others are highly relevant for his thinking. The remark points out, however, an important goal of notebook writing, namely, that of developing and organizing one's own philosophical thinking…

The tradition of writing notebooks

Taking a look at the tradition of notebook writing, it becomes clear that numerous characteristics of the form have remained the same over centuries. The notebooks of the loth century show patterns of memory, note-taking and collecting with the same frequency that is known from the older tradition of notebooks, such as the antique hypomnemata or the modern commonplace books. These patterns also occur in Gödel's notebooks, even though no continuous line of tradition from antiquity to the loth century is known to exist. This suggests that keeping a notebook is a form of writing that advances processes and reflection processes in a specific way.

Hence notebooks are a means of orientation for thinking. They offer this possibility spatially, as one can take them up over and over again and use dates and headings to find the pages dedicated to a specific question. This also holds true temporally, as one can find aspects with equal or similar topics at different times of writing.

This orientation role in thinking may well have been the reason why the writing of notebooks emerged in the first place. One takes notes concerning one's reading, sets down personal memoranda, and inscribes one's duties and obligations. An antique notebook, for example is called hypomnema', which means record, memory, but also admonition. In a hypomnema, citations and material from the work of other authors are written down as a memory aid, as well as thoughts, and ideas and duties, so that these may be referred back to in carrying out self-imposed obligations. It includes the habit — already widespread in antiquity — of making lists: of tasks, but also of names or of books. It is well-known that Pierre Hadot referred to the hypomnemata as spiritual notebooks because they keep the notes present for the thinking of the writer.' This also aptly describes what

Gödel notes for himself in a maxim in the notebook Time Management (Max) I: "Whatever one thinks about, be it a mathematical problem or what one should do the next day, it is always better to think 'with the help of something', either a book or something that one wrote or thought about it at an earlier time. Particularly when one is dealing with an enumeration, as this supports one's own memory (and ide significantly".

Gödel's first philosophical notebook (Philosophie I Max 0), moreover, contains lists of books and authors as well as other considerations for a program of philosophical studies; not atypical for scientific and philosophical notebooks, Time Management (Max) I and Time Management (Max) II contain lists of errands and tasks (for scientific work as well as practical affairs), work schedules and, again, lists of readings as well as concrete time-tables for work, breaks, walks. Gödel's reading is then reflected in excerpts and systematized aphorisms, which leads to original philosophical remarks on various subjects. Lists, programs and maxims are less present in notebook Max III, and from there on Gödel is increasingly and, at some point, exclusively concerned with philosophical remarks and foundational considerations.

In antique hypomnemata, the ethical conception of the Stoa is frequently put into in practice. Notebooks are used to develop a personal set of guidelines for one's own conduct of life. This ethical self-assessment needs to be distinguished from justified, normative, moral imperatives. In notebooks, commandments are often directed towards oneself in the form of admonitions or prescriptions rather than being stated as generally valid for everyone. Thus, notebooks are often a place of self-formation, where one seeks to cultivate an ethical access to oneself and a guiding principle for the personal conduct of life. This program of self-admonition, self-commitment and self-perfection follows the Socratic maxim not to live an 'unexamined', i.e. unreflected life. Such an ethically oriented form of notebook writing is also to be found in Gödel, particularly in the notebooks Time Management (Max) I and II, where he struggles for a guiding principle for his conduct of life as well as for self-admonition and self-perfection."

In contrast, the title of Gödel's Philosophy I Max o already indicates what kinds of entries are to be expected here: No maxims or admonitions directed at himself, for to these the following notebooks (in particular Time Management (Max) I and Time Management Max II, and partly also Max III) are dedicated. That Gödel purposely integrated this facet of notebook writing into his philosophical notebooks is demonstrated by the concluding remarks from Time Management (Max) II which were inserted subsequently and then crossed out: "Time Management (Max) II --(Phil II) This originally was the first maxim-notebook in addition to philosophy-notebook. Later on combined maxims and philosophy."

Though the time of writing shows that Time Management (Max) II was not the first notebook about the conduct of life (see below). This is probably why Gödel has erased the addition. It is likely that the first notebook was Time Management (Max) I. The remark still shows that Gödel simultaneously worked on the notebooks about the conduct of life and on the philosophical notebooks that do not emphasize the aspect of ethical self-perfection. The decision to combine them makes apparent Gödel's approach to a point of view in which ethics in the form of self-perfection and self-admonition are regarded as parts of a comprehensive concept of philosophy that have to be integrated accordingly...

Sample text simplified sans number and notes
What is knowledge?

 Any knowledge is expressed in a sentence.2. Knowledge is explained by its purpose: To determine behaviour via prediction.* (Via signs that represent the objects). This is itself a very important insight. It is the function of knowledge to find order in the world and to prepare us for it. To find

this order is the task of pure science. (The sentence* does not contain a weltanschauung yet (existence of a

world, etc.), but holds independently of every weltanschauung, viz. it has to fit in any.)

Knowledge is a picture of reality, since it is only by "pictures" that we can prepare ourselves. Turn the encounter with the unknown into an encounter with the known. Overcome unfamiliarity or moderate it.

The substance of signs is irre1evant.8 From this it follows that [there must be something different from the signs to perform the function of indicating, and this has been called the 'concept' (Plato's 'idea') — now the question arises what such a concept is? It can't be the mere word, the sound, the notch — hence one assumes that it is a kind of something behind it, something not sensually perceivable (as Plato has especially emphasized). Thus Plato came to create a 'realm of concepts'. More contemporary logicians have accepted this realm of concepts (though in a less mystical way), and so one talks of a `realm of ideal being', 'realm of consciousness' etc., i.e. the view is held that, besides reality, there is a realm of concepts.]

Platonic problem (realism, idealism).

For example, Bolzano speaks of the "sentence in itself '.

Schlick says: There must be something besides the signs to carry out the function of "indicating". Recently, a certain answer was given to this question, the psychologistic answer (the other signs are arbitrary, but "thoughts" are distinguished) - for example: B. Erdmann develops the theory of "abstraction", this means the formation of "general ideas". The refutation of psychologism consists in the fact that one can only imagine a horse either as being black or brown.

Solution of the Platonic problem: The question of what a concept is is misleading, and the problem arises through the belief that every noun must correspond to an object. This is a purely linguistic mistake (one doesn't believe that this might perhaps correspond to an object). It suffices to state which purpose the sign serves (conceptual purpose). It is often impossible to (explicitly) define a word, but it suffices to state the rules for it use. Bolzano is to thank for the overcoming of psychologism; this caused the regress to Platonism.

Getting to know something new with the old words of language is possible by combining the words in ever new contexts. The means for describing something new is a new combination of signs.

The essential point in the knowledge of singular facts is classification... <>

Band 2 Zeiteinteilung (Maximen) I und II / Time Management (Maxims) I and II by Kurt Gödel, edited by Eva-Maria Engelen, English translation from the German by Merlin Carl [De Gruyter, 9783110674095]

Volume 2 contains both notebooks of "Time Management (Max) I and II" and thereby Gödel's applied individual ethics, which he received among others through his teacher Heinrich Gomperz. Gödel thus incorporates the ethical ideal of self-perfection into his opus. The volume is prefaced by an introduction to relevant considerations from the ethics of the Stoics as well as ancient dietetics, which provide the philosophical background to understand Gödel's approach. In addition, editor Eva-Maria Engelen presents how this fits into the context of Gödel's Philosophical Notebooks.

INHALT – CONTENTS

The meaning of the concept of perfection for the Maximen Philosophie

Self-perfection is, as we have seen, a form of practice that falls within the realm of individual ethics. Furthermore, in the Stoic tradition, it also serves a therapeutic purpose. By contrast, the perfection of reason, of thinking and of the sciences is intended to serve the good of all humanity and to lead to improved living conditions for everyone. This aspect of the concept of perfection goes beyond the framework of individual ethics.

A prominent representative of the concept of the perfection of thinking for the good of all is Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who sought to perfect reason and the sciences by developing and implementing what he called a scientia generalis.

Godel's Maximen Philosophie embody an attempt to realize both ideas of perfection: 1) in Time Management (Max) I and II, the individual-ethical idea of self-perfection with its therapeutic implications; and 2) in the totality of the Max-Phil notebooks, the idea of the perfection of thinking in the writing subject, of reason and of the sciences.

Self-perfection and individual ethics: Time Management (Max) I and II

In both notebooks that bear the title Time Management, we thus find Godel's individual ethics, the purpose of which lies in the self-perfection for which he strove in his professional and personal life. In the notebooks, he formulates the relevant maxims (admonitions) carefully and deliberately and sets himself - as was also customary in the Stoic tradition - the task of reading them again and again (which the evidence shows he in fact did). He writes out the maxims that are of special importance to him repeatedly and undertakes to read them for the purposes of collecting his thoughts and intensifying his concentration before turning to his actual academic work.

The practices and habituations by which Gödel conducted his life are a means of self-reflection, and thus their motivation is entirely philosophical. He hoped with their help to give his life a stable, clearly arranged and orderly form, which in turn would furnish him with security, peace of mind and equanimity in matters both personal and professional. This is the therapeutic effect. Beyond this, however, the orientation toward self-determined maxims and admonitions was also intended to help him advance his academic work itself. One can see this clearly in the numerous maxims related to improving his mathematics lectures and talks, in which he reflects upon what a lecture in mathematics ought to achieve, what it ought to offer students, and what assumptions it II ought to make about its audience's knowledge.

Alongside these concerns, numerous maxims deal with the possibility of obtaining an academic position in mathematics or in the non-academic sector in order to earn a living. These maxims attest to Gödel's anxieties about the future, even in the late 193os, a time when he was already counted among the greatest mathematicians of his generation. They also demonstrate the degree of acuity he brought to bear on these questions, along with his not inconsiderable sociological talent. Gödel was well aware of the fact that achievement alone is not sufficient to obtain an academic position; he therefore listed factors that have nothing to do with achievement but that nevertheless play a role in academic employment, such as nepotism and the consolidation of schools of thought.

The notebooks that are oriented toward individual ethics are not merely of interest to readers concerned with Gödel as a thinker, nor even to those who are eager to gain a perspective on a modern form of Stoic admonition and practice as lived ethics. The significance of this approach goes much further, extending over the entire corpus of the Maximen Philosophie. It is therefore necessary to consider each of the aforementioned aspects of the concept of perfection more closely:

the ethical aspect of self-perfection, as well as the aspect of the perfection of reason and the sciences.

The perfection of reason through the scientia generalis

Leibniz's scientia generalis is intended to serve not only the renewal, growth and expansion of the sciences, but also the perfection of the mind and the general felicity of humankind.° Although the concepts of perfection and felicity are also relevant to Gödel's individual-ethical approach, they have a different meaning in the framework of the scientia generalis. Among other functions, and by working out the common fundamental principles (initia) of the various individual sciences (specimina), the scientia generalis offers them a common foundation and a common structure, thus making collaboration between the disciplines possible. Among the specimina are grouped all of the natural sciences, mathematics and the value-oriented sciences, such as jurisprudence and theology. By contrast, the initia include, for example, the grammatica rationalis and logic. In order to elaborate the common fundamental principles of the specimina, the task in the scientia generalis is to discover the simple concepts, namely, the basic elements of thinking. Admittedly, it was clear even to Leibniz that this was a goal that human beings would never fully achieve.

It has been shown that Gödel dealt intensively with this aspect of Leibniz's philosophy. In box boa, series V, folder 35 of the Gödel Nachlass, we find, right on the first page, unambiguous references to this. Here Gödel notes which chapters in Volume VII of the Gerhard edition of Leibniz's philosophical writings contain the scientia generalis and which contain the characteristica. Subsequently, he records which of the respective sections he has read. On the scientia generalis, he read everything but sections VI and IX.

What does this mean for the question of the degree to which the Maximen Philosophie function not only as an ethical but simultaneously as an intellectual instrument of perfection? Leibniz's scientia generalis is an encyclopedic universal or unified science, in which all sciences have their place. Through the perfection of reason, it is to serve the happiness of mankind. Reason is to be so perfected that it recognizes and realizes the good. It is the purpose of the human faculties to contribute to the attainment of happiness, and wisdom is nothing other than the science of happiness.

For personal happiness and wellbeing, the individual must look to himself. When it comes to the happiness of all, however, according to Leibniz, one must labor toward the perfection of reason, i.e., of the sciences within the framework of a scientia generalis. The scientia generalis contributes to the advancement of the sciences and thus to the wellbeing and happiness of all of humanity. The happiness of the individual and the common happiness are further distinguishable in that the individual experiences this happiness the moment he achieves it, whereas the happiness of all is dependent on the progress of science and thus on whether the sciences serve all of humanity.

For Gödel, the scientia generalis could have been a model for bringing the diverse disciplines under one roof. The manner in which he relates the various discipline-specific remarks to each other (often by analogy) suggests that he had in mind a scientia generalis for the perfection of the sciences. The idea of perfection relates in this case to the perfection of thinking.

The success of the individual-ethical approach is independent of whether the unity of the sciences has been achieved, since within the individual-ethical approach even the effort involved in the perfection of the self has meaning. The success of the perfection of thinking in the sciences, by contrast, depends upon whether the scientia generalis has been successfully founded.

The extent to which Leibniz's scientia generalis represents a model for Godel's Maximen Philosophie will become evident in the forthcoming volumes. Godel did not encounter this theme in Leibniz

alone, however, but equally within the Vienna Circle, since Leibniz's scientia generalis is at the very least comparable to the Einheitswissenschaft ("Unified Science") of the Vienna Circle. The title of a well-known series of publications by the Vienna Circle from 1933 to 1939, Einheitswissenschaft, was later changed to Library of Unified Science; there was also the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The parallels go beyond purely linguistic similarity, however, for the Einheitswissenschaft of the Vienna Circle, very much like Leibniz's scientia generalis, was to be an encyclopedic universal or unified science.

While the idea of self-perfection held no special significance for the Vienna Circle, the idea of progress, and thus of the happiness of all of humanity — achievable not least by means of an encyclopedic foundation for the sciences — certainly did. At the same time, knowledge is of central importance not only to the idea of the perfection of a unified science or scientia generalis but also to an individual ethics based on the Stoic model…

Excerpt simplified text.

Question 1.: Should I: I. spend whole morning 9:30-12:30 (3 h), 2-6 h) at the University Library, National Library, mathematics department or II. only pick up and return orders?

Question 2.: Are there other libraries that are more user-friendly with respect to things that are also there or that have things that are not there? For which subjects?

ad 1: Answer to question 1. needs to be drawn from the treatment of the separate subjects. Namely, if it turns out that I need to read certain books more carefully or have to use them (for looking something up) for a longer time, then I. holds. When it turns out that I first need to choose between many or have to inform myself about the literature, then II. holds. Further, if there are many periodicals to read, then I. holds, as these are special cases (they need to be looked through, and one needs to roughly estimate their content and quality, and only in special cases should they be read carefully and borrowed).

Question 3.: Which books should I buy for myself? — 1. Those that are never available and that are interesting, 2. reference works (directories, i.e., what can be bound in the catalogue room), 3. foundational work of the special topics, foundational works in general.

If only 3 1/2 h per week for one topic, then just 14h (-20% for interruptions) = ii h. During this time, a book can hardly be finished, especially when several books are borrowed at the same time.

A book is foundational if it treats a comparably large area (not a special question) while containing as many facts as possible but only important ones, if it presents the area in as little space as possible and provides an overview of the literature. 4. Periodicals, daily newspapers, official gazettes," Zentralblätter.

ad 2: Offers a common library for belles lettres and in part also for philosophical literature. Otherwise specialist libraries of the departments (e.g. physical, medical library, library of the Chamber of Commerce, library of the social sciences in the Town Hall, also in the other universities: technical, commercial college; for academic publications the Academy of Sciences and Humanities, [...]).

One of the main reasons for wasting time and not being able to get many things done is that I want to do things too accurately. When I borrow a book to look something up, I already start looking through it and maybe even reading it. When I want to merely skim through something, I read it carefully. Ultimate reason: Not holding on to my decisions.* The decision is the limitation of something (blinker); it may mean that something is lost, but on the other hand, that what was planned is done.

Question 4: Should one decide to do the following?: Every book that I pick up so as to read something specific in it (to look up or read a particular treatise, a certain chapter) should at least be skimmed through: Preface, table of contents, spot check, opinion, whether good or bad. [A book is good when the objective given by the title, the subtitle and possibly the preface is achieved well. In this respect, the readership for which it is meant according to th above criteria needs to be taken into account as well, or at least whether some objective or readership given by a different title or preface is satisfied.] And should one write a synopsis, however short, for each book that one picks up?

I think yes.

Remark: Transition to the next type, psychological: 0. Type: I study physics (read books, reflect).

1. Type: I reflect on the question or read something about "how I should organize my studies in physics" (or what different authors said about physics).

2. Type: I reflect on the question of how to learn quickest and how to most effectively organize my studies in physics.

It is advantageous to start with as high a type as possible.

Question 5: Should one invest more time in the activity itself (type 0) or in reflecting on it (type 1 and higher) when occupied with an activity?* The time used for this is saved when carrying out the activity itself because it will be carried out more effectively and quicker. The more time the reflection takes, the more methodically (rationally) one acts (to draw a line under it).

In the above time management, the activity and the reflection on the activity (etc.) usually belong to the same category, except: 15, which is the lowest type, as these activities are not forms of reflection at all. 13, 13' are of type co (because they can have arbitrary iterations of reflection as their object). It is a general characteristic of the lowest type that it is no longer reflection (reading, speaking, writing, shopping, walking).,, <>

BAND 3 MAXIMEN III / MAXIMS III PHILOSOPHICAL NOTEBOOKS – VOLUME 3: MAXIMS III by Kurt Gödel, edited by Eva-Maria Engelen, English translation from the German by Merlin Carl [De Gruyter, 9783110753257]

With the notebook "Maxims III," a new section of Gödel's philosophical notebooks begins. This notebook sheds light on the relationship between various disciplines – in particular psychology, mathematics (specifically logic), and theology – and their respective significance for both the thinking and working scholar and for the knowledge system. It also contains considerations on heuristics and scholarly methods. The role of fundamental or simple concepts in thinking also becomes apparent.

INHALT – CONTENTS
KURT GÖDEL – PHILOSOPHISCHE NOTIZBÜCHER
Dank
Editorische Notizen
Einleitung
Max III
KURT GÖDEL – PHILOSOPHICAL NOTEBOOKS
Acknowledgments

Excerpt: … …The division into foundational principles (initia) and individual sciences (specimina) shows up again in Gödel, but only indirectly. The Philosophical Notebooks contain remarks on questions of logic and first principles, mnemonics, and individual scientific disciplines such as mathematics, physics, psychology, philology, sociology, jurisprudence, history, theology and philosophy.' Thus the enumerations under the headings initia and specimina in Leibniz and Gödel do not overlap. This is hardly surprising, however, given that the catalogue of disciplines had changed since Leibniz's time, and even Leibniz himself hints at the possibility of new specimina arising in the course of history. Nevertheless, Leibniz's fundamental conception of the scientia generalis, as summed up by Arnaud Pelletier, turns out to be a useful framework for understanding Gödel's overall approach:

> The distinction between the initia and the specimina thus reveals that the Scientia Generalis cannot be understood as a universal science in the sense of a calculus or a single method that could be applied to all sciences. Its unity is not given by the uniqueness of an organon [...] but by the plurality of elements and principles whose domains of validity are to be determined through the collective progress of the sciences. A remarkable feature of the structure of the Scientia Generalis is that it does not presuppose a priori first principles but, on the contrary, intends to discover progressively the first principles that would "open the way to the ultimate causes of things" and [...] to wisdom.'

The distinguishing features of a scientia generalis that Pelletier zeroes in on here in the context of Leibniz also dovetail to a certain extent with Gödel's remarks. Gödel divides his remarks into two groups: those that address fundamental principles, and those that address individual academic disciplines. The scientism general' is not coterminous with and does not exhaust itself in a general calculus or a characteristica lying at the basis of all academic disciplines. Instead of definitively postulating a method that would connect all disciplines, Gödel draws analogies between the central concepts and (methodological) principles of various disciplines. The unity of scientific thought — and thus of the sciences (with respect to the academic disciplines) — is in this view founded upon common methodological elements.. Gödel mentally runs through the possibilities of taking the concepts and principles that have been successfully applied in one discipline and transferring them to others. In this way, he surveys the realm of possible objects to which these concepts can be applied. We can see that through such a procedure Gödel hopes gradually to discover the first principles that "open the way to the final causes of things" and hence to wisdom.

Heuristics

One of the focuses of the remarks and maxims in Maxims III is heuristics in mathematics,' for which concrete examples are often listed under the heading "important activities of the mathematician".

Alongside these, Gödel considers the idea of a general heuristics and of methods for other scientific areas, such as psychology. Because heuristics is an ars inveniendi, or a doctrine of methods for discovering evidence and counter-evidence in scientific research, it belongs in the Leibnizian sense among the scientism generalis and in today's sense among the fundamental disciplines within a given science!' We also find in this context a number of thoughts on theory formation and on the comparison of methods in various disciplines, on methods of argumentation, and on the usefulness of theories. A further theme in Maxims III is knowledge I [Erkenntnis]. Gödel comments on both the

significance of formal concepts for knowledge and the extent to which one can gain knowledge by relating specific sub-disciplines of a given science to each other.

Questions that arise about working practice in the sciences, including such things as how best to answer letters, do not traditionally belong to heuristics any more than general study habits do. In Maxims III, the latter include both the perfection of the individual learning subject and the acquisition and access to subject knowledge of the academic disciplines. Gödel's views on teaching should also be considered against the background of this context. We often find him yearning to be more confident as a teacher, more able to meet the learners' demands and to provide an orderly and consistent presentation of the subject matter. His thoughts on how one best becomes a mathematician, beginning, namely, with the study of applied physics, are to be viewed under this heading as well.

Mathematics and Psychology

In adds thinking about the connections between the academic disciplines, the relation between mathematics and psychology plays a special role. Gödel considers whether and in what way the psychology of mortal beings and their capacity for mathematical knowledge ought to be investigated, and whether it is even possible for human beings, given their entire psychology, to handle innumerable concepts. In any case, he sees human thinking as an inextricable knot of form and content. His thoughts on accepting a formal system likewise belong here, since according to Gödel such acceptance means not only having acknowledged the system's consistency, but also having set it as the point of departure for one's own actions and assumptions.

The discipline of psychology also stands in the foreground of this notebook. Gödel was convinced that basic concepts of psychology could be put to appropriate use as fundamental to all academic disciplines (see below). The concepts that Gödel presents in Maxims III as those that characterize psychology as a discipline - in particular actus, passio and finis - admittedly originate in the Aristotelean-Scholastic tradition of psychology, which includes the writings of Franz von Brentano. But Gödel was also at least somewhat familiar with the psychology of his time and its methods as an academic discipline. This can be observed in Philosophy I Maxims 0, where he adds the works of Karl Bahler to his bibliography; in the Protocol Notebook, where it becomes clear that he considered pursuing training in psychoanalysis; in his conversations with the psychologist Else Frankel, parts of which he likewise wrote down in the Protocol Notebook; and in the bibliographical lists on psychology and psychiatry.

Psychology and Theology

A connection between psychology and theology is established in Maxims III, particularly on the concept of sin. In the Allgemeines Wörterbuch der Heiligen Schrift, Joseph Franz Allioli discusses the theological concept of sin, namely as the willing transgression of a divine commandment, the causes of which are the free will of the human being and the devil. Moreover, according to Allioli, sin blinds the understanding. In his Biblisches Wörterbuch, Allioli adds that the inducement to sin is often human weakness and ignorance. No less informative is Matthias Joseph Scheeben's Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik, in which a distinction is drawn between a theological and a philosophical concept of sin — and consequently among the uses of the term in various disciplines. In contrast to the theological sense, sin in the philosophical sense is not a knowing transgression of one of God's commandments but an action against one's own conscience, a renunciation of what the agent's own reason has recognized as their personal dignity. For his part, Gödel uses the concept in remarks on theology and psyhology. In general, he maintains that sin consists in error, weakness and malevolence. Understood theologically with reference to original sin, it is impossible for the human being not to sin, and psychologically, one must accept this circumstance in order to understand one's

own sins. Similar to Allioli, who sees in ignorance a cause of sin, Godel considers sin a form of practical stupidity which, from a theological perspective, binds the human being to the devil.

Consequently, in contrast to Time Management (Maxims) II, where "sin" is mentioned above all in connection with self-reflection, in Maxims III Gõdel considers the different ways in which the concept is understood within the various disciplines. In this context, it is interesting to note that in Time Management (Maxims) II, he mentions the Catholic concept of sin when explaining why he shied away from converting from Protestantism to Catholicism: "The factors that explain reluctance to become Catholic [...] : Further also the concept of sin, repentance and in particular the kind of "sin" and confession following moral cowardice [... (Time Management (Maxims) II, p. 429).

Thus also with reference to "sin", remarks motivated by individual ethical considerations are superseded by those primarily oriented toward the disciplines. This is borne out by passages in Maxims III in which Gödel considers the idea of the perfectly rational being. These remarks express an ideal image and hence are no related to him as a person.,,

Sample text, simplified

Remark (Theology): The creation of the person is the only thing that God did not do to "us" (since we were not yet there). This corresponds to "conception".

Remark (Psychology): Knowledge is a kind of perception (cognition), which by its nature implies correctness. (But can one also know that one knows something?) Can one know anything at all?

Maxim: You should immediately register an idea, but [1.) only when there is a danger of forgetting]; 2. only think about it as much as is necessary for registering it, and perhaps reserve a certain hour for registering nocturnal ideas.

Remark: Praying makes our annihilation less "just". Praying to a just God is justice; praying to an unjust God is injustice, even though passion works in the same way in both cases [fear of the power to destroy me and make me suffer].

Remark: A war breaks out when there are many people who need it (some in order to be killed, others in order to get positions, others in order to improve through suffering). Those who do not need it do not feel any of that.

Remark (Psychology): In order to realize one's sins, the interest in having no sin (and the desire for it) must vanish first. Is it not a kind of great madness to want to be completely without sin, and does Christ not show us that the consequences are all the worse? Can one commit sins out of this humility?

Remark: To impute to oneself as a sin that which is not a sin can often serve to prevent one from viewing one's actual sins as sins (killing off the right instinct).

Remark Psychology: The fact that we do not know our own sins (those of our past life) is probably due not to the fact that we make trivial combinatorial blunders but to the fact that we see everything "in the wrong light". This means that we make a fundamen- tal mistake right at the start of forming ideas about our self, psychology, right and wrong.

Remark Theology: Augustine claims in Confessions X, 4.0,396 that it is not at all the power of the mind that leads us to any truth but God himself. Perhaps this should be taken to mean that the devi1397 has already corrupted our mind too much and that a replacement is offered to us in the idea of 'God', which leads not to "knowledge" (like the mind) but to recognition of the truth. (This is what came from outside the world after the Fall but is still preformed in this world, even in the realm of ideas.) And in spite of our sins, these ideas lead us to where the power of our mind would

have led us, and this even better. [This is reason in opposition to the mind.] [102] The start of this is probably ethical knowledge (good and evil).

Remark: There is a kind of purely linguistic connection that resembles puns but is still somehow right (although it appears stupid). For example: when comparing the foundation of set theory via functions with the "function-theoretic approach to mathematics" and the foundation of mathematical classes with the "algebraic" foundation (algebra of classes and relations). Or, another example, which letter precedes 'A'? No letter (thus, 'al' comes before `ala' in alphabetical ordering).

Remark: One reason for the non-implementation of decisions is: It appears to be superfluous (e.g. reading the work maxims every day).

Remark Foundations: It is the sense of an assumption that is to be destroyed when it has fulfilled its purpose.

Maxim: If, while wanting to achieve A, it occurs to you how to achieve something weaker than A (in particular, weaker with respect to constructivity) [103], then be on guard against leaving it aside because it is "too little". If something shows up during work that is not immediately necessary for the goal (even if it makes the achievability more elegant, etc.) but is interesting in itself, then note it in the program without following it right away.

Remark Foundations: There are two ways to weakening a result:

1. with respect to the actual content [possibly down to finitely many examples of a general theorem];

2. with respect to constructivity. However, a pure existence proof seems to be the upper limit in this respect, and one can only become increasingly constructive by going further downwards. Which weakening is fruitful for research (i.e., gradually leads to the desired results)?

Strangely enough, a weakening of the desired result in the sense of 2.) is always provable as well, namely when one wants to decide the proposition A. For example, the proposition:

$(\sum n)\ [(n = 1 \wedge A) \vee (n = 0 \wedge \neg A)]$ (extensional and intensional weakening).

Remark (Foundations): Weakening of the construction of a number:398 indication of how it can be constructed [e.g., by calculating the ordinal399 of the scheme of the expression that defines the number or by a proof that there is such an ordinal (for a certain reduction procedure)]. Perhaps one can assign a "solution procedure" to each problem in this way (but not in a computable way).

Remark (Foundations): Different weakening of the construction of a number: = construction of an ordinal number. When does an ordinal count as "calculated"?

Remark (Foundations): In order to give objective meaning to the "truth order" of a number-theoretical expression (in the sense of the existence of a realization for the negation of a, but not one

of a smaller order) [independent of the constructibility of a], one needs to write the expression differently, namely in such a way that infinitely many quantifiers are nested on top of each other (i.e., write "correctly"). This is because it holds for finite n-fold nestings that the truth order is at most con (presumably).

Remark: The seven virtues have the property that each higher one is the fruit of the lower ones. Moreover, they are different when applied to a different object (different goal). In particular, the

three highest (knowledge, understanding, wisdom) are, when applied to theology, fides, sees, caritas. Question: For example, what is wisdom applied to mathematics?

Remark: It is theoretically possible to do nothing without considering it beforehand. Namely, if the first decision is not to do anything without consideration (that is, to follow reason) and every further decision is a means of the preceding one (i.e., every goal is chosen with respect to one chosen earlier on)... <>

>

COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA: ESSAYS ON JEWISH HISTORY, RELIGION, AND CULTURE by Jonathan D. Sarna [A JPS Scholar of Distinction Book, Jewish Publicaton Society, 9780827615113]

COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA examines how Jews have long "straddled two civilizations," endeavoring to be both Jewish and American at once, from the American Revolution to today.

In fifteen engaging essays, Jonathan D. Sarna investigates the many facets of the Jewish-American encounter—what Jews have borrowed from their surroundings, what they have resisted, what they have synthesized, and what they have subverted. Part I surveys how Jews first worked to reconcile Judaism with the country's new democratic ethos and to reconcile their faith-based culture with local metropolitan cultures. Part II analyzes religio-cultural initiatives, many spearheaded by women, and the ongoing tensions between Jewish scholars (who pore over traditional Jewish sources) and activists (who are concerned with applying them). Part III appraises Jewish-Christian relations: "collisions" within the public square and over church-state separation.

Originally written over the span of forty years, many of these essays are considered classics in the field, and several remain fixtures of American Jewish history syllabi. Others appeared in fairly obscure venues and will be discovered here anew. Together, these essays—newly updated for this volume—cull the finest thinking of one of American Jewry's finest historians.

Reviews:

"A *tour d'horizon* of a remarkable historian's storied career, this valuable collection of essays is as much a testament to the complexity and creativity of the American Jewish experience as it is a celebration of the scholarly imagination."—Jenna Weissman Joselit, author of *Set in Stone: America's Embrace of the Ten Commandments*

"For over four decades, Jonathan Sarna has enriched our understanding of the American Jewish experience. How fortunate we are to now have in one volume so many of Sarna's groundbreaking articles! Replete with memorable anecdotes and brilliant insights, **COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA** is a trove of riches for all who care about American Jewish culture and American religion."—Shuly Rubin Schwartz, chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary

"The breadth and depth of Jonathan D. Sarna's work on the American Jewish experience is electrifying. This collection of the author's most outstanding historical essays is a page-turning exploration of the dynamics of Jewish life, shedding light on American Jewry's ongoing effort to 'straddle two civilizations.' Readers will discover that even as America has transformed Judaism, so

too have Jews contributed to the shaping of the American nation."—Gary P. Zola, executive director of the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

"Jonathan Sarna, the most erudite of historians of American Jewry, speaks of the past and of the present through this thought provoking and engaging volume."—Deborah Lipstadt, Dorot Professor of Modern Jewish and Holocaust History at Emory University

"As a doyen of American Jewish history, Sarna's work has long helped define this field of study. This collection of his pathbreaking essays offers scholars and students of history alike a second look at his sterling contributions to illuminating the Jews' and Judaism's encounter with America's free society."—Jeffrey Gurock, Libby M. Klaperman Professor of Jewish History at Yeshiva University

"Bringing together a wealth of insights from Jonathan Sarna's long scholarly engagement with American Jewish culture, **COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA** illuminates the evolution of the field of American Jewish history itself."—Beth S. Wenger, associate dean for graduate studies and Moritz and Josephine Berg Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania

CONTENTS

Excerpt: This volume explores how, in the wake of the American Revolution, Jews came to terms with the United States of America. The new nation, governed by a unique constitution, granted Jews far more freedom and equality, within a more religiously pluralistic setting, than Jews had ever previously known. It extended to Jews new opportunities and also posed new challenges.

How to be both Jewish and American became a defining question. While apologists insisted that there could be no contradiction, that being a better Jew made one a better American and vice versa, Jews learned from experience that reality was far more complicated. For much of American history,

for example, the legal work week extended to six days, and state blue laws mandated that Sunday be set aside as the day of rest. This posed a challenging problem for Jews who observed their Sabbath on Saturday. Should their children attend school or synagogue on Saturday? If they kept the seventh day holy, as Judaism demanded, that meant working fifty-two fewer days than their neighbors, and might cost them their jobs ("If you don't come on Saturday, don't come in on Monday"). Jewish holidays in the fall and the spring posed similar problems. Even famous sports figures like baseball stars Hank Greenberg and Sandy Koufax eventually had to choose whether or not to play in the World Series on Yom Kippur—a microcosm of the occasional but unavoidable tensions inherent in being both an American and a Jew.

Straddling Two Civilizations

Part 1 of this book explores diverse aspects of this theme, showing how in different ways, as well as in different times and locales, Jews "straddled two civilizations," looking mostly if not always successfully to synthesize them. As early as 1783, Philadelphia's Jews, led by their patriotic religious leader Gershom Seixas, assured Pennsylvania's Council of Censors, an elected body that evaluated the activities of the state government, that the "conduct and behavior of the Jews has always tallied with the great design of the Revolution Consciously ignoring the many Jews who had actually supported the British Crown during the Revolutionary era, Seixas chose instead to focus on Jews' patriotism, the purported congruity between their "conduct and behavior;' and the Revolution's "great design." He understood how important it was to proclaim that Judaism and the new nation marched hand in hand.'

Subsequently, the question of how exactly to tally being at once Jews and Americans proved an unending challenge. For much of American Jewish history, chapter 1 shows, American Jews did try to synthesize their dual identities, looking to forge a Judaism and an Americanism that reinforced one another. This "cult of synthesis" provided American Jews with the optimistic hope that, in the United States, they could accomplish what Jews had not successfully achieved anywhere else in the Diaspora. Instead of having to choose between competing allegiances—the great Enlightenment dilemma—they could be American and Jewish at one and the same time. American Jews advanced this vision in a range of ways, including championing a definition of America that warmly embraced them as insiders. In so doing, they also helped to redefine what being an American actually meant.

Chapter 2 shows how what Seixas called "the great design of the Revolution" had already begun to significantly reshape American Judaism during the immediate post-Revolutionary decades. In response to the political, social, and spiritual revolution wrought by independence and the beliefs flowing from it, Judaism in America was challenged and radically transformed so as to harmonize it with the country's new republican ethos. Liberty, freedom, and democracy became important religious themes to Jews during these years. Following decades of religious ferment, chaos, and originality, a new and more democratic Judaism emerged, attuned to post-Revolutionary Protestantism and to the new nation's distinctive values.

"The Jewish Prayer for the Government," discussed in chapter 3, provides a granular case study of how Jews reshaped their "conduct and behavior" in response to these distinctive values. Focusing on a prayer traditionally recited for kings, it shows how the prayer's words and sentiments underwent significant transformation as it accompanied American Jews through centuries of political, social, and religious change. Both the variations Jews introduced into the prayer and new prayers composed in place of the original one shed light on the effort to balance religious tradition and devoted patriotism. They likewise illuminate the changing relationship between American Jews and the American state.

The two chapters that follow, one dealing with the Jewish experience in Cincinnati and the other with Boston, offer case studies of a different sort. Each examines how Jews' "conduct and behavior"

interacted with civic culture ("the culture of place") to forge a distinctive communal ethos and vision. In Cincinnati, where British, Dutch, and German Jews numbered among the city's founders and builders, that vision rested on four interrelated premises: first, that Jews could succeed economically in the city; second, that they could interact freely and on an equal basis with their non-Jewish neighbors; third, that they had a mission, both as good citizens and as good Jews, to work for civic betterment; and finally, that they had an obligation to advance a new type of Judaism in Cincinnati, one better suited than traditionalism to the American milieu. Chapter 4 traces the rise and fall of this "lofty vision," illuminating how Jews straddled two civilizations on the local level.

Chapter 5, focused on Boston, shows how in a very different American city, East European Jews who had not stood among the city's founders likewise formulated a distinctive local ethos and vision, in this case deeply influenced by Boston's image of itself as the "Athens of America." Local Jews sought to forge a creative synthesis between Boston and Jew, a mélange they hoped would combine the best features of each culture—"Athens" and "Jerusalem"—and help Jews committed to both of them feel welcome.

Not all Jews, however, cherished the goal of synthesis; nor did all of them model the kind of "conduct and behavior" demanded of insiders. The subjects of chapter 6, instead, cast themselves as critics, subversives, and dissenters. They pushed the bounds of propriety, spoke out against hypocrisy and prejudice, and rebelled against the social and religious norms of their time. While subversive Jews who violated the cultural conventions of their day were far from typical, especially in early America, they too shed light on the central themes of this section. Even as the majority of American Jews looked to straddle two civilizations in a bid to become insiders, subversive badly behaved Jews sometimes made history as outsiders.

The Shaping of American Jewish Culture

In the late nineteenth century, as the size of the American Jewish community swelled, projects designed to secure it religiously and culturally proliferated. A new generation of Jews, women as well as men, many of them young, American educated, self-confident, and forward looking, undertook to lead American Jewry from the wilderness of insignificance into the promised land of Jewish cultural renown. Not content just to come to terms with America, they aimed to transform it into a center of Jewish culture, creativity, and scholarship.

The three chapters in part 2 trace this cultural transformation. "The Late Nineteenth-Century American Jewish Awakening" introduces the subject, showing how and why so many different religio-cultural initiatives—many of them spearheaded by women—took root between the late 1870s and World War I. Chapter 7 focuses on the nineteenth century, but also carries four lessons of continuing relevance to students of Jewish cultural renewal. First, continuity often depends upon discontinuity. Some of late nineteenth-century Jews' most successful and creative innovations, notably their emphases on religious particularism and Zionism, turned past wisdom on its head. New historical conditions created new movements, new emphases, and new paradigms—the very opposite of the tried and true. Second, magic formulas should be mistrusted. Many of those engaged in the effort to preserve and revitalize American Jewish life in the nineteenth century believed they held the secret to success—spiritual renewal, Jewish education, Zionism, unleashing the potential of Jewish women, and so forth. Not one of those panaceas by itself lived up to its advanced billing. Together, however, they succeeded wondrously, and in ways nobody could have predicted in advance. Third, the most creative ideas for revitalizing Jewish life often flow from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, and from outsiders rather than insiders. The young, the alienated, and those on the periphery of Jewish life produced innovative approaches and creative ideas precisely because they were not wedded to the community's central assumptions. Fourth, challenges, when cleverly addressed, can prove beneficial to the Jewish community, leaving it

stronger than before. Confounding those who predicted gloom and doom, the late nineteenth-century American Jewish community experienced surprising bursts of new life.

Chapter 8 explores how Jewish publishing helped shape that new life. It argues that two central impulses underlay this effort: the quest to forge a new Jewish cultural center in America and the desire to integrate American Jewry into a nationwide community bound together by a common culture of print. The first objective was achieved; the second not. Ultimately, instead of uniting American Jews, print media came to represent all that divided them. The same tension between the one and the many—between unum and pluribus—that has characterized so many other aspects of American culture came to characterize American Jewish culture as well.

Chapter 9, focused on the Jewish Theological Seminary, examines another tension in American Jewish culture: between timeless texts and timely issues. It shows how within the world of the Seminary—though, of course, not there alone—dispassionate scholars who pored over traditional Jewish texts clashed with activist scholars concerned with the application of those texts to improving Jewish life. It argues that competing visions of Jewish scholarship—one rarified and exclusive, the other popular and inclusive—reflected profoundly different conceptions: not only of the purposes of Jewish learning, but also of a seminary's objectives, obligations, and mission to the world at large.

HARLEM RENAISSANCE NOVELS: THE LIBRARY OF AMERICA COLLECTION: (TWO-VOLUME BOXED SET)
edited by Rafia Zafar [Library of America, 9781598531060

Together, the nine works in Harlem Renaissance Novels form a vibrant collective portrait of African American culture in a moment of tumultuous change and tremendous hope.

Review

"To have all these novels in one place is the best gift any reader could ever ask for."— Junot Di'az

- ➢ **CANE**, Jean Toomer
- ➢ **HOME TO HARLEM**, Claude McKay
- ➢ **QUICKSAND**, Nella Larsen
- ➢ **PLUM BUN**, Jessie Redmon Fauset
- ➢ **THE BLACKER THE BERRY**, Wallace Thurman
- ➢ **NOT WITHOUT LAUGHTER**, Langston Hughes
- ➢ **BLACK NO MORE**, George Schuyler
- ➢ **THE CONJURE-MAN DIES**, Rudolph Fisher
- ➢ **BLACK THUNDER**, Arna Bontemps

LIBRARY OF AMERICA is an independent nonprofit cultural organization founded in 1979 to preserve our nation's literary heritage by publishing, and keeping permanently in print, America's best and most significant writing. The Library of America series includes more than 300 volumes to date, authoritative editions that average 1,000 pages in length, feature cloth covers, sewn bindings, and ribbon markers, and are printed on premium acid-free paper that will last for centuries

CONTENTS
Volume One
CANE, Jean Toomer
HOME TO HARLEM, Claude McKay
QUICKSAND, Nella Larsen
PLUM BUN, Jessie Redmon Fauset
THE BLACKER THE BERRY, Wallace Thurman

CANE, Jean Toomer

Cane is a 1923 novel by African-American novelist and poet Jean Toomer, an author of the Harlem Renaissance movement. Consisting of a multitude of disconnected vignettes, the novel casts a wide net over African Americans' experiences in the United States during Toomer's day. The novel uses no single genre, but rather cycles through narrative, essay, poetry, and dialogue. As a result, the book's status as a novel is often disputed. Its unorthodox style and content contributed to it being named as one of the foremost works of the High Modernist movement, which utilized a plurality of voices and perspectives to convey the complexity of human subjectivity.

Jean Toomer started Cane while riding on a train between Georgia and Washington D.C. in the autumn of 1921. Before the end of the year, much of the content that would become the book was already finished, including "Kabnis," one of Toomer's most famous short stories. Toomer initially had no intention to publish a book but was convinced by his friend, the eminent writer Waldo Frank. Toomer expressed surprise at the book's completion, having never expected to become a long-form writer. Many of the book's most moving passages about the experiences of African-Americans in cities were added as afterthoughts. Toomer refused to identify with a race and nearly refused to publish the book when an agent insisted that he make his ancestry public to sell more copies.

The novel comprises three main sections. The first begins with the short story "Karintha," in which a young black woman struggles with being the object of desire of many older men. She reflects ambivalently upon her youth and the inevitable loss of innocence. She compares herself to an immature fruit, fearing that she will be "ripened" too early. Many vignettes turn to imagery that is more natural. For example, the sonnet "November Cotton Flower" explores the relationship between death and life, casting the two not as binary opposites, but as interdependent processes. The interaction of these two forces, the speaker suggests, is the recipe for beauty. The poem "Fern" explores the persistent divide between the American North and South via an interaction between a white Northern man who tries to flirt with a Southern black woman.

The novel's second and third sections focus more strictly on events in American cities. "Seventh Street" follows several individuals who live on an impoverished street known for its deep history related to Prohibition and World War I. Toomer comments on the entanglements that build up between America's policies, cities, and people, in times both good and bad. "Box Seat" considers the negative consequences of lust and the unpredictability of conflict, following a man who chases after a woman and ends up at a dwarf fight, where he catalyzes a fight of his own.

The novel's final piece is "Kabnis." A genre-defying work that most closely resembles a play, it gradually sculpts its characters through their dialogue. It utilizes intentionally vague language to blur the boundaries between individuals, illuminating the inner plurality of American subjectivity. Set back in the rural South, it interrogates, through its eponymous protagonist, whether any real selfhood can exist without community. Kabnis desires to create "a bridge between himself and the universe, all by himself," but ultimately feels broken and incomplete when he neglects the many people who have helped shape him. The ending of Cane mirrors Toomer's demonstrated anxiety about his race and role in the world. More than anything else, the novel illuminates how the vestigial dichotomy of the North and South, and their deep legacy of racism, can tear a subject apart.

HOME TO HARLEM, Claude McKay
Finding Home

Claude McKay wrote a compelling story about a young soldier's search for 'home', that feeling of fitting in and belonging to a community. Home to Harlem allows the reader to follow the life of Jake Brown, a young African American U.S. Army deserter. The entire novel is about Jake trying to find a place where he feels at home; the reader may ask if he is looking to feel comfortable with himself as much as with his surroundings.

Set during and immediately after World War I, Home to Harlem gives a glimpse of how difficult life was in the New York City borough of Harlem. Jake is on a journey that continuously leads him back to Harlem, where he feels like he belongs to the African American community.

Looking Back

The novel opens with Jake working as a chef on a boat. He is already on his way back to Harlem, but the first portion of the book focuses on catching the reader up as Jake tells the story of how he found himself traveling from London to New York.

Jake had joined the U.S. Army to help with the war effort during World War I. He wanted to be needed, to feel important and part of something big. Instead of an exciting combat position, he was given menial work that did not help him to feel like he was a true part of the effort. He deserted the Army and found himself living with a white woman in London.

His time in London ended after a horrific racial protest during which he saw that racial prejudice in London would never allow him to fit in. He longed for a partner more like himself. He fantasizes about brown women and their ability to make him feel good. Thus, we find him working on a freight ship as a chef for passage from London to New York and back to Harlem.

Harlem

Even though Jake is not originally from Harlem (he is actually from Virginia) he sees Harlem as his home. When he arrives in Harlem, he has two experiences that impact the trajectory of his life's journey. First, he spends a night with a prostitute whom he develops real feelings for; then he bumps into an old Army buddy, Zeddy, who can identify him as a deserter. Both of these experiences play a role in his future.

Jake's buddy is, at first helpful. They party together and Zeddy even gets Jake a job working on the docks. Jake, however, quits the job after finding out that he is a strikebreaker (working against the strike goes against his own desire to fit in and belong).

After losing track of the first girl he met (and fell in love with), Jake eventually connects with Rose, an entertainer at a local club. He moves in with her, but never feels like he loves her. She also does not treat him with love and affection, having multiple lovers during their time together. Things escalate to a physical altercation between the two and in disgust with himself, Jake leaves the relationship and Harlem.

QUICKSAND, Nella Larsen

Helga Crane is a teacher in the South, a short time after the First World War. She has a mixed racial background; her mother was from Denmark and her father was West Indian. She is light skinned with dark hair. Throughout the book, Helga is often materialistic and focuses on gaining attention from her peers. She is in her second year of teaching at the Negro School in Naxon when she decides that she can no longer support the school's efforts. She doesn't like the education system in the South and she wants to return to Chicago, even before the school year is finished. She finds the

principal, Dr. Anderson, enchanting, but because of a clumsy remark, he fails to talk her into staying. She breaks off her engagement to a colleague and returns to Chicago.

Helga's initial plan was to have her Uncle Peter support her. He is the only relative on the white side of her family who has been kind to her over the years. She visits his home and finds that he has married. His new wife is rude to Helga and tells her never to return. She tries to find work but has difficulty, since she doesn't have references or many skills other than teaching. An employment agency within the Young Women's Christian Association finds her a job as an assistant to Mrs. Hayes-Rore, who is going to travel and give lectures on racial problems.

Helga and Mrs. Hayes-Rore like each other and travel to New York. In Harlem, Mrs. Hayes-Rore introduces Helga to Anne Grey, who gives her a place to stay. Helga finds work and is initially happy with her life in Harlem, attending parties and other society functions. Eventually, she becomes irritated by Anne's fight for equal rights and social justice, because Anne imitates the fashion and mannerisms of white society while disliking white people. Helga runs into Dr. Anderson in New York, but she mostly ignores his desire to spend time with her. Helga receives a letter from her Uncle Peter. He apologizes for having to cease communication and encloses a check for five thousand dollars. He reminds Helga that she has an aunt in Denmark that always liked her. Helga leaves for Denmark, feeling that she cannot live with Black society and how it is treated in America.

Once in Denmark, Helga is pleased with how she is treated. Her family there, Herr and Fru Dahl, are wealthy and very welcoming. They dress her in colorful clothes, and the Danish people regard her as an exotic treasure. She is introduced to an eccentric artist, Herr Olsen, at a party. She learns that he will be painting her portrait. She spends more and more time with him and feels that they should be married. Helga receives a letter that Anne is marrying Dr. Anderson, and Helga feels conflicted. When Herr Olsen finally proposes, she refuses and tells him that she cannot be in an interracial marriage. Helga again feels unrest and decides that she must return to America where she can reconnect with Black society, planning to eventually return to Denmark.

Helga returns to Harlem and stays in a hotel, instead of with Anne. She sees Dr. Anderson at a party, and when they are alone, he kisses her. She embraces him and feels a strong connection. Later, they plan to meet to talk about the kiss. She is excited at what will happen when they meet. Dr. Anderson visits her in the lobby of her hotel and apologizes for what happened, showing no interest in pursuing the relationship, since he is married. Helga becomes angry and slaps him. The next night, Helga goes out. It is windy and raining, so she takes refuge in a building that is having a religious meeting. She is swept up in the spiritual celebration and is escorted home by Reverend Green.

Helga decides to marry Reverend Green and become religious. They live in a small town in Alabama. She is initially pleased by the importance of her role as the preacher's wife. She no longer has any of the glamour of her previous life. After having three children, and pregnant with a fourth, she begins to despair. Her fourth child is born and she reflects on her life, realizing that she doesn't believe in religion and hates Reverend Green. Her fourth child dies within a week and she lies in bed for a long time. When she finally recovers, she decides that she should leave Reverend Green, but she doesn't want to abandon her children. The book ends with her pregnant with a fifth child.

PLUM BUN, Jessie Redmon Fauset

Jessie Redmon Fauset's Plum Bun: A Novel Without a Moral recounts the story of a young Black woman in the 1920s who decides to pass as white. Ostensibly a coming-of-age story, the novel features a complex treatment of racial barriers and gender inequalities. While the trajectory of the novel is straightforward and relatively typical for the bildungsroman—young woman leaves home, discovers herself through a series of obstacles she must overcome, and finally learns how to live

happily—the narrative is fraught with tensions about what it means to be Black and a woman in early 20th century America. Originally published in 1928, the novel is considered Fauset's most important work, a notable entry in the extensive body of work produced by Black artists during the Harlem Renaissance.

Angela Murray, who lives on an ordinary street in Philadelphia, is a member of the growing Black middle class, with the potential to rise above her circumstances as her parents had done before her. Unlike her dark-skinned father and sister, Angela and her mother Mattie Murray are light-skinned Blacks who can pass for white. Throughout Angela's youth, Mattie takes her on shopping and dining outings in white establishments where her father and sister would not be welcome. While Mattie sees these outings as fun larks of no real consequence, Angela glimpses something more meaningful and more troublesome in their excursions: Whiteness, for Angela, comes to signify freedom of movement and power over circumstances. Racial identity is the central conflict in Angela's life.

After the death of her parents, Angela decides to move to New York—not to the bustling center of Black cultural revival that is 1920s Harlem, but to Manhattan. Here she will attend art school, make friends with several bohemian artists, and pursue romantic relationships, all while passing as white. Unlike her sister, Virginia, who is proud of her Black heritage, Angela sees her race as an obstacle to what she desires in life, the aforementioned freedom and power.

After changing her name to Angèle Mory to distance herself further from her family and background, Angela meets a wealthy young white man, Roger Fielding, through art school acquaintances. He courts her lavishly, and while she doesn't have particularly strong feelings for him, she finds his wealth and status attractive, a means to the end results of financial security and social prestige. She determines to marry him, rather than the lovesick Anthony Cross who has committed himself to the role of starving artist.

Angela's courtship with Roger is punctuated by Roger's racist diatribes against Black people, whom he sees as sub-human. When her sister Virginia comes to town, Angela snubs her, lest she risk revealing her true racial identity.

After many months, Angela is convinced that Roger is ready to propose—however, he proposes not marriage, but a sexual affair, keeping Angela in a love-nest and plying her with material goods that are beyond her means. After her initial shock and refusal, she ultimately gives in to Roger's desires. She craves security more than respectability, which she reasons isn't as important as the freedom she thinks she finds in Roger's wealth and social standing.

After a few months, however, the relationship sours as Angela becomes more possessive of Roger. He breaks it off, leaving her lonely, but clear-eyed about the fact that she hadn't really loved him. Despite a new job and new friendships, she cannot quite escape the anxieties of financial insecurity and lack of love. She remembers Anthony and decides that she has been foolish to deny her feelings for him. The two reconnect, and she falls more deeply in love with him upon learning his tragic back story: His father was killed in a lynching because, as it turns out, Anthony is also Black. Anthony denies that he is passing as white. He just chooses not to overtly identify as Black unless the situation warrants it. Angela decides to reveal her own secret to him, hoping that they will be happy together in their struggle to become artists.

However, Anthony reveals that he is, alas, already engaged—to Angela's sister, Virginia, who is actually still in love with their childhood friend, Matthew. The cruel irony of the situation is inescapable, but Angela decides to throw herself into her art with the hopes of winning a scholarship to study in France, leaving her troubles behind.

She is successful in her endeavor, as is another (openly) Black student, Miss Powell. When the sponsors revoke Miss Powell's scholarship because she is Black, Angela finally admits publicly that she is Black, too. Despite losing her scholarship and returning to Philadelphia, Angela is less restless than before and surer of her own true identity. She visits Matthew, who reveals that he, too, is in love with Virginia. Angela, wanting to make amends to how she previously treated her beloved sister, urges Matthew to confess his love for Virginia.

After her brief sojourn in Philadelphia, Angela travels to France despite being denied her scholarship, using donations from sympathetic white friends and proceeds from the sale of her parents' house. In France, she paints and pines for Anthony. In the interim, Matthew reveals his love for Virginia, and Virginia breaks off her engagement to Anthony, knowing that his true love is Angela. The novel ends on Christmas Eve in Paris with Angela reading a note from her sister saying she has sent a wonderful present: it turns out to be Anthony, of course, and Angela is assured a happy ending.

THE BLACKER THE BERRY, Wallace Thurman

Wallace Thurman's first novel, The Blacker the Berry: A Novel of Negro Life (1929) takes its title from an old folk saying, "the blacker the berry, the sweeter the juice." It is an autobiographical satire whose neurotic, dark-skinned protagonist, Emma Lou Morgan, internalizes biases against dark-complexioned people after a midwestern upbringing by colorstruck relatives mimicking racist societal values. Like Thurman, Emma Lou goes to the University of Southern California and then to Harlem. Unlike Thurman, who was primarily drawn to the artistic renaissance blooming there, Emma Lou hopes Harlem will enable her to escape finally the harsh intraracial prejudice that is exacerbated by her sex and egocentrism.

Among the mundane settings of Harlem tenement buildings, employment agencies, public dance halls, rent parties, cabarets, and movie houses, Emma Lou has numerous opportunities to overcome her obsession with color and class consciousness. She is, indeed, discriminated against by both blacks and whites, but not to the degree that she believes. In a crowded oneroom apartment filled with liquor-gorging intellectuals resembling Langston Hughes (Tony Crews), Zora Neale Hurston (Cora Thurston), and Richard Bruce Nugent (Paul), Truman (Thurman himself) explains intraracial discrimination by examining the parasitic nature of humankind. He argues that "people have to feel superior to something… [other than] domestic animals or steel machines… It is much more pleasing to pick some individual or group… on the same plane." Thus, he suggests that mulattoes who ostracize darker-skinned African Americans merely follow a hierarchy of discrimination set by materially powerful white people. Truman's anatomy of racism, however, is ignored by Emma Lou.

The Blacker the Berry received reviews that, while mixed, praised Thurman for his ironic depiction of original settings, characters, and themes then considered off limits for African American literary examination. Many others also criticized him for emphasizing the seamier side of Harlem life. But Thurman was never pleased with Blacker, and his caricature of the female protagonist shows why. Emma Lou behaves unlike traditional African American females who tend to revise rather than accept the values of both African American and white men. After she is repeatedly degraded by light-skinned Alva, Emma Lou's spiritual liberation begins only when she acknowledges the Thurmanian and Emersonian ideal that salvation rests with the individual, first expressed by white Campbell Kitchen (Carl Van Vechten). In other words, Thurman becomes trapped in the alien body of Emma Lou and does not have the creative imagination to break her racial fixation by summoning up a female perspective. Instead, Emma Lou trades an obsession with skin color for one that is viewed by a patriarchal society as being even more perverse. When she catches Alva embracing the homosexual Bobbie, Emma Lou finally gathers the strength to leave him. Herein lies an example of the dominant literary problem exhibited by the Harlem Renaissance old guard and avant garde alike.

Their art is consumed by the paradox in creating liberated African American male and female voices while mouthing the ethics of the American patriarchy.

Volume Two
NOT WITHOUT LAUGHTER, Langston Hughes
How Langston Hughes Brought His Radical Vision to the Novel by Angela Flournoy
Jan. 2, 2018 New York Times

For a writer like Langston Hughes, who made a name for himself as a poet before the age of 21, his debut novel, "Not Without Laughter," feels like an effort to stake out a bigger claim on his abilities, to create artistic and thematic breathing room. Arna Bontemps, celebrated poet and friend to Hughes, described "Not Without Laughter" as the novel that both Hughes and his readers knew he had to write, coming as it did on the heels of Hughes's two well-received poetry collections, "The Weary Blues" (1926) and "Fine Clothes to the Jew" (1927). Hughes published these collections while a student at Lincoln University, and he released "Not Without Laughter" in 1930, shortly after graduating. "By the date of his first book of prose Hughes had become for many a symbol of the black renaissance," Bontemps writes. The stakes were high, then, for the young man born in Joplin, Mo. He had to deliver.

"Not Without Laughter" crystallizes some of the themes introduced in Hughes's first two poetry collections and examines in detail subjects he would return to throughout his decades-long career, among them the experiences of working-class and poor blacks, the importance of black music to black life, the beauty of black language and the trap of respectability. It begins as a tale of family life, following the Williamses — the matriarch, Aunt Hager; her daughters, Harriet, Annjee (Annjelica) and Tempy; and Annjee's husband, Jimboy — in the small Kansas town of Stanton. After establishing the conflicts and desires of the adults, the narrative becomes a bildungsroman. Here it finds its true purpose: chronicling the upbringing of Sandy, the son of Jimboy and Annjee, as he struggles to forge an identity outside of the boxes the white and black worlds have put him in, and tries to find stability within his increasingly unstable home.

Each family member provides an example of how Sandy might navigate his world. Sandy's father is a blues man, a guitar picker with an itch for traveling, who leaves his wife and his son for months on end. Sandy's mother works long hours as a domestic for an exacting white woman and comes home so exhausted and lovesick that she doesn't have much attention to spare for her young son. Soon enough she leaves Stanton for good, determined to stay by Jimboy's side and find happiness in their reunion.

Aunt Hager is Sandy's primary caretaker, and it is her grandson in whom she invests all her hopes for her family line: "I's gwine raise one chile right yet, if de Lawd lets me live — just one chile right!" In an unkind light Hager can be read as a Mammy, a former slave who chose to stay by her mistress's side for several years after emancipation rather than "scatter like buckshot," as most freed people did, and who now washes the clothes of white people and tends to their illnesses when called. Hughes takes care to flesh out Hager's motivations, which prove to be more complicated than unblinking servitude. Hager finds sanity and solace in forgiveness, in assuming the best in people who are too ignorant to reciprocate that courtesy. Her benevolence is her own existential armor. Hate "closes up de sweet door to life an' makes ever'thing small an' mean an' dirty," Hager insists. Her beliefs stand in stark contrast to those of many other negroes, including her own children.

Hager's youngest daughter, Harriet, is beautiful, and has a voice made to sing the blues. She gives her mother and Annjee's way of life a chance — working at a country club where old white men make passes at her — but ultimately opts out, hoping to escape Stanton altogether. She runs away with

the carnival,then returns to town and dabbles in sex work before finally getting a break as a singer. Her story begins as one of classic teenage rebellion but ends as an example of fierce determination.

In his famous essay "The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain," Hughes expresses fondness for "the low-down folks, the so-called common element." Poor African-Americans made up a majority of the black population but were rarely depicted as fully realized characters in the serious literature of the day. "They furnish a wealth of colorful, distinctive material for any artist because they still hold their own individuality in the face of American standardizations," Hughes writes. A writer who extols the virtues of a group of people based on any demographic denominator runs the risk of flattening or essentializing his characters, but in the face of popular novels centered on middle- and upper-class black experiences, such as those by his contemporary Jessie Redmon Fauset, Hughes's call for nuanced consideration of working-class (and even out-of-work) black people was noteworthy. The early decades of the 20th century were also a period when "color mania" was part of day-to-day black social and professional life, with lighter skin seen as correlating with increased romantic prospects and more opportunities for upward mobility. Hughes's focus on main characters with darker skin tones — something we are reminded of throughout the novel — seems like a conscious statement against racial assimilation and conformity.

In reviewing Hughes's first autobiography, "The Big Sea" (1940), Richard Wright recalls Hughes's first two poetry collections being greeted with shock by the black reading public. "Since then the realistic position assumed by Hughes has become the dominant outlook of all those Negro writers who have something to say," Wright observes. Indeed what stays with the reader longer than the overall narrative arc of "Not Without Laughter" is the frequent, unexpected uses of imagery and language that make the characters and their lives feel real. Sandy recalls Aunt Hager, a woman who frowns on secular dancing — even if that dancing takes place in her own yard — whirling round and round at a revival in religious ecstasy. With the same amount of fondness he recalls his aunt Harriet "balling-the-jack" to Jimboy's guitar music in the yard. Both Aunt Hager and Sister Johnson tend to pronounce the word "idea" as "idee," a subtle nod to what the historian Henry Louis Gates Jr. calls "the linguistic legacy of slavery." During conversations between black characters, the word "nigger" rolls off their tongues often — sometimes pejoratively, sometimes humorously, but more often as a general descriptor — and it's a testament to Hughes's ear for black language that we are never in doubt about the intended tone. This focus on rendering realistically how black folks behave among themselves, whether or not such behavior would be considered proper in other contexts, is one of the novel's greatest achievements.

Like his one-time collaborator and contemporary Zora Neale Hurston, Hughes takes an anthropological approach to setting and character development. The town of Stanton where "Not Without Laughter" is set is similar to Lawrence, the small Kansas town where Hughes grew up with his maternal grandmother while his father worked in Mexico and his mother lived in Topeka. It was the sort of place where blacks and whites might live in close proximity to one another, but where a black boy would avoid walking by his white neighbor's front lawn for fear of having insults and slurs — or worse — hurled at him. Like the novel's hero, Sandy, Hughes grew up with a largely absent father and an interest in books. Already a budding public figure by the time of the novel's release, Hughes likely saw his own life pulling him farther and farther away from the small-town Midwestern world that raised him. Reading "Not Without Laughter," one can't help feeling as if Hughes had a desperate need to get all of his early cultural memories down on paper, from the "sooty gray-green light" that turns to blackness before a tornado touches down, to the possum, peach preserves and yams that make up a humble Thanksgiving dinner.

Sandy is an ideal protagonist for a novel so interested in place and culture — an observant boy with a penchant for finding the extraordinary in the ordinary. He listens intently during warm nights spent on the porch with Aunt Hager, with an occasional visit from Sister Johnson or the speechifying Madam de Carter. He overhears grown black folks parsing out the psychology of whites who want to keep blacks close to them — nursing their children, preparing their meals — but always beneath them, and withholds his own judgment, already wise enough to know he doesn't yet know enough. As a teenager Sandy sweeps up at a neighborhood barbershop, a place "filled with loud man-talk and smoke and laughter," and gets a crude sexual education from the conversations of the shop's day laborer customers and barbers, as well as plenty of lessons in playing the dozens — "the protective art of turning back a joke." He inhabits this new space the same way he inhabits every other one, simultaneously attuned to its peculiarities and somewhat set apart.

In "The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain," Hughes addresses the issue of respectability, the belief that promoting only the best, brightest and most palatable forms of blackness might somehow temper white bigotry. "'Oh, be respectable, write about nice people, show how good we are,' say the Negroes," he laments. The respectability argument is so attractive to some that nearly eight decades later it still rears its head with regard to black art and representation. For Sandy, the pressure to be respectable comes from Aunt Tempy, Aunt Hager's oldest child, who avoids visiting her washerwoman mother in an effort to preserve the illusion of her middle-class upbringing. After Hager's death, Sandy moves in with Tempy, and with his usual levelheadedness is able to see the futility of her and her husband's way of thinking: They look down on the Baptist church for its "nigger music" but are still made to use the servant's entrance at some of the town's finer white establishments. Sandy is nobody's fool, though: He sees the benefits their lifestyle affords him, like his own room and the freedom to read as much as he wants.

"Not Without Laughter" is an early Great Migration novel. Many blacks in Kansas arrived from the South after emancipation, and with the advent of automation and the decline of agricultural work, blacks kept traveling north and west in search of opportunities. A migration narrative is necessarily a story of change. The author's task is to replicate the nostalgia and hope his characters feel as they set out for new futures, or the fear, resentment and loneliness of those left behind. Jimboy, the novel's most frequent migrant, sings a song that encapsulates both sides of the experience:

He begins:

I got a mule to ride. I got a mule to ride. Down in the South somewhere. I got a mule to ride.

His sister-in-law, Harriet, responds:

O, don't you leave me here. Babe, don't you leave me here. Dog-gone yo' comin' back! Said don't you leave me here.

As a depiction of a period of transition, the migration novel often makes a priority of capturing life as it is led in its very moment, since there's no telling what might change when characters find themselves in new landscapes. The changing way of life between one generation and the next is a persistent point of tension in "Not Without Laughter." Aunt Hager pumps water for her laundry washing, as well as for the cooking and cleaning, yet a few miles away Tempy lives with electric lights and indoor plumbing. Hager sees hotels as breeding grounds for vice and sin, but both Harriet and Sandy jump at the chance to work at one, motivated by a paycheck. Hughes uses the songs and dances of Jimboy and Harriet as well as the church revival culture of Hager and Annjee — in scenes taking place on the same night, less than a half mile apart — to depict the crossroads between the traditions that have given expression to the community in the past and those that might fill that role in the future.

Sandy's father, Jimboy, is caught in a cycle of desiring to be on the road to find better work (and freedom from responsibility) and of nostalgia for the culture and familiarity of the South. Jimboy's wanderlust is offensive to Hager, but Sandy idolizes his father, begging him to teach him how to box and fish and play guitar. The scene of Jimboy about to cut out for the road once again — this time for good — is one of the most poignant in the book. Sandy discovers his father "sitting dejectedly on the well-stoop in the sunshine, with his head in his hands," his posture conveying the sort of defeat only a man intending to abandon his family feels. The father takes his son in his arms and kisses him awkwardly. He does not say goodbye. Later that afternoon Sandy discovers Jimboy has left town.

What prevents Hughes's characters from being mere archetypes of working-class black folks, or of the Great Migration, is their ability to change and respond to one another. "Not Without Laughter" is a novel not without forgiveness. Its characters ultimately prize family over their own ideological resolve, though it takes some longer than others to get there. After hearing news of Harriet's arrest for streetwalking, Hager doesn't speak her daughter's name for some time, but she does not disown her; Hager's dying wish is for Harriet to be happy. Even Tempy's taking in of Sandy can be seen as an attempt to pull her family close again after keeping her distance for so long. The one exception is Jimboy, who remains elusive throughout the novel, a father figure always out of reach.

A poet who writes fiction can imbue his prose with a considerable amount of magic. For Hughes, his magic is an appreciation for the lyrics and rhythms of jazz and blues. It's one thing to appreciate the cultural aspects of these musical forms, yet another to home in on the lyrics, the power of the repetition employed therein, the subtle turns of phrase and uses of wit.

"Not Without Laughter" includes lyrics to songs that are mournful, bawdy, vengeful and downright silly. They underscore the importance Hughes felt they played in black life and consciousness. One gets the sense that Sandy's upbringing has been shaped just as much by overhearing these songs as by Aunt Hager's teachings. As the novel progresses, Sandy's thoughts are rendered in musical streams of consciousness, quickly turning from anticipation to curiosity to anger to desire. The result is a realistic portrayal of the rhythms of a young man's inner life: Sandy lies in bed at night and riffs on his own past and future.

In perhaps the most peculiar scene of the novel, Sandy is pursued by a solicitous older man, a "yellow man with a womanish kind of voice," on the streets of Chicago. Sandy quickly ascertains that the man is one of the "queer fellows" who try to convince boys to come up to their rooms. The scene ends with Sandy running away, but Hughes writes that Sandy wondered what such men did with the boys they seduced. "Curious, he'd like to find out — but he was afraid." For the time period, to acknowledge homosexual activity, and to allow that it might pique one's interest, was quite rare. The scene would remain one of Hughes's more direct engagements with the topic of homosexuality in his prose until the 1961 short story "Blessed Assurance." The tragedy and senselessness of racism is felt throughout "Not Without Laughter," and Hughes takes care to show how it manifests itself in ways small and large. Sandy cries after he overhears Annjee's boss, Mrs. Rice, berate his mother as she packs up leftovers for him. When Sandy and his friends are turned away from the Children's Day Party at the theme park, the other kids talk loudly about the injustice of it, and Sandy just keeps muttering, "I suppose they didn't mean colored kids," a feeble attempt to make sense of a surprising and hurtful situation. His friend Buster plans to pass as white and tells the gang that if one day they should run into him in a big city, to act like they don't know him. Colorism seeps down to every aspect of life, even those moments made for pleasure, as at Benbow's dance: "'High yallers, draw nigh! Brown-skins, come near!' somebody squalled. 'But black gals, stay where you are!'"

Hughes would not write another novel for nearly 30 years, until 1958, but four years after the publication of "Not Without Laughter" he released the story collection "The Ways of White Folks,"

a series of vignettes about the interaction between white and black people, often with grim, moralistic endings. By this time he had parted ways with his white benefactor Charlotte Mason; his resentment over the split might explain why these stories reach for concrete conclusions that do not similarly burden his novel.

"Not Without Laughter" is a debut in the best of ways: It covers uncharted territory, it compels its readers to see part of the world anew, and it prizes exploration over pat conclusion. Hughes accesses the universal — how all of us love and dream and laugh and cry — by staying faithful to the particulars of his characters and their way of life. With this book the young poet from Joplin, Mo., manages to deliver something more valuable than simply an admirable debut — he gives his readers and contemporaries a guide for careful consideration of the lives of everyday black people. Such a guide is still useful to readers and writers today. Perhaps now more than ever.

BLACK NO MORE, George Schuyler

On New Year's Eve in 1933, Max Disher and his friend Bunny Brown go to the popular Honky Tonk Club in New York City. Max tries to ask a beautiful blonde girl from Atlanta to dance, but she cruelly rebuffs him because he is Black. The next day, Bunny tells him about an old friend of theirs, Dr. Crookman, who has discovered a treatment to turn Black Americans white. The treatment, called "Black-No-More," changes a Black person's skin, hair, and features in three days to make them indistinguishable from white people—though it will not change the features of any babies the person might have. Max resolves to be one of the first people to get the treatment, particularly because he can then go seek out the beautiful blonde woman.

After undergoing the treatment, Max is excited by his newfound freedom and assurance as a white man, though he soon realizes that white society is quite dull. But with thousands of people lining up for the treatment, society is changing. Black businesses are starting to worry about losing customers, and people are leaving Harlem in droves now that they no longer face housing discrimination like they did when they were Black. Max tells Bunny that he's going back to Atlanta to find the blonde girl and tells Bunny to meet him there.

Meanwhile, Black and white elites are both trying to shut down Black-No-More: white people are trying to maintain what they consider to be their racial purity and white supremacy. Black activists preach racial solidarity, and they are also worried about losing support for the Back-to-Africa movement or the money white people donate to their organizations when Black people face discrimination or violence. At the same time, Black-No-More has made Crookman and his associates, Charles Foster and Hank Johnson, incredibly wealthy, and they bribe politicians to prevent them from passing any legislation that would close their sanitariums.

Max Disher (who has now changed his name to Matthew Fisher), arrives in Atlanta but can't find the blonde girl. Recognizing white people's growing alarm at African Americans joining their ranks, Matthew realizes he can profit off of this hatred. He gets involved with a white supremacist group called the Knights of Nordica, founded by the Reverend Henry Givens, by convincing Givens that he is an anthropologist from New York and by giving impassioned speeches on white people's biological superiority. He quickly earns Givens's trust and becomes his second-in-command, growing their membership and their treasury. Matthew also learns that Givens's daughter, Helen, is the beautiful blonde girl from the Honky Tonk, and Matthew quickly courts and marries her.

A few weeks after the wedding, Bunny arrives in Atlanta and finds Matthew—Bunny has recently become white, too. Matthew immediately hires Bunny as his assistant, and they conspire to stop political progress in either direction. The longer they can draw out a fight between those in favor of and those against Black-No-More, the more members the Knights of Nordica can gain—and the more money Matthew can make.

Soon, white women start having Black babies because either they or their husbands used to be Black, unbeknownst to their partners. As a result, Crookman opens lying-in hospitals (i.e., maternity hospitals) where women can give birth and then turn the infant white immediately after birth. As a result, alarm spreads throughout the country and people pour into Knights of Nordica meetings, aiming to preserve racial purity.

Soon after, Matthew faces a new challenge: now that white workers (many of whom are Knights) do not fear companies firing them in favor of hiring cheaper Black laborers, they start to organize. Matthew uses this to his advantage, taking bribes from factory managers to stop white workers from organizing. Matthew then starts rumors among the workers that there are Black people among them, leading to infighting that prevents them from unionizing and raising their wages.

A presidential election looms. Because so many of the formerly Black people have better access to voting as white people, the conservative Democrats worry that the Republicans might carry the South and win in a landslide. Matthew comes up with a plan to prevent this, teaming up with the wealthy Anglo-Saxon Association (headed by Arthur Snobbcraft) to raise funds for the campaign while the Knights of Nordica bring in the votes. After some political maneuvering, Matthew convinces the delegates at the Democratic National Convention to nominate Rev. Givens for president and Snobbcraft for vice president; they run on a platform of using genealogical tests to determine who can vote. Meanwhile, the Republicans re-nominate the current president, Harold Goosie.

The political campaign is long and bitter: on the Democratic side are "pure" white people, while Republican supporters are those who either suspect or know for sure that they are "impure." Snobbcraft comes up with a plan to help sway people to their side, asking statistician Samuel Buggerie to make a report on people's ancestry that would be so shocking that people would have to vote for the Democrats to adopt their plank of using genealogical examinations to determine the right to vote. Buggerie aims to release the report just a few days before the election. Meanwhile, Crookman and his men donate money to the Republican cause.

About a month before the election, Matthew reveals to Bunny that Helen is pregnant and due in three weeks, and he doesn't know what to do because she wants to have the baby at home—but it will almost certainly be Black. Bunny counsels him to get a plane and some money ready and to tell Helen the truth—if she doesn't take it well, Matthew can flee, and if she does, then all is well.

Soon the Knights of Nordica grow violent, setting fire to one of Crookman's lying-in hospitals and killing 12 babies. Many of the women who flee the burning hospital are socially prominent, and this fact scandalizes the nation, prompting even more support for the Democrats. Desperate for a plan of attack, the Republicans learn about Buggerie's ancestry project and plan to steal the research so that he can't publish it. But two days before the election, Buggerie reveals to Snobbcraft that his research shows many of the most prominent politicians have Black ancestry—including Givens and Snobbcraft themselves. Heading to the vault where they are keeping the research, Snobbcraft and Buggerie soon discover that someone has stolen Buggerie's research and his summary showing the list of politicians that have Black ancestry.

The day before the election, Helen gives birth to a Black baby. But before Matthew can explain himself, Givens comes in with a paper, which has published a story about his and Snobbcraft's ancestry. He tells them that an angry mob chased him home and that they are all in danger. Helen begs Matthew to stick by her, thinking that her ancestry is the reason the baby is Black, and Matthew forgives her. He reveals that he was formerly Black and that he is actually the reason for their baby's skin color. He is relieved to tell the truth, and he, Helen, Bunny, and Givens all resolve to take his plane out of the country.

Meanwhile, Snobbcraft and Buggerie attempt to do the same thing, hiring a man to fly them to Mexico to avoid an angry mob. But the plane doesn't have enough gas and crashes in Mississippi, and Snobbcraft and Buggerie decide that their best course of action is to use shoe polish to blacken their faces and arms so that people don't recognize them from the newspapers.

However, the first town they come upon, Happy Hill, Mississippi, is notorious for lynching, and a pastor named Alex McPhule has taken over the town and convinced the townspeople that God is going to send them a sign on Election Day. On that day, when Snobbcraft and Buggerie approach the town, the townspeople (thinking they are Black) attack the two men until they pull off the men's clothes and see that they are actually white. However, after Snobbcraft and Buggerie clean up, the townspeople recognize them from the papers and because they have Black ancestry, the people brutally mutilate them, shoot them, and burn them alive.

The Republicans are elected in a landslide. Soon after, Crookman publishes a paper explaining that his treatment actually turned African Americans a few shades whiter than "pure" white people. As a result, makeup products spring up to darken people's complexion to prove that they are white, a trend which now makes most people look Black. In the book's final scene, Crookman sees a picture of the Givens and Fisher family vacationing in Cannes—all of them looking as dark as Matthew Fisher Jr.

THE CONJURE-MAN DIES, Rudolph Fisher

This 1932 novel should help Fisher (1897–1934) get the wider acclaim he merits for writing the first mystery novel populated solely by Black characters. NYPD police detective Perry Dart is drawn into a baffling homicide case after N'Gana Frimbo, a Harvard graduate who worked as a psychic, is found dead with a bloody head wound in his Harlem home by two prospective clients. They become suspects, along with several others who were waiting for appointments with Frimbo, including drug addict Doty Hicks. Dart discovers the unusual murder weapon, a club made from a human femur, and is intrigued by Hicks's apparent motive—the belief that Frimbo put a spell on his brother, Oliver, that's slowly killing Oliver and can only be broken by Frimbo's death. Fisher tosses in plenty of red herrings and subtly planted clues, along with self-referential humor. (At one point, Dart notes that in books, "It's always the least likely person.") The clever plot will resonate with golden age fans.

The Conjure-Man Dies is the first known mystery novel written by an African-American. Rudolph Fisher, one of the principal writers of the Harlem Renaissance, weaves an intricate story of a native African king, who, after receiving a degree from Harvard University, settles into Harlem in the 1930s. He becomes a "conjure-man," a fortune-teller, a mysterious figure who remains shrouded in darkness while his clients sit directly across from him, singly bathed in light. It is in this configuration that one of these seekers os the revelation of fate discovers he is speaking to a dead man. Thus a complex mystery begins, involving suspects and characters who are vividly and richly portrayed, and who dramatically illuminate for the reader a time, a place, and a people that have been sadly neglected in American literature.

Fisher presented a mystery and detective story, again set in Harlem and featuring an all-Black cast. It was Fisher's attempt to tap into a popular audience with a tale of African rituals, a mysterious murder, and hidden identities. It is also the first Black detective novel not originally published in serial periodical form.

Throughout the Harlem Renaissance, Fisher pursued an active career as a physician in private practice, a roentgenologist, and an X-ray technician. He died of a mysterious stomach ailment that some scholars suspect was caused by radiation exposure.

BLACK THUNDER, Arna Bontemps

Arna Bontemps's novel Black Thunder: Gabriel's Revolt: Virginia 1800 was published in 1936. This conflation of history and imagination is based on an actual slave rebellion reported in contemporary newspapers and recorded in the Calendar of Virginia State Papers (vol. 9, 1890). The chronicle begins in the great house of old Moseley Sheppard whose dependence on old Ben Woodfolk, his faithful house servant, has developed over the years into veiled companionship. Old Bundy, Ben's work-worn counterpart, once a fieldhand on the neighboring plantation but now reduced to scavenging throughout the neighborhood, intrudes on Ben's peace to beg for rum and surreptitiously to invite him to join the slave Gabriel's scheme for insurrection. It is old Bundy's misfortune to be observed with his jug of rum by Thomas Prosser, his merciless master, who uses the excuse to beat him to death.

Bundy's murder adds fresh resolve to Gabriel's plans and subverts the comfort of reluctant individuals like old Ben. Indeed, Gabriel had chosen the occasion of Bundy's funeral to elaborate his strategy to amass some eleven hundred men and one woman to take the city of Richmond in their first step toward freedom. The remarkable funeral seems to emerge from a collective preliterate tradition whose origins are African and whose inspiration to freedom arises from the natural world. Under these conditions, old Ben swears allegiance to the conspiracy in the presence of the principal plotters, at first with apprehension and then with deep trepidation.

Gabriel, the strapping six-foot two-inch coachman for Thomas Prosser, had earned the respect of slaves and "free" blacks throughout Henrico County, Virginia, about a year earlier by winning a titan's battle with Ditcher, the brutal driver of slaves from another plantation. Gabriel wins fealty for his resoluteness and a generosity of spirit, which appeals to persons as diverse as Mingo, the literate freeman, and the tempestuous Juba, Gabriel's woman; he finds personal inspiration in the proclamation of General Toussaint L'Ouverture, the Haitian liberator, who still lived, and in biblical text read aloud by Mingo.

At the appointed hour of insurrection, a relentless, unprecedented downpour transforms Henrico County into a flood plain; Gabriel's insurgents find it impossible to execute their grand design and are forced to pull back in favor of a more propitious time. The delay, however, is sufficient to uncover the treachery of Pharoah, who immediately snatches the opportunity to turn informant. Out of loyalty to Moseley Sheppard, old Ben confesses his role and names leaders.

Across the nation amazement accompanies alarm, for it is inconceivable that illiterate chattel are capable of conceiving such a scheme on their own. Every literate white person who is not native to the region is suspect, as Scotsman John Callender, friend of Thomas Jefferson, rudely learns. Frenchman M. Creuzot, printer, is particularly imperiled and flees north for his safety. Before long all the major figures in the conspiracy, including Gabriel, are captured and hung. Pharoah, meanwhile, literally loses his mind, but perfidious old Ben endures, however uneasily.

Richard Wright generously noted in his 1936 review that Black Thunder broke new ground in African American fiction by addressing concerns not previously touched upon in African American novels. Most critics readily concur that given its myriad voices and many points of view, the controlling idea of the novel is its universal determination toward freedom, a principle that warrants their generous attention to its political purpose. Others, however, noting its contribution to the vernacular tradition, cite meaningful distinctions between literacy and orality as racial and cultural markers. <>

DANTE by John Took [Princeton University Press, 9780691154046]

An authoritative and comprehensive intellectual biography of the author of the *Divine Comedy*

For all that has been written about the author of the *Divine Comedy*, Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) remains the best guide to his own life and work. Dante's writings are therefore never far away in this authoritative and comprehensive intellectual biography, which offers a fresh account of the medieval Florentine poet's life and thought before and after his exile in 1302.

Beginning with the often violent circumstances of Dante's life, the book examines his successive works as testimony to the course of his passionate humanity: his lyric poetry through to the *Vita nova* as the great work of his first period; the *Convivio*, *De vulgari eloquentia* and the poems of his early years in exile; and the *Monarchia* and the *Commedia* as the product of his maturity. Describing as it does a journey of the mind, the book confirms the nature of Dante's undertaking as an exploration of what he himself speaks of as "maturity in the flame of love."

The result is an original synthesis of Dante's life and work.

CONTENTS

In fondo, una serietà terribile

The greatest poetic expression of the Existentialist point of view in the Middle Ages is Dante's *Divina Commedia.* It remains, like the religious depth psychology of the monastics, within the framework of the scholastic ontology. But within these limits it enters the deepest places of human self-destruction and despair as well as the highest places of courage and salvation, and gives in poetic symbols an all-embracing existential doctrine of man. PAUL TILLICH [Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (Glasgow: Collins, 1980 [1952]),128]

When it came to great men and great books, T. S. Eliot was inclined in one and the same moment to take away with one hand what he gave with the other; for if indeed it is more satisfactory writing about greater as distinct from lesser men, there being more scope for finding something useful to say about them, then at the same time there is much to be said for leaving the great man in peace, he himself being far and away his own best expositor. On the one hand, then, from the twilight phase of his own meditation on the *Commedia,* Eliot writes:

What I have written is, as I promised, not an 'introduction' to the study but a brief account of my own introduction to it. In extenuation, it may be observed that to write in this way of men like Dante or Shakespeare is really less presumptuous than to write of smaller men. The very vastness of the subject leaves a possibility that one may have something to say worth saying; whereas with smaller men, only minute and special study is likely to justify writing about them at all. [T. S. Eliot, *Dante* (London: Faber and Faber, 1945 [1929), 63-64.]

while from just a little earlier in the same essay we have these lines on starting with Dante himself, together with the books he himself read, as the best way forward:

The effect of many books about Dante is to give the impression that it is more necessary to read about him than to read what he has written. But the next step after reading Dante again and again should be to read some of the books that he read, rather than modern books about his work and life and times, however good.

But that, alas, is not all, for already established fast by the time of his book on Dante is a sense on Eliot's part of interpretation—the main business, he suggests, of literary criticism—as a matter at

best of dubious verifiability and at worst of mere posturing, herein lying its twofold bane and blessing, its lingering on somewhere between truth and untruth:

> There is a large part of critical writing which consists in 'interpreting' an author ... [But] it is difficult to confirm the 'interpretation' by external evidence. To anyone who is skilled in fact on this level there will be evidence enough. But who is to prove his own skill? And for every success in this type of writing there are thousands of impostures. Instead of insight you get fiction. Your test is to apply it again and again to the original, with your view of the original to guide you. But there is no one to guarantee your competence, and once again we find ourselves in a dilemma.

Now none of this makes easy reading for those of us busying ourselves in this sector, for those of us busying ourselves in this sector are busy, precisely, about introduction and interpretation, about forestalling the pristine encounter in all the `terrifying seriousness' thereof. What possible justification, therefore, can there be for imposing yet again upon the reader and for indulging the will to interpretation?

The answer, I think, lies in our insisting, with as much good faith as we can muster, upon the notion that where Dante is concerned, something must be said, Dante himself going out of his way to engage the reader as party to the fundamental project, as there for the purposes not merely of discerning his meaning in the text but, by way of his or her role as reader, of helping to generate that meaning in the first place. In the context, then, of what in the case of the Commedia amounts to one of the most writerly of writerly texts in European literature, there can be no passing by on the other side. On the contrary, the reader—Dante's ubiquitous "lettore"—is at every point invited to step up to the mark and to speak on his or her own account to the matter in hand.

But with this we are as yet far from home, for having insisted that where Dante is concerned something has to be said, we have now to decide what that something might be, beginning, perhaps, with what actually matters about him. So what does actually matter about Dante? The depth and intensity of his meditation in any number of areas from theology to philosophy and from linguistics to literary aesthetics? Most certainly. His power and persuasiveness as a mythmaker, as one proceeding by way of a fiction which is, in truth, no fiction at all to confirm an ideal trajectory of the spirit? This too. His faith in the image, as distinct from the idea, as that whereby the human situation stands most completely to be contemplated? Absolutely. His fashioning from the as yet youthful Italian tongue a means of exploring the human situation in the at once sordid and sublime totality thereof? This to be sure. The resourcefulness and refinement both of the prose and of the metrical period as the hallmark of his consummate craftsmanship? No doubt. But over and beyond these things and serving the purpose of something greater than any of them is their commitment to the being and becoming of the otherwise anxious subject, of this or that individual or group of individuals concerned in respect of their properly human presence in the world as creatures of reasonable self-determination. This situation is everywhere discernible in the text and everywhere decisive for our reading and reception of it. It is discernible in the *Vita nova,* where it is a question of right understanding in love as that whereby the poet stands securely in his own presence as a maker of verses in the Italian vernacular, and it is discernible in the *Convivio,* where it is a question of how, in and through a more refined species of philosophical awareness, the 'many men and women in this language of ours burdened by domestic and civic care' might know themselves in their properly human happiness. It is discernible in the first book of the *De vulgari eloquentia,* where it is a question of how a certain group of people at a certain stage of their sociopolitical and cultural development might know themselves and in turn be known in their now recognizably Italian way of being, it is a question of encountering self in its power to self-annihilation *(Hell),* of fashioning self afresh in point of properly human knowing and loving *(Purgatory),* and of rejoicing at last in the now properly speaking transcendent substance of it all *(Paradise).* Throughout, then, the pattern is the same, for

throughout it is a question not simply of this or that high-level instance of cultural awareness, be it moral, social, political or linguistic, but of these things as making possible the emergence or coming about either of the individual or of the group of individuals in keeping with all they have it in themselves to be and to become.

Here, then, in what amounts to an honouring of the text by way of a reply in kind, of coming alongside the poet in respect of the leading idea, lies such justification as well as such consistency as this fresh exercise in interpretation possesses. Part 1, then, offers byway of contextualization an account of Florentine history from the early part of the thirteenth century through to the demise of Henry VII in 1313 and of Dante's life before and after his exile in 1302, while part 2 ('The Early Years') traces his activity as a lyric poet through to the *Vita nova* with its now secure sense of love as a principle of self-transcendence, of knowing self in the ecstatic substance of self. Part 3 (`The Middle Years') focuses on those works leading up to and culminating in the *Convivio* as an essay in the ways and means of properly human happiness and on the *De vulgari eloquentia* as a reflection upon language in general and poetic form in particular as a principle of collective identity and—in the case of the latter—of a now soaring spirituality, while part 4 ('The Final Years') gives an account *(a)* of the *Commedia* as, whatever else it is, an essay in significant journeying, *(b)* of the *Monarchia* as a meditation upon the deep reasons of imperial government and *(c)* of the *Questio de situ ague et terre,* the letter to Cangrande della Scala and the *Eclogues* as each in its way testifying to the strength of Dante's still scholastic and romance-vernacular allegiances. Finally, the afterword seeks to confirm yet again the deep seriousness of it all, a seriousness, however, `inmantled' at last by a smile as but its outward aspect. [*See Paradiso 2.0.13-15:* 'O dolce amor the di riso t'ammanti, / quanto parevi ardente in que' flailli, / ch'avieno spirto sol di pensier santi!' (O sweet love that mantles yourself in a smile, how radiant yo showing forth in those flutes filled only with the breath of sacred thoughts). Indebted as I am to the translations noted in the 'Select Bibliography' below, I have from time to time modified them in interest of further precision and readability.]

What, then, of Eliot's misgiving relative to those daring to take up the pen yet again where Dante is concerned? Given that the text is indeed it own best interpreter then deep down we cannot but concur, misgiving at every point rising **up** Leviathan-like from the depths to call into question the entire project. But that thankfully, is probably not how Dante himself would have seen it, for his, everywhere, is an invitation to the feast and, with it, to talk it all over one with another; for rather like those coming down from Jerusalem to Emmaus in the evening hour, we too have witnessed a strange and marvellous thing, talking it all over one with another serving merely to confirm its continuing presence to us as a means of significant self-interpretation.

A Coruscation of Delight

> E the e ridere se non una corruscazione de la dilettazione de l'anima,
> cioe uno lume apparente di fuori secondo sta dentro?

And what is laughter if not a coruscation of the soul's delight, a light bearing witness in its outward aspect to how it stands within?
Convivio 3.8.1[1]

To speak of the smile as but a showing forth of what *is* in the depths is by no means to qualify what in Dante amounts to the terrifying seriousness of it all, the `serieta' terribile' standing both at the beginning and at the end of his every undertaking and sustaining that undertaking at every point along the way. First, then, come the *rime,* busy from the outset about seeing off the levity of a Dante da Maiano in favour of the substance and psychology of loving and loving well. Then there is the *Vita*

nova, where it is a question of that same love contemplated under the aspect less now of acquisition than of disposition as the in-and-through-which of new life. Then comes the *Convivio,* the magnanimous *Convivio,* where it is a question of philosophy as but the love of wisdom coeval and consubstantial with the Godhead itself as the way of properly human being and becoming, as that whereby `the many men and women in this language of ours burdened by domestic and civic care' might know themselves in the fullness of their proper humanity. And then, as belonging to much the same moment as the *Convivio,* comes the no less precious *De vulgari eloquentia* with its sense of the *illustre (a)* as that whereby a certain set of people at a certain stage of their sociopolitical and cultural development know themselves in the now consummate character of their presence the world (book 1), and *(b)* as that whereby the would-be poet in the high style confirms and lives out the substance of his own astripetal or star-seeking humanity (book 2). And then there is the *Commedia,* an essay likewise busy at the point of ultimate concern, in the coming home of the pilgrim spirit as hitherto but a wanderer in the region of unlikeness. Seriousness this, therefore, of a high order and all the more so for its reaching out to involve every man—including those perforce 'deeming this time ancient'—in an act of ontological rejoicing, of knowing self in the freedom of self for its proper destiny.

But to speak thus of ontological rejoicing, of delight in (as Dante himself puts it) the butterfly-emergence of the spirit into the fullness of its proper presence in the world, is already to speak of the way in which the truth utterance is for him a smiling utterance, herein—in his ever-deepening commitment to the smile as but the outward aspect of seriousness-lying final confirmation of the seasoned substance of his own humanity; so, for example, the `sorrise parolette' moment of *Paradiso* 1 where it is a question of words, not simply as spoken but as smiled perforce, as irradiated both within and without by their smiling aspect:

> S'io fui del primo dubbio disvestito
> per le sorrise parolette brevi,
> dentro ad un nuovo piii fu' inretito
> e dissi: 'Gia contento *requlevi*
> di grande ammirazion; ma ora ammiro
> com' io trascenda questi corpi levi'.
> *(Paradiso* 1.94-99)

> If I was freed from my perplexity by the words she smiled to me I was all the more caught up in a new one, and said: "Content I was for a moment and relieved in respect of a great wonder, but marvel now how I should be rising above these light substances."

or the `ella sorrise alquanto' moment of *Paradiso* 2 where it is a question of the smile as preparing the way for a fresh act of spiritual intelligence:

> Ella sorrise alquanto, e poi `S'elli erra
> l'oppinion, mi disse, `d'i mortali
> dove chiave di senso non diserra,
> certo non ti dovrien punger li strali
> d'ammirazione omai, poi dietro ai sensi
> vedi che la ragione ha corte
> (Paradiso 2.52-57)

> 'She smiled a little and then said to me: "If mortal judgement errs where the key of sense fails to 'unlock, surely the shafts of wonder should not prick you henceforth, since following on from the semis reason's wings, as you can see, are short indeed."

or the `sorridendo, ardea ne li occhi santi' moment of Paradiso 3 where it is a question of the smile as testimony to the love-intensity of it all:

> Con quelle altr' ombre pria sorrise un poco;
> da indi mi rispuose tanto lieta,
> ch'arder parea d'amor nel primo foco.
> (Paradiso 3.67-69)

> 'With those other shades she first smiled a little, then answered me with the joy of one it seemed, in the first fire of love:

or the `sorridendo facendosi piil mera' moment of Paradiso 3 where it is a question of the smile as-here as throughout—prefacing and pervading the mane than ever ardent utterance:

> E io senti' dentro a quella lumera
> che pria m'avea parlato, sorridendo
> incominciar, faccendosi piu mera.
> 'Cosi com' io del suo raggio resplendo,
> si, riguardando ne la Luce etterna,
> li tuoi pensieri onde cagioni apprendo:
> (Paradiso 11.16-21)

> 'And within that radiance that just addressed me I heard begin as it smiled and grew all the in brightness: "Even as I reflect its beams, so, gazing into the eternal light, I perceive your thoughts and the origin thereof."'

—and all this by way of participation, of an ever more complete sharing in the life of the One who, perfectly self-in-seated, self-understanding and self-loving as he is, knows himself by way only of the self-smiling proper to being in its pure form:

> O Luce etterna the sola in te Sidi,
> sola t'intendi, e da te intelletta
> e intendente te ami e arridi!
> *(Paradiso 33.124-26)*

> 'O Light Eternal that solely abides in yourself, solely knows yourself, and, by yourself alone understood and understanding, loves and smiles upon yourself!'

This, then, for all the seriousness of the text, must constitute the *terminus ad quem* or point of arrival for any account of Dante as spokesman-in-chief for the existential point of view in the Middle Ages; for presupposing as it does the agony of existence in its moment-by-moment unfolding (for there is, in Dante, no speaking as a child, no understanding as a child and no thinking as a child), his withal is an account of the human situation in its properly speaking radiant complexion, in its forever opening out in a rapt coruscation of the spirit. <>

POETICS OF REDEMPTION: DANTE'S DIVINE COMEDY
by Andreas Kablitz [De Gruyter, 9783110634099]

The essays on Dante collected in this volume interpret his *Commedia* as the attempt of a renewal of the Christian work of salvation by means of literature. In the view of his author, the *sacro poema* responds to a historical moment of extreme danger, in which nothing less than the

redemption of mankind is at stake. The degradation of the medieval Roman Empire and the rise of an early capitalism in his birth town Florence, entailing a pernicious moral depravation for Dante, are to him nothing else but a variety of symptoms of the backfall of the world into its state prior to its salvation by the incarnation of Christ.

Dante presents his journey into the other world as an endeavor to escape these risks. Mobilizing the traditional procedures of literary discourse for this purpose, he aims at writing a text that overcomes the deficiencies of the traditional Book of Revelation that, on its own terms, no longer seems capable of fulfilling his traditional tasks. The immense revaluation of poetry implied in Dante's *Commedia*, thus, contemporarily involves the claim of a substantial weakness of the institutional religious discourse.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: The studies on Dante collected in this volume interpret his Commedia as the attempt of a renewal of the Christian work of salvation by means of literature. In the view of his author, the sacro poem, a response to a historical moment of extreme danger, in which nothing less than the redemption of mankind is at stake. The degradation of the medieval Roman Empire and the rise of an early capitalism in his birth town Florence, entailing a pernicious moral depravation for Dante, are to him nothing else but a variety of symptoms of the backfall of the world into its state prior to its salvation by the incarnation of Christ. Dante presents his journey into the other world as an endeavor to escape these risks. Mobilizing the traditional procedures of literary discourse for this purpose, he aims at writing a text that over comes the deficiencies of the traditional Book of Revelation that, on its own terms, no longer seems capable of fulfilling his traditional tasks. The immense revaluation of poetry implied in Dante's Commedia, thus, contemporarily involves the claim of a substantial weakness of the institutional religious discourse.

***

Poetics of Knowledge in the Paradiso (Paradiso XXVII and XXX)

"La natura del mondo, che quïeta
il mezzo e tutto l'altro intomo move,
quinci comincia come da sua meta;
        e questo cielo non ha altro dove
che la mente divina, in che s'accende
l'amor che 'l volge e la virtu ch'ei piove.
        Luce e amor d'un cerchio lui comprende,
si come questo li altri; e quel precinto
colui che 'l cinge solamente intende." (Paradiso XXVIII,106 - 110)

These words, which in many ways look so opaque, are spoken to Dante by Beatrice - the woman he once loved in his youth, and who is now guiding him through Paradise - at one of the most difficult points in the Divine Comedy. On their path through the heavenly paradise the Pilgrim and his guide have reached the point at which the material, finite world ends and the intellegible, infinite world begins. It is clear enough that God the infinite, who is free of all fleshly coils, can only have His abode in the realm of infinity. But where theology and philosophy can take refuge in the opposition of these terms, the description of a journey into the life beyond has to make apparent the transition point between the two spheres. Thus, at first sight paradoxically, greater theoretical rigour is demanded of the narrative text of the Commedia than of the theory itself. Theological and philosophical theoria are in a sense taken back to their etymological roots; for, after all, the original meaning of the Greek verb 'theorein' in fact expresses no more and no less than 'to see'. How then does Dante manage to translate the theory into the narrative, into the account of his pilgrimage through Heaven? In our answer to this question, which we shall address by focusing on the lines cited above, we shall also encounter one of the central features of Dante's sacro poems: namely his use of poetic language to create a mode of speech that is on a higher level than all theory and proves able to overcome its own deficits in the face of a transcendental world.

Before we go on to argue this in detail, let us outline the order of heaven that Dante makes the basis of his Paradise. In the Divine Comedy this order is not much different from that posited in Aristotelian and Ptolemaic cosmology. Dante assumes the existence of ten heavens revolving at differing speeds around the Earth, which itself stands still. The highest of these heavens is the empireo: the only heaven which does not revolve, but - like the Earth - is completely at rest. Given that it is to be understood as the place of heavenly paradise, as the abode of angels and the Blest, the assumption of such an Empyreum is what constitutes the specifically Christian contribution to ancient cosmology. That Dante makes the Empyreum no longer a corporeal sphere, but a non-corporeal one, is one of the most important changes in the Divine Comedy vis-à-vis the Christian tradition of cosmology of his time. This change is of great significance for the question that concerns us here, for it shifts the problem of the relationship between the corporeal and non-corporeal world into the realm of the received cosmic order itself. Dante can no longer avoid answering the question as to how each relates to the other, and how it is possible to move from one into the other.

The problem that arises here becomes even more acutely apparent if we simply observe the difficulty of even appropriately formulating this problem. Of course, we have to assume that the non-physical sphere is located outside of time and space. But even this statement points to the inevitable paradoxes that await us here. For 'outside' is of course a spatial category, and such a formulation therefore tacitly repositions in space the sphere that is beyond space. Modern physics' solution to the problem of the relationship between space and infinity is well known: physics has turned space itself into infinite space, and in the century we have just left physics dynamised this relation once more: now, it seems, the universe is constantly expanding space. But these solutions for a modern age will not work for a Christian theory of the universe. For the quality of infinity behooves only God the Creator, and not His creation; for thereby a constitutive characteristic of the divine would, unacceptably, be transferred onto His creation. The assumption of an infinite universe is therefore heretical and unacceptable to the mind of the Christian academic. What solution did Dante find? To reconstruct it, we shall now turn to look more closely at the verses cited.

Where in the order of heaven are Dante and Beatrice at the moment when she, his guide through Paradise, addresses these words to him? They are in the first of the revolving heavens, the biggest and swiftest of the corporeal heavens, which bears the name primo mobile. They are, therefore, at the boundary of the corporeal and simultaneously (we shall return to this in detail) of the natural world. The verses in question comprise the instruction that Beatrice is giving to her pupil. Later it will become clear why precisely this lesson is of special import. It is not his own observations that

Dante is describing at this point; rather he puts the discussion of the essence of the primo mobile into the mouth of one of the Blest. In this respect cognition cannot be separated from instruction. Of course, as the Commedia proceeds, the text reveals that this lesson will quickly bear fruit, for soon Dante himself will be observing the world of the immaterial sphere and simultaneously translating it into language for us. But of that more later. For the moment we shall concern ourselves with the content of Beatrice's instruction.

How, then, does Dante achieve the transition from the corporeal to the noncorporeal sphere in these lines that he puts into the mouth of Beatrice? For her words are concerned with precisely that threshold. We shall see that Dante uses various strategies: some concern the essence of what is being portrayed, and some he derives from the peculiarity of the portrayal. To begin with, we must take account of the ontological status of the boundary that is being described. The boundary of the primo mobile is designated as a circle of light (Paradiso XXVII, 112: "Luce e amor d'un cercio lui comprende"). The nature of light was intensively discussed in contemporary philosophy and theology, and many saw light as the primary, or least corporeal, element in the physical world, while nonetheless assigning it to the sphere of the corporeal. But Thomas Aquinas, who is indubitably the greatest theological authority of Dante's age, maintains quite clearly in his Summa theologiae that light is not corporeal, but non-corporeal: "Lux non est corpus", he posits categorically. Incidentally, one of the arguments that he uses to prove his thesis shows how far his thinking is from the notion, crucial to modern physics, of a speed of light that is invisible to the naked eye. For, he argues, if light were corporeal, it would necessarily be possible to apprehend its movement from one place to another. Dante, even though there is by no means a scholastic consensus on the matter, clearly decides in favour of this interpretation of the nature of light. This emerges quite clearly from the context of the lines. For the circle of light is not only made up of light, but is simultaneously made of love. And how could God's love be anything but noncorporeal? Light and love, therefore, are identified in the same geometric shape: in the shape of a circle, the perfect geometrical form. That clarifies beyond all doubt the status of light, a status which emerges further from hints given by Beatrice. For we are also told that love ignites (s'accende) in God's intellect. So the origin of love, too, is being thought in terms of categories of light, and thereby the real connection between luce and amor emerges. The ed of line 112, which seems almost to separate rather than link the two words, is actually telling us that we are dealing with the same thing. Light is basically nothing other than the form in which love becomes visible. This indicates on the one hand (and this will concern us further) that in this universe physics and ethics are merely two sides of the same coin. The ontological quality of light that we have described, however, also implies that the boundary of the corporeal world is itself already non-corporeal. In this sense light figures as a first point of contact between the two spheres.

Meanwhile the lines cited from Beatrice's lesson on the nature of the universe also engage with the delicate question of spatial relations: specifically the necessarily non spatial relationship of a sphere, that lies and must lie outside of space, to that same space. Basic to our understanding of this are the observations Beatrice makes regarding the relationship between the divine intellect, as the place where the love of the Creator is kindled, and the primo mobile: "e questo cielo non ha altro dove/che la mente divina". Thus the divine intellect is described as the place where the first of the moving heavens, the primo mobile, is located. But the sentence with which I attempt to paraphrase Dante's lines is very inexact; for it does exactly what Dante's own words avoid. Dante himself is speaking here not of any place or space, but using a formula which at first sight looks a little clumsy. On closer inspection, however, its great subtlety becomes apparent. His formula, translated literally, is: "The first heaven has no other 'where?' than the divine intellect." This mente divina is certainly non-corporeal and cannot, therefore, be identified with any particular place. Situating the first heaven in this divine intellect has the consequence of transforming the spatial relation into a relation

of cognition, into an intellectual operation. As is befitting to a god-creator, the creation that is heaven becomes a projection of God's intellect; the existence of this heaven relies on its cognition in the intellect of God. Now we can see why Dante here deliberately makes do with an interrogative pronoun. For his retreat into a simple question clearly serves as a signal that the spatial question is unsuitable: it is rejected. In the Empyreum, all that remains of our notions of space - so the text teaches us - is our own, unsuitable, question. The apparently clumsy formula is, then, when we look at it more closely, subtle in the extreme; for it functions precisely as a stimulant to cognition. For the first time here we come across a method that Dante will apply again in varying ways in the lines that concern us. The offence against the prevailing rules of language that is called 'poetic licence' (an expression which articulates an essential feature of all poetic writing) becomes a means of achieving cognition. In other words, poetic praxis becomes theory.

We can put the transformation of spatial relations into cognitive categories to the test in the following lines, 112-114: "Luce e amor d'un cerchio lui cornprendedsi come questo li altri; e quel precinto/colui the 'I cinge solamente in-tende." It is well nigh impossible to translate these lines into a non-romance language. The reason for that is the ambivalence of the two verbs comprendere and intendere. For each verb describes both a spatial and an intellectual relation. To begin with the first of the verbs: of course we can translate comprende in the context of a circle of light as 'embrace' or 'clasp'. This circle of light surrounds (in an initial reading of the line) the first of the moving heavens. But it becomes far more difficult to maintain this spatial sense when we come to the second subject of the sentence, amore. At the point when it is also said of love that it surrounds the primo mobile, the second, non-corporeal meaning of comprendere becomes relevant. For comprendere not only means 'to clasp'; the verb of course also means 'to grasp'. And if in this line the spatial and intellectual meanings of the verb comprendere already merge, that impression is only confirmed in the last of the lines cited. In that line the complementary perspective, so to speak, is described: the sight of the first of the moving heavens, girded with love. Of it is said that it alone understands what girds it, that is, the circle of light that is love. From an etymological point of view there is admittedly a corporeal element in the verb intendere, the notion of a tension that is directed towards something. But in the common semantic usage of this word the corporeal trace has long been replaced by an intellectual content, and intendere means 'to understand', 'to intend' or 'to want'. Here, too, then, we can see how the boundary between the corporeal and the non-corporeal can be removed by the use of words with plural meanings. Spatial relationships again become indistinguishable from intellectual operations; and to effect this transformation Dante uses a method which is frowned on in the language of theory, but extremely widespread and popular in the language of poetry. Dante deliberately and to great effect uses ambivalent formulations: he builds sentences that can be read in different ways and whose ambivalence achieves precisely that mediation between the corporeal and the non-corporeal, between finite and infinite space, that theoria alone cannot achieve. Once again the rhetorical method — here the ambivalence of the verbs used — is turned into an instrument to aid cognition and to help us transcend familiar thought patterns. Again a poetic method becomes a theoretical one. To use the same expression as before: poetic licence, the deviation from the conventional rules of language that is permitted the poet, serves to engender notions which transcend ideas familiar to us.

By the bye: inherent in the double meaning of the verb comprendere, which we have just reconstructed, is yet another connection, which has to do with the relationship of affect and intellect, of amore and mente. To understand is not per se an activity of love, but one of the intellect. But Dante dissolves this difference. Even Paul's first letter to the Corinthians recognises a love that takes on a cognitive role, because even the very highest knowledge fails in the face of love.

Dante, however, unlike Paul, does not play off affect and intellect against each other. Rather, he combines an Aristotelian anthropology, which sees the intellect as the noblest part of all higher

beings, with Pauline ethics, which accords the highest rank to caritas; and he combines them in the notion of a mente divina whose thinking (whose manifest form, that is) is love, or, to put it figuratively, the fire of the holy spirit. Out of the combination of these two elements Dante develops his cosmology, in which divine love positions the corporeal world out of the intellect of the Creator into space and time: that love, of which it will be said in the last line of the Commedia: "l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle" (Paradiso XXXIII, 145).

In our reconstruction of the double meanings of the verbs comprendere and intendere we have thus far concerned ourselves primarily with the first of the two. But what is that intendere telling us, which in lines 112— 114 describes the relationship of the first of the moving heavens to the origin of its movement? The answer to this question can be gleaned from the first tercet of the lines cited: "La natura del mondo che quieta/il mezzo e tutto l'altro intorno move,/ quinci comincia come da sua meta." The last of these three lines clearly presents a paradox: "comincia da sua meta", it says of the first heaven, the primo mobile: it "begins as if from its goal". For 'meta' means 'goal'. The commentators on the Commedia have struggled with this paradox. In the end they solve the problem by banishing the contradiction and explaining the usage of the word meta differently. Dante, they argue, deviates from normal usage here to mean not a goal but its opposite, the beginning and origin. But this is not the case — indeed, this distortion of the text robs it of its real message. For here, yet again, the superficial paradox reveals itself as a strategy on the path to cognition, and in this case it serves to banish the notion of a corporeal boundary as such.

To be sure that this is the case, one must take account of the fact that beginning and end are simultaneously spatial and temporal ideas, and in the context of the lines in question they really do refer to both simultaneously. For the boundary of corporeal space, the boundary of the primo mobile, the first heavenly sphere, and at the same time the boundary of all nature is also the beginning of all movement, for the Empyreum is completely static. In this, incidentally, it corresponds to the Earth, which is also immobile. For it is said of nature that it halts (quieta) its centre (il mezzo); and in the same way it will later be said of the Empyreum that God's love halts it: "l'amor che queta questo cielo" (Paradiso XXX, 52). So the immobility of the Earth is not originary but secondary. The correspondence that emerges in this way between the mente divina and the central point of creation to that extent makes tangible the patterns of a geocentric world view, but at the same time it exposes the risks posed by that world view. For, while the fact that the empireo is halted marks its difference from the creature and corporeal world, the Earth is at the end of a long chain of ever more slowly moving heavenly bodies, at the point where they come to a stand-still. Thus the Earth is at the centre of God's planetary system, and yet it receives only the smallest share of the movement of divine love — it is at the Earth that this love stops. Thus, as much as the Earth is shown to be the centre of nature, in the order of creation it is nevertheless accorded a rank that is finally inferior, and a position furthest away from divine love. It almost seems as if the drama of the world's fall and redemption is prefigured in this ambivalence regarding the cosmological positioning of the Earth. At the point of maximum distance from the origin of creation it is the most endangered place in the universe; and nonetheless it is at the centre of the story of God the Creator and His creation.

But let us return to the details of how the primo mobile moves. It is clear from line 111 that the movement of this heaven is caused by God's love. But of the same movement line 113 says "e quel precinto/colui the 'l cinge solamente intende". Intendere therefore stands in a number of oppositional relations. On the one hand it stands in opposition to the intellectual understanding with which God's love embraces the universe and sets it in motion; and the image of a circular understanding is a pretty exact figurative rendition of scholastic epistemology, notably the Thomist definition of comprehensio.' Perfect knowledge, which is depicted in the perfect geometric form of the circle, stands opposite the imperfect movement of the intentio, imperfect because it is directed towards something that has not yet been fully grasped' and is therefore a linear movement. But even

intentio is not merely an activity of the intellect: it, too, is movement and, according to the lines we are considering here, this movement must be identical with the movement that is caused by God's love. But how do the two things relate to each other? How can this movement be both the result of an outside impulse and intentional self-propulsion? Dante's order of creation, which is here also based on neoplatonic notions, intends us to understand the movement of the heavens as a consequence of their desire to return to their creator. Their movement is nothing other than the physical expression of this desire. God's love, which produces movement in His creations, simultaneously effects in them a desire to return to their origin, and that is why they move. It is precisely the combination of physics and psychology or, to be more precise, ethics, which can explain the paradox inherent in "quinci comincia come da sua meta". It really does become impossible to distinguish beginning from end, because the origin of movement coincides with its goal, the object of desire. But this also demonstrates that spatial concepts will not suffice to decipher the text. With the help of the paradox that makes beginning and end one, Dante is tacitly translating spatial categories into ethical ones. The notion of a spatial boundary thus disappears into the dialectic of love and desire. Once again a rhetorical device — paradox — functions as an aid to understanding. It puts a process of cognition in motion, which will end in our having to bid farewell to the categories that are familiar to us. Once again poetic devices are transformed in their turn into an instrument of theory.

Before I move away from the close reading of Dante's text which has occupied us thus far, I would like to give one last pointer to the poet's methods of transcending spatial categories. The lines in question deal with Beatrice's instruction regarding the nature of the transition between the corporeal and the non-corporeal spheres, which begins when Dante and his companion are still in the primo mobile, that is, in the first of the moving heavens. At the end of the long lesson, which in essence takes in the entire order of the world, Beatrice informs her pupil that they themselves have now arrived in the Empyreum: "Noi siamo usciti fore/del maggior corpo al ciel ch'è Pura luce'" (Paradiso XXX, 38f.). At first this looks like a rather inept attempt to avoid portraying corporeal movement in a place where it can no longer exist, but within the logic of the transposition of corporeal into intellectual movement that we have seen in the text thus far, this kind of construction does make sense. For when Dante reaches the Empyreum, after having been taught by Beatrice about the nature of the universe, he does so in a manner of speaking as the result of what she has taught him. Physical locomotion is replaced by intellectual progress, by cognitive gains —and this fits exactly with the strategies of substituting intellectual activity for physical relations that we have already been able to observe.

Canto XXX of the Paradiso, with which Dante reaches the Empyreum, thus also tells us something about the cognitive progress he has made. For he will now describe his perception of the bliss he encounters there in his own right, no longer needing to rely on the speech of a guide who is superior to him. But how - the question returns - might it be possible to portray something which eludes spatial and temporal understanding using a language which is inevitably bound into the categories of space and time? Dante does not skirt this difficulty; on the contrary, he very consciously faces up to it, and again develops a series of techniques which allow him to exploit poetic language to develop a vivid image of the transcendental world of the empireo that reflects his own perception. I would like to go on now to illustrate this poetics of transcendence with reference to the description of his encounter with the candida rosa, the rose in the shape of which the Blest who have arrived here group themselves around their creator:

> O isplendor di Dio, per cu' io vidi
> l'alto tl̈iunfo del regno verace,
> dammi virtu a dir com' io it vidi!
> Lume a la sa che visibile face

> lo creatore a quella creatura
> che solo in lui vedere ha la sua pace.
> E' si distende in circular figura,
> in tanto che la sua circunferenza
> sarebbe al sol troppo larga cintura.
> Fassi di raggio tutta sua parvenza
> reflesso al sommo del mobile primo
> che prende quindi vivere e potenza.
> E come clivo in acqua di suo imo
> si specchia, quasi per vedersi adorno,
> quando a nel verde e ne' fioretti opimo,
> si, soprastando al lume intorno intorno,
> vidi specchiarsi in pia di mille soglie
> quanto di not la sit fatto ha ritorno.
> E se l'infimo grado in se raccoglie
> si grande lume, quanta è la larghezza
> di questa rosa ne l'estreme foglie!
> La vista mia ne l'ampio e ne l'altezza
> non si smarriva, ma tutto prendeva
> il quanto e 'l quale di quella allegrezza.
> é leva:
> ché dove Dio sanza mezzo governa
> la Legge natural nulla rileva. (Paradiso XXX,97-123)

These lines make the very difficulties of the depiction the subject of discussion, right from the start, namely with the apostrophising of the isplendor di Dio. This plea for inspiration is one of a whole series of such pleas throughout the Cornmedia, which - following the progress of the Pilgrim into ever higher regions themselves aspire to ever higher things. Thus at the beginning of the Paradiso the apostrophising of Apollo replaced the invoking of the muses. Now, having reached the moment when he has to describe the empireo, the author of the sacro poems pleads for that isplendor di Dio, that reflection of divine glory that had once, in heaven itself, permitted him to gaze upon that transcendental reality that is beyond human powers of imagining. What this isplendor can achieve, therefore, namely the transgression of the powers of cognition natural in humans, also already leads to the proprium that is hidden behind the image. It is therefore only right that, in the 14th century, even the very earliest commentators identified God's grace in this reflection of divine glory. The metaphorical description, however, acquires a particular meaning in the context of the lines considered here. For, as we shall later observe in detail, the concept of inspiration Dante describes corresponds exactly to the manifestation of eternal bliss, the visio beatijicata, as he will go on to elucidate. So the supposedly metaphorical model for the text of the Commedia is part of the reality of the Blest. This relation between the text and its subject initially seems to correspond to the difference that Paul once defined as the difference between the cognition of truth in this world and the immediate cognition that occurs in the next, in Heaven. But the similarity between the model for inspiration and the visio beatificata is intended to dissolve that difference: "dammi virtu a dir com'io it vidi". The language used should reproduce the vision directly. It therefore needs to develop methods that approximate a transgression of earthbound modes of thinking and speaking.

But how can we imagine something that is beyond our powers of imagining? All human imaginatio is bound into space and time, and both categories fail in the face of the non-corporeal world of the Empyreum. What we see here again has the structure of a paradox. We can only imagine the foreign reality that is the blessed state of the saved souls by taking recourse to familiar notions, but precisely this familiarity must needs block our view into a sphere that is foreign to humans in this world. It is this very structure, the paradox, that Dante will use here to make possible what seems impossible.

To this end he first uses a rhetorical device that seems completely unsuited to the task in hand. For in lines 109 ff. he uses a comparison, more specifically a comparison that develops a pastoral scene: "E come clivo in acqua di suo imo/si specchia, quasi per vedersi adorno,/quando a nel verde e ne' fioretti opimo". Such a comparison seems unsuitable in several ways. To start with there is a problem with the comparative method as such, the most notable function of which is to render the unknown imaginable by analogy with what is known. But precisely this analogy is risky when describing a world that is per se outwith the bounds of human imagining. And furthermore, the unsuitability of this comparison seems to emerge from the marked spatial relations it thematises, above all the dominant vertical arrangement of the space. We shall be observing how Dante transforms this impediment into its opposite.

The comparison is made up of two separate components. It is basically a hybrid construction. On the one hand, it refers back to the myth of Narcissus: the motif of looking into a watery mirror, which reveals to the beholder his own beauty, inevitably makes one think of Ovid's image of the youth, in love with himself, who has to pay for his longing with death. Dante was very familiar with Ovid's Metamorphoses; particularly in the Purgatorio, he uses a number of Ovid's tales of transformation to convey figuratively the metamorphosis from sinner to one seeking salvation that is so basic to Christian thought. Especially line 110 of our comparison invites the connection with its reference, "quasi per vedersi adorno": "as if he wanted to gaze at his beauty in the water's mirror". But this gesture in the direction of the Narcissus myth seems oddly alienated, for the lines cited are not describing a person, but a mountain, whose peak is reflected in all the glory of its spring blossoms and greenery in the water at its foot. We shall return to this later. For the moment let us instead look at how Dante uses the comparison to deal with the categories of space which are invalid in the noncorporeal world of the Empyreum.

In this connection it is noticeable that the image of the mountain reflected in the water is clearly defined by a vertical axis, by the relation between above and below. The high mountain is reflected in the water at its foot. And the second part of the description of what is being compared with it, also begins with the characterisation of just such a vertical relationship. "Soprastando al lume intorno", it reads. Taken in conjunction with the formulation, or more precisely the periphrasis from line 114: that part of human beings which returns to heaven, that is, their immaterial part, is reflected in the light that circles around it. And this, at first sight, merely curious circumscription, which reduces the nature of the person who has returned to heaven to an indication of quantity, a quanto, is also a part of the programmatic intent of these lines, as will become clear. But of that more later. For now let us turn to look more closely at the description of the spatial conditions. In a circle or in a ball - the text leaves these alternatives open, and we shall soon see why it does - in a circle or in a ball the Blest surround the light that is God Himself, and in this way they form a rose, as it is called in line 117. If the word soprastando seems to pick up on the spatial conditions that pertained to the mountain, the characterisation that follows, intorno, immediately calls that analogy into question. For if the individual Blest ones, wherever they are, always stand above the light and yet simultaneously surround this light completely, then the relationship between 'above' and 'below' essentially loses relevance. The difference between the two is dissolved, and the pertinence of such spatial differentials to the Empyreum is in the same breath profoundly called into question. So at the point where the comparison appears to suggest similarities, it is in fact specifically drawing attention to differences. It is basically - as we see here - revoking itself, and we shall be able to observe the application of this method further in these lines.

This verbal image, that works against itself, is as such a very particular kind of illustration. No longer does it elucidate the unfamiliar by means of the familiar, nor the abstract by means of the graphic, rather an intentional incongruity alerts us to the general unsuitability of our notions in the face of the non-corporeal Empyreum. Thus the incongruous comparison becomes an epistemic medium; in

fact it amounts to the rejection of the imagination that proves to be an unfit means with which to seek insight into the nature of this transcendental reality. Thus, by specifically employing metaphor in this way, Dante uses a poetic device as an instrument to transcend the cognitive modalities of this world. At the same time this also constitutes a remarkable recasting of the function of the imagination, which scholastic epistemology, following the Aristotelian tradition, had linked to our imaginative powers. For this theoria, imagination means a cognitive gain, because it goes hand in hand with an upwards movement, away from merely sensual data to purely intellectual entities. But Dante uses this imagination *ex negativo* in the same sense. And if this comparison does indeed raise cognitive perception onto an abstract level, then this is specifically because it also negates the responsibility of the imagination for our perception of the afterlife.

Given that so far we have been able to observe how Dante nullifies the first spatial category - the vertical axis and the opposition between 'above' and `below' - then the same may also be seen with regard to the other dimensions of space. Let us, to this end, look more closely at lines 115 -117: "E se l'infimo grado in se raccoglie/sï grande lume, quanta è la larghezza/di questa rosa ne l'estreme foglie." Here another spatial opposition, that of height and width, of vertical and horizontal, plays an important part. And in the sense that Dante now also negates this opposition, then he only succeeds in doing so by setting the two axes in a, so to say, oblique relationship to each other. And it is not least of significance that the sentence quoted in effect lays out a set of condi- tions. For the conditional constructions suggests a consecutio which specifically does not come about. A more expected construction might read: "and if the lowest tier alone can hold so great a brilliance, then how brightly must the topmost tier shine." But this is exactly what the text does not do, and it even does not do so twice over. For on one hand it contrasts the lowest threshold of the light rose, l'infimo grado, with its larghezza. On the other hand, however, larghezza is a category of expansion which points to the horizontal rather than the vertical. And there is a second difference. For, when we read "quant' a la larghezza di questa rosa ne l'estreme foglie", then the category of larghezza corresponds - both grammatically and logically - to the light. Here, then, amplitude, that is, a broadly expansive area, is set against light; and the conditional structure of the sentence shows that ultimately the two are identical. Thus the opposition between vertical and horizontal already disappears on a verbal letter. For the larghezza of the rose is located in its extreme foglie. But estremo, the extreme outer edge, denotes a peripheral position where there is no distinction between vertical and horizontal; thus estremo does not in fact stand in opposition to infimo. But this mismatch also only indicates the principle that is realised in these lines. They dissipate the differences between the classifications of space that we are familiar with, and the removal of these spatial categories brings with it a second, incomparably more incisive change. What now happens is nothing less than the identification of quantitative and qualitative phenomena. For light intensity and lateral expansion are here seen as one. And with that, one of the most crucial distinctions in our reality - the difference between quantity and quality - is negated. In the non-corporeal world of the Empyreum, that by definition also knows no spatiality, the very categories of space became purely metaphorical, a metaphor of that distinction that alone is valid here: the different degrees of blessedness, which are distributed according to the level of grace that is apportioned to each of the Blest: "il quanto e 'l quale di quella allegrezza". In this sphere quantitas is identical with qualitas. And this also explains the paraphrasis that initially appeared so odd, and that Dante uses with reference to the nature of the souls who have returned to Heaven and who have a part in his salvation: "quanta di not la su ha fatto ritorno". The soul of the human being - the immaterial part of his or her being which alone can enter the eternal blessedness of Paradise - is referred to in terms of a quantity, quanto. This at first glance almost derogatory description of the Blest in fact points to the orders of this transcendental world, in which quantitas and qualitas can no longer be distinguished from each other.

The negation of the categories of space now also makes its mark on the language of these lines; and while the introductory apostrophe on the "isplendor di Dio" was issued as an appeal to the Lord to give the poet, on his return to Earth, the capacity to describe everything as he saw it, then this appeal is answered in these lines. It is worth citing these lines (Paradiso XXX, 118 —123) once again here: "La vista mia ne l'ampio e ne l'altezza/non si smarriva, ma tutto prendeva/il quanto e 'l quale di quella allegrezza./Presso e lontano, lì, né pon né leva:/che dove Dio sanza mezzo governa,/la legge natural nulla rileva." In a sense these lines articulate what the previous lines had portrayed in the reversal of the categories familiar to us in this world. Once again the horizontal and the vertical, ampio and altezza are called into play. But what concept are they set against? "Tutto prendeva it quanto e it quale." Thus we are told that the Pilgrim was not overwhelmed (smarriva) by the breadth and height of what he was seeing, but that he perceived the quantity and the quality of this blessedness tutto, that is to say, in the same moment. Any such perception would be impossible under the laws of our own temporal world. But these words graphically signal the differences. Space is now seen as a dimension of dispersion that is subsumed in the intelligible world; indeed spatiality, i. e. expansion, is shown by the choice of the verb smarriva to be a source of confusion. Here, in the Empyreum, there is, instead, expanseless oneness, which in turn also negates the difference between quantity and quality. The extent to which this nullification of the categories of space also pervades Dante's language, may be seen in the closing explanation for the invalidation of all natural laws: "Presso e lontano, il, né pon né leva". If one were to try to 'make sense' of these words, then one might paraphrase them as: "Near and far have no meaning there." But abstract concepts of this kind take away the real impact of Dante's words. For the non-validity of the relevant spatial categories is indicated by means of two verbs which, for their part, introduce spatial notions into the equation: "né pon né leva". And again verticals and horizontals come into play, which are thus ascribed to proximity and distance, although they are not identical to them. Thus the language in these lines evolves a metaphorical conceptuality and by means of a somewhat oblique combination of spatial categories exactly replicates the experience that constituted the Pilgrim's perception of reality in the empireo itself. And the same may be said of the phrase sanza mezzo in line 122. For this, too, links a spatial connotation, 'without distance', with a qualitative one, 'without mediator': and this mediation refers to none other than Nature, natura naturans, which at God's behest keeps Creation alive. The imagery of the formulation sanza mezzo once again causes the difference between quantitas and qualitas to disappear. "Dammi virtu a dir com'io it vidi!": this wish seems to have been fulfilled in the lines we have been looking at, and thus the text itself stands as evidence of the author's subsequent divine inspiration.

To recapitulate once more: the image in lines 109 —111, which signals dissimilarity by suggesting comparability paves the way for the dismissal of the categories of space that no longer make sense in the non-corporeal reality of the Empyreum. A circumstance that theoretical discourse can only describe as a negative finding is revealed in the comparison that revokes itself, in that it demonstrates the failure of the categories, familiar to us, that we normally resort to in the perception of reality. Thus, here again, Dante transforms poetic language into the instrument of a theoria that elucidates what theory itself is unable to describe.

While we have so far focused above all on the negation of spatial categories that Dante pursues in these lines, we shall now devote a little more attention to another phenomenon, namely the characteristics of perception itself, as it is described here. In this connection an important part is played by the notion of the mirror. As we saw, through the reference to the story of Narcissus, the mirror has, on one hand, a mythical stratum. But at the same time it has another, theoretical dimension. For the mirror also features in the patterns used to explain the human capacity for sight. A connection of this kind already seems apparent in the word or, to quote Ernst Robert Curtius, seems to be indicated by the etymology of the name. Speculum and speculari are related to each

other, even if the connection may at first seem to be anything other than obvious. For a mirror would appear to be passive; whereas speculari implies an intentional, goal-oriented looking; it implies searching out meaning and serves to mediate something hitherto unknown. But this question leads us to an opposition that pertains to the entire theory of optics as Dante knew it. A fundamental feature of this theory is its inability to decide between two alternatives. For, according to this theory, it is not certain whether seeing is an active or a passive faculty. At issue is the process of seeing: whether it depends on a light that is emitted by the eyes and which refracts on external objects, or whether seeing is a matter of absorbing images that the objects themselves transmit. These alternatives are also important in explanations of intellectual cognitive processes, for the theory of seeing also provides a - metaphorical - model for intellectual cognition, that is to say, our perception of reality. However, the case that concerns us here, the perception of God by the Blest in the Empyreum, removes the difference between the two. Here seeing and perceiving are no longer linked metaphorically, instead seeing, the visio beatijicata, is shown to mean nothing less than the undistorted perception and simultaneous recognition of God. How then is the vision of the Blest, which nullifies the difference between seeing and perceiving, presented in Dante's text?

In order to answer this question it is worth looking at a further paradox in lines 112 - 115, that we have so far not taken into account. The mirror situation described here presents not fewer, but probably incomparably more difficulties than the nullification of familiar spatial categories. For in the end, we would be hard put to say what is reflected where. According to the syntax, the relationship seems perfectly clear. "Quanto di not la su fatto ha ritorno": the immaterial nature of the Blest who have returned to Heaven seems to be the subject. Thus the minds of the redeemed souls who have been elevated into Heaven seem to be reflected in the light of God. But, at the same time, these apparently entirely unequivocal syntactical relationships contradict the logic — or at least the laws —of physics. For light, as a mirror for something else, is scarcely imaginable. On the contrary, it is normally light that is reflected in mirror images. So how can this paradox be resolved? We will have to take a second passage into consideration where these light relationships are described rather differently. Concerning the lowest level of the rose, we are told that "in sé raccoglie sí grande lume". It receives light, and thus God Himself is in fact shown to be the source of all light refractions and reflections. But once again we can make good use of the aporia between different passages, for it demonstrates the truth of the reality of the afterlife. Indeed, here it is no longer possible to distinguish between self-contemplation and the perception of God. The self-perception of the Blest is identical with their gaze on the divine. Thus this God is reflected as much in the faithful who have been elevated into Heaven as these see themselves in their God-given contemplation of their Lord. Dante thus manages to provide a very plastic illustration of the traditional notion of the visio beatificata. The beatific contemplation of the Lord as the epitome — as the very existence — of the redeemed in Paradise coincides with their own self-perception. And this contemplation of the Lord is itself beatific because it goes hand in hand with self-perception; thus the contemplation of God may be understood as a reflection of the self. So Dante's construction proves to be an ingenious combination of the two theoretical alternatives for the explanation of human seeing. In the situation he creates, it is no longer possible to decide whether seeing is a result of the emission of light from within oneself or whether it is rather the absorption of images transmitted by the objects themselves. Indeed, the reciprocity of light beam and reflection renders this difference insignificant. For the contemplation of God is identical with His self-reflection and at the same time constitutes the self-contemplation of the Blest. With his intentional subversion of the laws governing the logic and the physics of this world, Dante transforms the theory of optical perception into something of a phenomenology of heavenly blessedness.

But at this point the connection to the myth of Narcissus, inscribed into the comparison, again proves to be of relevance. And again we are dealing with a negative connection: the similarity is once

again lost in radical difference. The potentially fatal self-love of Narcissus, which is exacerbated by his gazing into his own reflection, is now set against the self-contemplation of the Blest which, for them, is associated with eternal life, and which is indistinguishable from God's self-reflection. The analogy with the myth of Narcissus thus also signals its dismissal. But this dismissal goes beyond a mythic allegorese. For Dante's so to speak anagogic reading of the story recounted by Ovid — that is to say, his response in terms of the afterlife — amounts to an invalidation of this myth. It no longer seems like a puzzle that hides the truth in an opaque form. The similarity again proves to be simply an instrument that serves to point out the difference. This mythic allegorese is thus anagogic because it in effect displaces the myth.

It is scarcely even a semi-comfort when the rather sad story of Narcissus, recounted by Ovid, ends with his transformation into a flower, that is to say, into a narcissus. In Dante's Empyreum, as we see from the lines we have been examining here, the flower that forms is a rose. And it is in this form that the Blest group themselves around the divine light. But that shape of the rose also reveals a last aspect of the light reflection in which eternal grace is realised. The relevant meaning is connected to the symbolic form of the rose. The rose is known as one of the most prevalent allegories for the Mother of God, and thus it also brings the Incarnation into play. Hence the lines examined here can be regarded as a rather hybrid, in a sense scriptural-neoplatonic theory of the Incarnation of the Son of God. If the Blest in Paradise are reflected in God as God is reflected in them, then they also constitute that figure which is in fact the source of this blessedness. For it was only when God became Man that the gates of Heaven reopened. The image of the rose thus transforms the unique, salvational event, that was the root of all grace, into the eternal form that humankind's salvation takes on in Paradise. At the same time, however, the Incarnation of the Son of God seems as such to be God's own self-reflection in humankind. Dante's depiction of transcendental blessedness seems to want to perfect Creation. As we read in the book of Genesis, human beings were originally created as an "imago Dei", in God's image. And here, in the Empyreum, salvation history comes full circle, we see the redemption of sinful humankind in the mirror-like nature of this imago. For now human beings not only carry the image of God within them, now this God recognises Himself in His own image. Thus the creation of a likeness of God amounts here — through the Incarnation of that same God — into His self-contemplation in humankind. It is almost as though we were seeing a cosmological theodicy of the self-sacrifice of God. The Incarnation — the sacrifice of God to the immaculate woman, embodied by the rose — now has the same meaning as the process of Redemption. For God's sacrifice to humankind cannot be distinguished here from the salvation of the individual human being, who sees him- or herself in the contemplation of God, in the visio beatificata. The preconditions for the redemption of humankind, the Incarnation and its result — the eternal grace of the saved — are here identified as one.

In view of the construction of these verses it is at first sight astonishing to see the ease with which we talk here of an image. For the figure of the rose, that the Blest together form, is indeed an image, an image of the virgin Mother of God and, as such, the beginning of Salvation. And the lines which demonstrate the inability of human imagination to establish the nature of heavenly reality, cannot manage without that image. At the same time it is interesting to look precisely at the point where this image appears. It relates to the Incarnation, that is to say salvation history, the history of God and humankind. Thus precisely this connection to salvation history is presented in the shape of an image. And in the matter of the connection between the transcendental world and the temporal world, again the image makes an appearance. While the ontological characteristics of Paradise would seem to preclude any images, here ongoing salvation history once again reinstates them.

We have seen how the verbal image revokes itself, in order to manifest the inability of the human imagination to picture the Empyreum. But this rejection of the image not only concerns its illustrative, graphic nature. It is also a matter of the rejection of the image as an exegetic device.

Which at last brings me to an as yet unfulfilled promise. For still unanswered is the question as to the reason for Dante's radical intervention in the Ovidian Narcissus myth. To put it a little bluntly — what's the point of this green, flourishing mountain that Dante has replaced Narcissus with? It seems as though the Patristics' interpretation of the Old Testament might be of assistance here. In the First Book of Kings there is a mountain, named Ephraim, on which lie the towns of Ramatha and Sophim. The interpretation of the mountain relies on the meaning of these names. Ephraim, as Gregory tells us, means 'fruit-bearing', furthermore he translates 'ramatha' as `visio' and `sophim' as 'mirror'. And so Mount Ephraim seems like a jigura coeli, a symbolic prefiguration of heavenly Paradise:

> Quis est enim mons ephraim nisi caelum? Mons quippe est frugifer, qui aeternae pulchritudinis flores et fructus indeficientis gaudii semper profert. Bene autem et ramatha et so-phim in ephraim monte sita perhibetur, quia illa omnipotentis dei aeterna uisio et altitudo illa ciuium beatorum non in terra habetur sed in caelo.'

Thus Dante's comparison is not limited to an illustrative effect, the image of the green, flourishing mountain proves at the same time to be an allegorical figuration of that Heaven whose reality is described in the sacro poema in the light reflections of the candida rosa. In view of the undistorted, unmediated contemplation of the afterlife, now this jigura coeli also loses its impact and seems no longer sufficient as a means to imagine Heaven. "Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem": With this momentous sentence Paul articulated the difference between the truth of this world and the next. And it is only against the background of this formulation by Paul, that Dante's depiction of transcendental blessedness is seen in its true light. For this reality, too, manifests itself in mirror-relations. But these reflections are no longer mere shadows, inferior likenesses of a higher and actual truth. The self-reflection of the Blest in the light of their God is the unmediated visio beatijicata of a truth which knows no higher level. Meanwhile, almost surreptitiously, one might say, this rejection of all imagery is confronted by the new, heavenly image; and significantly the blessedness of the Blest takes the form of an image at the very point where it is alluding to the temporal world. In the sense that the visio beatificata also has its roots in the salvation history of the temporal world, so, too, the Blest form into a rose, into the image of the woman whose role was the beginning of the Salvation that is here perfected. Thus the images in the Empyreum needs must be there, because the transcendental reality of the Blest could not be shaped without reference to the fate of this world. <>

THE POETRY OF DANTE'S PARADISO: LIVES ALMOST DIVINE, SPIRITS THAT MATTER by Jeremy Tambling [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783030656270]

This book argues that Paradiso – Dante's vision of Heaven – is not simply affirmative. It posits that Paradiso compensates for disappointment rather than fulfils hopes, and where it moves into joy and vision, this also rationalises the experience of exile and the failure of all Dante's political hopes. The book highlights and addresses a fundamental problem in reading Dante: the assumption that he writes as a Catholic Christian, which can be off-putting and induces an overly theological and partisan reading in some commentary. Accordingly, the study argues that Dante must be read now in a post-Christian modernity. It discusses Dante's Christianity fully, and takes its details as a source of wonder and beauty which need communicating to a modern reader. Yet, the study also argues that we must read for the alterity of Dante's world from ours.

Review

"Professor Tambling adds an original voice to the current surge of interest in what makes Dante's Paradiso uniquely intriguing, even in comparison to the Inferno and Purgatorio. He directly engages the question that haunts the poem: can authentic human hope sustain itself on its spacewalk through the material universe, even if it cannot foresee its end?" —Francis J. Ambrosio, Georgetown University, USA

Jeremy Tambling is Professor of English at SWPS Warsaw (University of Social Sciences and Humanities), Poland. Prior to this, he was Professor of Literature at Manchester University, UK, and Professor of Comparative Literature, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. He has written widely on Dante, psychoanalysis, urban literary studies, and Victorian literature. Previous publications on Dante include Dante and Difference: Writing in the Commedia (1988), Dante: A Critical Reader (ed.1999), and Dante in Purgatory: States of Affect (2012).

CONTENTS

Introduction: Reading Paradiso Out of Time

> If one had to expound the doctrine of antiquity with utmost brevity ... it could only be in this sentence: 'They alone shall possess the earth who live from the powers of the cosmos'. Nothing distinguishes the ancient from the modern man so much as the former's absorption of a cosmic experience scarcely known to the later periods. Its waning is marked by the flowering of astronomy at the beginning of the modern age. Kepler, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe were certainly not driven by scientific impulses alone. All the same, the elusive emphasis on an optical connection to the universe, to which astronomy very quickly led, contained a portent of what was to come. The ancients' intercourse with the cosmos had been different: the ecstatic trance. (Benjamin 1996: 486–487)

Walter Benjamin hints at problems in approaching Paradiso. For the modern to know the 'cosmos' means going 'to the planetarium'. The older contact with the cosmos—including Dante's—was different. It was ecstatic: the self was taken outside the self. We remain separated from the cosmos, knowing it objectively by ocular perception. Seventeenth-century Baroque texts mark the break with the ecstatic. The planets are at a distance, known only by 'optical connection', even though:

> A man that looks on glasse,
> On it may stay his eye;
> Or if he pleaseth, through it passe,
> And then the heav'en espie. ('The Elixer', Herbert: 188)

Paradiso imagines the ecstatic trance, but knows it is doing that, being in process of understanding the cosmos it describes as an allegory. But while it is on both sides of the ancient/modern argument, it believes that the cosmos is a finite entity, described as such by Ptolemy (c.100–170 CE), through the Latin version of the Arabic astronomer Alfraganus (ninth century), who had translated Ptolemy's Almagest. Ptolemy had paid tribute to Hipparchus (c.150 BCE). Further, Dante knew the universe as described in the Timaeus, the only document of Plato (427–347 BCE), which the Medieval world possessed.

Dante's is not our world. We are out of its time, and reading a text of the past cannot mean escaping into past certainties to be comfortable in them, taking an aesthetic refuge in a past world where we can lose sense of our own more relativist modernity. We cannot assume a privileged access to Paradiso claiming a shared theological understanding, or even as wishing to possess Dante's certainties. We cannot even assume entry into the same meanings as are in Dante; hermeneutics means that we cannot read across from his work to our world, save by an act of mental translation, however much, and however usefully, we equip ourselves with relevant knowledge. It may be even harder to read Dante now than during the modernism of Eliot, Pound, Joyce, and Beckett; the Dantean assumptions that lay like fragments before those writers are yet more dissipated another hundred years on. Yet reading Dante's Commedia and, specifically, Paradiso remains relevant, not because it gives access to a world whose assumptions we cannot share, but because it is untimely, and the best meditations are untimely, and all thinking has to be anachronistic, as Dante is, plentifully.

The difficulties affect texts prior to Shakespeare and the 'Early Modern'. Later writing is haunted by the sense of the 'nothing' (le néant), which comes forcefully into critical and philosophical thinking with Shakespeare and beyond, with the absence of a universe of which spiritual authority can speak affirmatively. Present writing demands 'tarrying with the negative' as Hegelian discourse puts it: accepting that there may be nothing, or nothing, out there, no grounds for saying that language affirms meaning (Hegel 1977: 19). This contrasts with the affirmativeness and joy of Paradiso, though there is a wager involved in arguing that earlier writing did not have such vertiginousness: it may even be an undertow within Paradiso. There is a bigger difficulty for readers of Inferno, which holds the attention, continually challenging readers' assent to, or fascinated disagreement with, judgments passed on people, concepts, and historical moments. Purgatorio is also a text that can be taken with a certain immediacy; it is instantly attractive. Paradiso, however, seems to have an unsympathetic discarding of material human bodies in favour of the reality of a spiritual world, which threatens to make it an alienating text; moreover, there is little that is easy in it.

This book, which started by wanting to confront these issues, offers an advanced introduction to Paradiso to those who would like it and argues that here is one of the great European texts that should not be left to a professionalism in criticism which only disputes competing critical positions, nor assumed to be the province of theology, nor confined to a historicising which assumes that Dante's cultural contexts are knowable and definitive for reading. We cannot read outside contexts such as those given by psychoanalysis, by deconstruction, or a modernist Marxism—all three inform the reading here—to do so is to put a brake on reading, pretending to know less than we either do—or ought to do—and it assumes a too determinate knowledge of Dante. While noting the alterity of the text from our own assumptions, reading should not isolate Dante within a medieval context, but see him within a history of the creation of the modern subject, to be read as medieval, and with traces of the modern.

Paradiso: The Cosmos
I start in introductory mode, by mapping the poem.

Paradiso has a narrative simplicity. Dante's editors and translators, Durling and Martinez, propose Friday, 8 April 1300, as when Dante enters Inferno: that is, around the spring equinox, when the sun was in Aries in its annual journey through the Zodiac (note to Inf. 1.37). As for Chaucer, beginning The Canterbury Tales, 'the yonge sonne / Hath in the Ram his half cours yronne' (CT 1.7, 8). Being at the equinox, the sun is on the celestial equator, which encircles the outermost heaven of the universe. Paradiso 1 sees Dante and Beatrice leaving the Earthly Paradise where they were at the end of Purgatorio at noonday; thereafter they are out of time.

Dante's universe comprises a sphere, its core the round earth. The two pass through seven planets, whose name-associations—classical-pagan and mythological, astronomical and astrological—are exploited, and show a tendential dualism in the poem's values. And Dante's angels are vestiges of what pagans called Gods and Goddesses, to whom temples were built and about whom poets like Virgil testified (Con. 2.4.6–7): Pallas, or Minerva, Vulcan, and Ceres—spirits of wisdom, fire, and grain. These planets have a chiasmic, echoing order. The Moon's nuns (in the first heaven) correspond to Saturn's monks (in no. 7). Mercury (2) corresponds to Jupiter (6) through the image of the eagle, which is first spoken of as Roman, then seen as a sign. Venus (3) corresponds with Mars (5), with the equivalent hot energies of love and war. The Sun stands central as the fourth of seven.

Within the first three heavens, examined in Chap. 2, political failure shows in every body of power. Femininity, the subject of the Moon, in the third heaven becomes an active force, giving character to violence, and creating the poetry of courtly love, rescinding nothing of the alliance of poetry and fin' amor, which was foregrounded with Francesca in Inferno 5, nor of the alliance of desire and an innovatory modern poetry within Purgatorio 26, where all the lustful are poets. Between, Mercury speaks of history and empire. These planets orbit within the shadow the earth casts (Para. 9.118, 119). Indeed, for Dante and the Medieval world darkness meant only the conical shadow cast by the earth:

> Since the sun moves and the earth is stationary, we must picture this long, black finger perpetually revolving like the hand of a clock; and called "the circling canopy / Of Night's extended shade" (Paradise Lost 3.556–557). Beyond Venus there is no darkness. (Lewis 1962: 111–112)

Darkness beyond the earth is a post-Copernican conception. It separates Dante as the poet of light from baroque awareness of darkness— Giottesque brightness from Caravaggio—where darkness includes the 'nothing'. Darkness means loss of a centre and an origin: Paradiso, however, moves from light to greater light. Souls in the shadow of the earth are closest in character to those in Purgatorio. Something of the earth clings to them. We hear of imperfect motivations; we see souls, as after Venus we cannot.

The Sun, in canto 10, gives a change in intensity. Here, and in Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn are heavens that, answering loosely to cantos 9–26 of Purgatorio, adopt the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, and Temperance. Here appear the most intense encounters with Paradisal lives, which redefine the meaning of Paradise, not limiting it to the afterlife. They re-define the present, as souls in Inferno continue in fuller form the hell they lived on earth, while souls in Purgatorio refine lives that on earth were singular instances of virtues and vices together and that continue to activate dualities within them. In Chap. 3, the heaven of the Sun, we see the wise and encounter four modern theologians. Aquinas the Dominican (canonised 1323) speaks of Francis of Assisi (canonised 1228), and Bonaventura the Franciscan (canonised 1482) gives the life of Dominic (canonised 1234). Francis is no less than Christ refigured, manifest as a human miracle present in urban Italy a hundred years earlier than Paradiso (Foster 1985: 480–496). In Mars, where imminent violence and hatred requires peaceful citizenship, and exile necessitates poetry, Dante is commissioned to write the Commedia. Saved lives, contrasted with excoriated contemporary rulers, appear in Jupiter, in canto 20 (37–72), and again with Saturn's contemplatives, where lives are stripped down to the utmost simplicity, being on the threshold between time and eternity. These contemplatives write the lives of others, lives as marvels, completing a pattern discernible throughout, in the spirit of such saints' lives as are recorded in The Golden Legend—where, amongst its 153 lives,4 Francis, Dominic, and Bernard appear, in what Jacques Le Goff (2014) calls sacred time.

Politics throughout these heavens is pan-European, and strains at Europe's limits. Chapter 5 examines the Fixed Stars and makes concentrated reference to Rome as an imperial and Papal centre. Chapters 6 and 7 go beyond, for whereas Timaeus made the Fixed Stars the eighth outmost sphere, Dante adds the Primum Mobile or the Crystalline Heavens as a ninth, counting out from the earth. This makes a complete diurnal East-West revolution round the earth, moving because it is attracted by the abode of God, in the unmoving Empyrean (not, actually, a Dantean word). Dante's Epistle 10.26 explains why: anything moves 'because of something which it has not, and which is the terminus of its motion'. Desire and motion are inseparable. As if emboldened by the language of Neo-Platonic deification, canto 33, in the Empyrean, is the most concentrated in willing to see God, as both the utterly immaterial, who is, nonetheless, manifest in Christ, 'nostra effige', and thus material. The text tries to unite loyalties to the material and the immaterial, by seeing them tied in a single 'nodo', at the risk of language, sanity, and life. Throughout, there has been little resolution of the dualist vision that moves between desire for the spiritual, the virginal, the angelic, and the world of light, and the other world, material, and corrupt; treated with alternating anger and love.

Writing Paradiso

Dante acknowledges difficulty from the beginning. In canto 2.1–18, three ter zine (the three-line stanzas in which the cantos are written) tell readers—who are poised like sailors in little boats—not to venture out into the ocean, that is, not to read any further. If they lost Dante, voyaging outwards, they would remain lost:

> L'acqua ch'io prendo già mai non si corse;
> Minerva spira, e conducemi Appollo,
> e nove Muse mi dimostran l'Orse. (2.7–9)

> (The water which I take was not already ever crossed; Minerva [i.e. wisdom] inspires or fills the sails, and Apollo [i.e. poetry] leads me, and nine Muses point out the Bears.)

Dante's barque sounds like the ship of fools, despite these splendid guides. The Bears are Ursa Major and Ursa Minor. Ursa Major was Callisto, Ursa Minor Arcas, her son by Jupiter. These constellations indicate the pole star. Though he says he is being guided, he knows he is doing something new; hence he addresses those readers who want wisdom. They must follow his boat's wake, or furrow (solco) 'dinanzi a l'acqua che ritorna equale': before the water that returns evenly (15); catching each momentary epiphanic insight that the writing opens up before the sea closes over it. Dante wants fellow-travellers (2.1–18) despite pretending to dissuade people from following.

The ship and its wake return in canto 33, when Dante thinks of the shadow (l'ombra) of the Argo—Jason's ship, Jason the fabled first mariner—furrowing the sea. For now, we see that canto 2 makes Dante Jason:

> Que' glorïosi che passaro al Colco
> non s'ammiraron come voi farete,
> quando Iasón vider fatto bifolco. (2.16–18)

> (Those glorious ones who passed to Colchis did not wonder as much as you will do, when they saw Jason become a ploughman.)

This evokes Ovid (Metamorphoses 7.100–120), where one test imposed on Jason was to plough with wild brazen oxen. Dante re-invokes the furrow Jason created when he used the refractory and difficult oxen to open up the field, furrowing it, like the wake the ship creates. In Inferno 2, Dante was afraid to start his journey. Purgatorio 1.1 speaks of sailing over better waters. Now he embarks on what exceeds Jason or the crazy voyage, 'il varco / folle' (Paradiso 27.82–83) of Ulysses, the unforgettable voyager of Inferno 26. In attempting something new, many literary precedents are brought in, because the poem comes out of a tradition that Dante modifies, actively.

This God-wards journey is offset by Dante's experience of exile from Florence in 1302. The text divides between growing enablement and deepening sense of loss. Politically, Paradiso is more urgent than Inferno and Purgatorio. Needing less to speak of their condition, past or present, in self-justifying or self-adjusting, Paradisal lives speak of others and reflect on current political states. Separated from time, they are absolutely engaged with time, as eager to advise on earthly affairs as Dante is to hear them. It seems that at the same time, Dante was writing his treatise on world-government, Monarchia, that is, in 1316–1317 (Hollander 2001: 148–167, but for an earlier date, c.1312, see Davis 1957: 263–269).

Paradiso was concluded in Ravenna, where Dante was the guest of the Guelf-leaning Guido Novello da Polenta, and visiting Verona, Mantua, and Venice.5 He had left Verona in 1318, and the Ghibelline Cangrande della Scala, with whom he had stayed—with intervals in Lucca—for perhaps six years. Petrocchi holds that half of Paradiso was in progress by 1318, including, perhaps, the tribute to Cangrande in Paradiso 17 (Bemrose 2009: 190). The Epistle to Cangrande (Epistle 10), which most Dante commentators accept was written either in part or fully by Dante as an official letter in Latin, dedicating the work to Cangrande, and as a self-exegesis of the first canto of the poem, accompanies the work.

The Epistle's Paragraph 7 declares the poem 'polysemous', having four senses derived from Biblical exegesis: literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical—these last three being allegorical: 'different (diversi) from the literal or historical, for the word "allegory" is so called from the Greek alleon, which in Latin is alienum (strange) or diversum (different)'. The work may be seen as 'allegory', however, in a less literal, or rigid (some might say reductive) sense than in Epistle 10, and I will try to show some rethinking about allegory below. As poetry, Paradiso's statements neither reduce to discursive utterance, nor to prose paraphrase. However formally committed to distinctive points of view, the utterance discovers more conflictual significances. Arguments proving Paradiso's orthodoxy, which seem increasingly fashionable, especially in America, mean that the intention (as this is assessed, with heavy dependence on Epistle 10) controls how the poetry is read. Criticism may include interpretation, but is not reducible to that.

At this point, I will indicate one way into the poem.

Mary and Beatrice

Paradiso is full of a poetry deriving indirectly, perhaps not always consciously, from the place given to Mary, and the Annunciation (Luke 1.26–38), an event that was coming into a new visibility in Dante's time. The Annunciation reverses order: the angel takes the subordinate place to the woman. Georges Didi-Huberman, studying Fra Angelico, notes how Aquinas had insisted on the newness 'that an angel had bowed down before an earthly woman'. He mentions Albertus Magnus (c.1200–1280), to comment on Gabriel's exalting of Mary, the angel by this making himself—superior, coming from above—appear embodied, human, below Mary. Didi-Huberman sees in the Annunciation-images something double, demanding a figural reading, beyond the 'literality' of the representation in art. Its presentation of the Incarnation and of the Trinity, which lie concealed in the Annunciation-image, exists in 'dissembled', concealed form within the pictorial image.

Several points emerge here, beginning with the place given to the woman, whose materiality is complex. As Purgatorio noted instances in Mary's life as exempla for Purgatorial figures, so Mary is exalted throughout Paradiso, implicitly in the place given to nuns' virginity in the Moon; seen as a glory in the Heaven of the Fixed Stars (canto 23); seen physically in the Empyrean (31.115–138 and canto 32); addressed and responding in canto 33.1–45. Mary was, historically, the theme of such men as Bonaventure (canto 12), Peter Damiani (canto 21), and Bernard of Clairvaux (cantos 31–33). Her distinction was to be Mother of God (Theotokos: declared so in Ephesus in 431 CE) and perpetual

virgin, who had made a vow of virginity before the Annunciation (so Gregory of Nyssa, c.335–395), her virginity declaring her singleness and sincerity (Ambrose). She was a figure of the Church (so Isidore of Seville: canto 10). She was sister of Christ and of the angels. Franciscans said she had taken a vow of poverty. Bernard of Clairvaux said she had been bodily assumed into heaven. Peter Damiani considered Mary's womb to be the house in the phrase 'wisdom hath builded her house' (Proverbs 9.1). Dante says her womb, 'fu albergo del nostro disiro' (the hostelry of our Desire, 23.105); this idea reappears in Bernard's prayer to the Virgin (33.7–9). Her womb makes her body's materiality pure, not needing to be touched by any other spiritual force that would redeem materiality. In Peter Damiani's words, 'the all-chaste womb of the holy maid becomes heaven' (Gambero 2005: 97).

This poses complex problems for feminism. Women within patriarchy are characteristically victims of contradictory double demands: required to be objects of beauty yet chaste; subjected to different and harder codes as regards the materiality of their bodies than those given to men; having to respond to the demands of men yet needing to find a place in patriarchy which they may claim as their own even though it may have been prescribed for them. The choice of virginity has engendered endless controversy as being repressive and disabling, in disregarding the materiality of women's bodies. Yet it may have been positive in giving a separate space though one not free from male violation, as canto 3 shows. The materiality of bodies, and of women's bodies, problematic in modernity no less than in medieval Christianity, appears throughout Paradiso.

Further, another woman speaks in the Commedia: Beatrice, who had died in 1291, aged 23, who as an allegorical figure partially derives from Wisdom in the Jewish Bible (Proverbs 8), and from Philosophy in Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy. Philosophy as a woman derives from Athena, from Thetis, and from the idea of the nurse—Odysseus' nurse Eurycleia—as well as from the classical Muses (Crabbe 1981: 237–274). In Convivio 2.16.12, the 'donna' Dante loves after Beatrice's death is Philosophy. These women and goddesses, like Mary, supplement the woman's value in Dante's poetic tradition, the dolce stil nuovo. Paradiso's claims for Beatrice go as far as they can; Dante in the Empyrean exalts Beatrice, seen in her appointed place, remote from him:

> Da quella regïon che più sù tona
> occhio mortale alcun tanto non dista,
> qualunque in mare più giù s'abbandona,
> quanto lì da Beatrice la mia vista;
> ma nulla mi facea, ché süa effige
> non discendëa a me per mezzo mista.
> 'O donna in cui la mia speranza vige,
> e che soffristi per la mia salute
> in inferno lasciar le tue vestige,
> di tante cose quant'i' ho vedute,
> dal tuo podere e da la tua bontate
> riconosco la grazia e la virtute.
> Tu m'hai di servo tratto a libertate
> tutte quelle vie, per tutti'i modi che
> di ciò fare avei la potestate.
> La tua magnificenza in me custodi,
> sì che l'anima mia, che fatt'hai sana,
> a te dal corpo si disnodi.'
> Così orai .... (31.73–91)

(From that region which thunders most high up, no mortal eye is so distant, not one that is lost deepest in the sea, as was my gaze from Beatrice, but that did not matter, for her image did not descend to me mixed with any medium. 'O lady in whom my hope is strong, and

who suffered, for my salvation, to leave your footprints in hell, in all the things which I have seen, I recognise the grace and the strength, from your power and your bounty. You have drawn me from slavery to freedom by all the ways, by all the modes that you had the power to use. Keep your generosity towards me so that my soul, which you have made whole, may, pleasing to you untie itself from the body'. Thus I prayed ....).

The distance from earth to the highest part of the atmosphere is augmented, as the distance from the region of thunder to the sea's bottom, the place of silence. This intensification gives the clue, for Dante sees Beatrice's image without material interruption (mezzo) across the Empyrean. Perspective, which distances things from the privileged subject's viewpoint, is not involved. He sees what she is, which his prayer, which is salutation, unfolds. Praise begins with Beatrice as the image of hope that imprints itself in hell. That impress of the immaterial upon the material substance of Hell, that is, Limbo (Inf. 2.52–108), sums up what the following terzine amplify: what Beatrice has done since the Vita Nuova days. Her trace (vestige) applies to everything when, though absent, she was drawing him from slavery to freedom of the will (in that way Dante reads his life and gives a reading of the substance of Paradiso). The last ter zina expounds his 'hope': he desires her 'magnificenza' to continue to his death. 'Magnificenza', which includes in it the sense of 'fortitude' as one of the cardinal virtues, is a rare word in Paradiso: applied only to Cangrande (17.85), and Mary (33.20). Is Beatrice a material or immaterial presence? Is her 'trace' a third thing, not material, but questioning immateriality, because something real?

Beatrice's visibility is also absence. He sees her as an 'effige': as an image and the trace of Christ in his descent to Limbo, harrowing hell, and, in ascending from earth, leaving his footprints (GL 1.292). 'Vestige' recalls the poet Guinizelli, purging his lust in fire, telling Dante that his words to him leave a 'trace' (vestigio, Purg. 26.106). The words of Dante affect Guinizelli's afterlife but are to Guinizelli memories from his life (giving memories before events). In following Guinizelli's poetry, Dante adds a trace to the earlier poet's work, deepening its meaning. The 'vestige' means that readers must enlarge their conventional chronology of first this poet followed by that. The afterlife of poetry vivifies its chronologically earlier moment of writing. Miri Rubin (2006: 169) notes that St Clare, who followed St Francis' teaching, desired to be the 'footprint' of St Francis, by following Francis' manner of life, but she adds that Clare was historically called 'a footprint [vestigium] of the Mother of God' (199). Clare, the trace of another, brings Mary into further visibility as her trace. Piccarda tells Dante that Clare, who is above her in heaven, and Piccarda's model, is followed on earth by nuns, whose desire is to the Bridegroom (Para. 3.97–101). Clare, wanting to be the trace of Mary and Francis, gives way to the Bridegroom whom Francis followed, who existed in time as the son of Mary; the trace enlarging the significance of the other. Beatrice, who left her footprints in hell, supplements Paradiso's Christianity, adding to heaven and to orthodoxy by guiding Dante, leaving her trace that makes her absent, and present, smiling, a spirit that matters.

Angels, Immateriality, and Prime Matter

The other figure in the Annunciation is the Angel. If angels enjoy a special place in Paradiso's cosmos, Dante is paralleled by Modernism, for example by Benjamin, whose 'Angel of History' attempts, perhaps impossibly, communication within history. If angels are messengers, their medium language, there is an analogy between angels and the immateriality of poetry. Angels are substances without matter ('sustanze separate da materia', Convivio, 2.4.2), immaterial. Yet, after Beatrice has died, in the Vita Nuova:

> In quello giorno nel quale si compiea l'anno che questa donna era fatta de li cittadini di vita eterna, io mi sedea in parte ne la quale, ricordandomi di lei, disegnava uno angelo sopra certe tavolette ... (VN 34.1)

> (On that day in which was completed a year since this lady [Beatrice] had become a citizen of eternal life, I was sitting in a place where, remembering her, I was designing an angel on some wooden boards ...)

Dante's Trauerarbeit takes the form of expressing, on the anniversary of Beatrice's death, another form of life, drawing an angel. That is analogous to writing poetry. The angel is not Beatrice, though it may be her trace, Beatrice here becoming even more an immaterial spirit. Drawing an angel on a wooden tablet, or panel, is creatio ex nihilo; bringing into visibility the invisible, as art does, since 'painting celebrates no other enigma than that of visibility' (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 127). What is visible is a riddle, as an image of what is invisible and only conceptual, questioning the difference between the visible and the invisible. What is seen is never the whole, and something permits visibility that is not visible, though it is inherent within it. Drawing an angel says that what the woman is or was cannot be brought into vision, and only what is not visible is worth seeing. Levinas calls it the il y a— the 'there is'—which is nothing in the sense that it is no thing (Tambling 2004: 351–372). Writing must be fascinated by it; it ensures that nothing is wholly visible. Paradiso finds it so potent that it sacrifices the visible for it, as the 'trace' that is, still elusively in this poem, God.

Angels by their understanding move the heavenly spheres, to quote the incipit to Dante's canzone, 'Voi che 'ntendendo il terzo ciel movete': commented on in Convivio Book 2, cited in Paradiso 8.37. Convivio Book 2, fascinated with angelic intelligences, and their spheres is Paradiso's seedplot. Kenelm Foster and Patrick Boyde find that this canzone shows Dante turning to allegory (Convivio 2.1; see Rime 2.161). Angels and allegory connect, and if the language describing/evoking angels is allegorical, allegory becomes a dualistic mode, the literal describes the immaterial, or spiritual. Angels contemplate God, and have no unrealised 'potential' in their knowledge. They need no language, though they may speak (see Para. 14.35, 36). Their immateriality puts them outside sexuality; angels being, psychoanalytically, 'the most ambitious attempt in our civilization to establish a world in which identity is not based on sex' (Schneiderman 1988: 17). They are opposite from the problem of 'prime matter', something ghosting Paradiso. What 'prima materia' is was a critical crux for Dante (Convivio 3.15.6, 4.18), not soluble by his dual allegiance to the philosophies of the Dominicans or the Franciscans. It will be discussed in Chap. 6. Here we can say that Aristotle held that the universe had not been created; it was eternal, as is matter. In what, then, lay the work of creation, which, being 'in the beginning', inaugurates time (according to Augustine)? Did creation work on existent prime matter, or had God created ex nihilo? If so, what is the status of unused prime matter?—which is also il y a.

The tensions in this debate, lasting through disputes and condemnations in the University of Paris in 1370 and 1377, took various forms onto which were mapped a problematic dualism between spirit and matter. The Neo-Platonic tradition from Proclus held that prime matter was not created by God, matter being eternal; but this made matter antagonistic to God. Followers of Aristotle's Arab commentator, Averroes (1126–1178) believed that matter's elements were created by the heavens, not by God, a view Bishop Tempier condemned in Paris in 1277. According to Bruno Nardi (1884–1968), Siger of Brabant, seen in the heaven of the Sun, accepted this.9 Boethius of Dacia, teaching at Paris, believed that philosophy could prove that creation could never have had a beginning, even though faith taught the opposite. This compelled belief in something like a 'double truth'—that something could be true and false together, depending on the system of thought used—and meant that there was always something slipping away from proof, resisting the firmness of faith (Boethius of Dacia 1987: 36–37, Introduction, 9–19). Whether there was matter that God created which lacked form, or whether matter was always there, haunting the primacy of God's creation had been a crisis-point for Augustine with the Manichees, whose dualism made matter and God's purity irreconcilable. This, questioning whether everything can be brought into God's system, haunts, perhaps troubles

Paradiso. Angels symbolise a desire for a pure knowing uncontaminated by matter, but the Annunciation implies the value of a virginal, pure-womb-like materiality.

Here we must address allegory as the medium for expressing 'immateriality'.

Allegory

Paradiso gives converse with jewel—or flame—or flower-like lights within light, supplementing light by reflecting light, as human eyes do, but disembodied, which the spirits feel as a loss (see canto 14.37–66). The only body visible is Beatrice's, who escorts Dante. In the Moon, she explains the non-literality of the heavens they are passing through. None of the beings encountered in the Moon are there, they only appear there. The staging-posts of the different heavens are only apparent: hence 'chiaro mi fu allor come ogne dove / in cielo è paradiso' (3.89–90: it was clear to me then how everywhere in heaven is Paradise). The souls in the Moon are actually in the Empyrean. They are like the highest Seraphim who most 's'india' (4.28)—most sinks himself in God.10 Beatrice names Moses and Samuel, Jewish prophets, and writers of sacred texts (see Jeremiah 15.1). She then names two Johns, saying Dante can choose either the Baptist, 'a man sent from God whose name was John' (John 1.6), or the Gospel writer, the beloved disciple John (13.23), who stood by Mary at the foot of the cross (John 19.26). John was a virgin, and Peter Damiani said he, like Mary, was assumed bodily into heaven, though Dante's John denies that in canto 25 (Gambero 2005: 87). All, says Beatrice, are equally within the Empyrean, whatever their capacity to feel, 'più e men', the eternal breath. But they appear for Dante's benefit, in these other, lower, heavens:

> Qui si mostraro, non perché sortita
> sia questa spera lor, ma per far segno
> de la spiritüal c'ha men salita.
> Così parlar conviensi al vostro ingegno,
> però che solo da sensato apprende
> ciò che fa poscia d'intelletto degno.
> Per questo la Scrittura condescende
> a vostra facultate, e piedi e mano
> attribuisce a Dio, e altro intende;
> e Santa Chiesa con aspetto umano
> Gabrïel e Michel vi rappresenta,
> e l'altro che Tobia rifece sano. (4.37–48)

(They have shown themselves, not because this sphere is assigned to them, but to make a sign of the spiritual sphere, which has the less ascent [the Moon]. It suits that they speak thus to your intellect, which only from the senses apprehends what it then makes worthy of the intellect. For this reason, Scripture condescends to your capacity, and attributes feet and hands to God, and means something else, and Holy Church represents to you Gabriel and Michael with human aspect, and that other [Raphael] who made Tobias whole.)

The souls in the Moon have descended, appearing as if in a masquerade. They make the Moon a sign, of weakness of the will. David Gibbons finds more metaphor in Paradiso than in Inferno or Purgatorio. Perhaps this indicates that presentations in Paradiso move towards the intellect by way of something visible. In reaching the non-sensual through the sensual, Dante is akin to the Gothic mentality of the Cistercian Suger (1081–1151), Bernard of Clair vaux's contemporary. Bernard refused church ornamentation, but Suger justified the Gothic ethos of his new Abbey buildings at St-Denis, proclaiming the 'anagogical' nature of Gothic images: all art within it figures divine reality, because Mens hebes ad verum per materialia surgit—'the dull mind rises to truth through that which is material' (Panofsky 1970: 164).

Suger—and Gothic art—worked from the Syrian pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (c.525 CE), the Neo-Platonist influenced by Proclus (412–488) whom Plotinus (c.204–270) influenced, and the saint whom Suger's Abbey church honoured. Pseudo-Dionysius stylised himself after the Pauline convert, the Athenian Dionysius who lived in the atmosphere of the worship of 'the Unknown God' (Acts 17.16–34). He appears in canto 10.112–114, and canto 28.130 evokes him as instructed by Paul, who had been in Heaven. The Celestial Hierarchy was translated into Latin by John Scotus Eriugena (c.860), the Irish poet at the Carolingian court of Charles the Bald (823–877).13 He believed in a 'hierarchy'—his neologism; it appears in Para. 28.121—of knowledge, ascending towards the hidden, though God also descends to matter hierarchically (Rorem 1993: 30). 'Anagogical', Panofsky's word in discussing Suger, means 'mystical, spiritual, having a secondary spiritual sense' (OED), being one of the fourfold senses of Scripture discussed in Dante's Epistle to Can Grande, deriving from such patristic sources as Origen, Cassian, St Jerome, and Eucharis of Lyons (d. c.449).14 Fourfold interpretation gives the Bible literal, allegorical, topological (or moral), and anagogical meanings. In anagogy, pseudo-Dionysius reads symbols as a way of returning towards God. It implies an uplifting: moving from the perceptible to the intelligible, towards contemplation or theoria, as angels contemplate (Rorem 1984: 55, 114).

The necessity for metaphorical/allegorical terms expands in canto 4. Scripture anthropomorphises the immaterial God, giving him a foot, or hand, for allegorical speech 'altro intende' (4.45). It means something else. The Church permits visual representations of Gabriel, or Michael, or Raphael as humans though they are immaterial spirits. Such humanising individuates, as art does. The angel who made Tobias whole comes from the Apocryphal Book of Tobit, 3.17: Raphael 'scaled away the whiteness of Tobit's eyes', an action allegorical of healing spiritual blindness (a refusal to read spiritually/allegorically). The material angel (a contradiction) allegorises a spiritual work, but Dionysius had spoken of 'dissimilar similarities' within Biblical symbols for angels, or God (Rorem 1993: 54–56). 'Dissemblance' disallows reading images for their apparent sense: the visible dissembles the invisible. This resembles Paradiso, whose literal heavens have allegorical features, their spheres not housing their spirits.

This presentational mode, comprising dissimilar similarities and non-reality, was not Dante's mode in Inferno or Purgatorio. There, souls were literal, within literal spaces. With Paradiso, the cosmos becomes allegorical. Beatrice in canto 4 explains the poem's method: finding sensuous equivalents to the cosmic spheres. Philo of Alexandria (15 BCE–45 CE) saw the cosmos as embellishing the divine idea, as allegories. The cosmos means 'the universe' and 'ornamentation, embellishment': for example, the stars as ornaments (Fletcher: 70–145, Radice: 131–135). Hence the cosmos is not intelligible 'scientifically' but allegorically: ornamental jewels flash back within it, adding to it. The Convivio compared the planets' sequence to that of the Trivium and the Quadrivium.16 With that 'scientific' order ghosting Paradiso's sequence, Dante creates the heavens in poetic terms. In canto 4.43–48, the Scriptures, and Church practices, justify Paradiso, according with Dante's mode of creation. The later text makes earlier ones, declared divine, accord with it. The poet works with his own absolute creation, though he presents this as an order vouchsafed to him; for, returning to canto 2.7–9, the waters his boat crosses were uncrossed before, but Minerva, Apollo, and nine Muses—Dante's essential number—show him the Bears. These constellations are co-ordinates for him, as the only nameable entities with a reality or a shape outside these uncrossed seas. As, historically speaking, mythic realities produced an ancient impulse to find them imaged as cosmic patterns, which, though fictional designs, gave viable indications for navigators, so with the fictional realities created in each heavenly sphere. Fictionally charged pagan constellations point out the way for writing Paradiso. Dante's inspiration within looks for pagan-classical and allegorical-fictional inspiration without which points him on; and his heavens generate new constellations.

Origin, Dissemination, and Hierarchy

Dante's heaven shows increasing light without shadow, harmony without disharmony. The stress on returning to God as the origin divides him from present modern critical theory. Teodolinda Barolini, I think rightly, shows disquiet with the implications of the statement that Dante has 'unease and suspicion in the presence of multiplicity'. She is quoting Patrick Boyde, who locates the source of that 'unease' in Dante's keen relationship to Neo-Platonism, this being marked in Monarchia 1.15.1–3, wherein Dante opposes plurality to a unity that seems closer to the origin: 'the best is that which is one as much as possible'. What falls short, 'falls short of being one, and therefore good' (Barolini 1992: 173, 181). Boyde writes that, with this Neo-Platonism, Dante 'seems to have entertained misgivings about the goodness of a universe which could not be perfect because it was neither "simple" nor "one"- as it should be' (Boyde 1981: 219). But Dante's thought shows doubleness. It desires and seeks throughout Paradiso an original, and immaterial, unity, but is attracted to materiality, which includes multiplicity, and fascination with numbers, and is inherently dualist, while 'sinning is nothing else than scorning unity and moving away from it towards multiplicity'.

Pseudo-Dionysius made creation a precession from God; creation stands still before him, and returns to him. There may be plural possible cycles of creation. This view, though the Christian framework does not affirm it, haunts the thought that external reality is layered hierarchically, as if it could be taken away (Schäfwe 2006: 65). In pseudo-Dionysius' follower, Maximus the Confessor (580–662), who influenced John Scotus Eriugena's Periphyseon (c.864), this return to God is to Christ, for Maximus identifies creation with Christ himself, speaking of the Incarnation as threefold: in the cosmos, that is, in creation, in the Scriptures, and in Christ. The soul returns to God. Maximus calls 'deification' the destiny of the human, invoking 2 Peter 1.4, where Christians are 'partakers of the divine nature', and I John 3.2, 'now are we the children of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be'. Lives will be more than almost divine, for God's intention—his divine love—was to be creator and saviour of the cosmos.

Dante is akin to Maximus, drawing on Neo-Platonism in making everything return to a 'proprio sito' (Para 1. 91–93), making diverse elements 'accline' towards their common 'principio' (1.109–111). Everything must be spoken of in allegory, whether the allegory of poets, or of theologians, since language is always, necessarily, 'other'.19 In Philo of Alexandria's tendential Neo-Platonism, allegory draws its power from inability to speak of divine mysteries literally, and from the idea of transmuting material into spiritual reality. The outer, literal meaning of Scripture was the body, the inner, allegorical meaning, the soul: reality is veiled behind the empirically seen (Whitman 1987: 62, 65). If writing allegory in Paradiso means rejecting the material (as with angels) and the literal—it bears repeating that it is not Inferno's mode—that necessitates accepting multiplicity, because speech as 'other', plural, exfoliates within material images.

Dante knew the Neo-Platonism emanating from Plotinus' Enneads (Ennead means 'nine'—for the six divisions of the text include nine books each). Plotinus' disciple Porphyry, incidentally, recorded in his biography that he 'seemed ashamed of being in the body' (quoted Plotinus: cii). Plotinus indeed considered matter to be evil (Ennead 1.8.3). His influence reached Boethius (480–524). A follower of the Plotinian Proclus wrote the ninth-century Liber de Causis, which Aquinas commented on, and which Dante quotes, in Convivio 3.4, and in Epistle 10, paragraph 21.20 God is known within a hierarchy, emanating downwards in light, and in and through angels, and, since an angel is a messenger, in language. Such emanations, pluralising themselves, are interrupted by materiality, a point Convivio 3.7 emphasises. The brightness of the cosmos and scriptural language unite. The association of light's rays with language is implicit in Dante's chilling phrase 'the sun was silent' (Inf. 1.60). No light means no language, no poetry: death. Knowledge returns upwards, with the anagogical power of the symbolic: ideas from the senses convey higher, non-sensuous realities. For

Plotinus, the Divinity inheres within three hypostases: the One, the Divine Mind, and the All-Soul. Emanations processing from the One are revealed in what the Divine Mind displays: RealBeings, Intelligences, and Powers, all nameable as the spiritual universe. They are 'closely like Dante's conception of the circle of angels and blessed spirits gathered in contemplation and service round the throne of God', while the All-Soul is 'the eternal cause of the existence, eternal existence, of the cosmos' (MacKenna in Plotinus 1991: xxxiii, xxxiv). We can hardly distinguish between God and the hierarchy of being; just as Maximus the Confessor deified Christ, the cosmos, and redeemed creation. Such thinking virtually de-centres God by overthrowing separate categories of thought. The distinction between spirit and matter comes into question. The dissemination, and the downward fragmentation of light and language, weakens the possibility of distinguishing literality and allegory in the Commedia—but it should be axiomatic that reading language 'literally' already requires interpretation. Language is figural, and allegorical, and literality is a sense derived from language's several significations. The literal is only that in being part of the 'letter' of 'literature'.

Dionysius' 'mystical theology', from Philo, Gregory of Nyssa, and Proclus, contends that knowing God means entering 'the darkness of unknowing', a phrase from Exodus 24.15, where God appears in the cloud and Moses goes into it. Thus in 'Midnight' by Henry Vaughan (1975: 290): 'There is in God (some say), / A deep, but dazzling darkness'. True language about 'the unknown God' must deny qualities of God, using such negating words as 'invisible', 'infinite', and 'ineffable' (Routh 1989: 45; Rorem 1993: 47–90, 183–236). God must be defined in negatives (apophatically). The Bible's symbols for God are those that are unlike him; they exist in the realm of 'dissemblance' (Didi-Huberman 1995: 45–60). This theology makes knowing less a loving than an intellectual principle, though description of what the soul knows or sees must be in the realm of the unlike—and multiple, neither singly spiritual, nor material.

On one side, everything speaks, as with Purgatorio's annunciating angel (10.34–40), so realistically carved that he seems to be saying Ave. He is messenger and message. Aquinas thought that when immaterial angels assumed a body this 'had a symbolic character: it signified the future assumption of a human body by the Word of God' (Aquinas 1968–1969: 1a.50–64, p. 37). Gabriel is allegorical, like his visibility, where his mien embodies his immaterial word; he is a speaking work of art. Mary, responding, 'avea in atto impressa esta favella / Ecce ancilla Dei' (had in her bearing stamped this speech, Behold the handmaid of the Lord, 10.43–44). Language, its Latin foregrounding it, is stamped into Mary's carved posture, her body, as if she needed not to speak.

On the other side, language fails. Paradiso notes gaps in memory, creating discontinuities within the self, the loss of a reference-point within the subject. One example, discussed in Chap. 5, comes in canto 23, when Dante cannot describe Beatrice's smile. Memory fails, and the writing self, which would think in single continuous terms, loses itself. Commentators often divide Dante the pilgrim from the poet writing, separating the partial insight the traveller possesses from the knowledge possessed by the writing subject (a random instance: Murtaugh 1975: 277–284, note 8). If this was possible it would allow autobiographical writing, where finality, centredness, and completion characterises the writing self, beyond the earlier self, which has partial knowledge. But the distinction is unsustainable. The Dante who travels with partial knowledge is a textual creation of his present writing which cannot distinguish the two. Nor can there be a return to a past original experience, for present writing cannot guarantee the purity of a past event, because it writes within its own present. Not only may memory not have registered experience, as happens in Paradiso, so that it cannot know what it did not know; in saying 'I', there cannot be a self with full presence to itself. The present self has not self-presence. It cannot distinguish itself from the past save by assertion, nor can it claim a separate time for narration putting itself outside the past. These points complicate thought of an origin, of a determinate single knowledge that the subject is acquiring.

Lives Almost Divine, Spirits That Matter

Paradiso may be a desire for pure speech, unstained by anything of materiality, as with Mallarmé, where speech moves beyond immediate sensuous auras as if wanting to be analogous to the angelic state, pure language that removes from it the conventional associations borne in poetic language. But Dante's poetry is driven by the referentiality of what it has left behind, as with its politics, voiced by those within the paradisal and contemplative state, but excited by earthly sensuous reality. Even angels have a desire: contemplation being for them desire of God (Pertile 1997: 148–166). Mary, Beatrice, angels, and the absence of bodies in ever-brightening light witness to a desire for the immaterial, just as resurrection-bodies will not be sexed (Matthew 22.30), yet this is not a single drive. Hence the subtitle: Spirits That Matter. This plays on the book-title to Judith Butler's Bodies that Matter (1993), where 'matter' means 'that which materialises' or 'which become matter' or simply 'which is important'. In how it 'matters', spirit contrasts with any theoretical discourse of the body. And spiritlives are individual, rich, and complex, and that, in Paradiso questions distinctions between the material and the non-material, and the visible and invisible. Paradisal lives are no less vivid than those of Inferno or Purgatorio; one prompting to start this study was noticing how many lives—whether offstage, and alluded to (outstandingly, Francis), or whether visibly, onstage—come before Dante in Paradiso, with histories that matter.

The full subtitle, Lives Almost Divine, Spirits That Matter explores what it means that Paradiso works by allegory, by figural language, however much affirming the reality of what has happened. Dante writes:

> Nel ciel che più de la sua luce prende
> fu' io' (1.4, 5)
> (I have been in the heaven that receives most of his light.)

'Fu io' is deliberate; it summons up St Paul's mystic vision (compare Inferno 2.28–32, 2 Corinthians 12.2–4, Para. 1.73–75). Dante desires the immateriality and perfection of the Paradisal world, as in such a figure as the Virgin, or angels. Allegory, enforcing dualism between the spiritual and the literal, is essential. The external, material secular world, whose multiplicity problematises thought of an origin, makes everything threaten to shade into the contradiction of equally valid opposites, including the dualism of this Christian heaven. Inferno has been found questionable, at least since the time of Chaucer's reception of it, on account of its punishments and its pain, which souls feel in their 'bodies', but Paradisal souls lack bodies, though desiring them, so making Paradiso an unfinished state, poised between spirit and matter. The desire for one state while engaging with another is symptomatic of split sympathies materialising throughout the text, and within Christian discourse. And there, as Caroline Walker Bynum shows, matter is unignorable. It discloses the divine, with its own strangeness, or foreign quality stubbornly inherent within it. A certain wonder clings to creation, haunts created things, and, for the Middle Ages, associates with the exotic homeliness of saints' miracles, fuzzing the boundaries between visible and invisible, material and immaterial, obeying chronology or not. It is with these conflictual states that the following chapters proceed.

It is hard now to think of a text comprising a unity: such could only exist at the level of conscious intention, and apart from unconscious intentions—which it is disingenuous to say we can know nothing of—we know that language makes such purity of intention impossible. Further, criticism has the task of seeing how intentions are realised. But we are in the afterlife of the text. Walter Benjamin distinguishes between reading for the 'material content' and the 'truth content'. While much outstanding work has been done on interpreting Dante's 'material content', it is insufficient; criticism must, more elusively, note a 'truth content' growing within the reading of the text, in proportion as the potential for taking it in its own terms recedes, as the text becomes out of time

(Benjamin 1996: 297–298). The 'truth content', however non-definable, is what in the text speaks to present modernity as the text separates itself from this. The purchase of this in Benjamin is the need to redeem the past; to count nothing lost to history, to let past lives matter in the present, to upturn a history that simply says the past is gone. We may not accept Dante's scheme of salvation—possibly it is not as unified and self-consistent as is claimed for it, and as it claims to be—but we may follow Benjamin's sense that salvation of the past is essential for a future: the point activating the importance of reading Dante, who speaks always with the dead, and whose concern is always redemption. <>

INTERPRETING AND EXPLAINING TRANSCENDENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO THE BEYOND
edited by Robert A. Yelle and Jenny Ponzo [Religion and Reason, De Gruyter, 9783110688221]

In this volume, an interdisciplinary group of scholars uses history, sociology, anthropology, and semiotics to approach Transcendence as a human phenomenon, and shows the unavoidability of thinking with and through the Beyond. Religious experience has often been defined as an encounter with a transcendent God. Yet humans arguably have always tried to get outside or beyond themselves and society. The drive to exceed some limit or condition of finitude is an enduring aspect of culture, even in a "disenchanted" society that may have cut off most paths of access to the Beyond. The contributors to this volume demonstrate the humanity of Transcendence in various ways: as an effort to get beyond our crass physical materiality; as spiritual entrepreneurship; as the ecstasy of rituals of possession; and as a literary, aesthetic, and semiotic event. These efforts build from a shared conviction that Transcendene is thoroughly human, and accordingly avoid purely confessional and parochial approaches while taking seriously the various claims and behavioral expressions of traditions in which Transcendence has been understood in theological terms.

CONTENTS

Introduction: How to talk about Transcendence
Rationale for this volume

Why another volume on Transcendence?' Hasn't the term been abused and, potentially, rendered useless for a study of religion that aspires to be anthropocentric and properly scientific? Indeed, a volume such as this one bears a special responsibility to give an account of itself, at a time when the study of religion appears to many close to reaching its aim of becoming empirical, or at least critical. Neither those approaches based on the natural and social sciences, nor those that may be grouped loosely under the rubric of "critical theory," would appear to have much use for the category of Transcendence, which smacks of antiquated, crypto-theological God talk. More than a century after Nietzsche declared the "death of God," and demonstrated (again) the all-too-human origins of that which we call religion, it would appear indeed untimely (although not in a good sense) to return to speak again in such terms—would it not?

The gamble taken by this volume is that such skepticism regarding the category of Transcendence is mistaken. It is not only possible but necessary to recuperate this category for a properly anthropocentric study of religion and culture. Indeed, without some such category as Transcendence, we declare that it would be impossible to account for the dimensions of human experience, expression, and behavior that are commonly labeled as religious. Far from being an antiquated and suspect category, Transcendence is arguably an enduring as well as urgent aspect of culture.

To be sure, the vast majority of discussions of Transcendence in the scholarly (as well as popular) literature do appear to restate the emic or confessional perspectives of particular theological systems. These generally do not attempt even to justify the use of the category with reference to any empirically observable phenomenon. Transcendence—paired with its standard complement, Immanence—is taken for granted as a descriptor for whatever is lofty, spiritual, or divine; as such, it is practically used as a synonym for the Christian (or at least biblical) God. This locates Transcendence as a near-synonym of the Holy or Sacred, which names what lies beyond and must be kept apart from the Profane, as in Rudolf Otto's (1959 [1917]: 40) concept of the numinous as "wholly other" (see also De Nys 2009: 17). The great historian of religion of the last generation, Mircea Eliade (1959: 11-12), argued that Transcendence was a human constant or at least a perennial possibility, as evidenced through the experience of a hierophany—a 'showing of the sacred'—that ruptures profane existence. Hence his naming of our species as Homo religiosus. As much as we would like to think of ourselves as fully secular or profane, we are, according to this view, never more than a few steps removed from an encounter with Transcendence. Eliade spoke frequently of peak experiences in religious traditions: e. g., of Hindu yoga as the quest for "immortality and freedom" (1969), meaning a transcendence of the ordinary limits of the human condition, especially of our limited lifespan. Eliade (1969: 326 — 30) viewed such experiences as parallels of shamanic techniques of 'ecstasy'—a term that means literally 'standing outside' one's self—as represented by magical flight. Going above or beyond—as in the case of the otherworldly journeys commonly reported by shamans and similar figures—is an obvious metaphor for (self-)transcendence.

An entire generation (or more) has passed since Eliade's day, and scholars of religion have grown increasingly skeptical of the idea that there may be any universals such as Transcendence that define a common human religious experience. Such approaches as Eliade's have been dismissed as phenomenological, crypto-theological, or at any rate insufficiently critical, and have largely been abandoned by more forward-looking theorists. And indeed, we offer a skeptical appraisal of such approaches below. However, after all the critiques have been addressed, we do not think that that the category of Transcendence vanishes into nothingness. Like the smoke from the altar upon which a burnt offering ('olah) has been consumed, it rises into the air, marking a passage between the

Here-and-Now and the Beyond (or Above). Something remains. The metaphor, which is based in the concrete world of materiality, points beyond itself to Something (or Somewhere) Else, and thereby figures a relation to something conceived or imagined as Transcendent. This remains true whether or not there is any God in heaven to receive such an offering. One of the shared convictions of the contributors to this volume—as different as their respective positions might be— is that Transcendence is above all a category of relation, rather than a thing-in-itself. There is no going back to the claim that Transcendence (or the Sacred, or God) is sui generis, utterly unique and incomparable. The very definition of Transcendence in relational terms, as for example the opposite of the Immanent, underscores this interdependence. Transcendence is always figurative, never realized or actual. Its full realization would even be a disappointment, since part of what Charles Taylor calls the "fullness" of Transcendence (see below) is the tang or sting of its absence in the Here-and-Now.

The God of monotheism has been identified as the paragon of the most radical form of Transcendence. This is the God of miracles, and of divine commands, who may be approached only on a mountaintop, and only by Moses, under pain of death. Iconoclasm, or the prohibition against the representation of the divine, may be partly a corollary of God's Transcendence. Even speaking His proper name became taboo. However, this happened gradually, given the traces of anthropomorphism that remain in the Bible. Furthermore, the ban on representation, or at least on relation, cannot be total. Otherwise God would be purely a deus absconditus or 'hidden god,' and there would be no further story to tell. Even when Transcendence is defined in purely negative terms—as in the Upanisadic refrain concerning Brahman, which is described as "neither this nor that" (neti, neti)—it retains some relation to the world. The same is true of the Buddhist equivalent, nirvana. We are in the domain of apophatic mysticism, as in the case of Pseudo-Dionysius (discussed briefly by Gustavo Benavides in his contribution), as well as, potentially, of the Hebrew Bible when describing the same God much earlier.

Etymology is far from diapositive. However, in this case it can help to reinforce the point. 'Transcendence' is a word with a long history, which is used today in many contexts and with many meanings. Originally from a Latin root, trans- + scandare, meaning 'to climb above or beyond,' the word has been applied far beyond its original etymological context and usages (see Ugo Volli's essay in this volume). O'Rourke (2010: 2) notes that "The dictionary translates the Latin verb transcendo with a variety of related terms such as 'to climb,' `pass,' cross, "step over,' overstep, "surmount, "excel, "exceed, "surpass.' Basic to its meaning are the notions of 'crossing over' or 'going beyond'[...]." `Transcendence' is used in many ways, and with many shades of meaning, in the present volume. As a first attempt at definition, however, we may note here that what most of these meanings share is the gesture or movement of `going beyond' some limitation, definite border, or condition of finitude. In this most general and abstract sense, Transcendence plays a structural role in many systems, as figuring what exceeds such limit, border, or finite condition (and which therefore may be limitless or infinite). The gesture of stepping beyond or outside characterizes prophetic critique, holy ground, or the desert that the Israelites crossed during the Exodus. Although many of its meanings are hardly religious, Transcendence appears to be bound closely with certain characteristically 'religious' ideas: the idea of the Infinite, of a High God (or deus absconditus), of immortality, of the ineffable: the list goes on and on. In- deed, without such a category, it would be difficult if not impossible to imagine religion at all.

As one of us pleaded earlier, it is high time we scholars of religion reckoned again with Transcendence, including the irruptive or antinomian aspects of religion:

> [T]he data of religious studies is replete with an almost infinite set of exceptional occurrences, ruptures, outbursts, and deviations. Religion includes not only the institutions

that are part of and reinforce the broader social order, but also individual and collective acts that protest, dissent from, or attack that order. [...] Indeed, the history of religions could be written in terms of such acts of transgression: the starving Buddha, crucified Christ, paralyzed Socrates (possessed by his daimon); Tantric libertines, orgiastic rites, Bacchantes, the self-mutilated devotees of Cybele, the bloody sacrifice of the taurobolium; various movements of iconoclasm (Egyptian [Akhenaten], Jewish, Islamic, Byzantine, Protestant); a host of millennial and apocalyptic movements; festivals such as Carnival, etc. (Yelle 2010: 193-19; see also Yelle 2019: 13)

The foregoing observations suggest the need to take seriously the category of Transcendence as a rubric for cross-cultural analysis, not only of religion but of society more broadly. Recognizing this need, the contributors to this volume have engaged in an interdisciplinary and exploratory approach to Transcendence and applied a variety of sociological, semiotic, historical, anthropological, and philosophical methods. The following is a true experiment in the sense that no claim of final success nor completeness is implied. Rather the idea has been to review some of the numerous notions and phenomena that have been gathered under the rubric of Transcendence with the goal of understanding these a little better. In the course of this effort, various new groupings, some of them perhaps quite unexpected, are tried out, as are different terminological approaches that may, in the future, eventually contribute to a more adequate metalanguage for Transcendence. All of these efforts build from a common acknowledgment that Transcendence is a human phenomenon, and accordingly reject purely confessional and parochial approaches while taking seriously the various claims and behavioral expressions of traditions in which Transcendence may have been understood in theological terms.

This volume

"Going above or beyond" (something, but what, precisely?) is, as noted above, a common denominator of the various uses of Transcendence in this volume. But if we think we know already where this "Great Chain of Being" ends—with the beatific vision of God, as depicted at the end of Dante's Commedia—where, precisely, does it begin? In the longest chapter of this volume, Gustavo Benavides offers a sweeping account of Transcendence that connects this phenomenon to the material and biological bases of human development. Benavides traces the various ways in which Transcendence is anchored in the very physiology of the human condition—from chewing, ruminating, digesting, cooking, and otherwise laboring and waiting, as well as growing, preparing, and processing our food (also internally)—all of which enabled the emergence of biologically modern Homo sapiens as opposed to our more ape-like ancestors. Unlike other hominids, whose physiology condemns them to an almost ceaseless quest for sustenance, Homo sapiens evolved beyond such need, which is nevertheless always present in the form of a fleshly substratum of eating and excreting. Perfecting a jujitsu move pioneered by Nietzsche in his Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887), Benavides illustrates how genealogical connections bind us inexorably to our materiality, which we attempt to surpass and overcome. With tremendous erudition, he narrates a guided tour of the history of religions across time and space, showing in case after case how what we call Transcendence is best understood as an attempt to escape the limits of the human condition, including labor and scarcity; and how, in any society, this role is assigned to or usurped by a particular category of religious specialists who resemble or are even identical with the nobles or socioeconomic elite. The human condition is, then, stratified, as the number of individuals who can raise themselves above the mud to any significant height is always only a fraction of the whole: a fact that leads to ressentiment, as well as to emulation and the aspiration to share in such Transcendence. The dialectic between Transcendence and Immanence is an embodied one, as Benavides reveals, extending Marx's critique of capital and dialectical materialism in a manner that suggests a radically new perspective on religion.

Seth Abrutyn attempts to identify more precisely how Transcendence emerged during the Axial Age. Key to this development were the centralization of power, urbanization, and the rise of entrepreneurship, which enabled a relatively robust institutional differentiation of religion from more embedded and local arrangements, and which contributed ultimately to the birth of several major religions, including ancient Israelite monotheism. As Abrutyn argues, the rise of something like a concept of Transcendence during what has been called the "Axial Age" was dependent on the prior emergence, not only of larger states or imperial formations, but also of a class of spiritual entrepreneurs that arose in direct and critical response to such polities. The prophetic tradition in ancient Israelite religion is a key example for such a sociology of religion. Broadening his analysis to other instances of reaction to the rise of kingdoms and empires, Abrutyn suggests that Transcendence may in some instances be understood as a corollary of the progressively more centralized yet internally complex organization of ancient civilizations.

Our next chapters delve into greater detail concerning two Axial traditions: namely, ancient Israelite religion and Buddhism. Before turning to the Hebrew Bible, Ugo Volli surveys the historical development of the usage of 'Transcendence' that is common today, tracing this primarily to Plato and the Neo-Platonists, as well as to medieval Christian theologians. Although this usage may not map onto ancient Israelite religion, Volli identifies some analogues in that tradition, for example the progressively developing idea of God's separateness, which was closely connected with His inapproachability, unnameability, and omnipotence. But the Hebrew God is not the ineffable and abstract One of Plotinus; He engages with His people, who in turn argue with Him. The personal, and relational, aspect of divinity continues into later Judaism. Volli stresses that the radically transcendent God of the Neo-Platonists or of later Christian theologians is not the God of the Hebrew Bible, with whom humans, including Abraham, are seen to quarrel, bargain, contract, etc.

Martin Lehnert shows how Buddhist philosophers affirmed the relationality of all thought, the identity-within-difference expressed in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras and Madhyamaka philosophy. Lehnert relies on Niklas Luhmann, in whom he finds a key to interpret the distinction between nirvana (the Ultimate) and samsara (the mundane round of rebirth). This distinction is coeval with the founding of Buddhism, but the Mahayana philosophers radicalized it by arguing that nirvana and samsara were, in fact, one and the same. They relativized absolutely everything, including nirvana itself, in the name of bringing liberation down to earth (and thus within reach). The paradoxical formulations of this stage of Buddhist thought illustrate the ultimately recursive nature of all such figurations of Transcendence, which must be depicted, if at all, through and in terms of particular signs, which are necessarily limited, unlike the Ultimate itself.

Katharina Wilkens focuses on the rituals of spirit possession and exorcism in the kibuki tradition of Madgascar, an African island that is predominantly Muslim. Borrowing Thomas Luckmann's idea of "great transcendences" such as ecstatic experiences, she connects these with the sphere of ritual, in which a special place and time is marked, in the case of kibuki, by female performers who manifest an entirely different, and divine, personality. As the possessed person learns to channel and control this spirit through the ritual performance, her feat of role-playing illustrates the close connection of religion—of ecstasy and effervescence—with imagination. Transcendence may be just this capacity to live within the liminal, the "as if."

The next several chapters focus on Transcendence as a semiotic phenomenon. Affirming a fundamental link between Transcendence and semiosis, Massimo Leone strips signification down to its bare bones. Offering, a la Malevich, a "Suprematist" semiotics abstracted from all material considerations and referring only to the processes of semiosis (and abstraction) themselves—namely, to Transcendence, Intransigence, Transparency, Transit, etc., all the way back to Tradition, which serves as the necessary foundation for all efforts at further elaboration, as well as for escape

or exit—Leone traces the manner in which religion performs a series of translations between this world and the next, between human and divine.

Volkhard Krech develops Charles S. Peirce's account of semiosis as a tripartite relationship among an object, a representamen (or sign), and an interpretant. He elaborates Peirce's notion of `thirdness' in a systematic manner and applies this to the Apostles' Creed and the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Krech's argument is built also on the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann's argument that Transcendence becomes accessible precisely when the distinction between Transcendence and Immanence 're-enters' on the side of Immanence, i.e. on our side of the veil, such that it can be made present through visible forms of signification and institutionalization (on re-entry.) Krech develops several metaphysical implications of Peirce's own thought while demonstrating the humanity of religious conceptions of divine Transcendence, which illustrate features that are basic to all forms of communication.

Jenny Ponzo focuses on the transformation and translation of older Catholic modes of Transcendence in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, which emphasized the idea of aggiornamento as a means of being up-to-date in the transmission of church teachings. Part of the mandate of the modern Roman Catholic Church was to open up to the everyday, to express in vernacular and lay terms what had formerly been veiled by the mysteries of the Latin language. Now Transcendence can be found even in ostensibly 'secular' genres of literature, such as Italian novels. In the case of some authors of fictional novels this translated to innovative and even heterodox ways of expressing traditional theological ideas of Transcendence, such as salvation, which were earlier conveyed in hagiographic narratives. Ponzo focuses attention on a novel by Dante Troisi in which three brothers attempt to hasten the apocalypse and Parousia through transgressive actions. The idea of a fulfillment, indeed a redemption of time, is a trope that connects religious with secular narratives.

Our biological nature, which has enabled us to walk upright, and granted us larger brains than our hominid ancestors, has already separated us from our evolutionary past. In cities, beginning with the rise of the great urban centers in the ancient world, we found, perhaps for the first time, the ability to lose ourselves, to become (relatively) anonymous. The first wave of urbanization was perhaps the material condition for religious entrepreneurs and prophets; but also for those who, like the Buddha, chose to depart from the world entirely. When too much togetherness brings us down, we depart to seek isolation and solitude. But this may leave us thirsting again for those moments of communion, or collective effervescence, when we once more lose ourselves, at least temporarily, in the crowd. Even and especially once material needs are satisfied, the products of imagination—literature, art, and (of course) religion—illustrate the desire to exceed our humdrum existence or the limits of the individual lifespan. Human beings may be limited, but they seek to extend or exceed these limits; this indeed may be the function of religion, to deliver inaccessible goods such as salvation, which is often imagined precisely as a form of immortality. To be human means to aspire to be divine: in other words, to wish to be transcendent. <>

MESSIAS PUER: CHRISTIAN KNORR VON ROSENROTH'S LOST EXEGESIS OF KABBALISTIC CHRISTIANITY: EDITIO PRINCEPS PLENA WITH TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION BY Anna M. Vileno and Robert J. Wilkinson [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004426481]

Previously considered irretrievably lost, the discovery of the only manuscript of the **MESSIAS PUER** composed by Knorr von Rosenroth, the leading exponent of Christian Kabbalah in the seventeenth century, gives us an important insight into the evolution of his thought and specific vision of the relations between Jews and Christians. Moreover, the subtle intertwining of both Kabbalah and the emerging biblical criticism at work in this partial commentary on the New Testament Gospels sheds new light on the largely unexplored role of Esotericism during the Modern Era in the construction of the future study of religion. This book includes a critical edition of the original manuscript and an annotated translation.

CONTENTS

Christian Knorr von Rosenroth was born in 1636 in the vicinity of Glogów, a Silesian city in present day Poland. The son of a protestant pastor, Knorr enjoyed a classical education, embracing theology, philosophy and the study of ancient classical and oriental languages. His student dissertation, presented in Leipzig, was devoted to the "Theology of the Gentiles" as it may be gleaned from the medals and coins conserved from Greek and Roman Antiquity. This rather curious work appears to contain the seeds of many of the interests later entertained by Knorr and to reflect an early stage of his interest in the ancient traditions sometimes called philosophia perennis. If von Rosenroth is best-known today for his Kabbala Denudata, a Latin anthology of kabbalistic texts partly taken from the Lurianic tradition, he did not confine his research to Kabbalah. A real "Renaissance man", he was productive as an author, translator, editor and commentator and took interest in fields as variegated as antique numismatics, medicine, biblical exegesis and landscape architecture.

As was the custom at the time, Knorr travelled throughout Europe in order to complete his education. Among the various countries that he visited— France, England and the Netherlands—his stay in Amsterdam seems to have been of particular importance for the future development of his thought. During the Seventeenth Century the welcoming city of Amsterdam hosted a large and motley Jewish community, of many different tendencies. Amongst these, the Marranos, the Jews who had converted to Catholicism while living in Spain or Portugal and who were now in some cases returning to Judaism, played an important role in the numerous cultural transfers that took place at the time between Jews and Christians. Through his meeting with a large number of scholars, Jews and Christians alike, who cultivated a deep interest in Kabbalistic studies, Knorr's interest in mystical Jewish literature was stimulated. The city of Safed, in upper Galilee, was an important centre where different audacious and innovative kabbalistic systems were elaborated by leading Jewish scholars such as Moshe Cordovero, Salomon Alkabetz and Isaac Luria, the most prominent figure of Safedian Kabbalah. Kabbalistic texts began to spread to the common Jewish folk. The study of esoteric lore became popular in Europe even beyond the strictly religious sphere where it had been confined until then. Although we lack precise information about the textual sources of his work, it is probably that,

while wandering through Europe, and especially in the Netherlands, Knorr gathered texts from the Lurianic tradition that would soon lie at the core of his kabbalistic anthology, Kabbala Denudata.

Furthermore, in the years 1662–1663 in Amsterdam, Knorr had the opportunity to encounter followers of the Sabbatean movement, which spread all over Europe in the wake of the messianic activities of Sabbatai Tsevi (1625–1676) the Jewish Messiah of Early Modern times. Born in Smyrna, in present day Turkey, Tsevi was the leading figure of an extensive messianic movement that spread across Europe and North Africa. Despite his conversion to Islam in 1666, Sabbatianism remained a strong and influential trend in Jewish life throughout the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries and inevitably provoked vigorous opposition from the rabbinic authorities. The extent of the consequential social unrest led inevitably to the involvement of the Christian authorities, who were solicited by other Jews to condemn Sabbatean adherents. This explosion of messianic fervour attracted the attention of several Christian scholars at the time, for example, the French biblical critic Richard Simon. According to some modern scholars, arguing from the concurrence of Sabbatianism and von Rosenroth's work, his publication of the Kabbala Denudata at the Palatine Court of Sulzbach where he was Privy Counselor needs to be considered in the light of the Sabbatean influence. This period, the second half of the Seventeenth Century in Europe, was characterized by strong messianic expectations, in both Jewish and Christian communities, and many Christian millenarians took a serious interest in the Sabbatean movement. Without doubt, this messianic tension needs to be born in mind when we account for the genesis of the last work of Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, the Messias Puer.

Christian Knorr von Rosenroth was deeply rooted in the intellectual life of his time. He carried on epistolary exchanges with such personalities as the Cambridge Platonic philosopher Henry More, which were published in the first volume of the Kabbala Denudata in 1677. More had expressed his views on Kabbalah in 1653, in his Conjectura Cabbalistica, and when he became acquainted with Lurianic Kabbalah recently made available in Knorr's Latin translations, he reacted vigorously against its use in a Christian context.9 Through Henry More, Knorr became acquainted with the thought of the French philosopher René Descartes, about whose work Knorr addressed many questions to his English correspondent.

Among Knorr's many connections we find G.W. Leibniz, whose friendship with Knorr has been illuminated particularly in the works of Allison Coudert. Until thirty years ago, Leibniz was considered as being quite indifferent to what were conceived as the "occultist" interests of Kabbalah. Though often presented as the incarnation of rationalism, the herald of modern science and mathematics, Leibniz was in fact attracted by the esoteric tradition of Judaism, and, in a world where philosophy, science and religion were hardly distinguishable, admired von Rosenroth's work. As the librarian of Duke Anthony Ulrich of Brunswick, Prince of Wolfenbüttel, Leibniz was well informed about the various publication projects of the République des lettres, and his correspondence preserves one of the very few early attestations we have of Messias Puer and its content. Leibniz was introduced to Knorr in 1671 when he was preparing his kabbalistic anthology by Knorr's friend and colleague Francis Mercury van Helmont. It appears that during one of his trips, in 1688, Leibniz spend a period with Knorr in Sulzbach and Leibniz's letters written during and after this stay attest his keen interest in Knorr's enterprise.

A central role in Knorr's life was played by his friendship with the Belgian physician and alchemist Francis Mercury van Helmont. Knorr wrote the preface to the latter's Alphabeti vere naturalis hebraici brevissima delineatio, about the Hebrew alphabet and its usefulness in the education of people affected by deafness. The collaboration of Knorr and van Helmont contributed to the publication of several works important for the intellectual history of seventeenth-century German

culture: a German translation of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy and a translation of the medical summa of Jean-Baptiste van Helmont, Francis Mercury's father, the Ortus medicinæ among them.

The exact role that each of the two companions played in the Hebrew printing and translation programme of the circle of the Palatine Court of Sulzbach is still under discussion among scholars. Was Knorr merely a compiler, (as he himself describes his function) and just the translator of versions that were requested from him by van Helmont, who in that case would be the real initiator of the project? Or did Knorr take a fully active part in the projects? As we suggest in this book, Knorr may have been only a major participant to the anthological project as a translator, but his close acquaintance with the texts allowed him to assimilate kabbalistic doctrines to such an extent that he became able to produce personal and original works such as the major part of Adumbratio and, of course, his most prominent and original achievement, Messias Puer.

As we have seen, Christian Knorr von Rosenroth was a German Christian Kabbalist who distinguished himself by the translation into Latin of Hebrew mystical texts belonging mainly to the Lurianic tradition and collected in an anthology called Kabbala Denudata published between 1677 and 1684. According to Gershom Scholem, the great twentieth-century scholar of Kabbalah, the kabbalistic system of Isaac Luria (1534–1572), the last stage in the historical development of Kabbalah, was characterised by strong innovative hermeneutics and was to become, through its reception in Hassidism, the most influential upon Jewish religious life until the present day—to such an extent that Lurianic Kabbalah can be considered today as the "official theology of Judaism". The quality of Knorr's translation work did not escape Scholem's notice any more than the reliability of his Hebrew sources.18 Whenever it is possible, a comparison of the Hebrew text and Knorr's translation reveals the latter accurately to convey the meaning of the Hebrew. Furthermore, Knorr showed a desire fully to grasp the multiple meanings of Kabbalistic texts, as one may see in his Loci communes kabbalistici, a dictionary of the most commonly encountered Kabbalistic notions, each entry of which exposes several different possible interpretations. In this way, the text is never reduced to just a single possible reading.

In addition to his translations and epistolary exchanges with notable contemporaries19, Knorr also worked energetically on Christian Kabbalah. Some works, like Adumbratio kabbalæ christianæ, probably produced in collaboration with his regular companion, Francis Mercury van Helmont and published in 1684 in the second volume of Kabbala Denudata, reflect his engagement in an intellectual programme aimed at re-interpreting Christian doctrines in the light of Kabbalistic teachings. But, in addition to the singular and original production of Adumbratio, Knorr was also responsible for an edition of the Syriac New Testament printed in unvocalised square Hebrew letters in Sulzbach in 1684. This year of 1684 was thus important in Knorr's intellectual development for with this Peshitta, our author took an important step in the general development of his own research into Christian Kabbalah. The significance of the Syriac Peshitta New Testament for Knorr was that he considered it was written essentially in the same Aramaic as the Zohar and thus allowed the New Testament to be understood in the light of Zoharic categories and doctrines.

This same year of 1684 saw the fruition of the next aspect of this important co-ordinated project of Knorr, namely the publication of an edition of the Zohar itself in Aramaic. In a certain fashion all of Knorr's publications since the first volume of Kabbala Denudata anticipated this publication which for a long time afterwards remained a work of reference for Hebraists. In the Latin introduction to the Sulzbach Zohar, Knorr, in pedagogic mood, proposes a progressive approach to the reader: to become familiar with the un-pointed Aramaic which appears in Hebrew letters in the Zohar Knorr recommends practice in reading the extracts of the Zohar published in the second volume of the anthology which give a vocalised text in the same Hebrew characters opposite a Latin translation and accompanied by commentaries. The exercise of reading the Syriac New Testament in square

Hebrew type together with the Kabbalistic lexicon which is the Loci, should enable the reader to approach the text of the Zohar without difficulty. A Zoharic reading of the New Testament thus becomes attainable.

The second volume of the Kabbala Denudata begins with a long preface in which Knorr, basing himself on authentic identifiable textual sources, sets out the history of the collection of the Zohar, as it is reported in Jewish tradition. Undoubtedly having himself an interest in the question, Knorr defended the antiquity of the Zohar. Indeed to trace the Zohar back to Simon bar Yochai as tradition demands, entails placing it close to the time of Jesus. It is then far easier to claim that the Zohar contains Christian truths. The principal object remains however to render the Zohar accessible to Latin readers, though Knorr's apologetic concerns are particularly clear in this year of 1684. However in addition to Adumbratio kabbalæ christianæ already mentioned, Christian Knorr von Rosenroth was also the author of a work entitled Messias Puer, which now with this edition can be seen to represent the final outcome of his Kabbalistic studies from a Christian perspective.

The work of Christian Knorr von Rosenroth enjoyed a wide and long-lasting reception. His kabbalistic anthology remained, until the end of the Nineteenth Century the principal if not the only one source through which readers could access kabbalistic studies without mastering the Hebrew language. Major scholars and intellectual personalities such as Adolphe Franck, Heinrich Graetz or Paul Vulliaud quoted Knorr extensively until the very beginning of the Twentieth Century. Most strikingly, standing both in the tradition established by earlier Christian Kabbalah and also representing its last most significant monument, Knorr's work was responsible for taking Kabbalah out of the field of the Jewish Studies and introducing it into the larger field of Modern Esotericism and Occultism. The kabbalistic library offered by Knorr, even though it often remained, so to speak, an unknown quantity under a well-known title, enjoyed such a wide fame that it progressively assumed a kind of mythical status itself. Beyond its historical and philological contribution in spreading kabbalistic texts through a wide European readership, the Kabbala Denudata also began to function as a kind of "warranty certificate" under the validation of which all kind of magical and esoteric texts circulated.

Amongst the texts presented in Knorr's anthology, two attracted particular attention: a lost alchemical treatise known as Esh Metsaref, and a selection of excerpts of the Zohar. Indeed, the Kabbala Denudata remains famous in Hermetic milieux because it preserves the only available fragments of a "Compendium Libri Cabbalistico-chymici", the title of which Knorr spells Æsch Mezareph, literally the "Burning Fire", which deals with the Philosophers' Stone. Quite quickly, these fragments were reassembled and published by an anonymous freemason in an English translation of 1714. The history of the Esh Metsaref is surrounded by a halo of mystery. If most of the sources that Knorr used in his anthology are identifiable, the case of this alchemical tractate is more complicated. Despite its title, no Hebrew work is known under this name. This has given rise to a lot of speculation and animated research. Basing himself on a close analysis of Knorr's translation, Scholem estimated that "the tournures as well as the content demonstrate in a very clear way that Knorr had at his elbow a real Hebrew manuscript and not some Latin version of the work". The Burning Fire builds on systematic parallels between the kabbalistic and the alchemical traditions. The rediscovery of the text by one of the most influential British Freemasons of his time, William Wynn Westcott, founder with Samuel Liddell MacGregor Mathers of the Golden Dawn, introduces us to the story of the latter reception of the Kabbala Denudata in the new context of nineteenth-century Hermeticism and its renewal through the perspective offered by Carl Gustav Jung.

To grasp this second important contribution of Knorr's Kabbala requires us to consider a major link in the chain of transmission of the Kabbala in its English version, Samuel Liddell MacGregor Mathers (1854–1918), one of the founders of the renewed Golden Dawn society, at the end of the

Nineteenth Century. In 1887 Mathers provided a translation of the three Zoharic tractates brought to light by Knorr, namely the Sifra De-Tseniuta (the "Book of the Concealed things"), the Idra Rabba (the "Great Assembly") and the Idra Zuta (the "Lower Assembly"). Mathers published his work under the barely innocent title of Kabbalah Unveiled. Most probably, the success of the Isis Unveiled published some ten years earlier by Helena Blavatsky played a significant part in Mather's choice. His translation was itself translated into many European languages and hence reached a very large readership. The crucial point here is that these tractates reflected a particular trend in the history of Kabbalah, that of Lurianic Kabbalah. As noted above, Lurianic Kabbalah brought a wholly fresh contribution to the history of Jewish mysticism and paid a particular attention to the three Zoharic tractates chosen and translated by Knorr. They were subject to numerous commentaries by the members of the Lurianic School (a great part of which Knorr integrated in the second volume of his anthology) and were widely considered the most dense and sophisticated of kabbalistic texts. Knorr's chosen emphasis on Lurianic Kabbalah in his translations was handed down, through the latter French and English versions, to the larger readership of the Nineteenth Century. This particular transmission history of kabbalistic texts lead gradually to a greater focus on the Zohar, and more specifically, upon these three tractates, considered as a kind of "essential Zohar". Through the work of the French Occultist Éliphas Lévi, an even sharper focus fell upon the short tractate Sifra De-Tseniuta, the "Book of the Concealed Things".

Éliphas Lévi whose real name was Alphonse Louis Constant (1810–1875) played a crucial role (along with the activities of Mathers and his friends) in framing a new conception of Kabbalah. Levi not only established a new occultist science articulated around the teachings of Kabbalah, he placed it at the very core of his new system. The Zohar and in particular the Sifra DeTseniuta became under his pen an "encompassing key" that allows one to explain everything that occurs and the operating mode of all traditions. Kabbalah became here the source of all esoteric and religious movements and the most intimate explanation of everything. Many of Éliphas Lévi's works are orientated towards this explanatory goal, among others his (quite personal) French translation of the Zohar. Here we encounter Knorr von Rosenroth again, since Éliphas Lévi based his translation on the Latin version of the Zohar published in the Kabbala Denudata and not, as he claimed, on the original text. Obviously, Levi did not have sufficient mastery of Hebrew and Aramaic to produce a translation by himself. Éliphas Lévi none the less insisted repeatedly on the necessity of going back to source texts and not relying only on secondary literature that had been produced by previous Christian Kabbalists. In that perspective, he recommended his disciples to read Knorr's Zohar and we learn from his German editor and biographer that Kabbala Denudata became, from 1850 onward, Éliphas Lévi's bedside book. In his Dogme et rituel de la haute-magie published between 1854 and 1856, Éliphas Lévi set up a systematic parallel between the kabbalistic tradition and the Tarot through his 22 chapters. There Lévi stated that the Zohar was "absolute secret knowledge". In 1896, the work reached the English readership thanks to the translation of Arthur Edward Waite, Transcendental Magic, its Doctrine and Ritual.

The close link established during the Nineteenth Century between Esotericism and Esoteric Freemasonry on one hand, and literature on the other hand, transmitted the influence of Knorr's work, though it became increasingly remote. Thus we find (as far as France is concerned) reminiscences of it deep in Joris-Karl Huysmans' literature of decadence and in the surrealism of André Breton and in Britain, in the work of Max Theon and Arthur Edward Waite. In the works of American freemasons like Albert Pike and Kenneth Mackenzie, the Kabbala Denudata became the foundation of the deepest arcana of the esoteric High Grades, whereas the revolutionary contribution of Helena Blavatsky offered for Knorr an unexpected posterity, now dechristianized and parallel to the recently discovered Oriental Tradition.

In contrast with the many translations, compilations and editions he produced, Knorr left us very few original productions, the most significant until now having been his Adumbratio kabbalæ christianæ. This makes it quite difficult for the scholar to enter the most intimate convictions and motivations of this discrete man who, as we have shown, nevertheless exerted a strong and long-lasting influence on the later developments of Western Esotericism. However, as will become evident in the following pages, Knorr's recovered Messias Puer introduces us into the final and most comprehensive formulation of his system of thought, through the systematic application of all his kabbalistic studies to the Syriac text of the New Testament. Indeed, as our apparatus to the Latin text makes clear, his Kabbala Denudata is omnipresent throughout his commentary, building a consistent world of references without which the complexities of this last work would remain impossible for the reader fully to grasp.

With the recovery of Messias Puer, there will now be scope for a detailed investigation of the manner in which Knorr presented several doctrinal matters and also opportunity to observe the development of his audacious and radical hermeneutic based on a complex but systematic and coherent re-reading of the Gospels. Both areas of innovation touch critically on the question of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity and offer an insight into Knorr's closely-argued exegetical deployment of the Lurianic doctrines in his engagement with New Testament texts as he sought to find a road to reconciliation between Judaism and Christianity.

Knorr had already demonstrated his mastery of traditional Jewish texts. But the Messias Puer is equally characterised by a linguistic component displaying a proficiency in comparative philology which is the basis for many of the text's developments. In practice, the Greek and Syriac versions are forensically compared to extract the interpretation at once most rich and also closest to the letter of the text, a principal focus of Knorr. In this context the Syriac version is generally preferred. Knorr is however aware of the Arabic version, feels confident to prefer an Arabic etymology from a Lexicon, and to refer to other Arabic material at second-hand. He was also familiar with contemporary work on Ethiopia and Ethiopic texts. A fuller consideration of Knorr's new work will now enable him to be placed in the context of a wider Oriental philology.

Also, considerable attention is devoted in the Messias Puer to the circumstances of the production of the New Testament texts as well to the historical context of the events related therein. The Jewish tradition is here seen as the key to unlock the New Testament passages which had always resisted convincing interpretation. In this respect Knorr is evidently heir to the work of John Lightfoot in Cambridge (whose work he had beside him)45 and his approach has similarities to Richard Simon's Comparaison des cérémonies des Juifs et de la discipline de l'Eglise which in the same period turned to Hebrew texts to elucidate the traditional Christian Scriptures. The topics thematically developed by the Messias Puer, the sources exploited, as well as the deployment of its exegetical technique, thus place this work at the centre of research into Orientalism in the context of developing Biblical Criticism. Yet what is missing from Lightfoot is a positive appreciation of the religious value of the Mishnaic and Talmudic material he exploited in his reconstruction of the realia of New Testament times, and what is not found in Simon is the deep conviction that the Jewish mystical tradition is the bearer of the True Gospel. Both these convictions inform the newly recovered Messias Puer. <>

Theological Ethics through a Multispecies Lens: The Evolution of Wisdom, Volume I by Celia E. Deane-Drummond [Oxford University Press, 9780198843344]

Engages with new evolutionary hypotheses, recent discussions in evolutionary anthropology and new multispecies approaches to ethnography and provides a constructive approach to the biosocial evolution of key virtues of compassion, justice and wisdom

There are two driving questions informing this book. The first is where does our moral life come from? The presupposition is that considering morality broadly is inadequate. Instead, different aspects need to be teased apart. It is not sufficient to assume that different virtues are bolted onto a vicious animality, red in tooth and claw. Nature and culture have interlaced histories. By weaving in evolutionary theories and debates on the evolution of compassion, justice, and wisdom, the book shows a richer account of who we are as moral agents. The second driving question concerns our relationships with animals. There is dissatisfaction with animal rights frameworks and an argument instead for a more complex community-based multispecies approach. Hence, rather than extending rights, a more radical approach is a holistic multispecies framework for moral action. This need not weaken individual responsibility. The intention is not to develop a manual of practice, but rather to build towards an alternative philosophically informed approach to theological ethics, including animal ethics. The theological thread weaving through this account is wisdom. Wisdom has many different levels, and in the broadest sense is connected with the flow of life understood in its interconnectedness and sociality. It is profoundly theological and practical. In naming the project the evolution of wisdom a statement is being made about where wisdom may have come from and its future orientation. But justice, compassion, and conscience are not far behind, especially in so far as they are relevant to both individual decision-making and institutions.

Develops a theology of wisdom that includes attention to both individuals and institutions.

CONTENTS

A Weaving of Wisdom: Introduction
1. Beyond Animal Rights
2. Whence Justice?
3. Love's Evolution
4. Becoming Wise
5. Life in a Multispecies Commons
6. Wild Justice, Justice as Virtue and Natural Law
7. Domestication: Including Animals in Building Virtue
8. Capability Theory, Just Institutions and Communitarian Conscience
9. Persons in Multi-Species Communities
Towards Wisdom Practices: Conclusions

Excerpt:

I intend to make clear precisely what I am arguing for in this book, how this will be connected to the larger project as a whole (which includes two more volumes), and how this is connected with previous work that I have begun to sketch out in The Wisdom of the Liminal: Evolution and Other Animals in Human Becoming, published in 2014.

My aim in The Wisdom of the Liminal was to write a new theological anthropology, one that took into account both the depth of Christian traditions and the extent of research in evolutionary anthropology and the related topic of animal studies. While I argued for a different way of framing what it is to be human that challenged the human/animal binary often lodged uncritically within theological discourse, I also demonstrated on numerous occasions how the Christian tradition provided rich resoAurces for a very different understanding of humanity's relationships with animals. I also showed how that theological research could engage in helpful conversations with evolutionary anthropology and, even though the basic assumptions of that research are different, there are some common questions related to human meaning and origins. Reason, freedom, language, and morality were the main ingredients that I teased out in the book since these very characteristics have habitually been offered as a way of asserting human supremacy over animals, and also used in the Christian tradition to define the meaning of human uniqueness as made in the image of God, imago Dei. I began to press for a different way of understanding what it means to be human in terms of relationships with animals in a common multispecies community. I touched on Marc Bekoff's understanding of wild justice as play and the theoretical framework for social justice that Martha Nussbaum presents in her capabilities approach. Theologically, the liminal intellectual space also included our relationship with the divine that reflects the divine image in us, grounded in Christology, with divine likeness understood as characteristic of all animals and creaturely kinds. That divine likeness should not be seen as demeaning for such creatures, but a way of affirming their goodness before God.

However, as I came to the end of that work I became acutely aware of areas requiring much more development, not least about the evolution of morality and virtues in particular. Rather than crafting morality as a single basket into which all our different capacities or dispositions might be placed, I consider that it is far more fruitful to tease out what that morality might look like in terms of specific tendencies for empathy, compassion, justice, and practical wisdom that in evolutionary terms becomes translated into other regard, inequity aversion, and symbolic thinking. Furthermore, rather than thinking of a valuer and what is valued in a single encounter, what has become clear to me in writing the present volume is that human valuation is part of a meshwork in a dynamic system, one that includes other animals (and indeed, other organisms including plants) in so far as what is valued from their perspective connects or conflicts with our own. This interspecies or, perhaps better, multispecies approach presents a very different theoretical and philosophical basis for ethical practice, especially that in relation to animals, which has been dominated by the rhetoric of animal rights. I have also in this book made a self-conscious effort to spell out as clearly as I can philosophical questions and issues compared with the Wisdom of the Liminal, finding inspiration for a different philosophy of life in the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold, philosopher Cynthia Willett, as well as drawing on the work of French phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, whose understanding of self as another and justice can, I suggest, be stretched to provide a more nuanced basis for interspecies/multispecies ethics, even though he did not move in this direction himself.

In Weaving of Wisdom, the introduction opening this book, I lay out the reasons for my particular theological and philosophical starting points and the evolutionary premises in relation to alternatives. Part of this material connects with aspects of the evolution of cooperation covered in The Wisdom of the Liminal. I am deliberately naming all three volumes the evolution of wisdom rather than the evolution of morality, because wisdom is itself about making connections, and is sufficiently fluid as a term to be flexible in what it can encompass, while not being quite as vague as morality. I deal with the more specific discussion of wisdom in a number of chapters, while cross-referencing to wisdom throughout the work, so wisdom also becomes a way of linking all the different chapters together.

In Chapter 1, I dive into a discussion of animal rights in order to set this volume within the intellectual framework of alternative approaches to animal ethics, even though I do not dwell on

issues of practical animal ethics. The ethics agenda from a more theoretical perspective is the basic question at the back of my mind in this volume, while for the Wisdom of the Liminal to face up to the tendency for ill and evil, what Christians have called sin. Volume 2 is therefore more explicitly theological in its framing, and I start with a discussion of Augustine's original sin, not least because it has had and continues to have such a profound cultural impact. I also draw on Sergii Bulgakov's understanding of evil as shadow Sophia, but take it up in a new way. But what are the deeper roots of these tendencies for ill, and how might that play out in multispecies relationships? French philosopher Paul Ricoeur comes to my aid again here because he was not only a profound and careful phenomenologist, but also, unlike Augustine, his understanding of evil and finitude tried to take into account its natural roots. I do not follow all his suggestions, but I do think that it helps frame discussions that follow where I explore the evolutionary, psychological, and theological interpretations of specific dispositions named vices. This is a new approach to what has sometimes been termed natural evil, and I hope to show that the split between natural and moral evil is not as sharp as it might seem, even though the self-consciousness of human beings puts their acts into a different ethical category.

Volume 3 moves from tendencies to sin in Volume 2 to a discussion of the evolution of morality in context of an evolution of religion and Thomas Aquinas's understanding of specific virtues infused by the grace of God. Ricoeur's discussion of narratives is also helpful. This volume faces more difficult questions of dissonance between theology and evolutionary anthropology, even though explanatory accounts of dispositions for justice, compassion, and practical wisdom in the first two volumes began such questioning. I interrogate contemporary debates on transhumanism that provide new approaches to transcendence, bearing in mind the length of humanity's relationships with tools. Over the three volumes I am not attempting a neo-Hegelian approach to this debate, or even necessarily suggesting that infused virtues can be separated from the acquired virtues grounded in our evolutionary and biological becoming. However, Volume 3 does open up further questions about the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of the world.

By breaking up this material into manageable pieces, my hope is that readers will appreciate both the enormity of this task, but also its contribution to theological ethics, as well as the dynamism of the conversation possible between science and theology more broadly. I recognize that there are still plenty of gaps to fill in here, and if I have done anything to inspire the reader to start working on those gaps, then I will have achieved my aim. One gap that I know is important and needs further discussion is that of symbiosis, both in the varieties of mutualism and parasitism.' However, as this discussion is more about the fundamental biological incorporation of different agents within each other either for good or ill, I see that discussion as a background to multispecies approaches. There are fewer ethical issues associated with symbiosis, though its prevalence in the biological world is perhaps one more reason why a multispecies approach is coherent with basic biological thinking. It is another example of an area that is sorely neglected in public understanding of biology compared with competitive models of interspecies association.

The search for wisdom is an ongoing and never-ending task, and this work is just one contribution towards that search. I believe wisdom to be the right framing for this whole project, not least because of its diversity in terms of virtue (as practical wisdom and wisdom proper), but also because it is necessary, in my view, in order to understand all other dispositions, including that supreme theological virtue, charity. Science, too, brings its own form of wisdom, and I remain grateful and in debt to all those who have been patient enough to share their insights with me along the way. But science as technology also has a darker side that is capable of fostering ambiguous desires towards transcendence and transhumanism that encourage disincarnation. The question—requiring a considerable exercise of wisdom—as to whether these are idolatrous or true expressions of human creativity will be left to Volume 3.

***

Towards Wisdom Practices

Drawing the various threads together that have made up this book is a challenging task, not least because every topic of exploration has opened up new questions, new challenges in interpretation, and sometimes unresolved puzzles. In the first instance I will highlight what I understand as the key concepts that have emerged in working through these threads. This will provide the background through which to consider in a limited way some examples of practical ethics.

First, one overriding thread that I have consistently sought to demonstrate is that consideration of different facets of human morality as if they were purely the product of a disembodied reasoning mind is no longer convincing. This does not mean that Kantian ethics is totally redundant, but that there needs to be far more awareness of its limitations. Looking back into deep time and speculation on the evolution of morality offers an evolutionary naturalism that, left unmodified, opposes Kantian theories. However, there are tensions and philosophical difficulties here as well, not least because arguments seem to be circular, for what is explained as arising through evolutionary selection pressures relies on empirical forms of reasoning that can then equally be scrutinized through evolutionary explanations. The standard Neo-Darwinian paradigm of evolution by natural selection that most theologians and philosophers adopt as a reference point does not take sufficient account of alternative hypotheses on biological and cultural evolution. These alternatives are more promising for the present project, as they open up more complex ways of considering how humanity came to be a moral agent, in so far as they stress the ecological niches in which humans and all other creatures have been and still are to a large extent situated, even if city dwelling has shielded many of us from that reality. Further, there is an important difference between seeking to explain how different and particular human capacities have evolved, including capacities for moral agency, and assuming that the content of that morality is thereby adequately understood simply through evolutionary explanations. Cultural evolutionary biologists edge towards such claims, though at their best their arguments are, in the most serious studies, suitably qualified in terms of the conclusions that can be reached. Similar tensions exist in evolutionary explanations of religion.

Second, widening the moral sphere to include animals in the manner that animal rights discourse has attempted to do, repeats the same mistakes of (a) beginning with humans and then extending that domain, and (b) focusing on a rational appraisal of (i) who are or who are not subjects of a life, (ii) who are or who are not capable of sentience, or, in the liberationist approach of Singer, (iii) what overall process leads to the maximum levels of flourishing, according to a utilitarian calculus. While Singer has accused the Catholic church of speciesism, the animal rights movement that he helped initiate relies on species-specific use of rights language that is a term grounded in humanism. Given that, it is hardly surprising that many who support human rights object to the term being used in the case of other animals, as it can seem to weaken the value of those who are claiming that right by such a comparative rhetoric with animals. Comparative rhetoric, historically at least, were often disguised forms of abuse. So, there is an equal risk of humanity, or even worse of different supposedly less 'developed' cultures within humanity, being degraded, rather than the opposite intention to elevate other animals to the human plane. The rhetoric against hierarchical schema on the basis of shared sentience sits uneasily alongside the use of rights language, that in some cases applies only to mammalian species like our own.

I have proposed an alternative multispecies approach in this book that focuses on the deep roots of core virtues of justice, love, and wisdom, and by doing so generally avoids foregrounding rights language. Further, wisdom puts stress on an interlaced, relational approach, while including rather than rejecting reason. It is the narrowly proscribed and disembodied reasoning that fails to gain traction. The evolution of wisdom is therefore holistic, inclusive, and open to the transcendent. I

believe such a wisdom-informed multispecies approach is more likely to encourage a deeper appreciation for the special importance of other animal lives in their rich diversity. I am not suggesting that animal rights has been completely unsuccessful in the practical sphere of animal ethics; certainly its campaigns for what are sometimes known as the three Rs of replacement, reduction, and refinement have led to important improvements in animal welfare. But it has not so far been all that successful in providing a solid basis for why animals are also so important for human identity, not so much in terms of their instrumental usefulness, but as part of, and integral to, our shared evolutionary history and present multispecies reality.

Third, the term morality is itself too broad to be really useful, and a kaleidoscope of different aspects of what morality entails helps to deepen analysis of the complex origins of different human tendencies to do good or ill, virtue or vice. I have focused in this book on just some of the important virtues of the moral life. I have referred to justice on numerous occasions, as this characteristic is particularly interesting in that it joins up individual moral virtue with more collective and structural dimensions of what it means to live in a just society. I think the jury is still out on how far and to what extent other social animals can display 'wild justice'. It is certainly fully functional, however, within their communities, most often in the form of fairness expressed as inequity aversion or in some cases play behaviour. Care needs to be taken not to assume that the tendencies towards this behaviour in different social animals, especially primates, are necessarily a template for the way justice needs to be understood in human communities. The fact that there is some resonance, however, is interesting and important to consider. Justice as virtue also overlaps with the notion of natural right and natural law, both of which have been dominant in discussions of moral theology.

Multispecies communities were the norm in evolutionary terms and this way of living still impacts our own social world, even though it is sometimes difficult to recognize. Love is sometimes thought of as a theological virtue, though prior to a full-blown transcendent version the capacity for other regard shows up in many other social species. I have concentrated in this volume on the virtue of compassion, which can be thought of as in some but not in all respects related to more developed and sacrificial forms of other regard. Cooperation is complicated by being both a tool for the greater good of a specific group of social animals, but also potentially greater violence towards outsiders. Bonds of affection between members of different species are, however, quite common, and show up in an important way in patterns of domestication in human communities prior to the subsequent treatment of animals in more mechanistic terms. Wisdom, too, goes back deep into time and human origins—in so far as it has a specifically human quality—though it does not seem to be in evidence as far back in the evolutionary account of hominins in comparison with compassion. There are, however, behaviours of other life forms that look from our own perspective rather like practical wisdom, just as there are behaviours that look rather like expressions of compassion or perhaps wild justice. But it is the specific way that humans can remember and their specific capacity to make long-term judgements in foresight that marks a distinctive human capacity for being practically wise.

Fourth, wisdom has a place not just as one ingredient among many in the evolution of morality, but is, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this volume, relevant for decision-making at individual, structural, and political levels. At the individual level, wisdom works alongside other virtues in order to make clear what it means to act justly, or what it means to love with true compassion. It is also part and parcel of what acting according to conscience looks like, and so in that case, is like the compass needle in the moral life, pointing in the direction that is going to lead to the common good as well as helping to shape what that common good might entail in different communities. To put this succinctly, wisdom, as practical wisdom, helps get judgements right. There is a rich theological background to wisdom thinking in a theology of creation,' and in the Hebrew Bible wisdom is capable of both being taught and learned through the experience of living in families. If the arguments of this book are correct, then human wisdom is also developed through the way our lives have been

and are interlaced with those of other life forms in general and other animals in particular. Many of those living in indigenous communities could be said to be exemplars of wisdom in the way that nothing is wasted, there is appropriate reverence for other animals and their agency, and ecological dynamics of human activity are taken into account.

Fifth, finding ways of appropriating the insights of indigenous communities into forms that make sense to the Western world can be challenging. I have suggested the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold points the way in this respect, in that he offers an alternative approach to the philosophy of life that both takes account of Darwinian forms of evolutionary biology and yet holds lightly to its implications. For him, evolution is also caught up with a dynamic interlacing process that is like a minor key in an overall musical score that makes up the evolutionary history of human life. The insights of Paul Ricoeur are also useful for a multispecies ethics, especially in so far as he provides, from a philosophical perspective, (a) ways of considering institutional aspects of the moral life that can sometimes be missed out in a virtue approach, and (b) a theoretical basis for the importance of considering the other in relationship as integral to the moral life. Both of these ingredients are useful when considering what justice and compassion might look like in multispecies relationships.

Sixth, by promoting a multispecies approach to ethics I am not collapsing ethical distinctions between humans and other creatures, but situating our moral life in a broader multispecies framework. Drawing particularly on the work of Ricoeur, I have tried to show how a multispecies framework might impinge on justice understood through individual decision-making and within human institutions as well. While it is obvious that no animal other than humans develops collective institutions, that should not be a sufficient reason for the exclusion of animals from moral considerability within those human institutions. I have argued, in particular, that recognizing personhood that is already in evidence in many different animals can be supported theologically through a particular interpretation of Trinitarian theology as well as through ethnographic observations. I have not specified which animals could be considered personal, as that would depend on the specific cultural frameworks in each multispecies community. In Western societies we are more likely to be open to considering our companion animals or domesticated animals personal, but this category will vary from one culture to the next.

Given the enormous variety of different ethical issues that arise in humanity's relationship with other beings, especially other animals, I will focus for the remainder of this conclusion on a very brief commentary on a couple of specific examples as a way of illustrating how a multispecies ethic that takes account of justice, compassion, and wisdom elements might be played out in practice in the specific context of Western, industrialized societies.' What I do not do here is work out more precisely the ways in which this might converge or diverge from alternative animal rights positions, for example. My own sense is that some will find a multispecies framework more convincing compared with animal rights, and if both ethical frameworks converge in their policy recommendations, then that should be welcomed, rather than resisted.

Agricultural Practice and Vegetarianism

The habit of forgetting humanity's dense multispecies relationship with other animals is nowhere more obvious than in the practice of farm animals reared in concentrated feeding lots. Such practices immediately raise the issue of animal suffering and the presence of human toleration of cruelty. A multispecies approach, in recognizing the shared space between human beings and domesticated animals, actively resists cruel forms of animal farming and so would support campaigns both to stop this practice and to introduce alternative methods. Second, such farming methods impinge on those migrant workers who are exploited and often at high risk of contracting disease, given the extent of excrement in the air in such conditions. Third, consideration of wider ecological questions demonstrates the extent to which methane production is elevated under these conditions, as well as

environmentally destructive nitrogen levels in the run-off water that also impacts negatively on the quality of drinking water.' On all fronts, justice, compassion, and wisdom are violated: for those working in unhealthy conditions, for the animals themselves, and in the wider impact on other living forms. More broadly still, the impact on climate change then has the potential to damage the livelihoods of predominantly the poorest communities of the world, though eventually that impact will be felt by everyone in future generations.' Tackling this issue, however, is also related to the need for structural and political reform and for just institutions as well as individual actions, such as limiting the quantity of meat eating, positively choosing to consume only those animals who have been reared in cruelty free conditions, and avoiding all factory farmed food.

A rather more ambiguous and difficult question is the extent to which a multispecies approach obliges a firm commitment to vegetarianism or veganism. I remain unconvinced by arguments that use the biblical text of Genesis as a direct reference point for such an ethic, not least because the Bible is ambiguous in this regard, and in the New Testament the practice of eating meat was not challenged. Recognition of the interlaced societies that make up multispecies communities certainly gives pause for thought on the extent to which human societies have become reliant on animal protein for their nourishment when there are viable alternatives available. The multiple effects of over-consumption on habitats, on climate change, and on those living in poverty all need to be taken into account. If there is an acknowledgement that all animals are in a shared community, including humans, then those in richer nations of the world who already consume to excess have a clear obligation to drastically cut their meat consumption and to avoid any practices that are indifferent to animal cruelty. My own view is that veganism is a desired goal towards asceticism more generally, rather than a strictly obligatory practice in

Conservation Ethics and Biodiversity

Even those most committed to animal welfare still admit that some kind of value scale needs to be introduced when there are conflicts of interest. Conservation ethics generally takes two approaches: one that is preservationist or conservationist. Nature preservationists aim to protect 'natural' areas of wildlife from any interference, at least as far as it is ever possible to achieve such a goal. Social conservationists argue for greater management of wildlife, wilderness, and other natural assets for the sake of human benefit. Arguments for the former believe that biodiversity loss (including genes, populations, and landscapes) requires strictly protecting areas from human interference, especially as that loss due to human influences is a thousand fold higher in comparison with estimates of 'background' loss." However, the vision of protected areas as a fortress against the ravages of human interference is much more difficult to sustain in practice due to complex social and political challenges in these areas.

More integrated approaches that seek to combine human development projects with conservation have largely failed to deliver benefits in tandem: for example, in the Ranomafana National Park in Madagascar, forest clearing has continued and revenue from tourism has not yet reached the local population. The split between those who view conservation goals as a means to address social ends, such as the alleviation of poverty, economic development, and political participation, and those who view those goals as distracting from the central mission of protecting areas for the sake of biodiversity conservation and human induced species extinctions is still very much in evidence. For nature preservationists, sustainable development is not just rejected, but a threat to the aim of biodiversity preservation. Indigenous arguments suggest that sustainable development projects are a politically imposed (and some would say colonial) agenda.

This opens up an important question of how best to act when specific vulnerable species are under threat of extinction. Holmes Rolston notoriously argued in favour of endangered and threatened species in his discussion of Nepal's Chitwan National Park (CNP), a UNESCO world heritage site

that protects one-horned rhinos (Rhinocereos unicronis) and Panthera tigris. A malaria eradication programme resulted in a higher population density, pushing the threatened species to near extinction in less than a decade. Those writing from an indigenous perspective strongly objected to Rolston's position." A multispecies approach will try to resolve such conflicts by taking account of the needs of the local indigenous communities as well as those of the various threatened species in the health of a whole system, rather than pitching one against the other. Many anthropological research papers have shown how disease crosses species boundaries, so that investigating the spread of disease by confining attention to human subjects simply will not work." So, in difficult situations where human communities and the health of species are under threat, much greater efforts need to go into trying to understand the interaction between the transfer of disease between different species and what makes the whole system resilient."

Envisaging a multispecies community as integral to human wellbeing means not just taking account of the health of an ecosystem, but also the particular paths to flourishing for each species within that system, especially other sentient animals with whom humanity is capable of entering into intimate relationships. As humanity dawned, so did consciousness of the divine, and this book has, to a large extent, deliberately refrained from detailed theological work except where it is particularly helpful for the arguments I am making. In the introductory chapter to this volume I presented a brief theology of wisdom, which is inclusive of knowledge from other sources, especially the natural and social sciences. As I move through the two volumes that follow, that theological articulation will gradually become stronger and more explicit. I hope that theologians will be patient in tolerating this strategy, and that others will sense that regardless of one's religious starting point there is something to gain through multidisciplinary frameworks of thinking.

I am acutely aware of the gaps in my argument in this first volume, and I can only hope to tackle some of these gaps in future work. One of the major ones is the difficult and troubling issue of natural suffering, disease, and death in the evolutionary record and in current ecological frameworks. How is that suffering also related to specific tendencies in human societies that work against moral goods? Where does human cruelty come from? Where do dispositions for different aspects of what was traditionally known as vice arise from? Is the doctrine of original sin still compatible with evolutionary accounts or not? Is there a distorted form of wisdom that connects the different vices together, just as wisdom informs all the virtues? Does a focus on vice help to enlarge an understanding of what virtues mean, as some writers in the early church supposed? How might vice come to be expressed in structural ways institutionally as well as individually? These and other related questions are left unanswered in this volume, but it is my intention to develop them in more detail in Volume 2. <>

SHADOW SOPHIA: EVOLUTION OF WISDOM, VOLUME 2 by Celia E. Deane-Drummond [Oxford University Press, 9780198843467]

Engages with evolutionary and psychological theories in mapping the origin of tendencies to act in ways that correspond to traditional theological teaching on vice, especially the seven deadly sins and develops a theology of wisdom (shadow sophia) that explores the origin of sin and a deeper understanding of the virtues in the light of a Thomistic understanding of moral agency

Why do humans who seem to be exemplars of virtue also have the capacity to act in atrocious ways? What are the roots of tendencies for sin and evil? A popular assumption is that it is our animalistic natures that are responsible for human immorality and sin, while our moral nature

curtails and contains such tendencies through human powers of freedom and higher reason. This book challenges such assumptions as being far too simplistic. Through a careful engagement with evolutionary and psychological literature, Celia Deane-Drummond argues that tendencies towards vice are, more often than not, distortions of the very virtues that are capable of making us good. After beginning with Augustine's classic theory of original sin, the book probes the philosophical implications of sin's origins in dialogue with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Different vices are treated in both individual and collective settings in keeping with a multispecies approach. Areas covered include selfishness, pride, violence, anger, injustice, greed, envy, gluttony, deception, lying, lust, despair, anxiety, and sloth. The work of Thomas Aquinas helps to illuminate and clarify much of this discussion on vice, including those vices which are more distinctive for human persons in community with other beings. Such an approach amounts to a search for the shadow side of human nature, shadow *sophia*. Facing that shadow is part of a fuller understanding of what makes us human and thus this book is a contribution to both theological anthropology and theological ethics.

Provides a constructive approach to biosocial moral evolution through engagement with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur

CONTENTS

Taking Soundings: An Introduction to Background Themes in Theology and the Evolution of Im(morality)
1. Original Sin
2. Paul Ricoeur on Evil
3. Selfishness and Pride
4. Violence and Cruelty
5. Anger and Injustice
6. Greed, Envy, and Gluttony
7. Deception, Lying, and Lust
8. Despair, Anxiety, and Sloth
The Search for Shadow Sophia
Afterword: Redeeming Sin
Bibliography
Index

This is the second part of a three-part trilogy on wisdom's evolution, which itself draws on an earlier monograph, The Wisdom of the Liminal. The first volume presents the case for a multispecies approach to animal ethics in preference to animal rights, drawing on evolutionary aspects of the human capacity for wisdom that I argue exists in close relationship with a growing capacity for compassion, love, and justice. This second volume tackles what could be called the shadow side of morality in deep time, which I am naming shadow sophia—evil, guilt, and the propensity to sin. I will argue that this shadow side, although difficult in some respects to ponder, reveals more clearly the meaning of different virtues by identifying their associated vices. The third volume will track what this evolving morality looks like through a theological lens by focusing on the distinctive ability of Homo to reach for the transcendent and by considering the theologically resonant virtues of faith, hope, and charity, as well as gratitude, humility, and grace. The third volume will also explore humanity's relationship with technology, including the secular reach to the transcendent that is becoming popular in transhumanist philosophies and often understood as the next trajectory in human evolution.

Here, in Volume II, I consider the key virtue of wisdom discussed in the first volume, but now with an explicit reference to the distortion of practical wisdom and its repercussions. I am fully aware of the distinction that Thomas Aquinas makes between the virtues of prudence (practical wisdom) and wisdom. In some respects, this book is about how the distortion or lack of both virtues, especially prudence, opens the door to the development of different vices. I am also aware that there are

many different interpretative traditions in Thomistic thought and I am not attempting to contribute to the largely internal Thomistic debates about his significance for the moral life.' Rather, I draw on his methodological insights on prudence and wisdom, in particular, as integral to a more constructive task of engaging with theology, philosophy, and the human sciences when facing bigger questions about the human tendencies to sin. Augustine of Hippo's influential notion of original sin, Paul Ricoeur's discussion of the symbolism of evil, and Ignatius of Loyola's account of the negative aspects of desolation as opposed to consolation are significant in this discussion. I critique an approach to vice that portrays animality as the primary source of the human propensity for sin, while avoiding an overly romantic approach to the social lives of animals. As in the first volume, I argue for the importance of a multispecies approach to ethics, though to some extent this aspect fades into the background.

The dominant interpretation of modernity, as discussed in the work of Charles Taylor,' is that modernity is, to an extent, a movement of scientific reasoning that has attempted to liberate humanity from the natural world in order to create its own history. Paradoxically, this view is now challenged by the narrative of the Anthropocene which has its conceptual roots in geological science. Even if that narrative is regarded as both a construction and a reference to geological data, envisaging humanity as dis-embedded becomes rather more difficult to justify. Humans are now no longer free from the ties of the natural world, but their collective activities of what is sometimes termed slow violence are leading to a major disruption of the Earth System and the extinction of numerous species. Ironically, perhaps, just at the time when it would be important to take our incarnation in the world seriously, at least some transhumanist philosophies press for a gnostic separation of mind in a mechanistic rather than organic posthuman future. Such confusing cultural currents require, I suggest, a much closer look at where our deepest desires stem from and what might lead humanity to act negatively or positively. Both (a) the so-called climate emergency, with its associated mass extinction of thousands of species, human migration, and cultural disruptions, and (b) the prospect of artificial intelligence and silicon posthuman futures present immense challenges. Both will inevitably need to face the risks associated with human weakness, failure, and sin. Both entail a significant impact on the earth on which we live, thus confounding the traditional categories of natural and moral evil and necessitating a closer examination of the role of collective, structural evil.

This blurring between human and natural evil in its individual and collective expression is complex, but shows in an important way why an adequate understanding of sin that takes account of humanity's relationships with the natural world is so critical. This book is an attempt to identify the origins of the drive for human sin by exploring philosophical, theological, and scientific explanations. It is, of course, my own interpretation of what this kind of synthesis might look like. However, my argument deliberately weaves back and forth, with some chapters focusing more on the theological or philosophical aspects and others more on psychology or evolutionary theories. My hope is that readers will have looked at the first volume as a prelude to this one, even though this book invites readers to enter into the darker side of human nature, which was mostly unexplored in the IL first volume. Looking at this darker side forces philosophical and theological aspects to the surface in a way that was not quite so prominent in the first volume. Such an elaboration opens up, for example, broader questions about the darker side of creation as such, tenebrae creationis, which comes to the surface in theological discussions about the meaning of Christology and deep incarnation.

Trying to understand this dark side is also, I believe, ultimately illuminating for the human condition. Such illumination about ways forward, including tendencies to act positively through religious belief and through secular alternatives discussed by transhumanists, will form the topic of Volume III.

I open this book with an introduction that presents a discussion of awareness of shame in hunter-gatherer communities, as discussed in the work of Christopher Boehm, and how such experiences are interpreted within that community. In so far as shame suggests some manner of moral awareness regarding good and evil, I next consider attempts within the Western intellectual tradition to explain the existence of evil. Theodicy, in particular, is one such attempt to reconcile the existence of a good God with the presence of evil in the world; moreover, theodicy raises questions about how shame and conscience might reflect awareness of a divine presence. After this, I introduce the traditional idea, which many virtue ethicists seem to have forgotten, that one can only understand how to act rightly in the context of what it means to act wrongly. Exploring the difficult topic of vice, as Saint Climacus did in the seventh century, is therefore a crucial endeavour in order to truly grasp the meaning of virtue.

Given the influence of Augustine not only on Western Christendom, but on wider Western culture more broadly, the first chapter explores his particular interpretation of sin as original sin. His work is interesting because he tries to explain the origin of sin in relation to biologically significant events, that is, through sex. It is also interesting because his insistence on the historicity of Adam and Eve has hamstrung discussion between theologians and evolutionary biologists. My own interpretation of the Fall of humanity will reject aspects of Augustine's view in the interests of consonance, but argue for a retention of what could be termed the intent behind his understanding of the origin of evil.

Working out the significance of evil and its roots cannot be done adequately without proper attention to philosophy, and for that task I turn in Chapter 2 to the work of Paul Ricoeur. His work is appealing because he rejects too sharp a separation between humanity and the rest of the natural world, while at the same time recognizing the distinctive contribution of humanity. His analysis of evil helps to crystallize the ways in which humans are distinct in their capacity to sin, most specifically in his discussion of free will, and he also tracks the important cultural milieu of the discussion on the capacity to sin through explicit practical notions such as defilement. Yet, while his interpretation makes Augustine's work relevant for contemporary culture, it is not beyond critique from a theological perspective.

Given that I have opened this book with a discussion of Augustine's understanding of sin, in Chapter 3 I deal with the tendency towards selfishness and pride. It is of interest that this disposition has also been taken up among biologists who, although they frame a discussion of selfishness in terms of conservation of genes, regularly seem to assume that self-interest is the default position of individuals in a population. I explore Mary Midgley's critique of Richard Dawkins' theory of the selfish gene, which, while somewhat outdated in scientific terms, still influences public debate. I also explore the relationship between sin, pride, and free will as laid out in Augustine's work. I argue against his view that virtuous behaviour among unbelievers cannot be named virtue at all, but amounts to forms of pride (superbia). I compare theological interpretations of pride with those laid out in contemporary psychology in order to arrive at some tentative conclusions.

Debates about how far and to what extent humanity, in its basic sense, is characterized by peacemaking or warmongering goes back to the early seventeenth century, particularly the discussions between Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the basic state of human nature. At stake is the question about whether humanity is fundamentally good or bad. What is interesting is that such discussions influenced anthropological interpretations that, in turn, had wider cultural impacts. While violence is endemic to animal societies in general, warfare is distinctly human, but neither are as prevalent as sometimes supposed. In Chapter 4, I take up these discussions in the light of more recent evolutionary anthropological research that explores archaeological evidence for the origins of organized violence in human societies. Tracing the deeper origins of such tendencies is challenging, but one piece of the puzzle includes a closer look at primate forms of aggression and

violence, while recognizing divergence from a common ancestor with humans was between seven and eight million years ago.

This discussion on violence raises the important issue of where the motivation for such violent and cruel acts originates in the human mind, while recognizing evolutionary or other pressures that might encourage such tendencies. In as much as anger arises from situations that are considered unjust or unfair it can readily spill over into a desire to retaliate, thus escalating violence. Aggression in social psychology is not necessarily understood as negative, while anger in the realm of moral psychology is understood in such terms. I try and work out in Chapter 5 ways in which anger and aggression can be understood as not just pathological in psychological terms, but also sinful from a theological perspective. My main interlocutor for this theological analysis is Thomas Aquinas, whose moral psychology spans many volumes. While his work continues to be influential in Protestant as well as Roman Catholic theological traditions, detailed treatment of his analysis of the different vices is often neglected. I also discuss ways in which God can be described as being full of anger and wrath and how theologians have tried to come to terms with such assertions.

In Chapter 6, I move from anger as a sin to other tendencies which can motivate harm to self or others, specifically greed, envy, and gluttony. Greed is one of the more interesting vices in so far as it has often been described in evolutionary psychology as an asset rather than a detriment to the individual. In contrast, the Christian tradition has viewed greed (often translated as avaritia) as a particularly pernicious vice. One of the reasons for this pernicious view is the idea that such desire—for wealth, for example—distracts the believer from desire for God, and so amounts to idolatry. How are such conflicting accounts to be reconciled or understood? Envy focuses on the goods of others that are desired for the self, while gluttony is more about self-indulgence, which in earlier traditions included drunkenness. Gluttony is rarely considered a vice in contemporary Western culture, given politically correct notions about the need to affirm different body shapes. But given the disparities in global wealth along with prevenient tendencies towards luxury of all kind, the need for ascetism becomes relevant once more. This is particularly the case when considering the global challenges arising from overaccumulation such as an elevated carbon footprint and its associated anthropogenic climate change, species devastation due to habitat loss, and extreme poverty.

The temptation to deceive is also intriguing as its basic ingredients seem to be common to the natural world. What is specifically distinctive about human deception and how might it be understood? Deceiving in human societies becomes explicit in the capacity to lie. This tendency is relevant not just for individuals, but also in socio-political terms. In Chapter 7, I explore the evolutionary psychology of deception and discuss some of the philosophical and theological dimensions of lying. I will argue for a biocultural explanation for the emergence of lying in human societies, while recognizing that the extent to which human communities engage in complex forms of deception is unique. Theologians have debated about whether it is ever morally permissible to lie in situations where it would protect the life of another or in self-defence. I assess the merits of these and other arguments, drawing the chapter to a close with a discussion of where deception has been used to gain sexual goods. That drive to deceive for sexual aims is related to the theological tradition of lust. I elaborate further on what lust might mean for contemporary theology and how this relates back to an Augustinian association of sexuality and sin.

My final main chapter deals with the shadow side of human nature related to despair, anxiety, and sloth. Like many other human emotions, it is possible to recognize something like despondency or anxiety in other social animals. However, despair implies a greater consciousness of transcendence than is possible for other species and is one reason why theologians and philosophers such as Soren Kierkegaard consider anxiety and despair integral to the human condition. In fact, Kierkegaard

frames anxiety as the driving force behind the first sin rather than selfishness, pride, greed, or lust. Ignatius of Loyola was among one of a number of mystics who sought to explore the experience of desolation, though he urged against his followers succumbing to despair. In addition, the monastic communities warned against the vice of sloth or acedia, which they named the `demon', so convinced were they of its negative impact on the spiritual life. This theological understanding of acedia is far richer than its secular interpretation as mere laziness.

In the concluding remarks, I come back to the notion of distorted forms of wisdom through an exploration of folly as well as vices opposed to prudence. Given that many of the vices tackled in this book also have transcendent as well as transactional importance, folly is the correct term to use as, following Aquinas, this implies that something more than just practical incompetence or distorted prudence is at stake. I suggest that Aquinas is hinting here at evil more generally, which relates to wisdom understood as competency in our relationship with God. This shadow side of human nature has come to the surface in each of the different vices explored, be it in their individual or collective form. It is, therefore, with some justification that we can say that the world in which humanity is born is, as Sergii Bulgakov would claim, a mixture of experiences of both creaturely sophia and shadow sophia.

***

This book is a continuation of the broad quest set forth in the first volume in this series, namely, a search for wisdom and its significance for the moral life through a multidimensional approach to human tendencies for good or ill set in the broadest context of a multispecies framework. Wisdom is an extremely difficult concept to grasp, not least because it eludes clear definition; or rather, through attempting such definition something of its complexity is lost. However, wisdom in the most fundamental sense is concerned with skills relevant to sociality, to relationships. When applied to practical tasks relating to the world, wisdom takes shape as the virtue of practical wisdom; in theological interpretations, when directed to knowledge of the divine, the virtue is wisdom as such. I argued in the first volume that human wisdom, as a relational term, is not just concerned with human relationships among kin. What I tried to demonstrate was that the different elements in the evolution of wisdom are best thought of in interlaced ways through a complex and dynamic multispecies understanding of wisdom's emergence. Further, human compassion and justice, which are also important relational characteristics relevant for the moral life, share at least some baseline characteristics with our nearest primate relatives. Knowing what justice and compassion mean in different human cultural communities requires attention to culturally attuned wisdom. More importantly, perhaps, the potential for inequity aversion and other regard in other primates and socially advanced animals shows the possibility, at least, of their interaction with those human communities. In other words, those human communities develop forms of compassion, justice, and wisdom in accordance with their specific and culturally attuned norms. These norms, in turn, are shaped through dynamic interactions with each other and other beings and lead to the eventual establishment of social institutions. The discussion of more specific theological aspects was left somewhat in the background in the first volume. In the quest for understanding practical wisdom I also attempted to map out the different elements of morality that are relevant to the way practical wisdom is best conceived. The task had practical implications as well since it showed forth a different way of considering theological ethics as well as animal ethics.

Rather than focus on via positiva the present volume tackles instead via negativa, that is, trying to discover more about wisdom through consideration of what it is not. Given the complexity of wisdom, the possible vices associated with its lack are legion, but in the course of this discussion there are important theological and theoretical issues to consider as prolegomena to more detailed attention to specific vices. This introduction provides such prolegomena. In the background to this

discussion is the way theodicies have relied too heavily on a reasoned and abstract account of why sin is present in the world, such as a free will philosophical defence.

***

The first important theoretical issue in addressing questions about the roots of moral and natural evil relates to theodicy in discussions that have occupied religious believers for many centuries. If God as Creator is divine Goodness and Wisdom, then how can there be suffering, pain, death, evil, and sin in the created world? From a logical point of view raising this question presupposes belief in God's goodness or, at minimum, God's justice. This raises another question of how religions and religious rituals are most likely to have arisen and what those religions promoted in terms of normative social behaviour. I can only touch briefly on this question in the present context.

Robert Bellah traces the origin of religion to rituals which arise out of what he calls 'serious play', where play behaviour is characteristic of social animals more broadly.' The way social animals play, however, seems to represent at least a liminal expression of a sense of fairness,' though Bellah does not comment specifically on this aspect of the connection between religious ritual and animal play. Justice, in so far as it is about right relationships, is also, in the broadest possible sense, about addressing evil, pain, and suffering in the world. The earliest form of interpreting suffering in many religious traditions was through an understanding that suffering was justified because God or the gods were simply paying back humanity for sins committed by the individual concerned or by earlier generations. <>

THE UNKNOWN GARDEN OF ANOTHER'S HEART: THE SURPRISING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN C.S. LEWIS AND ARTHUR GREEVES by Joseph A. Kohm Jr. [Wipf and Stock, 9781666710397]

In April of 1914, fifteen-year-old C. S. Lewis walked into a sick neighbor's bedroom for a visit. This neighbor, eighteen-year-old Arthur Greeves, was reading a book titled *Myths of the Norsemen.* Their meeting was a spark that would fan into a flame a friendship that lasted almost fifty years. Drawing on original research of the 296 letters written by Lewis to Greeves that span the life of their friendship, readers will explore the deep, emotional, and raw relationship of two dissimilar people where each unveiled himself to the other in ways they did with no one else. Embedded in this relationship is the trajectory of Lewis's faith journey, starting out as an arrogant skeptic and transforming into the greatest apologist of the last one hundred years. Readers will be drawn into this beautiful friendship and in turn become better friends to those around them.

Reviews

"If you want to see the meaning of true friendship in action, look no further than this inspiring book written by Joe Kohm! The lifelong, deep, and authentic correspondence between C. S. Lewis and his childhood friend, Arthur Greeves, is described beautifully by Kohm. New insights are here for fans of Lewis, scholars, and all who long for deeper relationships." --Joel Woodruff, President, C. S. Lewis Institute

"Joe Kohm has done us a great service by distilling hundreds of letters between two lifelong friends to give us deeper glimpses into their lives and the nature of friendship. Along the way, he explores the wonders of God's grace, the nature of Christian faith, and the joys of spiritual growth. This book showed me things about C. S. Lewis I had not realized before and made me want to deepen my

friendships." --Randy Newman, Senior Fellow for Apologetics and Evangelism, The C. S. Lewis Institute

"Kohm shows us what wonders ensue when one dares to cross a street to visit a sick neighbor. This exceptional work shows the secret garden of an abiding fifty-year friendship between Lewis and his homely and fascinating first friend, Arthur Greeves. Kohm chronicles how the mulch of letters fertilized key ideas and themes in Lewis's thought, providing a fresh and welcome narrative of the power of friendship as a road to knowing God." --Terry Lindvall, C. S. Lewis Chair of Communication and Christian Thought, Virginia Wesleyan University

CONTENTS

In April of 1914, a troubled fifteen-year-old boy, home for spring break from the school he hated, had just been given some good news. His father had informed him that he would only need to spend one more term at the school and then he would be allowed to leave and continue his education with the man who had tutored his older brother. Over the course of this young boy's short life, his older brother had been his only real friend. The two had grown up in a life of moderate affluence provided by their emotionally distant father, a solicitor. Their mother died of cancer in 1908, trampling the seeds of any faith in God the boy had. Growing up, both boys cocooned themselves in a life of books and drawing, creating their own imaginary world by bringing animals to life and calling their empire "Boxen." When the weather was fair, the brothers could explore the lush green hills of the Belfast, Ireland countryside.

Across the street lived a sickly young man of eighteen. Doctors told his parents when he was a small child that the boy had a heart condition. As a result, he lived a sedentary life, dropping out of formal schooling two years earlier. This afforded the young man the leisure of playing the piano, reading, and painting. His family ran a successful business converting material from flax plants into linen. The young man's father was stern, even "despotic," owing to the rigidity of the family's Plymouth Brethren faith. His mother was an enabler, trying to counteract the effects of his father's harshness. On this day, the young man was recovering from an illness and he inquired whether the boy across the street might be available to come visit him.

Up to this point, the boy and his older brother had attempted to avoid their neighbor "by every means in our power." Yet on this day his older brother was away, and for some reason he decided to visit his convalescing neighbor. Upon entering the sick neighbor's room, the boy saw a copy of the book Myths of the Norsemen. "Do you like that?" the boy asked. Sitting up in his bed, the other replied, "Do you like that?" With Norse mythology providing the tinder, this meeting would produce a spark that would fan into a flame a friendship lasting almost fifty years. The boy would later write of that first encounter with his sick neighbor, "I had been so far from thinking such a friend possible that I had never even longed for one; no more than I longed to be King of England."

By September 1963, the fifteen-year-old boy was now sixty-five and one of the world's most celebrated writers. In a little over two months, he would pass away at his home on the same very day as other world luminaries Aldous Huxley and United States President John F. Kennedy. Since that initial meeting with his sickly neighbor, he had fought in World War I, earned the academic distinction of a "Triple First" at Oxford, served both as a teaching fellow at Oxford's Magdalen College and as Professor of Medieval Renaissance English at Cambridge, appeared on the cover of Time magazine in the United States, published bestsellers in the genres of Christian apologetics, science fiction, and children's literature, and late in his life married a woman bed-ridden with cancer, who would eventually succumb to the disease four years later.

Now his health was deteriorating. He was largely confined to the first floor of his home on the outskirts of Oxford. Two years earlier, he was scheduled for an operation to address the issue of a distended prostate gland.4 Doctors were unable to proceed, as he also presented with a kidney infection and a weak heart. Two months earlier, he arrived at the same hospital for an examination relating to anemia and, moments after being admitted, he suffered a heart attack and slipped into a coma.5 Miraculously, he survived, and he returned home three weeks later to be joined there under the constant supervision of a night nurse and his personal secretary. Penning the last of his 296 letters addressed to that sickly young man over the span of nearly fifty years, the famous writer concludes, "But oh Arthur, never to see you again! . . . Yours Jack"

By now, the reader may have guessed the identity of one of the preceding individuals. C. S. Lewis is more popular now than ever before. His book Mere Christianity is arguably the most influential Christian work of the last one hundred years. Three of the seven books from the Chronicles of Narnia have been made into popular motion pictures. And on the fiftieth anniversary of his death, in 2013, Lewis was memorialized in Westminster Abby's Poets' Corner alongside such literary supernovas as Jane Austen and William Shakespeare.

Yet, who is the "Arthur" that C. S. Lewis laments he shall never see again? Arthur Joseph Greeves was born three and a half years earlier than Lewis on April 27, 1895, and lived across the road from the Lewis family. This book sets out to make the case that it was Arthur Greeves—not Owen Barfield, not J. R. R. Tolkien, and not even Lewis's brother Warnie—who was C. S. Lewis's best friend. The first of the 296 letters we have from Lewis to Arthur is from June 1914, and the last, referenced above, is dated September 11, 1963. Between these bookends, the remaining letters spanning nearly fifty years serve as an unrefracted light illuminating the life of C. S. Lewis, sometimes with shocking revelations. Those who want to see the unvarnished Lewis, warts and all, must begin here. In addition to the beautiful narrative of a fifty-year friendship, these letters lay out the trajectory of Lewis's faith journey from atheist to world-renowned apologist, ultimately and most importantly evincing a thoroughly transformed life. Conversely, readers are able to witness the almost opposite trajectory of Arthur Greeves's faith journey. Walter Hooper, who has served as the literary advisor to the Lewis estate since 1964, and who has been to Lewis what James Boswell was to Samuel Johnson, has written, "considering the intimacy and informality of their long friendship, I believe these letters may be as close as we shall ever get to Lewis himself."

Some may wonder, "Where are all the letters from Arthur Greeves to C. S. Lewis?" There are two possible explanations of why only four letters from Arthur to C. S. Lewis remain. The first is that Lewis simply may not have retained them. Letter-writing took up a substantial portion of Lewis's day. "Oh the mails: every bore in two continents seems to think I like getting letters. One's real friends are precisely the people one never gets time to write to," Lewis complains to Dorothy Sayers. Lewis, however, felt it was his duty to respond to each one. "I always answer fan-mail," he begins one letter, responding to an American admirer. Lewis further elaborates on the situation regarding his mail in a letter to Arthur where he explains that in the "aftermath of those Broadcast Talks I gave early last summer I had an enormous pile of letters from strangers to answer. One gets funny letters after broadcasting – some from lunatics who sign themselves 'Jehovah' or begin 'Dear Mr. Lewis, I was married at the age of 20 to a man I didn't love' – but many from serious inquirers whom it was a duty to answer fully. So letter writing has loomed pretty large!" With the enormous volume of correspondence Lewis received and sent out daily, he may have merely decided he didn't need the clutter.

A second and more likely explanation as to the letters from Arthur to C. S. Lewis concerns Lewis's brother, Warnie. Warnie was devastated by his brother's death. Shortly thereafter, he decided to move out of the Kilns, the home he had shared with his bother since 1930, and into a smaller residence. Prone to debilitating bouts of alcoholism, Warnie, Walter Hooper records, once "kept a bonfire of papers burning for three days." Shortly after Lewis's death, Hooper went out to the Kilns to check on Warnie and was able to rescue the four letters from Arthur before they, "Warren assured me, would have gone into the fire." Hooper surmises that it is entirely possible that if they existed, all other letters from Arthur to C. S. Lewis were incinerated in the three-day burn.

Fortunately, we are able to reconstruct much of the content and subject matter between the two from Lewis's letters alone. As a letter writer, even at an early age, Lewis habitually restated pertinent information from the last letter he received from the sender to build upon the content within the letter he was drafting. This literary device would serve him well later in his books that centered around the use of letters, such as The Screwtape Letters and Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer.

Located within the story of friendship between Lewis and Greeves that these 296 letters tell are all the major life events Lewis scholars and fans are familiar with. He writes to Arthur about his relationship with Janie Moore (mother of his friend Paddy Moore), on Warnie's chronic alcoholism, on his conversion to Christianity, on his marriage to Joy Davidman, and on his impending death, evincing why Walter Hooper makes the claim regarding these letters that those who really wish to know him will find the real Lewis within. Though it ebbed and flowed over the course of their respective lives, the relationship was indispensable tAo each. To the outsider, it would be reasonable to ask why Lewis, one of the most accomplished men of the twentieth century, would befriend, let alone be best friends with, someone like Arthur Greeves, who lived a very ordinary life. Who was Arthur Greeves, and why did he hold such a place in C. S. Lewis's heart that Lewis was once compelled to write, "when I come to die I am more likely to remember certain things that you and I have explored or suffered or enjoyed together than anything else."

Much of what is known about Arthur Greeves is attributable to both Warnie and C. S. Lewis. While Warnie's vocation was in the military, he was an accomplished author in his own right, publishing books on French history. He also devoted a significant effort to chronicling "The Memoirs of the Lewis Family: 1850– 1930," which ultimately produced eleven volumes with over three hundred pages each, containing letters, photographs, and other family documents. C. S. Lewis made two written contributions to the effort that are pertinent here. The first installment, recorded in 1933, paints an unflattering portrait of the Greeves family. He describes Greeves's father as "a harsh

husband and a despotic father." Greeves's mother had an outer veneer that was "simple, warm hearted," but underneath "a genuine streak of ill nature in her." After her husband's death, Lewis writes that "Her conversation came to consist more and more of a perpetual attempt, and a perpetual failure, to tell stories and riddles." Lewis notes that the family's faith was rooted in the Plymouth Brethren and that each of the family's five children ultimately abandoned that faith, with the result being that "their upbringing gave them no HUMANE tradition to turn to when once their theology was gone."

Arthur was the youngest of five children. Early in his life he was diagnosed with a bad heart. Unable to work, he lived as what would today be called a trust fund baby, as his family's flaxspinning business was prosperous. He achieved some success as a painter, studying at the Slade School of Fine Art in London as well as having his paintings exhibited with the Royal Hiberian Academy in Dublin.

Several years later, Lewis made another addition to "The Memoirs of the Lewis Family," this time focusing solely on Arthur. According to Lewis, Arthur tended "towards self-pity." He was also "the frankest of men," and "never showed any inclination to revenge himself." To his detriment, Arthur could easily be swayed to "adopt any canon of taste." Also, according to Lewis, Arthur failed to acquire the "visor to the human face," a characteristic embedded in men as a consequence of life's experience, resulting in an outward façade of toughness.

We can also learn about Arthur in his own words from the diaries he kept during 1917 and 1918 and then for a short period in 1922. These diaries are kept at the Marion E. Wade Center at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois. They reveal an anxious and lonely young man. Not being able to work, he describes his days as consisting of meeting various people for lunch, reading in the garden, having tea, and attending church. Evidence of C. S. Lewis's description of Arthur's father as "harsh" and "despotic" in "The Memoirs of the Lewis Family" are reflected in Arthur's entries regarding his father. A major point of contention seems to have been be Arthur's allowance. An entry from April 23, 1917, notes, "Talk with father, seems hopeless. I trust in God. All will turn out right." During the summer of 1922, Arthur pressed his father concerning a regular allowance but was rebuffed, with Arthur describing his father's response as "most unattractive to put it mildly – said certainly not." This entry concludes with Arthur writing that his father "shunned me as no Christian man – much less father would do."

Arthur's diary entries also reveal him attempting to make his faith his own. He was confirmed on June 10, 1917, in "stifling heat." He regularly records whether he had attended church, and various entries contain heartfelt mini-prayers such as, "Pray God I may keep pure minded." But one subject appears more than any other, and that is his friend Jack Lewis. There is a repetitive fixation on whether he received daily correspondence from Lewis. Arthur's diaries also coincide with Lewis's military service during World War I, where Lewis was seriously injured, and naturally Arthur displays a heightened level of concern for his friend.

Reading Arthur's diaries also show him to be intelligent and sensitive. For Lewis, the most attractive personal characteristic of Arthur's was rooted in what Lewis calls the "homely." Arthur's enjoyment of the ordinary was his sustenance. "A bright hearth seen through an open door as we passed, a train of ducks following a brawny farmer's wife, a drill of cabbages in a suburban garden – these were the things that never failed to move him, even to an ecstasy." In a 1931 letter to Arthur where Lewis informs him that he has "just passed on from believing in God to definitely believing in Christ – in Christianity," Lewis tells Arthur that "homeliness" was the chief lesson he learned from him and how this "homeliness" was an introduction to the Christian virtue of charity or love.

Lewis realized the power of friendship early in his life as a talisman against the brutality of the headmaster of Wynyard School, where he was sent at age ten to further his education, a mere four

weeks after his mother died. In his autobiography, Surprised by Joy, Lewis tags the Wynyard School with the moniker "Belsen" after the Nazi concentration camp. The headmaster, Robert Capron, administered relentless floggings, with Lewis reporting he witnessed Capron take running starts to deliver blows. One boy's parents brought an action against Capron for abuse, and he ultimately was committed to an asylum, where he died in 1911. Upon Lewis's arrival, there were approximately nine students who were boarding at the school, and another nine who were day students. As Capron's mental condition worsened, attendance dwindled until there were just five remaining boarders. It was within this remnant that Lewis found the strength to withstand his remaining days at Wynyard. "We stood foursquare against the common enemy. I suspect this pattern . . . has unduly biased my whole outlook. To this day the vision of the world which comes most naturally to me is one in which 'we two' or 'we few' (and in a sense 'we happy few') stand together against something stronger and larger."

The weight and importance Lewis placed on the idea of friendship led to one of the more significant relationships over the course of his life. England was engaged in World War I, and on June 8, 1917, Lewis joined the army. While billeted in Keble College, Oxford, he roomed with another Irishman named Edward Francis Courtney "Paddy" Moore. A few months later, Lewis spent his leave time at Paddy's home. It was there that he first met Paddy's mother, Janie King Moore. During this visit, Lewis and Paddy Moore promised each other that if one of them were killed in the war, the survivor would look after the other's parent. Sadly, Paddy Moore died in March 1918 when the Germans recaptured the French city of Peronne.

Lewis fulfilled his end of the bargain with Paddy. He was wounded in battle (by friendly fire) on April 15, 1918, and after his convalescence he lived with Mrs. Moore in Oxford from 1919 until her death on January 12, 1951. The general consensus among Lewis scholars is that he was both sexually and romantically involved with Mrs. Moore for an extended period of time.

After his conversion to Christianity, the nature of their relationship changed, with Lewis often referring to her in correspondence as his "Mother."33 Mrs. Moore had been previously married, then separated, but never divorced. Later in her life she suffered from dementia.34 Lewis dutifully cared for her at home for a period of time before placing her in a nursing home in the spring of 1950. Janie Moore died a few months later on January 12, 1951.

Those seeking to fully understand C. S. Lewis must understand the significance and weight he placed on the concept of friendship. The core of Lewis's beliefs regarding friendship was that it "must be about something." For Lewis, this meant, "Do you see the same truth?" When C. S. Lewis walked into Arthur Greeves's bedroom in the spring of 1914 and saw Arthur with Myths of the Norsemen, Lewis knew he and Arthur saw the same truth. Seeing this same truth was the foundation that their friendship was built upon. Seeing this same truth is what allowed, to the outside observer, an internationally known and accomplished intellectual like C. S. Lewis to be best friends with a relatively unknown and seemingly unaccomplished person like Arthur Greeves.

In addition to seeing the same truth, there was another factor in play that helps explain the friendship of C. S. Lewis and Arthur Greeves. It is a factor in all friendships and Lewis points it out in his book The Four Loves: "But for a Christian, there are, strictly speaking, no chances. A secret Master of Ceremonies has been at work. Christ, who said to the disciples 'Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,' can truly say to every group of Christian friends 'You have not chosen one another but I have chosen you for one another.'" When C. S. Lewis walked into Arthur's bedroom that spring morning in 1914, it was no mere accident, no mere chance. From the beginning of time, God had ordained their friendship, just as God has ordained all our friendships. The friendship between C. S. Lewis and Arthur is one of the many examples of "all things" working together for

good (Romans 8:28), the good here being that seventy years later readers are still learning from C. S. Lewis. <>

ANCIENT ANGELS: CONCEPTUALIZING ANGELOI IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE by Rangar Cline [Series: Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, Brill, 9789004194533]

Although angels are typically associated with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Ancient Angels demonstrates that angels (angeloi) were also a prominent feature of non-Abrahamic religions in the Roman era. Following an interdisciplinary approach, the study uses literary, inscriptional, and archaeological evidence to examine Roman conceptions of angels, how residents of the empire venerated angels, and how Christian authorities responded to this potentially heterodox aspect of Roman religion. The book brings together the evidence for popular beliefs about angels in Roman religion, demonstrating the widespread nature of speculation about, and veneration of, angels in the Roman Empire.

CONTENTS

Throughout the following study, I use the transliterated forms of the Greek word angelos (plural: angeloi) and its Latin equivalent, angelus (plural: angeli) when discussing ancient texts and inscriptions. I have chosen to use the Greek and Latin forms, rather than the standard English translation, "angel," in order to better illustrate the fluidity of meaning in the ancient terms. By maintaining the period-specific indigenous terminology I thus hope to avoid the imposition of an anachronistic terminological category. This approach is intended to more accurately reflect the religious views of the later Roman period rather than force such views to conform to religious and scholarly terminological categories of a later age, which would, by necessity, come laden with their own connotations and prejudices. Because of the frequent use of the Greek word angelos throughout the book, I have chosen to use the transliterated form, rather than the preserve the Greek characters, in order to make the book more accessible to those readers who may be less comfortable with the Greek alphabet. Otherwise, when discussing specific Greek texts, I have opted to preserve the Greek alphabet and present the Greek text with an English translation.

Although there have been recent studies of angels in early Christian and early Jewish theology, recent studies of the Christian representations of angels, thorough studies of individual Christian archangels, and valuable (though dated) encyclopedic studies of angels, this work is unique in its interdisciplinary approach to angeloi veneration as a religious practice common to several religious traditions in late antiquity contributing to what, in time, the Christian authorities defined as an orthodox cult of angels. The method of the present book is a departure from the approach of earlier studies that compared early Christian beliefs about angels with non-Christian and non-Jewish beliefs about various deities. Such early studies are perhaps best exemplified in G. F. Hill's 1916 article, "Apollo and St. Michael: Some Analogies." Hill's method was to identify some of the features of cult of Michael the Archangel, namely that he was viewed as a healer, a causer of plague, and sometimes associated with springs, and point out that Apollo was also viewed as a healer, a causer of plague, and sometimes associated with springs. There are critical flaws in Hill's method. Perhaps most significant is the lack of attention that his study pays to chronology. For example, Hill compares stories of Apollo from the Archaic and Classical Periods with stories of the miracles of St. Michael from the early Byzantine Period, the late Middle Ages, and the Early Modern Period. Thus, Hill's study reveals a tendency—also found in the works of other scholars of his era—to ignore chronological context in religious comparisons, a tendency that has been fairly and thoroughly criticized by J. Z. Smith. Implicit in Hill's argument is that somehow the cult of Michael absorbed some aspects of the cult of Apollo. However, Hill does not explain how this process worked, and pointing out that both Christian and pagans believed in the ability of supernatural beings to heal the sick and cause disease is not especially revelatory. Cyril Mango undertook this sort of comparison with more success in his1984 study of Michael and Attis.8 Mango's study was concerned with specific sites and particular moments in history when Michael and Attis could be confused. Thus, by its attention to historical and geographic context, his study avoided some of the pitfalls of Hill's earlier work.

While Mango's study was better conceived and executed than Hill's, both represent variations on a similar method of studying angels in early Christianity: that of comparing a particular pagan deity with a particular Christian archangel. This book follows a different method. The present book examines the conceptualization and veneration of angeloi in various non-Christian and non-Jewish contexts from ca. 150 to ca. 450 CE and the reaction of Christian authorities to various conceptions of angeloi and different forms of angelos veneration and invocation. Thus, the present study's approach bears some similarities to that of Franz Cumont's 1915 "Les anges du paganisme" or A. R. R. Sheppard's 1981 "Pagan Cults of Angels in Roman Asia Minor." However, unlike Cumont's and Sheppard's studies, this book does not attempt to trace religious influence in one direction or another. Nor does the book identify a corrupting outside influence on some pristine version of Christianity, Judaism, or one the Graeco-Roman religions, as other studies of late antique religion have attempted to do. Rather, this study examines angelos veneration as a religious phenomenon in the Roman Empire that took different forms in different regions and different religious and cultural contexts at a particular time. The evidence, when examined in this way, reveals the widespread popularity of venerating and invoking entities called angeloi (Latin: angeli) in distinct and divergent religious traditions in the Roman Empire. This method of inquiry also reveals the manner in which a shared terminology for angeloi facilitated Christians' attempts to communicate their ideas about such beings to non-Christians and likewise complicated Christian attempts to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of angelos veneration.

At every stage of this project, I have been asked by interested discussants some version of the following question: "What is the difference between angels and saints? Aren't they both called 'saint'?" In answer to this question: there are similarities between the cult of the saints and the veneration of angels. Some of those similarities are superficial, such as the title hagios/sanctus,

"Saint" for the archangels. Others are more significant, such as the intermediary role assigned to both angels and saints. In part because of this shared intermediary role, there are some ritual similarities between the early Christian veneration of the saints and the veneration of angels. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, some locations were associated with angels and thus prayers to angels were considered to be more efficacious in those locations. There are also specific sites associated with the ritual power of the saints, as is well known. However there is an important difference between angelos veneration and the cult of the saints. The veneration of angeloi did not focus on physical remains of a person or the detritus of their earthly life, as angels were believed never to have existed in physical bodies. One exception to this observation appears to be the third-century invocation of the tutelary angeloi of particular men and women, who were associated with the graves of such persons, as discussed in Chapter 4. Peter Brown's classic study of the rise of the cult of the saints, and Kimberly Bowes's and Ann Marie Yasin's more recent studies of the relationship between relics, ecclesiastical politics, and church space illustrate that the physical remains of the saint's life were crucial for establishing the praesentia the saint. The praesentia of angels was manifested in other ways, such as through natural springs, wells, fountains, and stories of angelophanies. In addition, the praesentia of angels could be effected through the proper ritual formulas, use of amulets, and inscribed invocations. In addition, as the following chapters illustrate, the veneration of angeloi existed in a number of distinct and divergent Roman-era religious traditions, including (but not limited to) Christianity and Judaism. Thus, while this is demonstrably not a study of the Christian cult of saints and martyrs, the following chapters present and discuss evidence for the ritual context in which such early Christian concepts and practices developed.

The Words of Angels

On the Via Appia outside of Rome there is an extensive network of catacombs and tombs collectively called the Catacombs of Praetextatus, after an early Bishop of Rome. A visitor to the Catacombs of Praetextatus will find wall paintings that depict scenes familiar from Christian tradition, such as Christ with a crown of thorns and Susanna from the book of Daniel. The visitor will also find thousands of Christian burials and reminders of Christian suffering in the face of persecution. While quite remarkable, none of this would be too surprising for the visitor. This is what one expects to find in a Christian catacomb. However, if the visitor should journey nearby, to one of the older underground tombs built in the late second and third centuries, he or she could come upon the tomb of Vincentius and his wife Vibia. There, the visitor would see a depiction of the deceased Vibia being led to a banquet in the afterlife. The visitor would also see a man identified by an inscription as an Angelus Bonus, or "Good Angel," leading Vibia to the feast. A first glance, the scene could be a Christian one; a figure identified as an angelus is leading a pious woman to a blessed afterlife. However, if the visitor looked more closely, he or she would notice that in other scenes Vibia is escorted by the god Mercury, and that her husband Vincentius is a priest of Sabazius. What at first glance appeared to be a Christian scene of angelic escort to the afterlife is in fact not Christian at all. The visitor might feel some confusion, as some scholars have when viewing the images. What is an angelus doing in a pagan painting? The confusion would be understandable because most viewers would associate such beings with Christianity and Judaism, or, in a later period, Islam.

Nevertheless, the images and the title angelus bonus are there, and there is other evidence for the belief in angeli in non-Christian and non-Jewish contexts in the Roman era as well. The evidence comes from later Roman literary sources, artistic depictions like that described above, Greek and Latin inscriptions, engraved amulets, and inscribed votives. These objects are sometimes explicitly non-Christian, sometimes they may be Jewish, and sometimes they are religiously ambiguous, like the title Angelus Bonus in the Catacomb of Vincentius. Literary evidence indicates that there was considerable discussion among Roman-era philosophers concerning the nature of angeli (Greek:

angeloi) and their relationship to a supreme god in the second century ce and afterwards. We know of this discussion from the texts of the philosophers themselves and from the works of Christian theologians who attempted to distinguish between orthodox Christian beliefs about angeli and the beliefs of their pagan opponents.

The literary and archaeological evidence indicates that angeli (angeloi) were a significant aspect of religion in the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, few readers will associate angeli with Roman religion. The present study attempts to change that by showing that such beings should be associated with later Roman religion. In order to do so, the following chapters present several case studies that examine the archaeological and literary evidence for angeli in later Roman religion and the manner in which Christian authorities sought to define orthodox Christian conceptions of angeli and establish the proper manner for Christians to call upon, pray to, or invoke an angelus. The study suggests that the prominence of angeli in early Christianity is due to the success of early Christian authorities in defining a system of orthodox Christian beliefs about, and attitudes towards, angeli that were distinct from non-Christian, and other Christian, beliefs about such beings.

Defining Angels

Before beginning a detailed examination of the evidence for the conceptualization and invocation of angeli/angeloi in the Roman Empire, it is necessary to discuss briefly the Greek word for angel, angelos, and its Latin transliteration, angelus. The word that later came to mean "angel" may seem like a term that needs little introduction. After all, many readers probably have some image in mind when they encounter the term, whether that image is a medieval depiction of the Archangel Michael slaying the dragon, or television's Michael Landon on an American highway. While both of these images fall within the range of the ancient term, the Greek word angelos can mean other things as well. Quite simply, angelos means messenger. In origin, the term does not necessarily denote a celestial being. For instance, Homer (ca. 700 BCE) uses angelos to describe the (human) messengers sent to Achilles, as well as the Greek heroes Patroclus and Tydeus when they act as messengers. Likewise, in the New Testament and Septuagint, the term angelos can refer to human messengers. For instance, the Gospel of Luke uses angelos to refer to the messengers of John the Baptist and the men that Jesus sent ahead of him to a Samaritan village. Similarly, the Septuagint Genesis uses angelos to refer to the messengers that Jacob sent to his brother Esau.

It is in this sense of a specific duty or task that Greek texts sometimes use angelos to describe the function of a particular deity or celestial being. For example, Homer calls the god Hermes an angelos, because he is a messenger who conveys the will of the gods. Likewise, Homer describes the messenger goddess Iris as an angele (the Greek feminine form of angel).[6] In the case of Homer's use of angelos, the word describes the roles of Hermes and Iris as messengers charged with communicating between the gods of Olympus and humans. However, in Homer, Hermes and Iris do not belong to a separate class of celestial beings known as an angeloi. Rather, Hermes and Iris are gods who submit to the will of Zeus and deliver messages for him. In submitting to the will of Zeus, they are not different from other Olympian deities. The title angelos in Homer, and in other early Greek texts, does not denote a special type of being, but a specific role of gods and humans.

By the second century CE, non-Christian Greek authors began using the word angelos in a more specifically celestial sense, and in later Roman texts and inscriptions, the word could denote a special class of celestial beings. As the case studies in the following chapters illustrate, angelos could describe a semi-divine being or a lesser god in the service of a supreme god, a manifestation of a supreme god, the soul after death, or even a guardian spirit. As such, these beings were conceived of as being different in nature than a supreme deity, or the deity they served. These meanings of angelos are similar to the meaning of "angel" and "angel of God" in biblical texts and Jewish and Christian literature.[7] Because non-Christians used the Greek word angelos in ways similar to that of

biblical texts, Christian apologists attempted to distinguish between the pagan and Christian meanings of the word. Their arguments, and those of their pagan opponents, are indicative of the semantic range of the spiritual meaning of angelos in the period. The pagan-Christian discourse on the meaning of angelos and related terms is best exemplified in the writings of Origen of Alexandria, a pre-Nicene apologist in the Greek-speaking Eastern Empire, and Augustine of Hippo, a Nicene theologian in the Latin West. A brief survey of their arguments here will help to demonstrate the multiple religious meanings angelos in the period and assist in understanding the evidence for angelos invocation in the following chapters.

Origen of Alexandria

Origen of Alexandria's Contra Celsum (ca. 248) contains one of the earliest attempts to distinguish between Christian and non-Christian concepts of angeloi. Origen's discussion of the Christian meaning of angelos, demon (daimon), and related terms is in the context of his defense of Christianity against the attacks of the philosopher Celsus. For Origen, the conflict with Celsus over the meaning of the terms angelos and daimon arose when Celsus attempted to interpret (and discredit) Christianity based on these terms. Although Celsus' polemic against Christian beliefs has not survived, one can reconstruct large portions of his argument from Origen's response. Celsus' work, the True Doctrine, was composed between 177–80, some sixty years prior to Origen's response. Celsus approached Christian theology from the perspective of the predominant philosophical concepts and language of his own day, that of Middle Platonism. One of the problems that Celsus found with Christianity was the belief that a god, or even a son of a god, could come to earth, as this violated certain philosophical beliefs about the separation of the divine and material worlds. Thus, Celsus suggested that when Christians describe a god coming to earth, they refer to an angelos; he suggested further that the particular type of angelos they refer to was probably a daimon.

Significantly, Celsus' statement reveals that Christians and non-Christians were using the same terms to describe similar theological concepts. Celsus terms the spiritual beings who could span the distance between heaven and earth angeloi. Celsus also used another word that would be familiar to Christian readers, daimon, usually translated as "demon." However, for Celsus and most readers in the second century, the word daimon did not have the pejorative meaning that it has in the biblical texts, where servants of Satan are regularly called "demons" (Greek: daimones/daimonia). Rather, Celsus used the word daimon in the same manner that it is used in Plato, where it describes a celestial being that can exist in heavenly and early realms, and is specifically charged with connecting heaven and earth. This is the platonic concept that Celsus finds to be closest to the Christian idea of Jesus the Messiah as the incarnate God.

Celsus' goal was to demonstrate the philosophical inconsistencies in Christian beliefs. Origen's response was to restrict the meaning of terms such as angelos and daimon. According to Platonists, daimones could be evil or good, just like men. However, Origen argued, based on biblical references, that daimones are exclusively evil, while angeloi are good, stating that Christians have learned that the gods of the Gentiles are daimones in search of sacrifices and blood, while the "divine and holy angeloi of God are of a nature and character other than that of the daemons on earth." Origen also elaborates on the difference between angeloi and daimones when responding to Celsus assertion that one ought to pray and sacrifice to daimones. According to Origen:

> Since there are both good and bad men, for this reason some are said to be men of God and some of the devil; so also some angeloi are said to be of God and some of the Devil. But the twofold division no longer holds good in the case of daimones; for they are all proved to be bad.

Origen's comment that a two-fold division of good and evil daimones no longer holds reveals a great deal about the debate over the meaning of that term and angelos in the dialogue between Christians and non-Christians. Origen's statement implicitly acknowledges that the term daimon did not exclusively mean an evil spirit. Rather, among the Hellenes of the later empire, the term was neutral as it had been for centuries. However, Origen is refusing to argue on the same terms as Celsus, and he asserts, on Christian authority, that all daimones are evil. Celsus had argued that daimones were responsible for maintaining certain aspects of nature, such as water and air. But Origen insists on a Christian definition of terms, stating that daimones cannot be responsible for anything good. Thus, Origen states that the angeloi of God are responsible for good natural phenomena, such as rain and un-polluted air, while daimones are responsible for the evils of nature, such as famine, barren vines, drought, and plague.

According to Origen, Celsus questioned the Christian idea that God could come to earth, stating, "If it is certain angeloi of which you speak . . . whom do you mean by them, gods or someone else?" Origen understood Celsus' criticism of Christianity to imply that angeloi and gods could be the same. The full context of Celsus' statement indicates that he made a distinction between angeloi and a supreme God. Celsus states that "no God or child of God has come down," whereas he allows that angeloi could come down to earth. It appears then, that Celsus made a distinction between a supreme, transcendent God, who would not come into the material world, and lesser divinites, called angeloi or gods, who could. Such a view would be consistent with Middle Platonism. However, Origen infers that Celsus equated God and angeloi, and he took the opportunity to further clarify his Christian understanding of both. He argued that although angeloi are sometimes called gods (theoi), this is because of their divine nature and not because Christians ought to pay them reverence or worship them.22 Origen adds that Christians should not worship angeloi but follow the example of such creatures' devotion to God. He also states that Christians should not pray to angeloi, but send all of their prayers through the "high priest of the angeloi," the divine Logos. Origen attempts a clear distinction between angeloi and God, but he implicitly acknowledges that there could be some confusion, as scriptures use the term theoi "gods" to refer to angeloi, and the pious might be tempted to worship them. Celsus' critique, and Origens' rebuttal, reveal the semantic overlap of the terms angelos, daimon, and theos in the second and third centuries. Origin's articulation of a more rigid distinction among these terms lays the foundation for later Christian definitions and is indicative of the importance of such disambiguation for Christian authorities.

Augustine of Hippo

The following chapters will examine several examples of Christian authorities distinguishing an orthodox Christian conception of angeloi from other Christian and pagan ideas about angeloi. However, as an introduction to the parameters of the debate, Augustine's City of God can serve as an example of how a Nicene theologian in the Latin West distinguished between Christian and pagan ideas about angeli. Augustine, in a manner similar to Origen, challenged his Platonist opponents' use of the terms angelus and daemon.25 Augustine's argument is primarily based on references to Christian scripture. However, Augustine also appealed to the popular use of the terms. Augustine's discussion of the terms suggests that by the early-fifth century an earlier, non-Christian understanding of these terms was giving way to a Christian one, and inherent in Augustine's argument is the position that the Christian understanding of the terms is dominant in popular and literary usage.

Augustine attempted to maintain a restricted, Christian definition of angelus and daemon, while at the same time acknowledging that philosophers, in particular Porphyry, Apuleius, and Cornelius Labeo had utilized similar, but divergent, definitions of these words. In so doing, Augustine argued

that daemones and angeli are not the same thing, and he based his argument on an appeal to Christian scripture. This is best characterized in Augustine's refutation of Cornelius Labeo:

> Since some demonolaters, to coin a term, including Labeo, claim that those they call demons are identical to those called angels by others, I declare that I must say something about the good angels. Our opponents do not deny their existence, but they prefer to call them demons rather than angels. For our part, we abide by the language of scripture, which is the basis of our Christian belief. And there we read of good and bad angels, but never of good demons.

The passage above illustrates several aspects of the debate over religious terminology. Augustine's statement acknowledges that non-Christians had used the word angelus in place of daemon, and vice-versa. However, Augustine states that Christians cannot use it so, because the word daemon, and its cognates, are always negative in Christian scripture. Augustine goes further, however, and argues that the biblical distinction between these terms was also found in popular usage, stating:

> In fact, wherever this name is found in the books of the Bible, whether in the form daemones or in the form daemonia, it always refers to malignant spirits. And this way of speaking has been so generally adopted, that even among those who are called pagans, who maintain that it is right to worship many gods and demons, scarcely anyone would be so literary and pedantic as to bring himself to say, even to his own slave, by way of a compliment, you are possessed of a demon . . . By using the word angel we can avoid the shock that using the word demon is likely to produce.

Augustine states that only a pedant (perhaps one should read here "Platonist") would insist that daemon could have a positive meaning. According to Augustine, in popular usage the meaning of the word had changed, such that people would be confused if he were to speak positively of daemones. This statement signals a change in the popular connotation of the terms, perhaps influenced by Christian, scripture-based usage of the terms angelus and daemon.

Augustine does, however, acknowledge some truth in the philosophers' claim that there are both good and bad daemones and angeli, while simultaneously rejecting their equation of the terms. Most revealing is in this matter is Augustine's attack on Porphyry's endorsement of theurgy.

> For [Porphyry's] belief corresponded more or less to what we hold, but he did not defend his opinions without reserve against the worship of many gods. He alleged in fact that there are two classes of angels: the one sort come down from above and reveal divine prophecies to men who practice theurgy, while the others are those who make known on earth the truth about the father, his height, and his depth.

If Augustine's paraphrase of Porphyry is accurate, then one can understand the manner in which Neoplatonists like Porphyry used the term angelus as a functional equivalent to the Platonic daemon. Rather than discredit Porphyry's view, Augustine endorses it, but with significant caveats. Augustine states that Porphyry was correct in stating that there are two types of angeli. However, Augustine's "Dear Philosopher" failed to see that those angeli who reveal prophecies to men who practice theurgy were, in fact, unclean spirits, whom Augustine prefers to call daemones.29 Those angeli whom Porphyry claimed could reveal the truth about God to men are, in Augustine's terms, the "Boni Angeli," in other words, the angeli of the Christian God.

Similar sentiments can be found elsewhere in the City of God, where Augustine does not wholly discredit the Platonic system of angeli and daemones but claims the philosophers have either mislabeled or misunderstood the functions of these beings. For instance, Augustine distinguishes between the "Good Daemones" of the pagans, responsible for spiritual matters, and other daemones, who are in fact unclean and malignant spirits. About these other daemones, Augustine

states, in an argument aimed at Apuleius, that daemones are not fit for humans to emulate, nor are they capable, as Platonists maintained, of communicating between the human and divine. Lest anyone be tempted to worship these good daemones, Augustine warns against it, stating that while the Platonists may prefer to describe the angeli as gods, Christians understand that the angeli are created beings and act only on the authority of God. Thus, angeli are not proper objects of Christian worship.

To summarize Augustine's views, he argues that the term daemon should only be used in a negative sense, but he acknowledges that the term angelus can describe either a good or and evil being. Augustine identifies the "good daemons" of the Platonists with the angeli of the Christian God. In order to avoid confusion, Christians should not describe those daemones that the Platonists honor with sacrifices and bend to their will with theurgic rituals as angeli because they are, in fact unclean spirits, which Christians should call daemones. One may infer from Augustine's discussion of angelic and demonic terminology that while the word angelus can be used to describe a minister of the Devil, a negative qualifier should always accompany it; whereas the term angelus without adjectival modification should be used only for the ministers of God. Augustine's statements offer a clear articulation of Nicene views about angeli and daemones and the relationship between such beings and the Christian God. In this view, such beings are created, of a nature different than God, and unfit for worship.

Augustine's and Origen's articulation of the Christian conception of angeli and daemones vis-à-vis pagan beliefs about celestial intermediaries can serve as an introduction to the ways in which Christians articulated their own beliefs about such beings in the context of other religions in the late antique Mediterranean. Of course, their statements do not provide a complete picture of Greek and Roman beliefs and religious practices, nor do they describe the variety of Christian and Jewish beliefs about angeli, daemones, and God. However, their expressions of Christian angelology will serve as a reference point as we examine the archaeological and literary evidence for angeli (Greek: angeloi) in later Roman religion and the Christian reactions to potentially heterodox practices of invocation.

Hellenism, Monotheism, and Polytheism

In addition to the word angelos, this study explores the meanings and limits of other terms, such as Hellenism, pagan, monotheism, and polytheism. Because scholars use these terms in different ways, I want to establish, in general, how these terms are used in the following pages. This book's examination of literary and epigraphic material considers the manner in which Hellenism allowed distinct religious traditions to communicate similar religious ideas about angels through the medium of the Greek language. In so doing, I hope that this study provides additional evidence for Glenn Bowersock's arguments concerning the function of Hellenism in late antiquity. As one scholar has recently noted, Bowersock's essays on the function of Hellenism are brilliant, but not always thorough or meticulous. It is hoped that the present study of Greek angelos inscriptions will, among other things, contribute to the further testing of Bowersock's brief but influential essays on Hellenism. Bowersock defined Hellenism in the following manner:

> Hellenism, which is a genuine Greek word for Greek culture (Hellênismos), represented language, thought, mythology, and images that constituted an extraordinarily flexible medium of both cultural and religious expression. It was a medium not necessarily antithetical to local or indigenous traditions. On the contrary, it provided a new and more eloquent way of giving voice to them.

Bowersock's contention that Hellenism did not necessarily crush local traditions but gave them a "more eloquent" and more cosmopolitan form of expression contrasts sharply with the views of other scholars such as Fergus Millar, who suggested that Hellenism was, in general, a force that suppressed local religious traditions through "Hellenization."

Bowersock briefly commented that one example of the ways in which Hellenism worked to give local religious traditions a cosmopolitan language was angel invocation. He noted, and briefly described, the example of a Greek inscription from Syria that invokes a Semitic angel-god by the Greek term angelos. He also noted the existence of dedications to "angel-gods" at Stratonikeia in Caria. Bowersock's theory that the Greek language was able to provide a common means of expression to regional, linguistically dissimilar, cults of angeloi was suggestive. However, the limited scope of his study did not allow him to fully explore the numerous cases of angelos invocation found on Greek inscriptions throughout the Mediterranean. The present study attempts to rectify that situation. The inscriptions cited by Bowersock are examined in the chapters that follow, along with many more pagan, Christian, and Jewish angelos invocations that illustrate, as Bowersock suggested, that the Greek language gave linguistically and religiously diverse traditions of angelos invocation and veneration a means of universal expression. This book explores the consequences of such universal expression for later Roman polytheism and its relationship with early Judaism and early Christianity.

This study examines non-Christian and non-Jewish inscriptions that refer to angeloi. These inscriptions offer information about the role of angeloi in later Roman polytheism and they record prayers and dedications to angeloi. In some contexts, this study uses the term "Hellenic" to describe these inscriptions as well as the religious groups associated with the inscriptions. This meaning of the term is almost same as the modern sense of "pagan," but not exactly. As several scholars have noted, from the early fourth century and afterwards, Christians and pagans used Hellenos and its adjectival formHellenikos to describe traditional Greco-Roman, Syrian, Egyptian, and Arabic religious practices. Hellene came to equal, and then replace, the term ethnikos (gentilis) as the term for non-Christians in the dialogue between Christians and polytheists. However, Hellene also means "Greek," "Greek-speaking," or, more generally, "a participant in Greek language and culture." Hellene and Hellenic are therefore more ambiguous than "pagan." However, the term conveys important aspects of later Roman polytheism which the present study seeks to examine. For example, this book examines polytheist angelos dedications written in Greek from several regions of the later Roman Empire where indigenous languages continued to exist. One of the common elements in these pagan inscriptions is their use of the Greek language and the Greek term angelos to express religious devotion. "Hellenic" thus describes a shared aspect of inscriptions that most often reflect distinctly regional cults.

The problem with using "Hellenic" to mean non-Christian or non-Jewish is, of course, that the Greek language was also what united much of eastern Christianity as well as Hellenized Judaism. The problem inherent in separating Hellenism as "paganism" from Hellenism as "Greek Culture" is not new, however; it was a topic that Christians and Hellenes debated in the period under discussion. For example, the Emperor Julian's attempt to ban Christians from teaching the classics, the reaction against the ban among Christians, and the debate among early Christians as to whether or not it was appropriate for Christians to study classical (Hellenic) literature reveal several aspects of the problem in separating the dual meanings of "Hellenism." The ambiguity of the term "Hellenic," and its dual meanings of "Greek" and "pagan" thus presented semantic problems for the early Christian church (as well as Hellenes) as Christian authorities attempted to define what was Christian and what was not. The ambiguity of the term "Hellenic" is sometimes appropriate for the present study, because it accurately describes the non-Christian and non-Jewish dedications to angels, all of which use the Greek term angelos to express divergent concepts of mediators. In addition, use of the period-specific term "Hellenic" to describe such dedications helps to communicate the challenge for the early Christian church as it attempted to distinguish between Christian and non-Christian forms of angelos veneration in the Greek-speaking eastern Mediterranean. However, on some occasions the polysemous nature of the word Hellenic does not serve to clarify the topic under discussion. In

such circumstances I have opted to use the word "pagan," albeit with some reservations, in order to avoid more laborious circumlocutions.

In addition to Hellenic, the following study also uses the words monotheism and henotheism, two terms commonly associated with angels. As there is disagreement about the definitions of monotheism and henotheism, for the sake of consistency I have chosen to follow the definitions of monotheism and henotheism stated by Henk Versnel in his study of monotheism in Greek religion. Versnel defines monotheism as follows:

> the conviction that only one god exists (with the cultic corollary of exclusive worship), while other gods do not, or, if and so far as they do, must be made nonexistent, for instance by relegating them beyond the political or cultic horizon of the community and attributing to them the status of powerless, wicked or demonic forces without any (real) significance.

He defines henotheism as:

> the privileged devotion to one god, who is regarded as uniquely superior, while other gods are neither depreciated nor rejected and continue receiving cultic observance whenever this is ritually required.

Distinguishing between polytheism and monotheism (or henotheism) in the real world is often more difficult than ideal definitions would suggest. However, in the following study I use the term polytheism to mean: the belief in and worship of more than one god. I hope that this brief definition of words associated with angeloi will assist the exploration of their meanings and implications in the chapters below.

The following chapter begins the examination of angels in late antiquity with the oracular response from Claros inscribed at Oenoanda (ca. 200 CE). The response connects angeloi with the later Roman beliefs in supreme deities who communicated with mankind through intermediaries. Based upon the Oenoanda inscription and similar oracular statements from the late imperial period, the chapter argues that the belief in, and veneration of, angeloi was not only characteristic of later Roman philosophical beliefs, but had popular manifestations as well. The chapter also examines Lactantius' and the Theosophy of Tübingen's reception of the oracle and their attempts to argue that the oracle's statements about angels anticipated Christian truths.

Lactantius' statements about Hellenic angeloi and daimones are in the tradition of Origen's earlier attempts to distinguish between angeloi and daimones and Augustine's subsequent statements concerning Hellenic angeli and daemones.

Chapter Three examines inscribed texts that are characteristic of dedications to angeloi from pagan contexts. These inscriptions come from Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Arabia, and Italy. They date from the second to early-fourth centuries and illustrate both the widespread nature of angelos veneration and the function of the Greek language in allowing local religious traditions to communicate similar ideas about such beings in a cosmopolitan manner.

Chapter Four examines Christian, Jewish, and pagan inscriptions, textual evidence, and artistic representations that illustrate beliefs in angeloi that guard the living, protect tombs, and escort the dead. The chapter brings together epigraphic evidence (from Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands, and Rome) dating from the late second to early fourth centuries. The chapter places this inscriptional evidence within the contexts of theological discussions of the period, comparing Christian and Jewish beliefs in guardian angeloi with Neoplatonic speculation concerning tutelary daemones. The chapter demonstrates that the belief in angelic companions was common to several different religious traditions in late antiquity while noting divergences in belief and practice.

Chapter Five examines evidence which suggests that angelos invocation was believed to be more efficacious in some places than others. The chapter examines the archaeological and literary evidence for Christian and non-Christian rituals at cult sites associated with angeloi. The chapter focuses on Mamre and the Bethesda Pool in Judea/Palestine, Colossae in Asia Minor, and the Fountain of the Lamps at Corinth, Greece. The chapter also includes discussion of the shrine of Anna Perenna in Italy. The chapter illustrates both the ritual power of sites associated with angeloi and the steps that Christian authorities took in the fourth and fifth centuries to control and supervise potentially heterodox practices at such sites.

Chapter Six considers how Christian authorities in Anatolia defined acceptably Christian forms of angelos veneration. The chapter examines the Synod of Laodicea's (ca. 360 ce) prohibitions against extra-ecclesiastical angeloi invocation, Theodoret's comments on the popularity of prayer to angels in the region, and the construction of shrines and churches dedicated to the Archangel Michael. The chapter argues that, contrary to the opinions of some scholars, the fourth and fifth century Church was not attempting to prohibit the veneration of angeloi in its entirety, but rather to prohibit forms of angelos invocation that could threaten ecclesiastical authority. Thus, the chapter argues that the evidence for the veneration of angeloi and the Archangel Michael in Anatolia are illustrative of the manner in which angelos veneration became a ritually powerful practice within normative Christianity that could support rather than undermine the spiritual potency of the nascent Church. <>

THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION edited and translated by Andy Orchard [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, Harvard University Press, 9780674055339]

What offers over seven hundred witty enigmas in several languages? Answer: **THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION.** Riddles, wordplay, and inscrutable utterances have been at the heart of Western literature for many centuries. Often brief and always delightful, medieval riddles provide insights into the extraordinary and the everyday, connecting the learned and the ribald, the lay and the devout, and the familiar and the imported. Many solutions involve domestic life, including "butter churn" and "chickens." Others like "the harrowing of hell" or "the Pleiades" appeal to an educated elite. Still others, like "the one-eyed seller of garlic," are too absurd to solve: that is part of the game. Riddles are not simply lighthearted amusement. They invite philosophical questions about language and knowledge.

Most riddles in this volume are translated from Old English and Latin, but it also includes some from Old Norse–Icelandic. **THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE**

TRADITION assembles, for the first time ever, an astonishing array of riddles composed before 1200 CE that continue to entertain and puzzle.

CONTENTS
Introduction
THE ANGLO-LATIN TRADITION
ALDHELM
BEDE
TATWINE
HWAETBERHT, THE RIDDLES OF EUSEBIUS

Riddles, wordplay, and enigmatic utterance have been at the heart of English literature for many centuries: if the crossword as a form is only a hundred years old, the principles that underlie its successful solution go back more than a millennium, when anagrams, acrostics, and a variety of word and sound games both within and beyond Old English and Latin, the two literary languages of Anglo-Saxon England, are attested both widely and well.

At first glance, the Old English and Anglo-Latin riddle tradition might seem a frivolous, obscure, and irrelevant subject for serious discussion in learned circles, a quaint coda to a sober field. But in fact not so: close study of the intellectual and material aspects of the riddles, composed for the most part by some of the most literate Anglo-Saxons whose names we know, and in both Latin and Old English, reveals a good deal of what we can ever hope to recover of the Anglo-Saxon world, its interests and opinions and, perhaps most important, its ties to those other worlds (the deep and beguiling seas of the classical, Continental, and Christian spheres) that it sought variously both to supplement and to supplant. The intimate connections between the learned and the lewd, the lay and the devout, the Latin and the vernacular, the inherited and the imported, and the oral and the literary provide contrasting perspectives. Such alternative insights into both the extraordinary and the everyday offer additionally a useful lens through which to perceive the past and the perceptions of others, as well as an appreciation of how wondrous the world can seem, and how marvelous the mundane.

In that sense, the Old English and Anglo-Latin riddle tradition can only aid us in solving the riddle of the Anglo-Saxons themselves, and how they chose to understand a wider world to which they perhaps inevitably felt peripheral, and not just geographically. Literate (which in the context of the surviving written record mostly meant Latinate) and therefore learned Anglo-Saxons would have known that the Mediterranean was quite literally the center of the world, but they did not simply surrender thereby their own space. However much the inherited and alien traditions of Latin and even Byzantine Greek impinged on their world view, not to mention analogues from the culturally

closer Norse and Celtic regions, Anglo-Saxon riddlers seem to have sought from the start to make the genre their own.

There are, of course, riddles in the Bible, notably those posed by Samson (Judges 14:14) and the Queen of Sheba (1 Kings 10.1). In the classical world it was the Greeks who made most use of the form. Oedipus answers the famous riddle of the Sphinx: "What walks on four feet in the morning, two in the afternoon, and three in the evening?" The answer is "man," with a clue potentially enshrined in his very name, if we focus on the last syllable, which means "foot." The encyclopedic and highly bookish Deipnosophistae (the title might be translated as Dons at Dinner, Fellows Feasting or Learned Banqueters, as in Olson's edition)

of Athenaeus, who flourished in the first quarter of the third century, demonstrates in Book io that riddles and problems were bandied about during banquets and drinking parties by the learned. Likewise, Book 14 of the sprawling collection of Greek poems from across several centuries now known as the Palatine Anthology comprises around 150 riddles, problems, and oracles. It is surely noteworthy that Latin speakers simply took over into their own tongue the two main Greek words for "riddle," namely (Latin aenigma) and (Latin griphus). Certainly, there seems no great indigenous Latin tradition of verse riddles (the native term scirpus, literally, "bullrush," but designating a riddle as complex as basketry, seems to have been used only in very specialized settings), although in an echo of the practice of the Deipnosophistae, we are told by Aulus Gellius in his Noctes Atticae of how well-educated Romans in Athens in the second century spent the feast of the Saturnalia, which took place in December each year. The chapter heading says it all (18.2):

> *Cuiusmodi quaestionum certationibus Saturnalicia ludicra Athenis agitare soliti simus; atque inibi expressa quaedam sophismata et aenigmata oblectatoria.*

> What kind of questions we used to ask in competition as Saturnalian amusements in Athens; and some entertaining puzzles and riddles that were produced there.

Latin riddlers evidently identified primarily with Greek contexts and Greek contests of learned emulation too, and it is no surprise to find that the esteemed rhetorician and poet Ausonius, who died around the year 395, should imitate the studied frivolity so evident here. Indeed, he even uses the term frivola (trifles) to describe his own enigmatic composition in the introduction to his *Griphus ternarii* numeri (Riddle on the Number Three), just before going on to emphasize the association of riddling and drink:

> *Acne me gloriosum neges, coeptos inter prandendum versiculos ante cenae tempus absolvi, hoc est dum bibo et paulo ante quam biberem. Sit ergo examen pro materia et tempore. Sed to quoque hoc ipsum Paulo hilarior et dilutior lege; namque iniurium est de poeta male sobrio lectorem abstemium iudicare.*

> And just so that you don't deny that I am boastful: I began these little verses over lunch and finished before suppertime; that is to say, I began while drinking and then a bit before I was drinking again. Let that be your scale for the theme and the timing. Read them too while a bit merrier and more drenched; for it is unfair for a sober reader to pass judgment on a poet in his cups.

It is against this background that we should turn to the aenigmata of Symphosius, the verse preface of which explicitly states that his own frivola were composed, perhaps even extemporaneously, at a

drinking party as entertainment during the Saturnalia; it concludes with a chirpy request for indulgence from a readership less drunk than the poet himself. The author's own name (which does not seem to be attested before the fourth century), indeed, with its clear parallels to the common noun symposium (drinking party), connects this collection of one hundred riddles back directly to those of his Greek predecessors. Symphosius laments the fact that he has brought nothing with him, presumably in the way of the kind of mechanical and memorized words that stud the sayings of the Deipnosophistae, and claims that his aenigmata either came to him quite spontaneously or were worked up on the basis of then-cited tropes. The preface to Symphosius's Aenigmata (here SYM PR) is itself of course a carefully contrived conceit: an opening pair of lines that does not appear in all manuscripts addresses an unknown teacher and points the way to the later use of these and other aenigmata in classroom contexts, while the final line addresses an anonymous "reader" (lector; another term that appears to be deliberately echoed by the Anglo-Saxon Aldhelm), perhaps pointing to a conscious literary collection. Certainly, the framing tale offered by Symphosius provides a secular echo of the reported inspiration of the pious cowherd Cædmon in late seventh-century Northumbria at a drinking party: Bede calls the gathering Cædmon attended a convivium (party); the Old English Bede adds the interesting extra detail that it was a gebeorscipe (beer-drinking party).

Suggested dates for Symphosius's texts range from the fourth to the sixth centuries, in the same milieu as, for example, Ausonius, Macrobius, and Martianus Capella, with tradition placing his origins in North Africa. Such a suggestion is all the more tantalizing given Symphosius's demonstrable and explicitly acknowledged influence on Aldhelm (who died 709/10the first Anglo-Saxon author to have composed extensively in Latin verse, and who chose the genre of aenigmata for his earliest compositions (ALD). Aldhelm was educated at the celebrated Canterbury school of Theodore and Hadrian, where among the subjects he tells us he studied was Latin metrics. Theodore, a Greek-speaking monk from Tarsus, may have introduced Aldhelm to the Greek tradition of riddling, but it was most likely the Latin scholar Hadrian, coming from North Africa, who introduced Aldhelm to the Symphosian style of riddling in a classroom context. It is striking that in the prose preface to his own collection of one hundred aenigmata Aldhelm is silent about any vernacular riddle traditions, but instead points very carefully to three major influences, namely Symphosius, Aristotle, and the Bible. This gesture may indicate his wider knowledge (presumably via Theodore, and certainly in translation) of the kind of Greek and Byzantine riddles preserved in the Palatine Anthology, and certainly downplays Symphosius as his only influence. Indeed, Aldhelm goes out of his way to surpass Symphosius, both in explicitly using Christian themes and language, and in composing lengthier riddles of between four and eighty-three lines (all of Symphosius's are strictly three lines long).

While Symphosius was certainly a major influence on the Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition well beyond Aldhelm, and in both Latin and Old English, it is harder to assess the impact (not to mention the provenance) of another anonymous collection of aenigmata variously called the Bern Riddles, Aenigmata Hexasticha, or the Enigmata Tullii (BER). These sixty-two aenigmata are uniformly composed in six lines of rhythmical rather than metrical hexameters and have a clear link to Symphosius (consistently doubling in scale the scope of his three-line aenigmata); their connection to the Anglo-Latin riddle tradition is less clear cut. The earliest

manuscript (Bern, Burgerbibliothek 6ii, dating to the early eighth century), which does not contain solutions, derives from an Irish monastic foundation on the Continent; hence the much-disputed attribution of the whole collection to a seventh-century Irishman, although conjectures concerning the collection's age range from the fourth century on. A closing acrostic spelling out PAULUS (ps-BER I) may, allowing for scribal error in transmission, underlie the attribution to "Tullius," presumably saddling Cicero, via his full name of Marcus Tullius Cicero, with material he would more likely disclaim than willingly declaim. Since the collection is given the title Qaestiones (questions, challenges) in some manuscripts, it is tempting to identify the author or compiler with the otherwise

unknown "Paulus Quaestor" (another form of *quaesitor*, "seeker," "questioner"?) named and quoted by Aldhelm in the two metrical treatises (*De metris* and *De pedum regulis*) that accompany his aenigmata. If so, the metrical verses attributed to Paulus may have been appended to the existing collection of rhythmical verses: the aenigmata themselves are purely rhythmical, except for the final acrostic. Whatever one's views on the literary merit and influence of BER, the judgment of their first editor, Riese, that these are "six-line rhythmical poems, horrid in their roughness" (*hexasticha rhythmica barbarie horrida*) seems a tad harsh.

This Text and Translation

With such a necessarily wide-ranging purview, it is perhaps inevitable that much of the material here will have been derived from secondary sources. Nonetheless, the texts and translations here are based wherever possible on firsthand analysis of the manuscripts, especially those written or owned in England before 1100 (as noted in G-L), and I have tried to consult as broad a range as possible of existing translations. For details with regard to individual texts and collections, see the relevant headnotes below. The solutions to the riddles are provided, along with other basic commentary, in the Notes to the Translations. The prefatory note there explains in more detail the conventions that I have adopted for distinguishing, where necessary, solutions provided in the manuscripts by the medieval authors or scribes from those proposed, with varying degrees of confidence, by modern readers; where these differ, I have explained the choice of preferred solution in the Notes to the Translations, and often more fully in the companion commentary, COEALRT. One other convention employed widely in the texts and notes should be noted here, namely the practice of printing what I consider interpolations or added material (often in the form of formulaic additions or embedded solutions) in italics. I have also used italics for letters that contribute to acrostics or *telestics* and for runic transcriptions, but I trust that context will always make clear the distinction in usage. In a few cases, I have used underlining to emphasize wordplay or other kinds of correspondence in the original languages.

Anglo-Saxons evidently wanted to understand the world, to explain it, and perhaps above all, to marvel at its myriad ways. The Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition poses many questions and seems to be comfortable with the fact that for each and all of those questions there is not necessarily a single or simple and unanswerable solution. Sometimes just asking is apparently enough, and in picking a path through the question at hand the respondent seems encouraged to wander. In the spirit of the multilingual Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition, this book aims not only to ask more questions than it can possibly answer but also to keep an eye on the benefits of wandering in wonder, as well as the grave dangers of error.

A COMMENTARY ON THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION by Andy Orchard [Supplements to the Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, Harvard University Press, 9780884024774]

This volume is a companion to **THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION**. Its extensive notes and commentary on hundreds of Latin, Old English, and Old Norse-Icelandic riddles illuminate and clarify the multifaceted and interconnected nature of a broad, international tradition. Within this commentary, readers will encounter a deep reservoir of knowledge about riddles produced in both Latin and Old English during the Anglo-Saxon period, and the literatures with which they were in dialogue.

Riddles range from those by prominent authors like Aldhelm, Bede, Alcuin, and Boniface to those presented anonymously in collections such as the Exeter Book. All are fully discussed, with particular attention paid to manuscript traditions, subject matter, solutions, style, sources, parallels, and recommendations for further reading. Consideration is given to running themes throughout the collection, comparisons to other riddles and to other literature more broadly, and important linguistic observations and manuscript readings. The commentary also lists the manuscripts and earlier editions for each riddle, extensive catalogues of proposed solutions, and additional bibliographic references. Following the general discussion of each riddle there is detailed line-by-line annotation.

This authoritative commentary is the most comprehensive examination to date of the bilingual riddle tradition of Anglo-Saxon England and its links to the wider world.

CONTENTS

***

Frige mec frodum wordum. Ne lætþinne ferth onhælne degol þæti þudeopost cunne. Nelle icþe min dyrne gesecgan, gifþu me þinne hyge-cræft hylest. and þine heortan geþohtas. Gleawe men sceolon gieddum wrixlan. Maxims I 1-4a

Question me with wise words. Don't keep your soul concealed, the deepest secret that you know. I don't want to tell you my mysteries, if you hide from me the power of your mind and the thoughts of your heart.
The smart should swap riddles.

It is in the nature of riddles to highlight unlikely or unusual combinations and contrasts, and in that spirit, I can only apologize for the combination and contrast of this volume of notes and commentary with the somewhat leaner, slimmer lines of the DOML volume of **The Old English and Anglo-Latin Riddle Tradition (OEALRT)** from which it grew, and with which it is necessarily paired. I have endeavored to keep the inevitable overlap to a minimum, while intending each volume to stand alone, with this one in particular potentially useful alongside all earlier editions of the relevant texts and translations.

Whether there was indeed such a thing as an Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition at all, as I argue here, I leave to others to judge.' But if this book and its companion serve any useful purpose, it may be again to underline the benefits of considering Anglo-Saxon culture in the widest possible context, and to highlight the dangers of simply speaking of Anglo-Saxon riddles (or indeed Anglo-Saxon literature as a whole) in the monoglot manner that the current study of the subject, overwhelmingly within university Departments of English, has inevitably, if inadvertently, encouraged. I have deliberately cast my net wider, and, mindful of the delightful manner in which riddles can level playing fields and eclipse both academic qualifications and book-learning in general, have also attempted to consult and incorporate as many relevant unpublished dissertations, comparative discussions, and other often web-based material as I have been able to identify. Here, I should particularly highlight the tools available through my own ongoing project, "A Consolidated Library of Anglo-Saxon Poetry," funded by the European Research Council (www.clasp.eu), several of which were employed and tested here.

***

A Note on This Commentary

The multifaceted, complex, and interconnected nature of the Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition can seem bewildering, and in devising a set of abbreviations and manuscript sigla I have striven for simplicity and transparency, always in order to emphasize the many different kinds of links that can be traced between the texts and collections presented here. The principles of abbreviation are as follows:

1. The major texts and collections are abbreviated in upper case, using three letters where possible, with pseudonymous material prefaced by ps-, where relevant.

2. Earlier texts, translations, and commentaries are abbreviated by suitable combinations of upper- and lowercase letters, restricted where feasible to two-letter forms, necessarily augmented to avoid ambiguity.

3. Manuscripts are represented by sigla consisting of a single uppercase letter, augmented where necessary by a superscript number. I have tried to retain the same sigla used in earlier editions, though this has not always been possible.

Apart from these abbreviations, I have indicated preferred and suggested solutions in uppercase italics, and also used the sign "—>" to indicate where logographs (those riddles that rely on changes in spelling to offer more than one solution) are involved. While the various texts and collections

differ significantly, often from manuscript to manuscript, as well as from text to text, about whether or not solutions are given at all, or circulate separately or in alternative forms, here I have deferred all suggested solutions (or indeed titles, as they are sometimes presented) to the relevant notes and headnotes, and leveled their forms to the nominative, rather than preferring the versions with Latin DE + ablative which I believe to be a secondary development aligning the Latin aenigmata with other didactic and encyclopedic texts, alongside which they often circulate. In presenting the texts, I have followed the usual conventions: acrostics and *telestichs* are signaled in capitals, and interpolations, especially interpolated solutions, whether right or wrong, in italics; runes are generally transliterated in lowercase. In general, in presenting a text I have followed existing editions more slavishly and silently in Sources and Analogues of the Tradition than in the Anglo-Latin Tradition and the Old English Tradition, where I have (occasionally) attempted originality, and the notes and markup reflect this accordingly.

I have translated the poems line by line, where reasonable, and in as neutral a manner as I could, in order to preserve the inherent ambiguity and developing revelation of these tricky, enigmatic texts. In introducing the relevant texts and collections, I have used the same basic template, again to facilitate direct comparison, considering in turn: authorship and date; manuscript context; subject matter and solutions; style; sources and parallels; idiosyncrasies of this text and translation; and further reading. For individual texts, including those within larger collections, I have adopted a similar basic structure, reporting individual manuscripts, earlier editions and translations, and solutions both accepted and suggested. For brevity and focus, in cases where there are multiple manuscript witnesses, I have deliberately favored the reporting of manuscripts written or owned in Anglo-Saxon England, and though I am well aware that this gives a highly skewed picture, it is at least a bias accurately reflected in the title. In a more inclusive manner, I report previous editions and translations so that their readings and renderings can be checked against mine, and have tried to include the whole range of suggested solutions, both modern and medieval, even those that remain baffling, unlikely, impossible, or overly imaginative. Within the notes, I have taken particular care to highlight comparisons, both verbal and conceptual, that link the various texts and collections, the better to emphasize what binds this material together. In the same vein, and to the extent that much of what makes the Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition appears to be a developing set of mutually reflexive texts with many shared themes and strategies, I have endeavored to offer exhaustive listings in the various introductions and headnotes, with cross-references where appropriate. By contrast, verbal parallels from outside the particular texts and collections showcased here are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather again to reflect the milieu within which the literate Anglo-Saxons who composed the vast majority of texts considered here taught and worked. <>

<>