RTReview.org

SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
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EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and

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[THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE, 2 VOLUME SET, 2ND EDITION](#) edited by Robert J. Sternberg [Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology, Cambridge University Press, 9781108485104]

➜ Provides a comprehensive historical overview of the field of intelligence and intelligence testing

➜ Contains new topics not to be found elsewhere, such as intelligence and video games, collective intelligence, leadership intelligence, and the historical evolution of intelligence

➜ Virtually no area of intelligence research is left untouched

Written by the foremost experts in human intelligence. It not only includes traditional topics, such as the nature, measurement, and development of intelligence, but also contemporary research into intelligence and video games, collective intelligence, emotional intelligence, and leadership intelligence. In an area of study that has been fraught with ideological differences, this Handbook provides scientifically balanced and objective chapters covering a wide range of topics. It does not shy away from material that historically has been emotionally charged and sometimes covered in biased ways, such as intellectual disability, race and intelligence, culture and intelligence, and intelligence testing. The overview provided by this two-volume set leaves virtually no area of intelligence research uncovered, making it an ideal resource for undergraduates, graduate students, and professionals looking for a refresher or a summary of the new developments.

Review
'This Handbook is the ultimate collection of chapters needed by everyone who is interested in intelligence. It's exciting to see how the field has developed from the first to the second edition!' — Joachim Funke, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany

'The definition, scope, and operation of intelligence is central to the field of psychology and no topic has been more controversial. This Handbook, ably edited by Robert J. Sternberg, is comprehensive, authoritative, up-to-date, and admirably balanced.' —Howard Gardner, John H. and Elisabeth A. Hobbs Professor of Cognition and Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education

'Robert J. Sternberg has assembled the ideal people to cover the field of intelligence at the highest level of expertise. This Handbook is destined to remain the definitive source for information about the field for a long time.' —Richard E. Nisbett, Theodore M. Newcomb Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan

I am not a researcher or specialist in this field, though I do have a long time interest in the nature of intelligence--- both human intelligence and machine capabilities aiming towards intelligence. I find this book a pleasure and joy to read through. The endorsement comments made by the prominent academics are spot on. This two volume set is beautifully crafted and curated. Every article is well written and well organized. It is easy to skip around to find the chapters or sections within chapters that the reader may be particularly interested in or want to skip over. Creating this updated 2nd edition was obviously an incredibly large labor of love by Professor Sternberg. Everyone interested in the nature of intelligence-- from academic researchers who specialize in the area to non-specialist who want to understand and follow these developments--- is fortunate that Professor Sternberg worked with all the co-authors to produce this handbook. A gigantic thank you! —Steven Miller, Professor Emeritus of Information Systems, Singapore Management University

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Back in the late 1970s, immediately after I received my PhD, I recognized what I saw as a need for a handbook that would integrate theory, research, and practice in the field of human intelligence. The resulting product was the Handbook of Human Intelligence, which also was my first book with Cambridge University Press. At the time, the book seemed enormous, comprising fifteen chapters and more than a thousand printed pages. That book proved to be something of a milestone for the field. Handbooks expire after some number of years: New theory and research result in their replacement. For example, in 1982, Howard Gardner had not yet proposed his theory of multiple intelligences nor had I proposed my own triarchic theory of intelligence. It was time for a replacement. In 2000, I edited for Cambridge the Handbook of Intelligence, which had twenty-eight chapters. It was printed in a larger format and came in at about 700 pages. Yet this book had an even shorter shelf life because, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, research on human intelligence, which had moved slowly during the twentieth century, was on the fast track. By 2011, the first Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence was published, edited by myself and Scott Barry Kaufman. The book was up to forty-two chapters and more than 900 pages in a large printed format. And now I present what will be, for me, almost certainly the last edition of the handbook I edit: the Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence (2nd ed.), which contains fifty chapters and 1250 pages.

The monotonic increase in the number of chapters over the successive versions of the handbook represents the huge expansion of the field since the publication of the original handbook. For

example, a chapter on video games would have meant an entirely different thing in 1982, before the advent of the Internet, and there was little or no research to speak of. Concepts such as emotional intelligence, collective intelligence, mating intelligence, practical intelligence, and leadership intelligence had not yet been proposed. Although social intelligence had been studied, the research had been of psychometric tests not all so different from what was to be found on standard intelligence tests. The chapter on biological foundations in the original handbook had almost no overlap with the current chapter, so much has the field changed since then. The Flynn effect had only recently been discovered and the field had not yet realized how important the finding of secular increases in intelligence would be. Chapters on intelligence and wisdom or intelligence and expertise could barely have been written because the literatures at the time were so thin.

In only the near-decade since the first Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence came out, the field has again been transformed. And that is the reason why I am editing this last, for me, edition of the handbook, hoping that someone else takes over the next edition. Because, although I may grow old, the field is still a relatively young one, at least in the multiple and diverse forms it takes today. It is hard even to speculate what a handbook of intelligence for 2030 will look like. And that is precisely what makes the field so exciting.

The Concept of Intelligence: The Metaphors Underlying How Intelligence Is Understood by Robert J. Sternberg

Upon her death bed, Gertrude Stein has been said to have inquired, "What is the answer?" Getting no answer, she said, "In that case, what is the question?" (Toklas, 1963)

Gertrude Stein's question, "In that case, what is the question?" applies to few fields as well as it does to the field of intelligence (Sternberg, 1985b, 1990). The source of many of the questions asked about intelligence is the model, or metaphor, that drives research on intelligence. Different metaphors of mind give rise to different questions about the nature of intelligence and about what various empirical phenomena relating to it mean (Sternberg, 1990). The field of intelligence has been and continues to be marked by noisy and sometimes vitriolic debates, but often the debates have been more about the best questions to ask rather than about what the answers to particular questions are.

As an example, a persistent debate in the field of intelligence is over the respective roles of nature and nurture in the manifestation of individual differences in intelligence (Mandelman & Grigorenko, 2011; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1999). But the argument makes sense only if the terms are carefully defined. Where do interactive epigenetic effects fit in? How about gene-environment covariance? What exactly is meant by intelligence? Is the intelligence for which nature and nurture are being studied really the same thing over the life span, or is it a changing entity such that changes in effects may be due in part to changes in the entity of intelligence itself? And perhaps most important, what kind of entity is intelligence anyway — a hypothetical factorial construct, a set of processes going on in the brain, a cultural invention, or what? If it is a factorial construct, then it is perhaps stable across time and space, but if it is a cultural invention, then it certainly is not stable, and so it is not clear how one even could pin down genetic and environmental effects.

Scientists sometimes are unaware or only vaguely aware of the metaphor under which they are operating, even though that metaphor can have a major effect on the way they conceptualize the phenomena they are studying. In this chapter, I consider seven metaphors: geographic, computational, biological, epistemological, sociological, anthropological, and systems. I further consider mixed metaphors, and how they work in the study of intelligence.

The Geographic Metaphor

The geographic metaphor is based on the notion that a theory of intelligence should provide a metaphorical map of the mind. The use of a map leads to particular questions:

1. What are the underlying sources of individual differences, or psychometric factors, along which people differ, that generate observed individual differences in standardized test scores?
2. How do people differ with respect to their scores on each of these psychometric factors?
3. How does the map of the mind evolve as an individual grows older? For example, do factors grow more differentiated with age, perhaps then becoming less differentiated in old age?
4. How predictive is each of the factors of performances of various kinds, such as school grades or job performance?

If one metaphor has dominated research on intelligence, it almost certainly is the geographic one. Virtually all standardized tests, which are used so widely not only in the United States, but also around the world, are based on the geographic metaphor. Although early editions of the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler tests were largely atheoretical, more recent versions are more closely tied in with geographic theories, such as Carroll's (Roid, 2003; Wechsler, 2008). The most well-known theories of intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1963; Spearman, 1927; Thurstone, 1938; Vernon, 1950) are based on this metaphor.

Various factorial theories compete to answer the four questions above. The competition today is probably less heated than in the past. Whereas in the past, arguments raged over whether the general factor was predominant (Spearman, 1927) or secondary and even epiphenomenal (Thurstone, 1938), today there is probably pretty widespread agreement over the hierarchical nature of geographically conceived intelligence (Willis, Dumont, & Kaufman, 2011), although the exact nature of the hierarchy is still a matter of dispute (e.g., Carroll, 1993, versus Johnson & Bouchard, 2005).

The competition has always been somewhat dubious because factors can be rotated in an infinite number of different ways, and part of the answer to the question of what geographic representation makes most sense depends on where one places the axes, and on how many orders of factors one decides to extract. There are an infinite number of possible maps that could be correct for any given geographic region, and which map is best turns out to be a question of usefulness rather than of veridicality. (Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the gerrymandering state legislatures have done to favor one or the other political party, resulting at times in contortionist districts created to favor one political party over the other.) The locations of the points on the map do not change — just how they are labeled (districted). Each map of the mind may be useful, but only for its own particular purposes.

Because geographic theories are structural, they tend more to address questions about structure but less or not at all questions about other issues. If one's goal is to predict school or job performance in general, a single score on a general factor of an intelligence test may be adequate, but if one wishes to do more differentiated prediction, more precise scores, such as of verbal, numerical, and spatial ability, may be more useful (Lubinski, in press). Geographic theories have little or nothing to say about the mapping of factors onto the brain and they do not have a clear way to deal with transition mechanisms in cognitive development (Sternberg, 1984). Geographically based theories tend to be derived on the basis of individual-difference data so that their depiction of intelligence is in terms of sources of individual differences. If intellectual abilities exist that are common in both the nature and level of ability across people, geographic theories tend not to represent them because there are no individual differences from which to derive psychometric factors.

A difficult issue for all of the geographic theorists is how fine a mapping one wishes to create. Carroll's (1993) was very refined, Cattell's (1971) much less so. Just as different kinds of mappings are possible, so are different degrees of differentiation within the regions of those mappings. Once again, then, there is no correct answer. One comes to realize that, within the geographic metaphor, there is room for many theories to be "right," in some sense. They all represent the same ground, but with different borders and different degrees of precision.

The Computational Metaphor

The computational metaphor sees the mind as a computing device analogous to a computer. "Software" in the mind determines the mental processes of thought, just as software in a computer determines the computational processes of the computer. The metaphor has proven to be enormously productive of both theory and research (see, e.g., Hunt, 2010; Sternberg, 1985a, 1988). Perhaps because the computational metaphor in the study of intelligence was generated largely in response to the geographic one (Hunt, 1980; Sternberg, 1977), its strengths and weaknesses tend to be complementary. For example, the geographic metaphor, because of its relatively static nature, tends to be somewhat weak in addressing questions of process. In contrast, the computational metaphor tends to be well able to address questions of process. But in the computational metaphor, inferences about structure are much more indirect than they are in the geographic metaphor, in which the results of a factor analysis directly provide a structural model. Moreover, whereas data from experiments generated by geographically based theories primarily make use of individual-differences data, data from experiments generated by computationally based theories tend to focus on commonalities among people and processing. Normally, in the computational approach, the main source of variation observed is that variation that occurs across stimulus conditions rather than across subjects. The result is that the computational metaphor tends to be well able to point out commonalities in information processing rather than individual. differences. Indeed, many information-processing experiments do not even consider individual differences at all, whereas psychometric studies, in contrast, virtually always do. This problem was recognized by Cronbach (1957), who spoke of the difficulty psychologists had had bridging the gap between experimental and differential psychology. Now, more than sixty years later, the problem exists as it did then.

The computational metaphor seemed, when it first was used, to be an answer to the ever-proliferating numbers of factors being posited by geographic theorists. At the time, the worst proliferator was probably Guilford (1967, 1988), who by the end of his career had increased the total number of proposed factors in his theory from 120 to 150 and then to 180. But in fact, the computational metaphor has the same problem as the geographic one. The computational metaphor provides no final answer, however, because just as factors can be subdivided endlessly, so can processes be subdivided endlessly. For example, one can speak of "encoding" stimuli, but certainly there are many subprocesses involved in figuring out what a stimulus is. Again, there is no one correct level of analysis: It depends on what one wishes to do with the theory. But it is important to realize that arguments over how finely processes should be split will be fruitless, because there is no one right answer. For example, one would wish to pay more attention to the details of how stimuli are perceived in a computer program that is designed to simulate visual perception than one would pay in a program that uses visual perception in the service of, say, inductive reasoning. Thus, even computer programs provide no final answer. When a program "encodes," how much information it needs to encode a stimulus depends on the purpose to which the encoding will be put.

Computational theorists tend to be insensitive to individual differences. As a result, these theorists have not always been quick to realize that often there is no one uniformly correct information-processing model that applies to all individuals, with respect either to performance on a given task or to performance on classes of tasks. Rather, there may well be individual differences in the

processes and strategies different people use to solve a given problem or class of problems (e.g., Hickendorff et al., 2010; Sternberg & Weil, 1980).

At one time, there was a hope that individual components of information processing would map into factors (Sternberg, 1977), such that each elementary information-processing component would map into its own factor as a source of individual differences. This view was idealistic and also nave. Informationprocessing components tend to cluster together into factors, rather than standing as separate factors (Sternberg, 1983). Moreover, the components do not always cluster into the factors they were expected to cluster into. Sternberg (1977) found this out early, when a preparation-response component proved to have high loadings on an inductive-reasoning factor — higher than did the components alleged to measure inductive reasoning. So there is no more a set of "correct" components than there is a set of "correct" factors.

Computational theorists have even argued among themselves as to what constitutes a true information-processing theory. Some early theorists, such as Newell and Simon (1972), viewed their computer programs themselves as theories. This made for extreme specificity in a theory, but perhaps to a fault. Would one really want to argue that even changing a line of code in a computer program resulted in a new theory, or even a serious variant of the original theory? And how general were these theories anyway? A computer program might be able to solve a given type of problem or perform a particular kind of task, but usually it would not have much generalization beyond the problem or task. Designating a program as a theory results in at least two criteria for good theories perhaps going by the wayside — parsimony and generalizability.

Other theorists, such as Schank (1972) and Anderson (2015), have viewed computer programs as operationalizations, and imperfect ones at that, of theories. Perhaps the biggest danger with computational theories is that they will fail to distinguish the forest from the trees. Because they tend to deal with information processing at a very basic level, it is easy for computational theorists to become extremely focused on the details of information processing and, at times, to lose sight of their deep motivation for studying a particular task. They may even lose sight of how performance on that task fits into a larger scheme of things. Cognitive psychology can get quite wrapped up in trees and be quite oblivious of the forest in which the trees grow.

The Biological Metaphor

Biologically based theories generally study intelligence in terms of the functioning of the central nervous system and especially the brain. Because our understanding of the brain is still rather rudimentary, biological theories are largely works in process. But some of them have come quite far (see, e.g., Haier, 2017). Many of the theories tend to be based on one or more of five types of data.

The first kind of data, briefly mentioned earlier, is actually of two subtypes —behavior-genetic and molecular-genetic data (see Plomin et al., 2012). These models typically use geographically derived theories to determine the structure of intelligence. That is, they are not models of structure or process but rather of the origins and development of intelligence. In the past, genetic and environmental factors were viewed as somehow opposed to each other, and theorists such as Jensen (1998) and Kamin (1974) saw their respective roles as arguing either for the higher (Jensen) or lower (Kamin) heritability of intelligence as defined by IQ. Hans Eysenck and Leon Kamin even wrote a book together that expressed their debating positions of higher or lower heritability (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). Those arguing for higher heritability, such as Eysenck and Jensen, believed the heritability of IQ to be around 0.80, whereas those at the other extreme, such as Kamin, questioned whether there was any heritability at all. A consensus estimate was around 0.50 (Mandelman & Grigorenko, 2011).

The debate was not one of the more productive ones in the history of psychology. For one thing, the debate falsely assumed that genetics and environment work in opposition to, rather than in coordination with, each other. Today, there is good reason to believe that gene-environment covariation is extremely important, and it is hard cleanly to assign such covariation effects to either genes or the environment since they work in coordination (Flynn, 2016). For another thing, as Herrnstein (1973) pointed out, there is no single true heritability of intelligence or of anything else. Heritability is determined as a ratio of genetic to phenotypic variance, and the level of the ratio will depend on the amount of variation there is in a given gene pool or in a particular set of environments. Where genetic variance is low — in genetic pools that are largely homogeneous — environmentality will have to be relatively high. Where environmental variance is low — in environments where everyone, say, has a poor or a good environment — heritability will have to be relatively high. These conclusions are deductively true — that is, they have to be correct because they are a function of the mathematics of the situation. What is odd, therefore, is that Herrnstein received such a vitriolic reaction to his book and other writings of the time. He was merely stating what mathematically had to be true, and what suggested that an effort to find "true heritability" was a waste of time.

Eric Turkheimer and his colleagues (Turkheimer et al., 2003) showed that the situation is even more complex, in that the heritability of intelligence appears to vary with social class. In particular, lower social class is associated with lower heritability of intelligence, presumably because there is more variability in the environments of individuals from lower socioeconomic status (SES) than is found for individuals of higher SES. The fact that SES affects heritability of intelligence suggests, of course, that there probably are other variables that affect heritability as well. The bottom line is that simply looking for the value of heritability seems to be a fruitless search. Understanding the mechanisms aside from variability that affect heritability, however, seems like an entirely worthwhile pursuit.

A second path to understanding the biology of intelligence is via brain-scanning mechanisms, such as positron emission tomography (PET) scanning and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) analysis. Some of the earliest pioneers of this method, such as Richard Haier and colleagues (1992a, 1992b), used PET scans to measure glucose consumption in the brain while subjects performed complex tasks, such as the game of Tetris. One might have expected that the more able subjects would become deeply involved in the game and show higher levels of glucose consumption; however, the opposite was true. The more able subjects showed lower levels of glucose consumption, presumably because they found the tasks easy and did not have to work very hard on them. For more difficult tasks, the pattern was reversed, presumably because the less able subjects gave up and the more able ones worked hard to solve the problems.

More recent studies have used fMRI to isolate portions of the brain involved in particular tasks. As a result of PET and fMRI analysis, Jung and Haier (2007) proposed a new theory of intelligence, parieto-frontal integration theory (P-FIT). This theory, described in more detail in Chapter 19, argues that the most important parts of the brain for the development and execution of intelligence are in the frontal and parietal lobes of the brain. Some of the relevant areas are in the left hemisphere, others in both hemispheres. The theory emphasizes the importance of the integration of the different parts of the brain in producing intelligence. This theory, in a sense, is opposite to Howard Gardner's (2011), which emphasizes the modularity of the various aspects of intelligence.

A third type of data is the specific use of patients with various kinds of brain damage, such as HM (now known to be Henry Molaison), who had a bilateral medial temporal lobectomy in the hope of mitigating symptoms of epilepsy. As a result, HM lost most of his ability to acquire new information. Thus, he could remember much of what happened in his past, but he could not form new memories. Many of the early brain-based theories of intelligence relied heavily on knowledge gained from such patients (e.g., Gazzaniga, 1970; Levy, Trevarthen, & Sperry, 1972). These theories represent

pioneering early work on brain-based theories of intelligence. The advantage of such theories was that it was possible to study what effects specific lesions had on intellectual functioning. At the same time, the methodologies raised some challenging questions. First, brain-damaged patients are scarcely typical, and it has never been clear how generalizable results from these patients are to other individuals. Second, to the extent that intelligence depends on interconnections among various brain systems, these patients are not the best individuals to study, because their brain interconnections are disrupted. One's conclusion may or may not generalize to normal brains. Third, the N's in studies of brain-damaged patients tend to be extremely small, leading to questions about how generalizable the results can be.

A fourth method has been somewhat superficial but nevertheless popular among some investigators, namely, studying head size or brain size (Pietschnig et al., 2015; Witelson, Beresh, & Kigar, 2006). There seems to be little doubt that there is a correlation between brain size and intelligence, as well as between brain integrity and intelligence. The larger question is what to make of the correlation. For example, is a larger brain a cause of greater intelligence, an effect, or both? In what specific areas does size matter? It appears greater interconnectivity between hemispheres can compensate in some degree for lesser size (Gur et al., 1999). How much do size and interconnectivity actually matter, and to what extent can they trade off? At the very least, the technology has come a long way since people simply were measuring head size, as they did in earlier centuries.

A fifth approach has been to use electrophysiological data. Electrodes are generally attached to a person's skull, and event-rated potentials (ERPs) or electroencephalogram (EEG) measurements are taken while subjects are at rest or while they are performing some task. The idea here is usually to look at patterns in the electrophysiological data or to convert the data into one or more scores and then relate the patterns or scores to measures that are believed to assess intelligence, such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales or Raven's Progressive Matrices (Neubauer, Freudenthaler, & Pfurtscheller, 1995). Such studies have revealed interesting aspects of performance, such as the relevance of certain event-related potentials (such as P300 — a positive deflection in an ERP occurring about 300 ms after the presentation of a stimulus) to alertness in task performance.

The Epistemological Metaphor

The epistemological metaphor is largely attributable to Jean Piaget. That said, Piaget was himself influenced by others, such as James Mark Baldwin. Piaget referred to his own approach to theorizing as "genetic epistemological," reflecting its joint influence by biology and philosophy. Although Piaget's theory is multifaceted, the theory as it applies to intelligence has two main parts.

One part of Piaget's account of human intelligence is his theory of equilibration, according to which the absorption of new information is achieved by a dynamic equilibrium between two complementary cognitive processes, assimilation and accommodation. The other part of Piaget's theory is his account of periods of development, starting with the sensorimotor period and ending with the formal-operational period. Piaget's theory has been enormously influential in developmental psychology and psychology in general, although today it has been superseded, at least in parts, by more modem cognitive theories (see Goswami, 2013).

Piaget's theory is not only formal itself, but draws heavily on formal logic and other aspects of the philosophy of knowledge in its development. As a result, it sometimes has been viewed as a theory of competence rather than of performance, describing the formal structures that underlie development rather than the way these structures are put into practice.

First, the theory is much more nearly complete in accounting for the development of formal and logical thought than it is in accounting for the development of intuitive and aesthetic thought. But much of intelligence is not understandable in terms of scientific modes of thought. Moreover,

current cognitive research questions much of the account of scientific thinking (see Goswami, 2013). That said, the only theories that have been more influential in psychology probably are those of Freud. The goal of psychological theories probably is not to be correct in all details, but rather to have heuristic value in generating further research, and few theories have generated more research than have Piaget's.

Second, there seem to be problems with strictly stagelike theories, whether Piaget's or anyone else's. Several critiques have been written of stage theories (e.g., Brainerd, 1978), but the biggest problem is that intellectual development just does not appear to show the strictly stagelike properties that it is supposed to show according to Piaget's theory. Piaget himself was aware of the problem and introduced the concept of "horizontal decalage" to account for the fact that not all operations within a given period seem to develop at the same time. But naming a problem does not in itself solve or somehow get rid of the problem.

Third, it now appears that children can accomplish many tasks at earlier ages than Piaget thought possible (Galotti, 2016). In some cases, children defined problems differently from the way Piaget and his coworkers defined them, resulting in their performance looking poorer than it might have if they had better understood what the examiner intended to ask. In other cases, the sources of difficulty that Piaget and his coworkers attributed as critical to the problems now appear to be quite correct. The most famous example perhaps is that pointed out by Bryant and Trabasso (1971), where difficulty in transitive inference problems that Piaget attributed to reasoning proved instead to be attributable to memory.

Fourth, formal operations, as Piaget called the last period, which begins at roughly age eleven or twelve, no longer seem to be the end of the line with respect to intellectual development. A variety of research efforts have suggested periods of intellectual development that go beyond formal operations (Arlin, 1975; Case, 1984). At the same time, it has become clear that not everyone even reaches the formal-operations stage.

The Sociological Metaphor

The sociological metaphor owes as much to Lev Vygotsky (1978) as the epistemological metaphor does to Piaget. Whereas Piaget viewed intelligence as making its way from the inside, outward, Vygotsky saw it as making its way from the outside, inward. As children develop, they internalize the socioemotional processes they observe in the environment. The sociological metaphor, consequently, focuses on how socialization processes affect the development of intelligence and related constructs.

The sociological metaphor is a fairly popular one today in developmental psychology, perhaps partly in reaction to Piaget. However, its being in vogue is certainly due in large part to the importance of enculturation and socialization processes to the young. That said, there exists nothing even resembling a complete theory of intelligence that is based on the sociological metaphor. The closest is the theory of Reuven Feuerstein (1979), the late Israeli psychologist, who believed that human intelligence is fully modifiable. However, his theory is more one of cognitive modifiability than of intelligence per se.

Vygotsky emphasized the notion of a zone ofproximal development, according to which learning occurs best with guidance from an experienced teacher at a level just beyond that at which an individual feels comfortable. The idea is that, with intervention, people can learn things they could never learn themselves. Intelligence is measured via dynamic testing (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002).

Dynamic testing is like conventional static testing, in that people are tested and then inferences are made about their abilities. But dynamic tests differ from static tests in that children are provided

with feedback that will help them to improve their performance. Vygotsky (1978) argued that children's ability to profit from the guided instructional feedback the children received during a dynamic testing session could function as a measure of children's zone of proximal development, or the difference between their developed abilities and their underlying capacities. Put another way, testing and instruction are treated as being of a single kind rather than as being distinct processes. This integration of testing and instruction makes sense in terms of conventional definitions of intelligence, which emphasize the importance of the ability to learn. A dynamic test directly measures processes of learning in the context of assessment rather than measuring these processes of learning indirectly as the product of past learning experiences. Such dynamic measurement is especially important when not all children have had equal opportunities in the past to learn what they need to know to perform well on tests.

The Anthropological Metaphor

Adherents to the anthropological metaphor view intelligence as, at least in part, a cultural invention (Berry, 1974; Berry & Irvine, 1986; Sternberg, 2004). On this view, intelligence is a somewhat different thing from one culture to another, because the knowledge and skills it takes to adapt to one culture will be quite different from those needed to adapt to another. Thus we may learn relatively little about the intelligence of one culture from studying intelligence in another culture, and indeed, our attempts to transfer knowledge actually may be harmful, because we may make generalizations that are likely not to be correct. From the anthropological viewpoint, the best example of this is IQ testing. In such testing, a test that is developed in one culture is often brought directly into another culture. Often, the translation does not even adequately convey the meanings of the test items to the individuals in the distinct culture. Not all adherents of the anthropological view are radical cultural relativists like Berry, but all of them believe that in order fully to understand intelligence within a culture, one needs to study that culture in its own right and not assume that generalization can be made from one culture to another.

The anthropological metaphor provides a needed counterbalance to the metaphors considered earlier, especially the geographic, computational, and biological, because it views intelligence in terms of the external world, not just the internal world of the individual. So whereas Haier (2017) argued that intelligence is entirely biological, those who believe in the anthropological metaphor might say that cognitive processes have some biological origins, but how they are manifested in the everyday world to display intelligence can vary widely from one culture to another.

A first possible problem with this metaphor is that it can go from the biological extreme to a cultural one. Intelligence probably represents some interaction of biology with culture. It is not clear that either a purely biological or a purely cultural viewpoint is as enlightening as some kind of integration of the two.

A second possible problem is that we do not have good theories of context, at least as it applies to intelligence. Context may well matter for the manifestation of intelligence, but we have nothing with the precision of the factor models in order to say just how these effects come about or even what exactly they are.

A third problem is that if intelligence is really so different from one culture to another, the implication is that any model must be painfully culturally specific. There have been attempts to remedy this apparent difficulty. For example, Sternberg (2004) has argued that the mental processes that underlie intelligence — processes like recognizing the existence of a problem defining the problem, formulating a strategy to solve the problem representing information about the problem, etc. — are universal.

But the ways in which these processes are manifested in the environment, and the ways in which they are best tested, can differ radically from one culture to another. On this view, some things are common, others are not, and part of understanding intelligence is understanding what is specific and what is not.

The Systems Metaphor

The systems metaphor is perhaps the vaguest of all of the metaphors that have been considered. I group under "systems theories" those theories that seek to understand intelligence in terms of multiple systems of intelligence or even multiple intelligences (Gardner, 2011; Sternberg, 2003). These theories are more complex, in some respects, than theories in the past generally have been, although probably no more complex than P-FIT theory. One goal of these theories is to understand intelligence in a way that transcends a single metaphor and that combines aspects of at least several of the metaphors that have been considered above.

The dangers inherent in systems theories are not readily dismissed. For example, Gardner's theory was first presented in 1983 (Gardner, 1983), but as yet there is no adequate empirical test or set of tests that provides solid empirical support for its main claims — that intelligence is modular, that there are eight multiple intelligences, and that the various intelligences are uncorrelated with each other. On the contrary, the existing evidence suggests that these claims are questionable (Haier, 2017; Visser, Ashton, & Vernon, 2006). Although there has been a lot of evidence collected in favor of Sternberg's theory of successful intelligence (Sternberg, 2003), many would question whether elements such as creative, practical, and wisdom-based skills should be included in the definition of intelligence (Hunt, 2010). Hunt, among others (see Sternberg & Kaufman, 2011), also considers the general factor of intelligence (g) to be more powerful than do I. So one might argue that systems theories, in attempting to be more encompassing, may go too far in stretching the concept of intelligence. In large part, whether one thinks so depends on the metaphor of mind that underlies one's thinking about intelligence. Systems theories also are broad but when one looks broadly, one sometimes misses important local details.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have reviewed different metaphors of mind for understanding human intelligence. Battles among intelligence researchers have either been between competing theories within metaphors, or equally often, between advocates for different metaphors. Some researchers appear to believe that there is a "correct" or most basic metaphor. For example, Haier (2017) seems to believe that all of intelligence is reducible to the study of the human brain. Lest it sound like I am casting aspersions on others, I hasten to add that I once believed that I had found the "correct" metaphor. At the beginning of my career, I wrote an entire book arguing that the computational metaphor was the basic one, and that eventually, other approaches would be reduced to the computational one (Sternberg, 1977). For example, I believed that factors of intelligence recovered through the geographic metaphor were nothing more than systematic combinations of information-processing components. Thus, a factor such as "inductive reasoning" could be accounted for in terms of information-processing components such as inference (seeing relations between items), higher-order mapping (seeing relations between relations), and application (applying relations from one item to another). I was able to collect data that showed that the information-processing components of inductive reasoning that I identified accounted for a lot (usually over 80%, sometimes over 90%) of the variation in reaction-time data across item types. But there were problems suggesting that the particular theory needed revision. The regression constant — preparation-response time — was more highly correlated with measures of fluid intelligence than were the inference, mapping, and application components!

Here is the problem: One can call into question and even disconfirm theories generated within a metaphor but there is no way of disconfirming a metaphor. Metaphors are not in any absolute sense right or wrong, but rather, more or less useful for particular purposes. If someone is committed to a metaphor, over time that someone may come to believe that the metaphor really is somehow the "right" one, even though it is just one of many possible windows into the world of intelligence (or anything else). If one looks at scientific careers, people change theories with at least some degree of regularity. They rarely change metaphors. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume, there are some luminaries who have done so. Both Spearman and Thurstone did so (Spearman, 1923 — computational — versus Spearman, 1927 — geographic; Thurstone, 1924 — biological — versus Thurstone, 1938 — geographic), but such flexibility across metaphors is the exception rather than the rule. Investigators, once they embark on the use of a metaphor of mind, change it only relatively rarely. There are exceptions, such as but not limited to Deary (2000), who has varied in his work across geographic, computational, and biological approaches.

Metaphors are like languages: They are different ways of expressing ideas. And even languages can employ different symbol systems, such as those that use the Latin alphabet, or the Chinese hanzi symbol system of Chinese and some other Asian languages, or the gestural symbols of American Sign Language, or the Cyrillic alphabet of Russian, or simply the only vaguely specifiable code of the nonverbal communication we all use with each other. There is no one "correct" symbol system. Each symbol system can be useful for different purposes. So is it with metaphors of mind. There is no one "right" one, although different ones can be more useful for different purposes. If one wants to understand the role of the brain in intelligence, one might turn to the biological metaphor, but if one wants to understand the role of culture, the anthropological metaphor will be more useful. We maximize our learning about human intelligence when we recognize that the metaphor that serves us best is the one that best serves our theoretical and research purposes. Sometimes, combining metaphors — even mixing them — is best of all. <>

A FEMINIST THEORY OF REFUSAL by Bonnie Honig [The Mary Flexner Lectures of Bryn Mawr College, Harvard University Press, 9780674248496]

An acclaimed political theorist offers a fresh, interdisciplinary analysis of the politics of refusal, highlighting the promise of a feminist politics that does not simply withdraw from the status quo but also transforms it.

The BACCHAE, Euripides's fifth-century tragedy, famously depicts the wine god Dionysus and the women who follow him as indolent, drunken, mad. But **Bonnie Honig** sees the women differently. They reject work, not out of laziness, but because they have had enough of women's routine obedience. Later they escape prison, leave the city of Thebes, explore alternative lifestyles, kill the king, and then return to claim the city. Their "arc of refusal," Honig argues, can inspire a new feminist politics of refusal.

Refusal, the withdrawal from unjust political and economic systems, is a key theme in political philosophy. Its best-known literary avatar is Herman Melville's Bartleby, whose response to every request is, "I prefer not to." A feminist politics of refusal, by contrast, cannot simply decline to participate in the machinations of power. Honig argues that a feminist refusal aims at transformation and, ultimately, self-governance. Withdrawal is a first step, not the end game.

Rethinking the concepts of refusal in the work of Giorgio Agamben, Adriana Cavarero, and Saidiya Hartman, Honig places collective efforts toward self-governance at refusal's core and, in doing so, invigorates discourse on civil and uncivil disobedience. She seeks new protagonists in film, art, and in historical and fictional figures including Sophocles's Antigone, Ovid's Procne, Charlie Chaplin's Tramp, Leonardo da Vinci's Madonna, and Muhammad Ali. Rather than decline the corruptions of politics, these agents of refusal join the women of Thebes first in saying no and then in risking to undertake transformative action.

Reviews

"Give her glory! In her reading of and with the **BACCHAE**, Bonnie Honig takes us through the text into critical theory, theater, and the agonistic political. Her sisterly feminism makes women fiercer, more violent, more political, more closely and willfully bound to one another, full of food and pleasure and joy in rebellion. In the arc of refusal that Honig makes visible, sexualities become iridescent acts of will, maternalism falls before an egalitarian sisterhood, and an ancient text opens to new forms of political struggle."—Anne Norton, author of *95 Theses on Politics, Culture, and Method*

"With a questing mind and an eye for the revealing detail, Honig finds unexpected meanings in Euripides's *Bacchae*, showing how the play expands and renews feminist concepts of resistance. In their repeated refusals, sororal mutuality, and storytelling, the wild women who desert Thebes for the forest give us valuable hints about how power is sustained and how it may be opposed. For Honig, reading itself becomes a bold collaboration, an opportunity to place thinkers in surprising company and learn from the experiment."—Joy Connolly, President, American Council of Learned Societies

"A profoundly relevant study of the three graces of refusal—inclination, inoperativity, and fabulation—and how, interwoven, they work to deepen its far-reaching agency. Honig encourages us all to stake a claim in the retelling of our histories, to push our narratives beyond the maddening limitations of patriarchal normativity. This is our civic and political duty, whether we succeed or fail. As Honig says, 'we are in it together.'"—Lisa Dwan, actor, writer, director, and star of *Pale Sister*

"In Bonnie Honig's stunning reinterpretation of the *Bacchae*, the concept of refusal—not an end in itself, but a necessary first step toward liberation and transformation—grounds an audacious and utterly persuasive feminist politics. Along the way, readers are treated to surprising and reciprocally illuminating pairings: Saidiya Hartman and Hannah Arendt, Greek tragedy and Black fabulation, Bartleby the Scrivener and Charlie Chaplin. This book blazes like a comet with intellectual sparks in its wake."—Vaughn Rasberry, author of *Race and the Totalitarian Century: Geopolitics in the Black Literary Imagination*

"Exhilarating. With her vital reading of the *Bacchae*, Honig develops a fierce feminist politics that sees refusal not as passivity but as a violent transformative love."—Catherine Conybeare, author of *The Laughter of Sarah: Biblical Exegesis, Feminist Theory, and the Concept of Delight*

CONTENTS

The Bacchae's Arc of Refusal and the Tragedy of the City

Refusal in Euripides's fifth century tragedy, the Bacchae, occurs when the women (1) refuse work in the city, then (2) move outside the city where they live otherwise, then (3) return to the city with a set of demands. The first two actions violate King Pentheus's orders. By the time of the third, Pentheus is dead and Cadmus, his grandfather, has stepped into his place. As I read the play, the three refusals are connected stops on a single arc of refusal. Indeed, the work-refusal and heterotopian escape set up the return to the city that follows. In this book, I make the case for reading the Bacchae this way. I also argue that depicting refusal as an arc conveys a normative, civic, and feminist obligation to risk the impurities of politics on behalf of transformation. The effort may fail, but the return to the city, I claim, is fundamental to a feminist theory of refusal that aims to transform the city, not abandon it. The city, in this book, is a figure for political community. It may be an actual city, but it may also be a state, a town, a village, or a neighborhood.

Not all admirable refusals follow this arc. Indigenous theorists of refusal, for example, have argued in favor of developing or recommitting to their own sovereignties rather than working to ameliorate or infiltrate those of settler societies. In some areas of Black studies, the city is seen as so unsalvageable that fugitivity is embraced as the only way for Black life to flourish. The arc of refusal that I trace here may not serve the needs of such theorists and prac ti tion ers of refusal.1 Even so, my hope is that some may find something useful in the agonism of Euripides' bacchants and the audacity of their refusal.

It was Euripides's play that first led me to think about refusal as having an arc and of the city as its destination. In the Bacchae, the arc belongs to the women, the bacchants, but their refusal has not received any serious attention as such, because (1) the women are assumed to be mad, in thrall to Dionysus, and unaware of what they are doing when they defy and kill the king, (2) the tragic ending means most readers see not an arc but a restoration or reprimand, and (3) although the play is named for the bacchants, most readers take the focus to be the play's remarkable agon between Thebes's male rivals: Pentheus, the king, and Dionysus, a foreign god who is (unbeknownst to Pentheus) the king's cousin. For these reasons, most readings of the Bacchae prioritize its lessons about religion, kinship, recognition, or hubris but not refusal. But what happens when we switch the focus from the male rivals' quest for power to the women's collaborative experiments? From male hubris to women's agency? From heterotopia as fugitivity to a space / time of rehearsal? From women's singular madness to refusal's arc?

Reopening the Bacchae as a drama of refusal requires first and foremost that we depathologize the conventional picture of the women as mad or deluded. Once we do that, all the other objections lose their grip. When it is said that the women do not know what they are doing, we may recall Hannah Arendt's insistence that in acting politically in concert with others, we are self forgetting. Caught up in action, we are not in charge of it; we may be its initiators, but we are not its authors. Indeed, we may well be surprised later to realize what we have done. This is why action, on Arendt's account, postulates forgiveness. The example of Agave, Pentheus's mother, reminds us it may also postulate mourning. The Bacchae dramatizes the difficulty that Arendt recounts. That the bacchants know not what they do is not reason enough to dismiss their political agency; it is also a reason to consider it seriously. Once we do so, the bacchants' return to the city stands out more starkly as a

po lit i cal action. They could have stayed away. They lack for nothing outside the city. But they return. Why? Perhaps to claim equality, perhaps to demand their story be told, perhaps to alter the city. Approached this way, the bacchants seem to be more worldly than worldless. Indeed, as I read it, the Bacchae teaches how even when refusal seems to reject the world, it betrays a deep attachment to it, if not to the world as it is, then surely to a more just world that is not yet.

From the perspective of an arc of refusal, the bacchants' time outside the city appears not as ventilation but as preparation: a re formation of the body and steeling of the mind to one day alter the everyday, not just rejoin it. When the women leave Thebes and repair to Cithaeron, I argue, their purpose is to prepare a storm of transformation and not just gather a breeze of fond memories that will occasionally stir the windless "safety" of home.3 The latter reading is recuperative. The former is transformative. The transformative intent is clear, as we shall see, in Agave's address to the city when she returns to Thebes.

Although I follow the lead of Agave and the bacchants, and trace the arc of their refusal, I want to make clear that the subjects of a feminist theory of refusal need not be women as such, but those shaped by feminist theory and practice. In the Bacchae, as we shall see, even the bacchants, who are women in the city, are not always women outside of it. Their experiments in living on Cithaeron traverse conventional categories of sex / gender and human / animal. We may see promise in their gender and species crossing while still seeing their dissidence as a feminist refusal. The term feminist here refers to the proj ect of enacting sex-gender equality, which includes pluralizing sex gender practices and identities, in the face of governing powers that insist on gender binarism, heteronormative sphere separatism, patriarchal kinship, and the instrumentalities and inequalities they secure. In some sense, I will argue, feminist refusal is, as such, a regicidal project because it seeks to put an end to the old order. In the Bacchae, when the bacchants kill the king, it seems they do so unknowingly. But I am not so sure.

In the chapters that follow, I connect the three moments in the bacchants' arc of refusal—(1) refusing work, (2) leaving the city (Cithaeron) and (3) returning to the city— with three refusal concepts, respectively: (1) Giorgio Agamben's inoperativity (which suspends use and offers up new (post) uses of the body), (2) Adriana Cavarero's inclination (which represents a new moral geometry of relationality and care "completely apart" from the autonomous verticalism of the city), and (3) Saidiya Hartman's fabulation (her "method of refusal," which can also be the basis for the story told of an action that becomes part of a web of meaning). In each of the three numbered chapters, the selected refusal concept— inoperativity, inclination, or fabulation— presses us to a new reading of some aspect of the Bacchae, and then the Bacchae, along with other contemporary "Bacchaes," in turn force a critical rethinking of the concept. To the latter end, Agamben on inoperativity is here joined with Judith Butler (Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, on assembly), Cavarero on inclination with Sara Ahmed (Queer Phenomenology, on dis / orientation), and Hartman on fabulation with Hannah Arendt (On Revolution and The Human Condition on the city that fabulation postulates and fabulates). The idea is to explore the three refusal concepts' promise and limitations in order to recover them for current use and illumination.

One particular focus throughout is on how refusal is remembered or erased. It will come as no surprise that the Bacchae, which tells the story of Dionysus, the god of forgetting, can be read through the lens of memory and forgetting. But in Chapter 3, on fabulation, we will see that memory is not enough: the story's emplotment matters, too. This comes out in my reading there of the seldom noted agon in the Bacchae between Agave and her father, Cadmus. The agon is seldom noted because the consensus is that "the principal axis of the play is the protracted contest between the two young cousins, Pentheus and Dionysus." It is a good scene; Robin Robertson is right about

that.5 But the later agon between Agave and Cadmus is worthy of attention, too, precisely because it shifts the play's principal axis and focuses attention on the politics of storytelling.

The contest between father and daughter is over how to tell the story of the women's action. A feminist theory of refusal notes the practices by which memory and forgetting are shaped and enjoined because these affect not only the past but also the future. In the Bacchae, as we shall see, the techniques by which the story is shaped include the pathologization of the women (by Pentheus), their maternalization (by Cadmus, Agave's father, and by Pentheus, her son), and, ultimately, their exile (by Dionysus). The Bacchae documents a "splendid failure" (to borrow W. E. B. Du Bois's term) in which a possibility first nurtured outside the city is extinguished, but memory of it remains. A women's refusal is rendered unimaginable but it nonetheless haunts the very pre sent that denies its possibility. It may even seed a future.

But the Bacchae is less well known than other dramas of refusal such as "Bartleby" or Antigone. I turn now to summarize the play before taking up in detail this book's work of counter-narration, conceptual critique, and recovery.

IN THE Bacchae, a festival of Dionysus goes terribly wrong, or possibly terribly right, depending on how we interpret the play. The play begins with the arrival in Thebes of Dionysus, a foreign god followed by bacchants from Asia who travel with him spreading his mysteries. Dionysus is the god not only of theater, music, and poetry but also of wine and forgetting. Tiresias, the blind seer, explains early on, "the goddess Demeter— she is the earth, but call her whatever name you wish; she nourishes mortals with dry food; but he who came afterwards, [Dionysus] the offspring of Semele, discovered a match to it, the liquid drink of the grape, and introduced it to mortals. It releases wretched mortals from grief, whenever they are filled with the stream of the vine, and gives them sleep, a means of forgetting their daily troubles, nor is there another cure for hardships." The chorus echoes Tiresias's appreciation of the gift: "To the blessed and to the less fortunate, he gives an equal plea sure from wine that banishes grief."

Dionysus is not really a foreign god, however. The drama turns on his native city's failure to recognize him as one of its own. In fact, he is, as Tiresias says, the son of Semele, one of four daughters of Cadmus, Thebes's founder and grandfather of the current king, Pentheus. Years earlier, as Dionysus explains, Semele had been "visited" by Zeus and became pregnant with Dionysus. She told her story, claiming Zeus was the father of the child, and was challenged by her three sisters, Agave, Ino, and Autonoe, to prove it. The sisters dared Semele to call Zeus to come to her, surely knowing the danger, since calling on Zeus is a perilous act. And sure enough, when the god did come, proving the truth of her claim, Semele died in the encounter. Was this an act of sororicide? Did the sisters instrumentalize Zeus to their purpose?

There is a shrine of sorts in Thebes for Semele, with a flame that is tended, so we may infer she is not forgotten. Yet no one seems to have inquired into the wrong committed against her nor into what might have become of the baby she was carrying when she died. After Semele's death, Zeus took the fetus into a womb of his own and birthed the baby (or something like that; in the play, Tiresias notes that story has been garbled over the years, suggesting the plurality of myth and the unreliability of reports). The child grew up to be the wine god, Dionysus, who now returns to Thebes seeking recognition and vengeance. Cadmus, king at the time of Semele's death, never addressed his daughters' vio lence, which was left open: unadjudicated, unresolved, poised to return. Thus, we know that the women who join up with Dionysus in the Bacchae already know how to act in concert with murderous intent.

The lack of an inquiry and the denial of his cult by Thebes, first under the leadership of his own grand father, Cadmus, and now under Cadmus's heir and Dionysus's cousin, Pentheus, outrages Dionysus, who returns in disguise to seek the recognition due to him both as a god and as a Theban, son of Semele. It is perhaps ironic that he represents forgetting when forgetting is precisely what he seeks to correct. For Dionysus, Pentheus's rejection of the Bacchic rites reiterates that earlier offense committed against Dionysus's mother, Semele, by her sisters, Agave, Ino, and Autonoe, Pentheus's mother and his and Dionysus's aunts.

The Dionysian rituals attract the three remaining sisters, Agave, Ino, and Autonoe, who, along with the rest of Thebes's women, abandon their work, violating Pentheus's order to return to their looms. Pentheus has some of the women imprisoned, trying to contain them and preserve order, but they all escape to Cithaeron where they party like it's 405 B.C. Says the servant to Pentheus, "And the bacchae whom you shut up, whom you carried off and bound in the chains of the public prison, are set loose and gone, and are gamboling in the meadows, invoking Bromius [aka Dionysus] as their god. Of their own accord, the chains were loosed from their feet and keys opened the doors without human hand." Or in a differ ent translation: "The chains fell from their feet and the bars of their cells were withdrawn as if by magic." It seems Dionysus is also the god of prison abolition. The women's escape is a gift of the god, Dionysus, the play suggests. That may be. But Dionysus is also a gift the women give to themselves: he is summoned by their desire.

I will detail further in Chapter 1 what happens on Cithaeron, the inoperative space / time outside the city to which the women repair, while tracking the power of Euripides's play to press on us a critique and recovery of inoperativity, Giorgio Agamben's refusal concept. For Agamben, inoperativity means the suspension of the ordinary (the "no" of Melville's Bartleby, with his formal formula: "I prefer not") and its replacement by a kind of "new use" that is useless or post use. In the Bacchae, however, the inoperativity that the women enjoy involves not just the suspension of use but also a kind of intensification of use. Away from patriarchy's sex-gender enclosures, the women experience leisure and plea sure in new, intensified ways that alter their experience of space and time. Their power is suggested by the messenger's report to Pentheus that when the women chased away the herdsmen spying on them, the women ran, and "the world ran with them." He is clearly stunned by the swerve he has witnessed. The bacchants exert a gravitational pull on the world from which others think they only flee.

They also learn to police their own boundaries, outside the city, away from the boundaries of public and private that once confined their movements and spaces. When they are spied on by those herdsmen "camouflaged with leaves," whose "good idea" it was to "lay in ambush" hoping to "hunt down Agave, Pentheus's mother, and drag her from the dance," the women attack. The herdsmen's foiled plan prefigures what will later happen when the women encounter Pentheus, also up to no good, also spying on what he should not see. In the earlier scene, the men, once discovered, flee in fright ("they would have torn us to pieces"), and the women attack the men's cattle in a horrifying way, dismembering rather than slaughtering them. "A single woman pulled a mewling calf in two, while others clawed apart a fullgrown heifer. . . . Then they rose like birds," flew to towns in the foothills, and "snatched children from their homes and pillaged houses." The men fought back with spears but drew no blood, while the women's "flung wands" in turn "ripped open flesh, and the men turned and ran. Women routing men! Some god was there with them," says the messenger.

Duly warned and frightened, the men who witnessed the horrors retreat and then report to Pentheus on the wildness of the women. This episode of violence against the animals is like a blooding of the hounds, a rehearsal for the more profound violence to come, when the bacchants will kill Pentheus. Indeed, arguably everything on Cithaeron is a rehearsal, perhaps even also for the return to the city that will follow. Having erected a para polis outside the city, the women will soon

risk their hard earned inoperativity in order to preserve and practice it in the city. They won't succeed fully. It is a tragedy after all! But whose tragedy is it? We have long assumed it is Pentheus's, since he overreaches and pays with his life; or that of the women, who also overreach, and will be exiled, and Agave's, in par tic u lar, since she will lose her son, Pentheus, the king. Pentheus withheld the recognition due a god, and the women dabbled in mysteries that were beyond them. But neither the women's violence nor their "splendid failure" means the women were wrong to leave the city and then return to it. It could simply mean the city was not ready for them, in which case, the Bacchae is not the women's tragedy at all, nor Pentheus's, but the city's.

Pentheus at first wants to battle the bacchants directly, but his desire to see and maybe even be one of them is stoked by Dionysus, who lures the king, his cousin, into a trap. Thinking he is talking to a stranger who follows Dionysus and not to the god himself, Pentheus listens to the stranger's advice and agrees to dress as a woman so as to be able to observe the women on Cithaeron surreptitiously without offense. Dionysus in disguise says, "I'll dress you up as a woman, and then you can go see what they are up to." Pentheus seems drawn to the stranger whom he admires as womanish ("such long hair . . . Not a wrestler, then, I take it? . . . Such pale skin," says Pentheus when they first meet). And then Pentheus clearly enjoys the cross dressing he initially resisted as unbefitting a king. He moves and adjusts his costume under Dionysus's direction, practicing his gestures. "So how do I look? A little like Aunt Ino, or a bit more like my mother?" Still under the direction of the god, but unknowingly also under his divine influence (but then, according to Tiresias, all the god does is to uninhibit our own secret desire), Pentheus follows Dionysus's instruction and hides in the top of a tree (it might even be a phallus tree) on Cithaeron so as to get a good view. Dionysus calls to the women, notifying them that a "creature" is watching them, and the women attack the creature, at first singly and without success, then together. "Once they saw [Pentheus] . . . they started pelting him with stones, throwing fir branches over like javelins." Notably, the bacchants begin singly, pell-mell, each one throwing branches and rocks at the figure high above. But "all fell short." So they try another tactic: "they sheared the limbs off an oak and tried to lever the fir [tree] up by its roots. But that failed, too." So Agave calls on the women to join together. " 'Come, my maenads, gather round this tree and all take hold. . . .' And with that, countless hands pulled and pushed." Only by acting in concert do the women succeed in bringing down the tree and Pentheus from its top: "and from his high roost Pentheus fell." They then kill Pentheus, whom they seem not to recognize. They certainly do not respond to his cries. When the sisters kill Pentheus, they reperform their terrible violence against Semele, but this time they do it—as they did with the cattle— with their own bare hands, and this time the victim is Agave's own son. Thus, loss is repaid with loss.

The earlier murder of Semele and the exile of Dionysus that ensued are repaid now with the murder of Pentheus and the ensuing exile of the remaining royal family. Cadmus and his wife, Harmonia, are fated, Dionysus pronounces in the aftermath, to become wandering, conquering snakes. Their daughters, Agave, Ino, and Autonoe, are exiled out of the city. The sisters leave Thebes together, perhaps holding hands. Their performance of sorority will be important to our recovery of inclination, in Chapter 2, where I argue that the refusal concept should figure not just maternal pacifism, as in Cavarero, but also the agonistic sororal ties that enable intimate dance and worship as well as violence and murder. These three sisters are on intimate terms with mutuality in all its violent ambiguities. Why doubt their taste for violence?

The play's most famous scene offers instruction here: when Dionysus seduces Pentheus into dressing as a woman, we see the king enjoys it as an expression of his own secret desire. Might the same be true later, when the women direct their vio lence against him? Tiresias claims early on that this god permits what his followers secretly want: "she who is modest will not be corrupted in Bacchic revelry. Do you see?" Is the bacchants' refusal, which includes their violent murder of the

king, an expression of their own secret desire? To borrow Tiresias's formulation, she who is pacifist cannot be corrupted to vio lence via revelry.

Judith Butler differs: the violence is regretted, she says in her reading of the play, rightly noting that what follows for Agave "is an infinite sorrow and remorse." But what do the sorrow and remorse mean? And are they the only feelings that count? When Agave mourns her son, it may mean she regrets murdering the king. But she could also be seen as mourning her situation in which she cannot kill the king without sacrificing her son. Regicide and filicide are inextricably intertwined. This is Sara Ahmed's "double bind," described strikingly by Maurice MerleauPonty, whom Ahmed cites, as "the vital experience of giddiness and nausea, which is the awareness of our contingency and the horror with which it fills us." The giddiness and nausea that are experienced simultaneously in MerleauPonty are pried apart in the Bacchae and sequenced in time. The women are giddy at the murder of Pentheus, and only later are they nauseated by what they have done. Such sequencing invites a moralized reading in which the later nausea is regret for the prior giddy act. But the simultaneity that MerleauPonty and Ahmed assume invites us to delve more deeply into giddiness and nausea as a "vital" response to the double bind of women acting free in patriarchy.

Alternatively, we may reconsider Butler's reading of Agave in loose connection with Bernard Williams's "tragic situation," which forces a choice between two oughts, and there is no single right thing to do because whatever we do will be attended by moral regret. In the case of Agave, she committed regicide and killed her son. Although this is not what Williams had in mind when he explored the tragic clash of oughts, his approach may be helpful here. Since Agave's son is the king, regicide and filicide are one and the same act: she could not do the former without also doing the latter, and so she has reason for regret. But, arguably, as in a tragic situation, had she chosen the alternative course, she would have regretted that, too. Not taking down the tyrannical king would also be cause for regret, since ending his tyranny is also a normatively compelling act.

On this reading, the women who oppose the king but love Pentheus both desire the regicide they commit (un)knowingly and mourn the consequences. Their tragic predicament is clarified when we note that the bacchants commit regicide long before they kill the king and only commit murderous violence against him when he forces their hand. It is regicide when the women refuse the king's orders to work (inoperativity) and when they set up a para polis outside the city in which they rehearse new comportments and inaugurate new temporalities (inclination).

These more or less nonviolent acts are regicidal in that they deny recognition to the king and refuse his authority. The later violence just literalizes, in a way, what has already occurred.

When they kill and dismember Pentheus, the bacchants advance an arc of refusal that began when they, together, broke out of prison and left Thebes en masse. Actually, it began when they first defied Pentheus to worship Dionysus. Pentheus has lost his monarchy, though he doesn't know it, well before he dares to disguise himself as a woman to spy on the bacchants only to be murdered by them in the most horrifying way. In Thebes, his orders are not followed and his words are impotent. Dionysus, the bull / [wo]man / god Pentheus aims to net with his mortal power, will tie him up in a trap like a spare piece of string. Pentheus' rule is in pieces.

In the moment of his murder, Pentheus calls out, "Mother, Mother, look, it's me, your son, Pentheus!" and Agave wrenches his arm from its socket. Agave's nonrecognition of Pentheus suggests there is a problem with kinship or maternity (Butler) or with Agave (most readings). But what if we switch Agave's identity from mother, which is the interpellation that fails, to subject, an interpellation that seems to succeed? What if Agave did recognize Pentheus and still, or therefore, went on to dismember him? Then the seeming nonrecognition would be a recognition— not between mother and son but between subject and king.

I return to the scene several times in the following chapters, from the distinct vantage points provided by inoperativity, inclination, and fabulation, to consider what it would mean to see the women's violence as, in some way, deliberate and free: a refusal. This means approaching Euripides's play as an imaginative exploration of what is needed to render patriarchy inoperative, to engage it agonistically with inclination, and to demand or propose the fabulations that rec it and support the effort to move past it. Let us start, though, by acknowledging that the murder of Pentheus is nauseatingly horrifying. Its horror, which is surely the point, leads most readers or viewers to condemn the women who com mitted the violence and to see them as mad. But is it right to be shocked by the women's violence, and not by the king's?

If we hold off on the urge to moralize about the play (is it really necessary to say that murder is wrong?), then we create space to see that the Bacchae illustrates, metaphorically speaking, the breadth and depth of patriarchy's grasp, its imbrication in everything we love as well as in the structures and powers we resist. The play's horror is its powerful lesson: breaking with patriarchy means breaking (with) the fathers, sons, brothers, neighbors we love. It is difficult and awful, nauseating. The women's horrific killing of Pentheus allegorizes the double bind that goes beyond the tragic situation theorized by Williams, and it shows how the breaks necessitated by equality tear us apart, rip apart loved ones, and destroy the conjugal and communal bonds we value even though they make us unequal. This is not a conflict between two oughts, so much as it is a depiction of a double bind. The scene of dismemberment vivifies the fears that stop us, the reluctance to lose loved ones that renders us complicit with oppressive structures, and the anxieties that can keep us compliant with our own and others' subjugation. I suggest, in any case, that the overt violence on which so many focus when they encounter the Bacchae is less radical than the relaxation and rehearsal on Cithaeron that precede the regicide and the claim to the city that comes after it. When the women return to the city to demand to be feasted and have their story told not as one of madness but of sex equality or even of women's superiority to men, they are, in a way, killing Pentheus again. This, too, is part of the bacchants' arc of refusal.

Gaslighting on a Global Scale

A conversation with Bonnie Honig on "disaster patriarchy" and how feminism offers the best way to make sense of the post-Trump moment.
Interview in *The Nation* by Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins

For the entirety of Donald Trump's presidency, academics and pundits continually debated if he was a fascist, a populist, a nativist, a businessman president, and so forth. This debate continues. Sometimes sidelined in these conversations was a perspective that might've understood the heart of Trump and Trumpism from the start—feminism. From beginning to end, some of the most sustained protest against Trump's presidency came from feminists galvanized by his blatant misogyny and the fear that their rights stood endangered by it. Indeed, given Trump's macho manner and sexism, feminist criticism offers rich resources for making sense of the Trump phenomenon to encompass man and movement.

This is why Bonnie Honig's new book, **SHELL SHOCKED: FEMINIST CRITICISM AFTER TRUMP** [Fordham University Press, 9780823293766], can be considered a landmark study, one that helps makes sense of the last four years. Honig, a professor of modern culture and media/political science at Brown University, shows how feminist criticism can help readers understand the idea of male entitlement, a concept in which freedom is reduced to being able to impulsively "say what you think and grab what you want." This impulsiveness, she argues, is essential to Trumpism and ultimately leads to constant disruptions, daily controversies, and rumbles of political rage. Such a permanent disorientation of reality, Honig observes, shocks and overwhelms a people's senses.

Trumpism is thus to be understood as a kind of "disaster patriarchy" leading to the unending gaslighting of democratic institutions.

How, though, can disaster patriarchy and its shell-shock effects be discerned? In what ways does feminist criticism provide tools to resist and refuse it? And what is the way forward for feminist criticism in the Biden era? To answer these questions, I spoke with Honig regarding her thinking on feminist criticism in the age of Trump we have lived through and how we might articulate "a feminist theory of refusal." —*Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins*

DANIEL STEINMETZ-JENKINS: Why did you title your new book *Shell Shocked: Feminist Criticism After Trump*? Is there a connection between your notion of "shell shock" and the theme of Naomi Klein's book *The Shock Doctrine*?

BONNIE HONIG: Yes, there is a connection, but I was also informed by shell-shock treatment during World War I, novelized by Pat Barker in *Regeneration*. Barker contrasts the approaches of real-life figures W.H.R. Rivers and Lewis Yealland. For Yealland, shell shock was a kind of feminized malingering, and he treated it with shock therapy ("the terrified soldier must utter words to get the torture to stop," said John Mullan, quoting Barker's book in *The Guardian*). For Rivers, shell shock was a sensorial injury and he treated it with a program of sensorial regeneration that included walks, nature, and poetry in addition to hypnosis and talk therapy. I build on Rivers' approach in *Shell Shocked*, affiliating feminism with criticism's art of close reading and noting its power as a humanistic response to shock politics.

Klein builds on different examples of shock treatment to analyze neoliberalism's "shock doctrine." She details what I call "the shock politics two-step," in which whole populations, or detainees subjected to torture, are first deprived of sensorial stimulation (for a population, communications are shut down; for a detainee, a hood is placed over the person's head) and then, later, once their sensory guard is down, subjected to overstimulation (the public is bombarded with propagandist messaging; the detainee is subjected to bright lighting and deafeningly loud music). But Klein's account of "disaster capitalism" is unconnected to "disaster patriarchy." In disaster patriarchy, shock is an everyday occurrence and reality itself is at stake. I extend Klein's argument to analyze *Gaslight*, the classic film about reality manipulation, as well as contemporary practices of gaslighting. In addition to Trump, I discuss Harvey Weinstein, Roger Ailes, Jeffrey Epstein, and others, noting that the real pleasure for them in their predations is the power to say, "No one will believe you." That is not just an instrumental threat, it is what these men are in it for: to hoard believability for themselves.

DSJ: You observe that after James Comey was fired by Trump as head of the FBI, his critics—and most notably, Trump—"so rapidly feminized [him] that you would think he was J. Edgar Hoover." They viewed Comey as a "drama queen" and "too emotional" to be head of the FBI. However, you suggest that Trump himself actually embraced a kind of feminization that worked toward his own political advantage. In what sense is this the case?

BH: George W. Bush played cowboy to masculinize his presidency (leading William Connolly to call his policies "cowboy capitalism"). Ronald Reagan supplemented his cowboy image with *Rambo* (the first three movies of the franchise came out during his presidency). Trump, I argue, presents himself in a more ambigendered way, playing both the brutal dominating strongman and the helpless damsel in distress. For four years, Trump bombastically ordered his crowds to beat up opponents and also pleaded with supporters to save him from unfounded persecutions. The cry to "Stop the Steal" was

the culmination of it all. Trump positioned himself as needing saving, and on January 6, 2021, many of his followers heeded his cries for help as if he were Penelope Pitstop and they were the Ant Hill Mob (whom they did uncannily resemble).

Historian Cynthia Herrup argues that early modern monarchs, both male and female, struggled to practice use of the pardon, presenting sovereignty as both merciful (feminine) and angry (masculine). The full story of Trump's pardons has yet to be told, but Trump as president presented sovereignty in just this ambigendered way. For example, when he talked at his rallies about the so-called "Russia hoax" and "deep state" investigations, he would veer into discussing Lisa Page and Peter Strzok, two FBI employees whose extramarital affair he used to suggest that everything they did was immersed in illegality. In front of thousands of people, week after week, he performed imagined scenes from their bedroom, and he played both parts: he was Page desiring Strzok as well as Strzok desiring Page. What other US politician on the national stage could impersonate a woman having sex with a man and get away with it? He did it regularly. The soundtracks to his rallies included the Village People's "YMCA" and "Macho Man," gay anthems that ironize the heteronormative sex/gender binary that Trump delighted in violating as he gyrated mincingly to their lyrics: "You can do whatever you feel!" There is also his wheedling tone, his pursed lips, his pinkie finger gesture that alternates with the strong thumb of dismissal, and his naturally high voice, which he deepens into a growl when he wants to play macho—all parts of his performance of sovereignty in drag.

Perhaps the point is that he alone can walk the sex-gender divide and still be a man, just as he alone could shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and still represent law and order. Or perhaps his act reassures men everywhere that manliness is just a performance, after all, and so they too can pull it off, with a thumb and a growl, or maybe a gun.

DSJ: In some sense the hero of *Shell Shocked* is the woman who appears on its cover: "Naked Athena." This is the name given to the Portland protester who resisted those mysterious federal forces who had descended on the city by order of Trump in the name of protecting a federal courthouse. She did so by sitting nude on the asphalt, with her knees up and legs spread wide. "A feminism worthy fighting for," you say, "needs its Naked Athenas." What makes her actions so powerful for you?

BH: Where Trump feigns vulnerability for his own purposes, the woman nicknamed Naked Athena risked authentic vulnerability when she intervened in a stand-off between police and protesters in Portland last year. She took off her clothes, walked to the middle of the road, stood there, then sat down in protest, and the police got into their cars and left. Someone called it "pussy power." It reminded me of what the older women in Toni Morrison's novel *Home* call "sun smacking." Sun smacking is the cure they prescribe for Cee, a young woman suffering the effects of shock and mutilation. But Cee hesitates to expose herself, and so the women who care for her have to help guide her past shame and self-doubt to healing, pride, and independence.

Naked Athena is on the cover of *Shell Shocked* because that image captures what shock can feel like to those on its receiving end, faced with bright lights, police cars, and anonymous armed men in the street, in the dark. She was important then because the so-called Moms had just entered the Portland protests, which was initially a welcome, humorous intervention but soon developed into a kind of retrograde Mom-ism. A counter-performance of feminist agency was sorely needed. But even more important than Naked Athena, I argue, were the Mothers of the Movement, Black women who'd lost children to police violence and had joined together to work toward police accountability, reform, or abolition, their grief and their power a living reproach to racist structural violence in the US.

So, Naked Athena is not the hero of *Shell Shocked*. The fuel of democratic activism is action in concert. But individual heroics can inspire, so it was a problem that her story was told at the time as if it were part of the branded quirkiness of Portland rather than part of a worldwide practice of nude protest by feminists in Latin America, Europe, and Africa. Her story was told, that is to say, as if it were cute, not powerful.

Shell Shocked counters such subtle techniques of disempowerment by retelling stories from Homer to Netflix of the last four years that feature people joined together, often at great risk, to perform acts of witnessing and solidarity on behalf of a more egalitarian future. Stories are like batteries: they store the power generated by action in concert so that the power outlasts the event. But we need to tell those stories in the right way. That means paying attention to their telling detail or loose threads.

DSJ: You seem primarily attracted to individual and local acts of refusal in *Shell Shocked* and your other recent book, *A Feminist Theory of Refusal*. Interestingly, you refer to Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez one time, and in passing. Women are at the forefront of a democratic socialist movement in this country. The Squad, for instance, arose during the central period of the Trump presidency. What do you make of this?

BH: One major technique of shock is to isolate the target. It is important to track how people work their way out of isolation back to world-belonging. When I focus on individuals, it is on behalf of such exemplarity. My claim is that feminism after Trump requires a commitment to the telling detail that might unravel patriarchy's whole cloth. I think this is one of AOC's great talents: she is great at reframing. In *Shell Shocked*, I refer to her in the context of the Green New Deal, when I analyze efforts by the wealthiest Americans to opt out of climate catastrophe (with secret bunkers and remote hideaways), while denying its reality for the rest of us. This is one of several chapters that center on the power of public things. Extending the claims of my 2017 book, *Public Things: Democracy in Disrepair*, I argue that public things not only revivify a democracy's sense of equality, they also help reorient democratic life after shock.

The neoliberal habit of opting out of public things deals a terrible blow to American democracy's prospects. Without the orientation of public things, like parks, bridges, community centers, and so on, we—by which I mean a multiracial, multi-ethnic, plural, and fractious democracy—are lost. And yet, Republicans have branded "choice" as freedom and for them choice is the freedom to opt out of public things. Opting out, it is important to recognize, is rooted in this country in the white supremacist abandonment of public things like schools and pools after they are racially integrated. Perhaps it should be no surprise that after a Black man was elected president, it became suddenly acceptable to a sizable minority of this country to opt out of elections too.

Trump is nothing new as far as the Republican Party is concerned. But the January 6 insurrectionists went further than before in their willingness to discard the procedures and even the facade of democracy. The procedures and facade of democracy are important, however: not because the procedures secure fairness and not because there is anything great about facades, but because they provide a ground on which to challenge the injustices of the existing political order. Stacey Abrams knows this.

The challenges are coming today largely from women. Women are not just at the forefront of a democratic socialist movement now, as you rightly say, but are also the leaders of the Movement for Black Lives, which has since the 2014 Ferguson uprising worked to reimagine policing, rebuild community, cancel debt, and organize for empowerment. We may recall Hannah Arendt referring to political action as miraculous when we note that things that were just recently unthinkable as

mainstream political positions are now on the agenda in the US because of the work of activists, organizers, and some elected politicians.

We are witnessing, and participating in, a set of vital, diverse political engagements on issues of race. At the same time, questions of economic fairness have been reopened in the wake of a pandemic that forced recognition that "essential workers" really are essential to any functioning society. These are some of the most important developments in American politics in the last few years. My claim in *Shell Shocked* is that feminist criticism and refusal are indispensable here because we are up against not just disaster capitalism and white supremacy but also the disaster patriarchy that completes the triptych.

DSJ: *Naked Athena* connects *Shell Shocked* to *A Feminist Theory of Refusal*, which looks to Greek antiquity for articulating a new feminist politics of refusal. What can antiquity teach us about how women can resist and transform unjust political and economic systems?

BH: *A Feminist Theory of Refusal* is inspired by Euripides' late-fifth-century BC play the *Bacchae*, in which Theban women refuse work, abandon the city, explore new forms of life outside it, kill the king (this may or may not be an accident), return to the city, and are then exiled by the wine god, Dionysus. Most readings of the play see the women as pawns of Dionysus, but why assume he uses them and not that they use him—or both?

The bacchants' actions are a radical demand for equality. They move along an arc of refusal from strike to fugitivity. The arc is completed when, on behalf of fabulation, the women return to claim the city. They want to tell their story in their own way, and there is, here, I argue, an important counter to those who embrace refusal in its "Bartleby" form. Preferring not to, refusing to engage in the to and fro of political claims, is a tactic, not a politics.

Thanks to your questions, I realize I might have done well to mention AOC in this context, as well, since she has not given up on the city either. Perhaps it is a telling Dionysian or bacchic detail that she used to work as a bartender.

DSJ: Cornel West and Jeremy Tate recently [wrote](#) a piece lamenting Howard University's decision to dissolve its classics department amid a move for "educational prioritization." West and Tate judged this decision to be a "spiritual catastrophe." Some might see decisions of this nature as the consequence of contracting university educational budgets. However, it is often justified by its defenders as the desire to move beyond the "crimes of the West" and the philosophies that have inspired it. You are a feminist critic who draws inspiration from the classics. What is your view of the matter?

BH: This is a difficult question. It is important to decenter ancient Greece, as many classicists are now doing, in the study of antiquity. At the same time, the task of feminist theory and criticism is to work through received materials. In the absence of reworking, the old readings retain their power, and we may find ourselves repeating inherited scripts. I made that argument in *Antigone, Interrupted* (2013), where I reclaimed Sophocles' *Antigone* for a less heroic, more collective feminist politics, building on neglected textual details that suggest a possible conspiracy between the sisters in Sophocles' play. In *A Feminist Theory of Refusal*, I note that some characters in the *Bacchae* think the women are mad, but others differ, just as in *Antigone*, the protagonist is called mad by some, but righteous by others. Thus, the idea that the women are simply mad is contested *within* the plays. Since pathologizing refusal is still a go-to move today, it is important to see that it has always been contested. I depathologize the bacchants in the company of Saidiya Hartman who does something

similar with the women she calls "wayward." Indeed, her *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments* is in my view a *Bacchae*, one of several I analyze in the book.

DSJ: Both of your books were written during the Trump presidency. Resisting the shell shock of it through the politics of refusal raises the question of feminist critique in the Biden era. Are you at all worried about a kind of apathy setting in as shock gives way to "normality"?

BH: I am not worried, but determined. Figuratively speaking, we have arguably chosen a good father over the monstrous one, a nursing father over an omnivorous one. *Both* are familiar patriarchal figures, however. And, though I think Biden has been perfect for the moment thus far, activists have made the actual difference with their years-long work. We are not done with Trumpism, but we need to not be reactive to it (non-reactivity is one of Biden's great strengths). The best way to defeat it is to build something worthwhile in its place. A feminist theory of refusal, committed to the city not as it is but as it might be, is a necessary and important part of the coalition of approaches needed now, and it is anything but apathetic. <>

NIETZSCHE, THE ARISTOCRATIC REBEL: INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY AND CRITICAL BALANCE-SHEET by Domenico Losurdo, translated by Gregor Benton. with an introduction by Harrison Fluss [Series: Historical Materialism Book Series, Brill, 9789004270947]

The general tendency to apologize for Nietzsche's bad faith, autocratic thinking, and anti-Semitism in English language accounts of the philosopher is corrected in this detailed historical contextualization of his life and thought. By putting Nietzsche in his time and place and appreciating his poetic genius, Losurdo may well reorient future Nietzschean studies, especially in America. It is a masterpiece of over one thousand pages of detailed exposition. An engrossing read that provides close studies of all the central texts of the Nietzschean ouvré . Recommended.

The most comprehensive historical accounting of Nietzsche's life and thought to appear in decades

Perhaps no philosopher is more of a conundrum than Nietzsche, the solitary rebel, poet, wayfarer, anti-revolutionary *Aufklärer* and theorist of aristocratic radicalism. His accusers identify in his 'superman' the origins of Nazism, and thus issue an irrevocable condemnation; his defenders pursue a hermeneutics of innocence founded ultimately in allegory. In a work that constitutes the most important contribution to Nietzschean studies in recent decades, Domenico Losurdo instead pursues a less reductive strategy. Taking literally the ruthless implications of Nietzsche's anti-democratic thinking – his celebration of slavery, of war and colonial expansion, and eugenics – he nevertheless refuses to treat these from the perspective of the mid-twentieth century. In doing so, he restores Nietzsche's works to their complex nineteenth-century context, and presents a more compelling account of the importance of Nietzsche as philosopher than can be expected from his many contemporary apologists.

Originally published in Italian by Bollati Boringhieri Editore as Domenico Losurdo, *Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico: Biografia intellettuale e bilancio critico*, Turin, 2002.

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Excerpt: How One Constructs Nietzsche's Innocence: Publishers, Translators, Interpreters

These comments give us some idea of the spiritual climate in which today's dominant Nietzsche interpretation has arisen and become established. An extreme case is that of Giorgio Colli, who says we should read the philosopher while simply abandoning ourselves to the musical charm of his magnificent prose. At the time, Montinari tries to resist. But we should not be deceived by the severe and mordant manner in which he expresses himself: we are on the eve of a capitulation. Colli's 'musical' interpretation, or a 'theoretical' interpretation that – as in Foucault's case – considers historical-philological reconstruction to be irrelevant or – as in Vattimo's case – seeks to correct Nietzsche's 'self-misunderstandings', has prevailed.

This spiritual climate has above all influenced the translations. But it is not the inaccuracies, oversights and errors that are the problem: no translation is flawless, and, of course, this also goes for the translations I have proposed in the Italian edition of my book. The problem is the 'method' that underlies the inaccuracies, oversights and errors in the Italian Colli-Montinari edition. This edition evinces a constant tendency to suppress the historical and political world as an alien and disruptive factor. This preoccupation is so pronounced that it has, at least in one instance, strongly influenced the editing.

The Young Nietzsche's Judeophobia

It is here we should start out, also because we have here a text that marks the beginning of Nietzsche's philosophical (and political) path. On 1 February 1870 he held a lecture in Basel titled 'Socrates and Tragedy' that concluded:

> In conclusion, a single question. Is music drama really dead, dead for good? Should the German really not be allowed to put anything alongside that vanished work of art of the past other than 'great opera', much in the same way as the ape used to appear next to Hercules? This is the most serious question of our art, and who, as a German, does not understand the seriousness of this question has fallen victim to the Socratism of our days, which undoubtedly cannot produce martyrs nor speak the language of the 'wisest among the Greeks' and which certainly blusters [like the historical Socrates] about not knowing anything, but really knows nothing. This Socratism is the Jewish press: I say nothing more. (ST, I, 549 and XIV, 101)

I have already dwelt at length on the reactions this text evoked in the Wagner household, as well as on Nietzsche's response (*supra*, 3 § 1). It is worth quickly reviewing the incident, so the reader has to hand the elements essential for evaluating the editors' decisions. Invited by Cosima Wagner to avoid prematurely and recklessly provoking the Jewish community, Nietzsche replaced the term 'Jewish [*jüdische*]' with 'today's [*heutige*]' and, probably later, crossed out the first part of the

paragraph (which I have italicised). The second part is on a page of the manuscript that has been torn out (by the philosopher or his sister Elisabeth, no one knows which). But so much is clear: the whole paragraph, as quoted here (with the explicit reference to the 'Jewish press') corresponds to the preparatory draft of the text, was delivered in the Basel lecture, was sent to Richard and Cosima Wagner and reflects without a doubt the original and young philosopher's true intention.

All this is clearly explained by Colli and Montinari (even though they have placed these clarificatory lines in such a way that they escape the reader's eyes). But let us see how they proceed in the edition prepared by them. The German edition gives only the first (italicised) part of the paragraph: to read the conclusion and the details of the matter, the reader must go to the trouble of checking in the volume devoted to variants and the critical apparatus. This procedure alone is highly questionable. Following Cosima's request, Nietzsche did not amend the written and spoken text because he had changed his mind but merely to carry out the temporary self-censorship urged on him by his correspondent. It is not clear why today's editors should follow Cosima's advice.

But things get even worse in the Italian version. Here the paragraph is quoted in full, save that the original 'Jewish press' has become 'today's press', while in the 'chronology' and 'notes' that accompany the text there is no reference to the original version. The 'chronology' (*Opere*, vol. III, II, 394–6) cites excerpts from Cosima's and Richard Wagner's letters in which they speak of the 'horror' and unease they had experienced on reading the text of the lecture; besides that, passages from Nietzsche's letter to Rohde are quoted, in which the philosopher explains that in future he wants to overcome the caution of the moment to express himself 'as seriously and frankly as possible'. But all this is made incomprehensible by the disappearance of the reference to the 'Jewish press' and Cosima's recommendations for caution on this point. The composer writes: 'You will receive absolution only if no one from *that side* understands anything. […] I hope with all my heart you do not break your neck.' And Cosima: 'We were so upset that we no longer read anything that evening.' One can easily imagine the reader's questions. What 'side' is being referred to? And why should it be so threatening? Wagner continues: 'You could free me of a great part, even an entire half, of my mission.' Reader: what 'mission'? But the reader is left in the dark about the essential issue: the intellectual alliance the musician, after reading *Socrates and Tragedy*, offered the philologist in the common struggle against Judaism, a struggle to be conducted with the tactical skill the enemy's power and malice necessitated. In conclusion, the self-censorship recommended by Cosima and inexplicably included in the German version of the critical edition becomes real censorship in the Italian version (and in the widely available paperback edition published by the Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi).

But that is not the only example of censorship. The 'chronology' cites in relation to *The Birth of Tragedy* (*Opere*, vol. III, I, 468) passages from Nietzsche's letter to Wagner in which he attributes to him the merit of having, together with Schopenhauer, given voice to the 'Germanic seriousness of life', a 'more serious and soulful worldview', threatened by 'clamant Judaism' (B, II, 1, 9). The quotation starts at an opportune moment: it reproduces the tribute paid to the 'Germanic seriousness of life', but the reader once again learns nothing about the opposition of Judaism and Germanism that so profoundly characterised Nietzsche before the start of the 'Enlightenment' phase, and nothing about the denunciation of Judaism that immediately preceded it.

Now we come to the translation. I will confine myself to examples easy for non-Italian readers to understand. *The Greek State* polemicised against 'a self-seeking, stateless money aristocracy' (CV, 3, I, 774 [171]). The allusion to Jewish finance, a constant target of the anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic polemic, is transparent. But, in the Italian version, the aristocracy changes from *apolide* [stateless] to *apolitika* [apolitical] (*Opere*, vol. III, II, 234)! Taking up one of Wagner's favourite themes, the young Nietzsche reproached Auerbach and authors of Jewish descent for using a form of German,

'due to national reasons', characterised by 'natural foreignness' and therefore 'deplorable' (VII, 598 [168]). In the Italian translation, *estraneità* [foreignness] becomes *inesperienza* [inexperience] (*Opere*, III, III, II, 196), and so the young Nietzsche's Judeophobia once again vanishes without trace.

The Suppression of Politics and History
The Germany celebrated by the Germanomaniacs, who would include the young Nietzsche, was synonymous with true 'culture', set against the banal 'civilization' of other peoples, above all the Romans. The culture/civilisation dichotomy is wholly absent from the Colli-Montinari Italian edition. Yet Nietzsche expressly emphasised the 'abysmal antagonism' between 'culture' and 'civilization' (*supra*, 11 § 7).

Given the methodological assumptions represented especially by Giorgio Colli, little attention is paid to history. Although the Puritan sect had sprung from an intrinsically plebeian Reformation, it succeeded in overcoming its origins and, thanks to the inducements to self-overcoming contained within its religion, becoming a master-race: 'Asceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable means of educating and ennobling a race that wants to gain control over its origins among the rabble' (JGB, 61 [55]), Nietzsche concluded. Not so, however, the Italian translation, which renders *Puritanismus* as *castità* [chastity]! Even if one ignores the risk of transforming the immoralist philosopher into a eulogiser of purity and sexual abstinence, the fact remains that the specific historical event to which he referred has vanished. Similarly, the 'visionary [*schwärmerisch*][4] spirit of the eighteenth century' becomes in the Italian translation a *spirito stravagante*[extravagant spirit] (FW, 362 [227]). Once again, the reference to the dreams of social regeneration that characterised the ideological preparation of the French Revolution tends to be obfuscated. The *Genealogy of Morals* (I, 5) criticised 'Europe's socialists' for their 'inclination towards the "Commune", the most primitive form of society': the Italian version has 'commune' in lowercase: will readers realise Nietzsche's target was the Paris Commune?

Luther, this plebeian, observed *The Gay Science*, 'lacked any inheritance from a ruling caste [*Kaste*] and instinct for power' (FW, 358 [222]). Caste becomes 'class' in the Italian translation (*Opere*, V, II, 272). The same happens in other even more significant contexts. It is 'is characteristic of every strong age', says *Twilight of the Idols*, to maintain 'the rift between people, between classes [*Stand*]' (GD, Skirmishes of an untimely man, 37 [212]). In the Italian translation too, 'class' again replaces *ceto* [caste] (*Opere*, VI, III, 136). As a result, we end up with the oxymoron of a chasm between class and class. One can speak of social class only when there is relative social mobility; but it is precisely this mobility Nietzsche aimed to eliminate. This is a trait that accompanied the philosopher in the entire course of his development, including the period of 'Enlightenment'.

Breeding, Physiology and Degeneration
A similar process occurs around the theme of 'breeding [*Züchtung*]'. As we know, Vattimo recommends its allegorical interpretation, with the help of an arbitrary abstraction from a historical context in which eugenic views were widespread, and an even more arbitrary abstraction from the interest, not to say enthusiasm, Nietzsche displayed for this new 'science'. It is interesting to observe how Vattimo immerses even the philosopher's most disquieting pages in a purifying bath. Zarathustra enounced the maxim 'Die at the right time' and then continued:

> To be sure, how could the person that never lives at the right time ever die at the right time? [Would that he were never born! – Thus I advise the superfluous. But even the superfluous boast about their dying [*thun noch wichtig mit ihrem Sterben*], and even the hollowest nut still wants to be cracked.] Everyone regards dying as important; but death is not yet a festival. As of yet people have not learned how to consecrate the most beautiful festivals. (Za, I, On Free Death [53])

I have put square brackets around the passage Vattimo omits, indicated in his book in the traditional way, by means of an ellipsis in square brackets. In this way, it is not clear to the reader that, for Nietzsche, the importance of the death of the 'superfluous' was purely subjective and imaginary. They weighed unbearably on society and life; in one way or another, one was to urge them to end a worthless existence. Zarathustra insisted strongly on this in the excerpt, which – not for nothing – has been called the 'suicide chapter' (*supra*, 19 § 4). But there is no trace of this in Vattimo's commentary. Thus, he miraculously transforms a brutal eugenicist discourse that celebrates the suicide of the malformed as a festival of culture into purely moral reflection.

The process of volatilisation and sublimation concludes with the proposal to translate *Übermensch* as *oltreuomo* (*oltre*, 'above, beyond', *uomo*, 'man') rather than as *superuomo*, on the grounds that Nietzsche cared only about 'transcending the man of tradition'.[6] But when Zarathustra, in the speech that immediately follows, denounced 'the selfishness of the sick', who clung to a worthless life and thereby compound the 'degeneration [*Entartung*]', he continued: 'Upward goes our way, over from genus [*Art*] to super-genus [*Über-Art*]' (Za, I, On the Bestowing Virtue, 1 [56]). An essential aspect of Zarathustra's speech was his setting of the 'overman' and 'super-genus' against rampant 'degeneration'. Again, we find ourselves returning to a theme that, together and inextricably intertwined with the themes of the hereditary transmission of crime and eugenics, dominated European and Western culture in the second half of the nineteenth century and also played a central role in the circle of Nietzsche's treasured authors and friends. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the names of writers like Galton, Lombroso and Gobineau frequently cropped up in their correspondence (*supra*, 19 § 1). In Zarathustra to seek to separate the great fascinating moralist from the brutal theorist of aristocratic radicalism is an untenable enterprise.

The *oltreuomo* becomes the starting point for a dizzying process of transfiguration and sublimation. Vattimo refers to § 868 of the *Will to Power*, of which I here quote the central passage: 'A dominant race can grow only from terrible and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? Obviously, they will show and consolidate themselves only after enormous socialist crises.' This is one of Nietzsche's most brutally significant pages. Confronted with the challenge of what Nietzsche elsewhere called 'socialist wars' (*supra*, 11 § 7), with the 'choice' of 'either perish or win through', as he wrote in the last months of his conscious existence, a new caste or master race would form from those in a position, after putting aside democratic and humanitarian inhibitions, to apply barbaric means as the situation requires, and to demonstrate a 'will to terrible things' (this is also an allusion to the annihilation of the malformed, the basis of the slave revolt). Only then would the new 'dominant race' be able to dispose of the mass of human beings as the 'most intelligent slave animal'. '[T]errible and violent beginnings', the 'will to terrible things': these repeated expressions set the tone for this text (XIII, 17–18). But Vattimo refers to it only in order to read from it the evocation of 'a sort of 'new barbarians', whose barbarism consists essentially in the fact that they 'come from outside', they are abstracted from the logic of the system': this new species 'already anticipates the characteristics of the freedom achieved by the *oltreuomo*'.[7] As if by magic, the 'terrible and violent beginnings', the 'will to terrible things', the 'enormous socialist crises', and, of course, the reaffirmation of the necessity of slavery dissolve into thin air.

Sometimes the hermeneutics of innocence are so pronounced they end up provoking an actual reversal of meaning. *Ecce Homo* invites us to pay attention to 'all the things about life that deserve to be taken very seriously – questions of nutrition, residence, spiritual diet, treatment of the sick [*Krankenbehandlung*], cleanliness, weather!' Unfortunately, 'in the concept of the good person, [one has taken the side] of everything weak, sick, badly formed, suffering from itself, everything *that should be destroyed* [*zu Grunde gehen soll*], – defiance of the law of *selection*' (EH, Why I am a destiny, 8 [150–1]). In the Italian translation, *Krankenbehandlung*, which had a clearly eugenetic meaning, becomes '*cura dei malati* [healing of the sick]', despite Nietzsche's highlighting with italics the

assertion that one was not artificially to keep alive in the world anything that ran counter to the 'law of *selection*' and that consequently 'should *perish*' (*Opere*, VI, III, 384–5).

Beyond the 'Nietzschean' Catechism

While some of the editorial choices are questionable and there are no few cases of political blocking in the translation, the 'chronology', and the 'notes' to the Italian version, the commentary in the *Opere* and the paperback editions published by Adelphi adopts an occasionally uplifting tone. Where *Twilight of the Idols*('Improving' humanity, 4) points to the Manu Code and the Hindu world as an expression of an 'Aryan humanity', Colli and Montinari's commentary takes care to point out that the conceptual pair Aryan/anti-Aryan has an 'objective, descriptive character', void of 'value criteria.' While Nietzsche defines Christianity as 'the anti-Aryan religion *par excellence*', according to Colli and Montinari he had emphasised Jesus's Jewish origins merely in order to confront Christian anti-Semites trying to demonstrate that the founder of their religion was at least half-Roman and half-Aryan (*Opere*, VI, III, 502). In fact, in the text at issue it is crystal-clear that the opposition was between 'Chandala values' and 'Aryan values': while the former found their consecration in Christianity, the latter referred to an 'Aryan humanity, absolutely pure, absolutely original', which rejected with horror 'the mishmash human beings', 'the fruit of adultery, incest, crime' (*supra*, 12 § 8). According to Colli and Montinari, a master of prose used such emphatic language to express an innocuously 'descriptive' concept! It is admittedly difficult to read in a non-judgemental way a philosopher who, with his concept of perspectivism, tirelessly emphasised that any theory involved the moment of decision, of choice, of the explicit or implicit utterance of a value judgement. However, it is incomprehensible how one can apply such an interpretation to a paragraph that even in the language it uses, in every line and every word, exudes value judgements.

The hermeneutics of innocence treats history as an intruder that must immediately be shown the door. At a time when the Aryan myth was running rampant, Nietzsche was supposedly not only immune to it but did not even know about it. In the last phase of his development, Nietzsche emphatically praised the Hindu world of castes, but was supposedly unaware of the fact that the term *varna*, 'caste', also indicated colour, and referred to the difference between the blond conquerors belonging to the higher races and the subjugated coloured peoples of the lower castes. So a trained philologist and passionate devotee of Hindu culture supposedly had no idea of what was perfectly clear to both Treitschke and the circles of Christian missionaries Nietzsche hated and despised. In fact, Aryan mythology, which had already made an appearance in *The Birth of Tragedy*, played a growing role in Nietzsche's subsequent development.

As often happens in such cases, the outcome is a paradox. On the one hand, the apologetic zeal completely misses its target, for consistent anti-Semites have no problem in acknowledging Jesus's Jewish descent, and at most take it as an occasion to denounce Christianity along with Judaism, as, for example, Dühring did (*supra*, 18 § 6). On the other hand, the apologetic zeal ends up achieving a result opposite to that pursued. In their interpretation of the aphorism just quoted, Colli and Montinari seem to assume that, for Nietzsche, 'Jewish' and 'Aryan' were opposites. In this case, the unavoidable acknowledgement of a positive or negative value judgement of the two terms would push in the direction of the most vehemently anti-Semitic circles the philosopher so staunchly defended. And yet the antagonistic pole of the master-'race' was not the Jews but the 'dark-haired native inhabitants' (GM, I, 5 [14]) who provided the mass of the servants or sudra.

The same apologetic zeal inspires the abandon with which the text *Socrates and Tragedy* is presented and 'adjusted' and with which the traces of Judeophobia in the young Nietzsche are erased. These are not the only cases of concealment and suppression with which the Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi can be reproached. One seeks in vain in the more available volumes for the most disquieting or downright repulsive fragments, which provide a theoretical basis for annihilations on a massive scale.

In this case, pedagogical and catechetical concern takes precedence over philological and historical rigour. That illustrious interpreters also resort to similar procedures is no reason for indulging in a method scientifically and ethically unacceptable.

As I have already explained several times, it is not at all a question of viewing Nietzsche as dated or uninteresting. On the contrary, his powerful demystifying potential can only be understood from the angle of the reactionary radicalism of his political programme. Moreover, his most repugnant sides refer to the most repugnant pages of the history the West wrote even before the start of the Third Reich. As in the history of the West as a whole, so too in the thought of this great philosopher, greatness and horror are two sides of the same coin: they point to the rigorous and unrelenting delimitation of the sacred space within which the right to the free unfolding of individuality is confined.

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Nietzsche's Spectacles and Umbrella: An Answer to My Critics

Colli and Montinari's editorial work is highly valuable, but it is not the hermeneutics of a fullness of time [*plenitudo temporum*] solemnly announced by the interpreters, eager to put an end to disquieting questions about reading Nietzsche. Gadamer's warning dates from 1986, and for a long time such questions were frowned upon in the name of political correctness and *bon ton*. And yet, even the Colli-Montinari edition confirms dimensions of the philosopher, however extraordinarily acute and stimulating he may have been, that today cannot but awaken the darkest memories: the glorification of eugenics and the 'super-species', the theorising on the one hand of slavery, on the other of the 'breeding' of the 'higher species of dominant Caesaric spirits', the demand for the 'annihilation of decadent races' and of 'millions of malformed', the assertion of the need for 'a hammer with which to smash degenerating and dying races, to remove them in order to make way for a new order of life'.

Gadamer's Discomfiture

How to explain that Nietzsche's lost 'umbrella' arouses more attention than the themes just mentioned? Here the second part of Gadamer's warning, which I italicised, comes into play. So, should we view sceptically the fact that all the philosopher's notes are published in the same way and accorded the same weight, so that the most disquieting passages end up being overwhelmed by a mass of details regarding the most banal episodes in Nietzsche's life? Perhaps Gadamer goes too far here with his application of a hermeneutics of suspicion. Moreover, it is untrue that the Colli-Montinari edition publishes everything in the same way and without distinctions. In the third edition of Nietzsche's works, the so-called Grossoktav-Ausgabe (vol. XIII, 43), we can read this passage:

> He that as a knowing person has acknowledged that in us, alongside growth of all kinds, the law of perishing is at the same time in force, and that annihilation and decay inexorably impose themselves at the end of every creation and generation: he must learn to experience a kind of joy at such a sight, in order to *bear* it, or he is no longer good for knowing. That is, he must be capable of a refined cruelty and get used to it with a resolute heart. If his force is even higher in the rank-ordering of forces, he himself is one of the creators and not just a spectator: so it is not enough that he is capable of cruelty only in *seeing* so much suffering, so much extinction, so much destruction; such a human being must be able to create pain with pleasure, to be cruel with hand and deed (and not just with the eyes of the spirit).

This fragment, reproduced in a well-regarded edition, was included by Baeumler in his Nietzsche anthology, devoted to illustrating or celebrating the 'innocence of becoming'. Later it was taken up again by Nolte, who used it to support his own interpretation: while Nietzsche reacted to Marx's demand for the 'destruction' of the bourgeoisie with a programme of 'counter-destruction', he

'provided the political radical anti-Marxism of fascism, […] decades in advance, with the spiritual model even Hitler himself was never quite up to'. This is a provocative thesis that would perhaps have deserved a wider discussion. But what happens with this fragment in the Colli-Montinari edition? As a preparatory draft of § 229 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, it is reproduced in the 'notices and notes' of the Adelphi edition of *Beyond Good and Evil* and in the volumes of the critical apparatus of the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* and the *Kritische Studienausgabe*, while it disappears completely from the digital version of the *Kritische Studienausgabe*, because this has not, up to now (March 2009), reproduced the critical apparatus. For the same reason, it disappears from the digital version of the original conclusion of the lecture *Socrates and Tragedy*, with its polemic against the 'Jewish press'.

Thus, there emerges an even greater danger than that against which Gadamer warns. It is not the case that 'such a comprehensive edition' leads ultimately to 'hiding essential things behind inessential things'. What actually happens is rather that completely trivial notes (not just 'I have forgotten my umbrella' IX, 587] but also 'don't wear glasses in public!' [XIII, 579], 'warm clothes in the evening!' [XIII, 580], etc) tend to marginalise and even cause to disappear the hymn of the joy to destruction and to the unmasking of the Jewish press.

'Persistence' and 'Improvement'

That these are serious problems is recognised by voices beyond suspicion. For example, Sossio Giametta, after a very critical reading of my Nietzsche study, notes:

> However, the book has one great merit: it puts an end, by applying the most historical, philological and critical tools, to the hermeneutics of innocence, which tear Nietzsche from his historical context and from his actual roots; this is a hermeneutic 'tendency' that 'has taken hold of even the best minds, including the two editors [Colli and Montinari]', and has led them to commit various errors that Losurdo persistently pursues.

What should one say of this analysis? In the first place, one cannot but value the intellectual honesty of a researcher who, having made a first-rate contribution to the Italian version of the new critical edition, does not confine himself to recognising the (understandable and even inevitable) presence of errors of translation and other sorts. More important is the acknowledgement that these errors correspond to a certain extent to a logic, a precise interpretative 'tendency'. As for my supposed 'obstinacy', I would like to point out that, while I simply highlight the influence of the hermeneutics of innocence on the otherwise meritorious Colli-Montinari edition, Giametta is carried away to the point where he notes that this hermeneutics has 'taken hold' of the two editors.

On another occasion, Giametta formulates an even more drastic judgement on Montinari, in this case focusing more on his interpretation than on his editing:

> In politics too he argues the need to take account of Nietzsche, his critique, his dimension. Not his blinding and lacerating truths. And not his errors and horrors, like the 'cannibal morality to be imposed dictatorially', as Rohde says, which bursts forth unmistakeably in *Beyond Good and Evil*. […] All the things Montinari preaches about Nietzsche have the appearance of being important. But they are, sorry to say, insignificant if not false.

I do not know if 'all' Montinari's observations are 'insignificant' or 'false', but it is certainly the case that his tendency to suppress 'errors and horrors' also shows up in his work as an editor, at least in the notes and commentary that accompany the Italian edition. My remarks are intended as a contribution to 'improving' the new critical edition. Here, I mention only the problems easiest to solve. Has the reader of the Italian edition the right to be informed of the fact that the lecture of 1 February 1870 ends with an indictment of the Jewish press? And is it acceptable that the reader is made aware of the agitation the lecture causes Cosima and Richard Wagner, but not of its cause (the public denunciation of Judaism as a synonym for Socratism)? Is it philologically accurate to quote only the glorification of the 'Germanic seriousness of life' from Nietzsche's letter to Wagner of

22 May 1869 but to remain silent about the contrasting of this worldview with 'clamant Judaism'? And, to return briefly to the problem of translation, would it not be right to put an end to the cheerful confusion of 'culture' and 'civilization', two terms to which Nietzsche ascribes quite different and even antithetical meanings? It is a good sign that some of my 'clarifications' regarding the translation 'can be accepted'. It goes without saying I am not questioning Colli's and Montinari's 'good faith' and 'intellectual probity'. But I fail to see why Lukács should be stripped of these characteristics, as the daily *La Repubblica* does in an anonymous article (a nice touch of elegance!) in which the adjective 'Lukácsian' is used practically synonymously with 'policing'. To expose one's opponents to vile suspicion but to reject it with disdain for oneself or one's own side is the very nub of dogmatism!

Emerson and Nietzsche

Among those open to discussion that have reacted to the challenging of the hermeneutics of innocence is an interpreter whom I have criticised as a leading exponent of this hermeneutic. Gianni Vattimo recognises that, in spite of his admiration for Emerson, Nietzsche 'certainly did not share the latter's commitment to the abolition of slavery': so the celebration of slavery as an indispensable foundation of culture is not merely a metaphor! Moreover, Vattimo draws attention to 'certain contradictions of individualism with which we must still grapple even today'. Can a worldview like that of Nietzsche and the liberal tradition behind him, which admittedly praised select individuals but labels the vast majority of humanity as instruments of labour and two-legged machines, truly be seen as individualistic? The emancipation of which the classical liberal tradition and – in a decidedly more radical and fascinating way – Nietzsche spoke never concerned the individual in his generality. That is precisely why the German philosopher, displaying a much greater critical awareness than his predecessor liberals, was careful not to profess individualism. On the contrary, he insisted that, just like 'collectivist morality', the 'individualistic' form had the disadvantage of asserting egalitarian measures, given that it demands the 'same freedom' and the same open-mindedness for all. The basic flaw of Christianity and socialism was, according to Nietzsche, to assume or invent souls and individuals where there were only instruments of labour. Vattimo is rightly concerned to valorise Nietzsche's 'less Nazistic traits of thought'. Yet the fact remains that we are not dealing with an unpolitical author; it is time to leave the hermeneutics of innocence behind us!

And yet there is no lack of shilly-shallying and vacillation. When Vattimo puts Nietzsche together with Emerson, he believes he can at least partially rescue the unpolitical interpretation: after all, who would want to assert against the American writer the suspicions and accusations levelled at the German philosopher? In reality, the hermeneutics of innocence prove unsustainable even with reference to Emerson. True, he had not experienced the trauma of the Paris Commune and an endlessly long revolutionary cycle that had devastated France in order to find its elective homeland in Germany in the late nineteenth century, where Social Democracy, a party celebrated or damned by the entire culture of the time as the spearhead of the revolution, was waxing menacingly. And yet disquieting themes are not absent from the American writer, above all when he praised great men (only they find sense in a world infested by 'pygmies' and therefore have the right to sacrifice 'millions of people' 'without sparing blood and without mercy'), insisted on the role of race ('we know what weight race has in history') and the fatal character of the expansion of the 'instinctive and heroic races', and praised the wars that 'rid the world of the corrupt races and the seats of disease'.

Also significant is the history of Emerson's reception. Certain aspects of his thinking were recalled later by Chamberlain and, with particular enthusiasm, by Henry Ford, the great scourge of the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy threatening the world, who for that very reason was highly successful in the Third Reich. It is well known that Emerson had excellent relations with Carlyle, who along with Chamberlain was celebrated by the Nazi press in 1935 as the inspiration behind the new German

regime: the two 'Britons' were jointly praised for having asserted the 'idea of the Führer and racial thought [*Führertum und Rassengedanke*]; thanks to this aristocratic worldview, they have tightened even further the links between the Germans and the English, the two peoples destined for leadership'. This acknowledgement could also be extended to the American author, who for his part emphasised and celebrated the common racial origins and common imperial mission of Germans, English and Americans. So, the attempt to rescue at least Emerson on the grounds of pure culture hardly succeeds. The fact is that Vattimo, despite polemicising against Lukács, shares a basic premise with him: both argue as if the process of the formation of the most disquieting themes of the ideology of the late nineteenth century, later inherited, radicalised and transformed by the Nazis, were confined to Germany!

The history of Emerson's reception includes a chapter of surprising actuality. Immediately after the declaration of war on Spain, he was raised by excited chauvinists into the pantheon of 'imperial intellects of his race', that superb 'conquering race', champion of the unstoppable expansion of the United States. Against that, he was later mercilessly reinterpreted by critics of the Vietnam War: it was Emerson who removed from our politics and our politicians 'any sense of restriction'.

The Public Prosecutor and the Defendant: A Strange Convergence

And yet, despite my persisting differences with Vattimo, the fact remains that his contribution is symptomatic: the hermeneutics of innocence regarding Nietzsche is no longer taboo. Perhaps the tendency to get rid of the 'preoccupations' Gadamer mentions by finding two scapegoats for them has begun to falter. The first is, of course, Elisabeth, accused of having adapted Nietzsche's philosophy to the needs of Nazism. Even today, few dare question this thesis. What does it matter if her biography of the philosopher appeared at the turn of the century, and if *The Will to Power* was published in 1901 or, in its second edition, in 1906, in the Europe of the *belle époque*, when no one was yet able to predict the outbreak of the First World War, let alone the rise of Hitler? To avoid troubling their conscience, the hermeneuts of innocence readily attribute extraordinary powers of divination to the despised Elisabeth. The result is to expose her as a sort of female Nostradamus, who, far from merely predicting a distant future, worked actively and successfully for its fateful realisation.

The interesting thing is that, despite the harshness of the indictment, the prosecutor ends up displaying some unexpected resemblances to the unfortunate accused. Vattimo, in his attempt to rescue the hermeneutics of innocence though in a weaker version, links Nietzsche to Emerson, but Elisabeth, in her biography, had already said the philosopher 'particularly loved' the American writer. Do not Colli and Montinari insist that Nietzsche had nothing to do with anti-Semitism and Judeophobia? This was exactly Elisabeth's standpoint. If the two editors, in their rendition of *Socrates and Tragedy*, confine the conclusion ('this Socratism is the Jewish press') to the critical apparatus or delete it altogether, the philosopher's scorned sister proceeded similarly. In her biography, she reported in detail on the lecture, but said nothing about its conclusion; she said Cosima and Richard Wagner reacted with both admiration and concern, but without specifying that this reaction was brought about by the explicit identification of Socratism and Judaism. Moreover, it is precisely Colli and Montinari that suggest, in the critical apparatus to the German edition, that it might not have been the author who tore out the final page, with its already familiar conclusion, from *Socrates and Tragedy*. And how could one explain by Elisabeth's intervention, if not by a desire to shield the philosopher from the accusation of anti-Semitism?

Elisabeth was the recipient of the letters in which the young Nietzsche gave free rein to his Judeophobia: he was glad 'finally' to have found an inn where one could enjoy a meal without having to endure the sight of 'Jewish ugly mugs', or, again with reference to the Jews, of 'disgusting soulless apes and other merchants'; he expressed his disgust at seeing 'Jews and cronies of Jews wherever

one looks' at a performance of the *Afrikanerin* by Meyerbeer (the musician of Jewish origin mocked by Wagner). He even wrote to ask his sister: 'How can you expect from me that I order a book from a scandalous Jewish antiquarian?' Elisabeth took care not to trumpet these letters abroad, but rather extended a veil of silence over them: but does not the Colli-Montinari edition do the same? There is another interesting detail. After Wilamowitz had torn into the *Birth of Tragedy* in a review, Nietzsche denounced him as a 'youngster suffering from Jewish arrogance', while he mocked the coldness of his teacher or ex-teacher Ritschl, blaming it on his Alexandrian or 'Jewish-Roman' culture. The philologist-philosopher's circle of friends reacted similarly. Elisabeth responded more coolly in her biography, where she merely criticised the philologist's limited horizons. That the young Nietzsche's violent Judeophobia has remained so long in shadow is, ultimately, thanks to the curtain his loving sister drew over it.

Far from adapting her brothers thinking to the ideological demands of Nazism (and moreover decades in advance of it!), Elisabeth tended rather to soften or remove the most repugnant declarations. On the other hand, Nietzsche's esteemed disciple Brandes provided an interpretation that made Nietzsche a champion of the most radical and repugnant forms of eugenics (later adopted by the Nazis): 'The hygiene that keeps alive millions of weak and useless beings that should rather die is, for him, not true progress.' In reality, 'one must measure the greatness of a movement by the sacrifices it requires'. In the end, the same preoccupation inspires today's apologists as inspired Nietzsche's sister: one should erect a monument to him, although it goes without saying that a postmodern monument would have to look very different from one designed to suit the Wilhelmine age.

The sole toehold for the idea of a plot by Elisabeth is the homage paid her by Hitler 1934, while she was still alive, and a year later, after her death. But this evidence carries little weight. Clearly, Hitler's tribute was meant not for the widow of Bernhard Förster but for Nietzsche's sister. And not entirely without reason, at least according to Heidegger, who in 1936 observed: 'Mussolini and Hitler, the two men that brought in a counter-movement against nihilism, both learned from Nietzsche, though in essentially different ways.' It is true Elisabeth seems to like the obeisances: at last her brother had become a national monument! And yet there was no lack of reservations and even of a certain irony: after Hitler's visit to Weimar, Elisabeth noted he had given 'the impression of a person more significant religiously than politically'. Heidegger was far less reserved in his enthusiasm: he was so fascinated by the Führer that he silenced Jaspers's doubts and timid objections by exclaiming: 'But look at his wonderful hands.' So why blame a poor woman rather than one of the great interpreters for shattering the magic of the unpolitical interpretation of Nietzsche? The hermeneuts of innocence do not allow themselves to be impressed by such an objection and withdraw from the affair, while effortlessly dipping Heidegger too into a purifying bath that washes away all political debris.

The Conflict of the Faculties: Philosophers and Historians

To realise how unsustainable is the second myth (the one that makes not Elisabeth but Lukács the scapegoat), it is enough to carry out a simple intellectual experiment. Let us imagine a student who wants to study Nietzsche, and starts by visiting a department of philosophy. There, Kaufmann, Deleuze, Foucault, Bataille, Vattimo and Cacciari practically rule the roost, all working in different ways to unmask Elisabeth's conspiracy and Lukács's ideological delirium. But should the student happen to cross over into a history classroom, he would encounter a completely different line of interpretation: eminent historians like Ritter, Hobsbawm, Elias, Mayer and Nolte all agree, though from quite different positions, on placing Nietzsche in the ranks of the anti-democratic reaction of the late nineteenth century, from which stems the movement that later led to fascism. In the philosophy classrooms, the hermeneutics of innocence are obligatory. On the other hand, Mayer

says the following about Nietzsche's philosophy: 'In this sense the new *Weltanschauung* was anything but innocent.' And if you think the historian quoted here is too leftwing (his book is dedicated to Marcuse), you can turn to Nolte: as we have seen, for the representative of historical revisionism, Hitler was a sort of shy and awkward follower of Nietzsche!

Instead of getting exercised about Lukács, the hermeneuts of innocence would do better to choose the targets of their criticism with greater care. George Lichtheim also displayed the highest contempt for the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, but then declared that '[i]t is not too much to say that but for Nietzsche the SS – Hitler's shock troops and the core of the whole movement – would have lacked the inspiration to carry out their programmes of mass murder in Eastern Europe'. The thesis is mistaken. Nietzsche was certainly not thinking of the Slavs when he elaborated his theory of the 'annihilation of the decadent races', for at the end of the nineteenth century the Slavs were still considered an integral part of the 'civilised' world (this view was also Chamberlain's). On the other hand, establishing an immediate and exclusive relationship between this 'annihilation' and the Third Reich helps to embellish the colonial tradition and the liberal West, as if the extermination of the Native Americans or the aborigines of Australia and South Africa had not already taken place by the end of the nineteenth century!

Even so, a problem arises: why do the hermeneuts of innocence attack only Lukács and not the historians mentioned above or more recent and authoritative scholars of the Third Reich (e.g., Kershaw), who stress Nietzsche's strong influence on Hitler's ideological formation? Earlier, there was much debate and widespread unease about the big gap between the natural sciences and the humanities, and people criticised the lack of communication between them. Now, however, there seems to be a lack of communication even within the humanities, between philosophical and historical research, whereby the latter signifies in the eyes of the philosopher-priests of the Nietzsche cult the desecration of a sacred ritual.

The Suppressions of the 'New Right' and of the Postmodern Left

Thus, the traditional criticism of Lukács, that he repeated, albeit with a reversed value judgement, Baeumler's picture of Nietzsche, turns out to be completely unsustainable. The charge ignores Heidegger of the 1930s on the one hand, and a whole range of contemporary historians on the other.

Nowadays, not only the postmodern left tends to suppress Nietzsche's most repugnant statements. So do the new rightists, whose efforts to gain a new respectability are seriously hampered by the demand for the 'annihilation of decadent races' and of 'millions of deformed'. This emerges with particular clarity from the recently published Italian translation of the book Alfred Baeumler, who two years later joined the Nazi party, dedicated to the philosopher in 1931. Here Nietzsche's *Zucht* and *Züchtung* are rendered as *addestramento*, '[military] training'. The term has military and warlike connotations and is thereby distinguished from the banal and philistine *educazione* ('education'), which the postmodern translators and interpreters like to use. However, neither *addestramento* nor *educazione* convey the eugenics programme of Nietzsche's 'new party of life', which aimed at encouraging the fertility of healthy couples while seeking to stop the malformed from getting married and even to 'castrate' or 'annihilate' them. This is why the 'new party of life', with an explicit reference to Galton, did not stop at recommending the 'education' or 'training' of the master race and the race of servants, but called for their 'breeding'. But Nietzsche's eugenicist ideas are a burden not only for the postmodern left, which would dearly love to see the back of them, but also for the new right, which seeks to define its anti-egalitarian programme in cultural rather than in naturalistic and biological terms, as in the past.

Similarly, *Übermensch* is no longer rendered in the recent Italian translation of Baeumler by the traditional *superuomo* but by *sovrauomo*. In this case too, the similarity with Vattimo's *oltreuomo*, meant to convey the transcendence of the human being of tradition, is striking. In Zarathustra's speech, 'overman' refers to the 'super-species': and again, the shadow of eugenics looms into view. But in the background lurks an even more disturbing shadow, that projected by a central and particularly sinister category of Nazi ideological discourse, namely, the category of *Untermensch*, which can be separated from *Übermensch* only with great difficulty: the two terms constitute a single conceptual dichotomy. A journalist who had read Nietzsche or was at least superficially acquainted with his writings pointed to the great danger posed to culture by such an *Untermensch* (the mass of 'savages and barbarians', 'essentially incapable of culture and obstinately hostile to culture'). Referring to Nietzsche (also in terms of his language and sources), he polemicised against the 'fetish' or 'idol' of 'democracy', evoked a 'new aristocracy' or 'new nobility', and expressed his admiration for Theognis and his battle against mixed marriages between the nobility and the common people. Here not just eugenics but the *oltreuomo* of the postmodern left or the *sovrauomo* of the new right was invoked to perform a miracle and above all eliminate the *Untermensch*!

Surprising in this linguistic-ideological story is the fact that the author in question was not a German but a North American who had studied in Germany: Lothrop Stoddard was the first to coin the term 'Under Man' in 1922, in a book subtitled *The Menace of the Under-Man*. The book was immediately translated into German, and Under Man became *Untermensch*. Rosenberg passionately embraced the category and admitted taking it over from Stoddard, upon whom two American presidents, Harding and Hoover, also lavished praise. Evidently, the alternative to the hermeneutics of innocence does not take the form of drawing a straight line of continuity from Nietzsche to Hitler. The *Untermensch* of the North American ideologue referred, well before its application to the oriental and Asiatic Bolsheviks, to blacks and Native Americans, who in the years following the Civil War were the object of terrorist violence and genocide. Similar considerations apply to the other term in the conceptual dichotomy. At the beginning of the twentieth century an English poet, John Davidson, referred positively to the theory of the overman, but criticised it on account of its cosmopolitan character. According to Davidson, Nietzsche missed a fundamental truth: 'The Englishman is the overman and the history of England is the history of his development.' A different opinion was represented by the Italian writer Angelo Mosso, another eulogiser of imperialism, who was fascinated above all by the epic of the Far West: 'The Yankee is the *superuomo*.'

So, to understand the repugnant aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy (the reverse side of his radical and fascinating project of emancipation, designated for a very small elite of the aristocratic caste and overmen), one must not only start from the end of the nineteenth century (rather than 1933), but one must also take into account the fact that this grim ideology of the turn of the century had spread not only across Germany but across the West as a whole, before being inherited and radicalided by the Nazis.

We thus return to the 'preoccupations' and the disquieting questions to which Gadamer had pointed: would it not make sense to take them up once again and discuss them from a new perspective, rather than give in to the compulsion to suppress them? Or will Nietzsche's spectacles and umbrella continue to make the running? <>

Bizarre-Privileged Items in the Universe: The Logic of Likeness by Paul North [Zone Books, 9781942130468]

An imaginative new theory of likeness that ranges widely across history and subjects, from physics and evolution to psychology, language, and art

A butterfly is like another butterfly. A butterfly is also like a leaf and at the same time like a paper airplane, an owl's face, a scholar flying from book to book. The most disparate things approach one another in a butterfly, the sort of dense nodule of likeness that Roger Caillois once proposed calling a "bizarre-privileged item." In response, critical theorist Paul North proposes a spiritual exercise: imagine a universe made up solely of likenesses. There are no things, only traits acting according to the law of series, here and there a thick overlap that appears "bizarre."

Centuries of thought have fixated on the concept of difference. This book offers a theory that begins from likeness, where, at any instant, a vast array of series proliferates and remote regions come into contact. **Bizarre-Privileged Items in the Universe** follows likenesses as they traverse physics and the physical universe; evolution and evolutionary theory; psychology and the psyche; sociality, language, and art. Divergent sources from an eccentric history help give shape to a new trans-science, "homeotics."

Review

"Likeness looks like a relation that is both too obvious and too 'bizarre,' likely because it has been used and abused by a few lyric and surrealist poets. As a result, dogmatists and suspicious minds have held it in low esteem. Paul North overturns all these prejudices in a sort of *tractatus poetico-philosophicus*—at once free and rigorous, impertinent and lucid. Here, Darwin finally meets Caillois; Plotinus finally illuminates Arcimboldo; Peirce and Wittgenstein finally converse with Bergson, Reverdy, and Benjamin. The book gives us luminously to understand how likenesses arise, act, and proliferate. How they aren't what we once thought; how they are a matter of noncoincidence, of multiplicity, of happenings; how they allow for the possibility of a morphology, a semiotics, a history, and a theory of social linkages. A 'grammatology' of difference and of repetition, **Bizarre-Privileged Items in the Universe** is a philosophical tour de force."**—Georges Didi-Huberman, professor at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales and author of more than fifty works on the theory and history of images**

"Paul North's exploration of the logic of likeness is unlike anything I have read, with its admirable mode of moving between so many unexpected regions and objects. It performs or enacts (perhaps we should say, borrowing a verb coined in these dazzling pages, that it enlikens) what it analyzes: the book connects domains that we thought were as far away from one another as Darwin's notebooks and Surrealism; the Plotinian universe and Wittgenstein's duckrabbit; Arcimboldo's composite vegetable portraits and Gabriel Tarde's sociology."**—Peter Szendy, David Herlihy Professor of Comparative Literature and Humanities at Brown University**

"It is very rare that one comes across a book like Paul North's **Bizarre-Privileged Items in the Universe**. I'm tempted to say that it constitutes itself a 'bizarre-privileged item in the universe,' in the best possible meaning of this formulation. It is an extraordinary, and extraordinarily well-written treatise that takes the reader through numerous different facets of likeness, following its complex yet airy texture, its multiple refractions, arrows and overlaps, by engaging in a smooth, tender, almost comforting flow of ongoing reflection. Big, extremely significant, and very far reaching claims are being made all along the way, in a manner that in no way imposes itself upon the reader,

but rather gently takes her hand and proposes a joint and fascinating journey through the strange wonderland of likeness. I have no hesitation in saying that this is one of the most original and important books written in the past decades."**—Alenka Zupančič, author of *The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two* and *What IS Sex?***

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Preamble

Preamble

The sentences that follow move through seven major premises that lay out something like a logic of likeness. Through their stepwise progression and in their accumulated intentions, the premises reflect two separate aspirations. First, they are meant to bring a reader from a naive and defensive position toward likeness to a discerning and receptive position toward it. At least, that is the wish. A receptive position is approached through a modification of the initial naïve premise, "Everything is like everything in some respect," a mainstay of empiricism since Hume. Further premises travel away from the initial naive premise. Each subsequent premise follows from the previous, as premises are supposed to do, but also modifies it. As they are modified, the premises converge on a topic, homeosis, homeosis being a name for the happening of likeness. A "subsequent" is a better premise, that is to say a more homeotic premise, than an "antecedent" premise. Second, while departing from a naive position and transiting toward a reflective position, the premises also conjure up a complex cosmos in which homeosis is the basic element. For example, Premise 4 says "World is an asymmetrical array."

To move from a naive view of a trivial phenomenon toward a reflective encounter with a new whole that acts by and large according to likeness's eccentric habits—this is the book's wager. The stakes are high. If likeness is the basic element of this cosmos, then there are no beings and no being. Instead, there is an arraying display of inertial pairs with overlapping traits. In place of individual objects in motion, this cosmos displays pairs in inertia with respect to one another. In place of independent entities, this cosmos arrays nodes or points of qualitative overlap. These pairs with overlaps were best described by Roger Caillois when he proposed "to establish the existence of bizarre-privileged items [elements insolites-privilegies in the universe" ("The Natural Fantastic," in **THE EDGE OF SURREALISM;** "Le fantastique naturel," in *Cases d'un echiquier,* Caillois's most provocative example of a bizarre-privileged item is the praying mantis. As he sees it, the mantis

overlaps with a human fear and a human desire, the fear of death and the desire for sex, turning the figure that results into a "bizarre" amalgam of human and animal, nature and psyche and culture, will and being, an eccentric conjunction among the most disparate regions. The mantis is one example of such an item. As it turns out, a community of bizarre-privileged items exists, cosmic points at which likenesses, which cut across modes of existence, overlap. Overlapping is homeosis's mode of existence. The presentation that follows collects a menagerie of bizarre overlaps. Along the way, the presentation also collects a vocabulary for talking about a likeness cosmos. As the premises proceed, terms are gathered from historical sources that depended on likeness, even if those sources only ever partially theorized it.

"Likeness" or figures like it have played decisive roles in a variety of discourses over the history of Europe and its satellites. Aristotle makes homeosis, at one point in the Poetics, the operative force within mimesis. Plotinus makes homeosis the glue holding the ladder of emanations together and to the One. Much later in chronological history, Darwin, following a long lineage of taxonomists, makes "resemblance" the highest principle in nature, while at the same time altering the meaning and scope of the term. Before him, Hume makes it the highest principle of mind. None of these thinkers, except for Plotinus, and then only in a roundabout way, tells you where exactly likeness fits among the other basic principles. Here, the individual sources for a likeness lexicon have been chosen for their conceptual daring and terminological precision, and they are arranged by their best placement in a theory of likeness under construction, rather than according to their chronological place in a history.

"History," in the European sense, has never got past likeness. When it comes to likeness, modernity and antiquity are not really distinct. Foucault's version of things simply cannot be right. The argument in The Order of Things hinges in part on the presupposition that likeness was once a basic principle, and "modernity" abandoned it or relegated it to a trivial position. Modernity is on the whole and in its essence anhomeotic, or so goes the thesis. From the perspective of likeness, the modern world never happened. This is not all that tragic, since the classical world never ended, either, or to use a more apt term, the archaic—the archaic does not release its grip on mind and nature, then and now. A scene that repeats across this swampy nonhistory is one in which a thinker compares likeness unfavorably with being and then surreptitiously explains being by means of likeness. In the garden of ontology, the alien seed likeness sprouts everywhere, and discourses committed to a cosmos full of entities struggle to contain its weedy growth. The philosophical purpose of this book is to challenge ontology with an alternative discipline that can be called homeotics. Homeotics would make the third in a triptych of fundamental explanatory schemata whose inner relations still need to be understood: ontology — semiotics —homeotics. <>

Apocalypse of Truth: Heideggerian Meditations by Jean Vioulac, translated by Matthew J. Peterson, with a Foreword by Jean-Luc Marion [University of Chicago Press,

We inhabit a time of crisis—totalitarianism, environmental collapse, and the unquestioned rule of neoliberal capitalism. Philosopher Jean Vioulac is invested in and worried by all of this, but his main concern lies with how these phenomena all represent a crisis within—and a threat to—thinking itself.

In his first book to be translated into English, Vioulac radicalizes Heidegger's understanding of truth as disclosure through the notion of truth as apocalypse. This "apocalypse of truth" works as an unveiling that reveals both the finitude and mystery of truth, allowing a full confrontation with truth-as-absence. Engaging with Heidegger, Marx, and St. Paul, as well as contemporary figures including Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek, Vioulac's book presents a subtle, masterful exposition of his analysis before culminating in a powerful vision of "the abyss of the deity." Here,

Vioulac articulates a portrait of Christianity as a religion of mourning, waiting for a god who has already passed by, a form of ever-present eschatology whose end has always already taken place. With a preface by Jean-Luc Marion, Apocalypse of Truth presents a major contemporary French thinker to English-speaking audiences for the first time.

Reviews

Hent de Vries, New York University:

"In this magisterial study, Vioulac proposes a radical reversal of thought, employing Biblical inspiration and philosophical rigor. *Apocalypse of Truth* dares to tap into a counter-archive that reaches deeper and further back than Heidegger's rethinking of truth as unconcealment, reviving the long-ignored idea of apocalypticism. What results is not only a stunning rereading of St. Paul, Meister Eckhart, Hölderlin, Hegel, and others, but also a subtle loosening of the mythological grip that Western ontology has too long imposed on its subjects. A tour de force in its own right, Vioulac's book builds on the recent breakthroughs in phenomenological and post-phenomenological thought, bringing a fresh realignment with Christianity and the 'incarnation of truth' it invites us to wager anew."

Thomas A. Carlson, University of California, Santa Barbara:

"In and through a learned, historically far-reaching, and textually rigorous meditation on Heidegger's diagnosis of our modern nihilism, Vioulac turns to the apocalyptic revelation of Saint Paul for truth that would undermine modernity's subjection of all beings to the logic of production and management by means of rational calculation and technological power. In sharp contrast to such machination, wherein humans become—like everything else—interchangeable, Vioulac advances a thinking of the frailty and vulnerability of finite, embodied, and mortal existence, and of the love and mourning essential to such existence. Thanks to an admirably graceful and faithful translation by Matthew J. Peterson, English readers will encounter a challenging and original thinker who sheds light on the disasters of our capitalistic and technological age."

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Preface Jean-Luc Marion

Translator's Note Matthew J. Peterson

Chapter 1. Clarifications

Chapter 2. From the Equal to the Same

Chapter 3. Truth and Its Destiny

To think apocalyptically is to think from the point of view of the ultimate (*Eaxatov*): not teleologically, from the point of view of the end (rang), but eschatologically, from the point of view of after the end. Such a point of view is forced upon every finite existant, whose essance unfolds temporally until its death: only a recapitulatory point of view is capable of circumscribing it in its being; a man can only be de-fined after his end, "changed to Himself at last by eternity" and eschatological thinking then consists in everyone asking himself what he will have been, what he will have made of his life, and in adopting on himself this final judgment that speaks from the ultimate, the *Eaxatov*. But our epoch demands transferring this eschatological perspective to history, humanity, life, and the universe, whose finitude is now manifested from all sides. History had a beginning [debut], it was preceded by hundreds of millennia of prehistory: it will have an end; the human species had a beginning, which only occurred after millions of years of animal evolution: it will have an end; life emerged on planet earth after billions of years of minerality, it had a beginning: it will have an end; and one major scientific revolution of the twentieth century was the thesis—still unthinkable for Einstein—of a universe in becoming, whose beginning it is possible to date, and also to foresee its end. It is thus a trait proper to our epoch to place all things within the horizon of the end, and to demand of the end itself the eschatological perspective. For millennia, the cosmos gave itself as an eternal Whole, albeit under the cyclical form of its own return; the eschatological perspective was then heterogeneous, offered by messengers of God who, like *Philippulus the Prophet*,' could always be considered crazy: but now it is the world itself, from its immanent rationality, that unfolds only in anticipation of its own end. Therefore, the horizon of the possible is now the horizon of the end, and to the thought of this possibility, our epoch furthermore demands taking into account its imminence. Indeed, contemporary technology possesses the means to annihilate all life on earth—through its chemical and nuclear potential—and climatology, in some of

its predictive models, raises the possibility of an imminent collapse of the biosphere threatening terrestrial life in the short term.' And, even more disturbing if possible, all of humanity seems only to desire this end, and is only motivated by the will to get it over with. Man never knew what he was, but he always knew how to preserve a mystery and a promise in this enigma: but now he no longer believes in it, and consents wholeheartedly and unqualifiedly to his reduction to the rank of a herd animal. Man is tired, with an ancient tiredness, and now seeks only to forget himself and run away from himself, in any pharmacopoeia, even the most narcotic, and any entertainment, even the most grotesque, to the point of seeking to leave the earth in order to lose himself in the interplanetary void, to the point of planning his own genetic mutation, to the point of putting his whole heritage up for sale in sales' that organize its total liquidation, where everything must go. Humans have long understood themselves as intermediaries between animal and divine, but now they consent to have been only intermediaries between nature and machine, and it is to their own disappearance that they are resigned today. Is a "genuine revolution of the whole of Being and knowledge"' going to occur to ward off these threats, are we "in the very twilight of the most monstrous transformation of the whole earth and of the time of the historical space in which it is suspended?"'—this is what thought is not in a position to know, and what it is not intended to organize.

It is only a matter of thinking, but precisely from this eschatological point of view, which tries to think Logos from the silence that succeeds it—from the epilogue, therefore—and thus to think in the future anterior: what will have been the event of speech and thought, what will have been human history within the universe once planet earth becomes sterile and deserted again and still slides around its orbit for millions of years before being evaporated in the expansion of the sun? Humanity certainly emerges from nature, but the fact remains that within nature it is the advent of something that is not natural at all, that in it springs forth a light that illuminates nature in its totality and (in the sciences) lights up its smallest corners, but also a power that (in technology) dominates it, turns against it, and can destroy it: in the eternal silence of infinite space humanity is a blaze that we must try to think as such. Humanity makes non-being emerge within beings, that is, Being and nothing, it makes meaning [sens] emerge in the whole panic of primordial senselessness [insense], and that is why we must conceive the human being "not as one among the other things on the Earth that creep and fly, but as the meaning of the Earth, in the sense that with and through the existant each and every being first arises as such a being, closes itself off (comes under command), succeeds and fails, and returns again to the origin."' And it is precisely because the event of human history is the advent of meaning that one can hardly come to terms with its absurdity: or at least, highlighting the emptiness of all signification, that is, of meaning as "vanity of vanities" (Eccl 1:2) is precisely what reveals the unfathomable abyss from which it proceeds, and reveals meaning itself as lack, and as empty.

According to the word of Hegel often recalled by Heidegger, *Wesen ist was gewesen ist*, "essance is the gathering of what has been," and it is the very content of the thinking of our epoch to be recapitulatory. But the whole question is then to know what is the principle of recapitulation, or what is its prince, its leader or its head, since recapitulatio, built on caput, as well as, on, literally means gathering on a single head, a single leader. To this question Hegel, which is to say metaphysics, answers: it is the Idea, which recapitulates itself encyclopedically, and this speculative logic was verified in contemporary totalization, the effective gathering of all that is into the planetary totality of technology, and the dissolution in the spectrality of cyberspace. Our epoch is, in fact, the systematic and automatic recapitulation of all the scattered nations, of all languages and all the generations of men in the same abstract and universal space-time that reduces everything to a quantity of ideal value: that is, in Capital, a word equally derived from caput, "the head." The contemporary re-capit-ulation is capit-alization.

Our epoch is that of the triumph of Capital and the onto-logical totalization that submits the entire planet to technical rationality and finally integrates it into Machinery: it is thereby the triumph of calculative thinking and its functionaries, it recapitulates knowledge and thought themselves, which have become a vast reserve fund for "research," in an apparatus in which "the scholar disappears and is replaced by the researcher engaged in research programs. [...] From an inner compulsion, the researcher presses forward into the sphere occupied by the figure of, in the essential sense, the technologist."' The destiny of philosophy, knowledge, art, and religion then becomes "culture," that is, the available stock of "cultural products," and fundamentally cultural capital. In this way our epoch is the domination of "specialists" to whom it recklessly grants the power to state the very meaning of history, and to give the impression that the conquering rationality that has conquered everything is recapitulation in-and-for-itself: that it is the Universal. Yet the eschatological question is to know who has the keys to define the very meaning of humanity's irruption within nature, who is right [qui a raison] in the recapitulation of meaning: who is the head, and the prince. Apocalyptic thinking then allows the elitist sufficiency of specialists to be sent back into the insignificance of its inanity, and it is in this sense that Hans Urs von Balthasar interprets the verse from the Apocalypse of John (5:2) that asks: "Who is worthy to open the scroll and break its seals?

> Who can decipher the meaning of the universe, its nature, its history? What philosophy can explain the beginning, the middle, and the end, and break its seven seals? To this question a terrifying silence responds: "But no one on earth or under the earth was able to open the scroll or to read it." In the middle of this distraught silence burst the cries of the visionary: "And I began to weep bitterly because no one was found worthy," because no one has the strength, even if he has the courage, to solve the enigma of the world. These cries reveal more to us and are more precious than all the dry eyes of the philosophers or other sages of this world, who manipulate the seals however they see fit, who recommend to us a solution, a "way" to slip through the seals or to simply deny their existence.

In the eternal silence of infinite space, humanity is an essential interruption, which opens a fault in the continuum of immanence where transcendence occurs from a word that through this fissuring introduces meaning. It is the abyss of this fault that reveals lucidity regarding meaning itself, which sees that "all is vanity and a chasing after wind. [...] For in much wisdom is much vexation, and those who increase knowledge increase sorrow" (Eccl 1:14-18): the Qoheleth thus grasped in the vanity of history as such, in the vanity of all labor and every work, the emptiness of an absence and the experience of a haunting lack of the essantial that could only be filled by an infinite love. The ultimate key to the fissuring of this fault in the field of immanence is then divine keno-sis as faultiness, in the singular person of the poorest, who endures, takes on, and recapitulates this infinite by an acquiescence, itself infinite, to the mystery, whose abyss he thus unveils.

But the destiny of the West is the panicked flight before the abyss of this infinite, the impossibility of enduring it and taking it on, its history is the continuous transfer of this infinite into thingness and objectivity, a transfer completed today in globalized techno-capitalist Machinery. In this way, it is annihilation of the infinite, in the sense that it denies it and takes it for nothingness, but also in the sense that it transfers it into non-Being, and makes it into a pure annihilating power: Machinery is extroverted infinitude, it is the attribution of the infinite to beings. "Man," continued Balthasar, "has had enough of being mortal, and he always invents new atomic bombs to blow up his finitude and acquire the infinite by any means necessary," and in this way he risks "lighting the match that, one day, by the explosion of all creation, would send the finite into the infinite. The search for the infinite that characterizes Euro pean modernity and that is unleashed in the possibilities, themselves infinite, of technology is in truth only the refusal of the originary infinite and the idolatry of an objectified infinite that only promises annihilation, and that at the same time covers and veils the abyss: the blinding clarity that contemporary rationality makes prevail throughout the whole universe and the

immensity of space thus exhibited, because they are enough to strike thought with terror, dissimulate the very possibility of the originary infinite; and thus the universe veils the One. Contemporary existence, that of the functionary of technology, is then entirely dedicated to fleeing melancholy, avoiding solitude, eradicating silence, despising the sacred, renouncing the past, denying death, tracking down and anesthetizing all phenomena of faultiness: it is the distraught denial of the abyss of its own distress. But as Heidegger said: "In the face of this abyss one can try to shut one's eyes. One can erect one illusion after another. The abyss does not retreat."

Apocalyptic thinking can only give the key to the abyss. "That key is charity." Today it must be content with rejecting "the wisdom of the princes of this epoch, who are doomed to perish" (1 Cor 2:6), it reveals to one and all: "For you say, 'I am rich, I have prospered, and I need nothing: You do not realize that you are wretched, pitiable, poor, blind, and naked" (Apoc. 3:17). It leaves nothing to be done apart from standing resolutely in eschatological imminence, and our epoch thus demands from itself the eschatological community that defined early Christianity: a new people who leave history because they gather in the end time; not the end of time, but a time that "has grown short" or "contracted" (1 Cor 7:29) by the knowledge that "the end of all things is near" (1 Pt 4:7), that is, a time that expects nothing more from time, which has always already rejected all historiological progress in order to place itself in the parvis of eternity. Such a community is always difficult to establish and maintain, and in principle since an eschatological community is essentially aporetic and exodic; it can in no way be identified with any politics whatsoever and could only be underground; moreover, it always remains exposed to the apparatus's atomizing power, and to the effective violence of real nihilism; it especially does not constitute any "solution" to the technological danger. But the tension of eschatological imminence nevertheless gives all its weight to the crucial phenomena of death and love, it thus gives a setting and a provisional morality that Ernst Junger defined perfectly in a text where he addressed the surge of contemporary nihilism under the monstrous figure of totalitarianism:

> In our deserts there are also oases where wilderness flourishes. Isaiah had recognized this at the time of an analogous upheaval. These are the gardens to which Leviathan has no access, around which he prowls with fury. In the first place, there is death. Today, as always, those who do not fear death are infinitely superior to the greatest of temporal powers. [...] The second power of the depths is Eros. Wherever two beings love each other, they gain ground on Leviathan, they create a space that he does not control. Eros will always win the day, as the true messenger of the gods, over all the fictions of the Titans.

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SPINOZA'S RELIGION: A NEW READING OF THE ETHICS by Clare Carlisle [Princeton University Pres, 978-0691176598]

A bold reevaluation of Spinoza that reveals his powerful, inclusive vision of religion for the modern age

Spinoza is widely regarded as either a God-forsaking atheist or a God-intoxicated pantheist, but Clare Carlisle says that he was neither. In Spinoza's Religion, she sets out a bold interpretation of Spinoza through a lucid new reading of his masterpiece, the Ethics. Putting the question of religion centre-stage but refusing to convert Spinozism to Christianity, Carlisle reveals that "being in God" unites Spinoza's metaphysics and ethics. Spinoza's Religion unfolds a powerful, inclusive philosophical

vision for the modern age—one that is grounded in a profound questioning of how to live a joyful, fully human life.

Like Spinoza himself, the Ethics doesn't fit into any ready-made religious category. But Carlisle shows how it wrestles with the question of religion in strikingly original ways, responding both critically and constructively to the diverse, broadly Christian context in which Spinoza lived and worked. Philosophy itself, as Spinoza practiced it, became a spiritual endeavor that expressed his devotion to a truthful, virtuous way of life. Offering startling new insights into Spinoza's famously enigmatic ideas about eternal life and the intellectual love of God, Carlisle uncovers a Spinozist religion that integrates self-knowledge, desire, practice, and embodied ethical life to reach toward our "highest happiness"—to rest in God.

Seen through Carlisle's eyes, the Ethics prompts us to rethink not only Spinoza but also religion itself.

Reviews

"Carlisle's book is a finely written and thoughtful introduction to Spinoza's philosophy for anyone who is curious as to why this thinker, dead for almost 350 years, remains vitally relevant today"— Steven Nadler, *Literary Review*

"A wonderful contribution to the growing literature on Spinoza as a moral and religious thinker. With scholarly acumen and graceful writing, Carlisle, rightly focusing on the *Ethics*, asks us to rethink Spinoza's relationship to religion and to modernity, as well as those very notions themselves."— Steven Nadler, author of *Think Least of Death: Spinoza on How to Live and How to Die*

"Clare Carlisle's outstanding *Spinoza's Religion* makes a compelling case for the importance of religion for Spinoza's vision of human self-fulfilment. Artfully written and meticulously researched, it provides a fresh perspective on a crucial aspect of Spinoza's philosophy. This is cutting-edge scholarship that is likely to reshape the field."—Yitzhak Y. Melamed, author of *Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought*

"Rigorous, creative, and sympathetic, this magisterial book opens up a neglected tradition and resource: a nondualistic, nondogmatic, and life-affirming spiritual philosophy. Placing Spinoza in a rich dialogue with Christian theology, Clare Carlisle shows that thinking alongside Spinoza reveals new approaches to ethics, freedom, transcendence, and participation in God. This is a landmark book that offers new vistas for philosophers and theologians and that future Spinoza scholars will need to reckon with."—Christopher J. Insole, Durham University

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The Question of Religion

Benedict de Spinoza did not have a religion—at least not in the usual sense of the word. He was brought up and educated within Amsterdam's Jewish community, from which he was cast out in 1656, at the age of twenty-three. As far as we know, he made no effort to reconcile with this community: leaving it was, it seems, a welcome intellectual liberation.' For the remaining twenty years of his life he pursued his philosophical enquiries in conversation with Christians of various sorts, while refusing to convert to Christianity. In the seventeenth century Spinoza was unusual, perhaps even unique, in engaging closely and deeply with theological questions as a free thinker, deliberately occupying a perspective outside any religious tradition. His masterpiece the Ethics (1677) shines out even amongst the philosophical works of his most original contemporaries—Descartes and Leibniz, for example—as a metaphysical and ethical vision unconstrained by the demands of doctrinal orthodoxy.

About a year before his death, while he was completing the Ethics, Spinoza wrote a letter to Albert Burgh, a young man who had just converted from Calvinism to Catholicism. Here Spinoza discussed Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and made plain his rejection of dogmatic, sectarian religion. He explained that he knew the truth of his own philosophy 'in the same way you know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles . . . for the true is the indicator both of itself and of the false'. He asked Burgh, who naturally thought his religion superior to any other,

> How do you know that [your teachers] are the best among those who have ever taught other Religions, still teach them, or will teach them in the future? Have you examined all those religions, both ancient and modern, which are taught here, and in India, and everywhere throughout the globe? And even if you had examined them properly, how do you know you have chosen the best?

These are good questions, and they are only partly rhetorical. Mocking the pride and competitiveness that often characterise religious sectarianism, Spinoza granted that 'the organization of the Roman Church . . . is well-designed politically, and profitable for many. I do not believe there is any order more suitable for deceiving ordinary people and controlling men's minds, unless it would be the order of the Mahommedan Church.' Yet his irreverence towards sectarian claims to spiritual pre-eminence also went in more tolerant, more conciliatory directions. 'In every Church there are many very honourable men, who worship God with justice and loving kindness, he reminded Burgh, 'for we know many men of this kind among the Lutherans, the Reformed, the Mennonites, and the Enthusiasts. So you ought to concede that holiness of life is not peculiar to the Roman Church, but is common to all: Spinoza closed his letter by counselling the eager young convert to 'recognize the reason God has given you, and cultivate it'. In his Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), he had made similar arguments about Judaism, challenging the idea that the Hebrews were God's chosen people. 'God is equally beneficent, compassionate, etc. to all,' Spinoza argued, adding that as far as 'intellect and true virtue' are concerned, `no nation is distinguished from any other'.

Given Spinoza's resistance to what commonly passes for religion, the title of this book contains an irony, and perhaps for some a provocation. At the same time, it is entirely in earnest. The book offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's Ethics which takes seriously the question of its religious and theological import. At the same time—as I argue in detail in my final chapter—it suggests that understanding Spinoza's religion forces us to rethink the concept of religion itself. And this is no coincidence, since our modern category of religion, structured by notions of belief and belonging, ideology and identity, rose to prominence during Spinoza's century. Thanks in part to Jonathan Israel's pioneering history of the 'Radical Enlightenment, Spinoza is now recognised as an architect of modernity—but was his vision of human beings and their place in the cosmos radically secular, or

radically religious?? And does this very distinction between 'religious' and 'secular' rest on a distinctively modern concept of religion, which Spinoza challenged in its infancy? How might the Ethics lead us to rethink our assumptions about what religion is, and what it means to be religious?

Raising these questions leads to a new appreciation of Spinoza's significance. He is rightly seen as a decisively modern thinker: like other forward-looking philosophers of his century, he turned his back on medieval cosmology and scholastic theology in favour of a more streamlined metaphysics, and took a keen interest in new scientific discoveries. He criticised superstitious religion, and sought to liberate philosophy from the still-powerful churches. Yet look a little closer, and we see that Spinoza challenged some of the defining features of modernity. In place of the increasing separation of God from nature, he argued that everything is in God, and even proposed 'Nature' as an alternative name for God. In place of modern individualism, with its ideals of autonomy and free choice, he regarded human beings as entirely dependent on God, interdependent on one another, and embedded in a complex ecosystem of causes: he understood the self to be deeply impressionable and porous, constituted by its relations with other things, and he rejected the idea of free choice as a kind of superstition, akin to belief in miracles. While an ethic of restless striving and relentless industry shaped, from Francis Bacon onwards, the modern pursuit of scientific knowledge, Spinoza balanced his own emphasis on effort and activity with an ideal of intellectual rest—an intuitive knowing that brings peace of mind—which echoes the ideal of contemplation cherished by pre-modern philosophers, monks and scholars. Indeed, he argued that resting in God is the highest human good. And while mod'ern capitalist culture spurs a race for productivity and profit, fuelled by anxieties which, as Max Weber argued in 1905, can be traced to the sixteenth century's Protestant theologies, Spinoza insisted that our deepest happiness is found not in production, wealth or competitive success, but in knowledge. A wise person, he writes at the end of the Ethics, is 'conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, and always possesses true peace of mind' (E5p42s). His own way of life bears witness to this ideal: he lived humbly and modestly, devoted to his philosophical enquiries.

Spinoza thus resisted deep tendencies of modern thought, which had begun to shape his own century and would produce the world we inhabit today. He did so not by drifting back into pre-modern science and religion, but by forging an alternative modernity that preserved or developed some of the profound insights of his ancient and medieval forebears, by setting them on new philosophical foundations. For example, the Ethics affirms the traditional theological view that we are thoroughly dependent beings, not by appealing to a Jewish or Christian doctrine of creation, but by arguing that we are modes, which are by definition 'in another, rather than substances, which are self-sufficient, 'in themselves. To offer just one further example (as we shall see, there are more), Spinoza echoes Plato's insistence that virtue is synonymous with inner happiness—a view challenged first by superstitious beliefs in posthumous rewards and punishments, and later by the means—end thinking of utilitarianism. Yet his defence of virtue's intrinsic value dismantles the idea of final causes that had structured medieval thought.

As its title indicates, the Ethics is primarily a book about how to live a good human life. Like a stripped-down Summa Theologiae, it begins and ends with God. For Spinoza, we work out how to live well by understanding our relation to God, to other people, and also, crucially, to ourselves. The core principle of his philosophy, governing his ontology and epistemology as well as his ethics, is that 'whatever is, is in God' (E1p15). I call this principle 'being-in-God, and regard it as Spinoza's deepest thought. He argues that the highest, most truthful kind of human life is fully conscious of being-in-God--and conscious, too, that every other creature and thing is also a being-in-God. We will be able to say much more about what Spinoza's religion consists in once we have considered what it means, both conceptually and existentially, to 'be in God.

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AFTERWORD
`The path to these things'

In the Ethics Spinoza proposes both a speculative theology and a philosophy of religious life. The first concerns our being, while the second concerns our becoming. These two aspects of the Ethics—the ontological or metaphysical, on the one hand, and the ethical or existential, on the other—are intimately connected. In Part One, Spinoza argues that God, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, necessarily exists, and that whatever is, is in God. For each individual mode this entails causal and conceptual dependence, which can give the impression that we are trapped in a rigid determinist system. As we move through the Ethics, however, Spinoza's metaphysics of human being-in-God unfolds: we see that we can be more or less, that we are continually passing between various degrees of being—and that our fluctuating existence, with its striving to persist and increase, opens up a path to follow in pursuit of the highest good. This ethical journey, way or path (via) expresses our nature, yet it involves effort, emendation, learning, growth in virtue and self-understanding.

Religious life consists in keeping to this demanding path, or, perhaps more realistically, in returning to it again and again. Its task is to appropriate, live out and remain faithful to the truth of our being-in-God—the truth that constitutes the core of Spinoza's theology. This is the meaning of 'human freedom, as the title of Ethics V suggests.

Spinoza ends Part Five with a word of encouragement to follow his difficult path of freedom: 'If the path [via] I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard [perardua videatur], still, it can be found' (E5p42s). In fact, he suggests, the path only seems arduous. When it is found and followed, even if only for a short time, it turns out to be a place of rest.

Religio joins a number of concepts in the Ethics—being-in-God, scientia intuitiva, participation, acquiescentia, amor Dei intellectualis and eternity—which are gathered in this book under the title Spinoza's Religion. These concepts touch one another, illuminate one another, and each might be placed at the heart of the gathering. Whichever concept takes centre-stage, the Ethics discloses ways of being, knowing, desiring, feeling and acting that are entirely natural to human beings, yet also high ideals which inspire strivings of devotion and cultivation. We considered, in Chapter 2, how the text itself exemplifies and guides these strivings. The Ethics addresses readers with mixed minds, and seeks to train their imaginations as well as model the clear, orderly thinking of ratio and the immediate, penetrating insight of scientia intuitiva.

Spinoza is often described as a rationalist—and he is certainly committed to the intelligibility of being. Yet his conception of knowledge seems much broader than the epistemologies that dominate contemporary philosophy. He understands human cognition to be intimately tied to our embodiment, our affective experience, our duration. His use of the verb cognoscere throughout the passages in the Ethics dealing with our knowledge of God suggests a process of getting to know God, which requires sustained attention. Similarly, he chooses the verb noscere—meaning to recognise, to become acquainted—to describe a process of getting to know ourselves: 'it is necessary to know [noscere] both the power and the weakness of our nature' (Eons). This suggests that we should seek to know, by intimate acquaintance, both our sadness and our joy: though Spinoza celebrates joy, and criticises the idea that forms of sadness should be cultivated as spiritual virtues, this does not mean we should resist or refuse sadness when it arises—for how else can we come to know `the power and the weakness of our nature, except by feeling its fluctuations? Sentire denotes the mind's feeling of its own eternity, while scientia intuitiva likewise conveys the immediacy and simplicity of sensation: a capacity to see, in one glance, the being-in-God of singular things. Spinoza suggests that our minds can connect to God in all these ways, and he shows why this

connection naturally, necessarily, brings us joy and peace—our highest activity, and our deepest repose.

We are not autonomous beings, and we do not strive for these goods alone. We seek like-minded companions, and the more we taste the immanent rewards of consciously being-in-God, the more we wish to share them with others. This is precisely what Spinoza himself desired—and what he did. The very fact that he spent many years writing the Ethics, without extrinsic reward, is, I think, an extraordinary demonstration of his own virtue of religio.

In my Introduction, I suggested that the Ethics may be ambiguous on the question of religion. This is partly because Spinoza approaches this question neither in terms of orthodoxy, nor in terms of orthopraxy; both these alternatives belong to the modern objectification of religion, which he sought to resist. More fundamentally, the religious ambiguity of the Ethics contributes to this resistance. It is possible to interpret the text so that the concept of God becomes a theoretical vanishing-point, evacuated of recognisably religious significance—and many people have read it this way. I find it remarkable that Spinoza's philosophy accommodates twenty-first-century atheism along with the simple piety of his landlady. This profound inclusivity is a great strength at a time when there are deep sectarian divisions not only between different 'religions, but between what we have become accustomed to call 'religious' and 'secular' perspectives. Unlike many other religious philosophies, Spinoza does not alienate nonreligious readers.

Nevertheless, if we exclude the insights I have considered under the heading 'Spinoza's Religion', we miss much of the richness and depth of the Ethics. We also miss the opportunity to allow Spinoza to challenge the dogmatism of the secular view that now dominates our culture, just as he challenged Christian and Jewish dogmatisms in his own time. If we insist on Spinoza's atheism, we cannot appreciate his core principle of being-in*God, and have little choice but to dismiss much of Part Five of the Ethics. If we assume that Deus sive Natura simply reduces God to a familiar modern notion of nature, stripped of any theological meaning, then we lose the conception of God (or Natura naturans) as ontological ground which is so integral to Spinoza's metaphysics, with its deep commitment to the intelligibility of being.

Spinoza offers us the freedom to name this ontological ground 'God' or 'Nature, YHWH' or 'substance, or perhaps something else. Any name can only gesture to a plenitude of being that eludes us—although we cannot exist, or conceive ourselves, apart from it. Yet how we gesture to the ground of our being matters a great deal, since this gesture is a fundamental way of making, or disclosing, meaning in our world. Since 'God' names this excessive, elusive, omnipresent fullness of being in a manner that draws human beings into communities of devotion and enquiry, equipped with long histories and rich philosophical, contemplative and poetic traditions to draw upon, this is both a good name and a risky one. In the seventeenth century it had a very broad appeal, and offered a promising basis for universality as well as enormous potential for theological discord. Perhaps this is why Spinoza retained it in the Ethics as well as in the Theologico-Political Treatise, while addressing, in both texts, the misunderstandings and conflicts generated by dogmatic 'belief in God'.

To speak personally for a moment, I feel ambivalent towards the word `God, but one of the things I like about it is that it places us in what Etienne Souriau called 'a questioning situation'. I find that this word opens up, rather than circumscribes, the Kierkegaardian 'question of existence'—What does it mean to be a human being?—that guides my philosophical work and what I hesitatingly call my spiritual life. The Catholic theologian Karl Rahner wrote that the word 'God' (or equivalent words in other languages) 'is so very much without contour, and for this reason is 'obviously quite appropriate for what it refers to. Using the word 'mystery' in a sense similar to Souriau's 'questioning situation, Rahner suggests that `the concept "God" is not a grasp of God by which a

person masters the mystery, but it is letting oneself be grasped by the mystery which is present and yet ever distant'.

The name of God, spoken with due care, has a remarkable power to hold open the question of religion. Since Spinoza retains the classical conception of religio as the virtue of giving honour to God, his decision to name God as the ground of being in Part One of the Ethics raises the question: what does it mean to give honour to God? This prompts theoretical, theological questions—What is God? Where is God? How am I connected to God? — and while the Ethics does offer compelling answers to these questions, it also suggests that pursuing them will cultivate a sense of our own epistemic limitations. Such questions flow from, and are intimately connected to, the practical religious question of how we might give honour to God. Spinoza refuses to answer this question in terms of religious belief or religious practice. In place of orthodoxy or orthopraxy, he holds open the ethical, existential or spiritual question of religion: 'How ...?' This is a working question, a guiding question, a question that is genuinely asked only insofar as it is lived.

One clear answer that emerges from Spinoza's works is the kind of devotion I discussed in Chapter 1: a willingness to spend time, to pay attention, to offer these resources of one's life—as Foucault put it, 'the price that must be paid for access to the truth. Paying this 'spiritual' price is what it means to honour God, and perhaps, as Latour suggests, 'learning to redirect attention is religion itself'. Yet precisely how we spend our time, precisely where we direct our attention, may remain open—for devotion can be expressed through philosophical and theological enquiry; through contemplation and meditation; through rituals and liturgies; or simply through ethical life. Religio might take the form of seeking God, or giving praise and thanks to a God already given through a cultural tradition. It might be cultivated and communicated in hymns and mantras, in speech and writing, in works of love or in silence.

Spinoza's conception of God as ontological ground not only secures the intelligibility of being, but also provides a resting-place for desire. In other words, this grounding is affective and experiential, as well as metaphysical. If we were not consciously grounded in God, we could not feel, or 'know by experience, that we are eternal—not even for a moment. The Ethics suggests that we do have this knowledge, and that we can rest in it, regardless of religious belief or belonging. Without God, our hearts would remain restless; our desire and love would be drawn only to mutable, perishable things. Spinoza's writings give philosophical expression to an eternal desire and love, which has been articulated in many ways, in many traditions, throughout human history We can trace the stakes of this issue to the beginning of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, where Spinoza describes how our minds, or souls, are disturbed and diminished by 'the love of those things that can perish'—whereas 'love [amor] toward the eternal and infinite thing feeds the mind [animism] with a joy entirely exempt from sadness. This is greatly to be desired [desiderandum], and to be sought with all our strength:

This affirmation of eternity does not make Spinozism a dualistic, life-denying, other-worldly philosophy. On the contrary: all the things of this world have some share in God's eternity, and deserve to be seen and loved as beings-in-God. When things express themselves most truly, they participate most fully in God's nature. For a Spinozist, it would be poetic, but not untrue, to call their being-in-God 'glory, and to say that every creature on the earth sings its own peculiarly glorious song in praise of its creator. <>

SPINOZA'S ETHICS, BY BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, TRANSLATED BY GEORGE ELIOT, edited by Clare Carlisle [Princeton University Press, 9780691193236]

An authoritative edition of George Eliot's elegant translation of Spinoza's greatest philosophical work

In 1856, Marian Evans completed her translation of Benedict de Spinoza's *Ethics* while living in Berlin with the philosopher and critic George Henry Lewes. This would have become the first edition of Spinoza's controversial masterpiece in English, but the translation remained unpublished because of a disagreement between Lewes and the publisher. Later that year, Evans turned to fiction writing, and by 1859 she had published her first novel under the pseudonym George Eliot. This splendid edition makes Eliot's translation of the *Ethics* available to today's readers while also tracing Eliot's deep engagement with Spinoza both before and after she wrote the novels that established her as one of English literature's greatest writers.

Clare Carlisle's introduction places the *Ethics* in its seventeenth-century context and explains its key philosophical claims. She discusses George Eliot's intellectual formation, her interest in Spinoza, the circumstances of her translation of the *Ethics*, and the influence of Spinoza's ideas on her literary work. Carlisle shows how Eliot drew on Spinoza's radical insights on religion, ethics, and human emotions, and brings to light surprising affinities between Spinoza's austere philosophy and the rich fictional worlds of Eliot's novels.

This authoritative edition demonstrates why George Eliot's translation remains one of the most compelling and philosophically astute renderings of Spinoza's Latin text. It includes notes that indicate Eliot's amendments to her manuscript and that discuss her translation decisions alongside more recent English editions.

Review

"Carlisle has done a beautiful job editing George Eliot's translation and providing a scholarly apparatus. . . . This is the edition that George Eliot's translation of Spinoza's *Ethics* has long deserved, and that we have long needed."—Steven Nadler, *La Vie des Idées*

"This edition will be of most interest to scholars of Eliot seeking more insight into the influence of Spinoza's thought on her literary work."—*Choice*

"Readers and lovers of George Eliot owe a large debt of gratitude to Clare Carlisle and Princeton University Press for their fine new edition of Eliot's translation of Benedict de Spinoza's Ethics (1677)."—Thomas Albrecht, *Women's Writing*

"For this volume to be truly worthwhile, the significance of the translation must be revealed, and to do this, the biographical, literary, and philosophical context in which the translation came to be needs to be explored and analysed. And Carlisle succeeds splendidly in all these respects."—Michael Della Rocca, *Mind*

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George Eliot's Spinoza: An Introduction

Spinoza and Spinozas

Our philosophical landscape is populated by growing numbers of Spinozists, and by quite a few Spinozas. Some uncontested facts provide common ground: he was born Baruch Spinoza in 1632, the son of Jewish Portuguese immigrants, and he was raised in Amsterdam's Jewish community, from which he was expelled in 1656, never to return; from then on he took the name Benedict (the Latin version of "Baruch," meaning "blessed"), associated with Christians of various kinds, but refused to join any Church. From here, characterizations of Spinoza diversify. There is the brave critic of superstitious religion, a clear-eyed prophet of the secular age: this Spinoza heralded a "radical Enlightenment" more than a century before Kant. There is the daring anti-theological thinker of "pure immanence," popularized in recent years by Gilles Deleuze's influential interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy. There is a Spinoza whose invocation of "God or Nature" represents a more familiar naturalism: his readers equate "God" to a modern, materialist conception of nature and tend to dismiss as rhetorical—or as mere "nonsense"—those passages in his works that suggest a more religious view. There are also left-wing and liberal Spinozas, early champions of equality, individual freedom, and democracy. Hovering among these modern Spinozas is the ghost of Spinoza the atheist, which haunted generations of readers and critics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While this old Spinoza was castigated for his "monstrous" atheism, his descendants are now celebrated for it.

The present text is, as far as we know, the first English translation of the Ethics. It was completed in 1856 by Marian Evans, then a successful woman of letters, who in the following year began to publish stories under the pseudonym George Eliot. She encountered a different Spinoza, more angel than monster: he wore a bright new halo, conferred by the admiration of successive German geniuses, including the poets Goethe and Novalis, the theologian Schleiermacher, and the philosophers Schelling and Hegel. Like Spinoza himself, these thinkers were neither atheists nor conventionally religious. Though they did not grasp Spinoza's philosophy perfectly, they appreciated its spiritual depth at a time when Protestant orthodoxy was being challenged in unprecedented ways, in Germany as in England. Through the first decades of the nineteenth century, this Spinozism emanated from the German university towns, its strange glow illuminating the avant garde of English intellectual life.

The Ethics is indeed a radiant book, though a tough one. It is Spinoza's greatest work, sitting easily among the true masterpieces of Western philosophy, and perhaps rivaled only by Plato's Republic in its completeness and power as a work of both ethics and metaphysics. It was written in Latin, like most of Spinoza's works, and published shortly after his death in 1677. It crowned a brilliant philosophical career, which included a critical exposition of Descartes's philosophy (1663), the controversial Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), various unpublished writings, including a book on Hebrew grammar, and a large correspondence in which Spinoza elaborated his philosophical system as well as his views on religious and scientific questions.

Part I of the Ethics sets out Spinoza's theology—his account of God, and of God's relationship to everything else—and at the core of this theology is the claim that "Whatever is, is in God" (E1, P15). This expresses in propositional form St. Paul's insistence that God "is not far from each one of us, for in him we live and move and have our being"—an insight Paul offered in Athens, "a city full of idols," as a corrective to the pagan idea that "the deity is an image formed by the art and imagination of mortals." In the seventeenth century, Spinoza was responding to a similar error: he saw that the mainstream Christian churches were propagating an idolatrous image of God formed after the pattern of human power, as if God were a great king or an omnipotent father, eager to reward or punish people for their obedience or disobedience. Spinoza's claim that all things are in God, a

doctrine now known as panentheism, undercut this anthropomorphic theology and challenged the crudely moralistic view of the human good that was based upon it.

Panentheism is a tendency found within all religious traditions, including Christianity. Augustine followed Paul in teaching that "all things are in God," though in a special sense, since God is "not a place," and Thomas Aquinas agreed with him; the early Franciscans pursued a radical way of living according to a panentheist spirituality. But in the context of post-Reformation Christian theology, which promoted an image of God separate from the world, Spinoza's insistence that God is "the immanent cause of all things," so that nothing "exists in itself outside God" (E1, P18), appeared to be heretical, even atheistic. And Spinoza's writing was certainly polemical: he condemned the destabilizing dogmatism and repressive, debilitating moralism imposed by the established churches, offering in their place a joyful, empowering, and deeply virtuous way of life that he called "true religion." Though the Ethics is evidently concerned with theology in the literal sense of the logic of God, or the study of God, Spinoza helped cement a cornerstone of Enlightenment thought by distancing himself from the seventeenth-century conception of theology as based on scriptural and traditional authority, and tied closely to obedience and faith.

Descartes is now widely regarded, not without justification, as the father of modern philosophy who tore up the roots of long-entrenched habits of thinking. Yet Spinoza's ontological reformation was far more radical—perhaps less in its account of God than in its account of everything that exists in God, including human beings. While Descartes saw human beings as finite substances, created by God, who is an infinite substance, Spinoza taught that God alone qualifies as substance: this term designates something that exists independently, selfsufficiently, which for Spinoza meant being self-causing. Human beings, like everything else that exists, are not self-sufficient. We are not substances but modes of substance: ways in which substance is modified or affected. Modes are, by definition, dependent entities, which exist in something else (see E1, Def. 5), and so Spinoza's claim that "Whatever is, is in God" categorizes everything—except God—as a mode of God. The etymological connection between "mode" and "mood" may illuminate this metaphysical point: a human life is to God what one of my moods is to me—ephemeral, substanceless, and impossible to conceive as separate from or independent of my existence. More metaphorically still, we are to God as waves are to the ocean.

By elucidating the concepts of substance, attribute, and mode in Ethics I, Spinoza reframed both the difference between God and the world and the difference between particular things. By designating God as the only substance, he made it clear that God is in a way fundamentally different from the way in which anything else exists. This new account of ontological difference has a clear religious significance: it indicates that we are at once closer to God, and more different from God, than we may have imagined. Since we are in God, we are inseparable from this divine source of our being; yet since God is substance while we are modes, the nature of our existence is different in kind from God's existence.

In fact, Spinoza's claim that everything is a mode of God gave a new philosophical expression to the religious view that all things are entirely dependent on God, a principle at the core of traditional doctrines of creation. In this way his "panentheism" opposed not just atheism, but also deism, which became widespread in the eighteenth century, propounding the idea that God is merely the architect of the universe, like a watchmaker who designs his creation, sets it in motion, then leaves it to function on its own. Spinoza acknowledged that his own view of God's omnipresent causal power echoed an older theology: "God is not only the cause that things begin to exist; but also, that they persevere in existing, or (to use a scholastic term) that God is the cause of the being of things" (E1, P24, Cor.).

As its title suggests, most of the Ethics is concerned with human life: with specifically human ways of knowing, feeling, and acting. Spinoza's analysis of human experience and behavior is underpinned by a philosophical anthropology: an account of what a human being is. He regarded the human body and the human mind as two aspects of a single, unified individual, understood metaphysically as a finite mode of God. It is not quite right to say that modes are parts of substance, or that we are part of God, for Spinoza's substance—as theologians have traditionally taught of God—does not have parts: it is both simple (i.e., not composed of parts) and indivisible (i.e., cannot be divided into parts). Yet God's power manifests itself in infinite totalities, including the intellect of God and face of the whole universe, and finite modes are parts of these infinite modes, or infinite manifestations. In other words, each finite human consciousness is part of God's infinite consciousness, and each finite human body is part of the physical universe, interconnected with countless other beings.

This anthropology passes seamlessly from theology to epistemology, psychology, and ethics—before returning to theology at the end of the Ethics. In the second, third, and fourth parts of the book, Spinoza works toward his account of the highest human good by explaining the difference between "inadequate cognition" and true knowledge, and by setting out a masterly, genuinely therapeutic analysis of human emotions. Arguing that "the laws of nature according to which all things come into existence and pass from one form to another, are every where and always the same," Spinoza shows that human actions and passions "follow from the same necessity and power of nature as other phenomena" (E3, Preface). He argues that we are mistaken to believe ourselves or others to act from free will: "men believe themselves free solely because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined" (E3, P2, schol.). Spinoza seeks to enlighten his readers precisely by overcoming this ignorance, and teaching greater self-understanding. A wise person, he explains, understands how she is affected by external things, and she also understands her dependence on God. In Part V of the Ethics, he concludes that knowing and loving God will bring us "blessedness," "freedom," "true peace of mind," and even some kind of eternal life.

With this end in view, readers may wish to dive straight into Spinoza's difficult masterpiece. For those curious to learn more about how this remarkable seventeenth-century text came to be translated by an equally remarkable nineteenth-century author—and about how Spinoza's philosophy may have shaped George Eliot's thinking and writing—there follows an exploration of the intriguing relationship between two of the widest and deepest souls, or "modes" of thinking, ever to arise within God's infinite intellect.

* * *

Despite all the causes that conspired to make George Eliot the first translator of the Ethics into English, her translation was not published as planned. During the summer of 1856, three or four months after

the translation was completed—while Marian was holidaying with Lewes on the British coast, gathering her strength for her fiction writing—Lewes exchanged a series of letters with Henry Bohn, who had published Lewes's translation of Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences three years previously. The two men had made no clear written agreement concerning Spinoza, but Lewes thought Bohn had committed to publishing a translation of the Ethics, possibly along with extracts from the The^l^gico-Political ^^eatise. Lewes presented this work as jointly produced by himself and a translator named Kelly, invoked t^ conceal Marian's involvement in the project, since disapproving reactions to her unconventional relationship with Lewes were likely to undermine its success. Perhaps Lewes had misunderstood Bohn's commitment to publish the Ethics, or perhaps Bohn had changed his mind; Lewes expected £75 for the work, while Bohn would offer no more than £50. In any case, their correspondence ended in disagreement and mutual recriminations. Their exchange

began in early June, and by June 15 Lewes was declaring himself "insulted" by his publisher, "declin[ing] to have transactions with a man who shows such wonderful facility in forgetting," and asking Bohn to "send back my m.s. and consider the whole business at an end between us."

Lewes and Marian may at this time have resolved to publish her translation of the Ethics elsewhere. Almost three years later, on February 25, 1859, Lewes noted in his journal that the publishers A. & C. Black had written offering "to publish a work on the `Spinal Chord' on half profits & also offering to publish my Spinoza." (As Lewes's biographer Rosemary Ashton has remarked, it is curious that he described the translation of the Ethics as "my Spinoza" here, in the privacy of his journal.) Lewes felt "dubious" about the treatise on the spinal chord: "It would be pleasant to do such a book but I'm afraid I can't afford it." The next day, February 26, he "wrote to A. & C. Black declining spinal chord ... , but offering the Spinoza for £75." But on March 7 Lewes "Rec[eive]d letter from A. & C. Black declining to publish Spinoza but requesting me to write a short article on Spinoza for the Encycl[opaedia]. Brit[annica]., which I declined." At this time George Eliot's first novel, Adam Bede, had just been published, and during the spring of that year it received huge critical acclaim and became a best seller. Perhaps amid this excitement her translation of the Ethics—and the prospect of £75—became less important to Lewes and Marian. And perhaps they were reluctant to add fresh complications to the escalating intrigue of authorial identity surrounding George Eliot's work.

George Eliot, or Mary Ann Cross (as she is named on her gravestone), died in 1880, two years after Lewes. The first English edition of Spinoza's Ethics, translated by R. H. M. Elwes, was published in 1883—in Bohn's Philosophical Library, of all places. In the same year, William Hale White also published his English translation of the Ethics, thus spinning new threads within the George Eliot— Spinoza web—for in the early 1850s Hale White had worked as a proofreader for John Chapman alongside Marian Evans and lodged in the room above hers in Chapman's house on the Strand. Hale White "worshipped" Marian "for her kindness and cleverness," and many years after her death he published his recollections of her.

Yale University purchased the manuscript of the Ethics from Lewes's granddaughter Elinor Ouvry in 1942, and it is kept in an archive in Yale's Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library. (The present text has been transcribed from this manuscript, with some editorial interventions which are discussed in my "Note on the Text.") In 1981, nearly one hundred years after the first English editions of the Ethics appeared, a typescript of her translation was published in a volume edited by Thomas Deegan for the University of Salzburg. This very limited edition made its way to a few academic libraries, then went out of print. Today, people are usually surprised to learn that George Eliot translated Spinoza's Ethics.

It seems right that Marian's long hours of labor on the Ethics should be rewarded with an edition that makes her elegant, intelligent translation widely accessible to new generations of readers—of Spinoza, and of the novels of George Eliot. This edition appears in 2019, exactly two hundred years after her obscure birth in the uncelebrated "heart of England." <>

Maimonides the Universalist: The Ethical Horizons of the Mishneh Torah Menachem Kellner, David Gillis [The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization in association with Liverpool University Press, ISBN: 9781800347458]

Maimonides ends each book of his legal code the *Mishneh torah* with a moral or philosophical reflection, in which he lifts his eyes, as it were, from purely halakhic concerns and surveys broader horizons. Menachem Kellner and David Gillis analyse these concluding paragraphs, examining their verbal and thematic echoes, their adaptation of rabbinic sources, and the way in which they coordinate with the *Mishneh torah*'s underlying structures, in order to understand how they might influence our interpretation of the code as a whole—and indeed our view of Maimonides himself and his philosophy.

Taking this unusual cross-section of the work, Kellner and Gillis conclude that the *Mishneh torah* presents not only a system of law, but also a system of universal values. They show how Maimonides fashions Jewish law and ritual as a programme for attaining ethical and intellectual ends that are accessible to all human beings, who are created equally in the image of God.

Many reject the presentation of Maimonides as a universalist. The *Mishneh torah* especially is widely seen as a particularist sanctuary. This study shows how profoundly that view must be revised.

Reviews

'Kellner and Gillis have written an impressive book that enables readers to enter more deeply into Rambam's religious worldview. At a time when Rambam is subject to so much misrepresentation and misunderstanding, it is heartening to read a book that seeks to present Rambam's teachings in a clear, genuine and convincing manner.' —Rabbi Marc D. Angel, *Jewish Ideas*

'This book belongs in the hands of anyone who teaches the philosophic halakhah of Maimonides, anyone who teaches topics such as slavery, ethics, or messianism in Maimonidean philosophic law. This book should be a valuable part of the essential library of the High School rabbi or pulpit rabbi looking to give a universalist defense of Judaism. The authors of this book have a sharp eye and acute ear for parallels between passages and echoes to discussions elsewhere in the text. As a literary reading of Maimonides the book is without equal.' —Alan Brill, *Kavvanah*

'The book most reads easily, making it accessible to readers not intimately acquainted with Mishneh Torah. And the book's extensive cross-references to Rambam's other works a are source of delight to scholars of Maimonidean studies. —'Eugene Korn, *H-Judaic*

'By treating these sermonettes to an in-depth study, the authors reveal how they can enhance our understanding of the MT itself and of Maimonides' philosophical outlook. [...] Kellner and Gillis demonstrate that the reflective endings of MT reveal his understanding of Judaism as an ever-expanding intellectual horizon upon which halakhah was the means not the end in itself. Highly recommended for all libraries. —'David B Levy, *Association of Jewish Libraries News and Reviews*

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Adapted from Alan Brill's Blog: This review is basically on the single book **MAIMONIDES THE UNIVERSALIST: THE ETHICAL HORIZONS OF THE MISHNEH TORAH** (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2020) by Menachem Keller and David Gillis, but also its intersection with David Gillis **READING MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH TORAH** (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2014) and Menachem Kellner and James Diamond, **REINVENTING MAIMONIDES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWISH THOUGHT** (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2019).

MENACHEM KELLNER is the Chair of the Philosophy and Jewish Thought Department at Shalem College. His prior position was at the University of Haifa for 33 years. He is the author of over 25 books. Kellner's basic focus in most of his books is how to have an ethical and rational Maimonides, which is part Hermann Cohen's Maimonides via Steven Schwatzchild (Kellner's doctorate advisor) and part a spiritualized and carefully selected selection of Maimonides's ideas that fights the battles against the farshtunken and perverse thinkers that Kellner openly disapproves of their thought including: Ultra-Orthodoxy, Kabbalists, and those who think Jews are superior to gentiles.

David Gillis, a student of Kellner's, who did not chose academia as a profession, wrote a very nice book back a number of years ago called **READING MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH TORAH** (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2014). In that work, Gillis shows how the organization of the laws in the entire *Mishneh Torah* is shaped by the medieval cosmology at the start of the *Principles of the Torah.(yesodei hatorah)* This book on universalism has a fine summery of Gillis' thesis, useful for showing how the keeping of the law is in accord with the rational structure of the cosmos.

The third book of that intersects here, Menachem Kellner and James Diamond, **REINVENTING MAIMONIDES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWISH THOUGHT** (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2019) where the Kellner sections show how much the Ultra-Orthodox approach and even the world of Rabbi Soloveitchik deviate from Kellner's ideal Maimonides.

In this book, *Maimonides the Universalist* the authors focus on the closing statements of each of the 14 books of Maimonides *Mishneh Torah* where Maimonides always gives a philosophic exhortation and universal rational for the laws of that section. They claim that these statements are the key to understanding Maimonides. They perform a close reading and fine-tuned analysis of these statements to construct a universal Maimonides, one that thinks anyone philosophic and ethical is performing God's will. They are especially interested in showing that this even applies to mizvot that are seemingly not universal such as circumcision, purim, or tefillin. Their readings are sensitive, careful, and thoughtful.

Universalism is the main rubric of the book, but along the way we get the best exposition of the role of philosophy in the specifics of the Mishneh Torah, better than found in any other scholarly book. Most of topics presented by Prof Isadore Twersky in his magisterial *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides* (1982) are given a fresh turn in this book, presented as crystal-clear arguments. An important topic such as the reasons for the commandments in Maimonides thought as the naturalistic perfection of the body and soul, as providing ethical, intellectual, and social organization is detailed with exact quotes. It also gained the cosmic element from Gillis' work. We also see the importance of science in Maimonides as the true object of study. Finally, the analytic presentation of Maimonides view of the messianic age is rich, detailed, and superb.

Yet, the authors themselves are aware of an implicit tension in their approach. Maimonides did not care about or refer to non-Jews in his thinking. In their reading, Maimonides was never thinking goyim; they were never on his mind. Maimonides, in this reading, remains provincial and parochial. According to Maimonides, Aristotle could merit the world to come as a rational and moral person. Since Aristotle, could do this even though he was not a Jew then Maimonides can be labeled as universalist. Personally, I find it a funny use of the word universal. It is what Michael Waltzer calls a "low flying universalism" rather than one that makes demands to go out of one's comfort zone.

Nevertheless, this book belongs in the hands of anyone who teaches the philosophic halakhah of Maimonides, anyone who teaches topics such as slavery, ethics, or messianism in Maimonidean philosophic law. This book should be a valuable part of the essential library of the High School rabbi or pulpit rabbi looking to give a universalist defense of Judaism. The authors of this book have a sharp eye and acute ear for parallels between passages and echoes to discussions elsewhere in the text. As a literary reading of Maimonides the book is without equal.

But at this point, I part company with this book and most books of Kellner. Kellner is highly selective in his reading of Maimonides avoiding the Aristotelian, Platonic, skeptical, mystical, illuminationist, and pietistic elements of the great rationalist's thought. Kellner champions a Maimonides of his own modern design, at points slipping into Hermann Cohen, Buber, or Steven S. Schwarzschild.

I find it anachronistic to appeal to Maimonides' use of 12th century science as a model for a 21st century universalism for modern Orthodoxy without further comment. If your book is prescriptive, then we should be looking for our universal worldview at the 21st century options such as transhumanism, the Anthropocene, RNA vaccine production, or the genome project. Or are we limited to thinking Maimonides advocated meteorology as did the medieval ibn Tibbons.

After I finished the interview, I asked Menachem Kellner some of my issues with his approach and he graciously responded. First, I asked him about his creating Maimonidean halakhah as an ideal type that never actually existed. His Maimonides is idiosyncratic and does not actually reflect Maimonidean reception or with any halakhic approach. To which he answered: "And Rav Soloveitchik's view of halakhah is not an ideal type? There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of poskim are not Maimonideans in the sense that Rambam would have wanted them to be.

It would be foolish to deny that… Poskim do not evaluate halakhah based on the universalism of *yesodei hatorah*. They do not see such evaluations as part of halakhic thinking."

Beyond that, this reading of Maimonides is very similar to many a Salafi Islamic rational thinker for whom Salafi/Wahabi Islam is rational and universal because knowledge of God and ethics are universal. Anyone can be Muslim. The presentation of Maimonides is very similar to the universalism in Islamic *dawa* found in the articles from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. I have met many an Islamic scholar for whom Islam is the universal truth for everyone to accept without limits based on tribe or people. To which Kellner answered: "And therefore? What's the problem? Personally, I think that Rambam would be committed to a view articulated by my late teacher, Steven Schwarzchild, according to which there can "Jewish Non-Jews." I doubt very much that Rambam the historical figure would have said such a thing, but were the implications of his positions pointed out to him, he might very well have agreed."

The book is written as a Modern Orthodox book whose major function is to reject Haredi positions. Ultimately, I felt the book was heroically going through an already open door. I am not sure that most people need this book to not consider an intrinsic distinction between Jew and non-Jew. And most do not see the return to medieval Aristotelianism and a Neo-Maimonideanism position as thoughtfully pursuing science or philosophy. A medieval rational universalism is rather ethnic and provincial in focus. But we do need this book to continue refining our understanding of Maimonides and in that it has nicely covered new ground.

Alan Brill's Interview with Kellner and Gillis

WHAT IS NEW IN THIS BOOK MAIMONIDES THE UNIVERSALIST?

Maimonides the Universalist is the first systematic, full-length study of an intriguing literary feature of Rambam's *Mishneh Torah*, namely the endings of each of its fourteen books, where the discussion goes beyond halakhah proper in a peroration that is often impassioned, even lyrical. If Judaism can be considered to have a universal pole and a particularist pole, we find that these endings have a universal polarity.

Much of Menachem Kellner's writing has focused on the combination of halakhah, Aristotelian science, history, and messianism in Maimonidean thought leading to an understanding of his consistent universalism, his rejection of claims (held before him by Halevi, and after him by Kabbalah and kabbalistically inflected Judaism) to the effect that there is some sort of ontological/metaphysical/inherent distinction between Jews as such and non-Jews as such. Human beings —all human beings— are truly and fully created in the image of God.

David Gillis in his *Reading Maimonides' Mishneh Torah* (2015), shows that while the major content of the *Mishneh Torah* is the commandments, the book has a universal philosophical message expressed in its structure.

Kellner's studies have demonstrated that halakhah is a tool, not an end in and of itself for Rambam, and that the *Mishneh Torah* should therefore be understood as a tool the purpose of which is better expressed in the closing statements of many sections.

WHAT DOES UNIVERSALISM MEAN? WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

We do not attempt a universal definition of universalism, as it were. We talk about it in a Jewish context. In that context, it means that there is no inherent difference between Jews and non-Jews, and that the same concept of human perfection applies to Jews as to all human beings.

We do not regard Maimonidean universalism as transcending Judaism. Rambam establishes as commandments of the Torah the knowledge of God and the imitation of God. He illuminates these

commandments with the aid of Aristotelian concepts of intellectual and moral virtue, and regards them as imperatives for any thinking person, but they nevertheless remain the essence of the Torah as far as he is concerned, and he makes the other commandments, down to the most particularist of them, serve these primary, universal ones. Universalism thus does not transcend the Torah; it *is* the Torah properly understood.

Lest it be thought that we personally want to live in Rambam's world, let us make clear that we understand that Rambam might be one of the open society's enemies criticized by Karl Popper, and that his vision of liberty is not the one that Isaiah Berlin and we prefer .Rambam, was convinced that truth is one, objective, and unchanging. If virtue is knowledge, then ignorance of the truth is immoral and also a form of mental illness.

HOW IS CIRCUMCISION, A SIGN OF PARTICULARITY, A UNIVERSAL IMAGE IN MAIMONIDES? HOW IS ABRAHAM UNIVERSAL?

Abraham is one of Rambam's two great heroes – the other being Moses. In Rambam's portrayal of him at the beginning of "Laws of Idolatry," Abraham is the re-discoverer of monotheism after humankind's lapse into idolatry. The emphasis is on his intellectual journey rather than on his role as the progenitor of the Jewish people. Out of a superabundant love of God, he sought to bring others to recognition of the truth, by means of persuasion and personal example, and he gathered around him a large community of believers.

The main custodians of the truth, however, were Abraham's descendants, and when they relapsed into idolatry, they were rescued from it by Moses, through the Torah. The Torah communicates as tradition, and embodies in ritual, the truths that Abraham discovered. Its ultimate aim, however, is to prepare its adherents to work out these truths for themselves, to recapitulate Abraham's experience. So Moses transmitted a particular law to a particular people, but the example that it champions is the universal one of Abraham.

This is seen consistently on the frequent occasions in the *Mishneh Torah* that Rambam mentions Abraham and Moses together. Abraham is presented as the personification of an idea that Moses formalizes as law. For example, towards the end of "Laws of Repentance," Rambam describes Abraham as exemplifying the rapturous love of God to the exclusion of all other concerns, and then states the Mosaic commandment "and thou shalt love the Lord thy God."

Circumcision exists on both the universal, Abrahamic plane and the particular, Mosaic plane. In Rambam's view, as expressed in the reasons provided for circumcision in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, it was practiced by Abraham and his followers as a means of restraining disruptive sexual desire and promoting social solidarity, and as sign of belief in the one God. It was instituted as a binding law by Moses, not Abraham, and as such it could certainly be taken as a badge of tribal belonging, but its ultimate aim is the recapture of the universal Abrahamic ideal.

WOULD THAT MEAN THAT MOST ISLAMIC RATIONAL THOUGHT THAT TRACES THE RELIGION TO ABRAHAM BE RATIONAL?

Clearly not everything traced to Abraham is universal. Circumcision is enjoined upon his descendants (including those descended from his second wife, Keturah), but not upon moral monotheists outside of the orbit of Judaism and Islam who follow the Seven Noachide commandments on the basis of rational considerations (who are called wise in "Laws of Kings", 8:11, even if they are not allowed residence in a Maimonidean Jewish state, since they do not accept the Torah, the constitution of such a state).

To the extent that Islamic rational thought is true, then, yes, it is universal. Rambam insisted that Islam is thoroughly monotheist, which means that its conception of God is both rational and universal.

HOW ARE PURIM AND HANUKAH SEEN AS UNIVERSAL?

Rambam takes two festivals which are clearly associated with Jewish– Gentile warfare and makes their ultimate message one of peace among all human beings. Through a conjunction with the laws of Sotah and of Shabbat candles, Rambam indicates that the meaning of both Hanukah and Purim is to be found in a messianic future of peace among all nations. He ignores the bellicose nature of the special prayer added to the liturgy on these holidays (*al ha-nissim*), and focuses on the message of universal peace. This is similar to the way in which he takes the figure of Elijah, a prophet presented in the Bible as unrelentingly vengeful (recall in particular his encounter with the prophets of Ba'al in 1 Kings 18), and makes him a messianic harbinger of universal peace.

HOW DOES MISHNEH TORAH SET OUT A HIERARCHY OF COMMANDMENTS TO REFLECT THE STRUCTURE OF THE HIERARCHAL UNIVERSE?

In the *Mishneh Torah*, Rambam establishes a hierarchy of the commandments. He configured the *Mishneh Torah* as a microcosm, its structure reflecting the hierarchical universe in which he thought he lived (See David Gillis's book **Reading Maimonides Mishneh Torah**). In Rambam's picture of the universe there are ten orders of angels that produce and control the spheres containing the stars and planets; and four elements of terrestrial matter. Correspondingly, the *Mishneh Torah* comprises ten books on the heavenly-oriented commandments between human beings and God, and four on the earthbound social commandments.

The angels and spheres, as intelligent beings, are superior to the four elements, while they themselves exist in a hierarchy according to the level of knowledge of God that each possesses. The arrangement of the commandments in the *Mishneh Torah* reflects this cosmic hierarchy. The first ten books are ordered in accordance with the degree to which they deal directly with the knowledge of God, the *Book of Knowledge* unsurprisingly coming first, while this intellectual aspiration is nobler than the material concerns of the commandments in the last four books that regulate the social order.

HOW IS THE REJECTION OF SLAVERY AT THE END OF THE LAWS OF SLAVES UNIVERSAL? HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE OR CHARACTERIZE THE ETHIC OUTSIDE OF HALAKHAH SHOWN IN THAT LAW?

In our reading, what is interesting about the ethic shown at the end of "Laws of Slaves," namely that a non-Jewish slave must be treated with the utmost consideration despite a Torah provision that implies otherwise, is that it is an ethic *within* halakhah. This is contrary to the consensus approach to the passage in question, which is that it is an example of *lifnim mishurat hadin*, of supererogatory behavior (which may or may not be an ethic outside of halakhah, but that is a whole other controversy).

We see Rambam as being much bolder than the consensus would have it. As we have mentioned, he determines that there is a positive commandment to imitate God, one of the 613 commandments. This, in the *Mishneh Torah* at least, means the cultivation of inward character traits that reflect the attributes of God's actions in the world as enumerated in Exodus 34: 6: merciful, gracious, long-suffering, and so on. These traits are universal not only in the sense that they represent an ideal to which all people ought to aspire, but also in the sense that they are indivisible, and should therefore find universal expression in one's dealings with any human being.

Hence for halakhah to permit demeaning treatment of a non-Jewish slave amounts to a contradiction within with the ideal of cultivating character traits. Rambam however has a graduated approach to fulfilment of the commandments.

The hierarchical structure discussed in the last question holds the answer, in that, Maimonides prioritizes the universalist commandment to imitate God found in book 1 over the provision allowing discrimination against a non-Jewish slave found in book 12.

Allied to the notion of prioritization is the notion of accommodation, that the Torah is adapted to actual social conditions. This is most famously seen in Rambam's explanation of sacrifices as a concession to conventions of worship prevalent at the time the Torah was given. The late R. Nachum Rabinovitch suggested that the discriminatory provisions in "Laws of Slaves" could be seen as a somewhat similar accommodation to social and economic reality.

Faithful as he was to the sources of halakhah, Rambam records these provisions, but at the same time, in impassioned rhetoric, he calls for them not to be taken as signifying Jewish supremacy or as cues for cruelty, and appeals instead for humanity and recognition of essential equality, culminating in citation of the verse "And His mercy is over all His works" (which we adopt as the motto of our book).

He does so, we argue, not from a perspective outside of halakhah, but from a rigorously constructed scale of value within halakhah in which the ethical imperative overrides, even if it cannot cancel, the provisions in question. This allows Rambam to espouse the universal while accommodating the particular, which we regard as not the least of his extraordinary achievements.

WHAT IS THE HIGHEST FORM OF TORAH STUDY FOR MAIMONIDES?

In order to fulfill the commandment of loving God with all one's heart and soul, "one must, therefore, be single-minded in studying and reflecting on the disciplines and sciences that give him such knowledge of his Master as humans can understand and apprehend," ("Laws of Repentance", 10: 6).

Thus chapters 2-4 of the *Mishneh Torah*'s opening section "Laws of the Foundations of the Torah" provide a summary of medieval science. Rambam identifies this science with *pardes*. In "Laws of Torah Study", the third section of the *Mishneh Torah*'s first book, he includes *pardes* in the most advanced stage of the Torah curriculum. Thus the highest form of Torah study for Rambam is the science and philosophy discovered by Abraham, which formed part of an elite rabbinic tradition that was lost (*Guide* i. 71), and that Rambam sought to restore with help from Aristotle and his followers..

AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE BOOK, YOU SAY MAIMONIDES WAS OBLIVIOUS TO NON-JEWS. WHY DID MAIMONIDES TAKE THIS APPROACH? WHY REJECT THE UNIVERSALISM THAT INCLUDES NON-JEWS OF SHEM TOV ON III:51?

It seems that the simplest answer to the question is the *Mishneh Torah* is a work of *halakhah* addressed to people who are commanded to obey the Torah's commandments in this world, i.e., Jews.

Rambam certainly thought that non-Jews could achieve a share in the world to come (to the extent that he thought anyone could, a debated subject in academic circles, which we will not address here). Both Abraham and Aristotle were non-Jews. As to Abraham, we assume that no one reading this will deny his place in the world come; as to Aristotle, Rambam wrote to Shmuel ibn Tibbon that Aristotle achieved the highest level of perfection open to human beings just short of prophecy. This is not something Rambam said about Hazal, and if he thought that they could reach a share in the world to come, it would be hard for him to deny such a share to Aristotle.

Shem Tov on Guide iii.51 thought that Rambam taught there that non-Jewish physicists were closer to God than non-physicist rabbis. That is likely Rambam's position (assuming the physicists in question were moral human beings) but it is not, we think, what Rambam was talking about there in iii.51.

HOW DO THE COMMANDMENTS SERVE THE PURPOSE OF HOLINESS?

It is easy to show that Rambam's view of the commandments do not reflect antecedent ontological distinctions in the universe. As we have outlined, we do see the arrangement of the commandments in the *Mishneh Torah* as analogous to the structure of the cosmos, but there is no actual connection between the commandments and cosmic reality.

Tum'ah (ritual impurity), for example, is defined entirely by halakhah. If one could invent a tum'ahmometer, as it were, it would indicate nothing when passed over something defined by halakhah as *tame*.

What, then, is their function? Rambam rules in the introduction to his *Book of the Commandments* that general imperatives in the Torah such as "be holy" do not count as independent commandments for the purposes of listing the canonical total of 613. Rather, "be holy" amounts to saying "keep all the commandments." We may conclude that the telos of the commandments is holiness.

What does Rambam mean by "holiness"? Jews were not given the commandments because they are holy, nor were they made holy by having been given the commandments. Rather, they *become* holy when they fulfil the commandments. This does not mean that as one fulfils commandments one's ontological status changes from profane to holy; rather, it means that "holiness" is the way in which Rambam's Torah characterizes obedience to the commandments.

Holiness for Rambam thus means the outcome of a kind of behavior. It is nothing that can be said to exist in and of itself, it is not some sort of superadded essence, it is nothing ontological. It is rather a name given to certain extremely important and highly valued types of behavior, and, by extension, to persons, places, times, and objects. It is, and this is a point that must be emphasized, something that is not given, but must be earned. Holiness is not an inheritable status.

The hierarchy of the first ten books of the *Mishneh Torah* referred to earlier can be described as a hierarchy of holiness. It ascends from the external holiness of place in the books dealing with the Temple (books eight, nine and ten) to the ultimate domain of holiness, the intellect, which is the domain of the commandments in the first book, the *Book of Knowledge*. It means a turning away from the material desires and bodily appetites towards the apprehension of God. This is the process that the prophet, the highest rank of human being, is described as undergoing in "Laws of the Foundations of the Torah," 7: 1, sanctifying himself through detachment from temporal concerns, detaching himself from temporal concerns and perfecting his knowledge of God's "wisdom", i.e. the laws of nature, until eventually "the holy spirit rests upon him."

For a greater details see our discussion of the remarkable passage that ends the *Book of Agriculture* in "Laws of the Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee," 13: 13

HOW IS RAV SOLOVEITCHIK'S THOUGHT AN OPPOSITE OF MAIMONIDES?

Soloveitchik revered Rambam, but the rational approach to the reasons for the commandments expounded in the *Guide of the Perplexed* disappointed him. It failed to match his sense of the grandeur of halakhah as an autonomous system, a way of comprehending the world at least on a par with natural science, but proudly separate from it, standing in no need of justifying itself before any philosophical tribunal.

In part three of the *Guide*, Rambam first posits the universal rational goals of the welfare of the body and the welfare of the soul, and then proceeds to demonstrate how each of the commandments promotes their attainment. Soloveitchik felt that such an approach could not possibly motivate religious observance or satisfy a religious sensibility. But in the *Mishneh Torah*, he found, the point of departure is halakhah itself, halakhah unbound. The justification for halakhah in that work lies in the inner world, the "subjective correlative" as he describes it in *The Halakhic Mind*, that observance of halakhah brings about. This, he felt, reflects the authentic Jewish experience.

Simply reading the opening paragraphs of the *Mishneh Torah* is enough to shake Soloveitchik's view of the halakhah. Rambam begins with certain axioms concerning the philosophical idea of a "First Existence," before announcing that this First Existence is the God of the world (note not the God of Israel) and making the first citation of a commandment in the *Mishneh Torah*, "I am the Lord thy God."

Just as in the *Guide*, the commandment is related to an antecedent philosophical principle. Similarly, in the second section of the *Mishneh Torah*, "Laws of Moral Qualities," Rambam first discusses the Aristotelian idea of moral virtue as cultivation of the mean between extremes of temperament, and then declares that the commandment "And you shall walk in His ways" refers to this idea. The commandments of the knowledge and imitation of God are thus based on philosophical premises. Maimonides sees the rest of the commandments as supportive of these primary ones. This entails that, ultimately, they are all philosophically motivated.

At the same time, we believe that Soloveitchik's idea of subjective correlative does come into play in the *Mishneh Torah*.

For Rambam, most strangely to us, moral psychology and cosmology are formally similar. The microcosmic form of the *Mishneh Torah* outlined earlier implies that observance and study of halakhah perfects human beings by shaping their minds and mores according to the perfect form and functioning of what he saw as a living, intelligent cosmos. In other words, the "subjective correlative" is the human microcosm, and the object with which it correlates, or ought to correlate, is the macrocosm, the created universe as understood by science.

This confirms the tendency identified above in the opening of its first two sections: the *Mishneh Torah* in its entirety is served by and serves the very science and philosophy from which Soloveitchik thought it had declared independence. It does not promote the formation of an autonomous halakhic world view.

WHAT IS MAIMONIDES' VIEW OF THE MESSIAH?

Rambam's naturalist and universalist vision of the messianic era challenges Jews to make the world messiah-worthy. The peak of messianism for Rambam is thus to bring all human beings to the point where they abandon idolatry (and all that idolatry stands for, namely, brutality and stupidity) and embrace monotheism.

So far as we know, our book contains the first complete presentation of all of Rambam's messianic texts in English.

The key passage reads as follows:

> "The Sages and Prophets did not long for the days of the messiah that they might exercise dominion over the world, or rule over the nations, or be exalted by the peoples, and not in order to eat and drink and rejoice, but so that they be free to devote themselves to the Torah and its wisdom, with no one to oppress or disturb them, and thus be worthy of life in the world to come, as we explained in "Laws of Repentance." Then there will be neither

> famine nor war, neither jealousy nor strife. Good things will be abundant, and delicacies as common as dust. The one preoccupation of the whole world will be only to know [lada'at] the Lord. Hence [**Israel**] will be very wise, knowing [yodim] things now unknown and will apprehend knowledge [da'at] of their Creator to the utmost capacity of the human mind, as it is written: "For the land shall be full (ki malah ha'arets) of the knowledge [de'ah] of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea" [Isa. 11: 9]."

Who "will apprehend knowledge [*da'at*] of their Creator to the utmost capacity of the human mind?" Printed editions have for generations written that it will be "Israel." However, that word is not found in the best manuscripts. Is it Israel, as the printed editions have it, or all human beings as the best manuscripts seem to teach? In our book, we prove (at least to our satisfaction) that the manuscripts are correct and that the addition of the word "Israel" here is an attempt, conscious or not, to restrict the fullest possible knowledge of God to Jews only, and not to all human beings.

Rambam's understanding of world history is that it is not God's original intention to choose the Jews. As Rambam explains in Laws of Idolatry ch. 1, Abraham chose God, not the other way round. Had the first individual to discover God through rational means after humanity had degenerated into paganism been a Navajo philosopher, then the Torah would have been written in the Navajo language, its narratives would have reflected the history of the Navajo people, and its commandments would have sought to purify, sanctify, and exalt the Navajo way of life. But the Torah in its innermost essence would not be different; it would teach the same truths it teaches today, only clothed differently.

Rambam's messianic universalism is also an outgrowth of his understanding of the nature of humanity. In this Jews and non-Jews are precisely alike, created in the image of God. Only those who actualize their intellectual potential can be said to have realized the image of God potentially in them.

However, such actualization is very hard work and can only be achieved by highly disciplined individuals living lives of self-restraint. It is in this sense that Rambam (and other medieval philosophers, Jews, Muslims, and Christians, working in the Aristotelian tradition) was convinced that a morally dissolute person could not possibly be a philosopher. In the perfected messianic world, all peoples will be able to realize the faith of Abraham.

In Kellner's next book (**We are Not Alone: A Maimonidean Theology of the Other** – Academic Studies Press,) it is shown that Rambam's messianism allows us to live in hope and therefore work for a better future: what is, is not what must be. Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed* addressed Jews of his day who felt challenged by apparent contradictions between Torah and science. *We Are Not Alone: A Maimonidean Theology of the Other* uses Maimonides' writings to address Jews of today who are perplexed by apparent contradictions between the morality of the Torah and their conviction that all human beings are created in the image of God and are the object of divine concern, that other religions have value, that genocide is never justified, and that slavery is evil. Individuals who choose to emphasize the moral and universalist elements of Jewish tradition can often find support in positions explicitly held by Maimonides or implied by his teachings. *We Are Not Alone* offers an ethical and universalist vision of traditionalist Judaism. <>

Leo Strauss and Contemporary Thought: Reading Strauss Outside the Lines edited by Jeffrey A. Bernstein and Jade Larissa Schiff [SUNY series in the Thought and Legacy of Leo Strauss, SUNY, 9781438483955]

Broadens the horizons of Strauss's thought by initiating dialogues between him and figures with whom little or no dialogue has yet occurred.

Leo Strauss's readings of historical figures in the philosophical tradition have been justly well explored; however, his relation to contemporary thinkers has not enjoyed the same coverage. In *Leo Strauss and Contemporary Thought*, an international group of scholars examines the possible conversations between Strauss and figures such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Charles Taylor, and Hans Blumenberg. The contributors examine topics including religious liberty, the political function of comedy, law, and the relation between the Ancients and the Moderns, and bring Strauss into many new and original discussions that will be of use to those interested in the thought of Strauss, the history of philosophy and political theory, and contemporary continental thought.

CONTENTS

In **THE ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF LEO STRAUSS,** Laurence Lampert tells a compelling story of Strauss's engagement with the esotericism of Maimonides as exemplified in the former's correspondence with Jacob Klein between the years 1937 and 1939. In these letters, and in Lampert's engagement of them, one sees clearly the captivating excitement that held the young Strauss as he discovered both Maimonides's writing between the lines as well as the influences and analogous instances of esoteric writers that preceded him. Before Strauss's eyes, a philosophical world was opening up—one that included Homer, Hesiod, Xenophon, Plato, Aristophanes, Farabi, and Averroes. As the Second World War raged on, and in the midst of professional and financial insecurities, Strauss lived in the urgent wonder of the philosophical life.

This excitement and wonder is doubtless present to all readers who try to engage seriously and thoughtfully with Strauss's own work. Perhaps one of Strauss's many virtues is to have conveyed precisely the excitement that he felt during his formative period to his readers during their/our own. To have shown, for example, that the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, the relation of the philosopher to the city, and the distinction between Jerusalem and Athens were living topics for reflection is no mean feat. From his early writings on Spinoza and on Medieval Jewish and Islamic thought, through the great lectures on natural right, Machiavelli, and the relation of the city to man in the 1950s and 1960s, up to the intensely difficult later works on Plato and Xenophon, Strauss successfully re-originates such excitement for all parties interested in the history of philosophy. Recent scholarly endeavors have continued this excitement as concerns the thought of Strauss himself. The inauguration of the Gesammelte Schriften—with its inclusion of Strauss's correspondence, unpublished drafts, and marginalia—has so far given readers a clear view of Strauss's intellectual trajectory from Weimar Germany, through Great Britain, and into the beginning

of his time in the United States. Similarly, the publication of Strauss's University of Chicago course transcripts by the Leo Strauss Center (both online and in book form) have given readers a good sense of Strauss the teacher, who engaged students' questions and worked closely through texts of thinkers familiar (Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes) and less-familiar (Grotius, Vico) to readers of Strauss's publications. This has, in turn, created vital thematic and historical avenues for scholarly monographs and articles on Strauss. Be it the early Weimar Strauss, the Strauss of the re-orienting 1930s, the Strauss of political philosophy, or Strauss as close reader of philosophical texts, the quality and quantity of secondary literature has decisively established Strauss as a fixed star in the realm of philosophical research. Put differently, the original excitement over the history of philosophy has continued into Strauss's own thoughts about that history and has led to several divergent lines of interest within Strauss studies—one such line being, not surprisingly, Strauss's relation to the very practice of writing between the lines that he discovered in premodern thought. Moreover, this continuous transmission of excitement surrounding the lines of Strauss's work and thought shows no signs of abating any time soon.

If the present volume makes a contribution to the excitement of Strauss studies, we hope it will be by paradoxically continuing to transmit the excitement of Strauss's thought by reading him (to a certain extent) outside the lines already established by the current receptions of Strauss's oeuvre. In placing Strauss's thought in conversation with other contemporary' thinkers and topics, we hope that this volume extends Strauss's thought to hitherto unexplored areas of research. This extension seems a natural one to us insofar as many of the other thinkers (e.g., Foucault, Lefort, Tönnies, Derrida, Lacan, and Blumenberg) have been in conversation with similar thinkers in the history of philosophy. Similarly, many thinkers have a thematic affinity with Strauss (e.g., the question of religion in public life, the concern over law). Finally, certain topics (comedy) have been underexplored in Strauss circles. We believe that inaugurating a conversation between Strauss and these thinkers/ topics can only highlight the excitement and reach of Strauss's thought going forward.

That Strauss's oeuvre amounts to a sustained argument favoring (in Hans Jonas's Aristotelian coinage) "the nobility of sight" hardly comes as a surprise, and the contributors to part 1 ("Arts of Seeing and Reading") all address this aspect of Strauss's thought. Jade Schiff argues in favor of an affinity between Strauss's and Derrida's practices of reading—their "shared awareness of the perpetually problematic character of politico-philosophical and deconstructive inquiry points to their shared affinity for the Socratic style of investigation that calls into question what we think we know—about ourselves, our political commitments, our world." Matthew Sharpe similarly highlights the readerly qualities that Straussian and Lacanian inquiry share: "there is the near-psychoanalytic attention Strauss asks his readers to pay to 'ambiguous words' like `rank,' virtue,' `secret,' tyranny, "the wise,' wisdom,' or 'moderation' and `courage' in revered thinkers. Are these not precisely what Freud calls condensations: words in whose double address Lacan espies the 'poetic spark' of metaphor?" In my own treatment of Strauss and Soloveitchik on law, I attempt to show how both thinkers make use of Husserlian phenomenological categories in order to "understand law as an optic through which certain fundamental phenomena come to light." Finally, in her treatment of Strauss and Lefort, Isabel Rollandi explores the question of how both thinkers read Machiavelli in order to accentuate the distinction "between teaching and thought" and the philosopher's "giv[ing] to think in pieces and, following his intention . . . reconstruct[ing] his thought" in the service of "contribut[ing] towards the recovery of the permanent problems."

In the recovery of the political horizon for philosophy, Strauss continuously does battle with historicism without denigrating history. Differently stated, in thinking about the differing perceptions of politics contained in ancient and modern philosophy, Strauss attempts to inoculate readers against viewing philosophy as under the aegis of history by consistently viewing history under the aegis of philosophy. In so doing, Strauss allows readers to appreciate the primacy of the political without

giving short shrift to history. The contributors to part 2 ("History and Politics") evince a notable awareness of this aspect of Strauss's thought. Jessica Radin's comparative study of Strauss and Charles Taylor on religious pluralism shows how both thinkers appreciated the political character of modern society's relation to particular religions: "For neither thinker is the accommodation of religion without limits—we must strive for moderation, for 'reasonable accommodation' that may sometimes mean excluding practices (in a given time and circumstance) as being intolerable. Yet there is both the risk and the hope that those circumstances can change." Miguel Vatter's contribution on Strauss's relation to Foucault on Platonic political philosophy discloses that "[u]ltimately, both Foucault and Strauss agree that 'political philosophy' or 'normative political thought' is not what the western tradition has made of it: it is neither a discourse that seeks to understand the nature of political things, nor does it delineate a theory of justice for the sake of moralizing politics . . . 'political philosophy' is a practice that seeks to replace a democratic political life by the legitimate government of some over others." The difference between the two is that where Foucault views natural right only as "the discourse that makes it possible to implant a pre- or supra-political government of others in a democracy," for Strauss natural right refers to "a discourse for which the government of others is 'by nature' right or in accordance with the needs of the philosophical life." Waller Newell showcases George Grant's prolonged engagement with Leo Strauss in order to better show the former's "deeply interesting contribution to contemporary political philosophy. Like Strauss, within the boundaries of political philosophy, Grant preferred the classical approach over the modern approach . . . like Strauss, Grant accepted the notion that the modern project for the conquest of nature embodied a paradigm shift from the classical search for the eternal order of the whole . . . Unlike Strauss and like Heidegger, however, Grant did accept the proposition that global technology summed up the essence of the modern project . . . And fundamentally, of course, Grant departed from Strauss in his central pre-occupation with Christian revelation in both its positive and its baleful effects." Danilo Manca brings together Strauss and Hans Blumenberg concerning their respective renditions of the Moderns: Strauss and Blumenberg "share the idea that the radicalization of Descartes's rhetoric of a new beginning can in no way work," thus necessitating "pav[ing] the way for retrieving another way of living and thinking." Finally, Peter Gostmann shows the benefits of studying Strauss and Ferdinand Tönnies from the standpoint of the sociology of philosophy by focusing "on the various social actors and groups that Tönnies and Strauss introduce [in their elaborations of the thought of Hobbes]" and considering "the qualities attributed to these actors and groups, as well as the figures of argumentation and figures of speech that [they] apply to explain the interrelations of them." In so doing, he shows that—for all his sensitivity to the distinction between natural right and natural law in Hobbes—Tönnies's approach remains tied to historicism, while Strauss's reading is positioned on the side of ancient philosophy against modern philosophy in its concern over "the problem of the best possible regime."

As with his approach to history, Strauss's approach was never simply to denigrate the very category of "culture" but, instead, to view it from a philosophical standpoint. It is in this vein that the contributors to part 3 ("Culture and Critique") approach the constellation of dialogic reason, comedy and mockery, nihilism, and one's relation to society and its traditions. In his conversation between Strauss and Habermas, Rodrigo Chacón argues that "[i]n their own self-understanding, Strauss and Habermas are critical thinkers . . . the work of critique consists in the dialectical overcoming of fixed oppositions into an expanded conception of reason . . . insofar as [Strauss and Habermas] were guided by problems which, in Strauss's words, are 'coeval with human thought,' they also advanced the work of reason in its movement towards self-consciousness." Alexander Duff treats a facet of Strauss's critique of Heidegger that has (to my knowledge) gone underappreciated in the still small literature on the two thinkers: "namely, his criticism of Heidegger for being inattentive to the comic or the laughable in human experience." For Duff "Heidegger's Socrates takes no account of Socratic irony, his noble dissimulation. He misses the status that opinion has in Socratic

philosophy, where opinion is the matrix of thought because it contains a distortion of the truth." Ingrid Anderson explores the convergence concerning nihilism between the thought of Strauss and that of Albert Camus: "Both formulate . . . nihilism as a resounding "No!" directed toward a justifiably disappointing liberal democracy . . . Perhaps most revealing is their shared assertion that resistance to German nihilism

and its successors requires a re-discovery of and renewed adherence to some semblance of absolute universal values, values that are not created by the forces of history, but identified in history as enduring and therefore fundamental." Menachem Feuer (in like manner to Duff's considerations) wonders about Strauss's conception of comedy: "Attention to Strauss's observations on the differing uses and divergent meanings of humor and comedy may prompt us to think differently about the meaning and place of comedy in his work." By means of a thoughtful journey through his readings of Aristophanes, Maimonides, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, Feuer's Strauss shows readers that "the main thing for both the Socratic/Platonic approach to philosophy and the Jewish approach to Prophesy is that chance and comedy displace fate and tragedy." Finally, Philipp von Wussow explores the relation between Strauss and Walter Benjamin, showing that "the two figures of interwar German-Jewish thought represent two different ways of conceptualizing the dialectics of modernity and premodernity, two models of viewing society and culture from the outside, and two different foundations for the understanding of the political in its relation to culture." Whereas "Strauss took his bearings from Socrates to avoid the political battleground of culture," Benjamin worked through " 'documents of culture'—modern literature, art, and everyday culture" in order to achieve a standpoint not simply entrenched in the ideologies of modern life.

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We hope that we have conveyed something of the excitement with which these contributions were composed to the readers who read them. We believe that each essay opens the door to potentially important avenues of research and thought. From our perspective, the depth of Strauss's thought is measured not only by how he engages with earlier philosophers, but also by how he converses with—and allows himself to be conversed with by—contemporary figures and ideas as well. That Strauss is, himself, a contemporary thinker in no way obscures his importance in retrieving and re-originating earlier thought (the former may, in fact, even be a precondition for the latter). Our claim is, rather, that the transhistorical philosophical life remains alive today and is visible to readers in these conversations. In reading Strauss outside the lines, we seek to continue and deepen the line that leads back to the philosophical life in the thought and work of Leo Strauss. <>

LEO STRAUSS AND THE THEOPOLITICS OF CULTURE
by Philipp von Wussow [SUNY series in the Thought and Legacy of Leo Strauss, SUNY9781438478395]

This archive-based study of the philosophy of Leo Strauss provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts.

2020 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title

In this book, Philipp von Wussow argues that the philosophical project of Leo Strauss must be located in the intersection of culture, religion, and the political. Based on archival research on the philosophy of Strauss, von Wussow provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts. Presenting the necessary background in German-Jewish philosophy of the interwar period, von Wussow then offers detailed accounts and comprehensive interpretations of

Strauss's early masterwork, Philosophy and Law, his wartime lecture "German Nihilism," the sources and the scope of Strauss's critique of modern "relativism," and a close commentary on the late text "Jerusalem and Athens." With its rare blend of close reading and larger perspectives, this book is valuable for students of political philosophy, continental thought, and twentieth-century Jewish philosophy alike. It is indispensable as a guide to Strauss's philosophical project, as well as to some of the most intricate details of his writings.

Reviews

"Philipp von Wussow has given us an excellent and engaging study of Leo Strauss' oeuvre in his compact and accessible *Leo Strauss and the Theopolitics of Culture*." — *Phenomenological Reviews*

"Von Wussow's book is a must read for anyone interested in Strauss's project, the themes of his work, or the genesis of his thought." — *CHOICE*

"Von Wussow compellingly argues that Leo Strauss is to be considered not only a historian of philosophy, but an original philosopher in his own right." — Paul Mendes-Flohr, author of *Martin Buber: A Life of Faith and Dissent*

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LEO STRAUSS ON DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LIBERAL EDUCATION by Timothy W. Burns [SUNY series in the Thought and Legacy of Leo Strauss, SUNY 9781438486130]

The first book-length study of Leo Strauss' understanding of the relation between modern democracy, technology, and liberal education.

Liberal democracy is today under unprecedented attack from both the left and the right. Offering a fresh and penetrating examination of how Leo Strauss understood the emergence of liberal democracy and what is necessary to sustain and elevate it, **LEO STRAUSS ON DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LIBERAL EDUCATION** explores Strauss' view of the intimate (and troubling) relation between the philosophic promotion of liberal democracy and the turn to the modern scientific-technological project of the "conquest of nature." Timothy W. Burns explicates the political reasoning behind Strauss' recommendation of reminders of genuine political greatness *within* democracy over and against the failure of nihilistic youth to recognize it. Elucidating what Strauss envisaged by a liberally-educated subpolitical or cultural-level aristocracy—one that could elevate and sustain liberal democracy—and the roles that both philosophy and divine-law traditions should have in that education, Burns also lays out Strauss' frequent (though often tacit) engagement with the thought of Heidegger on these issues.

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Introduction
1. Democracy and Liberal Education

Excerpt: Leo Strauss is famous for his recovery of classical political philosophy. This does not initially bespeak a friend of democracy. As he himself succinctly puts it, "To speak first of the classics' attitude toward democracy, the premises: 'the classics are good' and 'democracy is good' do not validate the conclusion 'hence the classics were good democrats.' It would be silly to deny that the classics rejected democracy as an inferior kind of regime. They were not blind to its advantages. . . . [But] the classics rejected democracy because they thought that the aim of human life, and hence of social life, is not freedom but virtue." There are to be sure, as he frequently noted, differences between classical democracy, which was, owing to economic scarcity, inevitably the rule of the poor and hence the uneducated, and modern democracy, which has far more abundance and which is structured toward greater abundance. Yet modern democracy, which Strauss considered the most decent of the available modern regimes, suffers from a new malady: it is "mass democracy," and as such stands in need of an education that "broadens and deepens" the soul—the very type of education that its dynamic economy of plenty threatens to destroy.

Strauss disagreed, moreover, with a number of his prominent contemporaries, some of them friends—Kruger, Löwith, Voegelin—on the secularization thesis, according to which modern democracy embodied the historically disclosed "truth" of Christianity, the secular manifestation of an advanced moral consciousness, first expressed within Christianity, of the equal dignity of each individual. He argued that modern democracy emerged, rather, through the modern philosophic-scientific project, and has therefore within it the very serious threat to humanity that is posed by technology. In fact, he goes on to argue, after the passage I have quoted, that "the difference between the classics and us with regard to democracy consists exclusively in a different estimate of the virtues of technology." The classics foresaw that "the emancipation of technology, of the arts, from moral and political control . . . would lead to disaster or to the dehumanization of man." It is this concern that predominates in Strauss's analysis of modern democracy.

Modern Political Thought as Technological Thought

Yet students of Strauss may well be surprised by his claim that the fundamental difference between the ancients and the moderns on democracy rests on the difference in their respective assessments of technology. Given Strauss's attention to political philosophy, one may even be (fairly) inclined to consider that statement (or even to dismiss it) as an exaggeration. In fact, however, Strauss not only made similar and corroborative statements throughout his work—from his earliest to his latest—but understood technological thinking to be at the very core of modern political philosophy: in its stand toward nature as something to be "conquered" by the increase of human "power," and its shift in human attention away from the political-moral question of the right end or ends of human life to the means to any desired end; in its enlisting of modern science and its attention to efficient causality in the project of conquering nature, including human nature; in its consequent and important obfuscation of the radical difference between the theoretical and practical/political/moral life; and in its promulgation of democratic and liberal political teachings.

That Strauss understood modern science as technological science is clear. In the Hobbes chapter of his first book, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, he identifies the spirit of modern "physics" with "technology": the very title of the book's first subsection is "The Spirit of Physics (Technology) and Religion." And, as this section of the work makes clear, he identifies technology with the goal of the conquest of nature. It is a distinctively modern goal, not found in the classics. (Since recent scholarship has presented the recovery of Lucretian Epicurianism as playing a decisive role in the

birth of modernity,' it is worth noting that, as Strauss later made clear, he included Lucretius among the classics and hence as quite distinct from the modern, technological thinkers: "For Lucretius, happiness can be achieved only through contentment with the satisfaction of the natural pleasures, no rushing out, no conquest of nature, glory, domination, power; or even charitable technology—technology inspired by the desire to improve the human lot. There is a very radical difference.")

That Strauss saw the moderns' disposition toward technology as decisive for at least one modern political regime is also clear. Readers of Strauss are bound to be familiar with his statements concerning technology's effect on the prospects, not indeed of democracy, but of modern tyranny. In his "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero," for example, he states:

> Present-day tyranny, in contradistinction to classical tyranny, is based on the unlimited progress in the "conquest of nature" which is made possible by modern science, as well as on the popularization or diffusion of philosophic or scientific knowledge. Both possibilities—the possibility of a science that issues in the conquest of nature and the possibility of the popularization of philosophy or science—were known to the classics. (Compare Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.15 with Empedocles, fr. 111; Plato, Theaetetus 180c7—d5.) But the classics rejected them as "unnatural," i.e., as destructive of humanity.

Seven years later, in Natural Right and History, one finds the same focus, in the difference between the ancients and the moderns, on technology's effect on the prospects of universal tyranny:

> The world state presupposes such a development of technology as Aristotle could never have dreamed of. That technological development, in its turn, required that science be regarded as essentially in the service of the "conquest of nature" and that technology be emancipated from any moral and political supervision. Aristotle did not conceive of a world state because he was absolutely certain that science is essentially theoretical and that the liberation of technology from moral and political control would lead to disastrous consequences: the fusion of science and the arts together with the unlimited or uncontrolled progress of technology has made universal and perpetual tyranny a serious possibility!

Both statements speak to the dark prospect of universal and perpetual tyranny, made possible by technology—a prospect that is, to say the least, as real as ever. What is less often observed are both Strauss's highlighting, in these statements, of the ancients' awareness of the possibility of technology, and their rejection of it on the ground that the use and dissemination of "essentially theoretical" science would be destructive of humanity. And the fundament, according to Strauss, of the ancients' humane stand against both technological science and its dissemination ("enlightenment") is the certainty that "science is essentially theoretical," and hence the gulf between the theoretical life and the life of praxis.

But this gulf obtains, necessarily, in considerations of the desirability of modern democracy no less than of modern tyranny. That this is so—and that the "destruction of humanity" is a term that encompasses not only our physical destruction—is perhaps no more clearly stated than in the original Walgreen lectures that became Thoughts on Machiavelli.' Here Strauss again makes explicit that a different disposition toward technology is the decisive difference between the ancients and us on the choice for or against democracy. He presents it as emerging from an "estrangement" or alienation from the fundamental "human situation" of "acting man," that is, of attempted discernment of our end or ends in the world of human action. And he distinguishes his attention to this estranging shift from the alternative tendency to attribute the rise of modernity to a newfound and better understanding of justice. In its stead, he proposes a different assessment of, or disposition toward, technology:

The shift from the perspective of the founder to the intellectual situation of the founder, i.e. the shift from the direct apprehension of the end to the reflection on the efficient cause implies an estrangement from the primary issue, and therewith an estrangement from the human situation, from the situation of acting man. This estrangement is connected with the assumption that chance can be conquered and therefore that the founder of society has not merely to accept the materials of his art, just like the smith and the carpenter, but that his material is almost infinitely malleable. . . . We cannot leave it then at applauding Machiavelli as a fore-runner of modern democracy, but most consider the reason why the tradition which Machiavelli attacked was not democratic. Plato and Aristotle did not lack social justice or a sense .of it. They knew as well as we can know them the true principles of justice, the beautiful principles of justice. They saw therefore, as well as we do, that a society ruled by a privileged group is of questionable justice, since social superiority and natural superiority do not necessarily coincide. But it is not hard to see that only men who are truly educated, who are experienced in things noble and beautiful, ought to rule, that average men cannot fulfill this condition, if they are not well-bred from the moment they are born, that such good breeding requires leisure on the part of both the parents and the children, that such leisure requires a reasonable degree of wealth, and that having or lacking wealth is not necessarily proportionate to deserts. The classics accepted this element of arbitrariness, and therefore of injustice, because there was only one alternative to the social scheme they espoused, that alternative being perpetual revolution, which means perpetual chaos. They did not consider another alternative, namely, that all members of society should receive the same good breeding. They did not consider this alternative because they took for granted an economy of scarcity. Not a different understanding of justice, but a different notion of whether an economy of scarcity could or should be replaced by an economy of plenty, separated modern man from the classical thinkers. The problem of scarcity or plenty is however connected with the problem of [whether] the mechanical and other arts should be emancipated from moral and political control, and whether or not theoretical science should lend its supports to the increase of productivity. But increase of productivity means necessarily also increase of destructivity. What separates modern man from the classics is not a different notion of justice, but a different attitude toward technology. We are no longer so certain as we were a short while ago that we have made a decisive progress beyond the classics by taking here a different stand, or that we have chosen wisely.

What here comes again into clear relief is Strauss's understanding of technology as entailing the introduction of theoretical science, and its attention to efficient causation, into the arts. The radical disjunct between theoretical and practical life—which, as we will see, is finally denied by Martin Heidegger—is a crucial part of Strauss's understanding of technology and hence of the difference between the ancients and the moderns, including their different assessments of democracy.

As Strauss next makes clear in the same talk, he did not consider the move to technology to have been necessary or impelled by a correction of an alleged weakness in philosophic thinking begun by the ancients that found its fuller elaboration or fate in the moderns: "But can we speak here of a choice? Must we not speak rather of a fateful dispensation?" (The implicit confrontation with Heidegger, who viewed technological thinking as the mysterious or fateful dispensation of Being in the West, continues here.) Strauss first, to. be sure, makes the case that there was indeed a weakness to classical political philosophy that moved Machiavelli to correct the ancients by introducing an embrace of technology, or conquest of nature:

As I see it, there was only one fundamental difficulty in the political philosophy which Machiavelli attacked. The classics were what is now called conservative, which means fearful of change, distrustful of change. But they knew that one cannot oppose social change

without also opposing what is now called technological change as well. Therefore, they did not favor the encouraging of invention, except half-ironically in tyranny. Still, they were forced to make one crucial exception: they had to admit the necessity of encouraging technological invention as regards the art of war. They bowed to the inescapable requirements of defense. By accepting this principle, they might seem to be driven eventually to the acceptance of the hydrogen bomb. This is the only difficulty which could be thought to be an entering wedge for the modern criticism of classical political philosophy, and therefore indirectly also for Machiavelli's criticism. This difficulty might be thought to imply the admission of the primacy of foreign policy.

But as he goes on to argue, it was the strictly speaking unnecessary, unfated enlistment of theoretical science in the artful conquest of nature that was decisive:

> It seems to me, however, that the real difficulty arises, not from the admission of the necessity of military invention, but from the use of science for this purpose. Therefore the fundamental issue concerns the character and the function of science. If we were to consider this fundamental issue, I believe we would realize that the classical position is not only thoroughly consistent, but as irrefutable as it has always been.

As this statement suggests, Strauss—again, contra Heidegger—understands technology not as originating with Plato but with Machiavelli; he sees it as born not of a "fateful disposition" of Da-Sein in the West but (as he goes on to argue) of anti-theological ire;" as something to be distinguished sharply from the techne of the smith or carpenter and his tools (to which Heidegger frequently appeals early in Being and Time to elucidate heedful being together with the "world," or our association in and with the surrounding world); as "an estrangement from the situation of acting man," and as consisting not of thinking essentially directed to a "standing reserve of energy," as does Heidegger, but most essentially as the deployment of theoretical science in the conquest of nature.

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Technology and Democracy

If the classics foresaw that "the emancipation of technology, of the arts, from moral and political control . . . would lead to disaster or to the dehumanization of man," and if it is this concern that predominates in Strauss's analysis of modern democracy, how, specifically, according to Strauss did the modern, essentially technological thought of modernity come to be democratic?

Strauss's account of how it did so begins to become clear in a sketch of the evolution of modern liberal democracy, in its resemblance to and its difference from the classical mixed regime, that Strauss draws in "Liberal Education and Responsibility." The sketch begins as follows:

> The modern doctrine starts from the natural equality of all men, and it leads therefore to the assertion that sovereignty belongs to the people; yet it understands that sovereignty in such a way as to guarantee the natural rights of each; it achieves this result by distinguishing between the sovereign and the government and by demanding that the fundamental governmental powers be separated from one another. The spring of this regime was held to be the desire of each to improve his material conditions. Accordingly the commercial and industrial elite, rather than the landed gentry, predominated.

The fully developed doctrine required that one man have one vote, that the voting be secret, and that the right to vote be not abridged on account of poverty, religion, or race.

Few would find fault with this brief description of the modern doctrine of (liberal or constitutional) democracy. But even as Strauss found "unhesitating loyalty to a decent constitution and even to the

cause of constitutionalism," as he says later in the same essay, to be a requirement of political "wisdom," he found liberal democracy to be highly problematic. As he continues:

> Governmental actions, on the other hand, are to be open to public inspection to the highest degree possible, for government is only the representative of the people and responsible to the people. The responsibility of the people, of the electors, does not permit of legal definition and is therefore the most obvious crux of modern republicanism.

Especially in light of the fact that he begins the same essay by explaining that "responsibility" is the contemporary (and degraded) substitute for "virtue," the "crux" to which he refers here initially comes to sight as the problem of the maintenance, in modern liberal regimes, of public-spiritedness or sense of duty in the people, who exercise sovereignty in liberal democracy—under the dominant activities of its new "commercial and industrial elite." But Strauss does not simply or for long identify the maintenance of public spiritedness among the people as the crux of the problem. Rather, he initially presents that as the crux of the problem as it was perceived at a certain period (the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century) by friends of the modern democracy that had come into being. The deeper (and earlier) problem, as he subsequently suggests, is tied up with the original, anti-biblical intention of the founders of the modern technological-scientific enterprise and its goal of "enlightenment" of the people. Owing to developments within the "stupendous enterprise" of modern philosophy-science, which, Strauss will argue, was from the start behind modern democratization, a "race" to "enlighten" the people before it came into its sovereignty replaced what had appeared, subsequently, to some to be the problem of educating the people in public-spirited virtue. The late, open admission of modern science that it is (and ever was) incapable of providing any moral guidance to anyone, but (however increasingly efficient and specialized) is in fact "value-free," has finally had the result that what most characterizes our present situation is "hardly more than the interplay of mass taste with high grade but strictly speaking unprincipled efficiency." Technology, in its anti-theological end, causes democracy to emerge out of modern philosophy, and has resulted in the highly problematic, deeply degraded contemporary situation in which we find ourselves.

We have alluded to Strauss's implicit disagreement with Heidegger on the source of technology and the best disposition towards it. The more we examine Strauss's presentation of liberal democracy and technology, the more Strauss's debt to Heidegger and break with Heidegger will come into focus. We note for now that, in a talk titled "Existentialism," Strauss indicates that his concern about the degradation of humanity posed by technology is one that he had in common with Heidegger. And in a letter to Heidegger student Hans-Georg Gadamer, Strauss goes so far as to express his agreement with Heidegger's characterization of our present situation as that of "the world night":

> It is strange that there should be a difference between us where you take a stand against Heidegger and I stand for him. I shall state this difference in a way which probably does not do full justice to you. I believe that you will have to admit that there is a fundamental difference between your post-historicist hermeneutics and pre-historicist (traditional) hermeneutics; it suffices to refer to your teaching regarding the work of art and language which at least as you present it is not in any way a traditional teaching; this being so, it is necessary to reflect on the situation which demands the new hermeneutics, i.e. on our situation; this reflection will necessarily bring to light a radical crisis, an unprecedented crisis and this is what Heidegger means by the approach of the world night. Or do you deny the necessity and the possibility of such a reflection?

That Strauss's work is everywhere a "stand toward" Heidegger, and therefore deeply informed by the work of Heidegger, is clear from the introductory remark that he makes prior to one of his rare

published confrontations with that work (and even a possible invitation to dialogue with it): "As far as I can see," says Strauss, "[Heidegger] is of the opinion that none of his critics and none of his followers has understood him adequately. I believe that he is right, for is the same not also true, more or less, of all outstanding thinkers? This does not dispense us, however, from taking a stand toward him, for we do this at any rate implicitly; in doing it explicitly, we run no greater risk than exposing ourselves to ridicule and perhaps receiving some needed instruction."

But unlike Heidegger, who likewise identifies the problem of technology and utilitarian thinking as a great threat to humanity, Strauss does not call for a "new thinking," characterized above all by an authentic and resolute, angst-induced attunement to one's true, "thrown" situation as disclosed in full awareness of death, to replace or directionally supplement the technological thinking that, Heidegger alleges, became more dominant in modern philosophy but has its roots in Plato's alleged failure to grasp the "ontological difference" and the need, in the light of it, to become attuned to an angst that makes possible an authentic life of being-toward-death. Strauss instead finds Plato and the other ancient political philosophers unflinchingly aware of their mortality and the passing away of all human things and of its significance, and for that very reason as drawing a sharp distinction between philosophy and political-moral thinking, with religion and ancestral tradition having an important and admirable role in the latter and serving as both a bulwark for human excellence and a crucial interlocutor with philosophy. And unlike the nihilists, both of Germany in the 1930s and of today, whose repulsion at what they saw as the immoral and amoral character of modern society led them to will the destruction of liberal democracy, he saw political-moral thinking and action, and even greatness, as manifestly still possible in modern democratic regimes—with the example of Winston Churchill being most important. The modest political recommendation that Strauss offers for our time, a time dominated by the technology of modern science, is faithful adherence to a liberal democratic constitutionalism whose tone and direction may be provided by a subpolitical "aristocracy within democracy," one whose thinking is informed by both serious religious education in one's ancestral traditions and study of the Great Books.

The four writings in which Strauss most directly addressed these matters are "What Is Liberal Education?," "German Nihilism," "Liberal Education and Responsibility," and "The Liberalism of Classical Political Philosophy." Looking first at the two works on liberal education and then at "German Nihilism" will enable us to understand the meaning of an "aristocracy within democracy" that Strass intended as the best means to sustaining and improving the regime of which he considered himself not a flatterer but a friend and ally, and the recovery of the non-historicist political reasoning that would make this possible. Having examined these works, we will turn to the fourth, Strauss's extended review of Eric Havelock's The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics. Havelock attempted in his work to find in the classics—in Plato's work and in the pre-Socratics—a buried ground for contemporary liberalism and technology, over and against the "moral absolutism," begun by Plato, that he saw as a threat to these. By examining the classical works on which Havelock's study relies, Strauss brings to light the reason for the ancients' stand against the autonomy of technology, for their support for healthy ancestral traditions, and for the art of writing that was required by their insight into the true character of moral-political life, in its opposition to the philosophic life. In the course of doing so, he extends his critique of Heidegger and his project, which he had begun in its explicit form in Natural Right and History, even as he indicates some limited agreement with him on the matter of "rootedness."

Before approaching these writings, I offer the following caveat. Among the thinkers whose words Strauss examines in these essays is John Stuart Mill, who likewise devoted attention to the problem of education within modern democracy, and who likewise suggested the reading of the classics as part of liberal education. Mill did so in part because the works of the classics, unlike most works written in modern democracy, were, in his words, "not written in haste," but rather with each word

carefully chosen. The seventeen-page essay of Strauss in which this quotation from Mill is given was written in response to a request for an elaboration on two sentences from "What Is Liberal Education?" It thus permits us to see, among other things, how weighted is Strauss's own writing, and so to see the careful reading that is needed to understand such careful writing. While what follows can claim to be no more than a preliminary study of these four works, I invite readers— friends and foes alike of Strauss—to join me in this preliminary effort with this need in mind. <>

Leo Strauss and the Recovery of Medieval Political Philosophy by Joshua Parens. [Rochester Studies in Medieval Political Thought, University of Rochester Press, 9781580465533]

Leo Strauss is known primarily for reviving classical political philosophy. Strauss recovered that great tradition of thought largely lost to the West by beginning his study of classical thought with its teaching on politics rather than its metaphysics. What brought Strauss to this way of reading the classics, however, was a discovery he made as a young political scientist studying the obscure texts of Islamic and Jewish medieval political thought. In this volume, Joshua Parens examines Strauss's investigations of medieval political philosophy, offering interpretations of his writings on the great thinkers of that tradition, including interpretations of his most difficult writings on Alfarabi and Maimonides. In addition Parens explicates Strauss's statements on Christian medieval thought and his argument for rejecting the Scholastic paradigm as a method for interpreting Islamic and Jewish thought. Contrasting Scholasticism with Islamic and Jewish medieval political philosophy, Parens clarifies the theme of Strauss's thought, what Strauss calls the "theologico-political problem," and reveals the significance of medieval political philosophy in the Western tradition.

Review

Joshua Parens presents a clear, highly readable account of how Leo Strauss approached the major themes of medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy as set forth in the writings of Alfarabi and Maimonides. He shows the pertinence of Strauss's investigations for questions of importance to human beings today, when Strauss was writing, and when the authors first addressed them. --Charles Butterworth, University of Maryland

Joshua Parens has written an important and useful work for the study of both the Straussian project and political philosophy more broadly. Parens explains here the meaning of Strauss's difficult writings on medieval political philosophy and shows how his study of this tradition enabled him to rediscover the enduring character of political philosophy. --Steven Frankel, Xavier University

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Upon his arrival in America from Germany, Strauss injected a frisson of Nietzschean unnerving scandal and repressed, intellectually-obscene horror at the heart of the normally somnolent and staid field of Medieval Political Philosophy by hinting at the presence of a previously undetected 'theologicalpolitical problem' at its heart. Not only was this grenade undetected, it was deliberately disguised and concealed beneath the conventional 'esoteric' readings of Alfarabi, Averroes and Maimonides to get it past their authoritarian masters, the caliphs and sultans; only today, through an 'exoteric' reading against

the grain of the text which picks up on certain signals, however, is it possible to fish out these 'pockets of dynamite' intended only for 'enlightened' readers properly prepared and capable of

receiving them. Strauss felt himself bound to extend this practice and was chary and elusive about breaking the protective silence around this dangerous secret – heightening, of course, a student's eagerness to have access to this explosive 'knowledge' previously denied him. It was known that Medieval Political Philosophy among the three 'Abrahamic' religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – was 'Platonic' in inspiration, but there were two opposing strands one could take within this tradition. One is conservative, centring around the well-known dictum that 'until philosophers become kings and kings become philosophers, there is no hope for building up a just society.' Efforts and emphasis would then be placed upon educating a class of future leaders through the four levels of the 'Divided Line' towards a direct, panoramic view of the archetypal 'Forms', so that a ruler can deliver just judgments. The introduction of a 'revealed' religion injects a tricky complication of indicating what role should fall to the 'prophet' who introduces knowledge or speculative truths not available to reason alone. Ideally, of course, such a 'revelation' should be compatible with, extend or reinforce the scaffolding built up by political philosophy, strengthening and anchoring it at the top with a speculative source.

But there is the alternative 'Socratic' strand whereby the philosopher – here in the role of a 'prophet' – does not work to reinforce or build up the structures of the state, but instead hints at – no matter how delicately – their nature as hollow conventions or their dishonourable role as thinly-disguised attempts at legitimating enslaving and emasculating power. It is here that Strauss jumps in with both feet. For suppose it is the case that the flourishing and prosperity of the individual citizen through such activities as philosophy – normally thought of as the goal and purpose of the state – does not work to reinforce the state's structures, but just the opposite, to criticize, attack, eradicate and destroy them – and not just in ancient Greece, but in political society as a whole? This is admittedly an abstract or even counterintuitive possibility, but it cannot be dismissed out of hand or a priori, and indeed the fate of Socrates before the Athenian 'democracy' is hardly a reassuring piece of evidence. And indeed, one does not have to have recourse to 'exoteric' readings of the philosophers mentioned above to uncover statements of wildly rebellious, iconoclastic, heretical or anarchic tendency in many of the sub-branches along the philosophical spectrum, including political philosophy. So is Strauss right about a 'secret ideological agenda' common to these thinkers that has lain hidden or concealed all these years that would totally throw off or overturn the conventional ambition of Medieval Political Philosophy to reconcile 'faith' with 'reason', or the goal of the common flourishing of the individual and the state? Where did Strauss get this 'burr up his butt'? Do we have to indeed revise completely the received interpretation of this discipline as a result of his powerful and provocative intervention?

Not seldom the explanation for such deviations is more pedestrian and conventional than one would have suspected, or even perhaps than one would have liked. Before one embraces metaphysical or global conspiracy theories, it is wise to look closer to home, specifically to history and to human nature. The Sunni-Shi'ah split occurred early in the history of Islam, and set urban, sophisticated Persians against uncouth, literal-minded nomadic Arabs who interpreted their reversal from excluded pariahs to the new 'people of God' as conferring the role of custodians of the Calvinist Sunni interpretation of Islamic thought and practice upon their Muslim brothers, and making all other 'people of the book' pay the 'jizya' tax for the privilege of living within their domains. Alfarabi was from Persian-Iranian stock which had bent under the burden Sunni barbarians imposed on Shi'ah cultural sophisticates. Averroes went to the length of composing his Incoherence of the Incoherence as an exasperated mockery and rebuttal to Al Ghazali's anti-intellectual, flat-footed attack on philosophers who had the temerity to complicate the sweet poetry of revelation. Maimonides had to flee from Andalusia, not to escape Christians, but the intolerant Almohad dynasty, and cross north Africa before he landed in Cairo, where he would finally find peace and respect. It is unavoidably deflating to consider more humble causes closer to home than to announce a Nietzschean cosmic

insurrection to account for unexpected data; to do so, however, not only provides better protection for the truth, but saves one unnecessary embarrassment. —Patrick Madigan <>

BRILL'S COMPANION TO LEO STRAUSS' WRITINGS ON CLASSICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT edited by Timothy W. Burns [Brill's Companions to Classical Reception, Brill, 9789004243354]

Brill's Companion to Leo Strauss' Writings on Classical Political Thought offers clear, accessible essays to assist a new generation of readers in their introduction to Strauss' writings on the ancients, and to deepen the understanding of those who have already benefitted from his work.

Strauss rediscovered esoteric writing. His careful explications of works by classical thinkers— of Socratic political philosophy, pre-Socratic philosophers, and of poets tragic and comic—have therefore opened those works up in a way that had been lost for centuries. Yet Strauss' writings, especially his later works, make considerable demands on any reader. These essays are written by scholars who bring to bear on their reading of Strauss many years of study.

CONTENTS

Leo Strauss' work is beginning to be absorbed into the scholarly mainstream – the existence of a *Companion* to his writing is itself evidence of that – although his students are still too frequently treated as carriers of an infectious disease. This absorption means that much of what is radical in Strauss is now at least half taken for granted. So, it is useful to remind ourselves of what is characteristic, and novel, about Strauss' view of the classics.

Strauss' study of the classics is distinguished from that of his contemporaries in several ways. He restores the importance of the split between ancients and moderns and treats the classics' discussions as conceivably true, or as no less true than modern discussions, or historicist reductionism. Indeed, he is instrumental in discovering or creating the category of radical historicism itself. He finds Plato and Aristotle to be at root, and to a large degree on the surface, similar. He emphasizes their unity with Jewish and Muslim medieval thinkers, and examines thoughtfully various medieval discussion of them. He takes Xenophon and Aristophanes' presentations of Socrates seriously, and he re-establishes Xenophon's importance. He uncovers and examines the significance of noetic heterogeneity and homogeneity in understanding Socrates' and Plato'sdifference from the pre-Socratics and the classics' differences from the moderns. He suggests the significance of permanent problems as a way tocompare and differentiate thinkers, or to grasp Plato's ideas. He examines the soul and its powers of eros and spiritedness as the classics but not the modern thinkers understand them. He makes the question of nature the core of much of his discussion, and the issue of natural right the core of his political analysis. He examines the special importance of classic political philosophy for philosophy generally, and adds to its usual themes the question of the philosopher's political status. He makes the question of the philosopher's public presentation of his discussions – his exotericism – a central interpretive, intellectual, and practical fact. He uncovers and restores the primacy of the regime in understanding political communities, modern as well as ancient. He investigates the pre-philosophic or 'common sense' origin of political philosophy and examines this theme concretely by exploring the classics and the Bible. He treats a life that walks on the path of revelation as a genuine alternative to a life devoted to the unstinting use of the mind. Some of these distinguishing elements of Strauss' approach are better known than others, but each is significant. Together, they make visible the range and radicalism of his understanding.

Still another feature basic to Strauss' approach is his directing his students to the great works themselves, and away from excessive attention to scholarly controversy, to discussions that attempt to explain thinkers' works in terms other than their own understanding, or to himself. He especially emphasized the importance of careful commentaries, of the sort he published onXenophon. Because the purpose of *Brill'sCompaniontoLeoStrauss'WritingsonClassicalPoliticalThought* is to examine Strauss himself, it inevitably points in a direction different from the one he advised. Within this restriction, however, many of the chapters follow Strauss' own direction, and there is much to learn from them not only about Strauss, but about the authors he discusses. If there is a general limit in the contributors' discussion of Strauss per se, it is their reluctance to confront in detail the difficult question of Strauss' own manner of writing, and to present this issue meticulously in the works they are discussing.

Although the authors by and large treat Strauss and those on whom he writes with great care – some, of course, more successfully than others – they do not always attempt directly to clarify or,

especially, to connect his major themes: several of the issues, I discussed above receive short shrift. Not all, however: 'Strauss' extraordinary claim', the editor asserts, 'is that this intention of classical political philosophy ["to settle the matter of whether what *appear* to be necessities are not actual necessities but the work of a god or gods who make all things come into being out of nothing"] was successful, and was *overlooked* bythe moderns …' (Alas, the editor does not favor us with a step by step demonstration of this success.) The occasions when Strauss' themes are linked with those of his teachers and contemporaries – as, for example, in his concern with the pre-philosophic or 'natural' world – are particularly telling. More of this linking would have made Strauss' discoveries seem in one sense less and in another all the more startling.

Each chapter of the *Companion* discusses an article or book chapter that Strauss chose to publish, rather than material that he chose not to publish. Several articles do make use of that material (which is important in its own right, of course), but according to what principle of inclusion is unclear. The book contains several articles on Xenophon and Plato, single discussions of Thucydides, Lucretius, Aristophanes, and Aristotle, articles on the relevant chapters of *Natural Right and History*, and discussions of Strauss' publications on Eric Havelock, R.G. Collingwood, and John Wild. All in all, therefore, the volume is comprehensive, with, however, some omissions. There are seven fine essays on Plato and Aristotle, but it would have been useful to have had still more – additional essays on his work on the *Republic* and something on his views on the *Statesman*, for example, and a discussion of the section on Aristotle in *Natural Right and History*. Given that Strauss' course on Plato's *Symposium* had been approved by him for publication and has now been published, moreover, and in light of the chapters on Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Socrates and Aristophanes*, an analysis of that work would have been especially telling. It would also have been useful to have had discussions of Strauss' essay 'On Classical Political Philosophy', and on the relevant sections of *What is Political Philosophy?* Companions, of course, cannot satisfy every wish, and the vagaries of edited volumes are such that not every commissioned article comes to fruition. So, we should be and are grateful for what we have been given. <>

Essay Was Leo Strauss a Zetetic Political Philosopher? by Harald Bluhm

In recent years, the ideas of Leo Strauss have received a great deal of attention. They have also been a source of controversy. Strauss' s concept of political philosophy and his interpretation of canonical philosophical texts gained influence in the 1950s with the emergence of the Straussian school and spread over the following decade as former students took teaching jobs at major American universities. Several years after Strauss' s death in 1973, the academic writings of his disciples triggered the first wave of Str au ssianism. The wave's swell was amplified by the entry of Straussians into top-level government circles during the first Reagan administration, where they served as political advisors, particularly in the State Department. In 1987, Straussianism became known to the wider public through The Closing of the American Mind, the best-selling work by Allan Bloom, Strauss' s most illustrious student. As surprising as this public resonance was, Strauss 's teachings would rise to even greater prominence two decades later during the heated debate about the pivotal role Straussians were alleged to have played in George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq.

Amid the ongoing disputes between Straussians, their opponents, and some more measured voices, contemporary scholars have begun to take a closer look at Strauss' s political philosophy. Volumes such as The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss (2009) and Brill's Companion to Leo Strauss' Writings on Classical Political Thought (2015) have since secured Strauss a place in the academic pantheon. 'Among the great philosophers of the twentieth century,' Heinrich Meier, a leading interpreter and the editor of Strauss' s collected works in German, wrote in 2014, 'political philosophy had only one advocate.' Whether this assessment of Strauss is justified— and whether his

political philosophy is a mere product of idiosyncratic readings of other philosophers —will not be discussed here. Rather, I am interested in a specific vein among the great variety of interpretations of Strauss: the view that he is a sceptic, or, in Grecophile terms, a zete tic, philosopher. Stephen B. Smith, Catherine and Michael Zuckert, Daniel Tang uay, Thomas Pangle, Leora Batnitzky, Laurence Lampert, and other scholars have sought to define exactly what constitutes scepticism and zeteticism in Strauss' s thought. Moreover, they have used the label 'zetetic ' label to distinguish him from the Straussians in the reception history of his work.

In examining the aptness of this label, I will primarily consider On Tyranny (first published in 1948) and Strauss 's correspondence with Alexandre Kojève, because these sources contain the few passages in which Strauss addresses zeteticism directly. I will argue that Strauss's zeteticism is an insufficiently elaborated form of scepticism that builds on ancient models but whose philosophical jumping-off point lies in the philosophy of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Husserl. The enduring motifs of those philosophers are for the most part hidden in Strauss's work, and as such can only be staked out, not systematically investigated. Like Nietzsche and Heidegger, Strauss was sceptical of modern philosophy and the philosophical tradition, which he thought sclerotic and stale.

I will begin by describing the meaning of 'zetetic ' in antiquity and its use in latter-day approaches. After taking an interlude to sketch out some of Strauss' s key ideas, I will turn to the role of the 'zetetic ' in his interpretation of Xenophon. I will then discuss several passages in which Strauss uses the terms 'zetetic ' and 'sceptic ' in order to better understand Straussian scepticism and its limits before drawing some conclusions about the kind of philosopher Strauss was.

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Zétesis is an ancient Greek word meaning 'open inquiry.' Its most precise definition can be found in Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in which four variants of scepticism are distinguished:

> The Sceptic School, then, is also called 'zete tic' from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and 'ephectic' or suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and 'ap oretic' or dubitative either from its habit of doubting and seeking, [...] and 'Pyrrhonian' from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors.

Sextus Empiricus describes scepticism as:

> An ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of 'unperturbedness' or quietude.

Two features of the ancient understanding of scepticism are striking from today's perspective. For one, it is primarily practical, not epistemological, and hence strongly associated with a way of life. For another, many thinkers of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern era understood Socrates as a sceptic without much differentiation between his statements in the early aporetic dialogues and the later ones containing Platonic doctrines. 'Zetetic' was a known term in modern bourgeois philosophy— Kant , for instance, would occasionally use it in his lecture announce-ments —but over time, it became obsolete. It was not until the late twentieth century that scholars took a renewed interest in the idea. In his 1990 monograph Zetetic Skepticism, Stewart Umphrey provides a broader account of the term and argues that in the Meno Socrates was a zetetic but not a sceptical philosopher. In 2014 the 'Zetesis Research Group' was founded, made up mostly of Italian philosophers devoted to the study of zetetic sceptical philosophy in antiquity and the modern era.

The interpretation of Strauss as a zetetic philosopher is part of this revival, but it is also a special case, for it simultaneously harkens back to the term's classical roots while seeing in it a key to understanding Strauss' s ideas. To date, interpreters have sought to define Strauss's scepticism in three different ways. The first view locates his scepticism in his anti-utopianism and in his principled distrust of opinions in favour of an unending search for truth. The second sees his scepticism in his criticism of revealed religion. The third is formulated by Leora Batnizky: 'Strauss' s kind of skepticism also is skeptical of itself. ' It is important to note that none of these definitions comes off the back of a systematic review of all passages related to zeteticism in Strauss's writings.

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In sketching out the scepticism attributed to S trauss — and assessing whether it can be called zetetic — I first want to recall several of the basic ideas of Strauss' s middle and late periods. It is well known that Strauss argues for antique political philosophy as the authoritative way of doing philosophy. For Strauss, philosophising is a radical, stubborn interrogation of limits, a search for wisdom that is not itself described as wisdom. Scholars —among whom Strauss counted himself— dwell in a cave deeper than the one that Plato famously describes, where they can do no more than rearrange the discussions of great philosophers. True philosophy only begins in the first cave, but reaching it is improbable given the dominant opinions of the day. As a result, religion must provide the orientation that the masses are unable to achieve through philosophy, lacking as they do the mindset for a philosophical form of life. In his 1953 book Natural Right and History, Strauss writes:

> No alternative is more fundamental than this: human guidance or divine guidance. The first possibility is characteristic of philosophy [...] the second is presented in the Bible.

In addition to his return to ancient philosophy, two other areas are useful in approaching Strauss 's scepticism: his interpretations of the ancient sceptics —Socrates , Plato, and Xenophon—and his notion of political philosophy. Strauss' s scepticism can be characterised as an existential skepticism that examines fundamental philosophical questions. In the 1950s, Strauss published several essays tying his sceptical viewpoint to the political. Almost all of those essays have been collected in the influential volume What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies(1959). There, Strauss describes political philosophy primarily by stating what it is not: it is not the history of political philosophy, though it itself is philosophical; it is notpolitical thought, for that also includes political opinions; it is notpolitical theory, which contains ideas about the political order with the goal of policymaking; it is not modern political science, which Strauss associates with positivism and relativism; and it is not political theology, which seeks to link politics with divine revelation. Instead, he locates political philosophy in the attempt to safeguard the possibility of philosophy through a tenacious search for truth. This branch of philosophy results from the necessity of taking the conflict between politics and philosophy seriously, and doing this means safeguarding philosophy as the Socratic enterprise of searching for truth and ascertaining the best way of life. Strauss describes ancient political philosophy as classical because it inquiries into the natural attitude of the political order unadulterated by previous tradition.

A crucial part of Strauss's understanding of philosophy is its dual mode of presentation: a manifest, exoteric message directed at the public and a hidden, esoteric message directed at true philosophers. This dual mode of presentation is necessary, Strauss maintains, because the masses are unable to absorb the truths of philosophy. The distinction between the masses and the philosophers is one that Plato made after the death of Socrates, which is reflected in the staged drama of the dialogues. By pitching their ideas on two different levels, Plato and other philosophers can dilute ideas that call the existing system into question while allowing the sceptical search for truth to continue. Strauss 's rhetoricisation of philosophy places the philosopher in a privileged position, an

author who codes his text in different ways for different readers. This not only has consequences for how the philosopher lives, but also highlights his opposition to non-philosophers.

An idea related to this dual mode of communication is Strauss's rarely scrutinised idea of teaching. Shaped by Heidegger's own rhetoricisation of philosophy in his lecture on Aristotle, especially in the summer semester of 1923, Strauss uses the term in a variety of ways to describe a theory's concealed meaning, that part of it that goes unsaid.20 Teaching, too, is an effort to dilute philosophical ideas that transform systematic constructions into problems of philosophical inquiry. But unlike H eidegge r, who reinterprets philosophies and thinks largely in terms of language, Strauss assigns the philosopher an emphatic role as an author who consciously encrypts his writing with multiple meanings. The work of interpretation consists in understanding the philosopher's texts in the way he understood them himself.

In What Is Political Philosophy, 'zetetic' appears only in the "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero," Strauss 's response to Kojève 's critique entitled "Tyranny and Wisdom. " Strauss does not use the word in an active sense, but as a casual self-description. He laid the groundwork for this zetetic inquiry in the manuscript of his 1932 lecture "The Intellectual Situation of the Present, " in which he writes:

Our freedom is the freedom of radical ignorance. The intellectual situation of the present is characterized by our knowing nothing anymore, by our knowing nothing. Out of this ignorance grows the necessity of questioning, questioning about right and good. And here the following Paradox presents itself: while the present is compelled to question as any age, it is less capable of questioning than any age. We must question without being capable of questioning.

Based on this briefest of sketches, I now want to describe the path to Strauss 's scepticism in more detail.

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Strauss' s novel method of interpretation is closely linked to his scepticism in his understanding of political philosophy. The obvious assumption — that Strauss encountered the idea of the zetetic in his work on Plato and Socrates and developed his scepticism from there —is partly correct, but it is not the entire story. Strauss' s understanding of the zetetic is initially informed by the ideas of Xenophon, whose rhetoric, he argues, is simpler than that of Plato and, as such, provides a springboard for un-derstand in g more complicated Socratic dialogues. Strauss employs his new method of interpretation in his first essay on Xenophon, "The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon." In this now-famous text, he reads Xenophon's comments on the "Constitution of the Lacedaemonians " as a satire, though they are often understood as a panegyric. Some remarks by Laurence Lampert help us to understand the role of Xenophon in Strauss 's thinking:

Over two months pass before Strauss again mentions his work in his letter, but the letter in which he does [February 6, 1939] is the most explosive of them all. He announces his intention to write the essay that appeared nine months later as "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon": 'I plan to prove in it that his apparent praise of Sparta is in truth a satire on Sparta and on Athenian Laconism. ' 'Xenophon is my special Liebling,' he says, 'because he had the courage to clothe himself as an idiot and go through the millennia that way—he's the greatest con man I know.' The clothing, the con that so endears Xenophon to Strauss, leads him to conclude that what Xenophon does, his teacher did: 'I believe that he does in his writing exactly what Socrates did in his life. ' [...] Strauss here elaborates the most radical aspects [...] of his recovery of esotericism, and he revels in it: 'In any case with [Xenophon] too morality is purely exoteric, and just about every second word has a double meaning. ' Socrates and his circle stand beyond good and evil.

Arguably, by 1939, Strauss had, for the most part, worked out his idea of political philosophy. Even if there is no talk of political philosophy per sein his Xenophon essay, Strauss' s remark that classical political science is based on foundations laid by Socrates while modern political science follows Machiavelli makes his meaning apparent.

In "Exoteric Teaching, " an essay from the same year, Strauss develops a specific understanding of scepticism that significantly broadens its scope to include morality, religion, political life, and even philosophy. Though Strauss considers philosophy to be an important search for truth, it is not wisdom itself, and cannot and should not provide direct guidance to politicians, scholars, and the masses. As Lampert correctly stresses, philosophers are not moral role models like the prophets. Rather, they are, in Nietzsche 's sense, beyond good and evil. Anticipating a possible objection here, Strauss states that 'the distinction between exoteric and esoteric speech has then so little to do with 'mysticism' of any sort that it is an outcome of prudence. '

Strauss puts special emphasis on the definition of philosophy as a search for wisdom, and from there draws consequences for the sceptical treatment of politics. He places wisdom in relation to the virtue of moderation, which comes to bear primarily in one's public activity. Here, he uses Machiavelli to argue indirectly against Nietzsche and Heidegger. Like them, Strauss thinks radically, but he does not try to dissolve the tensions between politics and philosophy. For him, political and philosophical life exists in permanent opposition, and it is precisely because the opposition is unavoidable that philosophers must practice moderation. Their scepticism about political opinions and the gods can confuse the body politic and destabilise its order; it is imperative, therefore, that philosophers conceal their radicalism and atheism. For Strauss, radicalism in thought and moderation in politics operate in entirely different spheres.

The point of Strauss 's nuanced study is to reconstruct Xenophon's original intentions, not to analyse his arguments. The distinction between form and representations puts Strauss on the path that leads him to discover scepticism, the dialogue form, and the difference between what is said and what is alluded to. Recently, Xenophon scholars have raised a number of objections to Strauss 's interpretation of "Constitution of the Lacedaemonians" as satire. Thanks to Strauss' s surprising interpretative reversal —returning Xenophon to the status of rousing, accomplished thinker that he enjoyed before the eighteenth century—he manages to remain in the spotlight of current scholarship.

Strauss originally published his second study on Xenophon dealing with the dialogue Hieroin 1948. Besides being an extraordinary contribution to the totalitarianism debate and exemplifying his position that big questions demand alternative answers, it is also methodologically interesting, because in it he develops his understanding of political philosophy. Strauss 's interpretation of Hierohas been commented on by many. I am only interested in looking more closely at his ideas on scepticism and their two-pronged attack against the mostly positivist, value-judgment-eschewing discipline of political science. In its place, Strauss favours a normative practice of political science that resists historicism, which, besides being relativist, is shaped by a hubristic claim to understanding past authors better than they understood themselves. The starting point for Strauss 's interpretation of Hiero and the normative philosophy of Xenophon is his understanding of the Socratic dialogues. Like Plato in his dialogues, Xenophon hides his true meaning in Hiero. Understanding it involves accessing his original intention. Strauss begins with a brief structural analysis of the two-part dialogue. Simonides, who plays the active role, visits the tyrant Hiero and strikes up a conversation. His intent —Str au ss calls Simonides a wise man— is not to give Hiero advice, but to develop an active discussion. Simonides wants to show what is wrong with the tyrannis over which Hiero rules (its pathology) and how to make things right (its therapeutics), but he can only do this if he proceeds indirectly. The idea is to make Hiero at least partially aware of the problems of tyrannical rule by

letting him become caught in his own contradictions. In this way, Strauss argues, the tyrant can be turned into the benevolent despot. Whether Simonides achieves this is unclear, but he does manage to show that Hiero's way of life is questionable and could change were he to give more consideration to the polis. By moving the dialogue from way of life to the question of virtue, Xenophon puts tyranny and its problem into stronger relief. But in doing so, he also, according to Strauss, employs a radical scepticism, one buried beneath the surface in an esoteric layer that is only revealed by what is not said: the silences, Xenophon's concealments, and Simonides' omissions.

Strauss first mentions the concept of the zetetic in his debate with Kojève —despite his strongly opposed viewpoint, he was one of the few people by whom Strauss felt understood —and only in his "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero" (1950). Kojève, who was influenced by Heidegge r in his early life, not only defends Hegel, but, as his own breed of Marxist, even indirectly defends Stalinism. 33 Kojève takes this position because he assumes that the utopia of benevolent despotism described by Xenophon was achieved in the modern era using different means. A Frenchman by choice, Kojéve uses historical arguments to claim that the expanding authoritarian regime, the coming world-state, is a good, the highest form a state can achieve. Furthermore, he believes that tyrants are particularly open to the advice of philosophers, although their recommendations must first be adapted to the circumstances by intellectuals, in whose company he places Simonides. Strauss rejects these extreme views, but he agrees with Kojève on one point: that the understanding of totalitarianism demands a return not to Machiavelli, as many contemporaries believed, but to Xenophon's Hiero. Machiavelli, who intentionally avoids the term tyranny in Il Principe, would presumably dismiss a ruler like Hiero. But to Strauss, an ethically rich understanding of tyranny unfettered by a restrictive theory of power is the basic prerequisite for understanding modern tyranny.

The crucial part of the dispute between Strauss and Kojève for our purposes concerns their respective concepts of philosophy. Kojève 's historical speculation is fundamentally at odds with what Strauss, in the following passage, calls 'zetetic philosophy':

What Pascal said with antiphilosophic intent about the impotence of both dogmatism and skepticism, is the only possible justification of philosophy which as such is neither dogmatic nor skeptic, and still less 'decisionist,' but zetetic (or skeptic in the original sense of the term). Philosophy as such is nothing but the awareness of problems, i. e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems. [...] Yet as long as there is no wisdom but only the quest for wisdom, the evidence of all solutions is necessarily smaller than the evidence of the problems.

To Strauss, Kojève verges on sectarianism because he, like the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit, decides for only one solution. Strauss believes his own position is open (though this might confuse readers given his conservative return to virtues, antiquity, and moderation). His "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero" marks a definitive switch from political science to philosophy, to philosophical politics and the political actions of philosophers.35 By the time of his debate with Kojève, Strauss had come to understand political philosophy as prima philosophia, grounded in the irrevocability of the human problem and the unavoidable conflict between philosophy and the polis. Strauss continues his interrogation of these basic problems throughout On Tyranny, both in his interpretation of Xenophon and in his debate and later correspondence with Kojéve. As I will argue in the next section, Strauss 's use of zetetic to explain his own approach is at once a revival of an ancient Greek idea and an act of appropriation to alter its original meaning.

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The interpreters of Strauss I mentioned at the beginning of this paper characterise his philosophy as zetetic. I will now discuss this claim using passages from Strauss's writings, especially from statements in letters in which he expresses himself freely. I will confine myself to those passages in

which Strauss uses the term 'zetetic' or 'sceptic' to show what he means by this, which are rarely considered collectively. My take on those passages shows that they provide a number of explanations but no systematic justification of zeteticism. Firstly, I want to recall the polemical context: since the late 1920 s, Strauss fought against relativism, historicism, and positivism. Notably, these are all movements associated with modern scepticism. As the following passage from 1931 shows, it is no surprise that the young Strauss distanced himself from this kind of scepticism:

There is no teachingof Socrates. Socrates couldnot teach; he could only questionand through this questioning help others to gain understanding. First, he helped them realize that what they believed they knew, in reality they did not know. Not that he himself knew what others did not know. Instead his wisdom— the famous wisdom of Socrates—meant that he knew that he did not know anything. Even this knowledge of knowing nothing is not a teaching. Socrates is also not a skeptic. A teaching, at least a philosophical teaching, is an answer to a question. But Socrates did not answer anything. The answer that he appears to give (the knowledge of knowing nothing) is only the most poignant expression of the question. Socratic philosophizing means to question [...]. Why, however, does Socrates persist in questioning? [...] How can he persist in questioning despitehis knowledge? The answer is that he wantsto persist in questioning [in der Frage bleiben], namely because questioning is what matters, because a life without questioning is not a life worthy of man.

I will put aside for a moment the issue of a worthy life to stress again that Strauss expressly does not call Socrates a sceptic; his terminology would not undergo asemantic shift until his later period. The passage also shows Heidegger's influence on Strauss. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that 'to persist in questioning'— in der Fragebleiben—is downright Heidegge rian in formulation. What is also interesting about this passage is Strauss's multilayered remark that Socrates has no teaching. The Greek dialogical philosopher does not have a doctrine; he questions. Strauss's later distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric for philosophers like Plato who rely on the written word does not apply to such a thinker. Nevertheless, while the early Strauss may have wanted to return to Socrates, his starting point was a modern one. He follows Nietzsche (apart from his criticism of Socrates) and is taken with Löwith, who reads Nietzsche as an author who 'repeats antiquity at the peak of modernity. ' In his 1931 review article on Julius Ebbinghaus, Strauss defines the purpose that Socrates and his specific form of scepticism should serve:

> The not-knowing [Nichtwissen] that is real in the present day is not at all the natural not-knowing [Nichtwissen] with which philosophy must begin; then a long detour and a great effort are first needed in order even to return to the state of natural ignorance [Unwissenheit].

The emphasis on 'natural' in 'natural ignorance' should not be overlooked. In the seldom-remarked-on third chapter of his Natural Right and History, Strauss alludes to a kind of epistemological explanation of his position: philosophical scepticism develops from 'pre-philosophical experience ' with hearsay and appearance. Drawing on Hu sserl 's idea of a natural, pre-philosophical attitude, Strauss defines a normative concept of nature —one opposed to the diversity of gods and mo res —that establishes a framework for doing philosophy.

An important aspect of Strauss' s concept of philosophy can be found in the 1945 "Farabi 's Plato," an essay often assigned special significance in his work. There, he writes:

> It is the way leading to that science rather than that science itself: the investigation rather than the result. Philosophy thus understood is identical with the scientific spirit 'in action, ' with ^^^^^^ in the original sense of the term.

The term 'political philosophy' does not appear here — Strauss speaks only of political science —but the phrase 'scepticism in the original sense' is one he will later use when talking about the sceptical character of his philosophy.

A peculiar feature of Strauss 's scepticism is its preoccupation with alternatives. In Thoughtson Machiavelli(1958), Strauss writes:

> We did assume that there are fundamental alternatives, alternatives which are permanent or coeval with man. This assumption is frequently denied today.

Similar anthropological claims can be found in Natural Right and History: the permanent problems are not only coeval with man; they are always the same, independent of time and context. 46 Strauss frequently claims that all fundamental problems have the character of an alternative. This is more than a preference for a dual code; it recalls Carl Schmitt's notorious distinction between 'friend and foe. ' But Strauss does not provide a single argument why, for a sceptic, all problems must assume the form of an alternative. Why should there not be three, four, or five possibilities? Why should unresolvable problems not be trilemmas or pentalemmas? Strauss 's fixation on alternatives significantly restricts the scope of his scepticism, though he does concede in his debate with Kojève that multiple philosophical solutions can exist. At any rate, it is a strange turn for someone who expressly rejects problem histories in the neo-Kantian mould and who argues against Hans-Georg Gadame r that the content of problems and their solutions can change. 48 Despite tying the understanding of a problem to the philosophising subject, Strauss remains tethered to the belief in eternal problems as such.

Several passages from Strauss 's correspondence with Karl Löwith shed more light on his conception of scepticism. In a letter from July 19, 1951, he responds to an essay by Löwith:

> It is excellently written and compared with the madmen who dominate the world stage, I agree with you 1,000 percent. But compared with the realox^pis, the Socratic-Platonic? You read Plato with Montaignean or Christian eyes. Socrates is no skeptic in a vulgar sense, because he knows that he knows nothing. To start, he knows what knowledgeis— and that's not nothing. Moreover, he knows that the problems are, theproblems, the importantproblems—that is, what is important.In other words, he knows that philosophizing is a unum necessarium.

Strauss goes on to make a distinction between Socratic scepticism and the vulgar scepticism of Pyrrho. In Strauss' s eyes, Pyrrho 's scepticism boils down to ataraxia, a state of philosophical equanimity which is both apolitical and individualistic. Socrates, by contrast, knew that he knew nothing, but he also knew that this was a special form of knowledge. Socratic philosophising is a political act because it seeks, through the interrogation of prevailing opinion, a renewal of the polisbased on sound principles. The philosophy that Strauss talks about— the unum necessarium — is not compatible with stringent scepticism. It would be naïve to assume that Strauss is unaware of the paradox in his position; as an expert in ancient philosophy, he was no doubt familiar with Cicero's maxim that we cannot even be certain that everything is uncertain. Strauss concludes his letter to Löwith by pointing to a particular source of his scepticism:

> To be quite frank, your article helps strengthen the sympathy for Heidegger that recently awoke in me, who remained loyal to himself by making no concessions to belief.

Sixteen years earlier, Strauss wrote the following to Löwith:

But these late antique philosophies are far too dogmatic, even the skeptics, for someone like you to remain with them and not go back to their forefather, Socrates, who was not dogmatic.

Around a month later, he wrote to Löwith again:

Why did I not respond to 'The doctrine of the mean?' Because I know who you mean, namely people like Burckhardt. I would like to believe you that B. was the ideal representative of the moderation of antiquity in the nineteenth century. But the subjects of his philosophizing are only possible on the basis of modern 'immoderation': no ancient philosopher was ever a historian [...] No, dear Löwith, Burckhardt—that really won't do.

Burckhardt, whom Löwith revered, did not figure similarly for Strauss. He associated Burckhardt, a historian, with relativism and saw no philosophical radicalism in his doctrine of the mean, despite the aristocratic remove from his contemporaries. To Strauss, Burckhardt 's moderation was nothing more than a theory of the juste milieu. But while Strauss disagreed with Löwith about Burckhardt, they both rejected the decisionism of Heidegge r and Schmitt.

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Strauss redefines scepticism, or zeteticism, in contradistinction to modern relativism with recourse to Xenophon and Socrates. It is embedded in his political philosophy and in his notion of exoteric and esoteric writing. His rhetoricisation of philosophy, its reduction to zetetic questions, is meant to facilitate and protect political philosophy. Its critical value is primarily polemical; compared with other forms of current political philosophy, it is unable to provide a detailed diagnosis of the present situation beyond a mirroring of theory in antiquity and assuring itself of its impact in the modern era through self-reflection. Instead of being a mere sub-discipline —a 'branch,' as Strauss calls it— political philosophy rises to first philosophy. In this capacity, it is the ceaseless, normative interrogation of fundamental human problems and of the political order. For Strauss, philosophy is the only framework in which this can meaningfully occur.

As I suggested at the beginning, several levels of zetetic questioning can be found in Strauss 's writings. He is sceptical of modern philosophy and tradition —including social sciences, political theory, political science, and revealed religion —for being neither radical nor normative enough. The philosopher's scepticism is directed at opinions in general and at the political in particular. Strauss argues again and again for moderation in politics and accuses other radical philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegge r not only of self-instrumentalisation, but also of not doing enough to prevent misunderstandings by disciples, intellectuals, and the poorly educated. Of course, it is doubtful whether Strauss did enough to prevent such misunderstandings himself, given the later success of some Straussians. His central topos —the warning not to separate wisdom and moderation in On Tyrannyand in other places —can hardly be ignored, yet he remains vague.

Strauss' s implicit set of anthropological assumptions, his concept of political philosophy, and his belief in the insufficiency of reason form the basis of his conservative approach, which was noted by his disciples, political sympathisers, and opponents alike. Yet one must admit that his zetetic approach, while producing innovative interpretations of canonical political philosophers, yields few substantive guidelines.

Strauss' s attempt to ground scepticism anthropologically may be interesting, but he can hardly conceal its limited scope, the lovely line about scepticism being a form of wisdom notwithstanding. Methodically, his philosophising is tied to the distinction between exoteric and esoteric writing, with all its illuminating and surprising insights. According to Strauss 's interpretative hermeneutics, the hidden meanings in philosophical texts enable radical questioning while shielding the public from its

ramifications. His political philosophy does not aim at specific solutions; rather, it is meant to have humanising side-effects on the city, on the political community, and on gentlemen. Strauss believes that philosophical scepticism, correctly understood, refuses instrumentalisation and, despite its radicalism in theory, is moderate in questions affecting the political order more narrowly.

Nevertheless, the limited scope of his scepticism means that his thinking can be called zetetic only in part. That limited scope grows out of Strauss's commitments to antiquity—to Socratic questioning, to persisting in questioning, and to understanding philosophy as a way of life. At the same time, Strauss wanted to elude criticism of the foundations of modern political philosophy and theory. His insufficiently elaborated existential scepticism can problematise relativism, historicism, and positivism —the spectres, in his mind, responsible for the crisis of modernity— but he cannot shake them systematically. His entire critique of modernism and liberalism stands on feet of clay. Interpreting Strauss's philosophy as sceptical does not do enough to address this or its scant epistemological underpinnings. <>

THE NEW HEAVEN AND NEW EARTH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY COMPARISON BETWEEN JÜRGEN MOLTMANN, KARL RAHNER, AND GREGORY BEALE by Raymond R. Hausoul, Foreword by Gijsbert van den Brink [Wipf and Stock, 9781725262829]

There is a growing focus on the Christian confession of God's completed kingdom, the new heaven and the new earth. This theme has time and again seduced people into elaborate fantasies that stimulated the senses. How can we talk about it meaningfully? Raymond R. Hausoul relates systematic theology to biblical theology by comparing three theologians: the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, the Protestant Jurgen Moltmann, and the Reformed Gregory Beale. This leads to reflections on differences between matter, space, and time of the new heaven and new earth and those of our present reality. The hope for renewal and resurrection is thus linked to the prophecies of the new Jerusalem, the tree of life, and the resurrection body.

Reviews

"In this book Dr. Hausoul bridges the gap between mainstream Christian theology that accepts historical biblical criticism (Moltmann, Rahner, et al.) and a classical Reformed theological approach (Beale). Overcoming mutual caricatures, he shows how both traditions can seriously learn from each other. His endeavor results in a detailed, extensive, and highly instructive study of the biblical topic of cosmic eschatology—a theme that rightly receives increasing theological attention today."—Gijsbert van den Brink, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

"This book is an interesting exercise in the field of the relationships between biblical theology (BT) and systematic theology (ST), focusing on the subject of the new heavens and earth. The fact that, in church history, BT and ST have grown apart so strongly can be called a disaster. Dr. Hausoul's work is a helpful contribution to bridging the gap between the two."—Willem J. Ouweneel, Evangelical Theological Faculty, Leuven, Belgium

"The dialogue between systematic and biblical theology is increasingly important. So the approach of Raymond Hausoul is timely, making clear how the interaction between these disciplines will enrich the reflection and debate on eschatological expectations, particularly the hope for a cosmic renewal, 'a new heaven and a new earth.' The careful comparison between the concepts of three major

theologians illustrates the yet-insufficient realized potencies of this needed interdisciplinary interaction."—Jan Hoek, Evangelical Theological Faculty, Leuven, Belgium

"Raymond Hausoul has done a good job in this cross-denominational and interdisciplinary study. Two systematic theologians from the Protestant and Catholic traditions and a biblical scholar from the evangelical tradition are brought into a critical and fruitful dialogue on the final perspective of life as envisaged by Christian faith."—Nico den Bok, Evangelical Theological Faculty, Leuven, Belgium

CONTENTS

Excerpts: In theology, there is a growing appreciation for the interdisciplinary conversation. This dissertation examines how the systematic-theological representations of the new heaven and earth of Rahner and Moltmann can be critically compared with the biblical-theological perspective of Beale on this matter in a methodically responsible way. It will explore in an exemplary way what an interdisciplinary comparison between experts in Systematic Theology (ST) and Biblical Theology (BT) can yield in the theological discourse of the new heaven and the new earth. It reveals that Beale's BT makes unconscious hermeneutical choices in its research and that Rahner's and Moltmann's ST common uses biblical "proof texts," without adequately taking the biblical context into account. Furthermore, it becomes constantly visible how both disciplines complement, challenge, and encourage each other on micro- and macro-level. Chapter 7 closes the inquiry of this dissertation with a structured conclusion about the methodical observations in the interdisciplinary comparison and the resulting value of this research.

Introduction And Methodology

Today there is a growing interest in the interdisciplinary dialogue between academic disciplines. In theology, this desire relates to the dialogue between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology. However, within academic publications, an exemplary development of how the methodological gap between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology can be bridged remains. Systematic theologians and biblical theologians write individual chapters in common publications, with no attempt to bridge this gap and carry a visible dialogue with each other in these. An inquiry into a possible comparison between experts in Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology that is methodologically responsible can be a significant contribution to addressing this gap.

This dissertation provides a new contribution to this by examining how, through a critical interdisciplinary comparison, the systematic-theological representations of Rahner and Moltmann on the new heaven and new earth can interact with the biblical theological perspectives of Beale. It will so serve as an exemplary exploration of what a comparison between both theological disciplines can

bring to the theological topic of the new heaven and new earth. In addition, this dissertation proposes a substantial contribution to the academic inventory of the cosmic eschatology of Rahner, Moltmann, and Beale in regard to the new heaven and earth. From the research question, the dissertation is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 contextualizes the research question of the dissertation, offers an overview of recent publications on the subject and includes a justification of methodology and assumptions. Chapter 2 investigates how Rahner, Moltmann, and Beale estimate an interdisciplinary conversation between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology. The individuality of these academic disciplines and the enrichments and dangers of a dialogue between the Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology are discussed. Chapters 3 to 5 contain a hermeneutical-theological analysis of Rahner's, Moltmann's, and Beale's reflections on the new heaven and the new earth. In addition to their differences in approach and execution, the core elements of the three theologians in their own approach to the subject are investigated. Chapter 6 examines how a critical interdisciplinary comparison between Rahner's, Moltmann's, and Beale's eschatology can be methodically conducted in a responsible way. From the chosen methodology therein, a first critical comparison is held on hermeneutical choices which the interlocutors make. After this, a second comparison is undertaken which focuses on the substantive choices Rahner, Moltmann, and Beale make in their talk about the new heaven and earth. This visualizes to which extent an interaction between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology can be of value in the theological debate about the new heaven and earth. In chapter 7, the dissertation will be closed with a conclusion about the methodical observations in the interdisciplinary comparison and the resulting added value.

Rahner, Moltmann, And Beale On Dialogue Between Systematic Theology And Biblical Theology

Chapter 2 presents the attitudes of Rahner, Moltmann, and Beale facing an interdisciplinary conversation with the other field presented. This chapter shows their individual attitudes towards this and mentions the enrichments and dangers they a priori observe in a dialogue between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology. The chapter demonstrates that all three theologians are in favor of such a dialogue when it is developed on an equal level. Their own enrichments, which they see in the dialogue between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology, can be summarized as follows: the dialogue between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology offers (1) inspiration by new insights; (2) awareness of one's own presuppositions; (3) enhancements from the overall theological picture; (4) relevance of the Bible and the Christian faith. Although Rahner, Moltmann, and Beale place different accents in their objectives of Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology, they agree both that Systematic Theology deals with subjects from the Christian creed and social questions thereabout, while the BT describes the biblical storyline. It will also be demonstrated that for all of them, the Bible is a basic source in the reflection about faith in the dialogue between Biblical Theology and Systematic Theology. On the question of the authority of the Bible, they think differently.

Karl Rahner's Perspective On The New Heaven And New Earth

Chapter 3 offers a new contribution to the study of Rahner's eschatology by analyzing and profoundly systematizing Rahner's thoughts on cosmic eschatology. The investigation into this shows how Rahner stresses in his hermeneutical principles that the future is only realized by God's absolute intervention. From this, responsible discourse on eschatology is only possible if it departs from the salvation which has already been achieved by Christ. For Rahner, the glorified and resurrected Christ constitutes the objective beginning of the new creation.

In his reflections on the new creation and on the interpretation of the biblical data about this, Rahner remains reluctant. At the same time, he emphasizes that the format and the content of the biblical imagery should not be separated. In his reflection on matter, Rahner presents the tangible and intangible as an inseparable unity. The history of the cosmos is therefore inextricably linked with the history of mankind. In Rahner's elaborations of this, Christ's resurrection stands in the midst and is very important when it comes to the reflection of the future resurrection. Christ's resurrected body is a unique and radical transformation of his crucified body. From this paradigm, Rahner speaks about the ultimate future resurrection of the body that humanity will receive. But he also insists that this does not mean that the resurrected body consists of the same identical atomic matter as the crucified body. With regard to time, Rahner sees eternity as the fruit of the personal history of human beings. Eternity as an infinite continuation of time or as an absence of time is rejected by him. Finally, Rahner stresses in his theocentric perspective on the new creation that in the visio beatifica the knowing of God remains an ongoing process in which the Creator and his creation will pervade each other in the same way as God's spirit permeates the Christian today.

Jurgen Moltmann's Perspective On The New Heaven And New Earth

Chapter 4 analyzes Moltmann's eschatology on the new heaven and earth. This chapter is unique in its comprehensiveness. In Moltmann's theology, eschatology stands in a central middle and cosmic eschatology is leading in this. The various hermeneutical principles that determine Moltmann's eschatology are analyzed and systematized in this chapter. It explains how Moltmann's eschatology is christologically determined. The crucifixion and resurrection of Christ are, according to Moltmann, related to the discontinuity and continuity between this creation and the new creation. The resurrection of Christ thereby anticipates what will take place between the present and the eschatological horizon. The doctrines of salvation and of creation are closely connected with this horizon. Out of this, history can be distinguished in three phases: creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio nova.

With regard to time and space, Moltmann says that God has confined himself to form a nihilum, in which he created the world. This nihilum makes creation imperfect and points to the future redemption. Despite recognizing positively that earthly historical time (chronos) causes the creatio orginalis to move to the creatio nova, he emphasizes the negativity of chronos because it is connected with the nihilum. Therefore, in the new creation, eonic cycle time will exist, which never perishes and glorifies all times throughout history. Also, on space (topos), Moltmann thinks both positively and negatively. On the one hand, space offers creation protection, but on the other hand, it makes a distance between creation and Creator. In the new heaven and earth, that distance disappears and God pervades all living space (perichoresis).

In his view on matter, Moltmann sees in Christ's Incarnation and resurrection a testimony to the redemption and renewal of the material. The matter of God's whole creation will be renewed and completed in the eschatological moment. The creation will be then changed into an eternal dwelling place for the triune God and will participate eternally in the trinitarian life. Moltmann recognizes various anticipations during this creatio continum on the coming new creation. These are images and metaphors which give us an idea of the new heaven and earth. They bring two facets forward: the absence of the current negativity and the presence or reminder of the current positivity.

Gregory Beale's Perspective On The New Heaven And New Earth

Chapter 5 analyzes Beale's perspective on the new heaven and earth. Because this has not yet been comprehensively done, this chapter constitutes a first scientific contribution to Beale's eschatology of the new creation. First, it examines the hermeneutical principles in Beale's Biblical Theology. His methodical form and his focus on the biblical storyline from protology to eschatology are discussed. After this, it looks at the substantive themes that empower Beale's Biblical Theology. Central to this,

Beale has the idea that (1) the story of creation reveals God's plan for this creation, (2) Eden is the prototype of God's new creation, and (3) the history of salvation is continuously accompanied by references to this beginning. Beale also emphasizes that Christ's resurrection constitutes the beginning of God's new creation in Christ. From this, Beale concludes that the Christian has already been spiritually resurrected in the life of the new creation. The physical resurrection thereby remains outstanding. This will happen at Christ's second coming. For that moment, the Spirit is preparing Christians as first fruits. A glimpse of that blessed future can be seen in the creation story of Genesis when it testifies of God walking on earth and of the peace that humanity in the new creation is allowed to receive.

Critical Comparison

Chapter 6 provides a critical interdisciplinary comparison between Rahner's, Moltmann's, and Beale's theological speaking on the new heaven and the new earth. This answers the research question of this dissertation. In the beginning, it reminds the reader of the openness for dialogue between Systematic Theology and BT, which the three theologians recognize. From there, it establishes a comprehensive methodology for the interdisciplinary comparison that this chapter presents. In a hermeneutical and substantive critical comparison, it will examine to what extent the Biblical Theology or Systematic Theology of the respective theologians can have any significance for the other in talking about the new heaven and the new earth. This hermeneutical interaction reveals how Beale's Biblical Theology unconsciously takes some important decisions from Systematic Theology when it comes to the realization of the future. It also shows that Rahner's distinction between "eschatology" and "apocalypse," and his exegesis of Mark 13 is inaccurate. In addition, all three theologians complement each other well in their perspective on protology and eschatology. They positively challenge each other to reflect critically on the origins of evil, and on the permanent impact evil has on God's original creation. Further, both systematic theologians stimulate in their theological perspectives Beale's Biblical Theology to an examination of the biblical images which are connected with the topic of cosmic eschatology, and they also request from his Biblical Theology a theological investigation of the resurrection stories of Jesus Christ.

After the hermeneutical comparison, the substantive comparison reveals how the spiritual renewal, which Beale's Biblical Theology stresses, and the physical renewal, which Rahner and Moltmann both emphasize in their Systematic Theology, can be brought together. This ensures that a strict separation between the tangible and intangible aspects of the resurrection is avoided. It also shows the balance which is necessary between the continuity and discontinuity of this creation and new creation. Also, Moltmann's and Beale's contributions about space are brought in juxtaposition so that they complement and challenge each other. This interdisciplinary comparison can potentially result in a further investigation of the contrasts and similarities in the biblical imagery about the new heaven and earth. Also, they may be further examined in Biblical Theology to illustrate how God's plan for this creation is related to his own being. Finally, the substantive comparison brings the question of the meaning and implication of certain biblical words for time forward. This interdisciplinary investigation, therefore, shows that both the Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology should be aware that their reflection on time and eternity is often more affected by an extra-biblical philosophy than by the Bible itself.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this dissertation brings the methodical observations in the interdisciplinary comparison to our attention. Of significance is the awareness of (2) the significance of the theological approach which the conversation partner applies, (2) the own hermeneutical grid, (3) the uniqueness and equality of both disciplines, and (4) on their own contributions to theology. The interdisciplinary comparison is from this perspective, valuable. It makes both disciplines aware of

their presuppositions and shows how both are related to the complete field of theology. Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology are in fact, an integral part of the same whole. Although both operate in a different way within theology, they search for the same reliable, authentic Christian theology.

This chapter speaks also of the significance of the interdisciplinary comparison on the theme of the new heaven and earth. In addition to the aforementioned hermeneutical awareness, it will be shown that this interdisciplinary investigation between experts on Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology about the new creation does not have to focus primarily on providing concise "proof texts," but should be seen in a mutual exchange of wider theological themes, which recommends new sub and main themes. From this perspective, the dialogue between the Systematic Theology of Rahner and Moltmann on the new heaven and earth, and the Biblical Theology of Beale on the same topic, has an added value for both disciplines. In the midst of this dissertation stands thereby the essential question of continuity and discontinuity between this creation and the new creation. We conclude from the separate analyses of Rahner, Moltmann, and Beale, as from the interdisciplinary comparison between them that the new creation is not a restitutio in integrum or a renovatio of the current creation (continuity), and that it also should not be seen as an annihilatio mundi (discontinuity). Rather, the new heaven and the new earth represent a change, glorification, and completion of the original first heaven and earth which God created. There is both a fundamental continuity and a radical discontinuity between the current life in Christ today and the future life in God in the new creation. So the future involves both a radical break with a subsequent novum and a process-based transformation and renovation, which transcends our thinking. However, the eschatological perspective on the ultimate arrival of the triune God to this creation urges us to take God's creation seriously. From the results of this research, there are still major challenges in the dialogue between Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology on the topic of the new heaven and earth. But at the same time, the Christian testimony may continue to witness that God, for his creation, offers not a hopeless end, but rather an endless hope. <>

THROUGH YOUR EYES: RELIGIOUS ALTERITY AND THE EARLY MODERN WESTERN IMAGINATION edited by Giovanni Tarantino and Paola von Wyss-Giacosa [Series: Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, Brill, 9789004464919]

The focus of **THROUGH YOUR EYES: RELIGIOUS ALTERITY AND THE EARLY MODERN WESTERN IMAGINATION** is the (mostly Western) understanding, representation and self-critical appropriation of the "religious other" between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Mutually constitutive processes of selfing/othering are observed through the lenses of creedal Jews, a *bhakti* Brahmin, a widely translated Morisco historian, a collector of Western and Eastern *singularia*, Christian missionaries in Asia, critical converts, toleration theorists, and freethinkers: in other words, people dwelling in an 'in-between' space which undermines any binary conception of the Self and the Other. The genesis of the volume was in exchanges between eight international scholars and the two editors, intellectual historian Giovanni Tarantino and anthropologist Paola von Wyss-Giacosa, who share an interest in comparatism, debates over toleration, and history of emotions.

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The "Religious Other" through Early Modern Eyes by Giovanni Tarantino and Paola von Wyss-Giacosa

The historic focus of Through Your Eyes is the (mostly Western) understanding, representation, and self-critical appropriation of the "religious other" between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The original idea for the volume arose from seminar discussion with members and fellows of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg (khk) 'Dynamics in the History of Religions between Asia and Europe' at Ruhr-Universität, Bochum, about the powerful conceptual language concerning the variation and fluidity of otherness and othering offered by social anthropologists Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich in their coedited Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach (2004). The making of the present book, however, has extended over several years, countries, and continents and found its final shape through the fruitful exchange of views and ideas between its editors, an intellectual historian and an anthropologist who share an interest in early modern religious comparatism, history of emotions, and theories and practices of toleration.

Otherness, which is instrumental to the quest for and development of national and cultural self-definition, is commonly regarded as being intrinsically related to the notion of an enemy that has to be destroyed, enslaved, or assimilated. However, Baumann, in particular, developed a 'weak' and nuanced concept of identity in which sameness and alterity, identity and difference, are not demarcated in an exclusive way. Cannibalizing three classic social theories originally proposed by Edward Said (1978), E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940), and Louis Dumont (1980), Baumann conceptualized three grammars of selfing/ othering (orientalization, segmentation, encompassment) in which identities and alterities are viewed as 'mutually constitutive or potentially dialogical.'

> Orientalism is not a simple binary opposition of 'us = good' and 'them = bad', but a very shrewd mirrored reversal of: what is good in us is [still] bad in them, but what got twisted in us [still] remains straight in them ... The social grammar of a segmentary system is a logic of fission or enmity at a lower level of segmentation, overcome by a logic of fusion or

neutralization of conflict at a higher level of segmentation ... It is thus entirely a matter of context who is one's foe and who one's friend at what classificatory level ... The Other may be my foe in a context placed at a lower level of segmentation, but may simultaneously be my ally in a context placed at a higher level of segmentation ... Encompassment means an act of selfing by appropriating, perhaps one should say adopting or co-opting, selected kinds of otherness ...: 'you may think that you differ from me in your sense of values or identity; but deep down, or rather higher up, you are but a part of me'.

The first of the three grammars, orientalization, constitutes "self" and "other" by negative mirror-imaging: 'what is good in us is lacking in them.' At the same time, and most significantly, it also entails 'a sense of loss' and adds a subordinate reversal: 'what is lacking in us is (still) present in them.' Famous early modern examples of fictional reverse travel writing come to mind, with Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes (1721) being the most distinguished among them. A lesser-known case in point—portraying 'a sensible Chinese' travelling through intolerant Christian countries—was offered by the versatile eighteenth-century Sinophile journalist and freethinker Thomas Gordon (see Tarantino's contribution to this volume). Failing to see these societies as 'Christians according to the gospel,' the Chinese traveller concluded that he should bless 'himself, and the more Christian spirit of good old Confucius.'

The second, so-called segmentation grammar 'determines identities and alterities according to context.' Think, for example, of the Italian Dominican friar Daniello Concina (1687–1756) who, in his five-tome Della religione rivelata, contra gli ateisti, deisti, materialisti, indifferentisti, che negano la verita^ de' misteri (Venice, 1754), set about opposing the unbelief of his age by demonstrating how eminent non-Catholic theologians and clerics, 'though obstinate heretics' (including Jean Le Clerc, Johann Franz Buddeus, Jacques Abbadie, Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, Edmund Gibson, Thomas Sherlock, Abraham Le Moine, William Warburton), had bravely overturned the depraved motivations of misbelievers. As for the third grammar, universalistic thought systems (no matter whether religious or secular) may actually smooth out difference by encompassing it. If segmentation always implies the existence or the construing of a common enemy, and if encompassment is always hierarchical, orientalization can raise ideas of complementarity and reverse mirror-imaging. By 'cannibalizing' and greatly simplifying Baumann in turn, and without either uncritically surrendering to the potential ecumenism of readings which rely too heavily on the concept of negotiation once warned against by Peter Burke, or underestimating Guy G. Stroumsa's caveat that 'comparing never reflects a neutral account of the other,' the contributors to Through Your Eyes specifically explore the potentially self-critical dimension of the representation of the "religious other" in the early modern era.

Translocal perspectives have also prompted a critical rethinking of categories such as 'identity,' 'nation,' 'civilization,' and 'religion,' and many historians have recognized the importance of theorization, despite an earlier distaste for it. In modern cultural studies, space is not understood in purely physical or material terms but is thought of as embracing a wide range of spaces, be they imagined, ascribed, mental, textual, corporeal, literary, and so on. A transcultural history of religion, if it is to be inventive, must work with very different notions of space, 'globally encompassing understandings of the past' while remaining sensitive to local particularities. Thus, as observed by Glei and Jasper: 'Translocality can thus be understood both as the practice of crossing geographical borders and as the act of transgressing geographical into mental spaces.' Writing entangled and translocal histories calls for an interest in 'the agentive capacities of all actors,' a 'decolonization of thought'—aptly evoked by Daniel Barbu in the afterword to this volume—and a hermeneutics that considers 'the permeability of borders; the negotiations of power; the dynamism of intercultural processes; and the inextricability of material and symbolic factors.' In what is known as the global or

globalized age, cultures, and religion(s), can no longer be viewed as discrete units and must be seen as hybrid formations involved in a constant process of multidirectional exchange with other cultures.

...

Early Modern historian Lee Palmer Wandel noted how Montaigne, having witnessed the harsh confrontations between Huguenots and Catholics over revealed truth, the discordant accounts of peoples and cultures separated by bodies of water and iconoclastic acts in churches, had pointed to the fact that 'none took into account either the subjectivity of the eye or the role of prior knowledge in shaping what the eye could see.' Those perceptive insights have been taken up in a particularly fruitful manner in the historical study of 'regimes of comparatism.' Scholars in anthropology and ethnography, art history, geography and cartography, history, history of science, religious studies, and national literatures have explored with increasing sophistication and sensitivity what Wandel, by evoking Michael Baxandall's notion of 'the period eye,' suggests might broadly be called 'the subjective eye.'

Through Your Eyes sets out to explore how the "religious other" was seen, perceived, understood, appropriated, or distanced between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. If Baumann's grammars suggested a fertile starting point, the contributors to this volume, all specialists in their fields, were invited to write in line with their own training and epistemologies, methods and methodologies, questions and terms, so that in reading the chapters one also becomes aware of many more "eyes" present in the volume. 'Mutually constitutive' processes of selfing/othering are observed through the lens of creedal Jews, a bhakti Brahmin, a perceptive collector of Western and Eastern singularia,14 a widely translated Morisco historian, well-travelled Christian missionaries in Asia, critical converts, toleration theorists, and freethinkers— in other words by mostly western or largely westernized people, dwelling in an 'in-between' space that undermines any binary conception of the Self and the Other 'as mutually exclusive poles.' Indeed, as Gauri Viswanathan has convincingly shown, 'assimilation may be accompanied by critique of the very culture with which religious affiliation is sought. Equally, dissent may aim at reforming and rejuvenating the culture from which the convert has detached herself.' In contrast, by visually and emotionally confining the "religious other" to the dark periphery of the world, the title page vignette by Charles-Nicolas Cochin the Younger, one of King Louis XV's favourite engravers, which appeared on each volume of the 'Catholicized' 1741 version of Jean-Frédéric Bernard and Bernard Picart's Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde—a powerful expression of dialogue, knowledge, and tolerance (see, in this volume, the essays by Minuti, Stünkel and Tarantino)—rendered non-Christians, and even more specifically non-Catholics, liminal.

Although privileging Western gazers (with the partial exceptions of the essays by Chakravarti, Minuti, and Rule on missionary encounters in India, Siam, and China), the collection has a broad geographic range, spanning Western and Southern Europe, the West and East Indies, the Far East, and North America. The chapters explore culturally specific ways to represent, understand, and emulate—but also to silence, domesticate, and appropriate—the "religious other".

Talya Fishman offers a survey of 'creedal moments' in Jewish history. Fishman argues that such building and expressions of creed—that is, the necessary and defining beliefs—by Jewish scholars in Christian and Islamic lands, is rooted primarily in external historical circumstances necessitating a doctrinal clarification of Jewish identity. Consequently, Fishman discusses the topic episodically and diachronically. Her examples range from the twelfth through to the eighteenth centuries, from medieval thought and crypto-Judaism to the emergence of the modern nation state and 'Jewish "capitulation" to confessionalisation,' revealing the 'gap separating Judaism's modern turn from its medieval antecedents.' Most significantly, for the purposes of this collection, the uncharacteristic separation of belief and practice, with a privileging of the former, is explained as a development

unique to Iberian conversos and to their Jewish descendants in lands of the Western Sephardic Diaspora.

Historian Ananya Chakravarti compares two dialogic texts in Marã^hï from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries respectively, which, by means of staged inter-religious dialogue, present the complexity and ensuing difficulties of religious co-existence between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians in the region. In offering a close reading of these roughly coeval textual sources, Chakravarti considers the importance, particular meaning, and finality of silence within such religious debates and explores the acceptance of difference grounded in bhakti devotionalism in the name of a shared and fundamental humanity. In contrast, Thomas Stephens's silences in his Discurso sobre a vinda de Jesu Christo reveal his limited acceptance of the other.

Fernando Rodríguez Mediano surveys the vicissitudes surrounding the publication and reception of the extraordinarily successful Historia verdadera del rey d. Rodrigo authored by the Morisco physician Miguel de Luna (d. 1615), uncovering the complex ways in which Old Christian Spanish society (and more broadly, early modern Europe) toyed rhetorically with cultural and religious distance, and used Oriental chronicles and Islam as instruments for self-reflection ('Hee that knoweth no Countrey but his own, knoweth not the worth or wants of his owne'). As Mediano illustrates, the circulation of Morisco works such as de Luna's within Spain and other European countries was as meaningful in its original intention of defending the existence of the Morisco community under the Spanish monarchy as in its later appropriation and reinterpretation by different political, historical, and literary agents.

The anthropologist Paola von Wyss-Giacosa looks at a treatise published in 1615, which presented an innovative theory about the historical diffusion of idolatry from ancient Egypt to the Americas and Asia. The author, Paduan antiquary Lorenzo Pignoria, based his comparative studies on material culture and, accordingly, included a considerable number of illustrations of the objects he had examined in his book, often using the first person in his writing and consistently supplying detailed information on the whereabouts of the artefacts to enable the verification of his observations. As Wyss-Giacosa argues, a close reading of the text and images, systematically employed as evidence by the antiquary, uncovers intriguing contradictions. Pignoria used the concept of 'conformità' as a heuristic tool. His engagement with the "other" through the sources on idolatry he had gathered led to an increasing intellectual and emotional irritation, to an intensified and challenging reflection on religion.

In his chapter on seventeenth-century Chinese converts to Christianity, Sinologist Paul A. Rule acknowledges that 'the other can be made familiar by misidentification, a perverse denial of otherness,' which may have informed the sympathetic appreciation displayed by European Jesuits for Chinese belief systems. At the same time, however, he forcefully rejects competing scholarly accounts of 'an insurmountable otherness of Christianity,' examining what he calls 'Confucian Christians.' Their tenets are encapsulated in the reflection by Xu Guangqi (known as one of the 'Three Pillars of Chinese Catholicism') that Christianity 'complements Confucianism and reforms Buddhism.' Significantly, Rule also notes the Jesuit missionaries' own conversion 'from a narrow Christianity to a broader—if you like more "liberal"—Christianity.'

In the next chapter, Rolando Minuti focuses on the Western understanding of Siamese belief systems. The growth of political and commercial dealings between Siam and European states, especially France in the second half of the seventeenth century, coupled with various missionary initiatives, resulted in a greatly increased knowledge of Siam and its religious traditions. This in turn provided a means for interrogating European culture. Minuti considers three main instances of 'orientalizing' attitudes—the reference to Siamese religion in Bayle's writings, the comparative approach in Bernard and Picart's Cérémonies, and the deistic interpretation of d'Argens's work—

and points out the difficulties of assuming a 'radical' attitude as a uniform and consistent framework of the Enlightenment's contribution to the long history of European philosophical thought about religion and the "religious other".

This radicalism is specifically addressed by Knut Martin Stünkel, who examines one of the most celebrated Enlightenment critiques of Christianity's moral and political influence. For Baron d'Holbach—Stünkel glosses, drawing on Jean Starobinski's théorie du dévoilement—'institutionalised religion (and the Church) and tolerance concerning matters of an inexplicable nature are mutually exclusive.' In his 'unveiling, enlightened and stereotyping view, the "other" is religion, while religion itself is othering.' Having been overcome by scientific and philosophical attack, religion ('a device for rulers to intensify an emotion') is viewed as having left a gap in the moral structure of human beings which needs to be filled by reason, experience, and education. Thus restructured, the moral code of the Enlightenment affords a perspective for considering other religious traditions ('Christianity provides no advantages compared to the other religions').

Equally importantly, as Vincent Carretta shows in his essay, Islam, RomanCatholicism, paganism, Protestantism, and Christianity were, in general, all subjected to 'the comparative and evaluative gaze' of early black authors who, with their writings, marked the beginnings of black transatlantic literature and social criticism. Writing as 'strangers in strange lands' and repeatedly making use of 'the trope of the sacred talking book,' they were positioning themselves rhetorically as outsiders and supposedly disinterested observers critiquing the religious beliefs and practices of societies they found themselves in, but not fully of, including Christian ones. Most eighteenth-century writings by and about individual people of African descent appropriate Judeo-Christianity in order to reveal and judge the beliefs and practices of contemporary hypocritcal self-styled Christians of European descent.

In the final chapter of the volume, Giovanni Tarantino argues that the Enlightenment's excessively contrived emphasis on priestly analogies between different religious traditions (think of Thomas Gordon's coinage 'priestianity') might have paved the way for religious indifferentism, or even, paradoxically, for a powerful rhetoric of intolerance and dramatically caricatural representations of religious alterity. In contrast, the indulgent consideration of human nature displayed in Bernard and Picart's Cérémonies (notably translated into English by Voltaire's accomplished translator John Lockman) appears to have offered, despite a number of contradictions, a more effective argument for adopting a humanist and informed position on all cultural belief systems, encouraging mutual toleration without being disparaging of religious practice as such. Peaceful coexistence was, of course, often undermined or shattered by government repression, ecclesiastical intransigence, and sectarian and sometimes violent tensions. Yet, as the late Thierry Wanegffelen rightly affirmed, 'religious history should not only be that of institutions, dogmas and rites but has also to allow failed virtualities, suffocated sensibilities and repressed aspirations of the conscience of believers.'

Daniel Barbu's afterword reflects on the ways in which the notion of "perspectivism" introduced by Amazonian anthropologist Viveiros de Castro may contribute to the historiography of cultural encounters in the early modern era. The discussion suggests bringing America back into the picture, in particular sixteenth-century discussions of religion and idolatry, and of the cannibal customs of the sixteenth-century Tupinamba established on the Brazilian coast. Cannibalism is here used also as a metaphor for cultural imperialism, although an attempt is made to complicate the West vs the rest narrative by considering how "alien eyes" informed European intellectual history, from Montaigne to Lévi-Strauss.

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The primary thesis formulated by the khk research program in Bochum was that 'the major religious traditions form, establish, and develop in mutual dependency.' The program viewed religious and

ethical traditions as the result of continuous processes of 'entanglement, exchange, adaptation, and demarcation', and investigated the 'intercultural compatibility' of the term 'religion'. Although a great deal has been written about the notion of "religion," defining it remains a "slippery enterprise." As the prominent khk guest fellow Christoph Auffarth warned, 'religion, as can be gathered from the history of the term, is a concept of European religious history.' The term pertains to a 'Christian object-language,' and is clearly problematic as a comparative term of 'religious studies metalanguage.' A widely used basic conceptualization of religion in the social sciences is that it is a 'system of beliefs and practices oriented toward the sacred or supernatural, through which the life experience of groups of people are given meaning and direction.' Moreover, religions 'frequently take on an institutional form.'22 Equally significantly, social research has singled out at least three basic dimensions of religion in society, known in English-speaking literature as the "big three Bs": belonging, behaviour, and belief. Besides these three dimensions, the social analysis addresses three different levels of society, the micro, the meso, and the macro, which deal respectively with the individual, with intermediary agents, and with society (or larger social systems in general). While nowadays what is meant when individuals affirm that they belong to a particular religious group or tradition may vary considerably, and for many is merely a categorical form which does not interfere with a person's identity ("being just a member"), in the early modern (and mostly Western) world religious belonging was typically a form of personal and collective identity, highly relevant to the self-understanding and behaviour of individuals and communities. The well-received modern thesis of "believing without belonging" did have its own precedents though, as Leszek Kolakowski's Chrétiens sans Église has shown, with its focus on relatively unknown early modern thinkers from across Europe who embraced Christian ideas while refusing to adhere to organized, institutionally controlled forms of religious life.

In Forgetting Faith?, a collective volume published in 2012, co-editors Isabel Karremann, Cornel Zwierlein, and Inga Mai Groote suggested that early modern historiography has seen a kind of 'religious turn' since 9/11, with a rediscovery of the continuity of religious division and confessional conflict in the modern world. In their view, the 'old narrative of secularization' was called into doubt, with a critical reappraisal of the classic periodization whereby the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were some sort of 'confessional age', as opposed to the age of secularization ushered in by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and fully achieved in the modern world. Most important though was the emergence and subsequent historiographical evolution of more internal approaches to religious phenomena, which went hand in hand with the decline in socioeconomic history from the 1970s onwards. Since then, Katsumi Fukasawa recently observed:

> the leading interest moved from the economy to mentality; from the social to cultural ('cultural turn'); from social structure to individual actors; from macrostoria to microstoria; from sociological determinism to a quest for internal significance, whether individual or collective; and from structuralist to constructivist analysis; in short, from explanation to comprehension, favoring altogether the passage from social reading of the religious to religious reading of the social. Thus the 'religious turn' was prepared by a 'return of the religious' that became manifest ... from the 1990s.

This combination of theme and approach—Fukasawa continues—has prompted new strands of research. First, unhampered by an ecclesiastical or denominational framework, historians are now becoming very interested in interconfessional or interreligious relations, all the more so as religious pluralism is a major feature of the contemporary globalized world. Second, in order to avoid the kind of political or social reductionism that generally results from a mechanically applied external reading, historians are pursuing a 'more nuanced and internal approach' to interfaith relations, viewing religious conflict not just as an ideological expression of political struggle or social antagonism. Third, having observed a persistent gap between the institutional framework and social

reality, and how legal or ecclesiastical constraints were disregarded more than was previously thought, historians are uncovering a 'less conflictual and antagonistic' side to interconfessional dealings. When examining everyday social relations from a microhistorical perspective, or reconstructing the individual journey of a given actor or interactions between several different actors, historians also find that although it was not uncommon for people to be 'divided by faith,' they nonetheless coexisted peacefully without mutual fear or concern.

A further key theme when focusing on religious interactions is that of conversion (and reconversion), which was both the chief task of internal and external missionary work but also the main cause of anxiety and suspicion, given the various forms of dissimulation and secrecy rife in the early modern age. Groups from different confessions or religions inevitably mingled in social contexts (or in powerful representations), and this, accompanied by everyday forms of dissimulation, often resulted in a groundswell of tolerance and sometimes very personal and eclectic shifts between faiths and confessions. Johannes Heinrich Horstmann, born in Borgentreich in 1663, was baptized no fewer than twenty-two times during a lifetime of denominational peregrinations between different faiths and religions, even though such moves were frequently motivated by the desire of individuals to escape from unhappy or no longer gratifying conjugal ties.

Studies of early modern ideas and practices of tolerance have concentrated for the most part on theological justifications for persecution, the enduring divisions caused by the Reformation, and the battle of ideas over liberty of conscience, championed by humanists, Protestants, and deists. Others have explored the negative economic effects of intolerance. Historians of emotions, by seeking to chart the background and development of modern psychological thinking, are contributing significantly to a more nuanced understanding of the discernible shift towards greater tolerance in Europe over the period (see, for example, the emotional undertext of Pignoria and Picart's comparatist efforts hinted at by Wyss-Giacosa and Tarantino in their contributions to this volume). They are trying to do so by examining practical and affective relations between people of differing creeds at a local level, by casting light on the points where patterns of intellectual, social, and cultural history meet, and on the gaps between them.

As Alexandra Walsham has remarked, attitudes such as enmity and amity, prejudice and benevolence, rubbed shoulders in early modern society for a long time, forming a 'cyclical rather than linear' relationship. Individuals kept at bay and appeased the guilt they felt about having dealings (in either real or representational space) with people who professed a 'false' creed through periodic outbursts of prejudice and violence. This is clearly illustrated by the Gordon Riots of 1780, which led to almost 300 deaths and proved to be one of the worst civil disturbances in British history. The riots were sparked by opposition to the Catholic Relief Act granting Catholics living in England some minor relief from discrimination. There was little in the act to offend the sensibilities of Protestants, who were broadly speaking accustomed to the presence of Catholics and quietly turned a blind eye to some of the more stringent restrictions applying to Catholics. The Gordon Riots were witnessed by Ignatius Sancho (see Vincent Carretta's essay in this volume), who had been born a slave in 1729 on an Atlantic slave ship, and was brought to Britain when he was very young. Here he worked in the homes of wealthy Londoners, rising from a decorative black domestic to a man of refinement and accomplishment. In 1773 he managed to open a shop in Westminster. Shocked by the violence of the riots, Sancho, a former Catholic turned Anglican who also flirted with Methodism, comments ironically in a letter on the 'worse than Negro barbarity of the populace.' And then, significantly, he continues: 'I am forced to own, that I am for a universal toleration. Let us convert by our example, and conquer by our meekness and brotherly love!'

The real-life experiences of early modern interconfessional and interreligious conviviality suggest that the intellectual labours of the European thinkers who advocated toleration did not occur in a social or cultural vacuum. However, it was not until Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) that the assumed

existence of an intrinsic link between being a believer and being a good citizen was seriously called into question. No less importantly, John Locke acknowledged that what a peaceful, fruitful discussion of religious issues required did not just concern the substance of the debate. The manner of disagreement, namely civility, was equally important. True civility was above all about dispositions—the 'disposition of the mind not to offend others.' Practically speaking, toleration was less about displaying an 'outward respect,' and more about expressing actual 'respect,' 'esteem,' and even 'love.' So, Locke argued, in questions of civility, as in religion, popular instruction was best served not by legislative prescription but by education and the setting of a moral and emotional example.

Admittedly, in early modern Europe, this practical wisdom often grew out of the difficult years of confessional hostility and religious wars. At the same time, it may encourage historians to ask what ordinary believers, who were not necessarily as inflexible in their attitudes as priests and ministers, really felt about ecclesial and doctrinal divisions. This pertains to what has been called the 'new social history of toleration'. Moreover, Fukasawa notes, the popular practice of coexistence should not be put down to a straightforward '"pragmatism" that would consider religious belief as a secondary problem compared with the individual or communal interests of daily life'. Historians must always be wary of slipping into reductionism, which is why the 'negotiation of the norms', as Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire suggested, is so important in this particular context. When engaging with the people, church, or government of another faith, everyone—be they high or low, rich or poor, lay or clerical, unlearned or learned—needs to negotiate in order to adapt to circumstances that may be varyingly problematic to their own religious practice. Beaurepaire suggests that negotiating the norms is not always simply a matter of bargaining or arriving at a studied compromise. Negotiation entails discussion and dialogue between opposing groups, which may cause rupture and unremitting antagonism, but could equally result in fruitful interaction and mutual understanding. As a consequence, 'negotiating the norms may be both an "experience of the other" and a quest for one's own identity reflected in the mirror of the otherness'.

Returning, then, to Baumann and Gingrich's perceptive conceptual toolkit—the initial inspiration and conceptual frame for our project—we are of the view, together with all the authors of this volume, that difference is more usefully understood 'not in an ontological but in a subject-centred manner as part of identity.' <>

The Philosophers and the Bible: The Debate on Sacred Scripture in Early Modern Thought
edited by Antonella Del Prete, Anna Lisa Schino, and Pina Totaro [Series: Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, Brill, 9789004418639]

The Bible is the crucible within which were forged many of the issues most vital to philosophy during the early modern age. Different conceptions of God, the world, and the human being have been constructed (or deconstructed) in relation to the various approaches and readings of the Holy Scriptures. This book explores several of the ways in which philosophers interpreted and made use of the Bible. It aims to provide a new perspective on the subject beyond the traditional opposition "faith versus science" and to reflect the philosophical ways in which the Sacred Scriptures were approached. Early modern philosophers can thus be seen to have transformed the traditional interpretation of the Bible and emphasized its universal moral message. In doing so, they forged new conceptions about nature, politics, and religion, claiming the freedom of thought and scientific inquiry that were to become the main features of modernity.

Contributors

include Simonetta Bassi, Stefano Brogi, Claudio Buccolini, Simone D'Agostino, Antonella Del Prete, Diego Donna, Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Guido Giglioni, Franco Giudice, Sarah Hutton, Giovanni Licata, Édouard Mehl, Anna Lisa Schino, Luisa Simonutti, Pina Totaro, and Francesco Toto.

Excerpt: This book collects papers presented during the international conference I filosofi e la Bibbia: Letture filosofiche delle Scritture in età moderna, which took place in Rome and Viterbo on 9–10 May 2019 and was organized by the Department of Modern Languages and Literatures, History, Philosophy and Law Studies (DISTU) of the University of Tuscia, the Department of Philosophy of "La Sapienza" University in Rome, and the National Research Council's Institute for the European Intellectual Lexicon and History of Ideas (ILIESI-CNR) in Rome. The invitation was then extended to other scholars, in order to present a coherent framework of the relationship between philosophy

and the Holy Scriptures. Experts coming from different research fields – from the history of philosophy to ethics, from the philosophy of religion to history of science, theology, and exegesis – were asked to investigate the pervasiveness, the influence, and the role of the biblical text in philosophical reflections during the early modern age.

From the early stages, the conviction that animated the project of the conference was the awareness that the text of both the Old and the New Testament has constituted the constant reference point for philosophical analysis from the early Middle Ages until at least the modern age. Beyond the various exegetical and theological interpretations, the Bible remains one of the main elements of the most important debates and the breeding ground for questions that have always nourished the history of cultural tradition in the Western world. Consider, for example, the metaphysical discussions on the nature of being, or the problems linked to the origin of evil and sin, the essence of good, truth and life, the concepts of eternity, freedom and free will, and the soul-body relationship. Different conceptions of God, the world, and the human being have been shaped on the basis of the history of salvation, constructed (or deconstructed) in relation to the various approaches and readings of the Holy Scriptures. Not to mention the history of languages and their linguistic implications, since some of the great idioms of the European tradition found their written and literary style thanks to translations of the ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Latin texts of the Bible. Such was the case of the German language, which established itself thanks to Martin Luther's translation, or of English, which became definitively established with the so-called King James Bible. These are just a few examples, but they are very significant in terms of the theoretical and practical effects of the long-lasting influence of the scriptural text. Much of European cultural heritage has been elaborated around it, from the formation of the collective imagery (proverbs, idioms, the multiform representations of figures such as the serpent or the devil, for example) to the great cosmological systems. The same process of secularization that began with Renaissance humanism is studded with questions of biblical exegesis, to such an extent that it seems impossible to discuss early modern and contemporary thought while ignoring or downsizing its biblical foundations.

Despite the widespread presence of the text of the Scriptures in Western culture, scholars have partly neglected this aspect in the analysis of philosophers' thought, certainly discouraged by the fact that 17th-century theologians have always taken exegetical work into their own hands, mistrusting if not outright rejecting the readings proposed by the laity. Indeed, with the exception of the pioneering work of Amos Funkenstein, of the volume devoted to the 17th century in the series Bible de tous les temps, edited by Jean-Robert Armogathe, and a few other general, monograph studies, not many texts have offered extensive and in-depth reconstructions of the philosophers' relationship with Scriptures. Hence the proposal for a debate on the different readings of the Bible in the early modern age, specifically devoted to the 17th century as a privileged century for philosophical analysis: it marked a milestone after the turmoil caused by the impact of the Reform and the development of knowledge. Furthermore, during this century the mingling of conceptual categories reached its peak, and the debate on the interpretation of the Bible began to affect directly the most compelling scientific issues in the fields of ontology, psychology, ethics, as well as in anatomy, physiology, geology, and above all cosmology, which had traditionally derived from the fusion of biblical cosmology with the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic world picture (see for example the clash between Galileo Galilei and Cardinal Bellarmino).

Historiography has long enriched and modified our knowledge of the vast movement of thought that runs from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, but common belief is still grounded firmly in the idea that the great cultural change that began and developed between the 16th and the 17th centuries primarily concerned astronomy, mathematics, physics, applied sciences, and medicine. That an equally radical mutation also affected the historical and hermeneutical disciplines was a deep conviction initially held by scholars such as Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller, who explored

Italian humanism and Renaissance. Later, other scholars systematically traced connections between this tradition and its developments in Europe in the 16th3 and 17th centuries. Today, the framework of our knowledge has expanded considerably and, thanks to the essential contribution of authors from different disciplinary areas (historians, exegetes, anthropologists, philologists, and linguists), our approach to the relationship between the Bible and philosophy has changed considerably. There is a growing awareness that the rejection of bookish erudition, exemplarily expressed in Descartes's Discours de la méthode, and strongly supported by Malebranche's pages of La recherche de la vérité, coincided with a general movement of break with tradition, and at the same time with a substantial affirmation and recovery of concepts, notions, and convictions that united rather than divided the different fields of knowledge of early modern European culture.

In fact, the impact of biblical exegesis on scientific debate has been the focus of a large range of recent studies. Particular attention has been paid to the disputes over the reconciliation between heliocentrism and the literal interpretation of the Scriptures as well as to its opponents and their doctrines. The feature that unites the pro-Copernicans, beyond the sometimes strong differences in their strategies, is the claim for an autonomy of scientific research from the control of theologians.7 This claim is based on three assumptions. First, the belief in a twofold revelation developing through the book of Scripture and the book of nature: the two books are endowed with equal dignity, but they refer to different spheres, so that the book of Scripture does not concern and does not hand down those scientific truths that must instead be explored in the book of nature, as Galileo explicitly declared. In the second place, the purpose of the Bible, in fact, is equated to its salvific message and to the moral indications contained therein, without forgetting that the study of nature can also take on an apologetic function. These themes are explored in the sections Rational Theology and Natural Religion and The Moral Message of the Bible, respectively. Lastly, biblical language is structurally "humanized," i.e. adapted or accommodated (accommodatio is the technical term) to man's intellectual capacities (ad captum vulgi). The section The Accommodation Doctrine is devoted to this topic.

None of the above-mentioned assumptions on the interpretation of the Bible shared by Copernicans was wholly original and they are accepted by both Catholic and Protestant sides on behalf of different auctoritates. However, both orthodoxies deny that they can be used to claim the autonomy of natural philosophy. On the contrary, this is the time in which the different religious confessions devised conceptual tools necessary to elaborate and reinforce their own formulas of faith, define the boundaries between what could be tolerated and what had to be refused, and reorganize their control and propaganda apparatuses. These macro-structural frames, largely transversal to the different historical contexts and geographical borders, explain why scientists and philosophers, although animated by deep Christian faith, may have aroused the suspicion, or even the hostility, of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, which agreed in the refusal of Copernicanism regarded as incompatible with biblical dictates.

In the last decades, research devoted to the early modern age studied the spread of increasingly sophisticated exegetical tools, functional to the textual and hermeneutical criticism of the Scriptures. During the 17th century, the development of the philology of ancient texts applied to biblical studies has led to the accumulation of an increasingly comprehensive knowledge about the languages, the historical context, and the nature of the sacred texts. This increasing attention to historical aspects seems finally to have led to a radical critique of the very foundations on which the authority of the Bible was built. Through the creation of communication tools and cultural networks spread throughout Europe – epistles, journals, and newspapers, for example – individual scholars participated in a Respublica litteraria going beyond the constraints of mere confessional ties and geographical borders of the various local and national communities.

The most recent studies in this field largely share the same characteristics, focusing in particular on reconstructing the intellectual physiognomy of an individual author and exploring his writings, or examining a specific thematic framework or cultural heritage. The merit of these contributions is that they have shown how the work of philosophers and exegetes led to the reconsideration of the Bible as a historical and cultural product. Hence the need to delve into the philosophical aspects of these themes and to reconstruct the origins of some particular hermeneutic trajectories in the sections devoted to Enquiring on Moses and Prophet's Witnessing.

The issue of vowel points highlighted by several authors, the attention to internal inconsistencies in the original texts, the incompatibility of the biblical chronology quoted in the various books, the semantic shifts in the translations raise doubts and heuristic problems that are difficult to resolve, undermining the very authority of the Scriptures. On the one hand it is denied, for example, that the Hebrew text of the Old Testament can be corrupted, on the other hand the Protestant principle of sola Scriptura not only encourages the proliferation of a large number of individual interpretations of the sacred text, but also contributes powerfully to the emergence of different confessional creeds and sects, often "sans Église," as well as to a progressive historicization of the Scriptures.

Despite of orthodoxy's repeated attempts to demarcate social and cultural spaces, the debate on "Mosaic physics" is very lively among exegetes and scientists as a clear sign of a dissent connected to a different understanding of power relations in the political and intellectual fields. However, without ignoring the existence of forms of unbelief, irreligiousness, and atheism, it seems that a large number of scientists and philosophers between the 16th and 18th centuries were sincere believers and sometimes programmatically structured their activity as a contribution ad maiorem gloriam Dei. Nonetheless, when cases of self-censorship did not occur, their adherence to a shared religiosity relentlessly clashed with the ecclesiastical institutions of the time. The "secular theology [...] conceived by laymen to laymen," so well described by Funkenstein, took on different meanings in authors such as Galileo and Descartes, for example, who aimed to ensure that natural philosophy had a space free from theological interference. Other philosophers and scientists, conversely, while agreeing with the need for science and philosophy to be free to investigate without the undue intervention of other disciplines, constantly interlaced theological and scriptural elements with their own scientific or philosophical thinking, as in the case of Kepler. Others, such as John Wilkins and Thomas Sprat, believed that it is a specific task of the philosopher to venture into natural theology, giving rise to what would be called physico-theology.

Therefore, the present volume does not aim to question the relationship between science and religion or the progress in biblical exegesis, which, as we have seen, have been widely explored by scholars, but rather to analyse the different uses that philosophers make of the Bible. As much as the fluid disciplinary demarcations of the early modern age allow, philosophy is the main focus of this work. Every chapter addresses fundamental aspects of early modern philosophers' views on the Bible. A complex picture emerges: it appears that, in very different ways and using different approaches, early modern philosophers made a constant effort to explore, deconstruct, and reconfigure the most diverse ontological, epistemological, logical, and theological-political issues through a close comparison and a careful reading of the biblical text. Some topics in particular stand out. In the first place, there was a strong interest in Moses's role as a lawgiver and founder of states, an interest arising from reflections on political issues of urgent relevance in an era characterized by the rise of absolutism and the emergence of the modern state. Secondly, the theme of prophecy stands out: it concerns the possibility of the communication of the divine word and of a mediation entrusted to a few chosen men. The debate on prophecy is thus configured as the privileged place for probing the relationship between religion and power and for assessing areas of coexistence of temporal and spiritual powers. Besides, the reflection on the Bible, its historical-documentary value, and its moral content, is closely intertwined with the debate on the possibility and significance of a

natural, unrevealed, and rational religion, finding a fertile breeding ground during the 17th century. Lastly, the relationship between religion and science becomes a crucial issue: philosophers and scientists rediscovered ancient theological doctrines – often anchored in a traditional language, but used according to new forms and meanings – providing them with new functions and producing a deep change in the relationship between philosophy, faith, and reason. As a result, this volume is divided into five distinct sections: Enquiring on Moses, The Prophet's Witnessing, Rational Theology and Natural Religion, The Moral Message of the Bible, and The Accommodation Doctrine. However, this subdivision does not intend to provide programmatic signposts. It is rather a possible reading path, stemming from the identification of some areas of research that has emerged in recent years as the most interesting and fruitful. Spinoza's role is confirmed as central, while, even if not directly addressed, the debate spreading after the 'Galileo affair' constitutes the background of the book.

The various contributions collected in the five parts of this volume examine, in the first place, the multifaceted use of the figure of Moses, variously presented as legislator, magician, or even impostor (Enquiring on Moses). The reflection on his role as author of the Pentateuch is an opportunity to address questions of a purely theoretical nature (see, respectively, the chapters by Simonetta Bassi and Pina Totaro). Thereafter, the wide domain of prophecy is put in the spotlight (The Prophet's Witnessing): its nature and status are analysed in the chapters concerning Campanella, Hobbes, and Spinoza with the aim of defining its theological-political implications (Guido Giglioni, Anna Lisa Schino, and Diego Donna). The relationship that some representatives of Cambridge Platonism, the English Unitarians, and Pierre Bayle established between rational theology and natural theology is then addressed (Rational Theology and Natural Religion by Sarah Hutton, Luisa Simonutti, Stefano Brogi). Pascal, and again Hobbes and Spinoza, then come under scrutiny (The Moral Message of the Bible) to identify the strength of the moral message of the Bible as its sole area of competence, negating further scientific implications (Simone D'Agostino, Francesco Toto, and Giovanni Licata). Lastly, the new use of the theory of accommodatio as a vehicle for a break with tradition is investigated throughout case-studies provided by Kepler, Mersenne, Descartes and his Dutch followers, Newton, and Wolff (The Accommodation Doctrine by Édouard Mehl, Claudio Buccolini, Antonella Del Prete, Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, and Franco Giudice).

In conclusion, the confrontation of modern philosophers with the Holy Scriptures appears to be marked by radical solutions, which paved the way and contributed to founding the values of tolerance and libertas philosophandi, with a highly diversified range of proposals. On the basis of this confrontation, indeed, the concept of freedom of speech finds a philosophical foundation and a theoretical justification in the claim for the separation and emancipation of philosophy from theological authority. The debate on history, on languages, and on the meaning of the sacred texts carried out by the philosophers contributed to a general rethinking of the nature of human beings and of their relationship with God and with the world. The elaboration of new frameworks establishing the relationships between civil and religious authorities and defining theological-political categories were decisive elements in the birth of modern thought. <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SEPTUAGINT edited by Alison G. Salvesen and Timothy Michael Law [Oxford Handbooks, 9780199665716]

The Septuagint is the term commonly used to refer to the corpus of early Greek versions of Hebrew Scriptures. The collection is of immense importance in the history of both Judaism and Christianity. The renderings of individual books attest to the religious interests of the substantial Jewish
population of Egypt during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and to the development of the Greek

language in its Koine phase. The narrative ascribing the Septuagint's origins to the work of seventy translators in Alexandria attained legendary status among both Jews and Christians. The Septuagint was the version of Scripture most familiar to the writers of the New Testament, and became the authoritative Old Testament of the Greek and Latin Churches. In the early centuries of Christianity it was itself translated into several other languages, and it has had a continuing influence on the style and content of biblical translations.

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SEPTUAGINT features contributions from leading experts in the field considering the history and manuscript transmission of the version, and the study of translation technique and textual criticism. The collection provides surveys of previous and current research on
individual books of the Septuagint corpus, on alternative Jewish Greek versions, the Christian 'daughter' translations, and reception in early Jewish and Christian writers. The *Handbook* also includes several conversations with related fields of interest such as New Testament studies, liturgy, and
art history.

CONTENTS

This volume is a response to the growing recognition of the phenomenon of the Septuagint, whose significance is much wider than is often perceived among biblical scholars. The term 'Septuagint' is not limited either to the first Greek translation of the Torah or to the interface between the Hebrew texts and their Greek renderings, as demonstrated by Cameron Boyd-Taylor's overview essay 'What Is the Septuagint?' at the start of this volume (Chapter 1). The Septuagint is a complex entity, which developed over a long period. Moreover, the study of the Septuagint relates in important ways to many other fields, including Hellenistic and Byzantine Judaism; New Testament and early Christianity; patristic biblical exegesis; Greek lexicography; 'daughter' versions; liturgy; papyrology and manuscript studies; translation studies; modern theology. We have endeavoured to cover as many of these areas as possible.

The two other essays in Part I set out the development of Septuagint studies in Western European scholarship, following the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the consequent flow of Greek scholars and manuscripts to the West. Scott Mandelbrote (Chapter 2) notes the way in which the rediscovery of the Septuagint and the Greek language influenced and was itself influenced by the movements of Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Such study was therefore not merely an

academic pursuit but until well into the nineteenth century was regarded as of great significance for the 'recovery' of authentic biblical tradition: the Oxford scholar Edward Grinfield even set up an annual lectureship to promote the Septuagint's 'value as an evidence of the authenticity of the Old and New Testaments'. Over the course of five hundred years, printed Septuagint books have moved from diplomatic editions of single manuscripts (some-times in polyglot volumes) to full eclectic critical editions that aim to recover the oldest possible form of the Septuagint (usually termed 'Old Greek' in the case of translations), based on a very large number of manuscripts and with one or more detailed apparatus. The most important of these are the editions of single books of the Septuagint corpus produced by the Göttingen Unternehmen and still to be completed, as detailed in Chapter 3 by Felix Albrecht. However, Albrecht also notes that the concept of editing the Septuagint ultimately goes back to both early Jewish Hebraizing revisions and to the Classical Alexandrian tradition of text-editing, both reflected in the work of Origen on the Hexapla.

Part II reviews the socio-historical setting of the Septuagint translations and related Jewish religious literature in Greek. Although it is usually assumed that all originated in the substantial Jewish communities in Egypt, especially in Alexandria, this may not be so for every book. In Chapter 4 James Aitken looks at the political situation and the extent of Greek knowledge in Palestine and the Diaspora outside Egypt, concluding that although there can be no certainty, a non-Egyptian origin is possible in the case of some compositions in Greek such as Sibylline Oracle 3 and 4 Maccabees. Livia Capponi (Chapter 5) assesses the evidence for the civic status and social circumstances of the very large Jewish community in Egypt, especially in Alexandria, during the Hellenistic and Roman periods until the virtual destruction of Egyptian Jewish life in the suppression of the revolt in 117 ce. She reflects on issues of Jewish identity for Jews living in the land of Egypt, speaking Greek. The Septuagint was translated into the Greek of the Hellenistic period, yet demonstrates some features alien to both literary and Koine Greek of the period, most often due to the nature of translation from Hebrew. For instance, the verbal system and basic syntactical constructions are very different in the two languages. In his chapter on language and lexicography (Chapter 6), Trevor Evans describes the development of the study of the syntax and vocabulary of the Septuagint, from the notion that the language of the LXX was a kind of Jewish Greek dialect, to a more informed appreciation of the points of contact between the usages of the LXX corpus, contemporary documentary papyri, and literary Greek. He also compares the methodologies employed by modern lexicons of the Septuagint. A controversial area is the degree to which LXX

translators introduced religious ideas of their own period into their renderings. Mogens Müller (Chapter 7) argues for the importance of distinguishing between what translators may have intended and how later readers understood the resulting texts. He examines terms used for God, the rendering of the Hebrew word Torah by the Greek nomos, and possible messianic and eschatological references, all of which in due course influenced the New Testament and later Christianity as well as being an integral part of Judaism expressed in Greek. The origins of the Septuagint translation, which it is generally agreed began with the renderings of the books of the Pentateuch (Torah), are shrouded in mystery. However, a pseudonymous work known as the Letter of Aristeas composed by a well-educated Greek Jew in the second century bce tells of the rationale and circumstances behind the Pentateuch's translation in such a compelling manner that it was not until the seventeenth century that its historicity was challenged. It is due to this work that we use the term 'Septuagint', derived from Pseudo-Aristeas's account of seventy-two translators who came down from Jerusalem to Alexandria at the invitation of King Ptolemy to translate the books of the Torah for his library. Dries De Crom in Chapter 8 notes how much of a sway 'Aristeas' still has on the scholarly imagination. He provides a critique of recent attempts to rehabilitate aspects of the narrative, concluding that it should be seen as 'performative rather than objective history'. More reliable indicators of the early history of the Septuagint can be obtained from the papyrus fragments and inscriptions that attest it. In Chapter 9 Michael Theophilos explains the meth od ology of

papyrological study and epigraphy, and their significance for Septuagint studies, as well as the difficulties in distinguishing Jewish and Christian provenance of manuscript fragments. In the next phase of transmission of Septuagint texts, as Luciano Bossina writes (Chapter 10), the codex began to replace the roll: traditionally regarded as indicating a distinction between Jewish and Christian practice, along with the use of the nomina sacra, in recent times this dichotomy has been questioned. In the ninth century the use of Greek uncials in manuscripts was superseded by minuscules. The dates of surviving manuscripts can give an indication of fluctuations in book production, usually related to economic and social stability of a particular period. Prior to the adoption of printing books were very expensive to produce in terms of materials and scribal labour, with 'complete' Bibles, pandects, being particularly rare. In Chapter 11 Hans Ausloos explains the methods and purpose of translation technique as seen in the Septuagint translations. The Hebrew and Greek languages are very different in structure as well as script. Literary translation between the two was virtually unknown in the period in which the first LXX books came into being. Moreover, there was no scientific understanding of Hebrew grammar, and little in the way of lexical aids until the early Islamic period. The translators employed various ways of dealing with idioms in Hebrew, and in the Pentateuch they established certain patterns in syntax and lexi cography that would prove influential for the rendering of later books. The study of such practices by modern scholars is now well-established and has great importance for textual criticism of the Hebrew Bible in that it plays a vital role in establishing the details of the original Hebrew text that the translators worked from.

In Part III, the focus shifts to the corpus of the Septuagint itself, with an emphasis on the translated books, but also including those often found in Christian collections from early times. As mentioned above, the Pentateuch covering the five books from Genesis to Deuteronomy was almost certainly the foundation for the other translations, both because the books of the Torah were at the heart of Jewish life everywhere, and also because the influence of the Pentateuch translation can be seen in other books. Dirk Büchner (Chapter 12) notes the presence of adaptations to the new Hellenistic environment, as in the example of the legal issue of a householder's killing of a burglar, as well as the possibility of exegetical interpretation of passages concerning sacrifice, and what this might imply about the audience's expectations of a rendering of the Hebrew Torah. The books known as the Former Prophets within the Jewish canon, and the Historical Books from a Christian point of view, have a complex textual history in both Hebrew and Greek. Natalio Fernández Marcos (Chapter 13) believes that Joshua was translated early, after the Pentateuch, noting that the book is a little shorter than in its Hebrew Masoretic version. However, although LXX Judges appears in two different forms in the oldest manuscript tradition, a single translation seems to underlie both, and goes back to a form of Hebrew close to the Masoretic Text (MT). The Books of Samuel, examined by Anneli Aejmelaeus in Chapter 14, are treated by LXX tradition as part of a four-book group covering 1 Samuel to 2 Kings known as 1–4 Kingdoms or Reigns. The challenge in the LXX manuscripts of Samuel, as also in Kings, is to find the original Greek rendering (Old Greek, OG) of the translator behind the layers of revision and recension in the manuscript tradition, especially the Hebraizing activity termed Kaige and the stylistic changes found in manuscripts and quotations associated with the region of Antioch and sometimes attributed to Lucian. However, there are clear differences in the lexical equiva lents used by the original translator compared with the vocabulary used not only by the Kaige revisers but also with that of books apparently translated later than Samuel. Recovering the OG enables us to perceive developments in the older Hebrew textual tradition as well. Similar issues affect the study of LXX 1–2 Kings (3–4 Kingdoms): in Chapter 15, Andrés Piquer Otero, Pablo Torijano, Timo Tekoniemi, and Tuukka Kauhanen discuss evidence for the probable history of the literary development of those books in Hebrew and Greek. The books of Chronicles in Hebrew have a complicated relationship with Samuel and Kings, and their LXX version, Paralipomena or 'things omitted', only serves to increase the difficulty. Laurence Vianès sets out the main issues (Chapter 16), and highlights that not only does the end of 2 Paralipomena also coincide to a large

extent with chapters 1–2 of Greek 1 Esdras, because at that point they each translate very similar Hebrew texts, but those same chapters also show influence from 4 Kgdms 23–4. The pattern of divergences and parallels between LXX Kingdoms and Paralipomena is not easy to unravel. Unusually among the LXX translations, Paralipomena may have originated in Palestine.

Among the Prophetic books, the Septuagint version of Isaiah has provoked the most scholarly discussion in recent decades. Highly influential among New Testament and appreciated by patristic authors, the Greek rendering is often attractive yet may diverge considerably from what we would consider to be the meaning of the Masoretic Hebrew text. Rodrigo de Sousa (Chapter 17) sets out the debates over whether the translator was 'actualizing' the message of Isaiah for his contemporary community in Alexandria, or grappling with a Hebrew text beyond his capabilities. De Sousa argues for caution in detecting consistent theological exegesis in the translation, but stresses that the translator was intent on communicating meaning to his community in his translation. The issues in Jeremiah are quite different (Chapter 18): as recognized even in antiquity, the book exists in a long Hebrew form (MT) and a short LXX form, with differences in the order of chapters. Furthermore, the book of Baruch is appended to Jeremiah in the manu script tradition. Matthieu Richelle agrees with a number of other scholars that the two forms of Jeremiah must reflect two literary editions, with the Greek text reflecting an earlier Hebrew version, but he disputes the notion that differences between the first and second halves of LXX Jeremiah are due to two different translators or revisers. As for Baruch, it is unclear whether the whole or a part of it is a translation of a lost Hebrew original, as opposed to a composition in 'Septuagintal' style. In Chapter 19 Katrin Hauspie surveys the development of scholarship on LXX Ezekiel over the course of the past hundred years, noting how the publication of the pre-hexaplaric Papyrus 967 has revolutionized perception of the book's origins, even though critical editions still give it only a 'marginal' place. Like Jeremiah, Ezekiel probably existed in variant literary edi-tions. The newest line of approach has been the application of Skopostheorie to the difficult issues in the last nine chapters. This method, along with further investigation into the vexed question of divine names, may be usefully directed towards the rest of the book in future. Daniel is not considered among the Prophetic books in the Hebrew canon of Scripture. However, the book and the associated tales of Susanna and Bel and the Dragon, along with extra material within Daniel itself, are part of the Greek tradition, but represented by two different translations. These are referred to 'Septuagint Daniel' (Dan-o') and 'Theodotion Daniel' (Dan-B'). Olivier Munnich (Chapter 20) demonstrates the importance of Papyrus 967 for the study of Daniel also. He also considers the problem of the differences between MT and Theodotion Daniel, and the question of the order of the deuterocanonical additions. He concludes that along with the Qumran fragments of Danielic material, both Greek forms provide information about the literary evolution of the Hebrew and Aramaic text of the book. In Chapter 21 Cécile Dogniez describes the nature of the Old Greek translation of the Twelve Minor Prophets, which was probably carried out by a single translator in Alexandria sometime after that of Isaiah. The style of the rendering varies between literalism and freedom, perhaps because of the difficulty of the underlying Hebrew coupled with the desire to offer readers a degree of eloquence in translation. The discovery at Nah^al H^ever in 1952 of a scroll of the Twelve Minor Prophets containing a Hebraizing version of the LXX Minor Prophets led to Dominique Barthélemy's groundbreaking theory that a revision of this nature preceded the work of the second-century ce translator Aquila. Features of this isomorphic 'Kaige' recension may be seen not only in this Dead Sea text but also in the manuscript tradition of some other books.

Chapter 22 focuses on the corpus of short books known in Judaism as the five Megillot, or Scrolls, and associated with festivals in the Jewish calendar: Ruth, Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth), Lamentations, and Esther. As Robert Hiebert points out, in their Septuagint Greek form the first four often have features in common with the Kaige recension. However, OG Esther incorporates sections not found in MT Esther, and there is a further Greek Esther text known as the Alpha-Text:

the precise relationship of OG Esther and this Alpha-Text remains obscure. The Septuagint Psalter has been particularly influential in Christian liturgy and devotion, as attested by the huge number of manuscripts containing it. Staffan Olofsson (Chapter 23) notes the debates over an Egyptian versus a Palestinian provenance, over a liturgical versus educational origin for the translation, and over the possible presence of Kaige elements in the translation. Olofsson argues that in the last case, the influence goes the other way, with vocabulary from the LXX Psalm translation being adopted by later Hebraizing revisers of other books. Another issue is the position of those who believe that the LXX Psalter was designed from the outset to be treated in an 'interlinear' manner, effectively as a crib to the Hebrew and to be understood only in the light of the meaning of the original, never having been designed to be read independently of its source text. While agreeing that the general tendency in the LXX Psalter is towards literal renderings, Olofsson notes that it also has non-literal traits. The Septuagint of Proverbs is a very different prop osition as a translation. Lorenzo Cuppi (Chapter 24) lists the many features that conspire to make this a peculiarly difficult text to pin down. It has free renderings and additions, double translations, and different ordering of sections and chapters, all of which render the editor's task particularly challenging. The Hebrew Vorlage may also have differed from MT Proverbs. However, there are also intriguing renderings suggestive of the translator's cultural ambience in second-century bce Alexandria. In the case of the book of Job (Maria Gorea in Chapter 25) we have two much clearer layers: there is the Old Greek rendering of its difficult Hebrew poetic text, which it has effectively abridged or summarized in many places, often ducking the more problematic theological ideas of the Hebrew book, plus the supplementation with wording supplied from 'Theodotion' by Origen, marked in the best witnesses by asterisks. The hybridity of the resulting text must have been puzzling for readers since it combined stylish and more literary Greek with Hebraizing renderings. In Chapter 26 Alison Salvesen surveys the miscellaneous books labelled 'deuterocanonical' or 'apocryphal'. These were Jewish in origin, and either compositions in Greek or translated from a lost Semitic Vorlage. They were adopted by Christians as further religious literature, even though their status was lower than that of the canonical works or even disputed as worthy of consideration.

Part IV examines the Septuagint in its Jewish context, starting with the two most important Jewish authors writing in Greek, Philo of Alexandria and Flavius Josephus. Their use of forms of the Septuagint text indicates its acceptance as Jewish Scripture in both Egypt and Palestine. As is well known, Philo's primary interest was the Pentateuch, whereas Josephus's interest in historiography meant that he focused on narrative. Sarah Pearce (Chapter 27) reviews Philo's treatment of the LXX Pentateuch in his works, his citation practice, the account he gives of the origin of the Pentateuch translation, and his high view of the Torah in Greek. Finally she discusses the question of how much Hebrew he would have known. In Chapter 28 Tessa Rajak establishes the significance of the Greek Bible for Josephus, especially in view of his sound knowledge of both Hebrew and

Aramaic, and discusses recent scholarship on the type of Greek text that he knew. Taking examples from the Tabernacle account in Exodus, the stories of Samuel and Esther, she concludes that Josephus used the Greek Scriptures as 'a literary springboard' but that the Hebrew text remains 'a tantalizing presence' in his works. His largely faithful retelling of the Letter of Aristeas implies a precedent for his own reworking of biblical narrative. In Chapter 29 Eugene Ulrich notes how the discovery of the scrolls from the Dead Sea region in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized biblical studies. It has raised the possibility of variant Hebrew Vorlagen and alternative literary editions behind the Septuagint translations. In addition to the scriptural texts in Hebrew, a handful of small fragments of Greek versions of the Pentateuch were also found in Qumran Caves 4 and 7, along with the scroll of the Minor Prophets at Nah^al H^ever containing a revision of the Old Greek text. As the earliest, and non-Christian, witnesses to Greek renderings of Scripture, these have all been highly significant for our knowledge of the early history of the Septuagint. As the Nah^al H^ever text of the Twelve Minor Prophets reveals, dissatisfaction with the original form of the

Septuagint translations set in early, with revisional activity taking place even before the Common Era. Such activity, which aimed to make the Greek translation of Scripture conform more closely still to the wording and current interpretation of the emerging Hebrew standard text, continued to at least the end of the second century ce. In Chapter 30, Siegfried Kreuzer discusses the nature of what has been termed the Kaige recension, how it may be identified in various texts by its more literal and Hebraizing renderings, and its likely relationship to the version known as Theodotion. Until the identification of the Kaige recension, Aquila's work was con-sidered to be the first radical attempt to modify the Greek text. Even though this has been disproved, Aquila's work is important in other ways, not least stylistically and lexicographically as well as for its long-term influence on later Jewish Greek interpretation of Scripture. In Chapter 31 Giuseppe Veltri and Alison Salvesen review Christian patristic and rabbinic Jewish attitudes towards Aquila's version, and the surviving evidence for it. Another reviser, Symmachus, is often called the freest translator, yet his work is demonstrably close to the standardized Hebrew text. Thus, while he certainly issues a more stylistically impressive Greek text, he stands in the same stream of revision that sought conformity to the Hebrew. Michaël van der Meer (Chapter 32) explores the motivation behind his version, and what we may know of the translator's religious affiliation, identity, and political outlook. Further revisions were included in Origen's Hexapla, though the names of their revisers are unknown. Their versions, however, have been recognized for their importance in the text history of several books. In Chapter 33, Bradley Marsh, Jr. examines what is known about the versions known as Quinta, Sexta, and Septima ('Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh'), perhaps from their position in the columns of the Hexapla. Bradley Marsh also looks at the phenomenon of the Greek version of the Samaritan Pentateuch (Chapter 34), evidence for which is preserved almost exclusively by Christian sources. Finally, although the Septuagint's influence in Jewish circles faded over time, conceptually it enjoyed an afterlife, in the continuing need for Greek renderings and glosses for the Hebrew Bible, as evidenced by manuscripts and fragments discovered in the Cairo Geniza. In Chapter 35 Julia Krivoruchko surveys this afterlife of Greek biblical texts in Byzantine and medieval Jewish communities, into the Constantinople Pentateuch and beyond.

Part V moves on to the reception of the Septuagint as Christian Scripture. The obvious starting point is the use of citations from Greek Scripture by New Testament writers, surveyed by David Lincicum in Chapter 36. He points out that the New Testament 'supplies a unique window into the shifting state of the Greek text in the first century', and a 'key stage' in the process of appropriation of the Septuagint as the Christian Old Testament. As time went on, educated Christians found it more difficult to defend the Greek style of the Septuagint, and textual witnesses originating from the region of Antioch may display stylistic adjustments. The character of the Greek version apparently edited by Lucian in Antioch at the end of the third century ce is one of the most significant and contentious issues in current research. It has been argued that the oldest readings in the Greek tradition may be found in Antiochian witnesses to the Kaige sections of 1–4 Kingdoms; these would then predate the historical Lucian and approximate to the Old Greek. Untangling the layers of the Antiochian text has proven difficult, as Tuukka Kauhanen explains in Chapter 37. Another direction for revision among early Christian scholars was that of Origen of Caesarea, whose massive work of biblical scholarship known as the Hexapla is responsible for preserving much of what we know of the ancient Jewish revisions. However, little survives of the version, and there has been a great deal of debate about several aspects of Origen's textual work, including its precise format, as Peter Gentry details in Chapter 38. Gentry sets out the patristic testimonies about the Hexapla, and also provides translations of several colophons of manuscripts containing texts ultimately deriving from Origen and his successors in Caesarea. John Lee's contribution (Chapter 39) focuses on the liturgy of the Greek Orthodox Church. Being full of allusions to Scripture, the liturgy is steeped in the language of both the Septuagint and the Greek New Testament. Lee notes many instances of vocabulary derived from LXX sources, demonstrating the Septuagint's profound influence on early

Christian spirituality as well as theology, from antiquity to the present. Questions remain, however, about how the liturgy relates to or derives from synagogue practice in the earliest period, and especially regarding the central role of the Psalms in Christian worship. Following on from this, Reinhart Ceulemans (Chapter 40) looks at the way in which the Septuagint profoundly shaped patristic and Byzantine Christianity, an influence seen not only through the vast literature of Greek biblical exegesis, but in a wide variety of other texts, documents, amulets, buildings, and ceremonies. Ceulemans explains the nature of various forms of exegesis, including commentaries, homilies, synopses, and catenae, the last being one of the most understudied areas of research on the LXX. Catenae often contain fragments from earlier, lost commentaries, so work in this area is throwing fresh light on the entire tradition. The Septuagint was also enormously influential in Latin Christianity, being rendered into Latin very early, as described by Michael Graves (Chapter 41). Revisions took place in the third and fourth centuries, and were even undertaken by Jerome before dissatisfaction with translating a translation led him to return to the 'Hebrew Truth' for what became the Vulgate Old Testament. However, the Old Latin version remained very popular for a long time, and both Augustine and Jerome used it for their commentaries.

Part VI concerns the Septuagint in its many translated forms, starting with the ancient 'daughter' versions. The first of these was the Vetus Latina or Old Latin (VL), mentioned already above. Chapter 42, Pierre-Maurice Bogaert's detailed overview, explains the nature of this version and the challenges in using it. The early date of the Vetus Latina makes it highly significant for reconstructing a possibly older form of the Septuagint that predates much revisional activity, and it may even hint at the existence of variant literary editions in Hebrew. However, the origins of the VL are shrouded in mystery and due to the success of Jerome's iuxta Hebraeos version, it is poorly preserved. Bogaert notes its importance for the textual history of the books of Exodus, Jeremiah, Daniel, and Proverbs in particular. Pablo Torijano provides a survey of the Armenian, Georgian, and Church Slavonic translations (Chapter 43). These 'represent the first works of their national literatures and caused the invention of their respective scripts', allowing access to the Christian Bible for the Caucasus and the Slav peoples. However, it has proved difficult to create modern critical editions of each of them. In Chapter 44 Marketta Liljeström discusses the version known as the Syrohexapla, dating from the early seventh century. Although the Syriac churches already possessed the Old Testament books rendered directly from Hebrew since the beginning of the third century, the Syrohexapla represents part of a theological and translational movement that looked to Greek sources. Uniquely, it is largely but not entirely dependent upon the Hexaplaric manu scripts deriving from Origen's Hexapla, and preserves many of Origen's critical signs. Its marginal notes give many readings from Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. The 'mirror-translation' nature of the Syrohexapla makes it especially valuable for discovering the nature of Origen's textual work. Chapter 45 (Andrés Piquer Otero) sets out the main issues involving the study of three other daughter versions of the Septuagint: Coptic, Arabic, and Ethiopic. The situation with Coptic is complicated by the existence and influence of different dialects, principally but not exclusively Sahidic and Bohairic. Arabic renderings of the Septuagint were used by Christian communities whose vernacular was Arabic and who sometimes used Greek letters to write the language, but other Arabic versions of Old Testament Scripture based on Syriac or Hebrew also circu-lated. In the case of Ethiopic, the Septuagint was rendered only into Ge'ez, but the wit-nesses are hard to date and also tend to be comparatively late. Much more recently, different teams of scholars have translated the Septuagint into several major modern languages including English, German, French, and Italian. Eberhard Bons (Chapter 46) compares the various approaches taken by these large-scale projects, and notes the difficulties involved in translating a text that is itself a translation.

Part VII takes a wider look at the significance of the Septuagint, principally for biblical studies and theology, but also for art history. In Chapter 47 Bénédicte Lemmelijn reflects on the changing role of the Septuagint for biblical textual criticism: from a tool to help establish a single Urtext, with the

LXX as 'handmaid' to the Hebrew, to become in the post-Qumran period a witness of scribal and editorial activity indicating textual plurality. In the case of the New Testament, Ross Wagner (Chapter 48) demonstrates that the Septuagint is vital for understanding both religious terminology and investigating the pluriformity of scriptural texts in the first century ce. In Chapter 49 John Barton discusses the implications of the Septuagint for Christian theology more broadly, singling out some areas for further reflection. These include the lack of a fixed and stable text of the Septuagint; the problem of what a canon of the LXX corpus would consist of, and how this could be seen as a single entity for the purposes of an overarching in terpret ation; whether it is desirable or possible to attempt a 'Theology of the LXX'; and the possibility of seeing both LXX and MT as canonical or at least authoritative. Finally, Maja Kominko (Chapter 50) shows how image and text work together in illustrated manuscripts of the Septuagint, sometimes drawing on extra-biblical or non-canonical elements, and providing visual exegesis of the Bible.

The present volume should be seen as complementary to other projects, especially to the series La Bible d'Alexandrie, the New English Translation of the Septuagint, the two-volume commentary Septuaginta Deutsch: Erläuterungen und Kommentare, the Septuagint Commentary Series, and most especially to the exceptional and ongoing text ual work of the Göttingen Septuaginta Unternehmen. The contributions in this Oxford Handbook owe a great deal to all of these, and they will be referred to many times in the following pages. Other important projects were published during the extended period this volume took to appear, among them the first volumes of the Handbuch zur Septuaginta series edited by Martin Karrer, Wolfgang, Kraus, Siegfried Kreuzer, and others; the T&T Clark Companion to the Septuagint edited by James Aitken; Brill's Textual History of the Bible edited by Armin Lange and Emanuel Tov. It therefore proved difficult to incorporate many references to them throughout the volume without delaying its submission to the Press even further. The reader is strongly encouraged to consult these works alongside the present one. <>

Essay: PHILO AND THE SEPTUAGINT by Sarah J. K. Pearce

Philo of Alexandria (c.20 bce—c.50 ce) is the most prolific and influential commentator on the Greek Bible known to us from Jewish antiquity.1 A member of a powerful and wealthy Jewish family, Philo included in his family circle high-ranking members of the Roman administration in Egypt with close ties to Agrippa I, king of Judea. Of Philo's public life, the only recorded episode concerns his leadership of an embassy to Gaius Caligula (c.39/40 ce) to defend the rights of Jews to observe their ancestral customs in Alexandria, free from persecution. This was a dangerous time to be an Alexandrian Jew; Philo's own account of events, presented in two treatises (Against Flaccus and The Embassy to Gaius; van der Horst 2003; Smallwood 1961), makes clear the existential threat to the Jewish community and Philo's absolute commitment to its preservation (on Philo's Judaism, see Birnbaum 1996; 2006). Half a century on, the Jewish–Greek historian Josephus would recall, with great admiration, Philo's distinguished role in this context (Ant. 18. 259–60; on Philo's life and context, see Schwartz 2009). Otherwise, what Philo reveals of himself through his works is his passionate devotion to studying the books of Moses—in the form of the Greek Torah—and to understanding and revealing their hidden treasures (cf. Spec. 3.1–6). Educated to the highest level in the Hellenistic school subjects and immersed in the Greek philosophy of his day, Philo represents a dazzling display of Greek learning put to the service of promoting the 'philosophy' of Moses as the highest expression of wisdom and virtue and the most perfect guide to the knowledge of God.

By the standards of his time, Philo was a very productive author. Around fifty of his treatises are extant, preserved in the original Greek or in late antique translations (Classical Armenian and Latin); as many as twenty-five additional works by Philo seem to have been lost in antiquity. All Philo's works were composed in Greek, which he describes as 'our language (8ta'AEKTov)' (Congr. 44; cf.

Conf. 129). His own Greek style is faultless, 'a fluent Hellenistic Greek with slight atticizing tendencies' (Runia 1986: 35; cf. Siegert 1996: 164). In terms of vocabulary, Philo's range is very extensive. Like the LXX translators, Philo is the author of numerous neologisms ('verba Philonica'); his creative approach to language includes the updating of LXX terms to reflect the contemporary context, for example on idol language (cf. Pearce 2013).

In a number of treatises the focus is on philosophical topics or contemporary events; while these works present relatively few scriptural citations, they are not without inter-est for LXX studies, supplying rich resources for Philo's development of fundamental themes based on scriptural sources and for accounts of the central place of the Torah in the life of contemporary Jewish communities (Aet.; Anim.; Contempl.; Flacc.; Legat.; Prob.; Prov. 1–2). As for works dealing directly with the interpretation of Scripture, Philo treats a wide range of Torah traditions in his two-volume Life of Moses, including an account of the origins of the Greek Torah (McGing 2006), while the fragmentary Hypothetica offers an overtly apologetic presentation of topics including the Exodus, the conquest of the land, and the laws of Moses (Sterling 1990). Yet the greatest part of the Philonic corpus (more than 75 per cent) belongs to three commentary series on the Greek Torah: the Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus; the Allegorical Commentary; and the Exposition of the Law (for detailed summaries of Philo's works, see Morris 1987; Royse 2009).

Taken together, Philo's commentaries include thousands of scriptural citations and allusions and represent a fundamental witness to the text of the Greek Torah. Philo's interpretations depend exclusively on the LXX text, signalling his confidence in even the most peculiar elements of the translation as sources of profound truth for those who know how to look for them correctly (Arnaldez 1984; Siegert 1996: 182–7). On the basis of these works, it may properly be said that 'With Philo, we have for the first time a sus-tained interpretation of the LXX' (Dines 2004: 141). With Philo, furthermore, we have a remarkable range of approaches to Scripture, exemplified in particular by the different methods of interpretation employed in the three great commentary series (Borgen 1997).

Philo's Commentaries on the Greek Torah

Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus (QGE)

Philo's work Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus (QGE) is the earliest known example of a sustained sequence of commentaries in the form of questions and answers on books of the Torah. The formal approach of QGE continues a long-established Greek genre of commentaries in the form of 'Problems and Solutions', designed to explain Homeric poetry, particularly in the light of philosophical doctrines. In QGE, Philo begins each commentary with a quotation of the Greek Torah text, followed by a brief question about why the text is as it is or what it means. Philo's questions deal with a range of problems, including apparent inconsistencies in the Torah text, surprising omissions or sequences in the narrative, and unacceptable interpretations. In his solutions to ques-tions posed by the Torah, Philo typically presents literal explanations of the text fol-lowed by symbolic or allegorical interpretations. While his answers imply the usefulness of the literal interpretation, Philo's treatment of the non-literal, 'deeper' meaning in QGE is relatively much fuller, often involving discussions of the ethical, psychological, and spiritual significance of a text, or extensive treatment of the symbolism of numbers in specific passages. Whatever the problems posed, Philo uses the answers to demonstrate the perfection of the words articulated in the (Greek) Torah text.

Philo's QGE seems originally to have comprised six books on Genesis and six books on Exodus (Royse 1976–7; 2001). The series survives primarily in a sixth-century Armenian translation, which transmits, incompletely, the six books on Genesis (numbered as four in the Armenian) and fragments of the six books on Exodus (in two books in the Armenian). There is no modern critical

edition of the Armenian text. The standard text remains that of Aucher 1826. (Modern translations of QGE: Marcus 1953; Mercier 1979; Mercier and Petit 1984; Terian 1992.)

QGE is also partially attested by several hundred Greek fragments preserved in Christian sources. The principal sources for these Philonic fragments are the remains of compilations of commentaries on sacred texts included in the Catenae; the Epitome of Procopius of Gaza; and the Sacra Parallela. The fragments confirm the generally literal character of the Armenian version and its important role in reconstructing the under-lying Greek (Petit 1978; Paramelle 1984; Royse 1984; 1991). Also in Greek, MS Vaticanus gr. 379 preserves the continuous text of QE 2.62–8 (critical edition: Royse 2012; for translation and discussion: Runia 2004). A Latin version (late fourth-century) represents the final book of QG, including material absent from the Armenian, from which three Greek fragments are known (Petit 1973).

Overall, the extant evidence transmits questions and answers on Gen. 2:4b–28:9 and Exod. 6:2–17:16; 20:25b–30:10. The significance of this material for LXX studies is relatively neglected, perhaps not surprisingly in view of the challenges posed by a corpus that survives largely in translation (for a valuable collection of studies on QGE: Hay 1991). Regrettably, the Greek fragments often lack the scriptural citation to be interpreted. For the most part, our knowledge of the Torah text in QGE must be based on the Armenian version, including significant variations from the standard LXX text which, in view of the literalism of the Armenian, are likely to have stood in the translator's Greek original. Substantial agreements in structure between QGE and later divisions of the Torah text into portions for the service of the synagogue suggest that Philo's questions and answers may have been inspired by the communal reading practices of Alexandrian Jewry (Royse 1976–7; 2001).

The Allegorical Commentary

Philo's longest and most complex commentary series is known to modern scholars as the Allegorical Commentary, echoing the ancient title of The Allegories of the Laws, which Philo himself is said to have given to the first three books of the series (Eusebius, H.E. 2.18.1; cf. Morris 1987: 830n53). Both titles reflect the overwhelming orientation of this commentary series towards the allegorical interpretation of Scripture. While Philo aims to uphold the validity of both literal and allegorical readings (cf. Migr. 86–93), the Allegorical Commentary is fundamentally concerned with the use of allegorical techniques to unlock the truths within Scripture. Allegory, states Philo, is 'the method dear to men with their eyes opened' (Plant. 36); to read in this way is to look beneath the surface of the written words of Moses and to be able to see in the terms of 'outward nature' the deeper reality that these words represent (Leg. 2.5). In this approach, the Greek Torah becomes a guide to the soul's migration, expressed primarily in Platonic categories, from the world of the body to the realm of the soul (Nikiprowetzky 1977: 239; Runia 1990: 1–18).

Nineteen books of the Allegorical Commentary are extant (counting books by their original extent), including one book represented only by the Armenian fragment of De Deo (Leg. 1–2; Leg. 3; Cher., Sacr., Det., Post., Gig–Deus, Agr., Plant., Ebr., Sobr.– Conf. [cf. Royse 2009: 42], Migr., Her., Congr., Fug., Mut., De Deo, Somn. 1, Somn. 2). Internal and external evidence points to the existence within the original commentary series of at least twelve more books, now lost, perhaps beginning with a commentary on Gen. 1:1 (Tobin 2000). What remains provides an extensive sequence of books giving running commentaries on verses from Greek Gen. 2:1–18:2 and other texts on the subject of dreams from the Jacob and Joseph cycles (Genesis chs. 28, 31, 37, 40–1).

In most treatises of the Allegorical Commentary, Philo's interpretation proceeds on a verse-by-verse basis (e.g. Leg. 1–3 on Gen. 2:1–3:19); in a few others, Philo takes a more thematic approach, based on a single verse (e.g. Agr. and Plant. on Gen. 9:20) (Runia 2013: 6–7). The basic structure of the Allegorical Commentary, like that of QGE, consists of citations of scriptural verses, followed by reflections on specific words or phrases in the text, in which the interpretation is based on

questions and problems (explicit or implicit) arising from details of the primary text. In the Allegorical Commentary, however, Philo typically constructs the interpretation of the primary text by introducing other scriptural texts which he links verbally or thematically to the primary text; these other, secondary texts are also cited and interpreted, leading to the creation of a complex exegetical chain that takes the reader back to the primary lemma. As a result, the Allegorical Commentary represents a rich resource of scriptural citations and is a key witness, in particular, to the Greek text of Genesis and other books of Jewish Scripture.

The complex character of the Allegorical Commentary suggests to many an intended readership of advanced scholars, familiar with Scripture and educated in advanced techniques of allegorical exegesis (Runia 2013: 7). A glimpse of this kind of activity is conveyed in Philo's description of the ascetic Therapeutae of the Alexandrian countryside (Contempl. 29, 78) (combining a communal setting with the meditative practice of the individual).

The Exposition of the Law

The Exposition of the Law (the title of the series as a whole derives from modern scholarship) is the most fully preserved of all Philo's exegetical works, with ten books extant: Opif., Abr., Ios., Decal., Spec. 1–4, Virt., Praem. At least two further books appear to have been lost in antiquity, since Philo mentions lives of Isaac and Jacob in Ios.1.

In contrast to QGE and the Allegorical Commentary, which restrict the primary text for commentary to parts of Genesis and Exodus, the Exposition of the Law aims to provide a systematic account of the Torah as a whole, from Genesis to the end of Deuteronomy. Philo's own descriptions of the structure of this series explain its or ganiza tion into distinct types or parts. In the most complete version of such descriptions, which Philo gives in the final book of the Exposition (Praem. 1–3; cf. the similar account in Abr. 2–5), he explains that 'the oracles of Moses' (i.e. the content of the Torah) consist of the following kinds: the 'making of the cosmos' (Opif.); the 'historical', concerning the lives of the ancestors (Abr. and Ios.); and the 'legislative', dealing with the laws of the Torah (Decal.-Praem.). (In Mos. 2.45–51, Philo divides the Torah into two parts: the historical (creation and the lives of the ancestors) and the commands and prohibitions; in that context, he is concerned primarily with explaining the reason behind Moses's arrangement of the Torah, in which he puts the historical material before the laws.)

The 'legislative' section includes the 'Ten Words', which, according to Philo, were given directly by God, and which function as comprehensive 'headings' for the 'specific laws' (Praem. 2),For that is, the laws of the Torah givenDistribution through Moses (Decal. -Spec. 1–4). The 'legislative' material continues with a discussion of Mosaic laws under the headings of particular virtues (Virt.) and concludes, following the model of the Torah, with an exposition of the punishments and rewards for transgression or observance of the laws (Praem.).

As Philo repeatedly emphasizes, a fundamental aim in the books of the Exposition is to provide the fullest possible investigation of the words of Scripture (on the importance of 'accuracy' (aKPt'PEta) see e.g. Abr. 2; Decal. 1, 52. This approach includes the use of symbolical or allegorical interpretation, though allegorical exegesis does not dom in ate the Exposition as it does QGE and the Allegorical Commentary (on the importance of using allegorical interpretation to reveal 'the hidden meaning' of the laws, see Decal.1. For examples of sustained allegorical interpretation in the Exposition, cf. Opif. 157–66, Abr. 60–106, Spec. 1.327–45).

The most fundamental difference between the Exposition and Philo's other commentary series concerns the presentation of the scriptural text. In contrast with the juxtaposing of scriptural quotation with interpretation in QGE and the Allegorical Commentary, Philo rarely cites from Scripture in the Exposition. Instead, the standard practice used in the Exposition is to summarize a

narrative or law and to reflect on themes and questions arising from the summary. In this rewriting of Scripture, Philo takes over words and phrases from the LXX and makes them part of his own version of the Torah (Runia 2001a: 10–21).

On the Life of Moses (De Vita Mosis 1–2)

Philo's two-volume work on Moses is written with the explicit aim of promoting knowledge of Moses in a world in which the majority of people, as Philo insists, remain ig norant of the life and achievements of 'this greatest and most perfect of men' (Mos. 1.1), even if the laws of Moses are (allegedly) well known and admired. This overtly apologetic work assumes readers with little knowledge of Jewish tradition but who might be inspired by the example of Moses to look further into his philosophy.

The relationship of Philo's Moses to the Exposition remains a matter of debate. Philo refers in the Exposition to his two treatises on Moses, but he does not include these books within his plans for the content of the Exposition itself (Virt. 52; cf. Praem. 53. See further Morris 1987: 854–5; Sterling 2012: 422–3). The treatises perhaps functioned as a philosophical introduction to the Exposition as a whole. Book 1 develops the theme of Moses's sovereignty as a divine reward, reading the narratives of Exodus–Deuteronomy as the story of Moses's actions as king; Book 2 is a study of those powers possessed by Moses 'as the most fitting accompaniments of his kingship', which Philo treats systematically under the headings of lawgiving, high priesthood, and prophecy, drawing on a wide range of material in the Torah (Mos. 1.334).

As in the Exposition, citations of Scripture are relatively rare, but the influence of the LXX is strong. Philo appropriates or alludes to LXX words and phrases in his construction of the life and teachings of Moses. Thus, for example, Philo expands Scripture's minimal account of Moses's youth by stating that 'the child from his birth had an appearance of more than ordinary goodliness Mos 1.9; cf. LXX Exod. 2:2,'; or he commends the accuracy of LXX language as applied to Pharaoh's overseers, 'men whose name of "task-pursuer" well described the facts' (Mos. 1.37; cf. LXX Exod. 3:7, etc.).

Philo's Bible

All of Philo's writings include references to the words and themes of Scripture. This is true even of the philosophical work De animalibus, a treatise with no citations from Scripture but in which 'the Mosaic treatment of animals must be considered as the determining factor in moulding [Philo's] thought' (Terian 1981: 46). The vast majority (c.95 per cent) of his scriptural citations or allusions are from the Torah, with the greatest concentration of these from Genesis chs. 1–25, reflecting the subject matter of Philo's commentaries. Philo also cites verses from the historical, prophetic, and poetic writings of the Greek Bible corpus; around half of Philo's citations from these books are from the Psalms (on which see Runia 2001b). There is no evidence in Philo's works of citations from the books of the Apocrypha (for possible allusions to Wisdom and Sirach in Philo's works see Allenbach et al. 1982: 90–1). His citation practice makes strikingly clear Philo's overwhelming focus on the books of Moses and his reverence for the superlative authority of their author. Nevertheless, he also praises other prophets as inspired (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Samuel, and the author of the Psalms), and refers to specific books outside the Torah as 'sacred' (Hypoth. 6.5 referring to Joshua; Ebr. 143 referring to 1 Kingdoms).

By Philo's time, a three-part division of Jewish sacred books is attested in the Egyptian-based author of the Prologue to Sirach (the Law, the Prophets, and other ancestral books). But Philo nowhere indicates that he thinks in exactly the same terms about Scripture. The closest he comes to a similar formulation is in his description of the practice of the ascetic Jewish community of Therapeutae, based outside Alexandria, who are said to devote themselves to contemplation of the 'laws and

oracles delivered through the mouth of prophets, and psalms and the other [writings] (^^ ^^^^) which foster and perfect knowledge and piety' (Contempl. 25).

Philo uses no special terminology to distinguish the Greek translation of the books of Moses from the Hebrew original ('the laws in the Chaldean tongue') (Mos. 2.26). In contrast to the standard use of (= tõrâ) in LXX, Philo employs a variety of terms to designate Mosaic teaching: as sacred writing(s) ; sacred book(s) or records (^^^^^^ or ^^^^^^); law(s) (^^^^) or legislation (^^^^^^^^), word(s) (^^^^^), and oracle(s) (^^^^^^^/^^^^^^) (Burkhardt 1988: 73–125).

Philo represents our earliest witness to the LXX titles of Mosaic books, designating their subject matter: 'Genesis' (Post. 127; Abr. 1; Aet. 19; possibly, Sobr. 50); 'Levitikon' (Leg. 2.105; Plant. 26; Her. 251); 'Deuteronomion' (Leg. 3.174; Deus 50). His titles do not always agree with LXX tradition. Instead of LXX Exodos, transmitted in Christian sources, Philo uses the non-LXX term Exagõgë, a title already known to Aristoboulos and Ezekiel the Tragedian (Migr. 14; Her. 14, 251; Somn. 1.117: see also manuscripts of QE [Royse 2012: 4–5; Royse 2016: 54–5]). Deuteronomy is also known by other, non-LXX names in Philo: the Epinomis ('Appendix'), imitating Platonic tradition (Her. 162, 250; Spec. 4.160, 164), the Proptreptikoi ('Exhortations') (Agr. 78, 172; Fug. 142, 170; Mut. 42, 236; Virt. 47), and the Paraineseis ('Addresses') (Agr. 84; Spec. 4.131). Titles of other scriptural books cited by Philo are close if not always identical to their LXX equivalents: 'the book of Judgements (LXX, 'Judges') (Conf. 128); 'the books of Kingdoms', as in the LXX, or 'royal books (^^)' (Deus 6, 136; Conf. 149); 'Hymns ()' (LXX) (Conf. 52 and many other examples including other terms derived from ^^^^^; see further Runia 2001b: 104–9); and 'Proverbs (^^^^^^^^)', following the LXX (Ebr. 84).

Philo's Biblical Text and its Transmission

Philo's citations of Scripture mostly reflect the LXX as represented in Codex Vaticanus. But the question of exactly what was Philo's biblical text is difficult if not impossible to pin down, for several reasons:

1) Some minor differences between Philo's citations and the standard LXX reflect the variety of the LXX texts of his time; in cases where Philo's scriptural citations have no known parallel in later LXX tradition, the Philonic reading may some-times preserve the original LXX.

2) Philo's creative approach to his text often involves minor alterations in style, substance (omissions and additions), and grammatical construction to the words of LXX; this process generates variants that are usually without parallel in the LXX tradition. Such modifications are not difficult to find in the citations of QGE and the Allegorical Commentary. In the Exposition and the independent scriptural treatises, however, Philo's mode of recasting the words of Scripture, with relatively few substantial citations, means that it is often impossible to determine whether particular words and phrases reflect his LXX text or his own construction of what he reads or remembers of it (Borgen 1992: 336).

3) The transmission history of Philo's works creates a major challenge: to what extent do our Philo manuscripts reflect Philo's own words and how far, in particular, have his original scriptural citations been altered in the process of transmission? The Greek text of Philo's works is transmitted directly in more than 150 medieval MSS (ninth–fifteenth centuries), comprising a substantial number of distinct text families. Based on the findings of the team behind the editio princeps (Cohn et al. 1896–1930), the textual tradition may be traced back via Byzantine scribes to copies of Philo's works made in the fourth century for the episcopal library of Caesarea. According to the best hypothesis, those copies were based on scrolls from Origen's library, brought from Alexandria to Caesarea in the third century (Barthélemy 1967; Runia 1993: 16–31; 2009: 215–21). It is not unreasonable to think that Origen's collection included autograph copies of Philo's works. But the sheer distance in time

between the earliest manuscripts and Philo's day, together with the diversity of the manuscript tradition, necessarily limits the extent to which we may reliably reconstruct Philo's original words. Our ability to check the medieval manuscripts against texts independent of the Caesarean collection is strengthened by two important papyrus codices from third-century Egypt (from Coptos and Oxyrhynchos respectively), supplying a valuable source of superior readings and of new evidence where gaps exist in the later manuscript tradition (Runia 2002). Crucially, the papyri often agree with the LXX version of Philo's scriptural citations where later Philonic manuscripts may differ from the LXX. It should be noted that only the evidence from the Coptos Papyrus was available for inclusion in the editio princeps (on various aspects of the Coptos Papyrus, see Royse 2016); a new critical edition of Philo's works will need to take account, among other things, of the Oxyrhynchos fragments (Royse 1980).

4) In some Philonic manuscripts (mainly UF), the text of the scriptural citations often differs substantially from the standard LXX and is closer to the Hebrew of MT. Based on the fundamental work of Peter Katz and Dominique Barthélemy, it is clear that these non-LXX readings are the work of a reviser and do not represent Philo's original biblical text. The characteristic readings of the non-LXX citations mostly appear in the lemmata that introduce Philo's in ter pret-ations; this so-called 'aberrant text' of the lemmata often differs from the partial citations given within the accompanying interpretations. Following Katz's guid-ing principle, the type of text found within the interpretation can 'with a very high degree of certainty' be assumed to be the text used by Philo; lemmata that conflict with Philo's own type of text are 'therefore bound to be secondary' (Katz 1950: 4). Building on Katz's conclusions, Barthélemy (1967; 1978: 140–73, 390–1; contra Howard 1973) traced the likely origin of the Hebraizing lemmata to a rab-binic Jew, perhaps to be identified on the basis of ideological additions to the interpretations with Rabbi Hoshaya Rabba, working in Origen's circle at Caesarea. The rabbinic reviser altered some copies of Philonic works, replacing the lemma texts with Aquila-type readings (also Kraft 2005).

Philo on the Bible of Alexandria

Philo gives an account of the Alexandrian translation of the 'legislation' of the Jews as part of his biography of Moses (Mos. 2.25–44). Here, Philo's overall purpose is to present Moses as the best of all lawgivers among Greeks and barbarians and his laws as supremely excellent and truly divine (Mos. 2.12, cf. 2.20, 27). According to Philo, this thesis is proved, first, by the wholly unchanged character of the laws of Moses;

Moses is the only legislator whose laws have been transmitted, completely unaltered, from the beginning to the present day (Mos. 2.14). A second proof of the unrivalled status of Moses is that, alone of all the laws in the world, his legislation is admired by almost all the peoples of the world, honouring the laws of Moses for 'their venerable and godlike character' (Mos. 2.15–20). Both proofs of the unrivalled excellence of Moses—that his laws have never changed and that they are universally admired—are (so Philo) embodied in the story of their translation into Greek (Mos. 2.26–44). Philo's account of the translation under Ptolemy II Philadelphos suggests that he knows and uses the much more extensive narrative in the Letter of Aristeas, but that he adapts and develops the older Alexandrian tradition in new directions to fit his purpose (Wasserstein and Wasserstein 2006: 37–45; Wright 2006). In particular, Philo offers a very different picture of the work of the translators. In contrast to Aristeas, where seventy-two translators work by comparing notes and agreeing on a final, authoritative translation (Ep. Arist. 302), Philo presents a much more extraordinary event: the translators (Philo does not number them) work in isolation, but are inspired to make exactly the same translation, as 'they prophesied the same word for word, as though dictated to each one individually by an invisible prompter' (Mos. 2.37; but cf. Wasserstein and Wasserstein 2006: 44). What is most remarkable, Philo emphasizes, is the phenomenon reported by others: the exact agreement of the Greek words and the 'Chaldean' (Hebrew) original (Philo often uses 'Chaldean' as

an alternative for 'Hebrew' in the Exposition and the Life of Moses, e.g. Mos. 2.32, 40). The 'clearest proof of this', so Philo argues,

is that, if Chaldeans have learned Greek, or Greeks Chaldean, and read both versions, the Chaldean and the translation, they regard them with awe and reverence as sisters, or rather one and the same, both in matter and words, and speak of the authors not as translators but as prophets and priests of the mysteries, whose sincerity and singleness of thought has enabled them to go hand in hand with the purest of spirits, the spirit of Moses. (Mos. 2.40)

In Philo's account, then, the Greek translation is the most perfect equivalent of the origin al words transmitted by Moses, mediated by wise translators who shared in the divinely inspired spirit of Moses and who were thus able to recognize the true force of the original Hebrew and to convert this with unerring accuracy into Greek (see further Winston 1991). The laws of Moses remain unchanged. But the translation itself is a potentially world-changing event, making possible (if not yet) the fulfilment of the prayers of the translators and their patrons, that through the Greek version the whole of humanity might come to know the laws of Moses and be 'led to a better life' by observing them (Mos. 2.27, 36). Indeed, Philo implies, world-wide reverence for the laws of Moses is already anticipated in his own Alexandria, in an annual festival on the island of Pharos, the location of the translation (though not explicitly stated in Ep. Aristeas), where 'not only Jews but multitudes of others cross the water, both to do honour to the place in which the light of that version first shone out, and also to thank God for the good gift so old yet ever young' (Mos. 2.41). The story of the translation, and its commemoration in Alexandria, prove that the laws of Moses are 'desirable and precious in the eyes of all', from kings to the ordinary person, Jew and non-Jew (Mos. 2.42–3).

Philo's emphasis in Mos. 2.38–40 on the exact correspondence of the Greek translation with the Hebrew original is widely seen as proof that he did not know Hebrew, or at least not enough of it to be able to see the clear differences between the words of the Hebrew Torah (MT) and their LXX equivalents (Gooding and Nikiprowetzky 1983: 119; Amir 1988: 444). The long-standing question of whether or not Philo knew Hebrew remains unresolved, in the absence of clinching proof on either side of the argument. The weight of evidence suggests but does not prove his ignorance of Hebrew (Nikiprowetzky 1977: 50–96). It is not clear whether a gloss found only in the Old Latin of QG 4.232, expressing amazement at differences between the Greek and Hebrew of passages in Genesis and the Psalms, should be attributed to Philo himself or to his transmitters (Petit 1973: 92; Nikiprowetzky 1977: 80).

Whether Philo knew Hebrew or not, his works draw extensively on Hebrew etymolo-gies as a means to the 'deeper meaning' of Hebrew names and places mentioned in the Torah (Grabbe 1988). Most if not all of the 166 Hebrew etymologies used by Philo are likely to be drawn from onomastic collections, a product of bilingual Jews whose work survives in large part (together with manuscripts of these onomastica, which exhibit substantial overlap with Philo's etymologies) thanks to Philo's creative appropriation of it within his allegorical interpretation. The Hebrew Bible is by no means irrelevant to Philo's enterprise. On the contrary, the central place given by Philo to the Hebrew etymologies strongly indicates that the Hebrew original remained fundamentally authoritative for him (Rajak 2014).

Suggested Reading

The most complete guide to Philo's scriptural citations is the index of the Biblia Patristica Supplément (Allenbach et al. 1982); caution is required in assessing the relevance of all references listed, since the index does not distinguish in its listing between citations and possible allusions. Important studies of Philo's scriptural citations include Siegfried 1873; Ryle 1895; Burkhardt 1988; Cohen 2007; Royse 2017. For the most complete index of Greek words in Philo's works, including

the main fragments, see Borgen et al. (2000); for an index to the fragment of QE 2.62–8, see Runia 2004.

On the question of text type, see Royse's invaluable studies on the text of Philo's scriptural treatises and biblical quotations within Philo's text, e.g. Royse 2000; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2017. <>

MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN THE SYRIAC CAVE OF TREASURES: REWRITING THE BIBLE IN SASANIAN IRAN by Sergey Minov [Series: Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, Brill, 9789004445505]

In **MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN THE SYRIAC CAVE OF TREASURES: REWRITING THE BIBLE IN SASANIAN IRAN**, Sergey Minov examines literary and socio-cultural aspects of the Syriac pseudepigraphic composition known as the *Cave of Treasures*, which offers a peculiar version of the Christian history of salvation. The book fills a lacuna in the history of Syriac Christian literary creativity by contextualising this unique work within the cultural and religious situation of Sasanian Mesopotamia towards the end of Late Antiquity. The author analyses the *Cave*'s content and message from the perspective of identity theory and memory studies, while discussing its author's emphatically polemical stand vis-à-vis Judaism, the ambivalent way in which he deals with Iranian culture, and the promotion in this work of a distinctively Syriac-oriented vision of the biblical past.

Chapter Outline

In seven chapters, I traverse conceptualizations of angels among ancient Jews and provide a revised portrait of late antique Judaism. Each chapter begins with an example of the genre of evidence under investigation and ends with a section describing the legacy of this material: how this ancient evidence impacted other sectors of Jewish society or Jewish practice more broadly. The first two chapters center on ritual-magical evidence from Babylonia and the Levant before turning to the earliest rabbinic evidence (third century CE). Because the Babylonian incantation texts are much longer than the Levantine amulets, they offer much more social information and, for this reason, they are discussed first (although they are arguably the latest ritual objects chronologically, dating from the sixth and seventh centuries CE). Even though this order does not follow a simple chronological progression through the sources, I have chosen this arrangement because the ritual-magical evidence is too often relegated to the periphery rather than treated as essential to the understanding of formative Judaism. Moreover, the vivid descriptions of religious experience in incantation bowls and amulets show what is at stake in rabbinic omission of angels in their foundational texts and what ideas the Babylonian rabbis were reacting to in later centuries. To be clear, I do not intend this arrangement to reflect an evolutionist outlook on the development of religion from magic to orthodoxy to mysticism. On the contrary, I hope this arrangement conveys how richly polyvocal and multicentered Jewish society was in late antiquity.

In chapter 1, "At Home with the Angels," I begin with the ritual-magical objects and texts that uncover an aspect of ancient life that is implicit but usually hidden from view in classical Jewish sources: one where relationships with beings in the invisible realm mattered within the framework of Jewish monotheism. Buried under the floors of homes in ancient Mesopotamia, simple ceramic bowls contained personalized incantations written in Aramaic and Hebrew. These incantation bowls reveal how Jewish men and women appealed to God, angels, biblical protagonists, rabbinic heroes, and others for aid. Incantation texts show the choices available to Jews and the many ways people could relate to angels in the invisible realm. The ritual evidence offers vivid testimony for how Jews imagined angels relating to them, healing their illnesses, restoring love in their marriages, increasing

their business, or protecting their home from the harm of antagonists and demonic forces. I close this chapter with reflection on the relationship of incantations and prayers, reading the formula that invokes the angels on all sides in many incantation bowls and much later in the Jewish liturgy as well.

In chapter 2, "Out and About with the Angels," I focus on Jewish texts from the Levant like amulets buried in ancient synagogues and the treatise Sefer haRazim ("Book of the Mysteries"). Necklace-amulets reveal how Jews visualized the angels among them in the Greco-Roman milieu of Palestine and how they participated in the religious-magical practices of the Late Antique Mediterranean world. Alongside these amulets, I also examine Sefer ha-Razim, a multilayered composition from Palestine, parts of which date to the same time period as the late antique amulets and rabbinic midrashim. The framework of Sefer ha-Razim describes how a learned ritual practitioner from Palestine understood the role of angels in relation to biblical traditions and God. Taken together, the ritual sources provide a fascinating window into Jewish beliefs in angels in the fourth and fifth centuries CE in Roman Palestine, and help place rabbinic, liturgical, and mystical texts in proper perspective. The evidence examined in this chapter contributes to my argument that relationships with the angels mattered to ancient Jews everywhere, not just to one diaspora community in Mesopotamia but to Jews in the ancient world more broadly. This chapter closes with a reflection on the relationship between angels in ritual-magic, Jewish attitudes toward gender, and the implications for ancient Jewish society.

In chapter 3, "No Angels," I delve into the earliest rabbinic material, fore-grounding the evidence in the Mishnah, Tosefta, and midrashei halakhah for Jewish engagement with angels as well as rabbinic ambivalence toward angels. This chapter focuses on how the rabbis of Roman Palestine downplayed interest in angels, even as their exegesis of Torah had to acknowledge (at times) that angels were integral to Israel's origin story. A few stray traditions betray that angels were integral to some sages' worldview, but, overall, angelic presence is repressed in earlier rabbinic sources. The earlier generations of Palestinian rabbis stand out for inveighing against angels and against Jewish preoccupation with angels. Recognizing this tendency reveals what the rabbis were worried about: loss of faith in a God committed to his people and still active on earth. Rabbinic attitudes to angels remained multifarious through the post-Talmudic midrashim, but they did perceptibly shift toward acceptance of engagement with angels over time. At the end of this survey of early rabbinic sources, I emphasize the relationship of ritual practices to rabbinic midrash, highlighting a possible origin for the invocation of angels on all sides in early rabbinic sources.

In chapters 4 and 5, I show how two competing frameworks were available to Jews in late antiquity, one associated with rabbinic settings and the other with worship settings: the former asserted that Jews should focus on relationship with God exclusively and imitation of God alone while the latter emphasized Jewish fellowship and imitation of the angels. In chapter 4, "In the Image of God, Not Angels," I trace the preoccupation with imitation of angels from the Second Temple period sources onward and the concomitant rabbinic reaction to it. One stream of the rabbinic movement distinguished itself by offering fellow Jews a way of relating to God that would arm them with confidence on the one hand and preclude other intermediaries, namely angels, on the other. Rabbinic disciples were encouraged to focus on God's love for them and the imitation of God alone. In effect, the rabbis who downplayed angels were drawing boundaries, distinguishing themselves from fellow Jews as well as other late antique religious communities. Ultimately, this rabbinic endeavor did not prove convincing to most Jews, who continued to seek fellowship with the angels, but it is worth examining to appreciate the intellectual investment of the rabbis in conceptualizing their relationship with God and the invisible realm.

In chapter 5, "In the Image of the Angels," we will see how angels took center stage in ever more vivid terms in the communal institutions of worship in late antiquity. I focus on the space of the synagogue and the liturgical poetry of Yannai, who openly encouraged Jews to imitate the angels

during their worship of God and to think of themselves in angelic terms. While conceptualizing angelic fellowship and imitation was common to Jews and Christians at this time, I show how Yannai gave a particularly Jewish lens to this imaginative framework. Yannai's work has the advantage of showing us how one individual Jew in late antique Palestine synthesized ideas about angels from the Bible, the popular imagination, rabbinic midrash, and even ritual practice. This liturgical evidence also opens a window into a time when Jewish men, women, priests, rabbis, and ritual practitioners mingled in the communal space of the synagogue, reciting God's praise in synchronicity with the angels.

In chapter 6, "Israel among the Angels," I examine the late Babylonian rabbinic perspective on the angels, showing how later rabbis came to embrace the angels in storytelling, prayer, and practice. Whereas earlier rabbis downplayed angels in foundational narratives, later rabbis inserted them into retellings of stories about their own legendary heroes. Where earlier sources criticized praying to Michael and Gabriel, later rabbinic sources taught Jews how to pray to their accompanying angels. Only later Babylonian rabbinic traditions are detailed enough to allow for a discussion of Jewish beliefs on the nature of good and evil angels, angelic freewill, and angelic emotions. By analyzing rabbinic traditions alongside ritual and liturgical evidence, we can see how the rabbis responded to Jewish attraction to angels. Seeing that the popularity of angels could not be overcome, the rabbis decided to harness it instead. This chapter closes with a rumination on the rabbis and their intermediaries of choice, angels among them.

Reciting prayer in the synagogue with the angels in mind sufficed for some Jews, but not for Jewish mystics, who took preoccupation with the angels to unprecedented levels. In chapter 7, "Jewish Mystics and the Angelic Realms," I investigate the earliest manifestation of Jewish mysticism found in the esoteric Hekhalot literature ("Books of Heavenly Palaces"). These texts illuminate the worldview of circles of Jewish mystics, who strove to pray in unceasing synchronicity with the angels, to achieve mastery of Torah through the angels, to imagine ascent to the heavens, and even to command the angels to do their bidding on earth. Some mystics positioned themselves as the ultimate heroes, angelic figures above both angels and other humans. Focusing on the earliest treatise, Hekhalot Rabbati, I examine its component texts, elucidating a variety of Jewish mystical views about angels, all revealing engagement with other segments of Jewish society, even as their radical stance clearly sets them apart. Though Hekhalot mysticism would give way to the mysticism of the Kabbalah, this "way not taken" in early medieval Jewish society demonstrates how some Jews took belief in angels to radical extremes and in the process, expanded the Jewish religious imagination.

In the Conclusion, "Angels in Judaism and the Religions of Late Antiquity," I summarize the results of my survey of ancient Jewish society. Acknowledging ancient views about angels may necessitate expanding our definition of Jewishness and Judaism as well as reevaluating the importance of relationship with others, invisible and visible, within the study of religion. I place my findings in the larger context of the religions of late antiquity, showing how developments in Jewish thought remain distinctive though in dialogue with conceptions of angels in other religious movements. Thereafter, I trace how conceptualization of angels changed from antiquity through the medieval period to the present. In doing so, I account for the afterlife of angels in religious history, their popularity and eventual decline in significance among modern Jewish thinkers and Jews more broadly. This book establishes how writing angels into the history of Jewish religion offers both a more accurate view of the past and important insights into Jewish practice today. <>

CONTENTS

Excerpt: In the case of literate societies, it is the practice of history writing that constitutes one of the most powerful and sophisticated linguistic mnemotechnics in the service of cultural memory. Historical writing is here evoked not in the narrow sense of historiography as a specifically defined literary genre, but in the broad sense envisioned by the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, who defines history as "the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of its past." The contribution of this type of intellectual creativity, which can express itself in a wide range of literary genres including but not limited to historiography, chronography, mythography, genealogy, biography, hagiography, and parabiblical writing, to the processes of developing and maintaining of collective identities, is attracting more and more attention among scholars of ancient Christianity.

My book contributes to this field of research by conceptualizing *Cave of Treasures* as an exercise in the construction of cultural memory. This methodological choice is justified by the fact that in his work, our Syriac Christian author deals with the foundational past of myth, in Assmann's sense of the word. Taking this into consideration, I intend to explore how *Cave of Treasures*'s author resorts to the textual strategy of Biblical rewriting and reshapes the master narrative of Christianity's foundational past, enshrined in the writings of the Old and New Testaments, in line with the perceptions and needs of his contemporary reality.

The central role played by historiographical literature and related strategies of appealing to the past in the development of collective identities among Syriac-speaking Christians of late antiquity and the Middle Ages has received increasing attention in the recent academic literature. In his discussion of the use of history by the famous seventh-century West Syrian theologian Jacob of Edessa, Jan van Ginkel singled out three main functions of historical writing in the context of Christian identity-building. First of all, the writing of history is meant to create a sense of continuity within a Christian community through forging a connection with the formative period of Church history, i.e. the days of Christ and his immediate disciples. In addition to this, the past was commonly evoked in order to affirm the antiquity of a group vis-à-vis its rivals, Christian and non-Christian alike, in accordance with the cultural conventions of the ancient world, where the argument from antiquity, i.e. the belief that the most ancient traditions are the most authoritative, enjoyed great popularity. Finally, the third important aspect of historical writing in the service of collective identity finds its expression in the establishment of boundaries with other groups, whether within the fold of Christian coreligionists or outside of it. In the course of my investigation, I shall pay attention to each of these three aspects and to how they interplay with each other in the original narrative of the biblical past created by *Cave of Treasures*'s author.

In the search for an appropriate framework for discussing issues related to the development of a collective identity among the Christians of the Sasanian empire, including the author of *Cave of Treasures*' and his community, another important methodological point should be made. Throughout most of their history, Syriac-speaking Christians lived under the political domination of other ethnic or religious groups, regardless of how demographically significant they might have been in a given territory. This is true for both the late Roman empire and Sasanian Iran, as well as for various Islamic polities that came to rule over the Middle East in their stead. This situation of permanent political, religious, and often cultural subjugation inevitably exerted a profound impact on how Syriac Christians conceived of themselves and of their society in general. This impact can be assessed if we

turn to the critical methods developed within the field of postcolonial studies, which enable us to recognize how cultural forms reflect the dynamics of power relationships between dominating and dominated groups in a given society. Engendered by the intellectual critique of imperialism in the aftermath of the anti-colonial struggles of the past century, the postcolonial turn in the humanities primarily focuses on the critique of hegemonic discourse. This critique operates by shedding light on "the power of hegemonic cultures to shape discourse while illuminating the increasingly autonomous self-representation of previously marginalized societies, ethnic groups and literatures."

Although the field of postcolonial studies developed from primarily focusing on the modern period, students of the ancient and medieval world are increasingly finding its insights useful for describing cultural dynamics in pre-modern societies. However, the spread of its methods in these academic circles shows an uneven pattern of distribution, so that when it comes to the world of late antiquity, the majority of the research is concentrated on the Roman empire, whereas the dynamics of imperial hegemony and its discontents within the Sasanian realm remain virtually unexplored. It could be particularly fruitful to examine the culture of Syriac Christians, a perennial subaltern group, from this theoretical angle. However, while postcolonial theory has already gained a certain currency among students of ancient and medieval Christendom, scholars of Syriac Christianity seem to be slow to recognize its explanatory potential.

I believe that turning to the instruments and insights of postcolonial studies may enrich our understanding of the processes of identity formation among Syriac Christians during late antiquity and later periods. In *Cave of Treasures*'s case, this approach seems to be particularly relevant for analyzing how its author makes use of Iranian themes and imagery. By evoking the postcolonial concept of cultural hybridity in connection with the representation of Iranian royal figures in *Cave of Treasures*, I hope to facilitate a new way of thinking about the culture of the Syriac-speaking Christians of the Sasanian empire.

The heart of this book, comprised by chapters 2 to 4, provides a close examination of the three most significant strategies of collective identification that *Cave of Treasures*'s author employs in his reworking of the biblical past. The first two are concerned with establishing difference, primarily conceived in religious terms. One of them, analyzed in chapter 2, is directed against the Jewish "other" and manifests itself in a pronounced anti-Jewish stance that characterizes the work as a whole. The second strategy, discussed in chapter 3, is expressed in the author's close engagement with the Iranian "other," which is pursued on different levels, both as a polemic against Zoroastrianism and as a creative appropriation of ideas and images primarily related to the domain of Iranian kingship. The third major strategy of identification, analyzed in chapter 4, is internally oriented and involves argumentation based on ethnic reasoning, which our author used in order to promote a peculiar vision of Syrian uniqueness that elevates his community not only over the non-Christian "others," but also over the rest of the Christian world. In order to establish the extent of *Cave of Treasures*'s author's originality in his reliance on these strategies of identification, they are examined in the diachronic context of other writings produced by Christians during late antiquity.

My primary concern in focusing on these three aspects of collective identity in *Cave of Treasures* is to expose their role as main factors in its author's creation of an up-to-date version of Christian cultural memory that would meet the needs of his community. Each of these chapters ends with concluding observations in which its particular findings are put into the broader context of the cultural and socio-political dynamics of late antique Mesopotamia. By attempting to articulate the possible relationship between the cultural and the social in *Cave of Treasures*, I follow the lead of Alon Confino, who, in an insightful critique of memory studies, calls scholars to ground the notion of collective memory within a rigorous theoretical framework by using it "as an explanatory device that links representation and social experience."

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The mythological past was a hotly contested terrain in the clash of cultures that characterized the intellectual climate of Sasanian Mesopotamia in late antiquity. Narratives of origins served as the primary basis of self-legitimation for both the Jewish and Christian minorities in their confrontation with each other, as well as their engagement with the dominant Iranian culture. In the course of this book, *Cave of Treasures* has emerged as an original and imaginative contribution to the development of Christian cultural memory during late antiquity due to its author's deployment of the biblical past for the needs of communal identity building.

I have argued that *Cave of Treasures* was produced during the second half of the sixth century or the first decades of the seventh century by a West Syrian Christian author, perhaps of the Julianist persuasion, who was active in the part of Northern Mesopotamia that was controlled by the Sasanian empire. Attentiveness to the social and cultural context of late Sasanian Mesopotamia enables us to better appreciate the kind of cultural work that this composition performs.

At the center of this book is the combination of the three major strategies of identification, the use of which defines the unique character of this work as an indispensable witness to the process of collective identity formation among Syriac-speaking Christians in Sasanian Iran. As we have seen, *Cave of Treasures*'s author offers his community a discursive form of cultural difference based on a collective internal definition, which entails both the externally oriented strategy of categorizing others and the internally oriented strategy of self-identification. The former strategy results in our author's construction of two principal categories of otherness: one comprised of Jews, a competing minority, and another of Persians, the politically dominant group. As for the latter strategy, it manifests itself in the rhetoric of "Syrianness."

As far as the strategies of identification involving *Cave of Treasures*'s author's paradigmatic "others," i.e. Jews and Persians, are concerned, we have seen that they primarily operate on the level of religious argumentation, i.e. they are aimed at the construction of otherness through the exclusion of those who are located outside the author's community of faith, understood here in the most general terms as the Christian religion. In both of these cases, *Cave of Treasures*'s author pursues the mutually related narrative policies of appropriation and subversion. In the case of the Jews, we see how he appropriates the canonical biblical narratives in order to create his own version of the foundational Christian past while simultaneously subverting it through careful ideological revision that includes anti-Jewish rhetoric, Christianization of the primeval history, and supersessionist theology. In the case of the Persians, he appropriates the symbols and images of Iranian kingship while confronting this social institution by dissociating it from Zoroastrianism and reimagining it within the Christian cultural framework.

We have seen that anti-Jewish polemic occupies an important place in *Cave of Treasures* as a whole. This evidence, as well as the author's explicit statement about the apologetic goal of his work, allows us to conceptualize *Cave of Treasures* as an exercise in apologetic historiography. By presenting Christianity as the original religion of the human race and rewriting biblical history along supersessionist lines, *Cave of Treasures*'s author participates in what Doron Mendels has described as the "long process of new hermeneutics," through which the Church "created a new collective memory out of the old Jewish heritage." *Cave of Treasures* thus emerges as an original contribution to the ongoing interpretation of communal tradition through which a Syriac Christian writer demonstrates his own community's continuity with the foundational past while excluding their Jewish rivals from it. In addition to this, by evoking the Christ-killing charge, our author sought to establish the ultimate boundary between Christianity and Judaism, making these two categories mutually exclusive. In light of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's observation on the role of difference in the construction of social identity that "difference is asserted against what is closest,

which represents the greatest threat," there is good reason to suspect that the pervasiveness of anti-Jewish rhetoric in *Cave of Treasures* somehow reflects the real-life situation of intercommunal competition between the two closely related religious minorities of Sasanian Mesopotamia.

The battle for the past, which *Cave of Treasures*'s author waged on two fronts, against both Jews and Persians, aims at dispelling any uncertainty regarding his community's origins. This uncertainty may, perhaps, have some relation to the important rupture in the transmission of historical knowledge among the Aramaic population of the Near East. Prior to the dawning of the modern era, only faint echoes of the former glory and rich history of the Assyro-Babylonian empires and ancient Aramaean kingdoms had penetrated the historical consciousness of the Syriac-speaking Christians of the Middle East. Since they had no indigenous historiographical tradition to rely on, their knowledge about this aspect of the region's past was almost entirely derived from the Bible and, to a lesser degree, from Greco-Roman sources. This dependence on the Bible as the primary source of information on their own "national" past made Christians in late antique Mesopotamia particularly vulnerable in the context of rivalry for prestige with the Jews and thus required an original solution.

Cave of Treasures's author demonstrates a considerable degree of creativity in his apologetically driven rewriting of biblical history. Far from limiting himself to a passive retranslation of the canonical biblical narratives, he exercises a remarkable degree of independence and resourcefulness in adapting them to fit his agenda. We have also observed his innovative approach regarding the inherited repertoire of anti-Jewish polemic. A comparable level of originality is evident in the way our author makes use of Iranian ideas and imagery, especially in his reinterpretation of the scriptural figures of Nimrod, Cyrus, and the Magi.

In the discussion of the representation of Persian religion and culture in *Cave of Treasures*, the insights of postcolonial studies, especially the notions of mimicry and hybridity, proved to be particularly useful. This approach to the study of cultural production in situations of competition and inequalities of power enables students of Syriac Christianity in Iran to be more attentive to how this subaltern group's self-representation was shaped by the hegemonic discourse of Sasanian imperial culture. The creative association of the biblical figures mentioned above (i.e. Nimrod, Cyrus, and the Magi) with the symbolic world of Iranian kingship undertaken by *Cave of Treasures*'s author reveals how the collective memory of a religious minority group could be turned into a space of negotiation with the dominant culture. Our analysis of the subaltern politics of memory and identity in *Cave of Treasures* thus throws additional light on the manifold nature of the "sociopolitical instrumentality of the past" in antiquity, to use the words of Bruce Lincoln.

Cave of Treasures's major contribution to the development of a new model of Syriac Christian collective memory manifests itself in the author's resort to an ethnic strategy of identification, integral elements of which are the work's ascription to Ephrem the Syrian, its evocation of the legendary Edessene king Abgar, and its advocacy of Syriac primacy. By attributing his text to Ephrem, who was revered by virtually every Syriac-speaking Christian in antiquity, *Cave of Treasures*'s author could claim this divinely inspired teacher's high spiritual authority on its behalf. Although he was not the first Syriac writer to resort to this pseudepigraphic strategy, *Cave of Treasures*'s author is innovative in that no one before him had used Ephrem's authority for a large-scale rewriting of biblical history. The most remarkable novelty in the author's advancement of an ethnic argument, however, is his original use of the notion of the primacy of the Syriac language. It should be stressed that this is the first known example of this idea being expressed by a Christian author writing in Syriac. What is perhaps even more significant is that he seems to be the first to resort to it for markedly apologetic purposes, using language as the most salient marker of collective identity.

Of course, as has been mentioned above, there are expressions of Syriac cultural pride or local patriotism that predate our composition, but none of them contains the element of confrontation

with other non-Syriac Christian cultures. This aspect of *Cave of Treasures* makes it one of the earliest expressions of "ethnic argumentation" in Syriac; that is, "the concern to formulate ethnic identities strategically as the basis for an apologetic argument." Our author transcends the limits of the territorially based notion of "Syrianness" by ethnicizing it, as he chooses the Syriac language to serve as the primary marker of cultural difference and communal belonging. In using the Syriac language to inscribe its speakers into the two axial points of the history, i.e. the moments of the world's creation and its redemption at Jesus' crucifixion, *Cave of Treasures*'s author does not limit himself to celebrating the antiquity of his native tongue, but turns it into leverage to assert the superiority of his ethno-religious community of "Syrians" over other religious and ethnic groups such as Jews, but also over Greek- and Latin-speaking Christians.

As we have seen, for Christians living under Sasanian rule, the choice of language was not only a matter of cultural preference, since it could easily be reframed in terms of political loyalty. *Cave of Treasures* author's ethnicization of Syriac Christian identity can be regarded as a response to the challenges posed to his community by the particular socio-political situation. Thus, the creation of a new "Syriac" collective self-awareness, based not only on the religious principle, but also on the ethnic one, would provide the Christian community behind *Cave of Treasures* with a convenient way out of the disadvantageous and potentially dangerous situation of "divided loyalties" in which Syriac-speaking Christians of Sasanian Iran would often find themselves as a result of their adherence to the official religion of the Roman empire, the perpetual enemy of their Sasanian overlords. By assuming the ethnicized "Syriac" identity, which was not only distinctive from but also superior to that of the "Greeks" and "Romans," the Syriac-speaking Christians of Sasanian Mesopotamia could distance themselves from the world of Western Christendom and thus demonstrate their loyalty to their Persian sovereigns. The manifestation of a specifically Syriac identity in *Cave of Treasures* could thus be imagined as a wave interference effect that emerges in the liminal "third space" of postcolonial theory, the space of cultural negotiation and resistance in the situation of a minority group caught in the clash of the two competing imperial hegemonies, Roman and Sasanian.

It may not be by chance that this new model of collective identification based on ethnicity emerged among the West Syrian Christians and not among their East Syrian coreligionists. Geographically divided between the territories of the two rivaling empires, the West Syrians may have been feeling a more acute need for an ideology that would guarantee their unity. There was also an inner-Christian integrative potential in ethnicity as the basis of group identity. By employing the self-designation of "Syrians," evoking the authoritative figure of Ephrem, and stressing the superiority of the Syriac language, *Cave of Treasures*'s author offered a supra-confessional and trans-territorial vision of Syriac Christian identity that was able to bypass the deep denominational division of the Syriac-speaking world.

It is thus the dual ethno-religious character of Syriac Christian group identity promoted by *Cave of Treasures*'s author that represents the major innovation in the repertoire of identity formation among Syriac Christians of late antiquity. This interpretation of *Cave of Treasures* appears to be fully compatible with the general model of collective identity formation among West Syrians proposed by Bas ter Haar Romeny, who envisages it as a movement from a purely religious to an ethno-religious modus of identification. The Leiden group's model requires only one small adjustment, which is related to the question of when exactly the ethnicization of the West Syrian collective identity began. The results of my investigation suggest that its earliest manifestations are attested not in the aftermath of the Muslim conquest of the Near East, but somewhat earlier, already during the late sixth or early seventh century.

The prominence of ethnic self-identification in *Cave of Treasures* forces us to critically reassess the position on Syriac Christian identity in Sasanian Iran taken by Sebastian Brock, according to whom it was religion that comprised the primary and only basis of collective identification for the Christians

of the Sasanian empire. *Cave of Treasures*'s case makes it apparent that for at least some Syriac-speaking Christians in Sasanian Iran, ethnicity was becoming an essential element in the construction of their self-representation. Nevertheless, I believe that the model Brock suggested could still be useful, if it is modified by limiting its applicability to the earlier, pre-sixth-century period of the Christian presence in Iran. As a matter of fact, there are reasons to assume that from the sixth century on, the ethnic factor had begun to take hold not only among the West Syrian Christians of the Sasanian empire, as exemplified by *Cave of Treasures*, but also among their East Syrian coreligionists. It has recently been argued by Antonio Panaino that even within the mainstream East Syrian church of Sasanian Iran, there are indications of its gradual Iranization and transformation into a "national Church" of Persia. While Panaino's hypothesis certainly appears plausible to me, this aspect of the East Syrian identity formation is in need of further investigation.

The strategies of representing the biblical past in *Cave of Treasures* discussed in this book reveal the innovative character of this work as a vehicle of cultural memory and its significance as a site for the production of a Christian collective identity in the late antique Near East. By converting the canonical texts of the Old and New Testaments into a shared cultural knowledge through the two-sided process of appropriation and contestation, its author develops a unique version of the foundational past, specifically tailored to meet his community's needs.

Unfortunately, we do not know how *Cave of Treasures*'s author's vision of Syriac Christian collective memory was received by its intended audience. From the later history of the work's reception during the Islamic period, we can conclude that it was sufficiently appealing to cross the confessional borders, as it can be found being read and transmitted by both West and East Syrians. Some of its novel ideas gained considerable popularity. For example, the notion of Syriac as the primeval language would become a stock motif in the repertoire of Syriac pride for centuries to come. However, more systematic research remains to be carried out on *Cave of Treasures*'s impact on the medieval historiographical tradition among Syriac Christians, including works produced in Arabic.

As a concluding caveat on the role of cultural memory in the formation of Syriac Christian identity in late antique Mesopotamia, we ought to keep in mind that *Cave of Treasures* provides us with access to only one aspect of this process. This composition opens a window to the dynamics of an *internal* collective definition that took place within the Christian community behind it, while the necessary *external* counterpart of these dynamics, i.e. this social group's categorization by other groups, Christian and non-Christian alike, remains invisible. Regardless of whether or not these limitations imposed by the nature of our sources could be overcome, this avenue of research should receive its due attention in future research on the evolution of Syriac Christian identity. Such research would also have to account for how universalistic and integrative trends in the making of Christian cultural memory like the one manifested in *Cave of Treasures* interplayed with more particularistic and factional identity strategies; most importantly, those rooted in Christological controversies. This book should be regarded, then, as merely a first step towards producing a comprehensive history of Christian collective identity in the Sasanian empire, in which the particular perception of the past in *Cave of Treasures* would be placed within the wider context of the "shared symbolic universe" of Iranian society and its culture, constituted by "common practices and representations."   <>

Hebrew Texts and Language of the Second Temple Period: Proceedings of an Eighth Symposium on the Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Ben Sira edited by Steven Fassberg [Series: Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah, Brill, 9789004447974]

The 21 essays in this volume deal with the language and text of Hebrew corpora from the Second Temple period. They were originally presented at the Eighth International Symposium on the Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Ben Sira, held in January 2016 in Jerusalem.

Most of the papers focus on the Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls in the light of First and Second Temple Hebrew. A few of the contributions are devoted primarily to the language of Ben Sira, Samaritan Hebrew, and Mishnaic Hebrew. You will find discussions of orthography, phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon, language contact, and sociolinguistics.

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[On Some Words in Two of the Dead Sea Scrolls](#) by Moshe Bar-Asher

In memory of my teacher
Eduard Yechezkel Kutscher
The great scholar of the Hebrew in the Dead Sea Scrolls (June 1, 1909–December 12, 1971)

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Introductory Remarks

1. Research into the Dead Sea Scrolls has revolutionized many issues and fields in Judaic studies. As is well known, the Hebrew Language and its history have also benefited from the discovery and the publication of the scrolls. Indeed, there is hardly a single fragment of the scrolls that has not provided some new linguistic item or, at least, some clarification or illumination of a word, a phrase or a grammatical form that appears in one of the main literary corpora of the classical period—the Bible or rabbinic literature.

2. In this study, I deal with three words that appear in the scrolls. One appears in the Commentary (*Pesher*) on Genesis C (4Q254) and two in the Apocryphal Pentateuch B (4Q377). Important scholars have studied these scrolls and have made important comments regarding the words that I deal with here. Nonetheless, much can still be said and I deal with these matters in this study.

Ḥagoro חגורו in the Commentary on Genesis

3. Dr. Esther Haber and Dr. Alexey Yuditsky, two of the three[2] researchers of the Dead Sea Scrolls in the Historical Dictionary Project of The Academy of the Hebrew Language, are excellent readers of the scrolls and understand the challenges of the field. In the course of their work, they combined fragments 3 and 8 of the Commentary on Genesis C (4Q254).[3] The combination of these fragments presents a reasonable text dealing with the narrative of Judah and Tamar as related in the book of Genesis. An important matter in the story is the deposit that Tamar asked of Judah and which is mentioned twice in the story: וַיֹּאמֶר מָה הָעֵרָבוֹן אֲשֶׁר אֶתֶּן־לָךְ וַתֹּאמֶר חֹתָמְךָ וּפְתִילֶךָ וּמַטְּךָ אֲשֶׁר בְּיָדֶךָ ("And he said, What pledge shall I give thee? And she said, Thy seal, and thy wick, and thy staff that is in thine hand" Gen 38:18), וַתֹּאמֶר הַכֶּר־נָא לְמִי הַחֹתֶמֶת וְהַפְּתִילִים וְהַמַּטֶּה הָאֵלֶּה ("and she said, Discern, I pray thee, whose are these, the seal, and wick, and staff" Gen 38:25). One of the items given as a deposit occurs in the combined text by Haber and Yuditsky: הפתיל (from section 8 line 3), ה[ו]אה חגורו (from section 3 line 4).

4. Here is the combined text:

5 *vacat* [הפלול ב°]
6 אשר לקח]ת[מר מיד יהודה לעד א[ת
7 והפתיל ה[ו]אה חגורו ב°]
8 הוצי[אוה ותשרף כיא ק]
9 [כיא חשבה לזונה]
10 [°וגם °]
11 [° ו חולל מב °]
12 תה בו[ן]

5. Two of the three pledged items do not require elucidation, the חוֹתָם (חוֹתֶמֶת) "seal" and the מַטֶּה "staff." However, פְּתִיל "wick" does. What was the nature of this item and what was it

used for? פְּתִיל and פְּתִילִים in the Bible refer to entwined cords (or ropes) which had various uses. In eight of the ten occurrences of פְּתִיל in the Bible, the use is clear. This is not the case, however, with the פְּתִיל (and פְּתִילִים) that Judah gave to Tamar. The text indicates neither the nature nor the use of this item.

6. (a) In two occurrences of פְּתִיל in the Bible, it refers to the cord that attached the breastplate to the High Priest's vest. It is mentioned in the command: וְיִרְכְּסוּ אֶת־הַחֹשֶׁן מִטַּבְּעֹתָו אֶל־טַבְּעֹת הָאֵפֹד בִּפְתִיל תְּכֵלֶת ("And they shall bind the breastplate by the rings thereof unto the rings of the vest with a lace of blue" Exod 28:28). This is repeated when the verse describes the implementation of the command: וַיִּרְכְּסוּ אֶת־הַחֹשֶׁן מִטַּבְּעֹתָיו אֶל־טַבְּעֹת הָאֵפֹד בִּפְתִיל תְּכֵלֶת ("And they bound the breastplate by the rings unto the rings of the vest with a lace of blue" Exod 39:21). In this case, פְּתִיל refers to the cord tied to the High Priest's breastplate and vest and that attached them together. (b) In two other verses, פְּתִיל refers to the strap that tied the High Priest's golden head plate to his miter: וְעָשִׂיתָ צִּיץ זָהָב טָהוֹר [...] וְשַׂמְתָּ אֹתוֹ עַל־פְּתִיל תְּכֵלֶת וְהָיָה עַל־הַמִּצְנָפֶת [...] וְהָיָה עַל־מֵצַח אַהֲרֹן ("And thou shalt make a plate of pure gold [...] And thou shalt put it on a blue lace that it may be upon the miter [...] And it shall be upon Aaron's forehead" Exod 28:36–38). Similarly, in the verse that describes the head plate's making: וַיַּעֲשׂוּ אֶת־צִיץ נֵזֶר־הַקֹּדֶשׁ [...] וַיִּתְּנוּ עָלָיו פְּתִיל תְּכֵלֶת לָתֵת עַל־הַמִּצְנֶפֶת מִלְמָעְלָה ("And they made the plate of the holy crown of pure gold [...] And they tied unto it a lace of blue, to fasten it high upon the miter" Exod 39:30–31). (c) The fifth occurrence of the word פְּתִיל refers to thin golden threads interwoven with blue, purple and other materials used in the preparation of the High Priest's vest: וַיְרַקְּעוּ אֶת־פַּחֵי הַזָּהָב וְקִצֵּץ פְּתִילִם לַעֲשׂוֹת בְּתוֹךְ הַתְּכֵלֶת ("And they beat the gold into thin plates, and cut it into wires to work it in the blue" Exod 39:3). (d) The sixth occurrence of the word פְּתִיל, also in the Pentateuch, is in the phrase פְּתִיל תְּכֵלֶת and refers to the blue thread attached to the four corners of a garment: וְנָתְנוּ עַל־צִיצִת הַכָּנָף פְּתִיל תְּכֵלֶת ("and they shall affix a thread of blue on the fringe of each corner" Num 15:38). Elsewhere in the Pentateuch, these threads are called גְּדִלִים: גְּדִלִים תַּעֲשֶׂה־לָּךְ עַל־אַרְבַּע כַּנְפוֹת כְּסוּתְךָ ("You shall make yourself twisted threads, on the four corners of your garment" Deut 22:12). (e) פְּתִיל twice refers to linen fibers or tow: וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ מַרְאֵהוּ כְּמַרְאֵה נְחֹשֶׁת וּפְתִיל־פִּשְׁתִּים בְּיָדוֹ ("and behold a man whose appearance was like the appearance of copper, with a linen cord in his hand" Ezek 40:3); the second occurrence expresses something that burns easily: וַיְנַתֵּק אֶת־הַיְתָרִים כַּאֲשֶׁר יִנָּתֵק פְּתִיל־הַנְּעֹרֶת בַּהֲרִיחוֹ אֵשׁ ("and behold he tore the bowstrings as a string of tow is torn when it is touched by fire" Judg 16:9).

7. The meaning of פְּתִיל in the eight occurrences mentioned above is clear. These are threads of various materials. Each thread fulfills a different function as is evident from the context of the verses. The ancient biblical exegetes also took the word to mean this. Targum Onqelos translated the six occurrences of פְּתִיל in the Pentateuch as חוּט ("thread") in the singular or as in the plural: חוּטָא/חוּטִין. Similarly, Targum Jonathan to the Prophets translates פְּתִיל as חוּטָא in Judges and as חוּט in Ezekiel.

8. Even so, the פְּתִיל (פְּתִילִים) given by Judah to Tamar as part of the deposit is not clear from the context. What was the exact nature of the פְּתִיל? What did it serve? The ancient exegetes do not agree and have offered different explanations. I am referring to the Jewish Aramaic biblical translations, the Samaritan Targum, the Peshitta, the Septuagint, and the Vulgate. The deciphering of the fragment of the Commentary on Genesis C by researchers of the Historical Dictionary Project adds an important source to aid in interpreting this word. I will present the findings and then deal with the uniqueness of the commentary evident from this fragment of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

9. Onqelos translated this noun in the two verses identically: וּפְתִילֵךְ (Gen 38:18)— וְשׁוֹשִׁפָּא (Gen 38:25)—וְשׁוֹשִׁפָךְ, וְהַפְּתִילִים. This was apparently a garment that Judah wore or a kind of head covering that hid his face, like a veil. This meaning is evident from a number of verses in

Targum Jonathan, where it translates אַדַּרְתּוֹ("his cloak" 2 Kgs 2:8) as שׁוֹשִׁפֵיהּ, בְּשִׂמְלָה ("in the garment" 1 Sam 21:10) as בְּשׁוֹשְׁפָא and וְהַמַּעֲטָפוֹת ("and the wrapping mantles" Isa 3:22) as וְשׁוֹשִׁיפַיָא. Marcus Jastrow has already shown that this noun is attested in Jewish Palestinian Aramaic and more examples appear in Michael Sokoloff's dictionary. Aramaic borrowed this word from Akkadian.

10. The Peshitta translates the two occurrences of פְּתִיל with the same word as Onqelos, וּפְתִילֶךְ—ושושפך, וְהַפְּתִילִים—ושושפא. In Syriac the word שׁושׁפָא means "a covering for the face," like a veil, and also "a cloak." This is evident from the Peshitta to the Pentateuch where שׁושׁפָא is used to translate a number of nouns: מַסְוֶה("veil" Exod 34:13), שִׂמְלָה ("a cloak" Exod 12:34). According to *LS³*, the pledge given by Judah to Tamar was a veil.

11. The early and late Samarian Targums of the Pentateuch translate הַפְּתִילִים and פְּתִילֶךְ in Genesis 38, which refer to the pledge given by Judah to Tamar, by the same word used to translate פְּתִיל throughout the Pentateuch. All occurrences of פְּתִיל are translated literally: שזר (or שזיר), meaning "an entwined cord," "wick." These translations do not aid us in understanding the nature or the use of the item (פתילים) פתיל given in pledge by Judah. Even so, Zeʾev Ben-Ḥayyim noted that in addition to ושזרך, the Samaritan dictionary *Hameliṣ* gives an additional translation for פְּתִיל in the verse in Genesis—ומפאתר. He comments there that this could refer to "a handkerchief." That is, the orthography מפאתר represents the form מַפְתָּךְ ("your handkerchief"). This is also evident from the Arabic translation for פְּתִיל mentioned by the author of *Hameliṣ*—מנדיל ("a handkerchief," "a towel," which is the meaning of מַפָּה in Mishnaic Hebrew). Thus, we have another source that does not take the פְּתִיל given by Judah to be a thread or a rope, but rather "a handkerchief."

12. The Septuagint and the Vulgate translate פְּתִיל in Genesis by nouns that refer to jewelry. The Septuagint translates the two occurrences of פְּתִיל in this narrative as ὁρμίσκος (the diminutive form of ὅρμος). The primary meaning of this noun is "a small necklace," "a beaded necklace." The Vulgate gives *armilla*—"a piece of jewelry for the hand," probably a bracelet.

13. The author of the text from the fragment of the Commentary on Genesis C (4Q254) understands the פְּתִיל that Tamar received in pledge differently. He writes והפתיל הוא חגורו "and the פְּתִיל is his belt." It is important to note that the commentary in this scroll relates a double message. (a) The author relates that the פְּתִיל is a belt. It is as if he said this פְּתִיל is like any cord or rope, but it was used as a belt. Indeed, in the past, a thick, entwined rope was used as a belt in the Middle East. This was like the Hassidic *gartel* made of entwined cords. (b) The author of the scroll does not state "the פְּתִיל is the belt." That is, he does not merely offer a general explanation of the noun in this context. He says "and the פְּתִיל is his belt." He does not explain what any פְּתִיל is but rather refers to the item that Judah gave to Tamar. His פְּתִיל is *his belt*. In other words, in this context, the פְּתִיל is like any פְּתִיל, but the scroll's author comes to define its function. In his opinion, this was the cord or rope used as Judah's belt. This item is not a head covering nor a cloak, not a handkerchief nor a necklace nor a bracelet.

14. An opinion similar to that of the author of scroll 4Q254 appears in the pseudepigraphal work *The Testament of Judah*, whose core dates from approximately the same time as this scroll. This opinion appears in two statements. In the first statement (12:4) the work lists the three items of the pledge in a different order from that in the biblical text καὶ ἔδωκα αὐτῇ τὴν ῥάβδον μου καὶ τὴν ζώνην καὶ τὸ διάδημα τῆς βασιλείας (= "And I gave her my staff and my girdle and the diadem of kingship"). In the second statement (15:3), which includes a rebuke on account of the adultery, comments on and explains the nature of each item of the pledge: ἔδωκα γὰρ τὴν ῥάβδον μου, τουτέστι τὸ στήριγμα τῆς ἐμῆς φυλῆς· καὶ τὴν ζώνην μου, τουτέστι τὴν δύναμιν· καὶ τὸ

διάδημα, τουτέστι τὴν δόξαν τῆς βασιλείας μου) = "For I gave my staff that is to say the stay of my tribe, and my girdle that is the power, and the diadem that is the glory of my kingship"). Special attention should be paid to Judah's words in 15:3 where he bears witness on himself and clearly states what the [פתילים] פתיל in the Bible are: נתתי לה ... ואת חגורי. This is the same wording in 4Q254 but in the third person: הפתיל ה[ו]אה חגורו [של יהודה].

15. We see that the author of 4Q254 and the author of the Testament of Judah preceded Rabbi Samuel ben Meir by more than one thousand two hundred years when he explained פתילך אזור "פתילך—a belt" (Gen 38:18; perhaps his own opinion?). This is how commentators understood the translation of this word in Saʿadya Gaʾon's *Tafsir*, which preceded Rabbi Samuel ben Meir by more than two hundred years. Rabbi ʿAmram Qoraḥ, in his commentary to the *Tafsir*, explained ומפתולך—**ומפתולך**—is a thin rope girded on the ("ומפתולך)חבל דק חגור(ה) על המתנים" waist"). The author of Neve Shalom may have drawn his comment from the commentary of Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam: ואלפתיל—is a beautiful ("והפתיל)מפתול מסתחסן ישד בה אלוסט ונחוה" entwined cord girded on the waist or elsewhere," ibid. p. 144).

16. Since the Bible did not explicitly state what was the פְּתִיל that Judah gave to Tamar, the way was paved for commentators to try to explain the item. The ancient commentators indeed differed as to the exact nature of the פְּתִיל that Judah gave to Tamar and what it was used for. The fragment of the Commentary on Genesis C that was edited as part of the Historical Dictionary Project offers a unique explanation that does not agree with most sources. It was not any kind of garment, such as a veil, a cloak or a handkerchief; nor was it or a piece of jewelry (a necklace or a bracelet). It was Judah's belt.

Meanings and Explanations of Words

17. A number of marginal comments are necessary to complete this study. There are quite a few examples in the Dead Sea Scrolls of comments that explain words or phrases based on the subject or the language in the structure discussed above, that is A is/are B. I will bring one short example. Here is a well-known example of a chain of comments like these. The Bible states כִּי חֲמַס לְבָנוֹן יְכַסֶּךָ וְשֹׁד בְּהֵמוֹת יְחִיתַן מִדְּמֵי אָדָם וַחֲמַס־אֶרֶץ קִרְיָה וְכָל־יֹשְׁבֵי בָהּ) ("For the violence of Lebanon shall cover thee, and the spoil of beasts, which made them afraid, because of men's blood and for the violence of the land, of the city, and of all that dwell therein" Hab 2:17). These comments appear in Pesher Habakkuk 12:3–9: הלבנון—הוא עצת היחד, והבהמות—המה פתאי יהודה עושה)עושי(? התורה]...[הקריה—היא ירושלם]...[וחמס הארץ—המה ערי יהודה) ("Lebanon is the Council of the Community and the animals are the simple folk of Judah, those who observe the Law. […] the city is Jerusalem […] the violence (done to) the country are the cities of Judah").

18. At times, the word of explanation precedes the verse. Here is an example from the Damascus Document. The Bible states וּנְשָׂאתֶם אֵת סִכּוּת מַלְכְּכֶם וְאֵת כִּיּוּן צַלְמֵיכֶם]...[וְהִגְלֵיתִי אֶתְכֶם מֵהָלְאָה לְדַמָּשֶׂק) ("And you shall carry *Sikkut* your king and *Kiyun* your images, […] And I will exile you beyond Damascus" Amos 5:26–27). The scroll gives a different version: והגליתי את סכות מלככם ואת כיון צלמיכם מאהלי דמשק ("And I will exile *Sikkut* your king and *Kiyun* your images from the tents of Damascus"). The comments follow the verse: וכיניי הצלמים וכיון]...[ספרי התורה הם סוכת המלך ("the scrolls of the Law are the Tabernacle of the King […] the scribe's הצלמים הם ספרי הנביאים rulers are the images and the scribes ruler are the books of the prophets" CD 7:14–20). Sometimes the comment does not occur in a chain but rather as a single comment. For example, the Melchizedek Document reads ו]יום הכפ]ורים ה]וא[ה ס]וף[ה]יו[בל העשירי לכפר בו על כל בני אור ("and the [day of aton]ement is the e[nd of] the tenth [ju]bilee in which atonement shall be made for all the sons of light" 11Q13 1:7–8).

19. Our scroll (4Q254) provides an additional aspect of the structures in question. It contains metalinguistic statements. That is, not interpretations but simple actual explanations of the meanings of words. In sections 5–6 that were reedited by Yuditsky and Haber, the meaning of the word המשפתים (Gen 49:14) in the blessing of Jacob to Issachar becomes clear. Even though this portion of the scroll is fragmentary with many lacunae, the proposal of the two editors is reasonable in light of their excellent elucidation of the text. They reconstruct the following formula: ‏[בין המשפתיים המה בי]ן הגבולים‏ clarifies the ‏גבולים‏. The common noun ‏הגבולים‏ rare ‏המשפתיים‏ ("areas"). In our section, which is a combination of sections 3 and 8 of this scroll, the statement appears which explains the word: ‏והפתיל הואה חגורו‏.

20. Metalinguistic statements are rare in the Bible and are uncommon in the Dead Sea Scrolls as well. However, statements of this kind do occur. One such well-known example is from the book of Samuel—‏(לַנָּבִיא הַיּוֹם יִקָּרֵא לְפָנִים הָרֹאֶה)‏ ("he that is now called a prophet was beforetime called a Seer" 1 Sam 9:9). Another metalinguistic comment is ‏פּוּר הוּא הַגּוֹרָל‏ ("Pur—that is the lot" Esth 3:7). In this case, the clarified word precedes the definition. The work of the researchers of the Historical Dictionary Project on 4Q254 has revealed one certain metalinguistic statement, and an additional reasonable, reconstructed one.

Two Words in the Apocryphal Pentateuch B and Their Meaning: ‏רעדודיה, בעורה‏

21. James C. VanderKam and Monica Brady published 4Q377. Other scholars have also worked on this scroll. Émile Puech has attempted to interpret the remains of the missing letters in Apocryphal Pentateuch B. However, scholars have shown that his proposals are baseless. Ariel Feldman has made a comprehensive study of this scroll, its contents, and language. He and Elisha Qimron have recently reedited the text. Qimron made numerous comments on the reading and the language and designated it ‏מגילת משה‏—Scroll of Moses.

The Section Dealt with in This Study

22. In this study I deal with one word and one phrase in section 2 column B. These two items have linguistic significance and they shed light on an important aspect of the author of the scroll's outlook. The word and the phrase occur in lines 7–10 of the text. Here is this section of the text, according to Qimron's edition:

> 7 ומראה]זיו[כבודו הראנו באש בעורה ממעלה]בנ[שמים
> 8 ועל הארץ, עמד על הה]ר להודיע[ר כיא אין אלהים מבלעדיו ואין צור כמוהו] ,וכול[
> 9 הקהל נעו וחתו ורעדודיה אחזתם מלפני כבוד אלוהים ומקולות הפלא] ,וינועו[
> 10 ויעמודו מרוחק.

The Affinity of This Section to the Bible

23. This portion of the scroll belongs to the genre usually called a reworked biblical text. Scholars have stated that this section deals with the revelation at Mount Sinai, as described in a number of places in the Pentateuch and elsewhere in the Bible. The affinity to Exod 20:15–17 is clear. The statement ‏וינועו[ויעמודו מרוחק‏ ...הקהל נעו[echoes the language of the verses ‏וַיָּנֻעוּ וַיַּעַמְדוּ‏ ("they trembled and stood afar off" Exod 20:15), ‏וַיַּעֲמֹד הָעָם מֵרָחֹק‏ ("The people remained far off" Exod 20:17). The phrase ‏ומראה זיו כבודו הראנו‏ is based on a combination of a number of biblical phrases: ‏וְכָל־הָעָם רֹאִים‏ ("And all the people saw" Exod 20:15), ‏ומראה כְּבוֹד ה׳‏ ("And the appearance of the glory of the Lord" Exod 24:17), and especially ‏הֶרְאָנוּ ה׳ אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֶת־כְּבֹדוֹ‏ ("the Lord, our God, has shown us his glory" Deut 5:21). The phrase ‏ומקולות הפלא‏ is reminiscent of the biblical phrase ‏רֹאִים אֶת־הַקּוֹלֹת‏ ("saw the voices" Exod 20:15). The expression ‏אש בעורה‏ reflects a number of biblical verses, such as ‏וְהַר סִינַי עָשַׁן כֻּלּוֹ מִפְּנֵי אֲשֶׁר יָרַד עָלָיו ה׳ בָּאֵשׁ‏ ("And Mount Sinai was altogether on smoke, because the Lord had descended upon it in fire" Exod 19:18). The

clearly ומראה [זיו] כבודו הראנו באש בעורה ממעלה [ב]שמים ועל הארץ עמד על הה[ר] expression echoes the verse (וּמַרְאֵה כְּבוֹד ה׳ כְּאֵשׁ אֹכֶלֶת בְּרֹאשׁ הָהָר "And the appearance of the glory of the Lord was like a consuming fire on the top of the mountain" Exod 24:17). It is possible to add many similar words and phrases, especially from the verses in Deuteronomy that relate to the revelation at Mount Sinai.

24. The scroll's author clearly drew expressions from other biblical verses, not related to the revelation. For example, the phrase ורעדודיה אחזתם is related to the expression יֹאחֲזֵמוֹ רָעַד ("trembling taketh hold upon them" Exod 15:15) in the Song of the Sea, the phrase אָחֲזָה רְעָדָה ("trembling seized the sinners" Isa 33:14) and especially the statement חַנֵּפִים רְעָדָה אֲחָזָתַם שָׁם ("Trembling took hold of them there" Ps 48: 7). The line כיא אין אלהים מבלעדיו ואין צור כאלהינו clearly echoes (וּמִבַּלְעָדַי אֵין אֱלֹהִים "and besides me there is no God" Isa 44:6), כִּי אֵין בִּלְתֶּךָ ("for there is none beside thee; neither is there any rock like our God" 1 Sam 2:2) וְאֵין צוּר כֵּאלֹהֵינוּ and similar verses.

The Additions to the Bible in This Section

25. Many scholars have shown that reworked biblical texts in the Dead Sea Scrolls tend to expand on the Bible in various ways. Devorah Dimant has recently dealt with this issue in her clear and well thought out introduction to Ariel Feldman and Liora Goldman's book. In addition to expansions on the content of biblical verses, these texts also expand on the Bible's language. Scholars have recognized some of these; others are concealed and await revelation.

26. Specifically, many of these expressions in this section of the scroll are somewhat like biblical quotations. They differ from the original verses in the addition of details knowingly added by the scroll's author. By adding details, the author endeavored to describe the event differently from the biblical narrative, thus aggrandizing it. I will present here some of the expressions with additional details, whether explicit or implicit: 1. 2, ממעלה [ב]שמים ועל הארץ .באש בעורה .3, ומראה [זיו] כבודו .ומקולות הפלא .רעדודיה .6, נעו וחתו ורעדודיה אחזתם...וינעו ויעמודו מרחוק .5, עמד על הה[ר] ,4].

27. The common ground to most of the expressions used by the author of the scroll is the addition of details not present in the biblical text. His intention being to glorify the event in the eyes of his readers. Here is an example. The author of the scroll exchanged וּמַרְאֵה כְּבוֹד ה׳ ("And the appearance of the glory of the Lord" Exod 24:17) with ומראה [זיו] כבודו ("and the appearance [of the radiance of] his glory" line 7). While we cannot be certain that the reconstructed word between brackets is indeed the noun זיו, there surely was another word that was added to expand the narrative. The Bible mentions הַקּוֹלֹת ("the voices" Exod 20:15). The scroll's author speaks of קולות הפלא ("wondrous sounds") in order to glorify the sounds that the people heard. The biblical verses state that the people וַיָּנֻעוּ וַיַּעַמְדוּ מֵרָחֹק ("they trembled and stood afar off" Exod 20:15) while the scroll's author states הקהל נעו וחתו ורעדודיה אחזתם [...] וינעו ויעמודו מרוחק ("The assembly moved and were afraid. Trembling seized them … and they moved and stood at a distance"). The addition is clear—the movement of the people far from the mountain was accompanied by fear and trembling.

28. Understanding how the scroll's author employs additions to the text, clarifies two other expressions in this fragment—the word רעדודיה and the phrase באש בעורה. רעדודיה occurs only once in the Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls and is not attested in any other Hebrew text. The phrase באש בעורה is also unique (although there is evidence for one more occurrence in Qumran). These two expressions provide additional insight to understanding the changes made by the scroll's author to increase the impression left by the revelation at Mount Sinai.

רעדודיה Raʿadudiyya

29. I have already indicated that the phrase רעדודיה אחזתם is based on a number of biblical expressions, above all רְעָדָה אֲחָזָתַם ("trembling took hold of them" Ps 48:7). However, one small

detail distinguishes the two expressions—the book of Psalms reads רְעָדָה while the scroll has רעדודיה. Feldman suggested that this is possibly a blend of רַעֲדוּד (in the nominal pattern קְטָלוּל) and the noun יָה. He believes, as others before him, that the addition of יָה to a noun acts as an intensifier to the extended noun. As we can see in Hebrew grammars that explain the word שַׁלְהֶבֶתְיָה ("a great flame" Song 8:6) in this way—שַׁלְהֶבֶת + יָה. In other words, רעדודיה is not merely "trembling" but "great trembling."

30. The word רעדודיה is a *hapax legomenon* in the Dead Sea Scrolls and is so far not attested in any other Hebrew text. I would like to offer a different explanation of this word. I do not believe that it is a blend. Biblical Hebrew tends to form blends in the case of proper nouns but not for common nouns. In addition, no such noun as רַעֲדוּד has ever been attested. The word should be vocalized רַעֲדוּדִיָה, like שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה in the nominal pattern פַּעֲלוּלִיָה. שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה occurs in the Bible as the *Qere* of the *Ketiv* שעריריה (Hos 6:10). This word also occurs in Qumran Hebrew, for example, נגועו במשפטי רשעה ושערוריות ("afflicting him with the punishments of sin and the horrors" Pesher Habakkuk 9:1). These two nouns are clearly expansions of nouns derived from tri-radical roots. רַעֲדוּדִיָה is derived from the root רעד״ד, a quadri-radical root. This root is an expansion of the tri-radical root רע״ד from which are derived the nouns רַעַד and רְעָדָה. Similarly, the noun שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה is derived from the root שער״ר, an expansion of שע״ר from which is derived the adjective שׁעֵר in the phrase כַּתְּאֵנִים הַשֹּׁעָרִים ("as the loathsome figs" Jer 29:17). The medieval commentators already noticed this, for example, Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Qimḥi. Modern dictionaries such as BDB, Ben-Yehuda, and *HALOT* also list this. Modern biblical commentators also hold this view. Thus, the relation between שֹׁעָרִים and שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה, the former derived from the root שע״ר and the latter from the expanded root שער״ר is a widely held view. Much can still be added to all that has been said concerning this.

31. Expansions of words (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) by repetition of the third radical is well known in Biblical Hebrew. Examples of this phenomenon are וְנַאֲפוּפֶיהָ ("and her adulteries" Hos 2:4), פִּרְחַח ("little sprouts" Job 30:12) and the verb אֻמְלָלָה ("has been bereaved" 1 Sam 2:5). Sometimes the second radical is repeated, for example in the word זְנוּנֶיהָ ("her harlotries" Hos 2:4). Biblical Hebrew even has examples of expansions by repetition of both the second and third radicals, for example the nouns and adjectives וְהָאסַפְסֻף ("but the multitude" Num 11:4), וּפְתַלְתֹּל ("and twisted" Deut 32:5), יְרַקְרַק אוֹ אֲדַמְדָּם ("deep green or deep red" Lev 13:49), פְּקַח־קוֹחַ ("free from captivity" Isa 61:1), יְפֵה־פִיָּה ("very beautiful" Jer 46:20); similarly the verb חֳמַרְמְרוּ ("burn" Lam 2:11).

32. Sometimes, the use of expanded forms in Biblical Hebrew can be easily understood. Indeed, in certain contexts the expanded form seems to express strengthening or intensification of the concept expressed by the original word (without repetition of radicals). This is clear in the roots נא״ף and זנ״י. The noun זְנוּנִים formed by the repetition of the second radical, indicates "additional harlotry" or "multiple harlotries"; נַאֲפוּפִים, wherein the final radical is repeated, indicates "additional adultery" or "multiple adulteries." This is evident from the prophet Hosea's remarks concerning the woman's harlotries and adulteries: רִיבוּ בְאִמְּכֶם רִיבוּ כִּי הִיא לֹא אִשְׁתִּי וְאָנֹכִי לֹא אִישָׁהּ וְתָסֵר זְנוּנֶיהָ מִפָּנֶיהָ וְנַאֲפוּפֶיהָ מִבֵּין שָׁדֶיהָ ("Strive with your mother, strive, for she is not my wife, and I am not her husband, and let her remove her harlotries from her face and her adulteries from between her breasts" Hos 2:4). In other words, the prophet states that she is exceedingly adulterous. If one were to say that multiple harlotries or adulteries are not expressed by the expanded forms (זנוניה, נאפופיה) but rather by the plural form (נַאֲפוּפִים and זְנוּנִים) but not זָנוּן or נַאֲפוּף), I will point out a more obvious example of a form where intensification of meaning is clear from the context. When the prophet Jeremiah states עֶגְלָה יְפֵה־פִיָּה מִצְרָיִם ("Egypt is a beautiful heifer" Jer 46:20), he clearly means her great beauty. Qimḥi already understood this and commented, "the *ʿayin* and the *lamed* are repeated to express great beauty, comparing Egypt to a beautiful heifer, rich and fertile."

33. The Sages understood the expanded forms as expressing strengthening or intensification of the concept expressed by the original word, as is evident from the Sifra, the halakhic midrash to Leviticus: ירקרק")—ירקרק—ירוק שבירוקים, ואדמדם—אדום שבאדומים "—the darkest green, אדמדם—the darkest red" Sifra Neg. 1:2). Many medieval sages thought so as well, including Saʿadya Gaʾon, Rashi, Qimḥi, and Maimonides, as Ben-Yehuda indicated in his dictionary. We can add Ibn Janaḥ as well. When discussing the nominal pattern פְּעַלְעַל, he states that this pattern is a descriptive word, or even a word expressing intensified description. He lists the words אדמדם, אדמדמת, ירקרק, שחרחרת, אספסוף and עקלקלות, חלקלקות, הפכפך. For the פְּעַלְעֹל pattern, he lists the words and פקח קוח. Even though his statement is not unequivocal, he refers to the word as an "adjective" (that is, the repeated consonant does not add meaning). However, he does describe the word as an "intense adjective," meaning an adjective expressing intensified meaning as opposed to the adjective without the repeated consonants.

34. However, others believed that the expansion of words expresses the diminutive. Thus, ירקרק means "greenish, light green" and אדמדם "reddish, light red." This is apparent from Rabbi Akiva's statement in the Mishnah: like wine mingled with—אדמדם")—כיין המזוג במים" m. Neg. 1:2). This is Ibn Ezra's opinion: ירקרק")—ירקרק וזה כפול לחסרון וכן שחרחרת [the letters] are doubled to express deficiency, like שחרחרת"); Rashbam also holds this view. Ben-Yehuda already wrote "the verse supports Rabbi Akiva's opinion that אדמדם is light red, because an appearance of לבן אדמדם ('reddish white') cannot be darkest red."

35. From the Aramaic Targums a third view is evident. Namely, there is no difference in meaning between the regular form and the expanded form. Onqelos, for example, translates אֲדַמְדֶּמֶת (Lev 13:19, 24) as סָמְקָא, the same way he translates the second occurrence of אָדֹם ("red") in the phrase הָאָדֹם הָאָדֹם (Gen 25:30)—סָמְקָא. סְמוֹקָא סָמְקָא in this verse is the masculine form of סָמֵק with the definite article. It is also the feminine form of סָמֵק in the verses quoted from Leviticus (13:19, 24). The Samaritan Targum translates this similarly: אדמדם— סמקא—(Num 19:2)—אֲדֻמֶּה, סאמק/סמק. This is also reflected in the Peshitta: הָאָדֹם הָאָדֹם is rendered סוּמָּקָא סוּמָּקָא. Similarly, the Peshitta translates the adjective אֲדַמְדָּם as סוּמָּקָא.

36. Thus, we see from the literature of the Sages of the early generations, in the Tannaitic and Amoraic periods, and the Aramaic Targums, different opinions as to the meaning of the expanded forms in Biblical Hebrew. Hence, each form should be examined in its context to see whether the expanded form is merely an alternate morphological form that has no semantic distinction from the regular form; or whether the expanded form expresses strengthening or intensification or are in fact diminutives. I presented this kind of analysis in the discussion of the nouns זְנוּנֶיהָ and נַאֲפוּפֶיהָ, and the adjective יְפֵה-פִיָּה.

37. It seems to me that the meaning of רעדודיה is clear from its context. The scroll's author could have used the biblical nouns mentioned above; רַעַד as in the phrase יֹאחֲזֵמוֹ רָעַד from the Song of the Sea, or רְעָדָה, as in רְעָדָה אֲחָזָתַם from Psalms. Had he done so, he would have used an expression known from the Bible. However, by using the form רעדודיה—whether this form existed in the language of the period or whether he coined the form—he conveyed that the trembling was not that implied in the words רַעַד or רְעָדָה, but rather an unusually powerful trembling. The expanded form רעדודיה conveys this message exactly like his other expressions related to the revelation at Mount Sinai that add details to the biblical account, especially stressing the intensity of the event.

38. The word רַעַד, composed of two syllables, and the word רְעָדָה, with three syllables, are not the same as רַעֲדוּדִיָּה with its five syllables. I believe the repetition of the consonant *dalet*, by increasing the number of syllables and lengthening the word, conveys a message. The scroll's author believed that the people at Mount Sinai were seized by trembling, but not by an ordinary trembling. An extremely powerful trembling seized them. That is, the text itself informs us of the meaning

of רְעֲדוּדִיָּה, and the word itself teaches us about the text. This also seems to be the relationship between שְׁעָרִים and שַׁעֲרוּרִיָּה. Many are of the opinion that שְׁעָרִים means "loathsome, repulsive." The noun שַׁעֲרוּרִיָּה would then imply an especially loathsome deed. I suggest, further in this study, to understand, as did Solomon Mandelkern, that the adjective שְׁעָרִים means "split, broken." I believe that the noun שַׁעֲרוּרִיָּה would then mean "a great break."

באש בעורה

39. When referring to the revelation at Mount Sinai the Bible uses the word אֵשׁ ("fire") without any addition, for example וְהַר סִינַי עָשַׁן כֻּלּוֹ מִפְּנֵי אֲשֶׁר יָרַד עָלָיו ה׳ בָּאֵשׁ ("And Mount Sinai was altogether on smoke, because the Lord descended upon it on fire" Exod 19:18), וְהָהָר בֹּעֵר בָּאֵשׁ ("and the mountain was burning with fire" Deut 5:20). However, the metaphor כְּאֵשׁ אֹכֶלֶת is also used—וּמַרְאֵה כְּבוֹד ה׳—("And the appearance of the glory of the Lord was like a consuming fire on the top of the mountain" Exod 24:17). However, the scroll's author uses the phrase **באש בעורה** (line 7). It should be noted, that the scroll's author does not use one word (אֵשׁ) as in the first and second verses, nor a metaphor (כְּאֵשׁ אֹכֶלֶת). Instead, he uses a direct, explicit and concrete expression—באש בעורה ("a blazing fire").

40. In the Dead Sea Scrolls, the spelling בעורה could indicate two different forms: (a) בעורה = בּוֹעֲרָה (or בּוֹעֵרָה), the active participle of the *qal* stem for the root בע״ר. In proximity to the pharyngeal consonant ʿayin, the *waw* is not written in its appropriate place—before ʿayin—but after it. This phenomenon occurs in the Dead Sea Scrolls, as documented by E. Y. Kutscher in the Isaiah Scroll (1QIsaᵃ). Examples of this phenomenon are ונטוע instead of ונטעו in the Masoretic text (Isa 37:30) and ופועלתי instead of ופעלתי (or וּפְעֻלָּתִי to be exact, in the Masoretic text, Isa 49:4). (b) בעורה = בָּעוֹרָה, the feminine form of בָּעוֹר, the participle that expresses multiple actions. The difference between בָּעוֹר/בָּעוֹרָה and בּוֹעֵר/בּוֹעֲרָה is similar to the difference between בָּגוֹד/בָּגוֹדָה and בּוֹגֵד/בּוֹגְדָה. The active participle בּוֹגֵד /בּוֹגְדָה, in its verbal usage, indicates a one-time action while the form in the פָּעוֹל pattern—בָּגוֹד/בָּגוֹדָה—is a nominal form indicating a quality involving multiple actions. This is in effect the difference between בּוֹעֲרָה and בָּעוֹרָה. בָּעוֹרָה indicates additional burning (בְּעִירָה) since it implies duration and a quality. In my opinion, it is not necessary to explain בעורה as an alternate spelling of בּוֹעֲרָה with the letters ʿayin and *waw* in the incorrect order. This is rather the form בָּעוֹרָה. In other words, when it is possible to explain an orthographic regular form as it appears in the text, there is no need to introduce explanations based on metathesis of letters (בועה > בעורה).

41. If these words in the scroll are indeed the phrase אֵשׁ בָּעוֹרָה as I believe, then this phrase does express strengthening or intensification, not only when compared with אֵשׁ ("fire") in Exod 19:18 or with בֹּעֵר בָּאֵשׁ ("burning with fire" Deut 5:20), but also as opposed to כְּאֵשׁ אֹכֶלֶת ("like a consuming fire" Exod 24:17). This is not only because כְּאֵשׁ אֹכֶלֶת uses imagery as opposed to אֵשׁ בָּעוֹרָה that is a direct expression. It is because this phrase is composed of a noun and an adjective, with the adjective in the פָּעוֹל pattern that expresses multiplicity or intensification to a greater degree than בּוֹעֲרָה, in the פּוֹעֵל pattern.

42. We can thus say that this scroll contains a number of expressions that expand on the biblical narrative of the revelation at Mount Sinai, such as קולות הפלא ("wondrous sounds") as opposed to הקולות ("the sounds" Exod 20:15), and other expansions of the content. This phenomenon is evident in these two unique expressions: רְעֲדוּדִיָּה—"an extremely powerful trembling"; בְּאֵשׁ בָּעוֹרָה—"a long-burning, powerful blazing fire."

Conclusion

43. I stated at the outset of this paper that every one of the Dead Sea Scrolls enriches us with information about language. We have seen here that the Commentary on Genesis C (4Q254),

edited by the researchers of the Academy of the Hebrew Language's Historical Dictionary Project, teaches us that the word חגור occurs in the Hebrew lexicon of the Scrolls. Not only does it occur in the Scrolls, but it also occurs in an interpretive and metalinguistic statement. When the author of the scroll wrote הפתיל הואה חגורו, he expressed his opinion that פְּתִיל, one of the three items Judah gave as a pledge to Tamar as related in Genesis (ch 38:18, 25), was a belt, to be exact, Judah's own belt. Indeed, in the scrolls we encountered metalinguistic statements, the clearest one being הפתיל הואה חגורו. We saw that his explanation of the פְּתִיל in Judah's pledge also appears in another extra-biblical work from the same period as the scroll—*The Testament of Judah*.

44. Important scholars have studied scroll 4Q377 and its language. I believe that two expressions required further clarification: (a) the noun רעדודיה, (b) the phrase באש בעורה. The noun רעדודיה is a morphological expansion of one of the nouns רַעַד or רְעָדָה. I read the orthographic form בעורה as בָּעוֹרָה—the feminine form of בָּעוֹר in the פָּעוֹל pattern with retained *qamets*. That is, the participial form expressing multiplicity or intensification as opposed to the participial forms בּוֹעֲרָה or בּוֹעֶרֶת, expressing a single action.

45. The two expressions discussed occur in a fragment of a scroll that expands on the biblical narrative of the revelation at Mount Sinai. Thus, it is logical that the noun רעדודיה and the phrase באש בעורה should be considered as expressions that expand on the content of the Bible. An ordinary trembling did not seize the people at Mount Sinai. Rather, an extremely powerful trembling seized them. The scroll's author calls this extremely powerful trembling רַעֲדוּדִיָה the expanded form of the noun, which also implies greater semantic force. God was revealed in an extremely powerful blaze. Therefore, the fire is referred to as אֵשׁ בָּעוֹרָה, not אֵשׁ בּוֹעֶרֶת or אֵשׁ בּוֹעֲרָה. These two expressions are a fitting example of the intensified description of the revelation at Mount Sinai, reflected in the language and style of this scroll fragment.

46. I wish to add a comment in the margins of the discussion concerning the meaning of the root שע״ר, which is reflected in the phrase כַּתְּאֵנִים הַשֹּׁעֲרִים (Jer 29:17) and the noun שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה (Hos 6:10) and its alternate forms (שַׁעֲרוּרָה, שַׁעֲרוּרִית). Two great scholars studied the root שע״ר and explained its meaning—Henoch Yalon and Aron Dotan. I believe that Mandelkern's view is more correct and possible, namely that this Hebrew root is the parallel of the Aramaic תר״ע meaning "splitting" and "breaking." הַתְּאֵנִים הַשֹּׁעֲרִים are split, smashed figs, deficient in taste. I am of the opinion that שֹׁעֲרִים and שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה are related. Hence, שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה, derived from the expanded root שער״ר, adds the additional semantic features of "break" and "split" to the word שֹׁעֲרִים, and thus means "a great break."

47. The intensified and expanded utterance of the noun שַׁעֲרוּרִיָה and its alternate forms is also evident in the phrase שַׁמָּה וְשַׁעֲרוּרָה ("an appalling and horrible thing" Jer 5:30). שַׁמָּה means "waste, appalling thing, destruction" and is followed by the noun שַׁעֲרוּרָה. When a phrase consisting of two near synonyms, the shorter noun comes first according to the "Law of Increasing Members," the longer noun comes in second place in the phrase thus intensifying the meaning of the first noun. An example of this is the phrase in the Song of Moses that describes the generation by the statement דּוֹר עִקֵּשׁ וּפְתַלְתֹּל ("a generation crooked and perverse" Deut 32:5). The adjective עִקֵּשׁ, which is the shorter word, precedes פְּתַלְתֹּל; פְּתַלְתֹּל, the longer word, follows the adjective עִקֵּשׁ thus intensifying its meaning. <>

The "God of Israel" in History and Tradition
by Michael J. Stahl [Series: Vetus Testamentum, Supplements, Brill, 9789004447714]

Author:

In **The "God of Israel" in History and Tradition**, Michael Stahl provides a foundational study of the formulaic title "god of Israel" ('elohe yisra'el) in the Hebrew Bible. Employing critical theory on social power and identity, and through close literary and historical analysis, Dr. Stahl shows how the epithet "god of Israel" evolved to serve different social and political agendas throughout the course of ancient Israel and Judah's histories. Reaching beyond the field of Biblical Studies, Dr. Stahl's treatment of the historical and ideological significances of the title "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible offers a fruitful case study into the larger issue of the ways in which religion may shape—and be shaped by—social and political structures.

CONTENTS

The cosmic, monotheistic God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam has a history, one which reaches back to a particular ancient people—Israel. Although destroyed almost three millennia ago, Israel's name and the worship of its god continue to shape religious identity among, and interreligious dialogue between, contemporary Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities. Yet, how did Israel's god first come to be worshiped beyond the people of Israel?

As known from historical sources, Israel was a relatively small kingdom in the southern Levant during the early first millennium, when it coexisted alongside the even smaller, independent kingdom of Judah to its immediate south.[1] Nevertheless, while Israel and Judah were two separate polities historically, the Judahite scribes who produced the Hebrew Bible ultimately claimed much of Israel's cultural and religious heritage—including the worship of deity under Israel's name—as their own.[2] As a subset of the larger historical problem of Judah's cross-cultural appropriation of Israel's identity, this study directly raises the specific religious-historical problem of Judah's worship of deity under Israel's name by critically examining the formulaic title "god of Israel" (אלהי ישראל) as it appears in the Hebrew Bible, setting it in the larger context of Israel and Judah's social and political histories down into the Persian and early Hellenistic periods. Nearly 200 times, Judahite biblical writing defines divinity by the epithet "god of Israel," even as the title's very formulation explicitly links deity and people using a named identity that, from a historical perspective, was originally socially and politically distinct from Judah, namely Israel. In light of the epithet's ubiquitous yet anomalous presence in Judah's Bible, the title "god of Israel" thus warrants sustained critical attention, a desideratum in current scholarship.

In using the title "god of Israel" for the patron deity of Judah's most central political and religious institutions—the palace and temple at Jerusalem—the Hebrew Bible's Judahite authors engaged in an act of religious appropriation that asserts, at least in ideal terms, a fundamental social-political and religious unity between Israel and Judah. This ideological claim essentially represents the perspective and political interests of the Hebrew Bible's primary authors and editors, whose interests lay with Judah, not Israel. The pervasiveness of this biblical claim notwithstanding, Israel and Judah historically were two separate kingdoms/peoples, and the nature of the "relationship between these two kingdoms, along with their individual histories, must be considered matters for investigation." While Israel and Judah's populations undoubtedly shared much in terms of language and local culture—including the worship of the deity yhwh and other deities—Israel and Judah display important differences in terms of their large-scale social, economic, and political structures. At a basic level, Israel's political culture, even in the time of kings, appears to have been more decentralized than Judah's. Such differences in social structure and political economy underscore Israel and Judah's separateness and necessarily impact any reconstruction of their political-religious landscapes. In this broader context, the religious-historical problem of Judahite use of the title "god of Israel" looms large, even as it has largely escaped critical scholarly scrutiny.

Judah's claim on the title "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible has had a lasting impact on scholarly reconstructions of Israel and Judah's political and religious histories, including some of the basic categories that modern scholars use to classify their work in broad terms. For instance, the scholarly study of "Israelite religion" in fact often deals with matters of Judahite religious history and practice. With respect to the title "god of Israel" itself, scholars regularly employ the appellation "god of Israel" as a kind of transhistorical or universalizing identity to refer to the god of the Hebrew Bible, ancient Israel and Judah, and/or early Judaism. At times, scholars use the designation "god of Israel" when examining particular biblical texts, even when those texts do not actually use the epithet "god of Israel" to define the deity. Through such shorthand practices, modern scholarship reproduces the Hebrew Bible's ideological claim of one God, one people, thereby marginalizing the larger historical problem of when and how Judah—and later Judaism—came to see its own religious identity in terms of the worship of the "god of Israel." Moreover, when scholars reflexively use the appellation "god of Israel" as an almost automatic identity for the Hebrew Bible's deity, the historical significance of the epithet often remains untethered to ancient Israel's distinct social-political reality, particularly its robust political tradition of collective governance. At the same time, Judahite appropriation of the title "god of Israel" entails a shift in the social and religious politics of this divine identity on account of Judah's distinctive political history and religious culture, centralized around David's royal house and the temple at Jerusalem. In short, the title "god of Israel" in its ancient expressions embeds particular political, social, and religious meaning linked to the author's historical and social location. Unlike divine epithets that identify divinity by sacred locations, cities, or divine capacities, the epithet "god of Israel" brands the deity in relation to "Israel" as a social-political and/or literary-ideological community, without reference to a single fixed center. While a named deity, such as El, Asherah, yhwh or Baal, could be worshiped by more than one people, the title "god of Israel" is particularizing, characterizing the (unnamed) deity in terms of a specific community. For this reason, the title "god of Israel" carries social and political significances, and its use by different communities across time and space demands the investigation of its social and religious politics at every turn.

Finally, the recognition that the title "god of Israel" refers back to the deity of a social-political community originally distinct from Judah brings to the fore the historical problem of Judah's appropriation of the worship of divinity under Israel's name as reflected in biblical writing. Scholarly reproduction of the Hebrew Bible's claim that the title "god of Israel" belongs to Judah has masked the need to analyze biblical usage of the title "god of Israel" and its relationship to Israelite and Judahite religious history. This observation may partially explain why, apart from one contribution in the early 1900s, there have been no systematic scholarly studies on the textual locations and literary

usages of the epithet "god of Israel" in the biblical materials, nor any analyses of this important title's historical development and its evolving social, political, and religious significances. This study seeks to redress these scholarly desiderata by analyzing the Hebrew Bible's use of the title "god of Israel" and providing a critical history of its social and religious politics, both for Israel and Judah. ***

The Scope of This Study

Critical consideration of the title "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible raises important historical questions in the study of ancient Israelite and Judahite religion. What were the social and religious politics of the title "god of Israel" in ancient Israel? When did yhwh come to be known by the specific title "god of Israel"—and under what political circumstances? When and how did the epithet enter into Judah's internal political-religious discourse? In what ways did the title contribute to the religious construction of "Israelite" identity in postexilic Yehud?

This study addresses these and other important questions in five chapters. Together, these five chapters trace the Hebrew Bible's usage of the title "god of Israel" and the history of its politics in roughly chronological sequence, from the title's use in ancient Israel proper, to its appropriation in the kingdom of Judah, to its transformation as Judaism began to emerge in the course of the Persian and early Hellenistic periods. Because of the complexity and unevenness of the biblical evidence, the present study's historical reconstruction of the epithet "god of Israel" in Israel, Judah, and postexilic Yehud consists only of momentary glimpses into a long and complicated historical process, most of which can no longer be reconstructed with precision. If the history of the title "god of Israel" were a puzzle, the majority of the pieces have been lost, probably never to be recovered. For this reason, the present study cannot be considered definitive, the last word on the matter, even as it aims for rigor and comprehensiveness. Undoubtedly, other scholars will wish to rearrange some of the puzzle pieces, or clusters of puzzle pieces, into different arrangements, providing somewhat different images. Be this as it may, the foundational aims of this study remain unaltered, namely to explicitly raise the religious-historical problem of when and how the title "god of Israel" entered into Judah's internal political and religious discourse, to collect all the relevant data on the epithet "god of Israel," and to ask fresh historical questions of the data in the light of current issues in biblical studies and the history of ancient Israelite—and Judahite—religion.

Chapter 2 begins the study's historical investigation into the title "god of Israel." On the basis of Genesis 33:20 and other pertinent biblical texts, this chapter argues that the epithet "god of Israel" first belonged to the old Levantine god El in connection with the ancient cult center of Shechem in the Israelite central hill country, and that Shechemite El's cultic role as the "god of Israel" was traditionally embedded within ancient Israel's decentralized political economy. The god yhwh, in turn, may only have come to be identified as the "god of Israel" in the service of a royal centralizing program during the ninth and eighth centuries. Specifically, I argue that the application of the title "god of Israel" to yhwh first blossomed in the ninth century, as Israel's Omride kings sought to consolidate their power at the new royal capital of Samaria and expand Israel's political control north of the Jezreel Valley and east of the Jordan River. In making this argument, I propose that Judges 5:2–11* + 12–23* reflects this important moment in Israel's political and religious history, and I situate the composition of this important biblical text in the broader historical context of the ninth century. As evidenced by the archaeological and epigraphic records, particularly the Mesha Stele and Tel Dan Inscription, the ninth century was a watershed in the political and religious history of the southern Levant. A number of new minor kingdoms, backed by royal ideologies interlocking god, king, and people, come into view for the first time, if only dimly. For Israel, with its traditionally decentralized political culture, the centralizing institution of kingship likewise emerges as a defining force in a new way during this period. I contend in Chapter 2 that the Song of Deborah was composed in the service of kingship as part of this ninth-century shift in Israel's political economy. Among other strategies for consolidating political power, the Omrides sought to disembed

("differentiate") the title "god of Israel" from Israel's collective cultic and political life and place it in the service of royal politics. If this reconstruction is correct, then the Omrides' political program in the ninth century offers one crucial context for the gradual equation of the gods yhwh and El in ancient Israel, connected in part to the epithet "god of Israel."

Chapter 3 then turns to the question of when and how the title "god of Israel" may have entered into Judah's own political and religious discourse. Among other biblical materials that may reflect this transition, Chapter 3 especially explores three groups of biblical texts from the books of Kings that use the designation "god of Israel" in politically significant ways: Solomon's dedication of the Jerusalem temple in 1 Kgs 8:14–21*, various royal evaluations that use the title "god of Israel," and the prophetess Huldah's two oracles to Josiah in 2 Kgs 22:15–20*. Based on the biblical evidence, it does not appear that the appellation "god of Israel" was a significant feature of Judah's political-religious landscape in the period of the two kingdoms—let alone in the time of a supposed "United Monarchy" under kings David and Solomon in the tenth century. Instead, the title "god of Israel" evidently first appeared in Judahite religious discourse in the seventh century, in connection with the (re)assertion of the political claim that Judah's kings once ruled Israel. The introduction of the appellation "god of Israel" into Judah's politics therefore appears to have occurred as part of a larger set of processes designed to further appropriate and transform Israel's identity in support of Judahite royal ideology following the kingdom of Israel's collapse in 722/720. As a rule, then, Judahite use of the title "god of Israel" begins no earlier than the late eighth century.

Furthermore, I argue that the programmatic identification of the Jerusalem temple as the site of yhwh's "name" in his identity as the "god of Israel" in 1 Kings 8:14–21* may reflect a novel palace perspective on the Jerusalem temple and its ideological significance that served certain royal political interests in the late monarchic period. As mentioned above, the title "god of Israel" does not appear in connection with the Jerusalem temple in early Isaiah materials, Jerusalemite royal psalms, the old building blocks of the David story, or early (albeit post-monarchic) Priestly materials in the Pentateuch. Rather, "yhwh of hosts" (יהוה צבאות) appears to have been the god of the Jerusalem temple and David's royal house during the period of the late Judahite monarchy. Moreover, the identity "yhwh of hosts" seems to have carried with it a highly distinctive political theology, one not clearly articulated in 1 Kgs 8:14–21*. The identification of the title "god of Israel" with the god of the Jerusalem temple in 1 Kgs 8:14–21*, without reference to "yhwh of hosts," therefore looks to be a novel claim, at least in the way it is asserted programmatically, and it is not at all clear that the Jerusalem temple's priestly establishment during the late monarchic period promoted this identification. In its wholly positive portrayal of Solomon and unqualified celebration of David's royal house and the Jerusalem temple as ostensibly living realities, 1 Kgs 8:14–21* deliberately identifies the Jerusalem temple as the location of yhwh's "name" as the "god of Israel," without any sense that the text forms part of a larger narrative meant to explain Judah's loss of monarchy and the temple. As a potentially late monarchic composition, I argue that 1 Kgs 8:14–21* rhetorically reaches back to the time of King Solomon, the legendary ancestor of Judah's kings, to assert a new political and religious reality, one in which yhwh as the "god of Israel" dwells in Jerusalem alongside David's royal house. In attaching the epithet "god of Israel" to the origins of Judah's central political-religious institutions—even as the first Jerusalem temple's cult historically does not appear to have venerated yhwh using the title "god of Israel"—1 Kgs 8:14–21* potentially functions as Judahite royal propaganda, appealing to older Israelite religious tradition to assert the Davidic monarchy's claim to Israel's name. If this reconstruction is correct, the use of the title "god of Israel" in 1 Kgs 8:14–21* can perhaps be seen as one ideological strategy to consolidate royal control over disparate populations in Jerusalem, some of whose social backgrounds and political interests likely lay with the former kingdom of Israel. In this way, the text's association of the title "god of Israel" with Solomon and the Jerusalem temple may have offered one religious-ideological means for Judah's kings to

(re)assert their claim to Israel's name and its people(s), thereby serving the political needs of Judah's kings in the wake of Israel's collapse.

Chapter 4, in turn, explores the title "god of Israel" in clearly post-monarchic biblical writing, focusing especially on the books of Ezra and Chronicles, which together account for almost a quarter of all the occurrences of the epithet "god of Israel" in the Hebrew Bible. While the appellation "god of Israel" proliferates in late biblical texts—in my estimation, at least 80–85% of the Hebrew Bible's references to the title "god of Israel" come from post-monarchic biblical writing—it does not do so uniformly. Many, if not most, late biblical texts and literary strata do not use the designation "god of Israel" at all or do so only sparsely. Rather, the sustained usage of the epithet "god of Israel" is limited to specific post-monarchic biblical books and literary strata, particularly late "deuteronomistic" and "post-deuteronomistic" writing in the Former Prophets, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Psalms, Ezra (but not Nehemiah), and Chronicles. Of these texts, Ezra and Chronicles particularly stand out on account of these books' use of this divine identity in their efforts to (re)define Jewish identity following the loss of Judah's monarchy.

For nearly a century, scholars have interrogated the uses and meanings of Israel's name in Ezra–Nehemiah and the books of Chronicles, yet the appellation "god of Israel" has typically received short shrift in these discussions. Chapter 4 therefore highlights the importance of this divine identity in Ezra and Chronicles, as well as its contribution for (re)constructing Jewish identity in the late Persian and early Hellenistic periods. In this era, the title "god of Israel" comes to be associated with the emerging twin pillars of later Jewish identity, namely Torah and Temple. Perhaps for the first time in history, the title "god of Israel" comes to be applied to the cultic worship of the god of the (second) Jerusalem temple, whose priests now occupied a primary place in Yehud's local political economy. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that the title "god of Israel" only came to be attached to the second Jerusalem temple cult and adopted by some segment(s) of the temple's priestly leadership at a secondary historical moment, which I connect with growing social-economic and political-religious competition between Yehud/the Jerusalem Temple and Samaria/the Mount Gerizim temple. In this way, collective "Israel's" worship of the "god of Israel," without reference to kings, reappears in the Second Temple period, even as its use still appears to have served centralizing political interests. Yet, because Chronicles and Ezra offer two different visions of what it means to be "Israel," these biblical books necessarily furnish two distinct conceptions of the "god of Israel" and what it means to be the "god of Israel's" people.

Finally, Chapter 5 considers how Jewish scribes in the late Persian and Hellenistic periods used the title "god of Israel" in the process of composing certain biblical books. In particular, later scribes responsible for the editing and transmission of certain books, such as Jeremiah and the Psalter, appear to have used this divine identity as part of their efforts to unify these biblical books as literary compositions. While this compositional activity likely served particular social and political agendas, which are briefly touched upon, Chapter 5 especially highlights the literary contribution of the title's use in these biblical compositions. In these biblical texts, the title "god of Israel" appears to function as a compositional link between disparate literary materials, a sort of *Leitwort* binding together large-scale biblical compositions into broader literary wholes. In this way, the title "god of Israel" comes to characterize the deity of particular biblical books and larger biblical corpora, an important step in the identification of the deity of the Hebrew Bible in its entirety as the "god of Israel."

The basic historical arguments of this study, then, are as follows: (1) the origins of the title "god of Israel" trace back to ancient Israel; (2) El was Israel's "original" or earliest god, and his role as the "god of Israel" was traditionally embedded in Israel's decentralized political economy as maintained at the venerable cultic site of Shechem in the Israelite central hill country; (3) yhwh especially came to be identified by the title "god of Israel" within Israel during the ninth and eighth centuries, in connection originally with the Omride dynasty's centralization of political authority at the new royal

capital of Samaria; (4) the title "god of Israel" appears to have only entered into Judah's internal political and religious discourse following the kingdom of Israel's collapse in 722/720, as Judah's kings sought to consolidate political power and (re)assert their claim on Israel's name; (5) the appellation "god of Israel" was not used in the Jerusalem temple's cult during the late Judahite monarchy, even as it appears to have been appropriated in the service of royal politics by palace-affiliated scribes; (6) the epithet "god of Israel" proliferated in post-monarchic biblical writing; and (7) the title "god of Israel" first came to be used in the cult of the (second) Jerusalem temple during the postexilic period, although evidently only at a secondary historical moment, perhaps due to increasing social-economic and political-religious competition with the Samarian temple on Mount Gerizim. <>

JEWISH BIBLE TRANSLATIONS; PERSONALITIES, PASSIONS, POLITICS, PROGRESS by Leonard Greenspoon [Jewish Publicaton Society, 9780827613126]

JEWISH BIBLE TRANSLATIONS is the first book-length history and analysis of Jewish Bible translations from the third century BCE to our day. As such, it is an overdue corrective of an important story that has been regularly omitted or downgraded in other histories of Bible translation.

Examining a wide range of translations over twenty-four centuries, Greenspoon delves into the historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious contexts of versions in eleven languages: Arabic, Aramaic, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Russian, Spanish, and Yiddish. He profiles many Jewish translators—among them Buber, Hirsch, Kaplan, Leeser, Luzzatto, Mendelssohn, Orlinsky, and Saadiah Gaon—framing their aspirations within the Jewish and larger milieus in which they worked. He differentiates their principles, styles, and techniques—for example, their choice to emphasize either literal reflections of the Hebrew or distinctive elements of the vernacular language—and their underlying rationales. As he highlights distinctive features of Jewish Bible translations, he offers new insights regarding their shared characteristics and their limits. Additionally, he shows how profoundly Jewish translators and interpreters influenced the style and diction of the King James Bible.

Accessible and authoritative for beginners to scholars, **JEWISH BIBLE TRANSLATIONS** will enable readers to make their own informed evaluations of individual translations and to holistically assess Bible translation within Judaism.

Reviews

"Translating their Bible has been a major cultural activity of Jewish communities for well over two thousand years and on several continents, and yet few Jews today know about this history or why it matters. This massively learned but accessible volume admirably fills that glaring gap. I highly recommend it to Jewish and Gentile readers alike!"**—Jon D. Levenson, author of *Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam***

"This is an irresistible book. Greenspoon distills a lifetime of learning into a lively account of famous and not-so famous versions of Hebrew scripture in diverse languages—even Chinese. Sages and eccentrics populate his pages."**—Ronald Hendel, Norma and Sam Dabby Professor of Hebrew Bible and Jewish Studies, University of California, Berkeley and author of *The Book of Genesis: A Biography***

"No one has more information at their fingertips than Greenspoon, and this book will inevitably become a resource for anyone working in translation. The book should also appear on course syllabi in Bible Studies as well as the history of Bible translation, and inform scholarship in Translation Studies as well."**—Naomi Seidman, University of Toronto Department for the Study of Religion**

"The only comprehensive guide on the subject, from earliest times to the present, *Jewish Bible Translations* is a masterful work from a master craftsman. By marrying profound erudition with lucid explanations, provocative questions and comments, and a light, sometimes whimsical touch, Greenspoon is sure to engage both scholars and laity alike."**—Alan Levenson, Schusterman/Josey Chair, Jewish History, University of Oklahoma**

"Do all Jews understand the Bible in the same way? The answer can be found in this fascinating and comprehensive volume that explains how and why Jews translated the Bible—from the earliest translation, into Greek, to contemporary English translations, and along the way, Aramaic, Arabic, Yiddish, and European languages. We encounter the translators, their interpretive traditions, and the agendas that inform their decisions. This book is a wonderful entrée into the Jewish engagement with the Bible."**—Adele Berlin, Robert H. Smith Professor of Biblical Studies (Emerita), University of Maryland, and coeditor of *The Jewish Study Bible***

"A masterfully broad survey—both chronologically and geographically—in a wonderfully engaging work by the dean of Jewish Bible translation."**—Marc Zvi Brettler, Bernice and Morton Lerner Professor in Judaic Studies, Duke University, and author of *How to Read the Bible***

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Other Ancient and Religious Texts

Excerpt: Anyone going into a large bookstore these days is confronted with, and perhaps perplexed by, an array of Bible translations. Most of these are produced by and marketed to Christians, primarily Protestants, but also Roman Catholics and adherents of the Orthodox churches. Either in the Bible section, or more often among books classified as Judaica or Jewish studies, one or more Jewish versions may be found. The relative paucity of modern-language translations by and for Jews obscures two related points of preeminent importance: (1) Bible translating began among Jews; and (2) all subsequent translations, whether under Jewish, Christian, or "inter-denominational" sponsorship, are profoundly Jewish.

Sadly, both Jews' and Judaism's substantial contributions to scriptural translation have gone largely unrecognized or underacknowledged, even among specialists who really should know better. In this connection, I call attention to non-Jewish scholars who, discussing the subject of English-language

Bible translation, completely ignore the very existence of Jewish translators and translations. Such is the case with the well-known biblical scholar and translator Jack P. Lewis, who claims, with the title of his book, comprehensive coverage of The English Bible from KJV to NIV (1981)— and yet he mentions not even one Jewish version. And then there are the authors of three popular books, Benson Bobrick, Alister McGrath, and Adam Nicolson, who purport to provide full accounts of the King James Bible, but fail to make any reference to the profound influence Jewish exegetes and exegesis had on this translation' I should also call attention to a scholarly work by Mary Wilson Carpenter, who never mentions English-language Jewish versions in her survey of British Bibles? (See chapter 6 of this book for a corrective to such lapses.)

Even when Jewish versions are discussed, they are sometimes presented in what I would politely term an "odd" manner. Thus, the esteemed Bible scholar and translator Bruce M. Metzger devotes seven pages to modern "Jewish translations" in his wide-ranging study, The Bible in Translation: Ancient and English Versions (2001). But he gives considerably more space to two questionably Jewish versions — God's New Covenant: A New Testament Translation by the philosopher Heinz W. Cassirer, who was born Jewish but did not practice Judaism; and the Complete Jewish Bible by David H. Stern, who self-identifies as a Messianic Jew—than to the undeniably mainstream Jewish versions produced by The Jewish Publication Society. Many other examples could be cited as having failed to provide their readers with crucial information about these topics.

While I am far from the first researcher to consider significant aspects of this process (more on this to come), I am the first to do so in a full-length volume. It is my hope that this current volume—the first-ever book-length study solely devoted to Jewish Bible translators and translations—will help redress these and other imbalances.

Differing Jewish and Christian Understandings

Unlike the Jewish understanding of the Bible, translation of the sacred word is foundational to the Christian system of beliefs and practices. Jesus's very words, which he spoke for the most part in Aramaic, were presented in Greek in the New Testament—that is, in translation. Translation thus lies at the heart of Christianity. Whatever efforts, if any, Jesus's earliest followers made to preserve and transmit his words in Aramaic were quickly and completely overwhelmed by the urge to translate them.

Thus it is that for contemporary Christians, the Bible is a Bible in translation, not the Bible in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. For this reason, very few Christian denominations or groups (outside of some Orthodox Christian churches) make a concerted effort to teach or preach the biblical languages among the laity. Additionally, large numbers of Christian clergy are, or appear to be, at best only superficially acquainted with the original languages of the Bible.

Not so for Jews and Judaism. Even the most nontraditional movements of contemporary Judaism continue to make use of Torah scrolls written in Hebrew, and expect the children in their congregations to be able to read, if not fully comprehend, portions of the Bible as part of becoming a bar or bat mitzvah.

And so it is that no Jewish Bible translation is intended as a practical or implicit replacement of the original. Jewish Bibles point to the original rather than attempt to replace it; in other words, they supplement but never supplant the original Hebrew (for more on this, see the conclusion).

Predominant Themes in Bible Translations

Throughout this book, other larger themes also emerge. One such motif is the contention that it is most productive to view translators in terms of the many contexts — both within and beyond the Jewish community—in which they worked. Appropriately generous room is given to the social,

cultural, historical, political, and theological environments of these translators and to the influence of their often-groundbreaking translations and commentaries on their environs. In this way, the word—especially, the word in translation— may come alive for today's readers in much the same way it did for the original audiences of each version. This, I hope, should in turn go a long way toward validating the observation that translations of the Bible have the power to transform society in addition to reflecting it.

Along with the recognition of historical and cultural realities goes an attendant realization that complex phenomena—which is what major Bible translations are—cannot be subjected to simplistic "either/ or" analysis. Such an approach seeks to locate the development of a given project in a single origin, to the exclusion of any other causes. A prime example of this tendency relates to the origins of the Septuagint. According to one ancient narrative, Ptolemy II, the reigning monarch of Egypt, was the primary force initiating this monumental translation, motivated as he was by the desire to have a Greek copy of the Jewish Law in his prestigious library. These days, many Septuagint specialists reject this explanation in favor of the rationale that the Jewish community of Alexandria, Egypt, needed a Greek translation of the Bible, since Greek was then rapidly replacing Hebrew as the language of everyday life. Given what we know of that period, it seems more likely that both of these factors were at work, rather than one or the other. Life as actually lived is, I fear, messier and less susceptible to compartmentalization than many scholars would like to admit.

This is also true when scholars attempt to simplistically designate the overall relationship between a translation and the text it is rendering. Up until the middle of the twentieth century or so, the most frequently used descriptive terms were "literal" and "free," often presented as if they were polar opposites (that is, "either/or"). "Literal" meant word-for-word, and "free" referred to renderings that strayed from this approach. Most translations up until that time were perceived as literal, and they tended to be more highly valued than freer versions.

But when properly understood, neither "literal" nor "free" is absolute or monolithic. So, for example, most "literal" translators allow themselves to be flexible when handling metaphors and other figurative language, and almost all "free" translators strive for consistency when representing significant theological or historical terminology. So it is that any graphic representation of, say, twentieth-century English-language Bibles should be seen as a continuum from interlinear (hyper-literal) to paraphrase (showing little, if any, linguistic or stylistic connections with the source language). These then constitute further support for a nuanced approach to reading and evaluating Bible versions.

In the 196os the linguist and translator Eugene Nida, a Protestant, introduced such a perspective to help not only in characterizing the work of Bible translators but also in explicating their motives? For "literal," Nida substituted the term "formal equivalence"; "free" became "functional equivalence." Here, Nida intended more than a change in terminology. He correctly discerned that the more literal translator sought to maintain as much of the original's form (grammar, syntax, etc.) as possible, believing that the meaning of a text was inextricably linked to its form (hence, formal equivalence). Those who rendered more freely concentrated on what the text meant (or how it functioned) for its original audience and how we would say that in our language today.

Within this context, it might seem intuitive that authentic Jewish translations would/should exhibit features characteristic of formal rather than functional equivalence; in other words, they would fall on the literal side of the continuum. Although a theoretical argument of this sort could plausibly be constructed, the evidence showcased in this book points to a far more varied conclusion. Once again, an "either/or" bifurcation is not fair either to the myriad translators we introduce or the multilayered translations we analyze.

Overview of This Volume

Each chapter of Jewish Bible Translations centers on Bible versions in a single language or related languages, and the chapters generally progress chronologically. Within each chapter, I place considerable emphasis on the target audience for each translation, to the extent that we can determine it. In my view, knowing whom a translator intended to reach with his or her work is essential to evaluating the translation's level of success within its original context.

Every chapter ends with a section I call "Concluding Thoughts." In part a summary, these remarks are also intended to bring together major themes within the chapter and to offer them as a stimulus for comparisons and contrasts with other Jewish versions. In this way I highlight both distinctive and shared features of Bible translations for Jews across many cultures extending over two thousand years.

Chapter 1 delves into the first translation of the Bible, initiated in the first quarter of the third century BCE (before the Common Era). Known as the Septuagint, this translation, from Hebrew into Greek, came to serve as something of a model for subsequent Jewish translations. It is my emphasis on the Septuagint as a Jewish document that distinguishes this discussion and analysis. So, in addition to a vast store of introductory material— for example, the legendary and historical origins of this version, starting with the rendering of the Torah; the techniques used by the earliest and subsequent translators; its reception by its first and later audiences; and the transmission of its Greek text— there are ample discussions of the ways in which the Septuagint might have functioned among Jews. What does it tell us about the interpretation and application of Sacred Writ in Hellenistic Jewish communities? How and why did Jews revise these Greek renderings? What did the talmudic Rabbis think about translation in general, and the Septuagint in particular?

Another perspective on the Septuagint is offered by the observation that some Greek translators followed the Hebrew wording of their source text literally, while others fashioned their renderings more freely. We explore possible reasons for these different approaches and identify the consequences for readers in the targeted audience for each translation. In the process we discover, among other things, how elusive the term "Septuagint" is; how varied its contents; and how much we (Jews, especially) owe to Christian scribes, without whom we would have at best a few scattered fragments rather than copious collections of this Greek Bible.

The Targums, translations from Hebrew into Aramaic, are the focus of chapter 2. According to Jewish tradition, Aramaic translation of biblical material can be traced back to the fifth century BCE, when the scribe Ezra read the Torah at Jerusalem's Water Gate, as narrated in chapter 8 of the book of Nehemiah. However, the term Targum is best reserved for specific Aramaic texts that date back to the first century CE (the Common Era). So, there are distinctive Targums to the Torah, the Prophets, and most of the books that make up the Writings. We carefully examine the various approaches taken in each Targum. All together, they consistently combined literal renderings of the Hebrew text with avoidance of anthropomorphisms in relation to God, endeavored to simplify and update biblical language, and added all sorts of explanatory material that the translators presumably felt would not only be valuable to readers but, on occasion, be entertaining.

It is by no means easy to determine why the Targumists rendered their Hebrew texts in such a distinctive way. But we can fruitfully speculate on the effects such a text would likely have had on those who first heard or read it. Moreover, since portions of the Targums were used in synagogues in tandem with Torah and Prophetic readings in Hebrew, these Aramaic versions exerted considerable direct influence within Jewish communities for centuries, and have continued to guide biblical interpreters to this very day.

Chapter 3 introduces Jewish translation into Arabic. Special attention is paid to Saadiah Gaon, a towering intellectual figure of Judaism active in the Babylonian Jewish community of the tenth century who nonetheless remains largely unknown outside of a circle of academic specialists. He is the first Jewish translator we know a lot about. His high level of involvement within the Jewish community is something of a pattern for many who followed him. Our knowledge of Saadiah's life and activities forms the context for analyzing his translation. In an effort to engage a distinct readership (a common objective among Jewish translators), he elected to privilege the linguistic and cultural sensitivities of his Arabic-speaking audience. He also used his translation to combat those Jews (especially the Karaites) who opposed the Rabbinic interpretations and beliefs he championed.

We uncover yet another salient feature of his and many later Jewish translations: Their rendering of the Hebrew is matched, if not exceeded, by the extensive commentaries they constructed. On the basis of extant remains of Saadiah's translation-with-commentary (or perhaps more properly, commentary-with-translation), it is difficult to determine whether Saadiah produced one or more than one translation of portions of the Hebrew Bible, depending on whether a version was envisioned as a free-standing text or in tandem with commentary. Such analysis also plays a role in our discussion of German- and English-language Bibles for Jews.

There is a long and rich history of "Translation into Yiddish (Judeo-German) and German," the subject of chapter 4. From the1200s until late in the 1700s, Central European Jews had a choice of several different styles of Yiddish-language versions. Even after the Enlightenment leader Moses Mendelssohn and his collaborators created the first translations into "proper" German, Yiddish versions were still being prepared—up until World War II. But the i800s belonged to Jewish translators who aimed their German-language editions (texts, commentaries, introductions, sometimes illustrations) at specific segments of the population—from Reform to neo-Orthodox. These translators (including some working through the first decades of the twentieth century) varied considerably in their approach: Some allowed Semitic elements to show forth in German, while others produced a version that read smoothly in the target language; some gave pride of place (or exclusive placement) to traditional Jewish exegetes in their commentaries while others allotted space to Christian scholars at the forefront of distinctly nontraditional critical approaches; some used new technology to mass produce low-priced volumes and others enhanced their own work with illustrations, line drawings, maps, and other reader-friendly features. As we compare these German-language versions, it becomes clear that translators, along with their sponsors and publishers, were expanding the scope of what a Jewish version of the Bible could accomplish by taking into account all factors that readers would encounter, not just the translated text itself.

Chapter 5 covers Jewish translations into five European languages: Spanish, French, Italian, Hungarian, and Russian. As readers will see, there is a notably unique feature of Bible translations into Spanish: Two of the earliest Old Testament versions owe their existence to the efforts of individual Jews as translators or benefactors. Jewish Bibles in the other four languages span the nineteenth century. We are fairly well informed about the translators of all these versions. They were well-educated leaders of their respective Jewish communities who used their translations to benefit their contemporaries in what might appear to be contradictory ways: The versions they produced (text, commentary, etc.) were intended both to educate their fellow Jews on appropriate exegetical techniques and to ease their way into fuller participation in the largely Christian societies of which they were a part.

But, as we will see, they understood these internal and external concerns as complementary means to strengthen their Jewish communities and provide for growth in the future. This analysis highlights the many goals Jewish translators set for themselves in fashioning their modern-language versions.

These efforts were also in keeping with the guiding principles of the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment).

Chapter 6 introduces readers to Jewish translations into English. The Anglo-Jewish translations produced in Great Britain from the late eighteenth century through the end of the nineteenth century offer a fascinating window into how the Jewish community of those times adapted to an array of external and internal pressures. From there we turn to developments in the United States, beginning with Isaac Leeser in the mid-nineteenth century and ending with the latest early twenty-first century versions on the market. For much of this time Jewish translators on both sides of the Atlantic transmitted substantial portions of the Protestant King James Version (KJV), retaining its style while jettisoning its Christian interpretive framework.

Since World War II, Jews, working as individuals and on committees, have undertaken pioneering efforts to update their English-language versions to attract designated segments of the North American Jewish Bible-buying public. To an extent, these segments can be identified as traditional or nontraditional in religious belief and practice. But Jews also have a choice based on, for example, whether the Bible is for a special event or life-cycle observance, intended for use in the synagogue or home or school, and is envisioned as a Bible in and of itself or in tandem with Scripture in Hebrew. In this regard, Jewish translators and their sponsors have mirrored parallel developments in the larger Christian (mostly, Protestant) Bible industry.

Of the many options, the **JPS TANAKH**, or New Jewish Publication Society version (NJPS), published by The Jewish Publication Society, has come closest to establishing itself as the standard translation across North American Jewish denominations and movements. For those interested in purchasing a Jewish Bible or supplementing their current collection, the chapter concludes by acquainting readers with the various English-language Bibles currently on the market.

Chapter 7, "Non-Jewish Translations with Jewish Features," analyzes three other examples of translations. The first consists of Yiddish translations, especially of the New Testament, most of which were prepared by Jews who had converted to Christianity. These texts, from the second half of the nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth, were sponsored by Protestant Bible societies and distributed by missionary societies that undertook evangelical activities within European and North American Jewish communities.

The second example is a twentieth-century "Jewish Bible" (according to its title) published by "Messianic Jews," in which their rendering of the New Testament seeks to restore Jesus to his original, Jewish context—more for evangelizing than historical reasons, The last example is the work of a Christian minister who converted from the traditional Judaism into which he was born and eventually moved to China, where he produced an influential Bible translation that exhibits a number of characteristically Jewish features.

The inclusion of this material provides readers with insights beyond what we typically consider a Jewish translation of the Bible. And it encourages readers to consider where the boundaries lie between Jewish and non-Jewish biblical versions.

Taking a broad view of Jewish Bible translations, the conclusion offers three separate but interrelated analyses. First, a comparison of how Jewish translators have portrayed God and humans demonstrates that the choice of a translation really does make a difference when readers seek understanding of what the Hebrew Bible says and means on central issues. Second, an identification of seven commonalities uniting almost all the Jewish translators and translations we have brought together from over two millennia offers insight into characteristics that have typically featured in

versions aimed at a Jewish audience. Finally, we consider where Jewish Bible translators are likely heading and what Jewish translations might look like in the future.

In this process, readers will come to know Jewish scholars who have made significant contributions to the study of Jewish Bible translation. Two twentieth-century giants in the field of Jewish studies, Max L. Margolis and Harry M. Orlinsky—both of whom produced volumes on Bible translation in general, with generous coverage of Jewish versions — offer illuminating insights. Based on their respective experiences as editors of English-language Bibles for The Jewish Publication Society, Margolis and Orlinsky, whose paths crossed briefly in the early 1930s, had very different views on what constitutes the most effective Bible version for Jewish audiences. Their contributions have stood the test of time and constitute the foundational elements upon which (or whom) I build. Others whose work I cite are Frederick Greenspahn, Edward Greenstein, Joseph H. Hertz, David H. Katz, Raphael Loewe and Everett Fox, Nahum and Jonathan Sarna, and Naomi Seidman.

Using This Volume

This book has been designed to fully engage readers at all levels of Jewish knowledge, from scholars and clergy to lay leaders, participants in adult study groups, and general readers who may or may not be versed in Hebrew or other languages beyond English. Thus I have provided translations for all passages from the Hebrew Bible as well as those in languages other than English. I have also clearly explained all technical terminology. In addition, through The Jewish Publication Society (JPS), I am providing a complementary study guide that includes questions to stimulate further discussion and an extensively annotated bibliography. To use it, go to https://jps.org/books/jewish -bible-translations and click on Resources.

I hope this book (along with its guide) finds a place in adult education courses or the like. Within these settings, instructors might well consider following a different order than that presented within the volume itself, which is largely chronological within selected language groups. I recommend starting with chapter 6, "English-Language Versions," since of course these will be the most accessible for English speakers and readers. From there it might make most sense, in some contexts, to go back to chapter 4, on Judeo-German (that is, Yiddish) and German translations, followed by chapter 5, on other selected modern European versions. Next on the syllabus might be chapter 2, the Aramaic text of the Targums, which is likely to be more familiar to the Jewish general public than either the Greek of the Septuagint (chapter 1) or the Arabic of Saadiah Gaon's Tafsir (chapter 3). In short, there is something to be said for moving from the more to the less familiar.

Also, be assured that proceeding out of order will not be problematic for students. Realizing that readers might well wish to approach the material in a different order than the one fashioned for the volume, I have ensured that successive chapters, which do build on what precedes them in some ways, can also be fully comprehended and appreciated in whatever order they are read.

In other more or less informal educational contexts, leaders or teachers may wish to use select material. So, the sections on French, Italian, and Russian translations, for example, would be useful for courses that survey, or center on, developments in Jewish life throughout those cultures. Or the analysis of the Septuagint as a Jewish document or the KJV as a repository for substantial Jewish interpretation would enhance learning of Bible translations beyond the usual academic contours.

As a university professor for more than forty years (and still counting!), I can also envision this book for use in any number of courses in biblical studies, Jewish studies, and translation studies. Courses in all three of these areas are inherently interdisciplinary and largely fashioned on the basis of what professors judge to be most pedagogically relevant. Chapters 1 and 2, on the Septuagint and Targums, respectively, would be particularly useful for biblical studies. For classes in Jewish studies, I would recommend the chapters on Arabic translation (chapter 3) and translation into Yiddish and

German (chapter 4). Those teaching courses in translation studies should find the remaining chapters—"Translations into Other Selected Languages" (chapter 5), "English-Language Versions" (chapter 6), and "Non-Jewish Translations with Jewish Features" (chapter 7) —especially beneficial.

In this connection, I would add one more point for consideration. The study guide for each chapter (again, visit https://jps.org/books /jewish-bible-translations and click on Resources) contains (1) supplementary material, including accessible books and articles, as well as reliable websites, for further study and research; (2) a listing of key terms; and (3) a variety of questions geared toward stimulating further creative thought among students.

I also encourage clergy to consider using this work as they compose sermons or otherwise address their communities more broadly. Still today, many Jews do not realize that reading an English-language Bible they have at home is not the same as reading that text in its original language. A modern-language — or even medieval-language —version of the Bible cannot supplant the text in its original language. As a supplement, however, such translations have long given value and strength to their communities. Versions in English or other languages can continue to provide this support, so long as their readers know how these texts can function.

As a practical matter, this book should help rabbis (as well as cantors, educational directors, and others) achieve their principal goals. Frequently, after reading a passage from the Hebrew Bible to the congregation, rabbis draw from different renderings of the same Hebrew text in order to provide multiple interpretations of what is often elusive language. Similarly, rabbis basing sermons on the Torah portion of the week will usually bring together a number of passages on the same theme from several biblical books. And, as I demonstrate, even on such central concerns as the nature of God and the make-up of humanity, markedly different perspectives emerge when one version is read against another. Knowing the context in which the given translator worked enables the English wording of, say, NJPS or The Living Torah or Everett Fox or Robert Alter to take on its full and appropriate meaning. Simply put, this book provides the big picture. And with it, rabbis and others can more confidently and knowledgeably cite translations from other languages, going back as far as the Septuagint and the Targums.

Unlike many other topics within the field of Jewish studies, there is not much of a history of sustained study of Jewish Bible translations as a centuries-long, widespread phenomenon. As an unabashed advocate for the value —maybe even the necessity— of knowing about Jewish Bible versions for a full appreciation of what it has meant and continues to mean to be Jewish, I have felt obliged to plant the seeds as much as harvest the crop (if I may use agricultural metaphors). Many treasures are to be unearthed in the pages to follow. I hope that when readers encounter, and consider, Jewish Bible Translations, they share in the excitement I have had in researching and writing it. <>

The **JPS Torah** at Fifty (2012): A Celebration of a Translation and a Translator by Leonard Greenspoon, *Klutznick Chair in Jewish Civilization, Professor of Classical & Near Eastern Studies and of Theology, Creighton University,* Omaha, Nebraska

As we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the first publication of the JPS Torah and the 20th yahrzeit of its editor-in-chief Harry M. Orlinsky, it is appropriate to take the time to consider how this translation and its lead translator fit into the long history (over 2,300 years) of Jewish Bible translations and translators. We observe characteristics shared by Jewish versions, as well as distinctive features of the JPS translation. This allows us to

acknowledge the role played by tradition and innovation. In the process, specific examples from the text of the JPS translation and from the life of Harry Orlinsky are highlighted.

In early May 1953, Harry M. Orlinsky delivered an address at the annual meeting of The Jewish Publication Society (JPS). At the age of 45, Orlinsky was a professor at the recently merged Hebrew Union College and Jewish Institute of Religion (HUC-JIR). Handpicked by JIR founder and president Stephen S. Wise, Orlinsky had already established a formidable reputation as a Jewish Bible scholar in what was still a predominantly Protestant field.

The title of Orlinsky's presentation on this occasion—"Wanted: A New Translation of the Bible for the Jewish People"—aptly summarized his goal that day, which in fact had by then been his goal for some years. He ardently argued for a new English-language edition of the Hebrew Bible, prepared by Jews for Jews (as well as others) that would take the place of the 1917 JPS translation.

No one was better prepared than Orlinsky to make this case and to play a pivotal role in carrying out the project. When Orlinsky, Canadian-born, completed his undergraduate education at the University of Toronto, he was determined to continue his studies at Philadelphia's Dropsie College, in particular to work with Professor Max L. Margolis. As it happened—and as Orlinsky knew well—Margolis had been the editor-in-chief of JPS's earlier Bible translation. A young Orlinsky arrived in Philadelphia in the fall of 1931 and immediately began his studies with Margolis and other Dropsie faculty. Alas, after a short period of time, Margolis fell ill and had to leave the classroom, never to return. He died some months later.

Although their time together was very brief, Margolis' influence on Orlinsky was profound. Like his revered teacher, Orlinsky took a keen interest and active role in Bible translation, particularly in the Septuagint, the Greek text that was the earliest translation of the Hebrew Bible.

In Orlinsky's case, his participation in Bible translation can justly be termed groundbreaking. During the 1940's, he was a member of the committee that produced the Revised Standard Version Old Testament, published in 1952, with the distinction of being the first Jewish scholar to participate in a Bible version otherwise prepared by, and primarily for, Christians. Later, Orlinsky was instrumental in the New Revised Standard Version, first published in 1990. Again, he was the only Jewish scholar to participate in that translation. (It is well worth noting, as Orlinsky convincingly argued, that the absence of Jewish scholars on translation committees was decidedly not the same as the absence of Jewish scholarship, which decisively influenced translations from the Vulgate to the King James Version and beyond.)

Orlinsky had once judged the shelf life of a Bible translation as about 50 years. So, in one sense, his pleas in the 1950's to replace the 1917 JPS version might have seemed a bit premature. But it was not simply the passage of years that motivated Orlinsky's call for a new Jewish translation. He was as aware as anyone that during the intervening years scholarship had made substantial advances toward a better understanding of the biblical text. This was true in terms of linguistics, grammar, and stylistic interpretation, as well as archaeology, paleography (the analysis of ancient forms of writing), and comparative religion.

But there was more. A conscientious reader of the JPS translation of 1917 could not fail to observe that it looked and sounded very much like the classic King James Version. This similarity was not by chance. Margolis, who was himself an immigrant from Lithuania, felt that the diction of the King James Version would serve as an appropriate model for teaching English to immigrant Jews. He saw his work in terms of instruction in language as well as in theology. In this regard, Margolis consciously modeled himself on the example of Moses Mendelssohn, the Jewish Enlightenment leader who in the late 1700's produced a Bible version in High German to replace earlier Yiddish

(Judaeo-German) renderings for a community that was now able to join polite society—but only if they abandoned the "uncouthness" of Yiddish for the elevation of proper German.

There are many positive features that speak in favor of making use of King James-type language and diction in a Bible translation. It is for this reason that the King James Version and its descendants continue to be best sellers in the huge market that includes Bible translations and commentaries. At the same time, it must be admitted that it is not an easy task for a modern reader to get through a chapter or more of the King James Version, given that its style, diction, and vocabulary reflect the 16th rather than the 21st century. (Although the King James Version appeared in 1611, its language was already a bit outdated.)

For Orlinsky, the antiquated nature of the King James Version was not at all charming or suitable. Quite the contrary: it contradicted what was for Orlinsky the primary function of a translator of the Hebrew Bible: to make the text intelligible for those who are not able to read the Hebrew in its original. A translator needed to carefully gauge the style of English with which members of his audience were comfortable. The translation that resulted from this approach would look and read like most any other piece of literature contemporary with the translator's audience.

And that indeed is how the JPS translation that first appeared in 1962 was intended to function.

Formal vs. Functional Translations

For many years, the overall differences between a version like JPS 1917 and the JPS 1962 were subsumed under the broad categories "literal" and "free," respectively. While there is some truth to these designations, they are not necessarily the best way to characterize them. Today, it is more usual to use the terms "formal" and "functional." A "formal" translation is more literal because every effort is made to retain the form of the original in the new rendering. A "functional" translation tends to be freer because the basic questions asked—What meaning were the original authors trying to convey to their audience? How do we say that today?—naturally lead toward renderings that are natural-sounding to the new audience. Because biblical Hebrew and American English are such different languages, a "formal" English translation will often sound foreign; a "functional" rendering will sound much more like natural English (but much less like the original Hebrew).

Harry Orlinsky was the primary proponent of "functional equivalence" translation within the Jewish world during the second half of the 20th century. Within the larger community of Bible translators, he was joined by a number of Protestants associated with the American Bible Society, who produced the **Good News Bible** and later the **Contemporary English Version**.

Average readers of a Bible translation, who are not scholars, will nonetheless quickly discern whether they are looking at a "formal" or a "functional" version. With respect to the Hebrew Bible, phrases such as "And it came to pass" or "Behold" and constructions such as "and. . . . and. . . . and" are clear markers that this is "formal equivalence" translation. Subordinate sentence structures (for example, "When . . . ," "After . . . ," and "Although . . .") and easily recognizable vocabulary alert readers to the "functional" nature of the translation.

There is yet another way to differentiate between "literal" and "free" translations, which can be expressed spatially. With a "formal" translation, the reader must move toward the text. This movement is necessary to bridge the gap between the modern reader and the ancient text. With a "functional" translation, we can say that the text moves toward the reader. This is the result of the translators' decision to minimize "foreign" elements in the text as a means of making it more immediately intelligible to the reader.

At first thought, it seems that a "formal" translation, with its literal approach, will always be more accurate than a "functional" version. But Harry Orlinsky argued against this view. He pointed to a number of biblical passages where the "functional" rendering conveyed what was to his mind the actual meaning of the Hebrew original, while the "formal" representation in fact misrepresented what the Hebrew meant.

In order to better explain such a comparison, here are a few examples from the JPS 1917 more "formal" version and the "functional equivalence" of the new JPS translation. (In each example, the 1917 rendering precedes the newer one; bolded words and phrases are key elements for comparison):

> Deuteronomy 24:16
> *The **fathers** shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the **fathers; every man** shall be put to death for **his** own sin.*
> ***Parents** should not be put to death for children, nor children be put to death for **parents: a person** shall be put to death only for **his** own crime.*

> Judges 12:9
> *And he had thirty sons, and thirty daughters he sent **abroad,** and thirty daughters he brought in from **abroad** for his sons.*
> *He had thirty sons, and he married off thirty daughters **outside the clan** and brought in thirty girls from **outside the clan** for his sons.*

> Jeremiah 31:29–30 (similar expression found in Ezekiel 18:14)
> *In those days they shall say no more: The **fathers** have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for **his** own iniquity; **every man** that eateth the sour grapes, **his** teeth shall be set on edge.*
> *In those days they shall no longer say: The **parents** have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But **all** shall die for **their** own sins; the teeth of **everyone** who eats sour grapes shall be set on edge.*

In other instances, as Orlinsky also insisted, the new translation revised and corrected older English renderings by mining the riches of the Jewish exegetical traditions:

> Genesis 1:1–2
> ***In the beginning God created** the heaven and the earth . . . And **the spirit of God hovered** over the face of the waters*
> ***When God began to create** heaven and earth. . . . And **a wind from God sweeping** over the water*
> Isaiah 7:14
> ***Behold, the young woman shall conceive, and bear** a son.*
> ***Look, the young woman is with child and about to give birth to** a son.*

Nonetheless, I would not see all changes as positive:

> Ezekiel 2:1 (and frequently elsewhere in Ezekiel)
> ***Son of man***
> ***O mortal***
> Proverbs 31:10
> ***A woman of valour** who can find? For her price is far above rubies.*
> *What a rare find is **a capable wife!** Her worth is far beyond that of rubies.*

The **JPS Torah** and **JPS Tanakh**'s Contributions to the Jewish Community

The Jewish Publication Society has had a distinguished publication record since the first appearance of its new Torah translation 50 years ago and the entire Tanakh in 1985. The English-language text has appeared, in its entirety or in parts, in a number of different formats, acknowledging the fact that Jews use the Bible somewhat differently for worship, study, and presentation at celebrations and holidays. My favorite format is the one that first appeared in 1999, with the Hebrew original and the JPS English translation on facing pages. I especially like this side-by-side format because it serves as a constant reminder that for Jews the modern-language rendering should always point to the Hebrew original.

The **JPS Tanakh** has had an ever-wider and deeper influence within the Jewish community and the larger community of scholars and worshippers for whom the Hebrew Bible is sacred writ. It appears in both editions of the influential Reform commentary edited by Rabbi Gunther Plaut (W. Gunther Plaut, ed., **The Torah: A Modern Commentary**. New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1981; and URJ Press, 2005) and the current Torah commentary used in Conservative synagogues (David Lieber, Jules Harlow, et al., eds., **Etz Hayim: Torah and Commentary**. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2001). The scholars who wrote the widely praised **JPS Torah Commentary** (**Genesis**, commentary by Nahum M. Sarna [1989]; **Exodus**, commentary by Nahum M. Sarna [1991]; **Leviticus**, commentary by Baruch A. Levine [1989]; **Numbers**, commentary by Jacob Milgrom [1990]; and **Deuteronomy**, commentary by Jeffrey H. Tigay [1996]) used the JPS translation, as did the editors of the extraordinarily valuable **The Jewish Study Bible** (Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). The **JPS Tanakh** in a somewhat revised form can also be found in the thought-provoking **Contemporary Torah** (David E. S. Stein, ed., **The Contemporary Torah: A Gender-Sensitive Adaptation of the JPS Translation** [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2006]).

To conclude, the Bible, in its original and in translation, should function as the springboard for our interaction with the text, for it is not lifeless nor is it static. In the case of the **JPS Tanakh**, this interaction is enriched, for at least some of us, by our personal knowledge of and experience with one or more of its translators.

Orlinsky's Genius

As editor-in-chief of the **JPS Torah**, Orlinsky exerted a decisive and, I would say, positive influence on the JPS rendering of the entire Hebrew Bible. It is very difficult for me to believe that his death took place 20 years ago. For, like all the texts he worked on, Harry M. Orlinsky is someone who invited us—one and all—to interact with him. When I read the JPS translation, especially those sections that he and I had discussed at length, I hear his voice and I experience again the pleasure of being in the company of one of the greats.

I remember, for example, asking Orlinsky how he felt about proposing a rendering for the first verses of Genesis that differed so markedly from the traditional wording of the King James Version. He told me that, prior to working with JPS, he had never heard or read other English translations of Genesis 1. Although I found this a bit difficult to believe, I knew better than to challenge him on a point such as this. Or in fact to challenge him on his memory of any of the hundreds of scholars and others with whom he had come into contact. He was, after, all almost always correct and always affable, at least with me.

His erudition, his sense of humor, his spot-on memory of just about everyone he ever met—the unique mixture of these and so many other traits—made Harry M. Orlinsky the unforgettable

person he was. Moreover, it is in part these traits of his that make the **JPS Tanakh** the very fine translation that it is.

We will never again see another Harry Orlinsky, or Max Margolis, or Moses Mendelssohn. But hopefully, we will be fortunate enough someday to come upon another Bible translation that bears its creator's genius in the way these three Jewish translators put their mark on their respective versions. We are, if I may put it this way, blessed and enriched by such individuals within our community. <>

On My Right Michael, On My Left Gabriel: Angels in Ancient Jewish Culture by Mika Ahuvia

[S. Mark Taper Foundation Imprint in Jewish Studies, University of California Press, 9780520380110]

Angelic beings can be found throughout the Hebrew Bible, and by late antiquity the archangels Michael and Gabriel were as familiar as the patriarchs and matriarchs, guardian angels were as present as one's shadow, and praise of the seraphim was as sacred as the Shema prayer. Mika Ahuvia recovers once-commonplace beliefs about the divine realm and demonstrates that angels were foundational to ancient Judaism. Ancient Jewish practice centered on humans' relationships with invisible beings who acted as intermediaries, role models, and guardians. Drawing on non-canonical sources—incantation bowls, amulets, mystical texts, and liturgical poetry—Ahuvia shows that when ancient men and women sought access to divine aid, they turned not only to their rabbis or to God alone but often also to the angels. **On My Right Michael, On My Left Gabriel** spotlights these overlooked stories, interactions, and rituals, offering a new entry point to the history of Judaism and the wider ancient Mediterranean and Near Eastern world in which it flourished.

Review

"Moving deftly across the full gamut of Jewish sources from late antiquity—from rabbinic literature to synagogue liturgy to magical and mystical texts—Mika Ahuvia demonstrates that angels, as objects of speculation and veneration as well as agentive entities in their own right, stand at the very core of Judaism as a religious tradition. This magnificent study capitalizes on the diversity of approaches to angels within the textual and material record in order to map the dynamic interaction among the various types of Jewish religious knowledge and expertise in this formative period."—Ra'anan Boustan, Research Scholar, Program in Judaic Studies, Princeton University

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Excerpt: Angelic Greetings or Shalom Aleichem

Peace be upon you, ministering angels, angels of the Most High,
Of the King, the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.

Come in peace, angels of peace, angels of the Most High
Of the King, the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.

Bless me in peace, angels of peace, angels of the Most High,
Of the King, the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.

Depart in peace, angels of peace, angels of the Most High,
Of the Kings of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.
—TRADITIONAL HEBREW SONG

Although many Jewish households begin the Sabbath by singing "Shalom Aleichem" (lit. "Peace be upon you") and welcoming the angels to their home, few people dwell on the literal meaning of this song's words. This popular seventeenth-century Hebrew song greets the angels of God beginning with "the ministering angels" and, alternating with calling them "the angels of peace," welcomes them to the home in peace, asks for their blessing, and wishes them a peaceful departure. The song's most common melody was composed in Brooklyn in 1918, but it is sung by Jews around the world.3 Despite the ubiquity of this song in Jewish domestic life, Christian conceptualizations of angels have become so powerful and pervasive that people often do not realize that angels have a firm biblical and Jewish pedigree. Twentieth- century scholarly accounts of Judaism's pure, monotheistic origins, taught in seminaries as well as the academy, have obscured the role of angels in the Bible, classical Jewish texts, and Jewish ritual practice. This book aims to reveal the significance of angels in the foundation of classical Judaism.

The book makes three interrelated arguments. First, it argues that conceptualizations of angels were an integral part of late ancient Judaism and Jewish society. Descriptions of angelic beings can be found in every layer of biblical text, and, in the Hellenistic period, Jewish myths enlarged the role of angelic beings so that, by late antiquity, the praise of the seraphim was as sacred as the biblically commanded Shema prayer, the angels Michael and Gabriel were as familiar as the patriarchs and matriarchs, and guardian angels were as surely present as shadows on a sunny day. Contrary to common understanding, angels were not coupled with demons in the late antique Jewish imagination; they were imagined on their own terms and as independent beings. Angels served as intermediaries, role models, and guardians, with descriptions and invocations of them appearing in a range of contexts, including in ritual- magical, exegetical, liturgical, and mystical sources.

This book's second argument—as well as its methodological contention—is that considering additional sources provides a fuller account of the role that angels played in ancient Jewish culture. An array of sources from antiquity attests that people took for granted that the invisible realm was crowded with mediating beings: angels could be found at home, on the streets, in the synagogues as well as in the multilayered heavens. Scholarship of ancient Judaism has focused primarily on rabbinic texts, and scholars of rabbinics have, for the most part, explored other dimensions of rabbinic textual production, deploying literary, legal, ritual, exegetical, and comparative methods. Recent scholarship has shown, however, that rabbinic texts do engage meaningfully with theological questions. This book argues that one neglected theological topic is angels in rabbinic literature. Moreover, and just as importantly, rabbinic texts only capture one dimension of late antique Judaism. Considering rabbinic and biblical sources alongside material evidence and seemingly less authoritative sources such as magical spells and synagogue poetry produces a more accurate picture of ancient Jewish thought about angels, in part by capturing the output of more than just a small group of elite

men, as has often been the case in previous scholarship. Indeed, angels appear frequently in incantation bowls, mystical sources, and liturgical poetry that existed alongside, in conversation with, and in tension with rabbinic sources.

Thirdly, examining references to angels in these diverse sources, in conversation with one another, demonstrates that rabbinic ideas about angels developed over time and in dialogue with other genres and materials. As time passed and angels became more prominent in other corpora, rabbinic writers began to accept that angels feature in other Jews' piety. Passages in the Babylonian Talmud suggest accommodation over time. This study of traditions about angels thus also reveals that the different registers of Jewish culture were, in fact, in contact in antiquity and that they evolved together: ideas about angels were exchanged and flowed between rabbis, ritual practitioners, synagogue poets, and mystics.

The fact that the function of angels was also debated by Christians and other adjacent communities in the late antique Mediterranean and Near East does not make angels any less significant for the study of Judaism. Abraham the patriarch is considered a foundational figure to Jews, Christians, Muslims, and others, and yet no one would question his significance for Jewish self- understanding. Likewise, angels were central to the religious communities of late antiquity, Jews among others. As I shall show, some conceptions of angels can be distinguished as specifically Jewish while others reflect the common beliefs of the inhabitants of the late antique Mediterranean. In the conclusion, I more broadly situate my findings about angels in Judaism in the religious landscape of late antiquity.

To return to the opening example: many of those Jews who sing "Shalom Aleichem" each Friday are unaware that it is believed to have been inspired by a tradition in the Talmud:

> Rabbi Yose the son of Yehuda said: two ministering angels accompany a man on the eve of the Sabbath from the synagogue to his home, one good and one evil. And when he arrives at his house, if a lamp is lit and a table is prepared and his bed covered, the good angel says, "may it be like this on another Sabbath too" and the evil angel answers "amen" against his will. And if it is not, the evil angel says, "May it be like this on another Sabbath too" and the good angel answers "amen" against his will.

In a few sentences, this passage manages to address many of the problems and questions associated with angels in antiquity: How do angels relate to their charges? What do they do? How do angels respond to human behavior? Equally important are the questions not asked by this rabbi: do angels exist? What do angels look like? Who oversees them? It was obvious to the ancients that angels were subordinate to God. The other two questions may seem natural to modern readers, perhaps, but were not to ancient people, who did not dwell on the appearance of angels and accepted the reality of divine beings crowding the invisible realm.

Though found only in the sixth century CE Talmud, this short story about angelic visitation is attributed to Rabbi Yose, one of the most quoted sages in rabbinic literature and a contemporary of Judah the Patriarch, the illustrious redactor of the Mishnah, the foundational document of the rabbinic movement (ca. third century CE). The story's attribution places it in chronological and geographical proximity to the beginning of normative Judaism. This tradition imagines that angels can be found wherever Jews congregate on the eve of the Sabbath (the holy climax of the Jewish week), and that angels follow people home from these gathering places. Once at the individuals' homes, the angels observe whether ritual and domestic preparations were made for the Sabbath and recite a benediction to God that affirms human behavior—for better or worse. In doing so, the angels, both good and evil, also acknowledge their limited authority under God.

As is the rabbis' way, they do not provide straightforward theology in their foundational documents, but formulate stories, legal pronouncements, and teachings instead. These traditions may be suggestive of the attitudes, at least, of the final redactors of the Talmud. The editors of the Talmud

seemed to have no problem attributing a story about the active presence of angels in Jews' life to the son of Judah the Patriarch. They transmitted a story that admitted the presence of "good" and "evil" angels, who nevertheless appear to operate within certain parameters under God's authority. I discuss this source at great length among other later rabbinic sources (see chapter 6), but for now we may note that this story answers some questions but leaves others unanswered: Why are angels at home with Jews? And what is an angel exactly?

Defining Angels

No single definition of angels holds true across all time periods or across all religions.7 The term angel in English derives from the ancient Greek aggelos, which can refer to a divine or human messenger. All the inhabitants of the Greco- Roman Mediterranean believed that the gods employed messengers that mediated between the divine and human realm (see aggeloi of the Iliad 2.26, 2.63, and 18.165). As in Greek, so in Hebrew, the term mal'akh can refer to a divine or human messenger. Mal'akh is related to the Hebrew word for divine work, melakha, a crucial term in Genesis's description of the origin of the Sabbath: "On the seventh day God finished the work that He had been doing, and He ceased on the seventh day from all the work that He had done" (Gen 2:2). Work here is melakha, from the triliteral root for L- A- KH, "to send" or "to work." Mal'akhim, or angels, are sent out to accomplish the work of God. The last prophetic book in the Hebrew canon is not named for a prophet but simply named Malachi: "my angel" or "my messenger." In Genesis the creation of the world and the Sabbath go hand in hand; so too do divine work and God's multitude of angels (Gen 2:1 states "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all their multitude," with angelic beings implied). This is one clue as to the angels' function: look for them as agents in works of creation (broadly conceived), near the Sabbath (see the rabbinic tradition and song above), and as messengers from God. Less common terms in the Hebrew Bible for angelic beings include "sons of God," "holy ones," and "the heavenly host." In the rabbinic corpus, angels are referred to as mal'akhim or, just as commonly, as the ministering angels (mal'akhei ha-sharet), with the latter term emphasizing the role of angels as servants of God.

The stories of the Torah provided Jews with a great deal of material for conceptualizing angels, but the Psalms proved equally important. One influential verse averred that God "made his angels winds / his servants flaming fire," suggesting that angels were somehow insubstantial, fiery yet invisible (Ps 104:4). That angels were made of fire was one of the only angelic characteristics upon which all later Jewish sources agreed. Like the rest of the inhabitants of the ancient Near East, Jews believed that the stars, moon, and sun were distant fiery divine beings, and scattered references in the Bible ensured they were understood as God's angels, fixed in the heavens but also able to exercise influence on earth. And yet, this phrasing proved capacious enough for multiple interpretations of the changeable nature of the angels.

Alongside the view of angels as messengers of fire and wind, coexisted the imagining of angels as fantastic hybrid beings (so- called "Mischwesen") like the cherubim and seraphim. Among the cultures surrounding ancient Israel, the cherubim and seraphim had distinguished iconography; no Israelite would confuse the fierce winged- lion cherub in the temple with the snake- like seraph. These animalistic features of cherubim and seraphim connoted power and the ability to ward off evil in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. Though references to these creatures is found throughout the Hebrew Bible, it is the visions of Isaiah and Ezekiel, especially the verses that became part of the liturgy, that left a lasting impression in Jewish conceptualization of these divine beings who surrounded God's throne. In time, the differences between these divine beings seem to have become blurred and forgotten in the minds of Jewish interpreters, who understood all of these different hybrid creatures as angelic beings worthy of imitation in liturgical practice and prayer.

By late antiquity, the rabbis commented that cherubim referred to beings with youthful faces, much like the cupids popular in Greco- Roman art. Where the prophet Isaiah saw only the six- winged

seraphim reciting "Holy, Holy, Holy" in the ancient Jerusalem temple, the late antique liturgical poet Yannai would imagine the cherubim, ophanim, holy creatures as well as "angels" in general reciting this praise of God, equating the various categories of these divine beings. Similarly, in incantation texts ritual practitioners did not dwell on the appearance of invisible beings but tended to be explicit about their invocation of God's subordinates, calling them mal'akhim before listing their names and describing what they hoped the angels would do for their clients.

Psalms and other biblical stories attest to the ancient Israelite belief that angels served ordinary persons, pious households, and the people of Israel on behalf of God. Psalm 91:11 assured hearers that God "will command his angels concerning you / to guard you in all your ways. On their hands they will bear you up / so that you will not dash your foot against a stone." This verse suggested angelic intervention on behalf of the individual with God's approval. Biblical stories demonstrated that angels had appeared to the meritorious patriarchs and matriarchs, but also to disconsolate figures like Hagar, the mother of Ishmael, comforting her when she was expelled and abandoned with her son in the wilderness. The book of Tobit illustrated how an angel might intervene to protect a pious household with Raphael in disguise as a helpful relative. The Exodus story affirmed that God sent an angel to guard the nation of Israel in the wilderness (23:20), and the book of Daniel reaffirmed angelic protection of the nation with Michael fighting on behalf of Israel in the heavens against the angelic representatives of Persia and Greece (10:13–21). Late antique Jews believed that angels were available to ordinary men and women and they were aware that angels were a cross-cultural phenomenon.

The Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo explained that those beings whom the philosophers called daemons Moses called angels (De Gigantibus 1:6). This description highlights the neutral disposition of angels, who could be sent on beneficent or maleficent missions by God. As I shall show in the following chapters, both early and late rabbinic traditions agree with Philo on this point: there were angels of good (or peace) and angels of evil and destruction. Philo and the rabbis insisted on a divinely guided universe, where no invisible being could be out of step from God's plans. The existence of demons was also taken for granted by the peoples of the Near East, including the ancient Israelites, who were castigated for turning to demons in the Torah and in prophetic texts. In my reading of the evidence, later Jews did not confuse angels of evil with demons; they had a different terminology and the rabbis even offered several etiologies for demons, which are not discussed in relationship to angels. Demons were distinct and diverse beings, also at home in the ancient Near East, and later linked to the Hellenistic Jewish myth of fallen angels on the one hand and in conversation with local traditions about demons in Persian Babylonia on the other hand.

demons, most do not.

In the Jewish texts of the Hellenistic period, we find reference to angels by the names of Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael. In the book of Daniel 10:20–21, Michael and Gabriel are called "princes" (sar), a title that will be used for top-ranking angels in the Hebrew mystical texts as well. In Greek texts, chief angels become known as archangels ("ruling angel"). In later Jewish interpretation, Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael were identified with the three anonymous men who visited Abraham at Mamre and foretold that he and Sarah would have a son (Gen 18). This proved to be one of the most ainfluential and popular and later Muslims.26 The location became a pilgrimage site in late antiquity." Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael became part of the shared culture of the Mediterranean world: they can be found in the rabbinic, liturgical, ritual, and mystical texts of late antique Jews but also in the Christian and Hellenistic- Egyptian polytheistic texts more broadly. This trio of angels can be found in incantation texts of late antiquity alongside other angelic names that are unpronounceable, recognizable only by

their location in lists of angelic names or their "- el" suffix. From extant sources, we can see that Gabriel and Michael proved to be the most commonly invoked angels among Jews.

Late antique Jews did not feel the need to define the category of angels, nor did they write an angelology or attempt to place divine beings in a hierarchy. And yet a modern reader may need a general definition of angels before proceeding any further into the findings of this book. From an etic perspective, for the Jews of late antiquity, angels were subordinate yet powerful divine beings, usually invisible to the human eye, who were ever present both in the heavenly and earthly realms and who could intervene for good or ill in human life in accordance with human behavior and God's will. Angels were an integral part of the religious landscape in antiquity, one deeply grounded in the biblical heritage, and yet, as I shall show, the significance of angels in people's lives varied greatly based on personal and familial preference, local custom, communal practice, religious ideology, and regional factors. My corpus- by- corpus approach will demonstrate this variation, even as I highlight what is particularly Jewish about angels, and the ways Jews argued and exchanged ideas about angels in late antiquity. Only much later Jewish and Christian medieval angelologies would seek to overcome these deeply local and diverse perspectives on the invisible realms.

This work makes no ontological claims as to the existence of angels but chronicles how ancient Jews believed in angels and made them into real presences in their everyday lives. These beliefs were anchored in biblical texts, in popular myths, and in dialogue with the other inhabitants of the ancient Near East. Angels were a particularly attractive mediating force because they could be used to circumvent established hierarchies even as they drew on the deep wells of inherited traditions. This book uncovers how angels made their way into the foundational practices and worldviews of ancient Jews and makes sense of why angels continue to play such a significant role within and without institutional Jewish settings.

Methodology And Scholarship

This book's interest in ancient Jewish "beliefs" about angels poses a tricky methodological challenge: How can modern historians know the intentions of ancient subjects? This study does not claim to uncover the thoughts of ancient Jews. Rather, each extant story, ritual incantation, liturgical piyyut, or mystical tradition about angels is treated as an example of one tradition once expounded in a rabbinic study house, one ritual object produced in a practitioner's workshop or performed in the home, one prayer recited in the synagogue, or one passage recited for mystical purposes. By placing each source in its historical and cultural context, insofar as is possible given our limited data from antiquity, I reconstruct the assumptions about angels that underpin rabbinic narratives, incantations, liturgical poems, and mystical texts about angels. Beliefs about and practices involving angels, just like any other Jewish beliefs or practices, were imparted and taught to ancient Jews in particular settings, and we can use these extant examples to think about how they were taught.

In each chapter, I describe the particular methods and problems pertinent to each genre of evidence under examination, but I begin here with a few general remarks about my approach overall. The sources cannot be treated as transcripts, of course, or fully representative of a conversation in the homes or streets of ancient Jewish towns. Rabbinic attributions to named figures cannot be taken at face value or dated with any certainty. And yet traditions associated with leading figures may reveal what disciples of the rabbis wished to associate with their predecessors and may be indicative of later rabbinic attitudes toward angels. As I shall show, rabbinic traditions critical and supportive of engagement with angels are associated with some of the most famous historical rabbis.

In the 1960s and '70s, scholars of classical Judaism took note of the number of traditions about angels in rabbinic texts, and they paid special attention to the theological implications of traditions about angels in rabbinic literature. However, lack of diachronically and synchronically precise studies elided tensions among various rabbinic corpora, which I hope to draw out over the course of three

chapters on rabbinic texts. This book differs from previous surveys in that it tackles the biblical and rabbinic evidence in conversation with neglected sources, thus placing the "normative" sources and authorities in proper perspective. The emphasis on rabbinic religiosity in modernity has obscured the extent to which angels played an important role in the life of ancient Jews. By bringing other sources on angels into view, this book provides a very different description of Judaism than has been offered before, decentering the rabbis and showing their approach to the divine as one possibility among other equally Jewish options. I intentionally begin this book with ritual evidence from the sixth century CE, showing that angels feature prominently in Jewish ritual sources and not just in opposition to demons. After detailing the Babylonian and Palestinian ritual evidence, I turn back to the earliest rabbinic sources from the third century CE and then trace them diachronically forward. The rabbinic evidence may still occupy three chapters of this book, but in this arrangement, the rabbis are properly framed by other Jewish voices from ritual, liturgical, and mystical sources, who all had as much, if not more, to say about angels. This book shows the rabbis in conversation with ritual practitioners and synagogue leaders and argues that they accepted the influence of other Jews in shaping their own prayer and practices involving angels.

In recent decades, specialists in more neglected areas of Jewish studies such as magic, mysticism, and liturgy have demonstrated the contributions of their research to the reconstruction of late antique Jewish society. They have also noted the role that angels fill in these texts, but their findings remained limited to publications in their respective fields. Only scholars writing about Jews through a lens of comparative religious studies have highlighted that the world of ancient Jews was filled with angels, but they do not elaborate on this assertion. The studies that have been devoted to angels on a corpus-by-corpus basis in recent decades, for example, in the Bible, in the literature of the Second Temple period, in rabbinic literature, and in patristic literature, now enable a more comprehensive study of angels in late antique Jewish sources.35 This book will show these different genres of material may be fruitfully engaged for the reconstruction of daily Jewish life and the role of the angels therein.

My approach to Jewish magic differs from others in that I treat incantation bowls and amulets as the ritual practice of a wide swath of the Jewish population rather than the domain of male specialists alone. In part, this is because I argue that the performative aspect of incantations was key to their efficacy. As I have contended elsewhere, incantations are best viewed as collaboration between practitioners and clients seeking to overcome a problem in the invisible realm. Incantation bowls or amulets are the artifacts of these relationships and these ritual performances. As such, they offer a window onto the diverse relationships that Jews had with entities in the invisible realm. I also treat Jewish magical objects as evidence of men's and women's concerns. Literacy in the ancient world may have been limited to a small segment of the population and slanted male, but a spectrum of literacy rather than a binary of literacy/illiteracy prevailed. Thinking about a spectrum of engagement with text provides a more accurate model of ancient people's engagement with reading and writing practices. Women's engagement with textual production should not be ruled out a priori; indeed, at least a few extant incantations proclaim a female identity and were written in the first-person feminine."

Although all the known synagogue poets were male, men and women were in attendance in the synagogue. Reading the liturgical and ritual-magical texts closely, one senses that synagogue poets and ritual practitioners interacted with women regularly. Overall, the topic of angels in late antique Judaism does allow access to more ordinary men's and women's concerns than other subjects might. Investigating Jewish attitudes to angels reveals Jewish men and women as dynamic participants in late antique trends, both in Palestine and Babylonia.

My decision to examine evidence from Jewish communities as far apart as Roman Palestine and Sasanian Iran is based on the fact that religious ideas and rituals were not limited by geographical

boundaries in late antiquity. Like Paul's epistles, which offer evidence of widely scattered religious communities communicating with each other, Jewish sources also provide a window onto a time when religious ideas were shared over a vast geographical area, despite the boundaries of the Roman and Sasanian Empires. Most famously, rabbinic traditions traveled with learned disciples from Palestine to Babylonia and back again." Likewise, magical spells from Palestine influenced Babylonian incantation formulas and vice versa. Jewish Palestinian synagogal poetry was exceedingly popular in Babylonia despite Babylonian rabbinic disapproval of 141 While a few traditions in the Hekhalot literature point to a Babylonian context, its complex literary development suggests development "at different places and different times," potentially in Palestine and in Babylonia. Fully appreciating the complexity of Jewish sources on angels may require considering the possibility that ideas traveled from afar and were adapted by different sectors of society.

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EARLY THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH FRANCISCAN THOUGHT edited by Lydia Schumacher [Series: Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie, De Gruyter, 9783110682403] Open Access

The thirteenth century was a dynamic period in intellectual history which witnessed the establishment of the first universities, most famously at Paris and Oxford. At these and other major European centres of learning, English-born Franciscans came to hold prominent roles both in the university faculties of the arts and theology and in the local studia across Europe that were primarily responsible for training Franciscans. This volume explores the contributions to scholarship of some of the leading English Franciscans or Franciscan associates from this period, including Roger Bacon, Adam Marsh, John Pecham, Thomas of Yorke, Roger Marston, Robert Grosseteste, Adam of Exeter, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, and Bartholomew of England. Through focussed studies of these figures' signature ideas, contributions will provide a basis for drawing comparisons between the English Franciscan school and others that existed at the time, most famously at Paris.

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Excerpt: Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought

Introduction

In the academic year 2018 —19, I had the opportunity to organize a series of conferences on various aspects of the early Franciscan intellectual tradition before Bonaventure, specifically as it developed at the University of Paris. At its founding around 1200, this institution became the first degree-granting university in the world. Soon after its establishment, a number of other universities were founded, for example, at Oxford, and Cambridge; however our conferences originally bracketed the investigation of intellectual trends that emerged in England for the sake of focusing on a rather neglected period in Paris. The product of these efforts was a series of three edited volumes which were published open access with De Gruyter in 2020 and 2021, and respectively dealt with the sources and context, doctrines and debates, and the legacy of early Parisian Franciscan thought.

The founders of the Franciscan school at Paris included Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who played a significant role in composing the so-called Summa Halensis, a major four-volume work that was named for and overseen by Hales between 1236-45. The purpose of the Summa was evidently to lay down a distinctly Franciscan tradition of philosophy and theology for the very first time. In the aforementioned edited volumes, contributors undertook to assess the work of Hales, Rochelle, and other early Franciscans who also contributed to the Summa Halensis, while maintaining a focus on the Summa itself as a larger Franciscan synthesis. This massive work has long been neglected in scholarship on account of the belief that it is merely an `Augustinian encyclopaedia' that early Franciscans composed for the sake of defending the Bishop of Hippo's longstanding tradition in the context of increased interest in the recently-translated major works of Aristotle.

In contrast to this way of thinking, the studies submitted to the volumes showed that early Franciscans at Paris were not mere re-formulators of Augustine's ideas but highly innovative thinkers who engaged with a diverse range of sources and deployed them to their own creative ends. These sources included but were not limited to Augustine, as well as Aristotle, and especially the new philosophical works of the 11th-century Islamic philosopher Avicenna and the Jewish philosopher Avicebron, whose major works had been translated from Arabic in the late 12th century, around the same time as Aristotle's were rendered from Greek. The study of such sources helped to produce a clearer picture of the shape and distinctiveness of early Parisian Franciscan thought. In due course, this generated further questions about the contemporary developments that transpired at the young university of Oxford and the Franciscan school that existed there from at least 1230; it thus gave birth to this inquiry into early 13th-century English Franciscan thought.

As is well known, Agnellus of Pisa, minister provincial of the order, appointed Robert Grosseteste as the first master of the Oxford school, even though he was not a Franciscan, on account of his sympathy with the order and his own impeccable academic credentials. Under his tutelage, a whole generation of 13th-century English Franciscans emerged which went on to cultivate other talented English Franciscan academics in turn. Many of these important figures have been studied in their own right, oftentimes, by the distinguished contributors to this very volume. Such research is demanding, given the size of the output of some of the English scholars in question and/or complications around

the manuscript traditions needed to determine their authentic works. As a result, the opportunity has not often arisen to try to draw conceptual comparisons between English and Parisian Franciscans, who worked in the major universities that existed at the time.

This volume cannot hope to remedy that gap in scholarship entirely but seeks to lay the foundation for doing so by presenting studies on a number of important English Franciscan thinkers who flourished mainly though not exclusively in the early 13th century. As we will discover, the figures selected for study here wrote on topics which help to highlight comparisons between their thought and that of their Parisian contemporaries who worked during the first half of the 13th century. This is arguably true notwithstanding the fact that the Parisian and English schools exhibited starkly different characteristics. In Paris, for instance, the study of theology quickly came to center around the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1150/60), a work which organized key quotations from Scripture and the church fathers according to theological themes which provided a basis for commentary and debate in the university. As early as the 1220s, Alexander of Hales began employing the Sentences as the organizing principle for his lectures, so that in the 1220s and 30s, the use of the Sentences alongside the Bible as a tool for teaching in Paris became increasingly common.

By 1240s, consequently, the Sentences had come to serve as the university's standard textbook in theology, and a commentary on the Sentences was established as the medieval equivalent to a doctoral degree.' In such commentaries, scholars took Lombard's authoritative quotations as a point of departure for developing their own systematic approach to key topics that were debated at the time. The first and foremost among these, following the introduction of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, was the question whether theology is a science in the Aristotelian sense of providing principles that allow for drawing conclusions about the status of various phenomena. This question — and the use of the Sentences in general — baffled some English Franciscans like Roger Bacon, and especially the Franciscan lector Robert Grosseteste, both of whom argued that the Bible should remain the sole object of theological study and that deviating from this method could invite problematic and unorthodox speculations. The first actual Franciscan lector of the school at Oxford, Adam Marsh, seems to have held the same opinion.'

On account of his intervention and that of his colleagues, the incorporation of the Sentences into the curriculum at Oxford was delayed until 1267. Thus, the first English Franciscan to comment on the Sentences while studying in Paris in the 1250s, namely, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, had to navigate carefully around Grosseteste's opposition to that very project and did so by trying to equate commenting on the Bible with the work of theology proper. This was not an altogether uncommon practice at the time. After all, the Summa Halensis had also referred to the teaching of theology as `sacra Scriptura'. In doing so, however, the Summa only intended to imply that the work of theology was to articulate conceptually the doctrines that can be derived from Scripture, which pertain among other things to the creative and salvific work of Christ. The mode of this Summa as well as the Sentences commentaries composed in Paris and elsewhere was unmistakably that of theological argument rather than biblical comment.

This difference in theological method might seem to situate the English and Parisian schools at some distance from one another, especially if we consider that members of the English school pursued another area of research that was largely foreign to their Parisian counterparts, namely, that of science. However, the preoccupation with scientific questions is not necessarily as incompatible with the theological drive of the Parisian masters as it may seem at first glance. As Cecilia Panti and other scholars have pointed out, Grosseteste and his followers in the English Franciscan school saw scientific examples, particularly concerning the nature of light, as helpful and important for explaining and teaching difficult theological concepts that arose in the reading of the Bible. As Raedts sums it up:

Grosseteste had wished theological teaching and theological method to be traditional, based on the Bible, using allegory as its explanatory tool. His interest in natural philosophy was motivated by that purpose: to sharpen those tools. (...) The intellectual expression of that deep conviction was his use of the allegory of light: light as the unifying force of the universe was the origin of all existing things, and even now everything participates in the form of light.

As this quote suggests, English Franciscan scholars pursued the tasks of theology, but simply assumed a slightly different approach to doing so. To recognize this is therefore to acquire a basis for discerning the obvious parallels in the actual theological and philosophical ideas that were advanced within the two schools. As noted, this volume can only begin to highlight some of those similarities, which of course do not efface or negate the remarkable diversity and individuality of English let alone Parisian Franciscan thinkers, each of whom tended to have his own way of elucidating common themes or claims, and some of whom even departed from those Franciscan party lines altogether. In what follows, however, I will try to gesture towards areas of synergy by offering a summary of each of the contributions to this volume which highlights — unless the author chose to do so already — some areas of compatibility with the Parisian school that has been my own focus so far. As a preliminary to that discussion, I offer below some brief biographical details on each of the main thinkers that will be discussed within the pages of this work.

Robert Grosseteste (c.1170-1253): Robert Grosseteste was born into a poor family from Suffolk. In his early years, during which he wrote a number of scientific works, he was apparently on the staff of the bishop of Hereford. Around 1220, he completed the first medieval commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, and around 1225, he began to lecture in Oxford, where he took an increased interest in theological problems and in applying scientific principles to addressing them. Although he never joined the Franciscan order himself, Grosseteste (c.1168— 1253) was appointed in 1229/30 by the English Franciscan minister provincial, Angellus of Pisa, as the first lecturer to the Oxford Franciscans. In this role, he enjoyed a particularly prolific period, composing several philosophical commentaries and theological treatises including his famous Hexaëmeron on the six days of creation. In 1235, he was made bishop of Lincoln, in which capacity he served until his death in 1253.

Alexander of Hales (c.1185 —1245): Alexander was born in what is now Halesowen, England to a noble family but spent the majority of his academic career in Paris. He completed his masters in the arts at Paris in the first decade of the 13th century before turning to study theology there. Between the years 1224-27, he became one of the first scholars to write a Gloss on Peter Lombard's Sentences and later established this text as a crucial part of the curriculum in theology at the University of Paris. In 1236, he joined the Franciscan order and became regent master of the Franciscan school at Paris, thus bringing his chair in the university theology faculty into the possession of the Franciscan order.

Adam of Exeter (d. 1233/34): Adam of Exeter (de Exonia, de Oxonia or Rufus) was born in Exeter but taught in Oxford, which is why he is sometimes also called Adam of Oxford. There, he was a student of Grosseteste and a friend of Adam Marsh, whom he encouraged to join the Franciscan order. He entered the Franciscan order himself in 1229 and died young in 1233/34 after traveling to the holy land to preach the gospel in 1232/33. As Cecilia Panti shows in her contribution to this volume, the main information about his life can be found in Thomas of Eccleston's chronicle on the coming of the Friars Minor to England, in Grosseteste's letters, which include high praise for Adam and his intellectual abilities, and in Thomas of Pavia's Dialogue on the Deeds of the Holy Friars Minor. signs of resonance with the Summa Halensis. In 1253, Rufus travelled to Paris and lectured on the Sentences for a second time before returning to England in 1256 to succeed Thomas of York as the fifth lector for the Oxford Franciscans

Thomas of York (b. c.1220, d. before 1269): Thomas joined the Franciscan order before 1245 and probably studied the arts in London before moving to Oxford by 1249. In 1253, he became the fourth lector to the Franciscans at Oxford, succeeding Adam Marsh, who held him in very high regard. From 1256/57 until his death, York acted as the sixth Franciscan lecturer at Cambridge. His magisterial Sapientale, currently the subject of a critical edition overseen by Fiorella Retucci, shows many signs of independent thinking while at the same time reflecting key aspects of the budding Franciscan intellectual tradition.

Bartholomew of England (b. before 1203, d. 1272): The first mention of Bartholomew places him at Paris in 1224, as a new convert to the Franciscan order, though he is of unknown English parentage. Prior to this time, he may have studied at Oxford. Between 1224-31, Bartholomew lectured on the Bible in Paris and was then sent to Magdeburg as lector for the Franciscan school there, which had been established in 1228 by Simon of Sandwich. During his time in Magdeburg, Bartholomew compiled his famous 19-book encyclopedia, De propñetabus rebus. This was completed by around 1245 - a date established in part by his use of the first version of the Summa Halensis. The encyclopaedia became a textbook at Paris in 1284 and was a very popular source both within and outside the order. He was later stationed in Austria, Bohemia, and Poland.

Roger Bacon (c.1220 - c.1292): Roger Bacon was born in Ilchester in Somerset, England. He likely studied the arts in Oxford before moving to Paris, probably before 1245, where he lectured on Aristotle's works of natural philosophy. Around 20 years later, he seems to have altered his perspective, pursuing a more `scientific' path under the influence of Robert Grosseteste and Adam Marsh, his teacher. This reorientation post-dated his entry into the Franciscan order, probably around 1257, an event which may have taken place under Marsh's influence. Bacon's great sevenpart Opus maius covers the whole range of natural knowledge, including the sciences, languages, mathematics, astronomy, astrology, and optics, and it had the prob able purpose of aiming to convince the then Pope Clement IV of the need for educational reform in Latin-speaking Europe.

John Pecham (c.1230 - 92): John Pecham was born in Sussex, England. After joining the Franciscan order in the early 1250s, he spent his novitiate at Oxford, moving to Paris around 1257 to study under Bonaventure and later serving as a master of theology between 1269-71. During this time he proved an outspoken opponent of the radical Averroistic Aristotelianism that was emerging in Paris and of Thomas Aquinas, whom he perhaps unjustifiably implicated in this movement. In 1272, he returned to Oxford to serve as regent master of the Franciscan school there. In this context, Pecham apparently became the first to lecture on quodlibetal questions. He also wrote commentaries on Lombard's Sentences and on some books of the Bible, grappling with the major theological questions of the day; his treatises on optics and astronomy appear to be influenced by Roger Bacon, whom he met in either Paris or Oxford. In 1275, he was appointed as minister provincial of the Franciscan order in England, and then archbishop of Canterbury, a position he occupied from 1279 until his death in 1292, thereby replacing the Dominican Robert Kilwardby, upon the latter's appointment to the cardinalate by Pope Nicholas I.

The chapters of this volume cover the aforementioned thinkers in roughly chronological order, starting with an initial contribution by Michael Robson, who provides invaluable context on the development of the Franciscan order and especially Franciscan education in England during the 13th century. As Robson notes, the Franciscans arrived on British shores in 1224 and became established in Oxford, in the Parish of St Ebbe's, that same year, settling also in Cambridge in 1225. From that point, and in the 1240s especially, the number of local convents mushroomed, so that by 1250, there were 43 Franciscan houses. These local convents were the lowest `rung' in a three-tier system of Franciscan education in England and more widely, where friars gained basic training in the arts, philosophy, theology (including the scriptures and the fathers of the church), as well as science, and

above all, the ministry of preaching and hearing confessions. According to Robson, the seven custodial schools that existed at an intermediate level `grounded friars in philosophy and theology, grooming them for higher studies.' As Robson notes, the custodial school of London had a particularly impressive list of members, including William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham.

Ultimately, the studio generalia at the new universities of Oxford and Cambridge trained friars to serve as lectors back in the convents or custodial houses. A small number of such lectors could be selected to go on and take the baccalaureate and the doctorate, ideally at Paris, where each province of the order was permitted to have two students in residence without additional financial and practical provisions in place. This privilege was only normally awarded to those who showed exceptional scholarly promise — approximately 5% of the students for the lectorate — after they had already served a period as teachers in the local and custodial schools. The Paris studium in question had been founded in 1219, although its students initially had no teacher of their own and attended lectures in the university's theology faculty, particularly those delivered by Alexander of Hales. As we know, he later became a Franciscan in 1236, perhaps under the influence of his Franciscan pupils. At this point, he became regent master of the Franciscan school in Paris, which had been officially founded in the city in 1231 and to that point benefited also from the teaching of other university masters who had joined the order before him.

In his chapter, Giles Gasper builds on this important historical context concerning the 13th-century English Franciscan school by exploring the curriculum Robert Grosseteste may have employed in teaching the Franciscans between c.1229 - 35. Gasper's inquiry is based on research concerning the Englishman's works on natural philosophy, many of which were apparently prepared during his time as Franciscan lector. This research has partly been conducted in the context of Gasper's major `Ordered Universe' research project on Grosseteste, which is based at Durham University and funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council U.K. However, the chapter also draws heavily on Gasper's study of Grosseteste's correspondence, pastoral care treatises, theological works, Dicta, and his Anglo-Norman poem, Le Chateau d'amour. The importance of such sources is emphasized by external witnesses such as the Franciscan core of the Lanercost Chronicle and Thomas of Eccleston's De adventu (on the arrival of the Franciscans in England).

As Gasper notes, the scientific works were important for Grosseteste in that they provided spiritual analogies which helped him explain biblical passages to the Franciscans. This, as noted previously, represents a key difference between the education that was delivered to Franciscans at Oxford versus at Paris, where Alexander of Hales lectured to the Franciscans from the Sentences even before he himself became a friar in 1236. As mentioned above, Grosseteste was among the first to react against this approach, and as a result of his opposition to the Sentences tradition, he never prepared a systematic or comprehensive account of every major theological issue that was debated in the day such as can be found in Alexander of Hales' Gloss, and especially in the Summa Halensis, which served as the basis for Franciscan education in 13th-century Paris.

Despite the significant disparity between approaches to theological education in Paris and Oxford, Raedts and others have highlighted numerous areas in which Grosseteste's treatment of many issues resonates with that of his Parisian colleagues.

These include his views on the reasons for the Incarnation, free will, the six days of creation, and the conception of Mary. As Robson also noted, these were among the areas in which Grosseteste pioneered theories that came to characterize the Franciscan school more widely, all the way down to John Duns Scotus. Further support for this contention can be derived from the Anglo-Norman verse-treatise, the Chateau d'amour discussed by Gasper, in which Grosseteste offers an extended

analysis of the loss and restoration of creation, and a poem that incorporates an allegorical description of the Virgin Mary as the castle in which Jesus Christ took refuge.

The next chapter by Aaron Gies undertakes a fascinating inquiry into possible images of Alexander of Hales that can be identified in the manuscripts of his works. This search is one the author took up as part of an effort to identify a cover image for a forthcoming English translation of Alexander's Gloss on Lombard's Sentences to which he himself has contributed. In particular, Gies draws attention to an image of a friar that is found in the manuscript Vat.lat. 705, f. 1ra, which likely dates to the late 1200s and probably contains the oldest extant image of Alexander of Hales.

In her chapter, Cecilia Panti summarizes the state of knowledge concerning the life and works of a little-studied friar, Adam of Exeter or of Oxford, who was a pupil of Robert Grosseteste at Oxford. As she observes, two short works are attributed to Adam in 13th-century manuscripts: an Anglo-Norman exposition of the Our Father, which was probably Adam's last work, and the Questio de fluxu et refluxu maris (question on the tide and ebb of the sea). A summary of Adam's theory of sound is also referenced by Master William of Clifford. On the basis of these works, Panti explores how Adam applied, and in some cases diverged from, Grosseteste's theory of light. In his known works, Adam held that the `different degrees of incorporation of light rays in watery or aerial particles of different thickness produce diverse effects, such as sound, tides and heat. All these phenomena are due to the convergence of light rays and the subsequent scattering of the incorporated light.'

The identification of Adam's opinions on this score allows Panti to further attribute to him a short treatise De calore solis (on the heat of the sun), commonly held to be by Grosseteste, as well as a short work on rainbows, known by the incipit Inter omnes impressiones, both of which present ideas consistent with Adam's physics of light. Also tentatively attributable to him on this basis are a set of glosses on Boethius' De institutione musica, which argue that celestial bodies continuously pour forth light which, in passing through sublunary air, incorporates within aerial particles and produces sound. As regards these glosses, Panti notes that 'the theory of sound as the incorporation of light in air particles spread largely among the early English Franciscans, including Alexander of Hales and Richard Rufus, Geoffrey of Aspall, and others.' In that sense, she shows that there is definite resonance with the early Franciscan school at Paris.

In her contribution, Emilie Lavall^e examines the themes of counsel, deliberadon, and illumination in the letters of Adam Marsh, which provide an important and indeed the sole surviving window into his theological perspectives. As she notes, Adam was highly regarded in his lifetime as a spiritual counsellor and advisor to major leaders of both state and church, even though he himself never held a high ecclesiastical office. In her study, Lavallée explores how Adam encouraged his readers to seek both divine and human counsel in order to reckon with the uncertain temporal circumstances of their lives. For Adam, divine counsel in particular is needed to compensate for the deficiencies and limitations of human knowledge. Whereas these obscure or darken our understanding of what to do in various circumstances, Adam argues that God who is the source of all certain truth can provide the illumination that is needed to discern the right course of action in any situation. This discernment should be sought through prayer, which opens us up to receive God's wisdom and thus makes it possible rightly to pursue an active life of ministry in the world.

While Adam regards divine counsel as the most significant resource for these purposes, Lavallée stresses that he also recognizes the value of the counsel that can be gained from other human beings who are illumined by divine wisdom and can therefore help in deliberating about what is best to do in different cases. In addition to providing such counsel himself, Adam's letters show that he sought counsel from respected figures like Grosseteste. In the give and take of human counsel, he

acknowledges that debate and disagreement may arise amongst those with different opinions on how to proceed in dealing with a matter. However, Adam regards such conflicts as an essential part of the process of achieving wisdom and a knowledge of the truth. As Lavallée beautifully summarizes, he defines counsel as a crucial mediator between the certainty of divine truth and the uncertainty of human circumstances, between the divine light and the darkness and shadows of the world.

As is well known, the trope of divine illumination was ubiquitous in the 13th-century Franciscan school, including at Paris 35 There it was advocated by John of La Rochelle who treated the topic in his Summa de anima and was likely responsible for its coverage in the Summa Halensis as well. Thus, it is quite poignant to see how this crucial Franciscan doctrine was applied in Adam Marsh's letters. Although Adam does not articulate his specific understanding of the doctrine in this context, it is not difficult to imagine that he may have entertained a similar view of illumination to his early Franciscan contemporaries. The most famous formulation of this theory from the period can be found in the Summa Halensis, whose authors followed Philip the Chancellor in identifying three main transcendental qualities, which characterize any given being (ens) and render them similar to God. These qualities include unity, truth, and goodness, which respectively define the identity of a thing as opposed to others; render it knowable as such; and useful for a purpose. The original source of this doctrine of transcendentals - which were not named as such until Scotus — was actually Avicenna, for both the Franciscans and the Chancellor.

In a development on Philip's account, the Halensian Summists argue that their triad of concepts does not merely capture the key qualities of beings; it is also impressed upon the human mind, where it constitutes what Augustine had described as an image of the Trinity. Although this image, or better, the concepts of unity, truth, and goodness it entails, do not provide the objects of human knowledge as such, they are essential to gaining a correct understanding of every being God has made and how it reflects the highest Being, or God, thus exhibiting his unity, truth, and goodness in some way. By relying on those concepts in performing acts of knowing, consequently, the human being becomes the beneficiary of divine illumination. As Lavallée rightly points out, however, such illumination or insight is only attainable in the Franciscan view for the 'pure of heart', who not only seek to know God but also understand that it is him that they know whenever they know anything at all.

In his study, Neil Lewis sets out to explain how Thomas of York, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Grosseteste sought to resolve the apparent tension between the many truths that can be known in the world and the single source of all truth, namely, God, a topic which had also been discussed by earlier thinkers like Augustine and Anselm. As Lewis demonstrates, York's view is an elaboration of Grosseteste's. Both authors argue that there are many truths which somehow signify or `supposit' the su preme truth in an indirect or oblique way. The relationship between truths and Truth can be discerned by those who are pure of heart but is obscured for those who whose darkened hearts render them incognisant of the Truth they obliquely know. For his part, Rufus similarly holds that every reference to a natural `truth' involves what he calls an analogical reference to the supreme truth, which is the only truth that is true in an unqualified sense.

As Lewis notes, however, what Rufus has in mind here is an analogy of proportionality which differs from the kind of analogy one finds, for example, in Thomas Aquinas, in that it posits a direct but limited relationship between truth and Truth rather than a wholly incommensurable one. In contrast to his contemporaries, Rufus concludes on this basis that `there is just one truth as a principle, but many in respect of participation.' While he might therefore seem to differ from Grosseteste and York who posited numerous truths, Lewis argues that the difference between supposition or signification on the one hand and analogy and participation on the other is not all that great, pointing out that this is something Rufus himself intimates. As Lewis elaborates, `Rufus is prepared to say there are many truths too, provided we bear in mind that the name "truth" is being used in an

extended sense of creatures, and is only applicable in a strict sense to God.' All the authors in question ultimately therefore think there are many truths, but that these are all representations in some form of the singular truth that they signify or in which they participate. Thus, the differences in their positions are more verbal than substantive.

Although the Summa Halensis does not go into as much philosophical detail as can be found in the English authors on the topic at hand, it employs the language both of signification and participation or analogy in offering a very similar account of the relationship between creatures and God, or truths and the Truth. In a long treatise on the so-called `transcendentals' of unity, truth, and goodness, which all creatures like God exhibit, the Summist — here probably John of La Rochelle — argues that while the human mind is unable to know God in full, it is entirely capable of capturing aspects of his nature, such as his truth, in a direct if limited — or `oblique' way — through the things God has made 42 That is not to say that God is composed of parts. As John insists, the multiplicity in question exists on the part of the creatures themselves, which bespeak God's causal work in one finite way or another, not on the part of God himself who is the infinite cause of all beings.

To illustrate how creatures reflect God, the Summa invokes the popular example of a circle with many radii deriving from its center. All of the radii signify or participate in the center in some way, but none encompasses it altogether, and instead the center virtually contains all the lines. In a similar way, John argues, creatures stand in an analogical relationship to God — and here he clearly has in mind an analogy of pr^^^rti^nality. In such an instance, there is a direct but finite relationship between the creature and God that allows for catching a limited glimpse of who he is. For John, the key to gaining this glimpse into the infinite God is adherence to the `inner light' of transcendental knowledge, that is, the innate knowledge of the transcendental concepts of unity, truth, and goodness, which God has implanted in all humans as his image, and which makes it possible, as noted above, to identify his unity, truth, and goodness as it is variously reflected in all beings.

In their joint contribution, Rega Wood and Zita Toth seek to show that John Duns Scotus' famous idea of the `formal distinction' originated with Richard Rufus of Cornwall, although it also had precedent in the work of Franciscans like Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle. The distinction was commonly employed by Franciscans in treating the doctrine of the Trinity, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while comprising one identical being, themselves differ formally in the sense that they have varying definitions or characteristics as individual persons. However, the authors focus on another significant area where the distinction was utilized, namely, in addressing the thesis concerning the identity of the soul with its powers. This thesis was often attributed by scholastics to Augustine. As Magdalena Bieniak has shown, however, it actually derives from the tradition of Isidore of Seville, and was mediated to early scholastics by Peter Lombard. The issue here again was that the powers of the soul, such as intellect and will, each perform unique operations and have distinct definitions but nonetheless comprise a single substance, that is, the soul.

As Wood and Toth point out, Alexander of Hales was the first Franciscan to try to reconcile the differences between the powers with their inclusion in the soul. By contrast to many of his contemporaries, who simply affirmed the identity of the soul with its powers, however, Alexander acknowledged that doing this would efface the distinction between creatures and God, in whom alone the soul and its powers can fully coincide. To differentiate creatures from God, Alexander, as well as John of La Rochelle and the authors of the Summa Halensis following him, argued that while the soul and its powers are not the same essentially, they are the same substantially. In other words, they belong to the soul in such a way that they cannot be removed from it — like accidents or habits — though they are not the same as the soul as is the case in God. Rufus gave a similar account of the relationship between the soul and its powers, arguing 'that the powers differ from the soul essentially only if we understand "essentially" in an extended sense — namely, definitionally.'

This was apparently his take on Alexander's idea that the powers of the soul are only substantially identical with it. However, Rufus was the first to actually use the term `formal' to describe the distinction between the powers, which was nonetheless implied by Alexander and his confreres. In elaborating the particulars of the position, both Alexander, his Parisian colleagues and Rufus further inquired what kind of entities the powers are. They cannot be substances strictly speaking, otherwise they would multiply the substance of the soul. Nor are they accidents or qualities that can change in a substance over time. Ultimately, the early Franciscans agreed that the powers could be described as virtual parts of the soul.

By contrast to the body and soul which are essential parts of a human being, or integral parts, such as the walls of a house, the Halensian Summists likened virtual parts to the radii of a circle that are united in its center and pre-contained in it. For his part, Scotus actually used the term unitative containment to describe how the lower entities, that is, the powers, are contained in the superior one, the soul. That is not to suggest that Scotus and Rufus, let alone the Halensian Summists, offered identical accounts of the soul and its powers or used the idea in exactly the same ways. Still, Wood and Toth successfully show in this chapter that there was a clear tradition for treating the powers the soul which originated with Alexander, was defined more explicitly by Rufus, and was ultimately adopted by Scotus. The latter accepted his predecessors' account as the consensus view, affirming that the powers differ from the soul in merely formal terms.

In her essay on the commentaries on Aristotle's De generation et corruptione by Richard Rufus of Cornwall and an anonymous scholar whose positions closely resemble Rufus', Zita Toth explores how these authors understand the principles of corruptibility or incorruptibility in both physical creatures like trees and humans as well as incorruptible beings like angels, and in specific how such beings undergo change. Many authors at this time, including the authors of the Summa Halensis, saw creatures of both kinds but especially material creatures like human beings as compounds of two substantial forms, first and foremost, the soul, and the body, which are naturally united to one another. The changes that such beings undergo involve the coming and going of further forms — in this case accidental ones — which are essences in their own right, though distinguishable from substantial forms like the soul and body in that they cannot exist independently of such substances. As Toth demonstrates, Richard takes this kind of viewpoint a step further and posits a whole Por phyrian tree of forms that constitute any given being. In this regard, he acknowledges the existence of both incomplete and complete substantial forms.

While a complete form consists in the individual actually existing substance, such as Sophie the cat, incomplete forms involve things like the general genus of the substance which gives it the potential to be a certain kind of thing. For instance, Sophie first exhibits potency in relation to the form of a corporeal rather than an incorporeal substance, which stands in turn in potency to the form of animate rather than inanimate things, and then to mammals, all the way down to feline creatures, and ultimately, to Sophie herself. In the case of corporeal beings like Sophie, the cause of corruptibility or changeability — in size, quality, or whatever — is matter, which following the tradition of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna adopted by many Franciscans, is positively defined as a kind of substrate or substance that is shared by all things, even though they do not exist as such until matter is imprinted on by a form.

More specifically, Rufus understands change as a function of the privation of matter, which entails a potential to receive opposite forms — that is, to be formed in one way rather than another. Thus, Toth concludes, 'the principle of such a corruption is a deficient cause and not an efficient cause.' This is a far more clearly articulated account of substantial change than we find in the Summa Haiensis, for instance, or even in its authors like John of La Rochelle, who had not yet ventured into

such depths of metaphysical speculation, and did not to my knowledge distinguish between a deficient and an efficient cause in this context.

For this reason, it is difficult to determine whether the Parisian Franciscans would have opted to define an efficient cause, namely, God, as the agent of all changes in a being or if they would have instead ascribed this to a deficient cause, namely, matter. What we do know is that they resisted the tendency of some others at the time, even including some Franciscans like Roger Marston, to define God as the agent intellect, that is, the ultimate cause of all human acts of knowing natural beings, which they insisted are the prerogative of the human mind itself. This bespeaks their ultimate belief in the integrity of natural beings — which should presumably be able to perform their natural operations independently of divine aid — and thus suggests that there might have been agreement between the Halensian Summists and Rufus on this issue.

As noted already, Fiorella Retucci is currently overseeing an edition of Thomas of York's Sapientale, which was written between 1250-60. In her chapter, she starts by addressing the common assumption that Thomas was a `mere' Augustinian—a moniker often applied to other Franciscans of this period as well. As she illustrates, however, Thomas quotes Islamic and Jewish sources in addition to the Latin translations of Aristotle by Grosseteste far more extensively than Augustine or other church fathers. This in her view should lead us to question the standard reading of Thomas, a project she pursues in offering three case studies into his thought, which concern his uses of the Liber de causes, which was attributed to Aristotle in this period even though it was later identified as a compilation based on Proclus' Elements of Theology; the hermetic tradition; and the 12th-century Islamic philosopher, Averroes.

In undertaking the first case study, Retucci notes that Thomas used the Liber far more than many of his contemporaries. In this regard, he offers a new interpretation of the first section of the Liber which describes God as the efficient cause not only of causes but also of things caused. Apparently, some Christian authors at the time, whom Thomas does not name, interpreted this statement as implying occasionalism, according to which creatures are only the site for divine action, attributing that view to Augustine. However, Thomas opposes an occasionalist reading of the Liber, showing that not only Augustine but also philosophers like Averroes rejected it.

Likewise, Thomas was a uniquely committed user of the Hermetic corpus and especially the Asclepius. In a rare citation to chapter 22 of this work, Thomas argues that the body is a tool for exercising the soul and thus for acquiring merit. This on his account is because the body and specifically its materiality creates all kinds of potential for different choices, or freedom, which when realized for the good, confirms the ontological superiority of the human being over other creatures — which are bound by the necessity of their instincts. In this way, paradoxically, the body ultimately prepares the human being for seeing God. As Retucci aptly observes, this is quite a unique take on matter and the body, which attributes to it a dignity which is not always emphasized in premodern texts that often stress how bodily ties impede the path to virtue.

In a final case study, she notes that Thomas quotes Averroes over 1,000 times, and though he contests the philosopher's views on the eternity of the world, he mostly otherwise quotes him affirmatively. In particular, he supports in his own way Averroes' argument that the sciences prepare the way for human beings to realize their humanity and attain the perfection through which they become able to see God. Although Retucci rightly observes that Thomas was unique in his use of the Liber de causis, the Asclepius , and Averroes, she nonetheless highlights implicitly a commonality with the Parisian Franciscans of the same generation, who have likewise often been written off as `merely' Augustinian, especially in the composition of the Summa Halensis, which has sometimes been mistakenly described as a sort of Augustinian encyclopaedia.

As the detailed study of this text has demonstrated, the authors of the Summa, such as John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales, who oversaw the project, depart significantly from Augustine, often in the context of interpreting his own writings, both spurious and authentic. In this regard, these authors, like Thomas, drew extensively on the Arabic sources available to them, such as Avicenna and Avicebron, to define their theological and philosophical positions, which they nonetheless adapted for their own purposes and those of Christian orthodoxy. What the study of this Summa has in common with that of Retucci, therefore, is a tendency to rub away at the oversimplified reading of early Franciscans as Augustinian and to present them as innovative thinkers in their own right who were developing their own intellectual tradition, often with the help of Islamic and Jewish philosophical sources that were far removed both historically, contextually, and conceptually from Augustine.

In her chapter, Sophie Delmas describes Bartholomew the Englishman (Bartholomaeus Anglicus) as one of most celebrated Franciscans of the Middle Ages, who famously authored one of the first encyclopaedias in 1247, namely, his Book on the Properties of Things (Liber de proprietatibus rerum). This hugely successful and widely disseminated work survives in more than 200 manuscripts and was translated into seven vernacular languages and printed in numerous editions up until the 17th century. At the time of its composition, Bernard was lector of the Franciscan province in Saxony, Germany, based at Magdeburg, where he had been sent in the 1230s. However, Delmas draws attention to the fact that before his move to Germany, Bartholomew already had an active career in Paris. In that city, Thomas of Eccleston reports that on the date of 14 April 1224, Bartholomew was probably one of the four English masters including Haymo of Faversham, Simon of Sandwich, and Simon the Englishman, who joined the Franciscan order.

A number of works have been ascribed to Bartholomew in connection with his earlier career, the authenticity of which Delmas proposes to reconsider. These works include some allegories on the Old and New Testaments, a hagiographical compilation, a commentary on the gospels of Mark and Matthew, and biblical postils and sermons. The close scrutiny of the external and internal evidence concerning these works leads Delmas ultimately to conclude that such exegetical and pastoral works cannot definitively be attributed to Bartholomew. Nevertheless, she stresses that the Book on the Properties of Things remained a crucial resource for preachers who made use of it in their sermons in the 13th century, after which it became a basis for the Thesaurus novus de sanctis, which acknowledges Bartholomew as an important source and the authority.

As Nicola Polloni observes in his chapter, Roger Bacon is famous for the often harsh criticisms he levelled against his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. One of his critiques which has colored the modern scholarly perception of the medieval situation concerns the Latin translations of Aristotle's works which had become available in the late 12th and early 13th century but which Bacon regarded as unreliable. In this connection, Bacon argues that a true translation between two languages is basically impossible, or at least it is very difficult to achieve. A good translator needs to be fluent in both languages in order to know how to render the concepts presented in one language in the terms of another. For this purpose, Bacon further contended, translators also require mastery of the disciplines of science, philosophy, and theology. Otherwise, they cannot possibly hope to translate works in these areas in a way that accurately conveys the original meaning.

Although some scholars in the past have taken Bacon's claims as an indicator of genuine problems with the translations available to scholastics, Polloni offers a more subtle reading. As he demonstrates, the work in which Bacon makes his claims concerning the translations, that is, the Opus maius, was clearly written with the purpose of persuading Pope Clement IV to initiate the reform of education in the Latin-speaking world. In light of this context, Polloni convincingly demonstrates more specifically that Bacon's claims concerning the translations are a rhetorical

device he uses in an effort to persuade the pope of the need for better training in ancient languages (Hebrew, Greek, and probably Arabic) for university students. While there were admittedly mitigating factors in the reception of the Latin translations available in the period, often stemming from the circulation of spurious works of Neoplatonic patrimony that were attributed to Aristotle, or even Augustine, which scholars working on the period need to take into account, Polloni's study successfully shows that Bacon's claims about the flawed translations need to be taken with a grain of salt.

In his chapter, Jose Filipe Silva traces two largely complementary but distinct strands in John Pecham's account of perception; the first derives from perspectivist optics, and the second involves a psychological account of perception. As regards the second, Pecham advocates an active model of perception, which he associates with Augustine, `according to which perception consists of a two-stage process: the object issuing corporeal species that are received in the corporeal sense organ, which excites the soul to making in itself an internal representation of that which is presented to the organ by the species.' This can be contrasted with a passive model of perception, where the impression of the species on the senses is the cause of the perceptual act. As Silva emphasizes, Pecham's decision to adopt an active model does not preclude passivity, that is, the receptiveness of a sense organ to external data; it simply stresses that an active effort of the soul is needed to register an image of that data. In other words, there can be no bottom-up epistemic causality of the perceptive act.

According to Silva, a parallel way of describing perception is found in Pecham's treatment of optics, in which the Franciscan favors an intromissive account of vision, where species are issued by external objects and travel through a medium until they are received in a perceiver's sense organs, which nonetheless emit some outgoing (extromissive) rays that facilitate reception. Here again, Pecham prefers an active rather than a passive theory of perception, even though he does not explicitly link the psychological with the optical account. As Silva aptly observes, his emphasis on the activity of perception in both contexts is closely connected to and based upon a bodysoul dualism which he inherited from Avicenna and shares largely in common with the authors of the Summa Halensis and other Franciscans. On his account, the human person is a composite of two substances, namely, the soul and the body.

In turn, each of those substances is itself a composite of matter and form, which in the case of the soul entails a kind of spiritual matter. Following the tradition instigated by the Jewish philosopher Avicebron, whose work enjoyed enormous popularity amongst early 13th century Franciscans, such composition renders anything a substance in the true sense of the term. Although body and soul in themselves are distinct, however, Pecham contends that they are untied by a principle of mutual inclination (inclinatione mutua), which the Halensian Summists had followed Hugh of St Cher in describing as a substantial unitability (unibilitas substantiafis). In offering such an account, both the early Parisian Franciscans and Pecham found a way to affirm the indispensability of the body to the human being and thus its integrity as part of God's creation, which will ultimately be resurrected at the end of time, while at the same time distinguishing the two in a way that gave the soul the ultimate prerogative over the body's activities, presumably to prevent them from going astray.

As Silva points out at the end of his contribution, the kind of `active' account of perception found in John Pecham finds resonances with the account, albeit less developed, of John of La Rochelle in his Summa de anima of 1236, which formed the basis for the section De anima rationali in the Summa ^^^ens^s. A variation on this view is one I have also defended in describing how John advocates what has sometimes been described as an `active' theory of cognition—or a theory in which the mind in some way `determines' what it perceives in the world rather than simply receiving data passively. The contours of this account have already been outlined above in my response to the chapters of

Levallée and Lewis, which explain briefly how certain transcendental concepts of the mind shape and organize human knowledge of reality, and ultimately, of God.

The last contribution to this volume, by Riccardo Saccenti, takes the study of Pecham and especially his understanding of the body-soul relationship a step further. In particular, Saccenti treats this issue in the context of Pecham's well known opposition to Thomas Aquinas' view of the relationship between the soul and the body, which he ultimately helped to condemn in 1286 during his period of service as archbishop of Canterbury. As Saccenti points out, Aquinas took a more purely Aristotelian line on the matter and described the soul as the `form' of the body. This means that the soul and the body form one substance in which each one is necessary to what the other is by nature and to its actual existence.

By contrast, Pecham took the view, described above, that the soul and body form two distinct substances which themselves each comprise matter-form compositions of their own kind. In the case of the soul, this involves a kind of spiritual matter, and in the case of the body, it entails prime matter and the form of bodiliness or `corporeity' which makes the body whatever kind of body is appropriate for the soul in question, such as a human body in the case of a human soul. For Pecham, the importance of affirming such a form of corporeity is that it allows for confirming that a dead body that is no longer enlivened by a soul is still the body of the person who previously inhabited it. This was important for acknowledging that the dead body of Christ was nevertheless his body; the presence of his body in the Eucharist; and the resurrection of the bodies of the redeemed at the end of time.

In Pecham's view, Aquinas' account of the body-soul relationship had failed to explain these issues and was therefore unorthodox. As Saccenti illustrates, however, the alternative view Pecham advocates, originally based on the philosophy of Avicenna, can be found already in the Summa Halensis. The same is true of a related question Saccenti treats in Pecham's thought, which concerns his view of the unity of the soul's powers — vegetative, and sensitive and rational. Following a common tradition at the time, the Summa Halensis argues that the three powers do not in fact form three substances but one within the soul. This however is only the case following the arrival of the third, rational, soul, which contains and perfects the others. In the absence of that soul, the human embryo initially has only the vegetative power, which is eventually perfected by and joined to the sensitive one, until those two become part of the rational soul. Before this point, the human being can only be said to live in the way that a plant or an animal lives; however it is not a plant or animal because unlike such beings, it is not perfected in vegetativeness or animality but in its humanity.

Conclusion

The foregoing examples gesture already towards the many areas in which Franciscan scholars born in England worked in commonality with their counterparts based in Paris. The chapters that follow not only highlight the commonalities between them in greater detail but also open further doors for research that does so.

THE LEGACY OF EARLY FRANCISCAN THOUGHT edited by Lydia Schumacher [Series: Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie, De Gruyter, 9783110682410] Open Access

The legacy of late medieval Franciscan thought is uncontested: for generations, the influence of late-13th and 14th century Franciscans on the development of modern thought has been celebrated by some and loathed by others. However, the legacy of early Franciscan thought, as it developed in the first generation of Franciscan thinkers who worked at the recently-founded University of Paris in the first half of the 13th century, is a virtually foreign concept in the relevant scholarship. The reason for this is that early Franciscans are widely regarded as mere codifiers and perpetrators of the earlier medieval, largely Augustinian, tradition, from which later Franciscans supposedly departed. In this study, leading scholars of both periods in the Franciscan intellectual tradition join forces to highlight the continuity between early and late Franciscan thinkers which is often overlooked by those who emphasize their discrepancies in terms of methodology and sources. At the same time, the contributors seek to paint a more nuanced picture of the tradition's legacy to Western thought, highlighting aspects of it that were passed down for generations to follow as well as the extremely different contexts and ends for which originally Franciscan ideas came to be employed in later medieval and modern thought.

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Excerpt: For those schooled in the historiography of the Franciscan intellectual tradition, a volume on the legacy of early Franciscan thought, that is, the work of the scholars who founded this tradition in the decades between around 1220 - 50, may seem unusual in its focus. Certainly, the later Franciscan tradition, from John Duns Scotus (1265/66 -1308) onwards, enjoys a significant legacy, which is celebrated by some and loathed by others. On some views, this legacy stretched not only through the later Middle Ages but even into modernity. In laying the foundations for future developments in intellectual history, however, later Franciscans are widely supposed to have broken with their Franciscan predecessors, most famously Bonaventure (1221- 74), who codified the findings of his teachers, including Alexander of Hales (c.1185 -1245) and John of La Rochelle (1200-45).

Such early 13th-century Franciscans were supposedly preoccupied with preserving the longstanding intellectual tradition of Augustine in the face of the rising popularity of Aristotle's recently-recovered major works. Despite their best attempts, their formulations eventually proved outdated and even Franciscans, not just Aquinas, turned in a more Aristotelian direction, albeit in their own way which was often at odds with that of Aquinas (1225-74).

In recent years, this narrative has been called into question through research efforts that highlight key continuities between early and later Franciscan thinkers, which transcend their allegiances to sometimes differing authorities. Some of these efforts have turned on illustrating that there is more than meets the eye to early not to mention later Franciscan appeals to authorities such as Augustine. In a previous volume for this same series with De Gruyter, The Summa Halensis.: Sources and Context, numerous specialists in the medieval and Franciscan tradition joined forces to nuance scholarly understanding of how the early Franciscan tradition drew on authoritative sources, in the Summa which was in fact the product of the co-operation of the founders of the early Franciscan school, above all, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, but not excluding Odo Rigaldus (1200 — 75) and potentially Bonaventure. This Summa, one of the first and `flagship' systematic theologies of university scholasticism, was also the charter text for the early Franciscan tradition.

The sources of this monumental work include not only Augustine but also the Bible; the 5/6th century author, Pseudo-Dionysius, whose works grew in popularity during the 12th century; and the Greek Father John of Damascus (676-749), whose De fide orthodoxia had been translated in the same century by Burgundio of Pisa and was initially employed in a limited way in Peter Lombard's Sentences (c.1150), which became the standard textbook of theology in the early universities founded around the turn of the 13th century. As Saccenti has shown, theologians of the early 13th century, not least early Franciscans, started to engage with the whole of the Damascene's work, in part because of its affinity with the Sentences of Peter Lombard in terms of the themes covered.'

Indeed, the order in which those themes were treated lent itself to the eventual division of the work — probably by Philip the Chancellor (1160 —1236) — according to the four-part structure of Lombard's Sentences, which treated God, creation, Incarnati^^, and Sacraments.$ As Saccenti

demonstrates, the late 12th-century manuscripts of Burgundio's translation do not present the work in terms of this fourfold division but according to Damascus' original organizational schema of one hundred chap- ters.9 Through these divisions, Damascus was pressed into the service and even the style of early Latin scholasticism and was presented as a new and key resource to facilitate efforts increasingly to systematize theology.

Although the Damascene became a major authority alongside Augustine --- though perhaps not equal in weight - during this period, he was not the only source of great significance. The lingering influence of John Scotus Eriugena (815 - 77), whose work had been condemned for pantheism in 1225, remained in certain ways, although it was channelled through other sources. Moreover, the Halensian authors were among the first to popularize the work of Anselm of Canterbury (1033/34 - 1109), which had been largely neglected in the century previous. Another key authority for the Summa was the 12th-century School of St Victor - not only Hugh (1096 -1141) but especially Richard (d. 1173).

As is well-known, the scholastic method of argumentation which was employed in the recently-founded universities as well as predating them, involved marshalling quotations from authorities for and against a particular opinion, seeking to reconcile them and indeed drawing on authorities again to resolve any outstanding tensions or objections between them. For the modern reader, the use of this method can give the impression that early scholastic authors did little but rehearse the arguments of earlier thinkers. This, however, could not be further from the truth. As numerous studies have borne out, scholastic authors often took quotations out of context in order to give them a new meaning which fit the arguments they themselves wanted to develop. This was not a matter of academic malpractice but was standard operating procedure at a time when thinking for oneself or advancing arguments of one's own required doing so in relation to points of contact with prior tradition.

When we consider scholastic arguments in this light, they are completely reconfigured: we can begin to see how deeply personal arguments, or arguments consistent with the values of the Franciscan order, for instance, were advanced through the guise of authorities who stood for a cause with which scholars wished to associate themselves. In the case of Augustine, this was the longstanding Christian tradition and indeed Christian orthodoxy. As noted above, the older literature on medieval thought often paints this as having come into tension around the turn of the 13th century with the newly translated major works of Aristotle's philosophy. But the situation is rather more nuanced than this.

As some contributions to the Sources and Context volume illustrate, scholars working in the first half of the 13th century approached Aristotle rather timidly, due to perceived problems with the translations, and with a decided bias towards reading him as compatible with Neo-Platonism, which was attributable to the circulation of spurious works like the Liber de causis, which was attributed to Aristotle but which Aquinas in 1268 identified as an amalgam of ideas from the Neo-Platonists Plotinus and Porphyry.

This bias inclined early scholastics warmly to receive the major works of the Islamic philosopher, Avicenna (980 —1037), whose monumental Book of the Cure had been published in Latin by 1168 in an impeccable translation. Although Avicenna, following many earlier Greek and Arabic commentators on Aristotle, regarded the Greek philosopher as compatible with Neo-Platonism, his brand of Platonic-Aristotelianism was ultimately unique and highly innovative. This is something early scholastics could not help but find attractive.

Furthermore, the Neo-Platonic leanings of Avicenna rendered him amenable to projection on to the thought of Augustine, to say nothing of Aristotle, both of whom were interpreted as relatively

harmonious sources, albeit with different major areas of philosophical interest. In sum, Avicenna proved a perfect resource not only for interpreting the still-dubious Aristotle but also for doing so in a decidedly religious or broadly `Augustinian' way that nonetheless allowed Latin thinkers to introduce a level of philosophical sophistication into their thinking that exceeded their abilities previously.

In examining the Summa Halensis with these and other crucial contextual matters in mind, the Sources and Context volume contributed to deconstructing the oversimplified notion of early Franciscans as relatively unoriginal `systematizers' of Augustine. It highlights all the ways they used authorities creatively, sometimes even manipulatively and highly unfaithfully, to develop an intellectual system all their own, which rose to and indeed epitomized the high scholastic standards of the day. The second volume, The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates, took this project further by examining some of the major theological questions that the Summa addresses, for example, on how to know and name God or to prove his existence, as well as its treatment of the nature of predestination and providence, the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, sin, grace, law, confession, Eucharist, prayer, and even the sanctification of Mary. In each case, close attention was paid to the actual arguments presented through the mouthpiece of authorities. What emerged as a consequence was a deeper understanding of the respects in which early Franciscan thought paved new theological ground and indeed anticipated some of the famous arguments of later Franciscans who supposedly departed from their predecessors' `mere' Augustinianism.

The present volume represents a natural progression in this line of inquiry. As the title conveys, the purpose of the volume is not only to explore in more detail some of the innovations of the Summa Halensis in philosophy and theology and to highlight continuities, despite differences, between early Franciscans and the successors who received their initial output. That is to say, the goal is to elucidate the reception and legacy of the Summa Halensis to later Franciscan and scholastic thought. The first part of the volume, on the philosophy and theology of the Summa, kicks off with a study by Cecilia Trifogli of what is arguably most fundamental in any metaphysical system, namely, matter. This is one area where early Franciscans were influenced by Avicenna's position according to which a kind of `prime matter' exists, even though it is not detectable until it becomes subject to form.

This was a very `positive' way of rendering matter in comparison with Aristotle, for example, and indeed Augustine, who saw matter not so much as the `stuff' from which things are formed as the sheer potential for formation that exists when there is simply nothing. Trifogli pursues two specific questions the Summa considers about the creation of matter, namely, whether it is created or eternally existent - a question which would become a serious subject of debate later in the century - and whether it is initially created unformed or whether it is created together with a form, as indeed it is, as noted above. In an important development of her analysis, Trifogli illustrates precisely the ways and extent to which the Summa anticipates the views of Duns Scotus and the ways in which he surpasses his predecessors.

From matter, the volume turns to the question of the specifically human matter, as it were, that subsists in the body-soul union. Magdalena Bieniak expands her extensive research on this topic to show how the Summa Halensis codified and developed a form of body-soul substance dualism, inspired by Avicenna, that was popular at the time and would become a hallmark of the later Franciscan school. By contrast to some earlier contemporaries, the Summist followed John of La Rochelle, who himself built on an insight from the Dominican Hugh of St Cher (c.1200 - 63), in arguing for the essential unitability of the body and soul despite their distinctness as sub-stances.

In an example of the aforementioned tendency to read Aristotle in line with Avicenna, Bieniak shows how the Summist attributes its dualism to Aristotle, who in fact held the body and soul to comprise

a single substance, where the main role of the soul is to make matter whatever it is. By contrast to this view, the Summist argued for the Avicennian idea according to which the soul is separate from its own matter - and therefore capable of existing immortally beyond it. For this reason, a series of media are required to translate the intents of the soul into the movements of the body, which are not needed by non-human beings in which the form does not exist beyond the life of the body or matter.

Furthering the study of Avicenna's reception, Anna-Katharina Strohschneider assesses the way the Islamic philosopher informed readings of Aristotle's newly translated Posterior Analytics, which delineated the conditions for any science and thus raised the question whether and how theology is a science. In this regard, the Summa distinguishes between the science of things caused versus the cause of causes, which Avicenna called wisdom; and between a science of causes that perfect the faculty of cognition and those that move the affective part of the soul towards what is good. While metaphysics achieves the former, only theology achieves the latter and is therefore a science of the cause of causes, or wisdom, in the full sense. In treating the subject-matter of the science of theology, the Summa further adopts Avicenna's influential distinction between the subject-matter of metaphysics and that which metaphysics seeks. He does not name his source, however, and instead uses the vocabulary of Augustine and Peter Lombard to incorporate an Avicennian position, in a way that was typical of Franciscans and indeed scholastics of this generation, who often used their own indigenous authorities as 'code names' for philosophers like Avicenna.

In her contribution, Tiziana Suarez-Nani demonstrates how the Summa Halensis epitomizes and sets fully in motion a major transition away from a negative idea of divine infinity, which had dominated in previous generations. According to this, God lacks spatial limitations and an origin or end. By contrast, the positive concept of God's infinity that increasingly replaced it described God as infinite not only in the sense of lacking any limits but also insofar as he positively fills all places and all times. The theological significance of this shift cannot be overstated in that it altered entirely the way in which scholars thought about God's presence in the world and indeed his knowability through finite creatures. Whereas earlier thinkers saw these as indicators of what God 'is not', or what he surpasses and exceeds, creatures now became a window, albeit a finite one, into the divine nature.

Next, Simon Kopf shows how the Summa innovatively reworks earlier accounts of divine providence, most famously that of Lombard who describes providence as a matter of God's knowledge, b^ incorporating John of Damascus' claim that providence is a matter of God's will and care for creation. The Summa Halensis harmonizes the two authorities by invoking the Boethian notion of the ratio of providence, terming the resultant executio of God's will as `government'. In this basis, Kopf shows that the distinction between providentia and gubernatio, so central to Thomas Aquinas' (1225-74) doctrine of providence, is to be found initially in the Summa Halensis.

Oleg Bychkov offers a corrective to the view presented by some modern scholars that beauty in the Summa Halensis represents a sort of `super-transcendental' that permeates the other transcendentals of unity, truth, and goodness, which respectively represent the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. While there is no textual evidence for this view of the Summa, which in fact describes beauty as a sub-set of the good, Bychkov shows how aesthetic forms of argumentation still play a significant role in the text, which affirms the function that evil and difficulties can perform in bringing about or promoting the good, and which describes things which are `fitting' or in a sense aesthetically pleasing doctrinally, for instance, concerning the internal order of the Trinitarian persons, or concerning the act of Incarnation, as effectively necessary on that basis.

In anticipation of the contribution b^ Mary Beth Ingham, Lydia Schumacher describes how the Summa Halensis draws on the work of Alexander of Hales to introduce a novel idea of free will.

According to this, free will is not strictly limited to willing the good, as Augustine, Anselm, and others supposed, on the ground that willing evil things actually enslaves and limits freedom. Rather, free will is indifferent to good and evil and can go either way, where the question which way it chooses is down primarily to the will, rather than the co-operation of will and reason, as Augustine and the longstanding tradition had affirmed. This new and rather voluntaristic view of the matter laid the groundwork for the even more radical presentation of later figures like Scotus and gave a legitimacy or positive role to evil that was designed once again to throw into relief the goodness of the good.

A further contribution from Nathalie Gorochov seeks to situate the person of Odo Rigaldus, who likely contributed to the Summa Halensis, in the context of his Parisian contemporaries and the other Summa authors. She pays particular attention to a historical factor which probably drove many scholars at the time, including Odo, into the arms of the religious orders like the Franciscans, namely, the debate over whether a cleric could hold a plurality of benefices. These were sources of income derived from parishes or clerical associations that some never even fulfilled because they found ways to prolong their courses of study. The religious orders naturally shunned this ecclesial-social-ladder climbing activity and thus became a refuge for the likes of Odo, who succeeded Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle as one of the regent masters of the Franciscan school at Paris.

In a fascinating contribution to this study, Alexander Fidora treats the Summa's unique stance on the Jewish Talmud, which had recently come under close scrutiny and criticism. In 1239, more specifically, the pope ordered all manuscripts of the Talmud to be confiscated and examined on the grounds that they constituted an alternative law to that of the Christian world, which he sought to undermine as a rival. To this end, he oversaw the burning of the Jewish books in 1241/42 in Paris. At a time when many objected to the Talmud as an alia lex, the Summa upheld the more traditional view, endorsed by Augustine, that Jews were witnesses of Christian truth as contained in the Old Testament. Although the Summa also ultimately supports the destruction of the Talmud, it does so for a different reason, namely, because the Talmud blasphemes against Christ and the Virgin Mary. Ultimately, this is still a critical perspective but it nonetheless allows for tolerance of Jews in society.

Following the aforementioned studies of certain philosophical theories in the Summa Halensis, the volume proceeds to consider its influence and reception in later generations. In the first chapter of this section, Jacob Wood observes that Thomas Aquinas' inquiry concerning and indeed rejection of the view that God's existence is self-evident is normally traced directly to Anselm of Canterbury, whom Aquinas quotes. As Wood shows, however, two major ways of interpreting Anselm had developed amongst Franciscan sympathizers in Paris and Oxford, respectively, most notably by John of La Rochelle and Robert Grosseteste (c.1168 —1253), which had become `coded in' to Anselm's arguments on this score. Wood traces how these theories evolve in the Summa Halensis and Odo Rigaldus, in Paris, and Richard Rufus of Cornwall (d. 1260), in Oxford, with a view to demonstrating that these are clearly the theories to which Aquinas responds when he undertakes his famous discussion of God's existence.

For his part, Theo Kobusch takes on the distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God, that is, the distinction between what God is capable in principle of doing and what he actually does, which receives its first systematic articulation in the Summa Halensis. This distinction was used by some later Franciscans such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham (c.1287— 1347) to affirm that God can even break the law of non-contradiction or contravene his own goodness and command evil. Whereas some have seen the Summa as a forerunner of this extreme position, Kobusch makes the more nuanced argument that the Summa does not genuinely entertain the idea that God could command opposites or evil. Rather, the distinction is meant to highlight what is

orderly or disorderly in terms of human and divine willing, the latter being ultimately impossible for God. Thus, he implicitly draws an important distinction between the purpose the Summa attributed to its argument and the ends to which later thinkers employed it.

In her contribution, Mary Beth Ingham considers the role that the poverty controversy — or the question how Franciscans were to deal with the use versus ownership of property — played in bringing about the transition from the semi-voluntaristic account of free will (liberum arbitrium) as outlined in the Summa Halensis, to full-blown freedom of the will (libertas voluntatis) in later Franciscans like Scotus. As Ingham shows, the latter perspective not only represents the natural development of the Summa's position but also underlines an important aspect of the Franciscan identity,

which regards unimpeded freedom, that is, the ability to do good or evil, as essential to human dignity and indeed to the meritorious nature of human decisions.

Drawing on his past research in medieval Christology, Richard Cross tackles the views of the Summa Halensis on two key questions in this field, namely, how the human and divine natures of Christ are united and why it is that human nature does not itself count as a subsisting person. On the former matter, the Summa offers an initial statement of the substance-accident model of the hypostatic union that would be developed by Scotus, appealing to the analogy of a branch that is grafted onto a tree, which changes the situation of the branch, or Christ's human nature, without altering the status of the divine nature.18 As regards subsistence, the Summa affirms that Christ draws his personhood from his divine nature, as the Son of God, while nonetheless maintaining the fullness of his status as a human individual. From this point, Cross makes the surprising and significant point that Thomas Aquinas, normally a critic of his Franciscan counterparts, actually adopted from the Halensian Summists the idea of an immediate connection between the united natures, even though he did not use the grafting model to describe that connection. By contrast, Bonaventure and Scotus posited a mediated connection, even though they furthered the Summa's general model of the union in its own right.

In a further study building on previous publications, Drew Rosato considers the Summa's analysis of Christ's sorrow and the way that later Franciscan thinkers developed this. Here, the key topic of debate was whether Christ could feel sorrow over his own suffering, not just as a natural or instinctual reaction to pain but as a product of his own free will. The problem raised by the latter view particularly is that it seems to suggest that Christ opposed God's will for himself. Following a trajectory set by the Summa Halensis, albeit with a variety of different strategies, later Franciscans Richard of Middleton (1249 —1308), Matthew of Aquasparta (1240 —1302), and Duns Scotus all find ways to affirm that he willed he would not suffer, nevertheless without implying that he somehow disobeyed or did not accept God's will.

While the contributions so far have focussed on the ways the Summa anticipates later Franciscan arguments, even if these are not always identical in their purpose or content, Volker Leppm argues in his paper on Ockham that the Franciscan heritage was not the only factor that influenced the development of later Franciscan thought. As Leppin demonstrates, the context in which Ockham worked and dialogued with contemporaries, who entertained their own set of specific concerns, is also necessary to consider when trying to interpret how Ockham came to defend certain positions.

According to the research of Jose Meirinhos on John of La Rochelle and Peter of Spain (d. 1277), 'the understanding of the nature and functions of the intellect became one of the main problems of the 13th-century Latin reception of Aristotle's De anima,' which reflected interpretive difficulties that had already been reckoned with by Greek and Arabic commentators on Aristotle. As Meirinhos shows, those difficulties were exacerbated by the confluence of the new Aristotelian sources with

the already prevalent tradition of Augustine, which seemingly placed certain restrictions on the way scholars felt they could describe theological-anthropological matters like the body-soul relationship, the limits of perception, and the work of the agent intellect in terms of illumination. This study shows how John of La Rochelle, and arguably also the Summa Halensis, inspired Peter of Spain, whose account of the faculties of the soul in his Scientia libri de anima silently appropriates Avicenna's Liber de anima to explain human life, sensation, knowledge, and free will.

In his chapter, William ^. Short, OFM showcases the work of the 14th-century friar, Bartholomew of Pisa (1338 —1401), who disseminates considerable knowledge of Alexander of Hales in his Book of Conformities. This work includes chapters on key Franciscan thinkers and Franciscan theology, in which Alexander is much discussed. In particular, Bartholomew invokes the Summa Halensis book III in his treatment of the life of Christ. There is also extensive discussion of Alexander in a hagiographical sense, as an example of Christian life, especially as regards his decision to join the friars minor somewhat late in life, after a career in the University of Paris — an event which Bartholomew describes as miraculous. Bartholomew also expresses admiration for the role Alexander played in writing a commentary on the Franciscan Rule, with several other friars.

Further to this discussion, William Courtenay explores the use of the Summa Halensis in the 15th-century Canonis misse expositio of Egeling Becker, which was revised and circulated by Gabriel Biel (1420-95). As Courtenay writes in his abstract: `Despite Biel's reputation as an Ockhamist and a leading proponent of the via moderns, the views of Alexander of Hales as reflected in the Summa Halensis prove to be the major source on which Biel relies for his Eucharistic theology. In addition, the study notes major differences between the Koberger edition of the Summa Halensis (Nurnberg 1481-82 and Lyon 1515 —16), which Biel used, and the edition published at Venice in 1575 and Cologne 1622.'

In his contribution, Riccardo Saccenti investigates the large number of manuscripts that survive of the four parts of the Summa Halensis or Summa fratris Alexandri. As Saccenti shows, the study of these manuscripts and their composition and circulation offer insight into the different contexts in which the text was received and used, from the time of its composition in the 1240s to the production of its first printed edition at the end of the 15th century. The study in this regard takes into consideration a variety of factors that influenced the Summa's transmission, including the development of theology as a discipline in the early decades of the 13th century; the material production of manuscripts within the university milieu, the institutionalization of the so-called pecia system, and the multiple ways in which theological texts were used in the university and in the convents of the religious orders. All these elements contribute to reconstructing the circulation and influence of the Summa fratñs Alexandra.

In a concluding article, Oliver Davies offers a broader perspective on the influence and legacy of the Summa Halensis, reflecting on the ways that Franciscan ideas, which were developed and designed to articulate and facilitate the earliest form of the Franciscan life, resonate with contemporary scientific concepts concerning the ways human beings shape society and operate together. In this regard, Davies explores how the Halensian doctrines of the transcendentals, natural law, free will, and so on, which were philosophical innovations in their own time, continue to hold authority today.

That is one ultimate purpose of this volume, namely, to recover the Franciscan intellectual tradition, particularly from Scotus onwards, from a generations-long tendency either to prefer the Thomist tradition to it as a resource for contemporary thought or even to charge it with causing the alleged ills of modernity that Thomism has been summoned to resolve in modern times. For instance, Scotus' doctrine of God's absolute versus ordained power supposedly introduced an arbitrary God who could command humans to do evil just as much as good. By the same token, he implied that

human beings themselves are completely unbound by good or evil and only choose the good out of a sheer and even unexplained will to do so (see Kusch, Schumacher, Ingham).

Such voluntarism is often supposed to have bled into the question of faith in God, which Franciscans allegedly rendered as a sort of unfounded or irrational `leap', thus creating a clear divide between matters of faith and matters of reason, including rational proofs for the existence of God, which in a highly rationalist manner were considered virtually infallible and above reproach (see Wood). In other philosophical contexts, Franciscans have been accused of denigrating the body by advocating a form of dualism which renders the body and soul or matter and form as separate substances (see Trifogli, Bieniak). They have supposedly offended God's transcendence and rendered him a `great big being like us', that is, an infinite being that is the sum total of all beings (see Suarez-Nani). In addition, Franciscan Christology has been charged with being too `Nestorian', or subjecting Christ to a split personality between his human and divine natures (Cross, Roseto).

In this work, the contributors come up against such accusations both indirectly and directly by providing a more nuanced picture of early Franciscan doctrine, represented first and foremost by the Summa Halensis, and by highlighting the ways this laid the foundation for later Franciscans and scholastics more generally, whose work has often been regarded as a break from the earlier tradition. The goal has been to read the tradition on its own terms and to understand the way it developed from its earlier to later forms as part of an organic process which, notwithstanding sometimes considerable developments and changes, resulted in a tradition characterized by some basic areas of continuity. Our efforts to interpret Franciscan ideas in their own context and in view of their original purposes - to support particular perspectives on religious life and action - help to dispel the myth that they were designed intentionally or otherwise for the supposedly more sinister intents of modern minds.

That is not to deny that the Franciscan intellectual tradition may have introduced ideas that were elaborated in new ways and in other contexts later on in the history of thought. However, it is to stress that criticizing them for later developments in which they had no involvement is anachronistic and misses the point of what the Franciscans themselves had to argue, which is something that this volume endeavours to make clear in several key areas of early Franciscan thinking, highlighting also for the first time the extent of its reach and influence in some more unexpected areas of late medieval and modern thought (see Bychkov, Gorochov, Fidora, Meirinhos, Short, Courtenay, Saccenti, Cross, Davies). From a variety of different perspectives, in summary, this volume underscores the legacy of early Franciscan thought - both historically and in terms of its future potential to be invoked as a resource in addressing the philosophical problems of contemporary research. <>

A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology: The Summa Halensis edited by Lydia Schumacher and Oleg Bychkov [Fordham University Press, 9780823298846] Open Access

A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology presents for the first time in English key passages from the Summa Halensis, one of the first major installments in the summa genre for which scholasticism became famous. This systematic work of philosophy and theology was collaboratively

written mostly between 1236 and 1245 by the founding members of the Franciscan school, such as Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who worked at the recently founded University of Paris.

Modern scholarship has often dismissed this early Franciscan intellectual tradition as unoriginal, merely systematizing the Augustinian tradition in light of the rediscovery of Aristotle, paving the way for truly revolutionary figures like John Duns Scotus. But as the selections in this reader show, it was this earlier generation that initiated this break with precedent. The compilers of the Summa Halensis first articulated many positions that eventually become closely associated with the Franciscan tradition on issues like the nature of God, the proof for God's existence, free will, the transcendentals, and Christology. This book is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the ways in which medieval thinkers employed philosophical concepts in a theological context as well as the evolution of Franciscan thought and its legacy to modernity.

A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology is available from the publisher on an [open-access basis](#).

Reviews
Provides thematic extracts in English from *the Summa Halensis*

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The Franciscan intellectual tradition as it developed before Bonaventure, and above all, Duns Scotus, has so far garnered relatively little scholarly attention. By most accounts, Bonaventure's forebears, and even Bonaventure himself, worked primarily to systematize the intellectual tradition of Augustine that had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages. In contrast, Scotus is supposed to have broken with the precedent set by earlier Franciscans in order to develop innovative philosophical and theological positions that anticipated the rise of modern thought.

The passages selected for this reader contribute to making the case for the innovativeness of early Franciscan thought and its fundamental significance to the further development of the Franciscan intellectual tradition. The passages have been excerpted from the so- called Summa Halensis, a massive text that was collaboratively authored by the founding members of the Franciscan school at Paris between 1236 and 1245, with some final additions in 1255–56. For a long time, the text was attributed solely to Alexander of Hales, the first master of the school, who had joined the order in 1236 after a long career in the University of Paris, where he was one of the most sophisticated and influential masters of his generation.

As is well established, Alexander championed the effort to give a central place in the theology curriculum to lectures on Lombard's Sentences, which was a collection of authoritative quotations from scripture and the church fathers. In fact, he composed one of the earliest commentaries on the Sentences and established this practice as the prerequisite for obtaining the license to teach theology in the university—the modern equivalent of the doctoral degree. Although he certainly oversaw the

work on the Summa and contributed a great deal to it, whether indirectly or directly, the editors of the third volume eventually established that other Franciscans were involved in its composition as well. The first and third volumes were likely authored primarily by Alexander's chief collaborator, John of La Rochelle, who had plans to prepare a Summa of his own before Alexander entered the order and his services became otherwise enlisted. Most probably, volumes 2.1 and 2.2 were prepared by a third redactor, who worked on the basis of John and Alexander's authentic works but did not always follow them exactly.

The multiple authorship has been one reason for the Summa's neglect, since modern scholars have tended to focus on single- authored works by a known author who could presumably guarantee the coherence of his work. However, the Summa is far from a compilation of relatively disjoined sections by different contributors. The coherence of the work is confirmed by manuscript evidence, which illustrates that the first three volumes were received as a whole following the deaths of John and Alexander in 1245. Only two small additions and no major corrections were made to these volumes in 1255, when Pope Alexander IV ordered William of Melitona, then head of the Franciscan school at Paris, to enlist any help he needed to complete the fourth volume on the sacraments, which was not composed by Alexander and John and has yet to be prepared in a modern critical edition. Thus, the Summa Halensis is significant precisely because it represents the "collective mind" of the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition at Paris and their attempt to articulate the contours of this tradition for the very first time.

Another major reason for the neglect of the Summa is the aforementioned assumption that Franciscan thought before and including Bonaventure was primarily aimed at defending Augustine's longstanding intellectual tradition against the rising tide of Aristotelianism. Even the editor of the Summa Halensis articulated this opinion: "The significance of the Summa Halensis consists in this, namely, that all the elements of this Augustinian tradition, both theological and philosophical, are gathered, arranged, and defended in it, even though Aristotle was on the rise. Thus, it is universally and rightly seen as the foundation of the Augustinian- Franciscan school in the thirteenth century."

Admittedly, there is an exceptional number of quotations from Augustine in the Summa. The work contains a total of 4,814 explicit and 1,372 implicit references to Augustine, which amounts to more than one quarter of the sources cited in the text. At the time, however, this pattern of quotation was not unusual: many scholastic authors gave disproportional weight to Augustine's authority, including Peter Lombard in his Sentences. The emphasis on Augustine was attributable to his status as the fountainhead of the Western Christian tradition and thus the "authority of authorities." To quote him was to situate one's own work on the right side of theological history.

Although appeals to Augustine sometimes involved simply repeating or defending his viewpoints, more often than not, the reason for quoting Augustine was to enlist his endorsement for whatever opinion an author himself wanted to develop. As Mary Carruthers has noted, works of authorities like Augustine were considered authoritative precisely because and to the extent that they gave rise to new interpretations and meanings. The liberal readings of Augustine that resulted were facilitated considerably by the wide circulation of spurious works that were often attributed to the bishop in the Middle Ages.

The most popular of these works among Franciscans included the De fide ad Petrum (On Faith, to Peter), De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus (The Dogmas of the Church), and, above all, De spiritu et anima (The Spirit and the Soul), a twelfth- century text produced in Cistercian circles before 1170, which the Summa's immediate predecessors and contemporaries such as Philip the Chancellor and Albert the Great had already declared inauthentic. This work contained an array of intellectual schemata that made it possible to associate practically any psychological theory with Augustine.

In this regard, it eased the incorporation of the works of natural philosophy that had recently become available to Latin thinkers through the translation movement of the twelfth century. Most famously, this movement saw the major works of Aristotle translated into Latin. However, the massive Book of the Cure of the Islamic scholar Avicenna also became available during this time and was actually more popular than Aristotle in the period of the Summa's authorship. There are numerous reasons for this, one being that Aristotle's works were introduced in a gradual and sporadic fashion, with some like the Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics circulating only in partial forms into the early thirteenth century.

Another problem concerned the quality of the translations from Greek into Latin, which was perceived as quite poor by comparison to the translations from Arabic into Latin. Although Avicennás work contained treatises on all the main topics Aristotle covered—metaphysics, physics, logic, and the soul—he was not a mere commentator on Aristotle. This is evidenced by the fact that his works do not appear in the manuscript tradition together with Aristotle's, as is the case with the works of Averroes on Aristotle, which only became available around 1230, though their actual incorporation apparently took longer.

By contrast to "the commentator," who followed Aristotle's text closely, Avicenna offered highly original insights on broadly Aristotelian topoi that nonetheless integrated many key facets of Neoplatonism. The reconciliation of Aristotle and Platonism along these lines was not perceived as extraordinary at the time given that Aristotle himself was regarded in both the Greek and Arabic commentary traditions as a kind of Neoplatonist, whose mature theological views were supposedly presented in the spurious Theology of Aristotle, which was in fact a compilation based on the Enneads of Plotinus.

Though this work was not translated into Latin until the Renaissance, a similar work called the Liber de causis was extremely popular in the Middle Ages and was attributed to Aristotle until 1268, when Thomas Aquinas identified Proclus as one of its major sources. Around this same time, new and improved translations of Aristotle were also produced. These along with the genuine commentaries of Averroes, which garnered more interest following

the production of new translations of Aristotle, encouraged the more direct and faithful reading of Aristotle. Until the mid- thirteenth century, however, Latin thinkers generally operated on the assumption that Aristotle could be read in conversation with Christian Platonic sources—above all, Augustine— interpreting both in line with Avicenna, who offered the most sophisticated resource available at the time for grappling with Greek natural philosophy.

While the Franciscans were by no means exceptional in making use of Avicenna during this period, they were by far the most predominant school of thought to do so. Moreover, their incorporation of Avicennian themes was far more extensive than that of many of their contemporaries. In the case of the Franciscans particularly, there appears to have been a sort of "happy coincidence" between the Avicennian materials that were available and popular at the time and what was well suited to articulating a distinctly Franciscan form of thought. As noted already, a major reason for the very production of the Summa was to give expression to a way of thinking theologically and philosophically that was presumably consistent with the vision and values of Francis of Assisi, who had passed away only ten years before work on the Summa began in 1236.

Although the Summa genre did not lend itself to speculation on motives for writing, the need for this initial statement of Franciscan thought was presumably urgent for a number of reasons. In the first place, the rapid growth of the order—from twelve members in 1209 to as many as twenty thousand by 1250—called for a means by which to induct learned friars who were rapidly accumulating in the order into the Franciscan way of life. In fact, the Summa Halensis formed the basis for the education

of friar- scholars at least through the time of Duns Scotus. Bonaventure, for one, credits everything he learned to his "master and father" Alexander of Hales, which is scarcely an exaggeration.

Another reason for the Summa's production was certainly to establish the place of the Franciscans in the University of Paris, which was founded around 1200 and served as the center for theological study at the time. Although Francis did not originally envisage a role for his friars in the university, higher education quickly became the precondition for religious and spiritual authority in the period and thus for the very survival of the order. Nevertheless, there was considerable controversy both within and outside the order as to whether the friars minor should be engaged in university affairs. Inside the order, for example, lay friars, some of whom had known Francis, protested that the pursuit of higher education and academic esteem undermined the founder's fundamental principles of poverty, humility, and simplicity.

Within the wider university, the secular masters, or masters who were not part of a religious order, saw the friars as a threat to their own jobs, student enrollment numbers, and therefore salaries. Under the circumstances, the growing body of learned friars—led by none other than Alexander and John—faced enormous pressure to establish a distinctly Franciscan form of thinking that would resonate with and uphold the principles of their founder, at a level of sophistication that would prove their worth as academics and their right to remain and even dominate in the university context.

The Summa Halensis was evidently the solution to this problem—and a highly successful one at that. Not only was it the first major theological treatise extensively to incorporate the new natural philosophy, but it also delved into more recently recovered theological sources, in addition to all the traditional patristic sources that were popular and available at the time and that had been invoked by Peter Lombard. These newer works included John of Damascus, whom Lombard had only begun to incorporate in a provisional way; Anselm of Canterbury, whose works had largely been neglected before Alexander of Hales; and Hugh and Richard of St. Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux.

In addition to mastering all available sources, the Summa Halensis far outstripped other texts of the period in terms of the size and scope of its inquiry. That is not to deny that there were other great works that preceded it, including many commentaries on Lombard's Sentences and early summae like the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre and the Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor, which also comprise major conversation partners for the Summa Halensis. However, the text that is by far the largest among these earlier works, namely, the Summa aurea, contains only 818 questions for discussion by comparison to the 3,408 of the Summa Halensis, as Ayelet Even- Ezra has shown. There is virtually no comparison in size between the Summa and earlier scholastic sources.

In this regard, the Summa served as a sort of "first installment" in the summa genre for which university scholasticism would quickly become famous, and a prototype for later and perhaps more well- known Summae like that of Thomas Aquinas. The Dominican master clearly had the Summa to hand when he began work on his magisterial Summa Theologiae, a full twenty years after the Summa Halensis itself was completed. As a comparison of these two summae confirms, Aquinas adopted many topics that had first been introduced in the Franciscan Summa, including his famous "Five Ways" to prove God's existence, his treatment of natural and eternal law, and the structure and key aspects of his account of the soul. While he situated these topics within his own frame of reference, with a view to bolstering his own doctrinal positions, his reliance on the Franciscan precedent in formal terms is often very apparent.

Even before Aquinas, Albert the Great had borrowed extensively, sometimes even whole passages, from the Summa Halensis, as Oleg Bychkov has shown in his study of aesthetics. The "great affinity" between the Halensian and Albertine summae was already highlighted by Victorin Doucet, the editor

of the third book of the Summa Halensis, who states that "these Summae not infrequently concur" (illae Summae non raro concordant) and that Albert "constantly had the Halensian Summa in his hands" (constanter prae manibus habuerit). This is not even to mention the Summa's influence on other prominent thirteenth- century authors such as Bonaventure, who likewise had this text in his hands (prae manibus) when he wrote his commentary on the Sentences.

When these aspects of the Summa's context are taken into account, the text that Roger Bacon sarcastically described as having "the weight of a horse" emerges as no mere "Augustinian encyclopedia" but as a pioneering text for early university scholasticism, which likewise represents the first statement of many concepts that would become defining features of the Franciscan intellectual tradition. The translations provided in this volume seek to showcase some of the doctrines where early Franciscans exhibited the greatest creativity and even novelty, including the nature of theology, the knowledge of God, the proof of his existence, the nature of God as infinite, as a transcendental being, as Triune, its Christology, and ideas on free will and moral theology. The doctrines are commented upon below roughly in the order in which the Summa treats them, with its first volume devoted to theology proper and the doctrine of God; the two parts of the second volume to creation and sin, respectively; and the third volume to Christology, the law, and grace.

Together with the translations, these comments open doors for exploring the continuity between the Summists' work and that of subsequent Franciscans: not only Bonaventure but also later thinkers like Peter of John Olivi and John Duns Scotus, who have often been regarded as the inaugurators of a new strand in the Franciscan intellectual tradition. At another level, the proximity of the Summa to Francis may facilitate efforts to detect the possible correlation between Franciscan ideas and the understanding of the Franciscan ethos that prevailed at the time, as depicted, for instance, in the three biographies of Francis by Thomas of Celano. In that sense, the Summa Halensis has the potential to bring us back to the heart of the Franciscan intellectual tradition and the reasons why certain ideas were formulated in the first place, disclosing the purpose and thus the promise of Franciscan thought, not only in its own time but also for theology and philosophy today. <>

SUMMA THEOLOGICA HALENSIS: DE LEGIBUS ET PRAECEPTIS: LATIN TEXT by Alexander of Hales et al with translation and commentary in German edited by Michael Basse [De Gruyter, 9783110501346] Pages: 2611, Open Access.

THE SUMMA HALENSIS – TRACT ON LAWS – presented here with the original Latin text and German translation along with commentary, is the most important legal treatise of the early scholastic period. The Tract is a rich source, both conceptually and as a document of cultural history, not least because it stimulates reflection on the multiple functions of the law and the connections between theology and law.

With the three-volume publication, a German translation and a commentary on this important work in the transition from early modern to high scholasticism will be presented together with the Latin text for the first time. From a conceptual point of view, this treatise was fundamental in its foundation and development of the different manifestations of the law - as eternal law, natural law, Mosaic law and evangelical law. His extensive interpretation of the Mosaic Law also has concrete references to the world of life and belief, which are revealing for the cultural and social history of this time. Also regarding the turning to the Torah in the current theology and in the context of the

interreligious and socio-political discourses over the understanding of the law deserves attention the law council of the Summa Halensis, because he in many respects to the reflection over the function (s) of the law as well as the context of theology and law.

TRANSLATED TABLE OF CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION

1 CONTEXT OF ORIGIN (PP. 3-21)

The Summa Halensis is one of the most important works that were created in the transition from early to high scholasticism. Scholasticism initiated an intensive preoccupationwith tradition in all branches of science, and so in dealing with texts, and that meant with language and argumentation structures, uniform methods of investigation developed or since the 13th century in thedisputatio." ² The most important instrument here was the logic with which the plausibility of arguments and authorities was assessed. In terms of educational and institutional history, the emergence and development of scholasticism was closely...

2 THE TRACT 'ON THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS' (PP. 22-32)

The Summa Halensis consists of three books. In the prologue to the third book, a general objective of the work is presented, which is also of importance for the systematic-theological place of the legal treatise. Thus it is fundamentally established that the entire 'instruction' of the Christian faith is related to two things: "the belief and knowledge of the Creator on the one hand and the belief and knowledge of the Redeemer on the other hand". Accordingly, in the Summa Halensis, a doctrine of God and creation is first developed and then a soteriology, which consists of a Christology and a doctrine of the sacraments.

At the beginning of the first book, in an introductory treatise, the scientific nature of...

II LATIN TEXT AND GERMAN TRANSLATION

INQUISITIO PRIMA DE LEGE AETERNA (pp. 34-111)

Summa theologicae disciplinae in duo consistit, in fide et moribus. Expeditis inquisitionibus pertinentibus ad fidem, ut de Redemptore, adiutorio Iesu Christi, procedendum est ad inquisitiones pertinentes ad mores.

Ad informationem autem morum concurrunt necessario praecepta et leges, gratia et virtutes, dona, fructus et beatitudines. Leges et praecepta, ut ostendentia debitum boni faciendi et mali vitandi; gratia et virtutes etc., ut praestantia facultatem faciendi et vitandi. Prima igitur pars inquisitionis moralis erit de legibus et praeceptis;
secunda de gratia et virtutibus; tertia de donis, fructibus et beatitudinibus.
Sed quia omnes leges, prout dicit Augustine, et praecepta ab aeterna lege derivata...
[The summary of the theological discipline consists of two things: faith and morals. Having completed inquiries pertaining to the faith, such as the Redeemer, with the assistance of Jesus Christ, we must proceed to inquiries pertaining to morals.

Now the precepts and laws, grace and virtues, gifts, fruits, and beatitudes necessarily concur in the pattern of morals. Laws and precepts, as showing the duty of doing good and avoiding evil; grace and virtues etc., as excellence of the ability to act and to avoid.
The first part, therefore, will be of the laws and precepts of moral inquiry;
the second about grace and virtues; the third of the gifts, fruits and beatitudes.
But because all the laws, as Augustine says, and the precepts derived from the eternal law…]

INQUISITIO SECUNDA DE LEGE NATURALI (pp. 112-209)

Adiuvante divina gratia, consequently inquirendum est de legibus derivatis a lege aeterna ad ordinandam rationalem creaturam. Harum autem quaedam est rationali creaturae indita, ut lex naturalis; quaedam vero imposita sive addita, ut lex Moysi, lex Evangelii et humana. Prior igitur inquisitio erit de lege naturali; consequens vero de legibus additis, quantum pertinet ad theologicam inquisitionem.

De lege autem naturali inquisitio est talis:

Primo, on sit;

secundo, quid sit;

third, quo modo sit;

quarto, quorum sit.

quaeritur an sit, primo absolute quaeritur an talis lex sit quae sit rationali creaturae indita;

secundo, dato quod sit, an creata vel increata sit....

[With the aid of divine grace, we must therefore inquire about laws derived from the eternal law for ordering rational creatures. Some of these are imprinted on the rational creature, such as natural law; others were imposed or added, such as the law of Moses, the law of the gospel, and the human law. The first, therefore, will be an investigation of the natural law; it follows from the addition of laws, as far as it pertains to theological inquiry.

The natural law is as follows:

First, let it be on;

secondly, what it is;

third, in what way it is;

fourthly, of whom he is.

the question is whether it is, the first question is absolutely whether there is such a law that is imprinted on the rational creature.

secondly, that it is given, whether created or uncreated…]

INQUISITIO TERTIA DE LEGE MOYSI (pp. 210-1911)

Consequens est, adiuvante Dei gratia, inquirere de lege Moysi.

Et primo, generaliter quantum ad Legis conditions;

secundo, in speciali, quantum ad Legis praecepta et sanctiones.

Circa conditiones autem legis mosaicae inquirenda sunt haec:

Primo, de latione Legis;

secundo, de continentia Legis;

tertio, de impletione per Christum;

quarto, de onere observantiae legalis;

quinto, de iustificatione Legis.

Quantum ad Legislationem inquirenda sunt haec:

Primo, de utilitate lationis;

secundo, de necessitate lationis;

tertio, de tempore lationis;

quarto, de personis quibus lata est;

Quinto, de latore Legis.

[No. 259] CAPUT I

[The consequence is, with the help of the grace of God, to inquire about the law of Moses.

And first, generally with respect to the conditions of the law;

secondly, in particular, as to the precepts and sanctions of the Law.

These things must be inquired into in regard to the conditions of the Law of Moses:

First, the legislation of the law;

secondly, on the continence of the law;

thirdly, of the fulfillment through Christ;

fourthly, the burden of legal observance;

fifthly, about the justification of the law
These are to be inquired into with respect to the Legislation:
Of the utility of motion;
secondly, the necessity of motion;
thirdly, the time of motion;
fourthly, of the persons to whom it was issued;
Fifthly, the lawgiver
[No. 259] Chapter I]

DE UTILITATE LATIONIS LEGIS.

Quantum ad primum sic procedure: a. Rome. 5,...
[The consequence is, with the help of the grace of God, to inquire about the law of Moses.
And first, generally with respect to the conditions of the law;
secondly, in particular, as to the precepts and sanctions of the Law.

These things must be inquired into in regard to the conditions of the Law of Moses:
First, the legislation of the law;
secondly, on the continence of the law;
thirdly, of the fulfillment through Christ;
fourthly, the burden of legal observance;
fifthly, about the justification of the law

These are to be inquired into with respect to the Legislation:
Of the utility of motion;
secondly, the necessity of motion;
thirdly, the time of motion;
fourthly, of the persons to whom it was issued;
Fifthly, the lawgiver
[No. 259] Chapter I

THE UTILITY OF THE LAW

In the first procedure: a. Rome. 5

INQUISITIO QUARTA DE LEGE EVANGELICA (pp. 1912-2280)

Consequens est, invocata Spiritus Sancti gratia, inquirere de lege et praeceptis Evangelii.
Cuius inquisitionis erit talis modus, ut primo quaeramus in generali de latione et
conditionibus legis Evangelii;
Deinde vero in speciali de praeceptis et consiliis Evangelii.
Inquirentes autem in generali ad pleniorem et perfectiorem intelligentiam altius
perscrutantes quaeremus:

Primo, an una sola sit lex data vel indita rationali creaturae;
secundo, an praeter legem inditam sit ponere legem scriptam;
tertio, an sint duae leges tantum, lex naturae et lex Moysi, ita quod non requiratur lex
Evangelii;
quarto, on lex Evangelii eadem sit lege naturali vel differens;
fifth, to eadem...
[The result is, invoking the grace of the Holy Spirit, to inquire about the law and the
precepts of the Gospel.
The mode of inquiry will be as follows: first, let us inquire in general about the legislation and
conditions of the law of the Gospel;
Then in detail about the precepts and counsels of the Gospel.
We will seek more inquiring in general for a fuller and more complete understanding

First, whether there was only one law given or imparted to the rational creature;

secondly, whether it is contrary to the innate law to place a written law;
thirdly, whether there are only two laws, the law of nature and the law of Moses, so that the law of the Gospel is not required;
fourthly, that the law of the Gospel is the same or different from the natural law;
fifth, to the same...]

III Comment

First Investigation: The Eternal Law (pp. 2283-2295)

With a fundamental distinction between 'faith' and 'morality', literally 'customs' in Latin, the position of the legal tract in the systematics of the theological disciplines is explained from a scientific-theoretical point of view. He then forms the first part of a moral theology and deals with the demonstration of the 'good' that must be done and the 'evil' that is to be avoided in view of existing laws and regulations. The question of man's ability to do good and avoid evil will then be dealt with in two further sections of this moral theology of the Summa Halensis, which deal with grace and the...

Second Inquiry: The Law of Nature (pp. 2296-2315)

In the order of laws derived from eternal law, natural law is examined first. This section of the legal treatise of the Summa Halensis gave important impetus to the further development of the scholastic doctrine of natural law. 33 Previously, the legislators and decretists had already dealt with the natural law, 34 before William of Auxerre then developed a systematic approach. 35 Alexander von Hales, on the other hand, paid little attention to this topic in his glosses of sentences. 36 The study of the Summa Halensis is divided into four major sections, dealing with the fundamental questions of (1) whether natural law exists, (2) what, or (3) how it is...

Third Inquiry: The Law of Moses (pp. 2316-2476)

The tract is divided into two sections: first, the general terms of the law are clarified, and then there are specific discussions on the do's and don'ts of the law. The first section is further divided into five questions dealing with the making of the law, its content, its fulfillment by Christ, the burden of obedience to the law, and justification by the law.

Given the foregoing discussion of natural law, which provides evidence that natural law can adapt to changing circumstances, what is the benefit of the enactment of the Mosaic Law? The Summa Halensis refers...

Fourth Inquiry: The Evangelical Law (pp. 2476-2516)

After the Eternal Law, the Natural Law and the Mosaic Law, the fourth and final part of the legal treatise of the Summa Halensis examines the 'Evangelical Law'. This part is divided into two major sections - 'tracts' - which deal first with the enactment and characteristics of the Gospel law and then with its regulations.

The first part of the examination of the evangelical law deals with its salvation-historical necessity and its relation to the natural law on the one hand and to the Mosaic law on the other.

The arguments that speak for the fact that there can be only one law for the rational creation are confronted with four counter-arguments, whereby...

Bibliography
register

A Guide to Citing the Summa Halensis by Simon Maria Kopf and Lydia Schumacher

When citing the Quaracchi edition of the Franciscan Fathers, we suggest and use in this volume the following form as a standardized way of citing the Summa Halensis:

Alexander of Hales, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH),4 vols(Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bona venturae, 1924 – 48),Vol III, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1,Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179.

The relevant text divisions of the Quaracchi edition include, in the followin order:

Vol—	Volume (tomus)
P—	Part (pars)
In—	Inquiry (inquisitio)
Tr—	Tract (tractatus)
S—	Section (sectio)
Q—	Question (quaestio)
Ti—	Title (titulus)
D—	Distinction (distinctio)
M—	Member (membrum)
C—	Chapter (caput)
Ar—	Article (articulus)
Pr—	Problem (problema)
Pa—	Particle (particula)
(n[n].)—	Paragraph number[s]

A further specification of the thus determined entity (to be cited as ven in the edition) might, at this point, include:

[arg.]—	Objections
Respondeo/Solutio—	Answer
(Sed) Contra—	On the Contrary
Adobiecta—	Answers to Objections
p[p]—	Page number[s].

The second instance of citation should read as follows (ing all relevant text divisions):
SH III, In2, Tr2,S2, Q1,Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2 (n. 162), Solutio, p. 179. <>

THE SUMMA HALENSIS: SOURCES AND CONTEXT
[Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie, De Gruyter, 9783110684926]

For generations, early Franciscan thought has been widely regarded as a relatively unoriginal attempt to systematize the longstanding intellectual tradition of Augustine. This volume brings leading scholars of medieval thought together to undertake the first major study of the sources and context of the so-called Sumna Halensis (1236-45), which was one of the earliest and most significant instalments in the Summa genre. This Summa was collaboratively authored by the founding members of the Franciscan school at Paris, who sought to lay down a uniquely Franciscan intellectual tradition for the first time. In examining how the Summa reckons with some of the most significant sources of the day, the contributions to the volume illustrate that early Franciscans interpreted their authorities

to their own ends, developing highly innovative ideas that had a lasting impact on the Franciscan intellectual -tradition and the disciplines of philosophy and theology.

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The Summa Halensis: Sources and Contexts by Lydia Schumacher

Introduction

The Franciscan intellectual tradition as it developed before Bonaventure, and above all, Duns Scotus, has not been the subject of much scholarly attention over the years. By most accounts, Bonaventure's forebears, and even Bonaventure himself, worked primarily to systematize the intellectual tradition of Augustine that had prevailed for most of the earlier Middle Ages. In contrast, Scotus is supposed to have broken with past precedent to develop innovative philosophical and theological positions that anticipated the rise of modern thought. Thus, Scotus and his successors have been the focus of many studies, while his predecessors are deemed largely insignificant for the further history of thought.

This volume and another that accompanies it will make a case for the innovativeness of early Franciscan thought, which the editor has also advanced elsewhere. The contributions are based on proceedings from four conferences which were held over the course of 2018 and sponsored by the European Research Council. While these conferences concerned the early Franciscan tradition in general, their more specific focus was the so-called Summa Halensis, a massive text that was collaboratively authored by the founding members of the Franciscan school at Paris between 1236 and 1245, in an attempt to lay down a distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition for the very first time. Although some final additions to the text were made in 1255–6, the Summa was mostly composed during the second quarter of the thirteenth century and thus within the first 50years of the existence of the University of Paris, which was founded around 1200 and served as the centre for theological study at the time. In countless respects, it laid the foundation for the further development of the Franciscan intellectual tradition.

The need fora text like the Summa was precipitated in part by the rapid growth of the Franciscan order—from 12 members in 1209 to as many as 20,000 by 1250—the most gifted of whom required a basis for their scholarly formation. As a matter of fact, the Summa was the text on which the likes of Bonaventure and Scotus were inducted into their order's intellectual tradition. Bonaventure, for one, credits everything he learned to his 'master and father' Alexander of Hales, which is scarcely an exaggeration. As is well documented, the rapid emergence of a scholarly division within the order quickly gave rise to considerable controversy both within and outside of its membership. While some largely lay Franciscans, particularly those who had known Francis, questioned the compatibility of studies with the Franciscan ideal of poverty, the 'secular' masters at the young university, namely, those who were not associated with a religious order, perceived the friars as competitors for students, prestige, and ultimately as a threat to their personal income.

One of the ways that the Franciscans sought to defend their stake in university life involved attempts to 'out-do' the secular masters in terms of the scope and extent of the theological texts they produced. The Franciscans were aided in this regard by the entrance of Alexander of Hales into the order in 1236, which instigated the production of the Summa Halensis itself. In his already long and distinguished career, Alexander had been celebrated as one of the most sophisticated and significant theologians in the Parisian Faculty of Theology. As is well known, he championed the effort to give a central place in the university timetable to lectures on Lombard's Sentences, in addition to the Bible. Furthermore, he composed one of the earliest Sentences Commentaries, eventually establishing this practice as the key to obtaining the license to teach theology, the medieval equivalent to the doctoral degree. By acquiring such a distinguished scholar amongst their ranks, the Franciscans captured their place in the university at a time when higher education was fast becoming the precondition for religious and spiritual authority and thus essential to the very survival of the order. More immediately, they gained the human resource needed to oversee the project that ultimately resulted in the Summa that bears Hales' name.

Although Alexander certainly oversaw the work of the Summa and contributed a great deal to it, whether indirectly or directly, the editors of the fourth tome, led by Victorin Doucet, eventually clarified that other Franciscans were involved in its composition as well This was something that the editors of tomes 1– 3, overseen by Bernard Klumper, had insisted on denying, in the face of mounting evidence against a single author. As Doucet showed, the first and fourth tomes were likely authored primarily by Alexander's chief collaborator, John of La Rochelle, who had plans to prepare a Summa of his own before Alexander entered the order and his services became otherwise enlisted. Most probably, tomes 2 and 3 were prepared by a third redactor, who worked on the basis of John and Alexander's authentic works but did not always follow them exactly.

The multiple authorship has been one reason for the Summa's neglect, as modern scholars have tended to focus on single-authored works by a known author. However, the Summa Halensis is significant precisely because it represents the 'collective mind' of the founders of the Franciscan intellectual tradition at Paris and their attempt to articulate the contours of this tradition for the very first time. Far from a compilation of relatively disjoined sections, the Summa exhibits remarkable coherence and an overarching vision, and it contains many ideas that would quickly become defining features of Franciscan thought.

This is confirmed by manuscript evidence, which illustrates that the first three volumes were received as a whole following the deaths of John and Alexander in 1245. Such evidence is strengthened by the fact that only two small additions and no major corrections were made to these volumes in 1255–6, when Pope Alexander IV ordered William of Melitona, then head of the Franciscan school at Paris, to enlist any help he needed from learned friars to complete the last volume on the sacraments, which was not composed by Alexander and John and has yet to be prepared ina modern critical edition.

Because of its collaborative nature, the Summa effort ultimately resulted in an entirely unprecedented intellectual achievement. There were of course other great works of a systematic nature that did precede it, including many Commentaries on Lombard's Sentences and other early Summae like the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre and the Summa de Bono of Philip the Chancellor. However, the text that is by far the largest among these, namely, the Summa aurea, contains only 818 questions for discussion by comparison to the Summa's 3,408, as Ayelet Even-Ezra shows in her contribution to these volumes. There is virtually no comparison in size between the Summa and earlier texts.

In many respects, this Summa was the first major contribution to the Summa genre for which scholasticism became famous, which served as a prototype for further instalments in the genre, including Thomas Aquinas' magisterial Summa Theologiae, which only began to be composed twenty years after the Summa Halensis was completed. Although Thomas Aquinas took a different view from his Franciscan counterparts on many issues, a comparison of the two texts shows that he adopted many topics of discussion from them which indeed became common topics of scholastic discussion more generally. For example, he inherited from them the idea for his famous 'five ways' to prove God's existence, the notion of eternal law, his account of the passions, and a structure for dealing with questions on the soul.

A major reason for the unprecedented size and scope of the Summa is that it incorporated an unmatched number of sources into its discussions. These included the traditional patristic sources that can be found in Peter Lombard's Sentences, along with the newly translated Greek patristic sources of Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus, whom Lombard had begun to use in a preliminary way. The Summists also engage with more recent sources from the 11th and 12th centuries, including Anselm of Canterbury, whose works had largely been neglected until Alexander and his colleagues took an interest in them, as well as Hugh and Richard of St Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux. The Summa even maintains a dialogue with earlier contemporaries like William and Philip the Chancellor.

Of special note amongst the Summa's sources are many philosophical texts that had recently become available in the West in Latin translations. This in fact is one reason why the size of the Summa mushroomed so significantly, namely, because it was the first systematic treatise extensively and comprehensively to incorporate philosophical questions— about the nature of reality and knowledge for instance— into its treatment of how the world comes from and relates to its divine source. This is also a significant respect in which it set the agenda and terms of further scholastic

debate. A common misperception of the scholastic period is that the incorporation of philosophy into the scope of theological inquiry was due largely to the rediscovery of Aristotle. This may have been true for the generation of Aquinas, but there was a period of about 100years, between 1150 and 1250, when Latin access to Aristotle was patchy and riddled with problems.

A basic problem concerned the fact that the Aristotelian translations from Greek were not perceived to be of a high quality, and they were sometimes partial and were not produced all at once. For this reason, scholars during this period tended to rely much more heavily on the readily available work of the Islamic scholar Avicenna, whose writings translated from Arabic were of a much higher quality and became available all at once, between 1152 and 1166. Although Avicenna took Aristotle's texts as a point of departure, he proceeded from there to develop a system of thought that is nonetheless incommensurable with Aristotle's and in many respects advances beyond it, not least by incorporating a Neo-Platonic dimension. At the time, the Neoplatonist reading of Aristotle was not uncommon, as it had long been proffered in the Greek and Arabic commentary traditions on Aristotle, not least on the basis of spurious Aristotelian works like The Theology of Aristotle.

Although Latin thinkers did not have this work until the Renaissance, they possessed a variation on it in the Liber de causis, which Aquinas realized in 1268 was actually a compilation based on Proclus' Elements of Theology rather than an authentic work of Aristotle himself. Such Neo-Platonizing works legitimized the reading of Aristotle in line with Avicenna. Furthermore, they justified projecting ideas from Avicenna on to Christian Neo-Platonists like Augustine, who was reconciled with Aristotle by means of Avicenna as well. In this connection, early scholastics and especially Franciscans relied particularly heavily on spurious Augustinian works, such as De spiritu et anima, De fide ad Petram, and De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, which lent themselves to interpretation in terms of Avicenna's thinking.

While the Franciscans were by no means exceptional in making use of Avicenna at the time, they were by far the most predominant school of thought to do so; and indeed, their incorporation of Avicennian themes was far more extensive than many of their contemporaries. In the case of the Franciscans particularly, there appears to have been a sort of happy coincidence between the Avicennian materials that were available and popular at the time and what was well-suited to articulating a distinctly Franciscan form of thought. Francis had been more emphatic than most in insisting on the radical dependence of all things on God and the necessity of his guidance in human knowing. Avicenna aided the first Franciscan intellectuals to give an account of philosophical and theological matters that respected his values. This presumably went a long way towards justifying to members of the order itself that there was a place for high-level intellectual pursuits in their life.

That is not to say that Franciscan thought is a function of Avicenna or any other authority. While Avicenna in many cases provided important philosophical resources for Franciscan thinking, these were always adapted to suit Franciscan and more broadly Christian purposes, as well as supplemented with insights from other sources in the Christian and even the Islamic and Jewish traditions that resonated with the Franciscan ethos. The ultimate product of these synthesizing efforts was a systematic framework for thinking that was entirely the invention of early Franciscans. Although it incorporates many authorities, consequently, the Summa cannot rightly be described as a mere attempt to rehearse or systematize any authority, including the authority of authorities, Augustine.

In this connection, it is worth noting that the Summa is not exceptional in making extensive use of Augustine. All major thinkers at the time, from Anselm and Hugh of St Victor to Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, also gave disproportional weight to Augustine's authority. The reason for citing

Augustine in such cases was not simply to interpret or bolster his own views, however. Rather, references to Augustine were marshalled as proof texts to lend support to the author's own perspectives, regardless of whether those coincided with authentic views of Augustine. This was standard and even required practice at a period in time when the accepted method of advancing one's own arguments involved situating them in relation toa broader, if loosely defined, tradition or authority for thought.

THE SUMMA HALENSIS: DOCTRINES AND DEBATES

edited by Lydia Schumacher [Publications of the Grabmann Institute for research into medieval theology and philosophy Munich university publications Catholic Theological Faculty, Founded by Michael Schmaus †, Werner Dettloff † and Richard Heinzmann, continued in collaboration with Ulrich Horst. Edited by Isabelle Mandrella and Martin Thurner, De Gruyter, 9783110684957]

The Objectives of this Volume

This volume offers a corrective to that tendency in the form of contributions which examine in detail how the Summa reckons with some of the most significant sources of the time, including the Bible (Gies), Augustine (Schumacher), Pseudo-Dio (Edwards), John of Damascus (Cross, Zachhuber), Anselm of Canterbury and the Victorines (Canty, Rosato, Coolman), as well as some more covert influences like the th century thinker John Scotus Eriugena (Kavanagh) and above all Avicenna (Bertolac Schumacher). Further contributions situate the Summa in its historical and i tual context, in some cases by locating it with reference to contemporaries like William of Auxerre and other early Summa authors (Brown, Even-Ezra), William of Auvergne (Smith), or even associates of the English Franciscan school (Gasper).

Finally, the Summa is placed in relation to later contributors to early Franciscan thought like Odo Rigaldus (Delmas) and to the Franciscan religious order and rule more generally (Senocak). From different perspectives, consequently, these contributions highlight what an exceptional text the Summa was in its context and how it deployed sources to construct what was at the time an entirely novel Franciscan intellectual tradition, which laid the foundation for the work of Franciscans for generations to follow. By illustrating the Summa's novelties, in fact, this study provides grounds for identifying continuity where scholars have always seen a break between the earlier Franciscan tradition and the new departures of John Duns Scotus and his generation.

This not only shifts the credit for some of Scotus' innovations back on to his predecessors but also highlights more clearly the Franciscan ethos that underlie his work, which shines most clearly through the study of early Franciscan thought. In that sense, the study of the Summa Halensis clearly demarcates Franciscan thought from any modern developments in intellectual history which took place side the order, exonerating it of the charges some have laid before them of causing the alleged ills of modernity. At the same time, this study helps to clarify how Franciscan ideas were meant to be construed and employed on their own terms and the promise they might hold for reckoning with philosophical and theological problems today. To make such a recovery of the Franciscan intellectual tradition in future is one ultimate objective of this project to highlight the tensions between authorities and innovation in early Franciscan thought.

For generations, early Franciscan thought has been widely regarded as unoriginal: a mere attempt to systematize the longstanding intellectual tradition of Augustine in the face of the rising popularity of Aristotle.

The founding of the first chartered university at Paris around 1200 set in motion a cultural revolution in the field of higher education. In this context, members of the recently-founded Franciscan order quickly came to the fore as trend-setters in scholarly debates. This volume undertakes the first collective study of major doctrines and debates presented in a work authored jointly by the first Franciscan scholars at Paris, the so-called Summa Halensis (1236-45), which codifies the key elements of their burgeoning intellectual tradition. Although early Franciscans are often regarded as unoriginal followers of past authorities, the contributions illustrate how they innovated in ways that laid the groundwork for the later development of Franciscan thought, which is often regarded as a forerunner modern thought. This groundbreaking study is therefore crucial for understanding the further course of inteliectual history and the origins of philosophy and theology as academic disciplines.

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Of special note amongst the Summa's sources are many philosophical texts that had recently become available in the West in Latin translations. This in fact is one reason why the size of the Summa mushroomed so significantly, namely, because it was the first systematic treatise extensively and comprehensively to incorporate philosophical questions— about the nature of reality and knowledge for instance— into its treatment of how the world comes from and relates to its divine source. This is also a significant respect in which it set the agenda and terms of further scholastic debate. A common misperception of the scholastic period is that the incorporation of philosophy into the scope of theological inquiry was due largely to the rediscovery of Aristotle. This may have been true for the generation of Aquinas, but there was a period of about 100years, between 1150

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In this connection, it is worth noting that the Summa is not exceptional in making extensive use of Augustine. All major thinkers at the time, from Anselm and Hugh of St Victor to Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, also gave disproportional weight to Augustine's authority. The reason for citing Augustine in such cases was not simply to interpret or bolster his own views, however. Rather, references to Augustine were marshalled as proof texts to lend support to the author's own perspectives, regardless of whether those coincided with authentic views of Augustine. This was standard and even required practice at a period in time when the accepted method of advancing one's own arguments involved situating them in relation toa broader, if loosely defined, tradition or authority for thought.

As Mary Carruthers rightly notes, authorities in this period were not so much thinkers but texts; and texts were subject to interpretation, with their meanings always capable of being extrapolated in new ways in new contexts. What rendered any given text authoritative was precisely whether it gave rise to such new readings, which in turn became part of the meaning or tradition of the text. Although scholastic authors generally invoked authorities with a view to bolstering their own agendas, that does not mean there were not cases, including in the Summa, where they sought to represent the position of a particular authority fairly accurately. In such cases, however, there was generally a coincidence between the views presented by an authority and those of the scholastic author, who was still working for his own intellectual ends, which remained the ultimate arbiter of his use of sources. In spite of this reality, a tendency remains to take scholastic quotations from authorities at face value, thus interpreting texts like the Summa Halensis as more or less the sum or function of their sources.

The Objectives of this Volume

This volume offers a corrective to that tendency in the form of contributions which examine in detail how the Summa reckons with some of the most significant doctrines and debates in the theological context of the time. Many of these concern the doctrine of God himself, which is treated in entries which assess the debate which long divided Greek and Latin thinkers whether God is an individual or a universal (Côté); whether he can be referred to through analogical, equivocal, or univocal language, that is, language that is either related, unrelated, or exactly the same as language used for things that are 'not God' (Wood); whether his existence can be proved, and if so, how (Schumacher); how God predestines some to salvation(Harkins);how his providence operates in the world (Barnes);and what it means to say that God is Triune (Coolman).

As the authors of articles on these issues show, these are all areas of Franciscan innovation, but so are the Summa's interventions in Christology as well as moral and sacramental theology. These matters are dealt in further contributions on the reason for the Incarnation (Hunter),the definition of personhood in the Summa (Kobusch), the nature of grace in early Franciscan authors (Strand), and the Summists' attitude towards philosophers, pagans, and Jews (Marenbon). As regards moral theology more specifically, there are important innovations to note in the Summa's account of passions and sins (Veccio), and eternal and prescribed laws as well as oaths and vows (Saccenti). In

the field of sacramental theology, the Summa breaks now ground in dealing with issues surrounding penance (Levy), the Eucharist (Colish), prayer (Johnson), and the immaculate conception (Ingham).

In dealing with such diverse matters of doctrine, the contributions in this volume highlight what an exceptional text the Summa was in its context and how it served to construct what was at the time an entirely novel Franciscan intellectual tradition, which laid the foundation for the work of Franciscans for generations to follow. By illustrating the Summa's novelties in key doctrinal areas, in fact, this study provides grounds for identifying continuity where scholars have generally seen a break between the earlier Franciscan tradition and the new departures of John Duns Scotus and his generation.

In that sense, the current project not only shifts the credit for some of Scotus' innovations back on to his predecessors but also highlights more clearly the Franciscan ethos that underlies his work, which shines most clearly through the study of early Franciscan thought. By these means, the study of the Summa Halensis clearly demarcates Franciscan thought from any modern developments in intellectual history which took place outside the order, exonerating Franciscan thinkers of the charges some have made that they are responsible for all the alleged ills of modernity. At the same time, this study helps to clarify how Franciscan ideas were meant to be construed and employed on their own terms and the promise they might hold for reckoning with philosophical and theological problems today. To make such a recovery of the Franciscan intellectual tradition possible is one ultimate objective of this project to highlight the tensions between authorities and innovation in early Franciscan thought. <>

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: QUESTIONS ON VIRTUE, GOODNESS, AND THE WILL edited and translated by Eric W. Hagedorn[Car School author 2021 285 B)39999218(ut)-5.(r)1-a

Ockham's Place in the History of Thought

William of Ockham is widely considered to be among the greatest of the Christian philosophers of the late Middle Ages; his thought at the very least foreshadowed, and to some degree actually shaped, much of the course of European thought for several centuries after his death. In Ockham's writing we see the first stages of the transition from ancient and medieval ways of thinking to more characteristically modern ones such as a greater emphasis on individual rights, the primacy of experience, explanatory modesty, and human freedom. His most characteristic philosophical views are his nominalist metaphysics, voluntarist ethics, and liberal political theory.

Among philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries Ockham is best known for being the progenitor of a particular variety of ontological reductionism. Though not the first thinker in the history of philosophy to be a nominalist in the contemporary sense denying any kind of universal entities (that honor likely goes to the twelfth-century thinker Peter Abelard and his immediate predecessor Roscelin of Compiegne), Ockham is probably the historical figure most readily associated with that doctrine. He shrank the standard medieval Aristotelian ontology considerably through the use of his eponymous Razor along with an array of other metaphysical principles: he argued against the existence of any kind of universals and he also pruned away many of the branches of the Aristotelian categorical tree by arguing that there is no philosophical need to posit any entities at all within the categories of Quantity, Relation, Time, Place, Action, etc. Ockham's world is one that contains only individual substances and individual qualities inhering in those substances; in this way, he prefigures and sets the stage for early modern substance/mode ontologies as found in authors such as Descartes and Locke. (The reader will see some faint traces of this ontological program in this volume, e.g., in texts where Ockham argues against more ontologically expansive theories that suppose moral goodness and original sin must be some sort of property or relation inhering in morally good acts and in unbaptized humans, respectively.)

The content and influence of Ockham's ethical views are less well known today than are his ontological doctrines, but they were no less impactful in the history of thought. Ockham, along with his predecessor John Duns Scotus, helped initiate a momentous shift in th history of ethics. In the century immediately prior to their work many of the dominant ethical theories were eudaimonist; according to such views, what is right for an agent is importantly grounded in what is good for that agent. Further, many of these views were also in some sense naturalist; they taught that what is good for an agent is a matter of natural fact, at least to some degree discernible through unaided human reason alone. Thus, according to a thirteenth-century thinker like Thomas Aquinas, one can discover most, if not all, ethical truths simply through the natural study of human nature and the human good. Furthermore, Aquinas and many of his contemporaries held that one's conception of the good in some way necessitates the activity of one's will: the very idea of choosing contrary to one's considered judgment was seen as paradoxical at best, outright impossible at worst.

Scotus begins to sever this theoretical link between the right and the good, arguing that it is at least possible for God to bring about a world in which an agent's ethical duties conflict with that agent's own flourishing, and that it is at least possible that one's ethical duties might not be deducible from the facts of human nature. He also laid an elaborate doctrine of the will's two inclinations (an idea previously suggested by Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century); for Scotus, the will is always simultaneously tugged toward one's moral duty and toward one's own self-interest, and the will's freedom lies in its ability to indeterministically select which of these inclinations to

Ockham extends Scotus's ideas, arguing that the concept of right action is entirely based on relations of duty and obligation, that such obligation holds irrespective of the agent's flourishing, and that the will is empowered to select absolutely anything the intellect can represent. An agent willing what is straightforwardly morally bad while conceiving that very thing as bad is not treated as a paradoxical situation by Ockham; if anything, he seems to take it to be a not uncommon occurrence of human experience, one we should be able to recognize in our own lives. He is firmly committed to the view that an agent is only morally praiseworthy or blameworthy when their actions are both deliberate and unnecessitated; someone acting from drunken rage or from outside compulsion cannot be held morally responsible for those acts, and is in fact blameless in the sight of God (although, of course, the drunk individual might be responsible for deliberately and freely getting drunk). 9 Further, he holds that God has no moral obligations — this seems to be a conclusion he reaches from the premise that the only possible source of moral obligation is the command of a superior authority, together with the belief there is no authority to whom God owes deference — and therefore there is nothing that God could ever do that could count as being morally wrong or unjust in any sense. Rather, God's activity is, in an important sense, simply not subject to moral appraisal. Views such as these would serve to form a basis for the moral and theological reflections of later thinkers such as the early Protestant reformers.

Connotation

Perhaps the single most utilized implement in Ockham's philosophical toolbox is his notion of connotative terms; since connotation theory is used a number of times in this volume without actually being explained in any of these texts, a short summary may be useful.

Ockham regularly accuses his predecessors (justly or not) of trying to derive ontological structure from linguistic structure, believing that they assume, for example, that some entities in reality must be common to many because some terms generally apply to many, or that some entities in reality are relational items because there are true sentences containing relational predicates. The theory of connotation is intended to forestall and help clear up such metaphysical confusion.

On Ockham's account, some linguistic terms and concepts are what he calls "absolute"; they signify only individual substances and/or individual qualities that do exist in reality, they are truly predicated of everything that they signify, and the semantic role of these terms just is this signification. (In contemporary terms, we might say their meaning is equivalent to their reference.) Most linguistic terms and concepts, however, are "connotative" and so have multiple semantic roles; they have what Ockham calls both a primary signification and a secondary signification, by which he means that such terms are truly predicated of one real entity (or entities) while conveying or bringing some other entity (or entities) as well, but without being truly of the latter entity (or entities).

Examples may help. On Ockham's view, absolute terms like Thomas Aquinas,' Lucifer,' 'the redness of that ball,' dog,' 'human being,' and 'heat' all play a similar semantic role. They differ in that the first three signify unique individuals (an individual human, an individual angel, and an individual quality entity) while the latter three signify all the members of a collection (all the individual dogs, and heat qualities, respectively), but all these terms are similar insofar as they have the same kind of semantic

role: each term is predicated of all the entities in question, and this, Ockham thinks, is the entirety of its meaning.

The paradigmatic case of a connotative term, on the other hand, is something like 'parent.' On Ockham's view, the word 'parent' primarily signifies all the parents, but secondarily signifies (i.e., connotes) all the children of those parents; the semantic role of 'parent' is that it is truly predicable of all the parents by means of its implicit gesturing to the children, since 'parent' is not truly predicated of someone unless there's a child around somewhere. What Ockham thinks he gains from of this theory is he doesn't need to appeal to a relational property of parenthood floating around in the external world to explain why it's true that some people are parents and others aren't; rather, it's just a lingudtic fact about the term 'parent' that it only applies when both the appropriate primary significate and secondary significate exist. Similarly, albeit in a more complicated way, Ockham argues in the texts collected here that there is no distinct property of moral goodness that actions possess when they are good and lack when they are not good; rather, the term 'morally good' is just a connotative term that primarily signifies the good action while connoting (among other things) that the agent committing that act is under an obligation to perform that act. Likewise, he also claims in this volume that 'intellect' and 'will' are connotative terms with exactly the same primary significate: 'intellect' signifies a rational soul while connoting that soul's thinking, while 'will' signifies the very same rational soul while connoting that soul's desiring. Thus, on his view, the intellect and the will are entirely undifferentiated in reality; the division between intellect and will is, on his view, merely a difference in how we conceptualize and speak about the human mind and the various kinds of operations it can perform.

On the Texts

As the culmination of his graduate studies at Oxford, William of Ockham was required to spend two years lecturing and commenting upon the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a twelfth-century theological compendium of Catholic doctrine organized into four books (on God, Creation, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments, respectively). By Ockham's day, it was no longer typical practice to comment on the Sentences line by line; rather, the custom was to use the text of the Sentences as an occasion to discuss whichever philosophical and theological questions related to the text the degree candidate found most interesting, and so, especially in his commentary on Books II—IV, Ockham pays little attention to the actual text of Lombard other than as a source of themes to discuss. Given standard practice, Ockham probably spent one academic year lecturing on Books I and II and lectured on Books III and IV the following year; one likely guess is that these lectures took place during the years 1317-19.

A student would have been tasked with keeping a transcript of these lectures; for Books II—IV of Ockham's commentary, this unedited student transcript (known as a reportatio) was the only text ever produced. For Book I, however, Ockham personally corrected, emended, and expanded upon the student transcript to produce a more polished version of the text (an ordinatio); the completed Ordinatio on Book I is significantly longer than the Reportatio on Books II, III, and IV combined. Ockham seems to have completed at least an initial version of the Ordinatio of Book I before he finished the last of his lectures on the Sentences; in the final question of Reportatio IV he directs his students to consult "Ockham's Ordinatio" by that name. Ockham also made a significant number of later emendations to the text of the Ordinatio, though it is unknown exactly when these revisions occurred.

Most of the texts translated in this volume come from the Ordinatio and the Reportatio. Those that do not come from two other collections of theological and philosophical questions, the Quaestiones variae and the Quodlibeta septem. The Quodlibeta septem is a unified work, comprising seven sets of short questions that may be the result of classroom exercises during Ockham's years of teaching

in London (perhaps revised and completed while at Avignon); at the least, their content indicates that they are among the very latest of Ockham's academic writings. A complete translation of the Quodlibeta already exists in English,' but I have included translations of two short questions for reasons discussed below.

Unlike the Quodlibeta, the Quaestiones variae is not a single unified whole, but a grab bag of short essays, longer disputed questions, and marginal notes collected under that title in the mid-twentieth century by the editors of the critical edition of Ockham's academic writings. It is unclear when or for what purpose any of these texts was produced; many of them are clearly later than the Sentences commentary, though at least one question appears to be the original student transcript of part of the lectures on Book 1.2 I have included five texts from this collection in this volume.

One of those texts — Var. Ques., q. 4, on the nature of final causality —provides little to no internal evidence as to its time of composition or purpose. Though much of the question contains material relevant to the topics of this volume, it is exceedingly long, nearly twice as long as any other chapter in this book, and includes long digressions on the metaphysics of causation that are at best tangential to my purposes here. Given this, I have only included a few excerpts from it, largely confined to matters of moral psychology concerning how ends that are loved function differently in the causal process leading to action than do ends that are hated.

The other four texts from Quaestiones variae from which I have taken material are worthy of special note by one interested in Ockham's ethics.3 There is significant internal evidence that what the edition calls articles 9—10 of question 6 were composed together along with questions 7 and 8 in the same manuscript: q. 8 includes explicit references to q. 7 and to q. 6, a. 9; and q. 7 includes such references to q. 6, a. 10, with each of these references stating that the discussion in question can be found on "an earlier page [quaternus]." Given both the connection and the content of these texts — on the nature of the passions, the role of self-control and temperance with respect to those persons, the connections of the virtues to each other and to prudence, and whether virtuous action is possible when reason is mistaken — I think it a distinct possibility that these four questions were an attempt or composing a commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI—VII; but when they were written and whether they were intended to be part of some larger project is entirely unclear.

In producing this volume, my aim has been to present as much of broadly ethical material as possible from Ockham's academic works. (I have not included any selections from the political writing from the second half of Ockham's life; but many of these texts are already available in English.) The most notable absence is the longest part of this hypothesized commentary on the Ethics, namely the lengthy question on the connection of the virtues (Vars. Ques., q. 7); that text would be twice as long as the next longest chapter in this volume, and besides, a complete English translation of it is already in print, so I would direct the reader to look there. The ethical questions in Quodlibeta septem largely tend to be either echoes or elucidations of what Ockham says in the questions translated here, and are already available in English elsewhere, but I have included translations of two short questions that have been widely discussed in the secondary literature and that may differ in subtle points of doctrine from the views Ockham expresses in his Sentences commentary: namely, Quod. III, q. 14, on whether any acts are necessarily virtuous, and Quod. II, q. 14, on the possibility of moral knowledge. I have also included one very short excerpt from Var. Ques., q. 7 that closely parallels Quod. III, q. 14 but that seems to have been largely overlooked in the secondary literature. The resulting volume is not an exhaustive collection of Ockham's ethical writings by any means, but it is, I think, as close to complete as could be produced, especially if it is supplemented with the existing translation of Var. Ques., q. 7.

In organizing this material, I have decided to compile it thematically and in such a way that Ockham's doctrines are presented largely in a logical order, rather than following the original order of presentation according to the arrangement of Lombard's Sentences. First, I include a number of questions on the nature of the created will and its internal states and abilities, followed by questions about the divine will, then questions about the morality of individual acts and virtuous habits, and I close with a series of questions about charity and grace. <>

TYCONIUS' BOOK OF RULES: AN ANCIENT INVITATION TO ECCLESIAL HERMENEUTICS by Matthew R. Lynskey [Series: Vigiliae Christianae, Supplements, Brill, 9789004454835]

In **TYCONIUS' BOOK OF RULES** Matthew R. Lynskey explores the church-centric interpretation of ancient biblical exegete Tyconius in his hermeneutical treatise *Liber regularum*. Influential within his Donatist tradition and the broader context of early North African Christianity, Tyconius wrote one of the earliest works on exegetical theory and praxis in Latin Christianity.

By investigating five key concepts undergirding Tyconius's theology of church, Lynskey demonstrates how Tyconius' ecclesiology shaped his hermeneutical enterprise. Through careful readings and close analysis of Liber regularum, this study seeks to describe Tyconius' exegesis on its own terms, reflecting on notable historical, theological, formational, and missiological implications of his ecclesial exegesis as it concerns the ancient and contemporary church.

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Mottos:

When you have understood, you will be delighted by the sweetness of the divine words, but when you begin to preach and work out what you understand, you will experience bitterness.

cum perceperis, oblectaberis eloquii diuini dulcedine, sed amaritudinem senties, cum praedicare et operari coeperis quod intellexeris.

Tyconius, *Expositio Apocalypseos* 3.59.5–7 (CCSL 107A:165), translated by Gumerlock, *Exposition of the Apocalypse*

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I have no more made my book than my book has made me: 'tis a book consubstantial with the author, of a peculiar design, a parcel [member] of my life.

Je n' ay pas plus fait mon livre, que mon livre m' a fait. Livre consubstantiel à son autheur: d' une occupation propre: membre de ma vie.

Montaigne, *Essais* 2.18 (Coste 2:400), translated by Cotton, *Michel de Montaigne: Selected Essays*

***

Let those, therefore, who are going to read this book not imitate me when I err, but rather when I progress toward the better. For, perhaps, one who reads my works in the order in which they were written will find out how I progressed while writing.

quapropter quicumque ista lecturi sunt, non me imitentur errantem, sed in melius proficientem. inueniet enim fortasse, quomodo scribendo profecerim, quisquis opscula mea ordine, quo scripta sunt, legerit.

Augustine, *Retractationum*, Preface 3 (CSEL 36:10 [PL 32:586]), translated by Bogan, *The Retractions*

Excerpt: The subject of this work explores the ecclesiological hermeneutic of a little-known theologian from fourth-century North Africa, Tyconius. Intriguing is his focus on the centrality of the church in the exegesis of Scripture. Whereas much research has explored early Christianity's Christocentric exegesis—an unmistakable dynamic manifestly characteristic of patristic interpretation and also evident in Tyconius' extant writings—less work has explored the role of the church in scriptural hermeneutics. In this regard, Tyconius has much to say. In retrospect, Tyconius' own historical, sociopolitical, ecclesiastical, and theological setting explain why the church would occupy a central focus in his thinking, writing, and hermeneutical endeavors. From Tyconius' own perspective, however, he practiced an ecclesial exegesis precisely as a natural outflow of his understanding of the nature of the church. For Tyconius, the Scriptures themselves illumine the pathway of its own exegesis. The church being central in the sacred biblical text, Tyconius would summon readers to also make the church central in the interpretive process, reading the Bible ecclesiocentrically.

Exploring the ecclesial hermeneutic of Tyconius, this monograph is a revision of my doctoral work completed in 2018 at the University of South Africa. As its original title suggests—"Aspects of the Spirituality of the *Book of Rules* of Tyconius: Bible and Church in Engagement"[1]—the project was conceived as an interdisciplinary effort to explore the intersection of hermeneutics, ecclesiology, Christian spirituality, and missiology through the historical figure of Tyconius. Under the generous supervision of Professor Christo Lombaard, this research specifically targeted Tyconius' *Liber regularum*. Having lived during the fourth century, Tyconius was well-known during his day, but had grown to be an abstruse figure to historical inquiry. This exploration endeavors—alongside other more recent efforts in Tyconian scholarship—to reconstruct the unique ecclesial hermeneutic of this Donatist theologian as he is set in the context of early North African Christianity.

Tyconius' ecclesiological exegesis—and all its intersections of corresponding domains—is relevant to contemporary hermeneutical dialogue. Paul Ricoeur once poignantly wrote that "what must be interpreted in a text is a *proposed world* that I could inhabit." Far from being stale procedural training or an erudite intellectual display, textual interpretation shapes the lives of its readers. Texts have used, and continue to use, their prowess to both change the people who inhabit the world and to

transform the world they inhabit. Specifically, when the text being interpreted is the Bible, *hermeneutical inquiry* nurtures *spiritual formation*. Too often, however, even a hermeneutical exploration of the Bible can fall prey to an intellectual oligarchy or can become lost in a myriad of speculative dead-ends. Biblical hermeneutics—as a charter for genuine understanding of divine revelation—was meant to bring the sacred text of Scripture to bear on *actual human lives*. Nevertheless, to receive the time-tested benefits of textual interpretation (and biblical interpretation nonetheless) a hermeneutical renewal must draw nigh. Precisely said, a *spiritual renovation*—personally, communally, and societally—awaits those who have a *hermeneutical starting point*.

Inquiry into biblical hermeneutics opens the door to a variety of corresponding fields of study: theology, exegesis, missiology, history, philosophy, etc. Particularly, biblical hermeneutics itself is uniquely suited for the exploratory task involved in understanding *spiritual formation in the life of the church*. Hermeneutics has a gentle way of setting the stage for both *interdisciplinary* and *interpersonal* dialogue, even among scholarly disciplines and conversation partners who have been long estranged from each other. Being such an intersection of scholarly and relational worlds, hermeneutical dialogue can serve as an aid to reunite the oft-segregated fields of theory and praxis, theology and exegesis, academy and church, and mission and spirituality in the context of community formation. Hermeneutic dialogue can suture the wounds of such ill-fated fragmentation as we begin to (re)envision a world where texts are not only *brought to life* but are seen once again *bringing people to life*.

Specifically, the *hermeneutical voice* of the past has something to say to the *ecclesial present*. As is often the case, voices from antiquity prove to be some of the most fitting remedies to the idiosyncratic maladies of the day. In a small way, such is the goal of this current study. As this study seeks out how one exegete from history, Tyconius, read the sacred text of the Bible, his hermeneutical proposal of *Liber regularum* is offered in the name of *Christian spirituality in the life of the church*. This research ventures toward this goal not with the naive hopes that Tyconius will answer all interpretive questions, resolve every theological quandary, or provide some sort of inspired hermeneutical theory. But, rather, the hope is that Tyconius can lend a fresh word to help better understand the strengths and (sometimes hidden) gaps in the contemporary dialogue of hermeneutics and Christian spirituality. And pastorally, by considering his hermeneutical contribution—a contribution from the distant past—one hopes Tyconius might help the "church-of-the-now" to be further resolved and resourced to anticipate the future and to live faithfully in the present. In other words, by conversing with Tyconius, this research seeks to more appropriately and accurately understand the "proposed world" of the biblical script, the world that its readers are meant to inhabit.

Though a project such as this can make a writer feel, at times, quite solitary, no author completes a work of such scope and profile unescorted. True to the topic of this study, theological reflection, hermeneutical inquiry, and spiritual formation are by their very essence community enterprises. At no point in this research could I claim complete independence. Rather, along the way, the Lord had sovereignly brought the right people at the right time to move my research, thinking, and writing forward. <>

LIVING I WAS YOUR PLAGUE: MARTIN LUTHER'S WORLD AND LEGACY by Lyndal Roper [The Lawrence Stone Lectures, Princeton University Press, 9780691205304]

From the author of the acclaimed biography MARTIN LUTHER: RENEGADE AND PROPHET, new perspectives on how Luther and others crafted his larger-than-life image

Martin Luther was a controversial figure during his lifetime, eliciting strong emotions in friends and enemies alike, and his outsized persona has left an indelible mark on the world today. *Living I Was Your Plague* explores how Luther carefully crafted his own image and how he has been portrayed in his own times and ours, painting a unique portrait of the man who set in motion a revolution that sundered Western Christendom.

Renowned Luther biographer Lyndal Roper examines how the painter Lucas Cranach produced images that made the reformer an instantly recognizable character whose biography became part of Lutheran devotional culture. She reveals what Luther's dreams have to say about his relationships and discusses how his masculinity was on the line in his devastatingly crude and often funny polemical attacks. Roper shows how Luther's hostility to the papacy was unshaken to the day he died, how his deep-rooted anti-Semitism infused his theology, and how his memorialization has given rise to a remarkable flood of kitsch, from "Here I Stand" socks to Playmobil Luther.

Lavishly illustrated, **LIVING I WAS YOUR PLAGUE** is a splendid work of cultural history that sheds new light on the complex and enduring legacy of Luther and his image.

Reviews

"Roper's book proves that a rigorously scholarly work can also be a pleasure to read."—Dan Hitchens, *The Times*

"[*Living I Was Your Plague*] may unsettle in ways that open diligent readers to new vision. The book accomplishes something that few of the books about Luther occasioned by the 2017 anniversary accomplished: it sees Luther with fresh eyes and shows us why we need to wrestle with his legacy."—Vincent Evener, *Christian Century*

"Intelligent and absorbing"—Sean Sheehan, *The Prisma*

"After an outpouring of books about Luther at the time of the quicentenary, one could have been forgiven for thinking. . . that there wasn't much of interest left to be said. In her ambition to tackle together the life and the legend, and her avowed determination to appraise Luther in a thoroughly Lutheran spirit of anti-authoritarianism, Lyndal Roper has triumphantly demonstrated the contrary."—Peter Marshall, *The Tablet*

"Lively and engaging. Roper's scholarship is of the very highest caliber, and her writing is crisp and eloquent. *Living I Was Your Plague* is full of brilliant insights."—Joel F. Harrington, author of *Dangerous Mystic: Meister Eckhart's Path to the God Within*

"Lyndal Roper focuses on topics that have been neglected until now, from Luther's masculinity and dreams to his binary thinking and the role of images in Lutheranism. The work of an eminent and creative historian, *Living I Was Your Plague* demonstrates that Luther is anything but boring."—Thomas Kaufmann, University of Göttingen

"Another book on Luther? The analytic exuberance of this stunning, inspiring, and deeply engaging cultural history will inevitably both inform and delight the reader."—Helmut Puff, author of *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400–1600*

"With trenchant analysis of words and images, Roper tackles disturbing aspects of Luther's legacy, from his vicious hatred of the pope and of Jews to his strutting, bullying masculinity. She skillfully interweaves these with explorations of the artists, followers, fans, and critics who have shaped his long shadow, from the mythmakers of his own day to the purveyors of Luther-themed socks and snow globes today."—Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, author of *A Concise History of the World*

"Roper's absorbing book takes us deep into Luther's psyche and across German history to engage with our own questions about overbearing leaders, religious strife, and cultures of masculinity. Her brilliance shines through on every page as she demonstrates the connections between Luther's emotional and intellectual preoccupations and our struggles with how to confront his legacy today. This is a book of breathtaking insight."—Ulinka Rublack, author of *The Astronomer and the Witch*

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The World of Martin Luther

The nineteenth century commemorated the Protestant hero Martin Luther with giant statues on a host of town squares across Germany. When after 1871 the new German Reich built its massive new cathedral in the heart of Berlin, it placed a huge Luther statue in its line of national heroes. But for the 500th anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation, the twenty-first century produced the cute plastic Playmobil Luther that you see above. You can assemble (and disassemble) him yourself and he fits neatly in your pocket. No longer staking a claim to public space, the Luther colossus has now shrunk to kitsch.

If you want to understand Germany and its culture, you have to understand Luther—and particularly because since Brexit, Germany is now the dominant force in the European Union. Martin Luther grew up in the former East Germany and spent almost his entire life there. Luther is anchored deep in the German psyche. You can hear Luther's speech cadences in today's German Bible, based on Luther's original translation, and they echo in the rhythms of even so secular a writer as Bertolt Brecht. Luther's embarrassingly earthy humour is quintessentially German—and he shaped early German literature with its fondness for the crude. With his deep-set eyes, wayward curl and heavy jowls, Luther remains instantly recognizable—his face is on chocolates, pasta and billboards. The man who loved pork and beer is one of a line of German heroes with gargantuan appetites, through Bismarck to Helmut Kohl who presided over the unification of East and West Germany in 1990. But he isn't a figure who unites. If it was hoped that celebrating Luther would bring East and West together, in fact the continuing chasm between the two was exposed, a generation after the fall of the Wall. The former East Germany is a resolutely secular society and Protestant church membership is low; it is not as rich as the former West and its politics are different too.

I had published a biography of Luther, **Martin Luther, Renegade and Prophet.** It took me twelve years to write because I needed to return to the sources—Luther's biography had become so well-known and so formulaic that if I wanted to say something new I simply had to start again. To my surprise the book became a German bestseller.

Living I Was Your Plague was written as I travelled around Germany to speak about Luther to a series of very different audiences. Academic authors rarely get to meet their readers: it was an exhilarating and exhausting experience. I was surprised by how much Germans knew about Luther and how deeply concerned they were about his anti-Semitism. I had started the book with a sneaking liking for Luther's robust male posturing—but it looked much less benign in the era of Trump. I had tackled the anti-Semitism in the biography, but when I preached from Luther's pulpit in the church with its statue of a Jewish sow suckling Jews whilst a rabbi looks in the pig's backside, I knew that I had not got its measure. Luther's anti-papalism too turned out to be deeper and nastier than I knew. He even wanted his curse of the papacy to be his testament: '*Living I was your plague, dead I will be your death O Pope!*'—and he meant it. These words are to be found on many portraits of the reformer, even including those of him on his deathbed. I hadn't seen them because they are often painted out. And even when they weren't, I could not see them because I simply did not expect them to be there.

As I began to realise, Luther's ghost is everywhere in German culture. And that matters outside Germany too: after all, until recent times Germans were the second largest migrant group in the USA. Luther is far more than a religious figure, and he offers a way into understanding what German-ness means and what its legacies are. This nexus of German identity and the figure of Luther is the reason why Luther could not be celebrated in any straightforward fashion: he is inseparable from Bach and the German love of music, he permeates German literature. Yet his monumentality can fit neatly into a pattern of German political leaders, and he has been instrumentalised to celebrate Saxon patriotism, Reich nationalism and East German pride. His virulent anti-Semitism comes too close for comfort.

Luther remains a deeply divisive and flawed human being. But he was also remarkably courageous and a brilliantly creative theologian. He had the determination and bravery not to recant his views when interrogated in front of the Emperor and the representatives of the whole Empire. That example, perhaps even more than his theology, remains inspirational—'here I stand, I can do no other'.

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The anniversary of Luther in 2017 was not just an event of local Wittenberg history or even primarily of the Lutheran church. Because Luther has so long been linked with German-ness itself; the event was a secular commemoration as well, an occasion to ask about what being German means today. Even though the country was formally reunited in 1989, the difference between the former East and the former West is still unmistakeable. The East remains noticeably poorer, and thirty years on, its idealism is different too, with an abiding commitment to equality and communitarian values, and an ingrained suspicion of the power of the state. If the anniversary were meant to do anything politically, it was intended to bring East and West together. Yet those formed in the education system of the East approached Luther very differently. They wanted to know about the economic side of the indulgences trade, and the wealth and status of those who supported him, topics which were not really considered during the centenary celebrations. They asked different questions too; scholars from the former East who worked in monument conservation, for instance, undertook the archaeology on Luther's house and transformed our view of the family's wealth. But far from uniting East and West, it felt as though the questions and outlook of the former East was

often silenced during the anniversary year in favour of a more anodyne commemoration of the reformer as the translator of the Bible and inventor of the German language.

Celebrating Luther has often been politically fraught, and linked to questions of German identity. The first centenary of the 95 Theses was celebrated on the eve of the Thirty Years' War, the catastrophic conflict that unleashed a generation-long religious and political military struggle and left much of Germany devastated. In 1917, the posting of the 95 Theses was commemorated in the midst of war and on the brink of revolution and defeat. Now, in a reunited Germany, with the commemoration happening on the territory that had once been that of the former East Germany, celebrating Luther was also an attempt to escape defining Germany's history solely in terms of Nazism and the holocaust—to find, that is, a 'usable past'.

How Luther was commemorated was therefore a question of national significance.' This difficult hero, with his stodgy determination, his love of beer and pork, his relentless hatreds, his penchant for misogynist quips, and his four-square masculinist stance, has always been a divisive figure. Embracing him would not be easy. It could only be done with self-mockery, and could succeed only if religious divisions proved to be distant enough for denominational identity to be surpassed by a more indulgent attitude towards the colourful characters of the sixteenth century But the fact that the Gottingen professor of church history Thomas Kaufmann published a book on Luther's Jews that acknowledged Luther's anti-Semitism once and for all, and which did not excuse it as a product of his times, meant that this issue in particular became a subject of national debate, the first time it had been confronted head on since the Second World War.

Luther, it seemed, always raises issues of cultural and national identity that reach far beyond his theological legacy. A colossus of the stature of Bismarck, every age seems to appropriate him as its own—erasing him as a historical figure. People either love him or hate him, and even today, he elicits strong emotional reactions. How this anniversary unfolded, and what rituals of remembrance took place, revealed a lot about German culture and politics: here, surely, cultural history had much to say. It could help us examine Luther's cussed character, his lumpy masculinity, the depth of his appeal, and it could explain the pervasive legacy he has left in German culture, musical, linguistic, material, and visual.

As the commemorative year wore on, I pondered how the biography I had written of Luther had itself become part of the memorial cult, and I often felt uncomfortable. Partly because of my own experience when I spoke from the pulpit in Luther's church, I realized that I had not done enough to interrogate Luther's anti-Semitism or to ask how far it extended into Lutheran theology. And I sensed that I needed to confront the less comfortable sides of his legacy. Most of all, I needed to look more critically at one of the aspects I loved most about Luther: his rambunctious masculine posturing. Here studies of masculinity didn't really seem to offer the tools I needed. Years before, I had felt impatient with historians who divided masculinity into 'good', responsible house-father masculinity and rough, disruptive male behaviour. Surely you could not have one without the other; the upstanding patriarchs of today were yesterday's tearaways. Indeed, because state power so evidently relied in the end upon force in the early-modern period, authorities needed their young men to have mastered the use of weapons (towns were defended by citizen militias); and while law-makers might inveigh against drinking to excess, male bonding rituals—then as now—usually involve collective consumption of alcohol.' I felt irritated with histories that adopted the authorities' moralising tones towards the young rowdies of the past, and impatient with those who claimed to be shocked by Luther's crudeness, or who air-brushed out his aggressive polemics against those he disagreed with. This, to me, was part of Luther's anarchic attractiveness, his refusal to be a plaster saint. And yet, the commemoration year led me to re-consider my tendency to integrate Luther's

obstreperous qualities into a relatively positive assessment of his personality, and to draw out more the dangers of his habitual aggression.

Thinking about masculinity—one of the major growth areas of gender history over the last thirty years—can help us think differently about Luther. You could, for example, write a history of the Reformation through Luther's facial hair: the tonsured, shaven monk gave way to the shaggy, bearded, mustachioed Luther once he was in hiding in the Wartburg, disguised as a nobleman. The mature Luther adopted a clean-shaven look but the stubble on his jutting jaw is usually visible. The Cranach workshop was at pains to show Luther as a virile, potent man, a figure very different from a diffident monk. Indeed, it could be argued that the Reformation marked a genuine moment of transformation in the history of masculinity, as it rejected the ideal of celibacy, mocked the pope as effeminate, and abolished monks and priests as different models of manhood. Protestant pastors were meant to be patriarchs like the city fathers and stately bureaucrats who employed them. Instead of a multiplicity of different kinds of masculinity, Lutherans valued only one.

Cultural history of this kind has its seductions, but our story must be more complex, because masculinity is never uniform and individuals craft their sexual identities, albeit in dialogue with social forms. After all, from early on, Luther was paired in portraits with the much less potent-looking Melanchthon. Unlike Luther, the younger man wore a wispy beard; and as Melanchthon never was a monk, he did not have to repudiate celibate masculinity; but both men knew Melanchthon was the better scholar. The reformer's masculine strutting was of a piece with his bullying antagonism to the Jews. In his final years he ordered German rulers, including his own elector, to take measures against the Jews and he castigated the Brandenburg electors for being too tolerant, using the same polemical, prophetic mode he had developed early on to enable him to speak the truth (as he saw it) to power.

Luther revelled in his masculinity and liked to see himself as the hero of the Reformation. It was part of the way he established his dominance over his younger followers. It had playful aspects—one of Luther's greatest gifts was his sense of humour—but it also had much less pleasant sides. So, in 1530, when Melanchthon had to conduct the negotiations over the recognition of the Confession of Augsburg, Luther twitted him for his lack of masculine bravery and for weeping too much, cutting remarks that seemed to reveal less about sixteenth century masculinity than they did about Luther's penchant for bullying.' Or when, as the Table Talk (the notes Luther's students took on his dinner conversations) reveals, Luther mocked his wife Katharina von Bora for her failure to understand what 'rhetoric' was or pronounced that cleverness was the garment that suited women least, Luther's jolliness was also a way of shutting women up.' Luther's masculinist polemical mode, in fact, may have been part of the way he cemented his own position and made it less possible for others to speak. It also contributed to making compromise—with the Catholics or with the Sacramentarians—impossible. In this sense, the history of masculinity has much to offer, because this kind of rough-hewn, bullying manhood may mesmerise even those it grinds down. Why were Luther's followers, including women, willing to fall into line, at least for much of the time? And what did Luther's manly displays enable him to do, crossing the lines of what was acceptable, getting away with rudeness, and directing aggression at his greatest enemy, the pope? Luther's masculinity, it seemed, had its noxious streak.

Luther thought in binaries, and repeatedly split people into friends and foes. His ability to turn the world into an epic moral struggle—to see the Devil at work everywhere, to simplify, and to give names to things—was one of his greatest strengths, but also the source of his greatest weaknesses. This pattern is evident in his theological works as well: his ability to put a 'name' on something was key to his devastating polemic, but it was also one of his greatest gifts as a theologian. Looking for repetitive behaviour across all areas of Luther's activity helps us to understand his theology

differently: the Luther who devised brilliant nicknames for his friends, calling the Wittenberg pastor Johannes Bugenhagen 'Dr Pommer' (he came from Pomerania and so spoke Low German, and his sermons were too long) and his enemy Johannes Cochlaeus 'the snail' (he was always several steps behind Luther), also had the knack of summarising complex theology in a word.' Naming is after all about the relationship of language to reality, a fundamental issue for Luther philosophically as well as theologically. These essays are an attempt to do theological history in a different way. Instead of treating ideas as independent agents, with their own lineages, this book tries to understand them in relation to the person who produced them, and not to distinguish them from their unconscious and semi-conscious usages. It looks for patterns and habits of mind as much as for explicit statements.

Binaries structured much of Lutheran rhetoric and a good deal of the Reformation's propaganda too. Central to this was its apposition of the pope and Christ, and the movement developed an unrelenting anti-papalism in which Luther was the hero who revealed the Papacy for what it truly was: the Antichrist. Even as Luther died, he repeated the anti-papal prophecy which is also a curse: 'Living I was your plague, 0 Pope, dead I will be your death'. This bitter aphorism was surprisingly pervasive in Lutheran memorial culture from the sixteenth century on. Nowadays the offensive words have frequently been erased, but even when they are not, it can be easy to overlook their presence in some of the most familiar images of the Reformation. For example, Luther's binary thinking was mirrored in the image-making which the Cranach workshop invented for the new movement, with clear vertical divisions into good and evil and anti-papal caricatures which at times bordered on being images of hatred. The movement's obsession with the pope is revealed in the insults his opponents flung at him, both radicals and Catholics. Müntzer dubbed him the Wittenberg Pope, accusing him of 'play[ing] the hypocrite with the princes' and `set[ting] himself up in place of the pope'.' He is 'Pope of the Elbe', complained another former supporter.

And yet the Cranach workshop did far more than manufacture images of hate. It also created novel Reformation iconographies, in particular, Law and Gospel, which—though they use binary forms— do more than contrast opposites. Both Law and Gospel are needed, for the Christian needs the Law to recognize their sin. The image-form the workshop devised required the viewer to meditate on different sections of the image, to incorporate it into their own devotion, and to follow words and sign so as to `get' the key theological ideas.

There was more, too, to Luther than just the bullying patriarch. Dreams are not normally part of the field of investigation for ecclesiastical historians. But one cannot fail to be haunted by reading Luther's account in a letter to his confessor, Staupitz, of a dream he had when he was feeling abandoned by him, in which he wrote that he felt like a child 'weaned from its mother'. Weaning is a foundational human physical experience, for the mother as for the child, and yet we rarely talk about it. When a child is weaned, he or she gradually separates from the mother and the interdependence of their two digestive systems, which begins at conception, finally comes to an end. For mother and child alike, it means the loss of a deep source of physical connection and pleasure. Both have to find comfort without that oral link, and the child must learn to comfort himself or herself. Yet while this is a universal human experience, what is revealing is how Luther chose to invoke it, and what this might tell us about a specific historical time. As Luther wrote in the letter, the words were taken from Psalm 131, a psalm which Luther later translated, using words that conveyed more of the child's experience of being weaned, and that left the agency of the child in the process unclear. And yet in translations by others, the child is content, having reached its own separation from its mother. Mistakes and imprecisions are usually revealing, often more so than we readily realize, as Freud pointed out long ago: Luther 'remembered' the psalm as conveying a feeling of abandonment and not the child's arrival at its own contentment. This profound ambiguity in how Luther recalled what was a very important biblical quotation for him helps us to understand the depth of his attachment to Staupitz. It also suggests that he was groping his way towards independence as he set off on his own

theological path, revealing some of the pain and abandonment that parting from the Catholic church entailed.

A conventional psychoanalytic interpretation might attempt to divine Luther's relationship with his mother through this dream, but that might be a reductive path, narrowing a complex character to problems in weaning and development, about which we know nothing in Luther's case. So also, a psychoanalytic analysis which derived Luther's theology from his relationship with his parents would be unsatisfying—though his complicated relationship to his father, against whom he rebelled by becoming an Augustinian friar, gave him unusual insight into the paternal aspect of the Christian's relation to God, and how that can lead to struggle with God. Psychoanalytic ideas are not much use to historians if they lead them to pathologise an individual. They serve then merely to cheapen complex inner lives and they do not help us understand their thought over time, organically revealed in all their habits, patterns of mind, conscious and unconscious inclinations, and in their actual relationships with others. As we start to tease these out, we can see how dreams—which raise issues about the nature of divine inspiration and prophecy as opposed to the letter of scripture— were connected to central dilemmas of Luther's Reformation. By approaching questions at a tangent, by looking at issues that are on the periphery of our scholarly vision, new and unexpected connections often emerge. So, for example, one of the central theological divisions of the Reformation was linked to the status of dreams. The revolutionary firebrand Thomas Müntzer was scathing about Luther's support of the rich and powerful, and derived his own authority in part from dreams and visions. For his part, Luther was always sceptical about them, preferring to rely on scripture alone—but of course, scripture too features prophetic dreams and visions. Luther could never entirely disavow dreams, and his apparent scepticism masked a fascination with them.

Dreams communicated hopes and fears for people in Luther's circle, allowing them to talk indirectly about them by arguing over possible interpretations of their dreams. They wondered, for example, if the eagle, who became a cat in one of Melanchthon's dreams, stood for the emperor. He was the focus of much of their anxieties at this time as they waited to present their confession of faith to him at the Imperial Diet of 1530 at Augsburg, the document that founded their new church. They worried about this while being unable to talk to Luther, who could come no further than the castle of Coburg. Psychoanalytic ideas could therefore help illuminate not just the psychological dilemmas of individuals, but might disclose the richness of relationships between groups of people—and it was these collective dynamics which were crucial to the Reformation's implementation. They were not just harmonious relationships of co-operation, but often of rivalry for Luther's attention, and they could on occasion include attacks on each other's manhood, as in every movement with a charismatic leader. To look at these undersides of the nascent church is not, of course, to belittle what the Wittenbergers accomplished together; it reminds us how important that Wittenberg collective was to the movement's self-perception: one of the abiding iconographies of the Reformation, not just within Lutheranism, but copied even within iconophobic Calvinism, was that of the reformers sitting together around a table. Images were central to Lutheranism and museum exhibitions featured prominently in the celebrations of 2017. Perhaps the most inspiring was 'Luther and die Avantgarde', held in the nineteenth-century former jail in Wittenberg, with each artist given a prison cell as a canvas on which to develop their ideas about Luther. Containing a ramshackle series of installations, videos, mixed media artworks, and sculptures, the crumbling building was as much a part of the show as the exhibits, for it juxtaposed the architectural legacies of state institutions with Western cutting-edge art (having been a prison in the Third Reich and in the DDR, the building had lately become a depot for storing official records). Not all of it worked. Some artists seemed to think that Luther was an iconoclast who wanted to destroy all religious images—he was no such thing—while others thought he stood for the freedom of the individual. But some of the displays conveyed aspects of Luther that scholarship had been unable to deal with. In particular I was

struck by Erwin Wurm's orange fist that greeted the visitor on arrival at the exhibition, which conveyed that masculine aggression so much part of Luther's style. Another was a dizzying prison of clear plastic tubes in a cage-like structure by the Chinese artist Song Dong, filled with sweets and placed on top of a mirror that filled the floor space—it somehow managed to recreate the self-referential quality of Luther's thought, conveying how such a liberating theology could yet turn inwards on itself, repeating its key concepts to infinity.' Above all, the sheer creativity and inventiveness of this exhibition showed that Lutheranism is far from being confined to museums, and can inspire extraordinary art.

As it did from its inception. There is no other Protestant sect which could have hosted such an amazing number of exhibitions, because none fostered such a rich material and visual legacy. Most other protestant sects shared iconoclastic instincts, mistrusting sumptuous altarpieces that might seduce the senses, and favouring white-washed walls or simple words from scripture. Not so Luther: from the outset, he remained closer to the Catholicism he had left, and though Lutherans remodelled their churches to include didactic art, with paintings of Christ blessing the children that underlined the importance of infant baptism, or of Law and Gospel, they decorated their places of worship with appealing and fashionable mannerist designs. They also furnished their churches with images of the reformer himself. The artist Lucas Cranach was one of Luther's oldest friends and earliest supporters, and as the Lutherjabr demonstrated, he did more than any other artist to shape the remarkable churches of Saxony and Thuringia, to make Luther's face well known, and to stamp the 'look' of early modern Lutheran print." Lutheranism was as much a visual and material culture as it was a musical one. And if we think that we can 'know' Luther as an individual, that is largely because we are so familiar with the Luther the Cranach workshop made, the man with the deep-set, farseeing eyes, the confident four-square stance, and the wayward curl, poking out irreverently from underneath the doctor's hat. If this book can occasionally seem critical of Luther, or point to less comfortable features of Lutheranism's legacy, I hope that this will be taken in the spirit of Lutheranism I so admire: its profound anti-authoritarianism, its political engagement, and its insistence on argument, discussion, and critical appraisal of its own history.   <>

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