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# SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

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## EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

# Contents

# BRILL'S COMPANION TO THE RECEPTION OF PRESOCRATIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN LATER CLASSICAL THOUGHT edited by Chelsea C. Harry and Justin Habash [Series: Brill's Companions to Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy, Brill, 9789004318175]

In **BRILL'S COMPANION TO THE RECEPTION OF PRESOCRATIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN LATER CLASSICAL THOUGHT,** contributions by Gottfried Heinemann, Andrew Gregory, Justin Habash, Daniel W. Graham, Oliver Primavesi, Owen Goldin, Omar D. Álvarez Salas, Christopher Kurfess, Dirk L. Couprie, Tiberiu Popa, Timothy J. Crowley, Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro, Iakovos Vasiliou, Barbara Sattler, Rosemary Wright, and a foreword by Patricia Curd explore the influences of early Greek science (6-4th c. BCE) on the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hippocratics.

Rather than presenting an unified narrative, the volume supports various ways to understand the development of the concept of nature, the emergence of science, and the historical context of topics such as elements, principles, soul, organization, causation, purpose, and cosmos in ancient Greek philosophy.

CONTENTS

One way to think about the reception of a philosophical thinker is to consider the influence of that philosopher on another, or the use that the later writer makes of the work of the earlier. Thus, we can discuss how Descartes's work influenced Spinoza, or how John Rawls made use of both Aristotle and Kant in developing *A Theory of Justice*. Sometimes the influence is seen as direct: How does Spinoza respond to the questions that Descartes asked and develop his own answers to them? Sometimes the influence is less direct: Rawls took care to talk about an Aristotelian principle, claiming to capture something about what Aristotle saw about ethical theory without claiming to be giving "Aristotle's view." In these examples, readers have (or can have) the advantage of having the texts of Descartes, Spinoza, Aristotle, and Rawls in front of them, and can judge to what extent the responders have quoted correctly, or whether the interpretive response is more or less consistent with what one reads in the original. Are we getting Descartes' own view, or a Cartesian theory?

When the subject (as here) is **THE RECEPTION OF PRESOCRATIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN LATER CLASSICAL THOUGHT** a special problem arises. What remains to us of early Greek philosophy is (literally) fragmented. In some cases, we have have only a word or two, or a few lines. In other cases (Thales, for example), there is good reason to think that nothing that Thales himself wrote has been preserved in the writing of another author. For some others (Parmenides and Empedocles), although we have larger segments of text, we can be sure that much is missing. The problem becomes more complicated because, in many cases, the sources of the Presocratic fragments are the very people (among others: Plato and Aristotle in 4th C. BCE; Simplicius in the 6th C. CE) who are using and interpreting these texts to make their own points. Moreover, by the time we get to a number of valuable sources for our early philosophers (e.g., Simplicius, who is the only source for some of the most important fragments of Parmenides), the materials that they are using are old, rare, and sometimes in tatters. The problems involved are intertwined: we must rely on our sources to reconstruct the thought of the first philosophers, but we need to have an interpretation of that thought in order to evaluate the responses of those who are our sources. Imagine that all or most of Plato's works are lost to us, and try to reconstruct his views using the remarks about them in Aristotle, and information drawn from the ancient commentators on Aristotle. (This is actually the case with Zeno of Elea's four paradoxes of motion. We have no original texts, only Aristotle's names for and proposed solutions to the paradoxes in *Physics* 6.9.) So, how do we read and study the Presocratics and how do we think about their influence? Although there are difficulties, complete pessimism is misplaced. We can always wish that we had more textual and doxographical evidence, but there is enough general agreement among scholars about enough material to make Presocratic studies lively and interesting; nevertheless most who work on early Greek philosophy understand that a certain level of humility in the face of the evidence should prevail: As in the case of Empedocles and the Strasbourg Papyrus, more new material may yet come to light that will require reconsideration and revision of previous interpretations.

Recently, there has been discussion of the proper term for referring to the group that we are discussing. *Presocratic* goes back to the nineteenth century, and originally implied that Socrates marks a break in the development of philosophy because of his interest in ethics. Some scholars now prefer the use of "early Greek philosophy/philosophers." Because of the ubiquity of the older term and because it now seems clear that there was no real break between the Presocratics and the philosophers of the classical Athenian period, the name "Presocratic" is more often a neutral label used to refer to a group of thinkers (who themselves are often classified as early Presocratic or later Presocratic). There is also the irony that Socrates himself wrote nothing, and so there is no evidence for his supposed single-minded interest in ethics other than the depictions of Socrates by Plato and

other authors. There is even counter-evidence in Plato: the Socrates of the *Phaedo* reports his early interest in the theories of Anaxagoras.

Careful study of the extant fragments and testimonia can help us build accounts and interpretations of the earliest Greek philosophers. In some cases, we can disentangle text and interpretation by paying attention to language: Archaic dialect and language usage can confirm that we have a genuine text rather than a later report, summary, or outright forgery. Since some Presocratics wrote in verse (Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles), paying attention to poetic meter can sometimes help connect passages that are reported in different sources. Simplicius occasionally comments on the archaic or poetic language of passages he quotes. For example, in what is now fragment B2, he notes that Anaximander "said that the indefinite (*to apeiron*) is both principle (*archē*) and element (*stoicheion*) of the things that are, and he was the first to introduce this name of the principle." Later in the same passage he observes that Anaximander "speaks in rather poetical language." The vocabulary of early Greek thought presents difficulties of its own. In the Anaximander fragment from Simplicius, it is unclear just which word it is that Anaximander is said to have been the first to use (*apeiron* or *archē*) and there have been disagreements among interpreters about this. One thing does seem clear, though: *Stoicheion* with its technical meaning of *element* as Simplicius uses it here, is an Aristotelian coinage, and it would not have been used in this sense by Anaximander himself. The same goes for such Aristotelian terms as "matter" and "substance." While post-Aristotelian commentators and philosophers can happily use these words and know what they mean by them, using them to explain Presocratic views can be seriously misleading. Thus, many who work on early Greek philosophy talk about *stuff* rather than *matter*. This is not a case of being overly fastidious, for to speak of matter invites talk of form, and the form-matter distinction is Aristotle's important solution to complicated physical and metaphysical problems that can be traced back through Plato to the Presocratics. The same caveat goes for translations and understandings of the various forms of the Greek verb *einai* (to be). It is a mistake to think that the fundamental notion here is *existence*. Rather, the being of a thing is what it is to be that sort of thing (its nature, or as Aristotle would say, its essence). Parmenides' account of "Truth" (frs. B1.26–28 to B8.51) is not concerned with what exists (grass, grasshoppers, numbers, pains, etc.) but with what counts as a metaphysically fundamental entity in any account of how things are. Only such a being can be a genuine object of knowledge and serve as an explanatory foundation. This notion of a basic being continues through later Presocratic thought and in Plato, e.g., in the *Phaedo*, only the Forms can be said genuinely to be; and in the central books of the *Republic*, Parmenidean assumptions about what it is to be provide the starting points for the arguments that the Forms are the only objects of knowledge. This progression culminates in Aristotle's radical and problem-solving assertion in *Metaphysics* Z.1 that "being is said in many ways" and the fundamental way of being is to be a substance (*ousia*).

Yet we might ask: in what sense are these early Greek thinkers *philosophers*? Clearly they did not think of themselves as such. While in fragment 35 (from Clement) we find that "according to Heraclitus, men who are lovers of wisdom (*philosophoi*) must be inquirers into many things," the extent of the actual quotation is open to question: Is the word *philosophoi* part of the original text? In an important sense it makes no difference; the presence or absence of a particular word is not relevant in determining whether these thinkers were engaged in what we would now call philosophizing, and Heraclitus was certainly interested in wisdom and the criteria for claiming to know or understand how things are. While we should be careful to avoid anachronism in attributing later philosophical meanings to the terms that they use, the Presocratics can and did use traditional language in new ways, and invented new words.[7] The fact that a word has a particular meaning (or range of meanings) in Homer or Hesiod or other early texts does not entail that the same word cannot have a novel or extended meaning in Heraclitus. Thus, for instance, arguments about how we should understand Heraclitus' notion of *logos* cannot be solved simply by canvassing its uses in

Homer. The notion of nature (*physis*) in early Greek philosophy is another subject about which scholars have disagreed vigorously. It seems clear that many of the Presocratics (if not all – and the question of who belongs on the list remains open) were indeed interested in questions about the possibility and structure of human knowledge, in worries about how that which can be known must be in order to be knowable, and the roles that can or cannot be played by sense perception and thinking in answering such questions. Not only are what we would call first-order scientific, metaphysical and epistemological problems considered, but ideas about the proper structure of the accounts (or theories) that would solve these problems are being developed. Another important point is that the Presocratics were discussing and responding to one another. Heraclitus names some of those with whom he disagrees. In other cases, linguistic resonances and word choices indicate that Parmenides was aware of earlier views about the nature of the cosmos, and that both Anaxagoras and Empedocles are constructing accounts that take seriously Parmenides' strictures on the nature of what-is and the possibility of knowledge.

Thus, borrowings and influence (acknowledged and unacknowledged) and responses (both positive and negative) are already present in the Presocratics themselves. In addition, many of the philosophical questions and range of philosophical topics that engrossed and were developed in new ways by Plato, Aristotle, and those who came after them began with the Presocratics. As the contents of this volume demonstrate, when we consider the reception of Presocratic philosophy, we see that the earliest Greek thinkers set the agenda for those who followed. *Patricia Curd*

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Plato and Aristotle, together with the Hippocratic thinkers, are the most celebrated and prolific contributors to a period of ancient Greek thought that we will refer to here as "later classical." This name and designation is partially bounded by time, ca. 5th–4th centuries BCE. But, more importantly, it means thinkers that form a sort of "second wave" in ancient Greek thought. This is to suggest that in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hippocratics, we see not only new ideas and novel arguments, but also dialectical arguments, responses to previous positions, and even syntheses of previous ideas. These syntheses, in turn, create new ideas, and even paradigms in early philosophy and science. Those whom we will consider here as a more or less "first wave" of thinkers, given their status as interlocutors to the later classical thinkers, are more commonly known as the "Presocratics," or as Aristotle called them, the φυσιολόγοι (*physiologoi*). This "first wave" of thinkers spans a longer time in history, ca. 6th–4th century BCE, as well as a far more diverse geography, from modern day western Turkey to modern day southern Italy. What is more, they represent different philosophical schools. Nevertheless, we group them together because we have the sense that they made a collective, if not directly related, effort that effectually began ancient Greek philosophy and science with various enquiries into nature.

This volume takes for granted that both Plato and Aristotle were profoundly influenced by these "first wave" philosophical forebears. For, despite Plato's Socrates's well-known account of his own turning away from natural philosophy in the *Phaedo*, ideas about the concept of nature inform Platonic philosophy across Plato's corpus. Thus we see discussions of "nature" not only in Plato's *Timaeus*, his singular work on cosmogony and cosmology, but also in works like the *Republic*, a foundational text of political theory, which also takes up the nature of *human* being. Aristotle, often considered the first scientist in the West because of his profound contributions to the foundations of biology and zoology, was also the first philosopher to develop a method by which to undertake and proliferate a complete *phuseôs epistêmês*, or science of nature. While Aristotle's negative accounts almost alway reply to commonly held theories of his time (*endoxa*), these theories are often treated anonymously and not considered in their own right. The *endoxa* to which Aristotle replies nevertheless come from a rich historical tradition of investigation into the greatest mysteries of nature and being, which though perhaps not methodological in compilation and scope, certainly

aimed at the same target as Aristotle: truth. As John Burnet put it, curiosity was the common denominator, and Jonathan Barnes famously argued that it was reason.

Despite centuries of excellent philological and philosophical scholarship produced on these early Greek thinkers, they remain lesser known to most than the later classical thinkers. This may be due in part to a lack of extant literature we have from them today. Whereas a figure like Empedocles might present an anomaly to this generalization because we have more extant from him than most, in other cases, e.g., Thales, we have only a few lines of testimony on which to rely. So, even when Plato or Aristotle allude to these first wave thinkers, we face the challenge of sometimes having no other real source to cross-reference, and thus needing to rely on these allusions in order to know the Presocratic thinkers at all. Of course, the fact that we have the allusions indicates for us the relative importance they had for the later classical thinkers; and, yet, the lack of extant material whence we could examine, confirm, or deny certain attributions can make any effort to know these early Greek thinkers better seem speculative at best.

This leads us to a question of reception. While to scholars familiar with both of these waves of thinkers, it is undisputed that the later classical thinkers "received" many ideas (*endoxa*), formulations, and arguments from the early Greek thinkers, the details and force of the reception is still not widely understood. Consequently, what exactly served as theoretical catalysts for the second wave of ancient Greek thought, in what capacity, and to what end, is a topic for ongoing examination. The purview of the present volume is to address, as reasonably as possible, the reception of first wave natural philosophy by the second wave thinkers. By 'natural philosophy,' we mean discussions of what some today might consider early or proto-scientific concepts of elements, motion and activity, materiality, form or soul, causation, medicine, dreams and wakefulness, and existence itself. Inquiries into these concepts assume, whether it is explicitly articulated or not, a theory of nature itself. Thus, the art of understanding some of the complexity of even investigating this reception is to consider that the term or concept, "nature" meant different things over the course of the time period of interest to us in this volume.

What is the meaning of "nature" in Presocratic and in later classical inquiries? In the early Greek literary tradition, talking of something's nature (*phusis*) is generally a way to describe the outward characteristics of a thing. But, notably, it has been suggested that there was a unity in the long inquiry known to us today as Presocratic natural philosophy, namely, that when taken as a cohesive body of inquiry and work, the Presocratics used *phusis* as a term to mean something intrinsic about a thing—that which things really are. Likewise, it has been argued that *phusis* means "origin" only occasionally and that there is no unifying interpretation of the use of the term across extant texts and authors.

Part of the question in this debate is whether nature means the nature of all things, or whether it means the nature of a particular thing. For example, according to Beardslee's early twentieth century study of the development of the term and concept over time, the Milesians, or earliest of the first wave thinkers, "… focused their attention not on a particular example of the phenomenon, but on earthquakes or lightning-flashes in general. Their inquiries were directed towards classes of natural phenomena, and they exhibit this feature of science, that it investigates the universal and the essential, not the particular and the accidental." Beardslee then provides a history of the term's use in early Greek thought: "particular" in the Hippocratic thinkers, "character of things in general" in the Pythagoreans, "universal nature" in Plato's Lysis, "particular nature" in fourth century colloquial usage. Beardslee concludes that: "Until the close of the fifth century there is no direct proof that *phusis* was used for Nature in general."

Even in what we consider later classical thought, the meaning of "nature" continues to lack consistency. When authors were indeed thinking about similar problems to those of one or more Presocratic philosopher, a shift in method and focus means that these comparisons are not always

easily drawn. A key example of this is found in Aristotle, who redefined "nature" as an *archē*, an inner principle, of motion (*kinêsis*) and rest (*stasis*) in his most general work on nature philosophy, the *Physics* (192b13-22) Despite the fact that he is in dialogue with the Presocratic Ionian thinkers, the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, and Plato, his complex and self-contained treatment of nature might seem a world apart from the first wave thinkers' styles of inquiry and conclusions. Yet, Aristotle's interest in natural objects is part of his interest in explaining change, and the idea that nature comes from and exists as a single underlying material element, or principle of change and rest, recalls rather than supplants the Presocratic inquiries.

Plato's philosophy of nature, on the other hand, is less certain, told in the *Timaeus* as only a likely tale (38c). For Plato, the notion of material change, as opposed to the steadfast form or Idea (*eidos*) inherent in nature, called into question the possibility for veracity at all in an account of nature. Thus, at the heart of Plato's physics is something rather immaterial. Instead of studying the nature of natural beings, it provides an hypothesis about the entire picture. His theory of nature, then, is not a study of individual bodies subject to change; rather, it gives an account of the whole. As aforementioned, Plato talks about nature in other ways outside of his philosophy of nature. In these instances, we see nature means the *nature of,* x, or a particular kind of thing. This approach to thinking of nature is employed throughout Plato's Socratic dialogues, as interlocutors seek truth about the essence of ideas. So too, Plato and Plato's Socrates's interest in *human nature* marks a turn from talking about the natural world to talking specifically about human psychology and community. But, just as we recognize the mark of Presocratic natural philosophy in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, we see here too an echo of a turn in Presocratic philosophy—from the inquiry into the nature of phenomena in the Ionian thinkers to the interest in humanity and community in Heraclitus and others.

In the spirit that fits well with the plurality of views on nature proffered by Plato, Aristotle, the Hippocratics, and indeed the Presocratics themselves, the contributors to the present volume have each brought their individual understanding of the nature and challenges of the idea of reception to bear. The resulting work highlights a familiar disparity of views regarding the major interpretive issues in Presocratic studies but also in conceptions of this idea of reception itself. This is to say that this volume does not purport to offer an interpretive or methodological solution to understanding the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy. The editors aim, rather, to highlight the complexity, relative opacity, and yet the obvious importance, of scrupulous scholarship on the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. To this end, this volume brings together a global array of voices in Presocratic studies that include the perspectives of rising scholars in the field along with those of established voices.

The contributions have been organized according to a division among thematic, topical, and methodological lines. While some chapters address broad methodology and continue the conversation about aforementioned concepts present both in Presocratic and later classical authors, other chapters address either misinterpretations and misattributions of specific Presocratic ideas in later classical authors, or work to uncover an overlooked or "hidden" influence of the former in the latter.

## Reception: Methodology and Grounding Concepts

The first four chapters each take up in depth and overarching discussions regarding the meanings of the concepts, *nature*, *reception*, *principles/causes/ elements*, and the *beginning of science*, for studies on the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy. These chapters likewise each consider multiple Presocratic figures in their approach to saying something about the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. Because of their relatively global approach, these chapters are

intended to scaffold, as much as possible, the studies undertaken in the subsequent eleven chapters. Readers will also find cross-references among the first three of these chapters.

Gottfried Heinemann's chapter continues the discussion about the ancient Greek concept of nature introduced here. Specifically, he establishes this foundation on the philosophical project of the Presocratics as he explores the root of the study of nature in ancient Greek thought, beginning with the Presocratic nature philosophers before turning to Plato, and then to Aristotle. In the end, Heinemann shows Aristotle's own work on nature to be a sophisticated result of a complex conversation both with the earliest Greek philosophers and with Plato. Aristotle's works mark a return to a philosophical focus on the natural, but they likewise entail a new way to define nature, in terms of regularity and necessity.

Andrew Gregory takes up the question of Plato's reception of Presocratic natural philosophy generally, ultimately arguing for a nuanced reading of certain passages in the Platonic corpus, including the famous *Phaedo* passage (96a ff), where Socrates details his original interest in and then subsequent disenchantment with Presocratic natural philosophy.

Justin Habash proposes that we reconceive our understanding of the chain of conceptions of nature that runs from the Presocratics through the so-called Sophists to later classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. Habash argues that despite their variations, conceptions of nature among the *physiologoi* almost invariably contain purposive strains that serve as precursors to Aristotle's more fully developed conception of a teleological nature.

Daniel Graham discusses the beginning of science in Presocratic philosophy, arguing that Parmenides and Anaxagoras are the authors of the "revolution that launched scientific astronomy," specifically through theories of the source of lunar light and the explanation of eclipses. Their new scientific conceptions replaced all other accounts of these phenomena and have held sway through the present time. Other scholars point to the problems of specific barriers within the reception of certain ideas.

## Hidden Reception: Exploring Sources and Developing Themes

Misinterpretations, unacknowledged influences, and misattributions of Presocratic ideas in later classical thought frequently occurred because of a hidden or obscured intermediary, or due to unrecognized sources. Scholars writing on what we here call "hidden reception," identify and examine unrecognized links in the chains of specific ideas and concepts as they develop through ancient Greek thought. These chapters provide new ways to understand not only individual thinkers, but also the broader tapestry of ancient Greek philosophy itself.

Oliver Primavesi presents a special case of reception, in that his very project calls into question the meanings of categories like "Presocratic" and "later classical thinkers." Namely, he investigates a case of Presocratic influence in later classical thought within the Presocratic period. Using relatively recent evidence and deft philological analysis, he offers a convincing argument for the influence of the Pythagorean numerical ratios in the Empedoclean cosmic cycle.

In his chapter engaging the Pythagoreans, Owen Goldin points to specific forms of methodological influence of Presocratic protologic on later classical thought when he argues that Aristotle's theory of demonstration integrates Platonic ideas of definition with later Pythagorean distinctions between causally basic realities and their derivatives.

Omar Álvarez Salas traces references to Pythagoras in Aristotle's extant and lost works, arguing that despite never naming Pythagoras in his texts, Aristotle nevertheless implicitly refers to him as often as he does other relevant early Greek thinkers, in the context of the other "so-called" Pythagoreans. This conclusion provides an alternative position to the more standard reading by scholars that

Aristotle was not as engaged with Pythagoras' doctrines as he was with other previous thinkers or that Aristotle was hesitant to include Pythagoras as a member of the Pythagoreans.

Christopher Kurfess provides compelling support from Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* to suggest that views on Eleatic *archai* presented by Aristotle in the opening books of the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and *De Anima* were first articulated by Theophrastus in a work Simplicius called, *Natural History*. Kurfess's research and analysis makes possible a reconsideration not only of the relationship between Theophrastus and Aristotle, but also of the reception of certain Eleatic formulations, as we have come to know them by way of Aristotle.

Dirk Couprie illuminates the spherical earth bias present in Presocratic reception after Aristotle, occasioned, as he argues, by Aristotle's polemical treatment of the flat earth cosmology. The spherical earth bias, which Couprie finds not only in the doxography but also in modern interpreters, has led to a general lack of understanding about the characteristics and distinctive features of the flat earth cosmology. His article provides a careful treatment of these features.

Tiberiu Popa and Timothy Crowley investigate the so-called elements of nature. Popa shows us the role elemental varieties, including quasi-elementary simple bodies, play as explanatory devices both in cosmological and ontological accounts among Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaximenes, early Hippocratic works, Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. While Popa is cautious in discussing the specific reception of such a role, he provides convincing evidence that simple stuffs helped early cosmological and ontological theory move from basic Ionian material monism to material dualism, as Popa calls the Hippocratic prescriptive emphasis on fire and water, to the more complex theories of simple bodies, elements, and their properties found in later classical thinkers. With a focus on Empedocles and Aristotle, Crowley examines the reception of Empedocles' four element hypothesis. Taking as a starting point Aristotle's remark at *Metaphysics*Alpha, that Empedocles was the first to talk of four material elements, Crowley discloses part of the historically significant and long-standing reception of a theory that was still being discussed in 17th century science. Crowley finds a fundamental difference between Empedocles' four element hypothesis and a four element hypothesis otherwise.

Iakovos Vasiliou and Lilliana Carolina Sánchez Castro focus on reception as it relates to questions of the soul. Vasiliou argues that Plato relies heavily on Anaxagorean concepts of *nous*, separation, and mixture in establishing a teleological framework that explains the relationship of body and soul in the *Phaedo*, focusing on the role of the philosopher's way of life on Plato's theory of body-soul separation. Sanchez Castro tackles Aristotle's engagement with the Heraclitean notion of the soul in *De Anima*, arguing that despite barely a passing mention of the Ephesian's views on *psuche*, Aristotle deliberately includes Heraclitus' view as a way to illustrate the soul as a cognitive principle.

Both Barbara Sattler and Rosemary Wright focus on Plato's careful adaptation of the ideas of earlier thinkers. Sattler first sketches different forms of philosophical reception in the Presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle before turning to a specific focus on the way Plato receives and modifies atomistic theory. Sattler argues that Plato's conscientious construction of atomist thought in the *Timaeus* is a deliberate attempt to be explicit about key points of disagreement while incorporating the ways in which Plato agrees with atomic theory. Ultimately, Sattler offers a new way to understand why, despite atomic influence on his work, Plato does not name or directly refer to the atomists in his corpus. Wright, on the other hand, offers an analysis of the intersection between Presocratic cosmogonical and cosmological conclusions and Plato's use of myths in the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*. Delivering an expert summary of a wide swath of Presocratic views, Wright argues that despite that Plato takes Presocratic cosmology as subjects of myth, or likely stories, they serve as a basis for his views about immortality. In an appendix to her chapter she lays out the evidence

for understanding the *Timaeus*to follow closely on the conversation in the *Republic*, thus connecting the ideas of nature in these two key dialogues.

## On Reading This Volume

Due to the indirect, complicated, and sometimes wily nature of addressing Presocratic reception—especially given that "Presocratic" is such a broad and deep category of thinkers and topics itself—the volume allows for multiple ways of entry to read, compare, contrast, and digest the rich contributions contained within.

The first way of entry is linear and straightforward. It takes the first four chapters as a unit constituting a theoretical propaedeutic to the subsequent eleven chapters. Readers can study them first, and use them as a guide to beginning more specific studies on the figures and themes discussed in later chapters.

These first four chapters reveal themselves to be a less straightforward trailhead, however, when one realizes that the aforementioned concepts weave into each other, and that the unit is at times inconsistent: overlapping, converging, but also diverging in complementary, at times challenging, ways. Nevertheless, the muddiness they reveal helps to put the subsequent eleven studies into their proper context and alerts readers to the real interpretive issues with which any study of Presocratic reception must contend.

The next points of entry take just one of the four initial chapters and then looks to between one and four more specific studies in subsequent chapters, which can be identified as thematically and/or stylistically resonant. On this approach, some possible pathways include: "nature, principles, and elements": read chapter one, followed by chapters five, eight, ten, and eleven; "reception, nature, and soul": read chapter two, followed by chapters twelve, thirteen, and fifteen; "purpose, nature, Plato, and Aristotle": chapter three, followed by chapters thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen; "scientific inquiry, nature, cosmos, and reception": read chapter four, followed by chapters six, seven, and nine. This list, however, is far from exhaustive; the engaged reader will discover many more such theme-based adventures in the pages of this volume.

A final suggestion for beginning an exploration of the pages that follow eschews the scaffolding provided by the first four chapters and uses the following topical guide to begin reading more narrowly about one or more Presocratic thinker(s), theme(s) in nature philosophy, passage(s), or later classical thinker(s): *Aristotle*: ch. 1, ch. 3, ch. 6, ch. 7, ch. 8, ch. 9, ch. 11, ch. 12; *Plato*: ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15, ch. 2, ch. 3; *Empedocles*: ch. 1, ch. 5, ch. 10, ch. 11, ch. 15; *Cosmology*: ch. 4, ch. 5, ch. 9, ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15; *Heraclitus*: ch. 3, ch. 12, ch. 15; Eleatic: ch. 7, ch. 1, ch. 3, ch. 10; Pythagorean: ch. 7, ch. 5, ch. 6, ch. 15; *Milesians*: ch. 1, ch. 3, ch. 8, ch. 10, ch. 15; *Atomism*: ch. 2, ch. 3, ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15; *Phaedo* 96a ff: ch. 1, ch. 2, *Soul*: ch. 2, ch. 12, ch. 13; *Timaeus*: ch. 1, ch. 2, ch. 3, ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15, ch. 1; *Theophrastus*: ch. 8, ch. 10.

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How did the most famous classical philosophers benefit from the inquiries and findings of these Presocratics? How exactly was Presocratic natural philosophy received in early Greek philosophy and in later classical times? To what extent does the history of science owe a debt to the explorations and conclusions of the earliest Greek philosophers? With this volume, we strive to address these questions. <>

# THE PRESOCRATICS AT HERCULANEUM: A STUDY OF EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE EPICUREAN TRADITION. WITH AN APPENDIX ON DIOGENES OF OINOANDA'S CRITICISM OF PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY by Christian Vassallo [Studia Praesocratica, De Gruyter, 9783110726985]

This volume analyses in depth the reception of early Greek philosophy in the Epicurean tradition and provides for the first time in scholarship a comprehensive edition, with translation and commentary, of all the Herculanean testimonia to the Presocratics. Among the most significant scientific outcomes, it provides elements for the attribution of an earlier date to the attested tradition of Xenophanes' scepticism; a complete reconstruction of the Epicurean reception of Democritus; a new reconstruction of the testimonia to Nausiphanes' concept of *physiologia*, Anaxagoras' physics and theology, and Empedocles' epistemology; new texts for better comparing the doxographical sections of Philodemus' *On Piety* with those of Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods*, which update H. Diels' treatment of this subject in his *Doxographi Graeci*.

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XXIX Nausiphanes Teius
XXX Orpheus Thracius
XXXI Parmenides Eleates
XXXII Pherecydes Syrius
XXXIII Philolaus Crotoniates
XXXIV Prodicus Ceus
XXXV Protagoras Abderites
XXXVI Pythagoras Samius
XXXVII Thales Milesius
XXXVIII Thrasymachus Calchedonius
XXXIX Xenophanes Colophonius
XL Zeno Eleates
Locorum laudatorum editiones
COMMENTARY
I Acusilaus Argivus
II Alcmaeo Crotoniates
III Anacharsis Scytha
IV Anaxagoras Clazomenius
V Anaxarchus Abderites
VI Anaximander Milesius
VII Anaximenes Milesius
VIII Antipho Rhamnusius
IX Critias Atheniensis
X Damon Atheniensis
XI Democritus Abderites
XII Diagoras Melius
XIII Diogenes Apolloniates
XIV Diotimus Tyrius
XV Empedocles Acragantinus
XVI Epicharmus Cous
XVII Epimenides Cretensis
XVIII Euryphon Cnidius
XIX Gorgias Leontinus
XX Heraclitus Ephesius
XXI Hippias Eleus
XXII Hippocrates Chius
XXIII Ion Chius
XXIV Leucippus Abderites
XXV Melissus Samius
XXVI Metrodorus Chius
XXVII Metrodorus Lampsacenus (maior)
XXVIII Musaeus Eleusinus
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XXX Orpheus Thracius
XXXI Parmenides Eleates
XXXII Pherecydes Syrius

The idea for this volume was born about thirteen years ago, when I was first embarking on my study of Herculaneum papyrology. As a team member of the ERC-Starting Grant 241184-PHerc (Interactive Edition and Interpretation of Various Works by Epicurean and Stoic Philosophers Surviving at Herculaneum), directed by Graziano Ranocchia,1 I began to work on PHerc. 1004 systematically. PHerc. 1004 transmits an unknown book of the extensive treatise On Rhetoric by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara. This book is extremely important for our understanding of the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric in the debate amongst the Hellenistic schools (a large section of the papyrus is devoted to Philodemus' criticism of Diogenes of Babylon, whose thought on the nature of rhetoric and its role in philosophical training he paraphrases at length), but it is also relevant for the Presocratic tradition, especially in regard to Heraclitus and Pythagoras. This fact, along with my increasing interest in the texts belonging to the stunningly rich Herculaneum library, persuaded me that it was worth undertaking the task of collecting and (partly) re-editing all the Presocratic material transmitted through the Herculaneum papyri. The greatest challenge presented by this task was its interdisciplinary character. As fate would have it, in 2011, during one of my research stays in Germany, I met Georg Mohrle at the University of Trier, at a lecture on the Placita given by Jaap Mansfeld. For many years, Prof. Wöhrle has been directing an international research centre on the Presocratic tradition in Trier and — along with other eminent scholars including Richard McKirahan, Denis O'Brien, Oliver Primavesi, Christoph Riedweg, David Sider, and Gotthard Strohmaier4 — had inaugurated the two renowned De Gruyter editorial series Traditio Praesocratica and Studia Praesocratica. Further encouraged by this circumstance and by the fruitful exchange of ideas with friends and colleagues, I broadened my selected research on the Herculaneum papyri and began to place the Presocratic testimonia within the context of the surviving Epicurean literature, from Epicurus to Diogenes of Oinoanda. The first fruits of this work were reaped through a series of preliminary publications, partially collected under the label Praesocratica Herculanensia, which have appeared both in collective volumes5 and in some scholarly journals, including Analecta Papyrologica, Archiv fur Papyrusforschung and verwandte Gebiete, Cronache Ercolanesi, Hermes, Hyperboreus, Lexicon Philosophicum, Mnemosyne, and Philosophie Antique.

The research project was officially launched at the 27th International Congress of Papyrology in Warsaw (29 July-8 August 2013), where I delivered a paper entitled Towards a Comprehensive Edition of the Evidence for Presocratic Philosophy in the Herculaneum Papyri. A few years later, the project was awarded a DFG-Grant (VA 1030/1-1). Thanks to this funding, I was able to proceed with the research and to give the project a decisive push at the University of Trier, under the supervision of Prof. Wöhrle. During those years (2015-2017) I achieved two important goals: the publication of the first updated catalogue of all the Herculanean testimonia to Presocratic philosophers (Index

Praesocraticorum Philosophorum Herculanensis)8 and, above all, the organization of the international workshop Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition (Trier, 22-24 September 2016). At this workshop, a team of specialists in the field of philosophical papyrology and ancient philosophy and doxography had the chance to discuss the numerous sources that such an inquiry entails, concentrating on the Herculanean sources as well. Over the years that followed, further important experiences gave me the input required to bring the work to completion: the time I have spent as a Research Assistant Professor at the University of Calabria (Cosenza), where I am currently lecturing Ancient Philosophy - and which has supported and partially financed my research stays in Naples and in the Officina dei Papyri Ercolanesi from the first moment I moved from Germany to Italy (2017) - and the Spring Term (2019) I spent as a Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Notre Dame (IN, USA), where I had the luck to meet two extraordinary colleagues, Gretchen Reydams-Schils and John T. Fitzgerald. I am extremely grateful to them for encouraging me to finish the volume and for inviting me to discuss its content with the graduate and postgraduate students of the Program of Liberal Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

As the reader will see, this book provides an extensive introduction focused on the Epicurean reception of early Greek thought (Prolegomena) and the first comprehensive edition of all the Herculanean testimonia to the Presocratics (Corpus Praesocraticorum Herculanense), with an English translation of the texts and a wide-ranging commentary on them. The work makes it possible to find easily important pieces of evidence on these philosophers, from the Milesians to the Sophists, which are otherwise either totally absent or only partially considered in the classic Diels/Kranz collection, or which were previously cited only in outdated editions.' In particular, the present study aims to advance scholarship on the Presocratics as regards ancient epistemology and theology. Both of these fields are here analysed in reference to the philosophical perspective of Epicurus and the Epicureans (above all Philodemus, but also, for example, Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda), a view which was contrary to both scepticism and atheism. Several testimonia clarify the legacy of Peripatetic (and not only Theophrastean) doxography (and philosophy) in the main works of Epicurus (above all his masterpiece On Nature) and Philodemus (especially his treatise On Piety). Moreover, some of them (e. g., some passages from PHerc. 1005/862) testify that Epicurus was able to read the original works of some Presocratics directly, including at least those by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Hence, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the most ancient holdings of the Herculaneum library these works (or part of them) were also preserved. Among the most significant scientific outcomes of the project, the following deserve special mention: the attribution of an earlier date to the attested tradition of the so-called `scepticism' of Xenophanes; the complete reconstruction of the Epicurean reception of Democritus (in addition to that preserved in Epicurus' Letters), with particular reference to the problem of the movement of atoms, and of human freedom; a new reconstruction of testimonia to Nausiphanes' concept of, Anaxagoras' physics and theology, and Empedocles' epistemology; and new texts for better comparing the doxographical sections of Philodemus' On Piety with those of Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods, which update Hermann Diels' treatment of this subject in his renowned Doxographi Graeci.

## Presocratics and Epicureanism: a historico-philosophical inquiry based on the contribution of the Herculaneum papyri

A specific and systematic inquiry into the relationship between Epicurus (and the Epicureans) and the Presocratics has thus far been missing from scholarship on Epicureanism. There are two reasons in particular why such an inquiry is necessary: a) first, it will broaden our perspective on the sources of Presocratic philosophy, in large part through consideration of the papyrological sources, the potential of which has generally been underestimated in prior studies; b) second, it will help in evaluating the actual role of doxography — not only Theophrastean, but also pre-Theophrastean (especially Aristotelian) doxography — in tracing the development of the basic core of doxographical information that was later used and reworked in the Placita. However, the

(philosophical and doxographical) similarities and differences between the early Atomists and Epicurus have often been treated as an obvious presupposition by those scholarly approaches, beginning from the nineteenth century, that have taken the subject into account. C. Bailey's thesis is representative of this point of view. He argues that, "although in Epicurus there are traces of the influence of Aristotle and a keen critic has even seen an approach to the doctrines of Plato, there is never a word of polemic against either. Epicurus' controversy is with the pre-Socratics, and his debt, unacknowledged and even violently denied, is to Leucippus and Democritus." But — as we will see — Epicurus' debt to the Presocratics cannot be reduced to his philosophical (viz. polemical) relationship with the theories of the early Atomists. Indeed, with regard to the tenets and (Peripatetically influenced) methodology of the Letter to Pythocles, as Bailey observed, "the great majority of the explanations advanced are derived from the hypotheses of previous philosophers, not only from the Atomists, but from the Ionians, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, and there is little which is characteristically Epicurean, except the occasional working out of an idea such as that of the genesis of lightning or the atomic mechanism of the action of the magnet."83 Of course, the presence of all of these influences should not overshadow the original elements of Epicurus' science of nature, which is unique both in its technical tenets and in its ethical aims. In fact, in addition to their theoretical legacy, Epicurus' extant writings also stand out for their (more or less direct) criticism of the Presocratics, who made up a considerable proportion of his "professional rivals," as D. N. Sedley terms them in a famous article. Nevertheless, as several passages of the CPH will demonstrate, this philosophical rivalry never sours the sense of respect that Epicurus felt towards those thinkers, whom he recognized as forerunners of his science of nature.

It is not easy to summarize all aspects of Epicurean polemics against the Presocratics. For the sake of clarity, however, they can be reduced to four main themes: a) physics, b) theology, c) epistemology, and d) ethics. a) On the physical level, Epicurus first criticizes the monists, by demonstrating the impossibility of explaining a reality that begins from a single principle. As for the pluralists, some sources (especially the Herculanean ones) indicate that he recognized Anaxagoras and Democritus as the forerunners of his version of atomism. However, he seems to disagree with Anaxagoras' theory of homeomeries, due to its inadequacy in explaining the formal shape of compounds. Conversely, the principal points of his disagreement with Democritus concern the features of atoms and their motion. The movement of atoms is also connected with the ethical side of his polemics, especially with the question of how to reconcile atomic determinism with human freedom. b) Theological questions are closely connected to physical ones, since Epicurus and the Epicureans identify the physical principles of the Presocratics (and particularly of the monists) with the gods. Based on this point of view, the Presocratics are generally attacked for undermining the Epicurean concept of the gods as beautiful, eternal, and bless- ed beings endowed with bodily senses, yet totally impervious to human beings and their vicissitudes. c) As for epistemology, the Presocratics are often criticized for their alleged scepticism. In particular, Epicurus and the Epicureans focus on the dangerous consequences of the Presocratic doctrines that seem to deny the plain evidence of the senses, which provides the starting point of Epicurus' canon of truth. This denial of incorporates both a kind of scepticism inherent in Epicurean polemics, which goes beyond the question of the senses and implies that it is impossible to have certain knowledge of human and divine things (e. g., in Xenophanes and the pupils and sceptical interpreters of Democritus, such as Metrodorus of Chios), and even 'relativism', which is sometimes connected — as in the case of Protagoras — to a concealed form of `atheism'. d) All the previous points converge in the final theme: ethics. For Epicurus, there can be no physical inquiry without the ethical goals of happiness and imperturbability. Therefore, all physical, theological, and epistemological questions raised by Epicurean polemics against the Presocratics are linked to ethics, inasmuch as the Presocratics' philosophical errors run the risk of preventing men from reaching pleasure and impassivity.

Below, I will provide an outline of the problem, with reference to the most important Presocratic authors and schools. In particular, I will try (with additional references to questions that will be examined in depth in the commentary on the CPH) to consider Epicurean doxography in its entirety, including the Herculanean sources known thus far. I must stress that, although they often support the polemical aims listed above, these Herculanean texts also provide evidence of the respect that Epicurus and his school showed towards some of the most prominent representatives of Presocratic philosophy. I will base this general picture in part on the succession of Presocratics printed by Diels in his edition (though without endorsing the geschichtliche Entwicklung of early Greek philosophy outlined by E. Zeller), and I will also use the conventional distinction between monists and pluralists. This distinction, introduced by Plato and Aristotle and subsequently followed by Theophrastus, is adopted by Epicurus as well, especially in Book 14 of his treatise On Nature.

## The criteria and the rationale of the present collection

Despite the laudable efforts that have been made in recent decades towards fostering the study of the Herculaneum papyri, in most cases they still remain unknown to and/or voluntarily ignored in the studies of ancient philosophy. It is not my place here to investigate the causes of this strange phenomenon. What can be said, however, is that even today, to the majority of scholarship, Herculaneum papyrology seems an esoteric discipline. Also for this reason, the quotation of the works transmitted by the Herculaneum papyri is not an easy task. Therefore, I would like to explain, in light of the anomaly noted above, the criteria that I have adopted in ordering and publishing the CPH. Being fully aware that, whatever criterion I decided to follow, I would inevitably satisfy some and disappoint others, I have tried to make the numerous references to the Herculaneum papyri as understandable as possible even to those who are not familiar with these sources. Obviously, such a choice makes this volume a work addressed not only to Herculaneum papyrologists, but also (and above all) to historians of ancient philosophy.

First of all, for each author, the order of the Herculanean sources referring to them is conventionally based, for schematic reasons, on the sequence of the inventory numbers of the papyri. The authors, meanwhile, are instead listed (with an indication of their ethnicon) in alphabetical order by name. The rationale of the present collection explains this approach, which differs from Diels/ Kranz's (i. e. in its ordering of the traditional succession of schools and individual philosophers). In fact, in addition to the other historico-philosophical goals of this volume, the CPH is intended to provide aid to scholars currently studying the ancient tradition of individual Presocratics that this book considers, and also to those in the future who will systematically undertake a serious, overarching work that will replace the Vorsokratiker, without leaving out any kind of source - and hence one that takes all the Herculanean sources into account as well, including those absent from Diels/Kranz. Of course, it is always possible to debate whether it is still appropriate today to retain the old denomination 'pre-Socratics' for this group of philosophers, a number of whom were contemporaries with Socrates and even with Plato (thus, even the term 'pre-Platonics', first coined by W. T. Krug and employed for a time by F. W. Nietzsche as well, seems historically inadequate, at the very least). Personally, as a tribute to the philological and historico-philosophical tradition, I prefer to preserve the usual label.

In general, I have decided to use a more inclusive method of selection, taking some sources largely considered uncertain at this point into account. I treat the testimonia that I find absolutely uncertain, however, differently: although I did not include them in the CPH, I take them into consideration under the heading Dubium/Dubia, appended to the commentary at the end of the chapter devoted to each relevant author. As for the Herculanean testimonia already recorded in the Vorsokratiker or, sometimes, in the most authoritative modern collections of individual Presocratics, the correspondence of these sources with DK and, where needed, with other collections is indicated in the CPH. Unlike in the catalogue that I have already published (IPPH), I have decided here to treat all the Herculanean passages in the same manner, i. e. like 'testimonia', whose philosophical and

doxographical meaning is caught between the fragmentary nature of the papyrological context and the polysemy of the so-called cover-text, a very useful (although vague) label coined by G. Schepens to indicate the texts that hand down the fragments of lost ancient historians. Hence, in this volume, I will not distinguish between the passages in which (certain or alleged) fragments (i. e. ipsissima verba) of Presocratics appear and those that transmit testimonies on, names of, and/or allusions to one or more Presocratics. Where necessary, the commentary explains the reasons for including certain dubious testimonia in the CPH. When the same testimonium mentions or refers to more than one Presocratic philosopher, I record it only once, in the section devoted to the author more directly involved by the testimonium, i. e. not always in the section devoted to the author who appears first. Specific cross references will orientate the reader, making it possible to find the corresponding texts both in the Corpus and in the commentary. Moreover, the commentary will concentrate on the details of the testimonium with minimal repetition, with the exception of occasional necessary remarks in the brief introduction that precedes the commentary on each text.

I have re-examined all the Herculanean passages of the collection autoptically in the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi of the National Library 'Vittorio Emanuele III' in Naples, using binocular microscopes and Multi-Spectral Images (MSI) of the Herculaneum papyri."' Whenever it is possible, for each testimonium I provide the name of the scholar who has published the most recent comprehensive edition of the papyrus in question (or of the work to which it belongs). Where (my or other scholars') new readings and conjectures have considerably changed the text of the reference edition, the reader will find them in the critical apparatus and the bibliographical references in specific footnotes. The reference editions I used in the CPH (the same that I used for the IPPH, but with additions and updates) are listed at the end of the collection (Locorum laudatorum editiones) and divided into four sections: the first three sections are devoted to individual authors (or authors identifiable with a fair degree of probability), namely (in alphabetical order), Demetrius Laco, Epicurus, and Philodemus; the last section is devoted to anonymous Herculanean authors (Scriptores incerti), with reference to the works transmitted by PHerc. 176, PHerc. 1589, and PHerc. 1788. This list takes all the most recent editions into account, not only those already published, but also those in preparation or in press (both my own and those of fellow scholars who, over the last few years, have kindly provided me with advance access to their forthcoming works). Basically, only the editions of the papyri quoted in the collection are taken into consideration, even where the work to which they belong is preserved in multiple papyri. As for partial editions of Herculanean works that are composed of several books (or parts), I have preferred to indicate in the footnote the corresponding page of the comprehensive edition that is still the reference edition in scholarship.

Finally, for the papyri of uncertain attribution, I put the author and/or the title of the work in square brackets in the cases where palaeographical and historicophilosophical considerations have led some scholars to put forward convincing hypotheses about the question of their attribution.

Each Herculanean witness is provided with a critical apparatus and an English translation. Unless otherwise noted, the translations are mine. The critical apparatus that follows the texts I have not completely re-edited is modelled after the apparatus of the reference editions. But, for reasons of uniformity, this apparatus has been increased and/or modified, as required; furthermore, the form of specific editorial, textual, and bibliographical references has sometimes also been changed. As for the previous editors, if any, they are indicated by surname only, and, in doing so, I refer the reader to the conspectus siglorum of the reference editions reported, as mentioned above, immediately after my collection. My own readings and supplements are instead indicated in the apparatus by an asterisk (*). Where the readings of the reference edition have been confirmed with some slight changes — e. g., only a few letters have been placed outside a lacuna —, the 'new' reading is printed in the text, while the previous one (along with its author, not necessarily the same as the reference

editor) is recorded in the critical apparatus in round brackets. In the restored texts, the use of the sigma lunatum is limited to cases in which the placement of the letter at the beginning, the middle or the end of a word remains uncertain (the same criterion is applied for the lectiones of the disegni recorded in the critical apparatus of the individual testimonia). For the sake of brevity, any palaeographical observations, which should be part of the diplomatic transcription of a given text, are generally excluded from the critical apparatus. However, the diplomatic transcription of the various texts has been described in many of my earlier works, preparatory to the CPH. In the critical apparatus, the readings of the Oxonian and/or Neapolitan apographs are marked by top half brackets. when they represent the only or a better source. Letters of either or both apographs modified by the editor are indicated with a low asterisk (*). Generally, diacritical signs of the Leiden System are used, but they have been adapted to the specific requirements of Herculaneum papyri. One of the peculiarities of these papyri is represented by overlapping layers (sovrapposti and sottoposti), that is, portions of papyrus layers that, when the scrolls were unrolled, have remained stuck to the immediately preceding (sovrapposti) or following (sottoposti) winding(s) of the roll. Replacing these layers is one of the most challenging tasks of the Herculaneum papyrologist. If performed correctly, this operation allows to gain new textual portions formerly disregarded by editors. As is standard in the most recent editions of Herculanean texts, I indicate replaced sovrapposti and sottoposti through boldface letters. Finally, with regard to the testimonia belonging to Herculanean works or books transmitted in more than one copy, in addition to printing the text of the various copies separately, I have decided to provide the reader with a unified text, which is the result of my 'collation' of the various copies available. This virtual text is preceded by the conventional sign # and is followed by an English translation.

As I have often pointed out elsewhere, any collection of the testimonia to the Presocratics in the Herculaneum papyri must be considered provisional and subject to progressive improvement. Publishing as yet unpublished papyri or reediting those already known according to the updated criteria of Herculaneum papyrology could lead us to surprising new finds. In the meantime, this selection, edition, and explanation of the sources known thus far is intended to be a step forward in the study of Presocratic thought and a contribution to the reconstruction of its reception in antiquity, including in Hellenistic philosophy, and, in particular, in the Epicurean tradition. Any attempt to achieve this goal, philosophical or philological, would be in vain without a serious and rigorous examination of the texts now preserved in the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi, almost two millennia after the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 AD and more than two and a half centuries after the stunning discovery of the charred scrolls from Herculaneum.

## Diogenes of Oinoanda's criticism of Presocratic philosophy

The topic of the relationship between Epicureanism and Presocratic philosophies in both the Epicurean and the anti-Epicurean Latin literature of the first century BC deserves a separate discussion, as this literature deals with the question extensively. In the anti-Epicurean line, I refer to Cicero, especially to De natura deorum (but the discussion should be extended to the Lucullus as well); in the Epicurean line, I obviously refer to Lucretius. In the commentary on the CPH, I have stressed the doxographical importance of Cicero's texts on numerous occasions. In particular, the new critical edition of the passages of Philodemus' On Piety parallel to the doxographical sections of Book I of Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods provides relevant material for revising and reinterpreting the pages of the Doxographi Graeci that Diels devoted to this complex issue. As far as Lucretius is concerned, it would be useless to reopen the discussion on the topic here in a systematic way. Many studies have already been dedicated to the vexata quaestio, and in particular to the excursus on the Presocratics in vv. 635-920 of Book I of De rerum natura. On the other hand, in the Prolegomena we have had cause to mention this doxographical section of the poem several times. It makes sense instead - and may be very useful - to devote the Appendix of this volume to an Epicurean author who, because he was active in the first half of the second century AD

(i. e. in the latest phase of Epicureanism in antiquity, a period in which Diogenianus, for instance, also was active), allows us to revisit the problem of the relationship between Epicurus and the Presocratics from a broader perspective. I am obviously alluding to Diogenes of Oinoanda. In fact, among the remains of his renowned inscription, a considerable number of fragments are preserved in which the Presocratic doctrines are more or less directly called into question. As we will see, the Herculanean testimonia collected in this volume are often extremely important for better interpreting Diogenes; and, vice versa, Diogenes often facilitates a better understanding of certain fragmentary Herculanean passages. This is an exemplary case of interdisciplinary hermeneutic work, in which papyrology and epigraphy are revealed as fundamental tools of the historian of ancient philosophy.

As a matter of fact, the most obvious distinctive feature of the philosophical fragments in question is that Diogenes' writings are transmitted by epigraphic sources. Diogenes, for his time certainly a rich man, had a kind of abrégé of Epicurus' thought engraved onto a portico wall belonging to his property, placed in the ancient city of Oinoanda in Lycia (in present-day southwest Turkey). This inscription is important not only for reconstructing Epicurean thought, but also for the doxographical and historico-philosophical information we can infer from it. The exposition of Epicurus' ethics and physics entails (as in the case for all Epicurean literature, including that transmitted by the Herculaneum papyri) a close confrontation with and a criticism of non-Epicurean doctrines, in particular those of the Presocratics, the Socratics (especially the Cyrenaics), Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In reality, the Inscription of Oinoanda is not the only epigraphic source of information concerning early Greek thought. For example, on the famous stele of Al Khanoum, about a hundred and fifty maxims of the Seven Sages were engraved: although almost entirely lost (only a small fragment is known to us), the inscription can be dated to the first quarter of the third century BC and is ascribed to the Peripatetic philosopher Clearchus of Soli. However, the Presocratic witnesses transmitted by the Oinoanda Inscription require more complex philosophical discussion. As in the case of the majority of the testimonia of the CM, all Diogenes' evidence should be evaluated and assessed from the perspective of the Epicurean tradition and its use of the philosophical past.

As is well known, the portico where the inscription was erected was discovered in 1884. The first fragments (sixty-four in all) were published in 1892 by G. Cousin and then, in 1897, by R. Heberdey and E. Kalinka. Following the editions by J. William, A. Grilli, D. W. Chilton, and A. Casanova, the reference edition is now that published by M. F. Smith in 1993. Over the next few decades, leading up to the present — thanks above all to a series of excavations directed by Smith along with J. Hammerstaedt — a large number of new fragments have come to light. These fragments have made a substantial contribution to our understanding of Diogenes.838 According to our current knowledge, the Oinoanda Inscription is the largest that has survived from the ancient world. By Smith's calculations, it originally extended to about 80 m in lenght, while its considerable height (about 2.5 m) was divided, according to content, into seven groups of writings: 1) the first group (in the lowest course of the inscription, preceded by an uninscribed stone base) contained Diogenes' epitome on Epicurean ethics; 2) the second group contained an epitome on Epicurean physics, and was placed on a stone layer higher than that devoted to ethics, in order to allow passers-by to read it first (in accordance with the Epicurean principle of the utility of physics only in view of ethics, viz. of the achievement of happiness); 3) in the third course of the inscription, we find letters that Diogenes addressed to his friends and supporters (like Antipater and Dionysius) and to his relatives, together with some (Epicurean) maxims, probably written by the same Diogenes; 4) to the fourth group of writings belong some letters (probably) written by Diogenes, and perhaps a letter of Epicurus to his mother; 5) finally, at the top of the inscription (and separated from the previous courses by a brief engraved stone layer), there are three sections containing a treatise of Diogenes on old age.'

If we consider what has been said so far in the Prolegomena, we can understand how the question of Diogenes of Oinoanda's criticism of the Presocratics mostly (but not only) concerns the fragments of the lowest courses of the inscription: those transmitting Diogenes' two epitomes on ethics and physics. All this philosophical and doxographical material, as we will see, is a vital component for any attempt to reconstruct the Presocratic tradition in Epicureanism.' However, it is not easy to reassess these fragments according to a consistent methodology. In general, the task could be carried out in one of three ways: a) by examining the Presocratics involved in the inquiry one by one; b) by analysing the testimonia according to the thematically arranged layers of the inscription, listed above; c) or by studying the fragments on the basis of Diogenes' polemical targets. For convenience's sake, I will follow this last approach, above all because it favours the unification of authors and themes that often involve either the same course of the inscription or single fragments (or continuous sequences of fragments). Hence, the agenda of the present inquiry is as follows: 1) the legacy of the doxographical catalogues on the Presocratics (and others) in Diogenes; 2) Diogenes on the monistic Presocratic doctrines; 3) Diogenes on the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition, Empedodes' physics and daemonology, and Anaxagoras' pluralism; 4) Diogenes on the physical, ethical, and epistemological aspects of Democritus' atomism; and 5) Diogenes on the Sophists and Diagoras of Melos. Such a division could be put forth once more with a focus on the philosophical object of the polemics. This approach traces Diogenes' criticism of the Presocratics back to the following fundamental subjects, which, grosso modo, reflect the topics explained above in the Prolegomena with regard to the Herculanean Presocratic tradition,842 namely: a) Presocratic physics and the inquiry into the causes (criticism of monism and pluralism); b) knowledge and the role of the senses (criticism of some Presocratics' so-called `scepticism'); c) theology and the nature of the soul (criticism of some Presocratics' alleged atheism and of the stone layer), there are three sections containing a treatise of Diogenes on old age.'

If we consider what has been said so far in the Prolegomena, we can understand how the question of Diogenes of Oinoanda's criticism of the Presocratics mostly (but not only) concerns the fragments of the lowest courses of the inscription: those transmitting Diogenes' two epitomes on ethics and physics. All this philosophical and doxographical material, as we will see, is a vital component for any attempt to reconstruct the Presocratic tradition in Epicureanism.' However, it is not easy to reassess these fragments according to a consistent methodology. In general, the task could be carried out in one of three ways: a) by examining the Presocratics involved in the inquiry one by one; b) by analysing the testimonia according to the thematically arranged layers of the inscription, listed above; c) or by studying the fragments on the basis of Diogenes' polemical targets. For convenience's sake, I will follow this last approach, above all because it favours the unification of authors and themes that often involve either the same course of the inscription or single fragments (or continuous sequences of fragments). Hence, the agenda of the present inquiry is as follows: 1) the legacy of the doxographical catalogues on the Presocratics (and others) in Diogenes; 2) Diogenes on the monistic Presocratic doctrines; 3) Diogenes on the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition, Empedodes' physics and daemonology, and Anaxagoras' pluralism; 4) Diogenes on the physical, ethical, and epistemological aspects of Democritus' atomism; and 5) Diogenes on the Sophists and Diagoras of Melos. Such a division could be put forth once more with a focus on the philosophical object of the polemics. This approach traces Diogenes' criticism of the Presocratics back to the following fundamental subjects, which, grosso modo, reflect the topics explained above in the Prolegomena with regard to the Herculanean Presocratic tradition, namely: a) Presocratic physics and the inquiry into the causes (criticism of monism and pluralism); b) knowledge and the role of the senses (criticism of some Presocratics' so-called `scepticism'); c) theology and the nature of the soul (criticism of some Presocratics' alleged atheism and of the doctrines of the soul's immortality, such as metempsychosis). Finally, it must be said that all these themes do not simply recap the basic reasons for Diogenes' polemics against the Presocratics; they also show how, in general, the polemical passages of the Oinoanda Inscription are never an end in themselves, but represent a prerequisite

for a more effective and correct exposition (and dissemination) of Epicureanism and its `truth', and do so in a philanthropic and universalistic key. In other words, the sections belonging to the pars destruens of the inscription — from the Presocratics to the Stoics — cannot be separated from the pars construens. <>

## THE SOCRATIC METHOD: A PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK by Ward Farnsworth [Godine, 9781567926859]

A thinking person's guide to a better life. Ward Farnsworth explains what the Socratic method is, how it works, and why it matters more than ever in our time. Easy to grasp yet challenging to master, the method will change the way you think about life's big questions. "A wonderful book."—Rebecca Goldstein, author of *Plato at the Googleplex*.

About 2,500 years ago, Plato wrote a set of dialogues that depict Socrates in conversation. The way Socrates asks questions, and the reasons why, amount to a whole way of thinking. This is the Socratic method—one of humanity's great achievements. More than a technique, the method is an ethic of patience, inquiry, humility, and doubt. It is an aid to better thinking, and a remedy for bad habits of mind, whether in law, politics, the classroom, or tackling life's big questions at the kitchen table.

Drawing on hundreds of quotations, this book explains what the Socratic method is and how to use it. Chapters include *Socratic Ethics*, *Ignorance*, *Testing Principles*, and *Socrates and the Stoics*. Socratic philosophy is still startling after all these years because it is an approach to asking hard questions and chasing after them. It is a route to wisdom and a way of thinking about wisdom. With Farnsworth as your guide, the ideas of Socrates are easier to understand than ever and accessible to anyone.

As Farnsworth achieved with *The Practicing Stoic* and the *Farnsworth's Classical English* series, ideas of old are made new and vital again. This book is for those coming to philosophy the way Socrates did—as the everyday activity of making sense out of life and how to live it—and for anyone who wants to know what he said about doing that better.

### Reviews

"The Socratic method decelerates reasoning, making space for deliberation when disagreements arise. So, the Socratic method is, Farnsworth says, an antidote to some social pandemics of our day." —**George F. Will**

"A wonderful book. It is elegant, erudite, but wears its pedagogical virtues so lightly as to never come off as pedantic." —**Rebecca Goldstein, author of *Plato at the Googleplex***

"A group of bad American movies has unfortunately associated the Socratic method of inquiry and teaching with a bullying style of teaching. But the Socratic method was something very different to Socrates, and is something that remains at the heart of serious intellectual honesty. Ward Farnsworth's important book is not only impressively erudite in its mining of classical sources, but is also the best account we have of what the Socratic method really is and why we dismiss or caricature it at our peril."
**—Frederick Schauer, David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia**

"Many of us refer casually to the Socratic method and some of us think we practice it. But is only

when reading Ward Farnsworth's learned and inspiring book that one can begin to appreciate the profundity of Plato's teaching and understand how its lessons are just what is needed in a world where invective and hasty judgments seem to have replaced deliberative reasoning and rational argument." —**Stanley Fish, author of *Winning Arguments***

"A great success. There is nothing like it. An excellent resource both for students and for general readers." —**A. A. Long, author of *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life***

"A beautifully written, immensely thoughtful, and multi-faceted book. Ward Farnsworth offers a fresh understanding of the Socratic method as it's represented in Plato's early dialogs, then shows how it can be internalized as a way of bettering intelligence." —**Henry Abelove, Professor Emeritus of English, Wesleyan University**

"Ward Farnsworth's *The Socratic Method* deserves attention from scholars and lawyers and teachers of law—but, really, from anyone who wants to practice clear thinking. The book rests on a firm foundation of scholarship and then goes on to do something at which few such scholarly works succeed: it is useful for ordinary readers. It is indeed a practitioner's handbook. Read it to enlarge your knowledge of ancient thought, but also read it for the mental exercises all thinkers need in order to stay agile." —**Paul Woodruff, author of *The Garden of Leaders: Revolutionizing Higher Education***

"Ward Farnsworth's brilliant new book, *The Socratic Method*, offers powerful insights into the most important and effective means for discovering the truth, or at least coming closer to it, in education, politics, business, and everyday relations. Building on the wisdom of Socrates, Farnsworth makes clear not only why Socratic discourse is essential, but also how to undertake such discourse in a positive and affirming manner. This is especially important today at a time of deep political polarization in which Americans increasingly speak only to people like themselves and hold those who disagree with them in disdain. This state of affairs, no doubt contributed to by the advent of social media, poses a serious threat to a well-functioning democracy. If we as a nation are to make it through these times and preserve the most fundamental premises of our democracy, we must all learn how to engage in Socratic discourse and embrace the principles of an open mind, rigorous questioning and honest debate. This book offers essential lessons to anyone seeking to preserve American democracy." —**Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago**

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The Socratic method is a style of thought. It is a help toward intelligence and an antidote to stupidity. This has to be said right away because many people consider the Socratic method, if they consider it at all, to be a technique for teaching. It is that; but the reason the Socratic method is useful in the classroom is that it's a style of thought better than the one we tend to apply naturally to important things. Socrates didn't question people in order to teach us how to question people. He did it to teach us how to think. That is what makes his method a matter of general interest, not a device for specialists or special occasions. This is a practitioner's handbook, and the first lesson is that everyone is a practitioner, or can be, on any given day.

This book explains what the Socratic method is and how to use it—the original method, that is, as practiced by Socrates in the dialogues of Plato. It is a book about the operation of the mind. It is also a practical introduction to the philosophy of Socrates more generally. Socratic philosophy is still startling after all these years because it doesn't definitively answer hard questions. It is an approach to asking hard questions and chasing after them. Socratic thought is a route to wisdom but not wisdom in a box; it denies that wisdom can be fit in a box. It is helpful for thinking about every kind of problem, large or small—how we should live and who should walk the dog.

This book also tells the origin story of Stoicism, an ancient family of ideas that many people still find compelling. The Stoic teachings that have had staying power descend from the teachings of Socrates; anyone interested in what the Stoics said should understand how it relates to what Socrates said. And anyone interested in Socrates can in turn find, in the Stoics, examples of how Socratic thinking can be put to work in ordinary life.

The teachings of Socrates can also improve conversations about all sorts of hard subjects. The Socratic method means, among other things, asking and receiving questions fearlessly; it means saying what you think, and not getting hot when others say what they think; it means loving the truth and staying humble about whether you know it. In other words, it's about all the good things that have been vanishing from our culture of discourse.

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That is a short account of this book's purpose. Here is a more complete one.

About 2,500 years ago, Plato wrote a set of dialogues about ethical and other questions. Most of the dialogues, especially those now said to be the early ones, follow the same pattern. Plato doesn't appear. The dialogues depict Socrates having conversations with others. Usually he asks questions to which his discussion partners think they know the answers. Socrates tests what they say, takes apart their claims, and shows that they don't understand the topic as well as they had imagined. Readers tend to come away with the same impression about themselves. This sounds straightforward, but the way Socrates does it, and the reasons why, amount to a good way of thinking about many things. This we will call the Socratic method.

The Socratic method is often described as one of the foremost productions of the classical mind. Gregory Vlastos, the 20th century's most distinguished scholar of our subject, described the method as "among the greatest achievements of humanity" because it makes moral inquiry a common human enterprise, open to every man. Its practice calls for no adherence to a philosophical system, or

mastery of a specialized technique, or acquisition of a technical vocabulary. It calls for common sense and common speech.

The value of the method extends to law, politics, and all other matters that call for reasoned judgment. John Stuart Mill regarded the Socratic method as a profound influence on his thinking and a mighty asset, causing him to reflect, in an essay on Plato, "on the debt mankind owe to him for this, incomparably his greatest gift."

So the method is the most valuable legacy of Socrates, and Socrates is perhaps the most illustrious figure in the history of Western thought. We might therefore expect that everyone would be familiar with the principal features of the Socratic method. But most people aren't, and even most intellectual types don't feel any particular sense of profit from the teachings of Socrates, at least not directly. Why, then, is there such a discrepancy between the value of the Socratic method (by reputation, anyway) and popular knowledge of it?

I believe there are three reasons. First, the method is never clearly explained in Plato's dialogues. It runs in the background of discussions that are about other things. The method has to be inferred from the way Socrates talks and acts and from comments he makes about why; the reader who opens a dialogue looking for direct instruction won't find it.

Second, the discussions in the dialogues, and Socrates himself, can be off-putting. The characters often will argue about a question that is of no pressing interest to the reader. They conclude nothing except that they don't have a good answer, and the arguments along the way sometimes seem to be hair-splitting or formalistic. Pushing through those arguments to enjoy the method and learn from it is a kind of work that, for most readers, can charitably be described as an acquired taste.

Third, the Socratic method is never likely to be popular because it doesn't offer what most people think they want. The teachings of Socrates don't propose to make anyone richer or more famous. They don't offer rewards after death. They don't answer the questions that torment us, and they don't confirm that we're right about what we already think. What the teachings do offer is wisdom, but this good thing is always bought at the price of some discomfort. The human appetite for wisdom, and its tolerance for discomfort, has never been great, in ancient times or ours.

These points help explain why the Socratic method isn't known to most people and isn't taught in school. But it should be. The elements of the method are simple and potent, easy to grasp and challenging to master. It can produce results in the hands of those who know nothing else about philosophy. It's helpful for thinking or arguing about things that matter to everyone now, not just things that mattered to Plato. And the method does offer a route to happiness in the ancient sense of that word: a better life, if not a better mood.

Since the dialogues don't set forth the method in an accessible way, that is what this book means to do. It seeks to make the ideas of Socrates, and especially his method, easier to understand.

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There are lots of other books about Socrates and Plato, so I should say why another one seemed worth the trouble. Such books are almost all written by scholars in philosophy departments. Their job is to read Plato closely, to debate the fairest way to interpret what he wrote, and to teach students to do the same. I read what those scholars write and admire it. But the question that most interests me is how the Socratic method can be used, not just by teachers but by anyone. I mean to approach it as a farm animal rather than a zoo animal. This difference in approach is modest; I'm interested in what Plato meant and will cite a lot of scholarship on that question, too. But I want to focus on applied aspects of the method. The book is for those coming to philosophy the way

Socrates did—as the everyday activity of making sense out of life and how to live it—and who want to know what he said about doing that better.

In practice this means the book will spend less time than others on a complete textual analysis of every issue raised. Plato provides endless grist for debate. It takes a lot of time and space to defend any claim you might make about him against every competitor or criticism. But I want this book to be of moderate length, and it's impossible to keep it that way while also chasing down every issue raised by the evidence. The book therefore will treat a lot of hard questions lightly, just showing where they lie and letting the footnotes explain where to read more if you like. The reader who wants a finer-grained exegesis has hundreds of other books to choose from. Many of them are listed in the bibliography, though it is far from being a complete or up-to-date index of the writings on our subject; it mostly just covers the sources that are cited in the text. But it is enough to give the interested reader points of entry into the literature.

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A few years ago I wrote a book called **THE PRACTICING STOIC**. It presents ideas from the ancient philosophy of Stoicism that are still of modern interest. This book is, in effect, a prequel to that one. It explains where Stoicism came from. The Stoics regarded themselves as descendants and followers of Socrates, and his influence on them was immense; the ethical teachings of Stoicism can, indeed, be viewed mostly as an elaboration and extension of what Socrates taught. This book shows why. No knowledge of Stoicism is needed to enjoy what follows, but those who are interested in that subject should also be interested in this one. Many readers like Stoicism because, more than some other philosophies, it has constant practical application to their daily lives. The teachings of Socrates are like that, too. They produce a mindset that is useful all the time. It is, as we will see, the mindset of Epictetus; and from that way of thinking, many more specific Stoic teachings followed naturally as details.

Much the same might be said of Skepticism, another philosophical tradition with many modern adherents (whether they are conscious of it or not). The ancient Skeptics were students of Socrates and rivals of the Stoics. We will spend time on their views as well.

The book will also offer some ideas about how Socratic teachings relate to our current cultural and political difficulties. Let us backtrack a moment. The ancient Romans built elaborate networks of pipes to deliver water where they wanted it to go. The networks were a marvel. But many of the pipes were made of lead, and the water carried the lead along with it. One school of thought regards this as part of the reason for the decline and fall of Rome: lead poisoning gradually took its toll, impairing the thought and judgment of many Romans, especially at the top. The theory is much disputed; perhaps it contains no truth. But as a metaphor it is irresistible. We have built networks for the delivery of information—the internet, and especially social media. These networks, too, are a marvel. But they also carry a kind of poison with them. The mind fed from those sources learns to subsist happily on quick reactions, easy certainties, one-liners, and rage. It craves confirmation and resents contradiction. Attention spans collapse; imbecility propagates, then seems normal, then is celebrated. The capacity for rational discourse between people who disagree gradually rots. I have a good deal more confidence in the lead-pipe theory of the internet, and its effect on our culture, than in the lead-pipe theory of the fall of Rome.

The Socratic method is a corrective. Before viewing it as a technique, consider it an ethic of patience, inquiry, humility, and doubt— in other words, of every good attitude discouraged by social media and disappearing from our political and cultural life. It means asking hard questions fearlessly and receiving them without offense; indeed, it means treating challenge and refutation as acts of friendship. Socrates, as we shall see, sometimes likes to define an elusive concept by asking for the

name of its opposite. That approach can help us here, too. If I were pressed for a one-word opposite of the Socratic method, a strong candidate would be Twitter.

The threat that such technologies pose to the quality of our discourse, and the damage they have already done, are both obvious to all. But the battle is fought between forces that have not been defined as crisply as might be useful. Fanatical partisanship, wishful thinking in place of truth, the shaming of dissenters, the censorship or self-censorship of disapproved views, the inability of people who disagree to talk, let alone cooperate—everyone sees all this on the rise, and most thinking people fear and loathe all that it involves and portends. Those tendencies have not been unified under any coherent heading, though, except insofar as people on one political side say those problems (or the worst of them) mostly belong to the people on the other. And an alternative to all of them at once hasn't been expressed in a programmatic way. Nobody likes what is happening, but the resistance has not had a shape, a plan, or a hero.

This book nominates Socrates as that hero, and the Socratic method as his plan. It is the natural corrective to the entire family of vices named a moment ago. Distinguish between the vices and distribute them between the political extremes as you like; the Socratic mindset is, regardless, the best corrective for them. It is also a worthy muster point: an apparatus of thought that comes with a powerful rationale, a useful set of tools, and a venerable pedigree. Those who mean to push back against the corrosion of our thought and discourse on every front and without partisanship can helpfully say, before they identify by party, that they are Socratics; before they take up arms, they can subscribe to Socratic rules of engagement. This book explains what that commitment might mean.

As an inhabitant of a university, I especially mean this book to broadly suggest the ethic by which such institutions function best. Their health requires Socratic commitments: to reason, to refutation, and to not flinching when hard questions are put on the table. A university should be a Socratic gymnasium.

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This book covers a lot of ground related to the Socratic method, and some readers will be interested more in certain parts than in others. Here is a brief roadmap of what the chapters cover and where.

Chapters 1 and 2 provide background. Chapter 1 talks about who Socrates was (or might have been), and the relationship between the historical Socrates and the literary one. Chapter 2 explains the distinction between the substance of Plato's ideas and the methods of the Socrates that he gives us in his dialogues.

Chapters 3–12 show how the Socratic method works. The elements of it are summarized in Chapter 3, then explained in detail in the chapters that follow. Chapter 4 talks about the use of the method in one's own thinking rather than in conversation. Chapter 5 discusses the question-and-answer approach to inquiry. Chapters 6 and 7 explain the elenchus—the type of argument Socrates likes best—and the importance of consistency in Socratic thought. Chapter 8 explains the Socratic approach to drawing and erasing distinctions; Chapter 9 discusses the method's use of analogies. Chapter 10 goes over some ground rules for Socratic dialogue. Chapter 11 is about ignorance and, in particular, double ignorance—that is, ignorance of one's own ignorance: the problem at the heart of the Socratic project. Chapter 12 is about aporia—the impasse to which Socratic dialogue often leads, and the states of mind that can result from it.

Chapter 13 lays out the Socratic case for caring about the benefits that the method provides. Chapters 14–16 show examples of where the method can lead. Chapter 14 summarizes the

conclusions that Socrates reached about the meaning of happiness and how to achieve it. Chapter 15 shows how the methods of Socrates were used, and his conclusions extended, by the Stoics. Chapter 16 does the same for followers of Skepticism.

Chapters 17 and 18 show some simple ways to create Socratic questions of your own. The Epilogue turns the Socratic method, and the ethic behind it, into rules of engagement for conversations that take different forms. It also talks about the importance of the Socratic ethic in the life of a school.

This book uses footnotes. Sometimes they offer a brief comment from scholarship that is relevant to the main text. Sometimes they just show where an interested reader can find more discussion of a point. I prefer footnotes to endnotes because they don't require flipping to the back of the book. If you don't like footnotes, though, just ignore them here; they are never essential for understanding anything.

Notes on the translations appear at the end of the book. The citations to Plato as we go along will use the Stephanus numbering system. Those numbers make it easy to find the same passage in any edition of Plato's dialogues. They refer to pages in a beautiful edition of Plato's works published by Henri Estienne, a 16th-century French printer (his Latinized name was Stephanus). He published the dialogues in three volumes. Each of the volumes has page numbers that start near 1 and then run into the hundreds. Then he divided each page into parts with the letters a through e. It is conventional to use the pages and letters in those editions to refer to passages in Plato's works. (Similar numbering is used to cite the works of Plutarch, as we also will see at a couple of points.)

The result is very convenient. Suppose you see a quotation from Socrates here and it's cited as "Symposium 221d." If you go get a copy of Plato's Symposium—translated by anyone and published by anyone—you can probably find "221d" in the margins, and you will see the same passage there. Technically speaking, "221d" means the quote appeared in section d of page 221 of the volume in which Stephanus put Plato's Symposium (which happens to have been volume 3). But the practical point is simple: the number lets you quickly find a line from Plato in any book that contains it. <>

## THE PRACTICING STOIC: A PHILOSOPHICAL USER'S MANUAL by Ward Farnsworth [Godine, 9781567926118]

"Farnsworth beautifully integrates his own observations with scores of quotations from Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Montaigne and others. This isn't just a book to read—it's a book to return to, a book that will provide perspective and consolation at times of heartbreak or calamity."—The Washington Post

See more clearly, live more wisely, and bear the burdens of this life with greater ease—here are the greatest insights of the Stoics, in their own words. Presented in twelve lessons, Ward Farnsworth systematically presents the heart of Stoic philosophy accompanied by commentary that is clear and concise.

A foundational idea to Stoicism is that we appear to go through life reacting directly to events. That appearance is an illusion. We react to our judgments and opinions—to our thoughts about things, not to things themselves. Stoics seek to become conscious of those judgments, to find the irrationality in them, and to choose them more carefully.

In chapters including *Emotion*, *Adversity*, *Virtue*, and *What Others Think*, here is the most valuable wisdom about living a good life from ages past—now made available for our time.

## Reviews

"As befits a good Stoic, Farnsworth's expository prose exhibits both clarity and an unflappable calm… Throughout *The Practicing Stoic*, Farnsworth beautifully integrates his own observations with scores of quotations from Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Montaigne and others. As a result, this isn't just a book to read—it's a book to return to, a book that will provide perspective and consolation at times of heartbreak or calamity."— Michael Dirda, *The Washington Post*

"It is reported that upon Seneca's tomb are written the words, *Who's Minding the Stoa?* He would be pleased to know the answer is *Ward Farnsworth*."—David Mamet

"This is a book any thoughtful person will be glad to have along as a companion for an extended weekend or, indeed, for that protracted journey we call life."—*The New Criterion*

"This sturdy and engaging introductory text consists mostly of excerpts from the ancient Greek and Roman Stoic philosophers, especially Seneca, Epictetus through his student Arrian, and Marcus Aurelius as well as that trio's philosophical confreres, from the earlier Hellenic Stoics and Cicero to such contemporaries as Plutarch to moderns, including Montaigne, Adam Smith, and Schopenhauer… A philosophy to live by, Stoicism may remind many of Buddhism and Quakerism, for it asks of practitioners something very similar to what those disciplines call mindfulness."—*Booklist*

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This is a book about human nature and its management. The wisest students of that subject in ancient times, and perhaps of all time, were known as the Stoics. Their recommendations about how to think and live do not resemble the grim lack of feeling we associate with the word "Stoic" in English today. The original Stoics were philosophers and psychologists of the most ingenious kind, and also highly practical; they offered solutions to the problems of everyday life, and advice about how to overcome our irrationalities, that are still relevant and helpful now. The chapters that follow explain the most useful of their teachings in twelve lessons.

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We appear to go through life reacting directly to events and all else in the world. That appearance is an illusion. We react to our judgments and opinions — to our thoughts about things, not to things

themselves. We usually aren't aware of this. Events come to us through lenses of judgment that are so familiar we forget we have them on. Stoics seek to become conscious of those judgments, to find the irrationality in them, and to choose them more carefully.

This idea is foundational to Stoicism. Sometimes its truth can be seen by noticing that when we react to an event, we really are reacting to what we've said to ourselves about it. (Perhaps we can say something different.) But in other cases it's harder to see the role of judgments in producing a reaction because they are so ingrained that we take them for granted. The Stoics investigate those reactions — the ones that feel inevitable — by comparing them to the very different reactions that others have to the same things when their conditioning is different (or to the different reactions that we have when our circumstances are different). The Stoics infer from all this that our way of reacting to anything depends, indeed, on thoughts we think and beliefs we hold, however deeply buried they might be. Since those beliefs and thoughts belong to us, they should be possible to change, and so ought to be subject to more rational scrutiny than they usually get. Our experience of the world is our own doing, not the world's doing, and the Stoic means to take responsibility for it. (Chapter 1.)

We should stake our well-being on what we can control and let go of attachment to what we cannot. We generally can't control events, or the opinions or behavior of others, or whatever else is outside ourselves. The Stoic thus considers money, fame, misfortunes and the like to be "externals" and regards them with detachment. A Stoic still has preferences about those things, and so would prefer to avoid adversity and would rather have wealth than not have it. But attachment to those desires or fears is considered a guarantee of anxiety, and a form of enslavement to whoever controls the objects of them. In sum, it is against Stoic policy to worry about things that you can't control. What we can control, and should care about, are our own judgments and actions. (Chapter 2.)

To put these first two points together: we get attached to things beyond our control, and this brings us misery; we are oblivious to features of our thinking that we can control and that, if managed better, would bring us peace. Stoicism tries to make us conscious of this pattern and reverse it.

Having shown that our thoughts and judgments create our experience, the Stoics set out to change them. They use two kinds of strategies for the purpose, which we might describe as analytical and intuitive. The analytical side consists of rational arguments — using reason and evidence to show the futility of material desires, the needlessness of various fears, and so on. The intuitive approach consists of looking at life from perspectives that are meant to have effects similar to those produced by the arguments, but without the arguments. One just sees things from a new angle and has a different reaction to them. Equivalently, we might say the Stoics seek to persuade with words and with pictures.

To begin with the intuitive side — that is, the pictures: we all have an ordinary and automatic point of view. We peer out from inside ourselves and see the world accordingly. This angle of observation makes us captive to a long list of deceptions. The Stoic seeks freedom from them by looking at events from a standpoint less obvious — comparing things or events to the scale of the world, or of time, or seeing them as they would look from far away, or seeing your own actions through the eyes of an onlooker, or regarding what happens to yourself as you would if it happened to someone else. Stoics gain skill at viewing life from perspectives that encourage humility and virtue and that dissolve the misjudgments we live by. (Chapter 3 and elsewhere.)

The Stoic also works not only to overcome the fear of death but to treat mortality as another source of perspective and inspiration. Being mindful that existence has an end puts daily life into a new and ennobling light, in much the same way as contemplation of the scale of the universe or of time. (Chapter 4.) Stoics also practice thinking about comparisons that make us less neurotic than

the envious ones with which we ordinarily harass ourselves. (Chapter 5.) These all can be considered more examples of seeking wisdom through adjustment of one's point of view.

Turning to the analytical side of the project: the Stoics dissect the stuff of our inner lives — desires, fears, emotions, vanities, and the rest. Those states are shown to be products of how we think and to mostly amount to mistakes; the judgments that lie behind them are found on inspection to be false or idiotic. The Stoic remedies broadly amount to applications of the first two points above. We react not to things but to our judgments about them, and those judgments typically consist of scripts that follow convention or are otherwise foolish or fictitious. The Stoics try to dismantle the scripts and give us better ways to talk to ourselves about the subjects of them.

The more specific Stoic analysis of desire, fear, and perception consumes the middle of the book, and it can't all be summarized here. Much of it involves observing human nature very exactly and taking notes on the irrationality found in it. For example: we desire whatever we don't have, we are contemptuous of whatever we do have, and we judge our state and our success by comparisons that are arbitrary and pointless. We chase money and pleasure in ways that can bring no real satisfaction; we pursue reputation in the eyes of others that can do us no real good. We torment ourselves with fear of things that are more easily endured than worried about. We constantly overlook the present moment because we are preoccupied with future states that will in turn be overlooked when they arrive. There is more, but this suggests the flavor of the Stoic diagnosis. In short, we vex ourselves with beliefs, mostly half-conscious, that came from nowhere we can name and that tend to make us unhappy and ridiculous. Thinking better and harder about the workings of our minds can free us from many subtle insanities. It might seem doubtful that analysis of the kind just sketched could change the way one feels about anything; you might suppose that people can't be talked out of habits and feelings that they weren't talked into. But sometimes they can. Besides, the point of Stoicism is that, without realizing it, we often were talked into our feelings — by our culture, and by ourselves. (Chapters 5-9.)

Stoics take a different view of adversity than is conventional. They don't seek out pain or hardship, but they seek a mindset that isn't thrown into disarray by those things and that is able to turn them to good. It is an unavoidable and important part of life to meet with what we don't want; and unwanted developments produce great achievements, strong characters, and other things we do want. Stoicism therefore means applying one's imagination to developments that seem unwelcome and using them as a kind of building material. The Stoic takes whatever happens and puts it to use. (Chapter 10.)

Some of the Stoic analysis just reviewed has a rich but negative character. It amounts to the reasoned annihilation of false beliefs that serve us badly. As a Stoic sees it, though, none of this should lead to despair. Quite the contrary: we can find more durable and satisfying pleasures in wisdom, and less anguish, than we ever did in our illusions. The Stoics propose an escape to reality, so to speak, not away from it. Seeing the world clearly, understanding life rightly, and being free from the fictions that drive most people crazy — this they regard as the good life. (Chapters 6 and 11.)

Stoics also advocate enjoyment of pleasures that are natural, as opposed to the ones we invent to keep ourselves going on the hamster wheel. The usual Stoic goal is to enjoy or react or do most else in the world with moderation and a sense of detachment. (Chapter 6.) The detachment doesn't mean a lack of attention or interest. It is better considered an aspect of moderation — moderation, that is, in our relationships to external things. Stoics avoid getting elated or crushed or otherwise worked up about them. A large share of Stoicism might be viewed, in effect, as interpretation of two famous inscriptions above the entrance to the Temple of Apollo at Delphi: know thyself; nothing in excess. The Stoics turn those maxims into a detailed philosophical practice.

. Stoicism also offers a strong affirmative vision of what life is for: the pursuit of virtue. Living virtuously means living by reason, and the Stoics regard reason as calling for honesty, kindness, humility, and devotion to the greater good. It also calls for involvement in public affairs — that is, in the work of helping others in whatever ways are available. Instead of living to satisfy desires, Stoics regard themselves as meant to function as parts of a whole. There is great joy to be had in this, though it is not the variety that comes from the acquisition of things or approval from others. The happiness the Stoic seeks is eudaimonia — the good life, or well-being. Virtues bring about that type of happiness as a byproduct, and Stoics regard this as the only reliable path by which happiness can be secured. (Chapter 11)

Stoicism is meant to be a practice, not a set of claims to admire. It is hard work, because many of our judgments, and the fears and desires that follow from them, are habitual and hard to change or set aside, and they are constantly reinforced by our surroundings and conventions. Taming the mind through reason takes the same kind of commitment that we associate with martial arts or other demanding physical disciplines. In return, Stoicism offers happiness, equanimity, and sanity. (Chapter 12.)

Stoicism has been criticized for advocating a lack of feeling or compassion, for asking the impossible of its students, and (because it is impossible) for making hypocrites out of those who claim to follow it. Chapter 13 offers some replies to those criticisms. To summarize:

> Stoics can be viewed as using reason as a substitute for time and experience. They try to respond to temptations and hardships in about the way they might if they were experiencing them for the thousandth time; the recommended Stoic reaction to most things is the natural reaction of the veteran. This way of looking at Stoicism makes it less otherworldly. The philosophy can be considered an effort to help us toward the state of mind we might reach on our own with more time, rather than as an effort to make us less human. Looking at Stoicism this way also makes clear that the practicing Stoic isn't unfeeling or uncaring. The Stoic responds to the suffering of others like a good doctor who has seen it all before: with activity and compassion, though probably without much emotion.
>
> Perfect Stoicism is no doubt impossible. The "wise man" held up as an example by the Stoics is best viewed as an ideal. It is meant to provide a direction rather than a destination. This shouldn't be alarming. Many philosophical and religious traditions call on their aspirants to work toward an ideal that nobody quite attains. The question is not whether anyone gets to the end. It is whether we are helped by trying.

Claims of Stoic hypocrisy usually arise from a misunderstanding of what Stoicism is for. Its purpose is to help those who use it, not to give them a basis for judgment of others. The exhortations of Stoic teachers sometimes create a different impression, but explaining Stoicism and practicing Stoicism are different activities. Stoicism may have to be taught if it is to be learned, but the practice of it involves thinking and acting, not preaching. If Stoicism inspires claims of hypocrisy against its students, the students are probably bad Stoics — not because their actions are impure, but because they are talking too much.

The order of the chapters in this book mostly follows the order of the discussion above. Many discussions of Stoicism start instead with the definition and place of virtue in the philosophy. In this book that comes later — not because it is less important than what comes earlier, but because it is (I suggest) easier to follow once one understands the Stoic view of what reason means and requires, which is a theme developed in the earlier chapters. I say this so the reader will feel free to take what follows in whatever order is of interest, and not treat the sequence of topics as an argument of the Stoics or as an argument of mine. The order is proposed as useful, not at all as essential. <>

# Isagogical Crossroads from the Early Imperial Age to the End of Antiquity edited by Anna Motta and Federico M. Petrucci [Series: Philosophia Antiqua, Brill, 97890045061 83]

This book explores how introductory methods shaped school practice and intellectual activity in various fields of thought of the Early Imperial Age and Late Antiquity. The isagogical crossroads—the intersection of philosophical, philological, religious and scientific introductory methods—embody a fascinating narrative of the methods regulating ancient readers' approach to authoritative texts and disciplines. The strongly innovative character of this book consists exactly in the attempt to explore isagogical issues in a wide-ranging and comprehensive perspective—from philosophy to religion, from medicine to exact sciences—with the aim of detecting connections, reciprocal influences, and interactions shaping the intellectual environment of the Early Imperial Age and Late Antiquity.

CONTENTS



## Excerpt: Towards the Isagogical Crossroads

### Premiss

Isagogics concerns introductory methods and exegetical rules for what are considered classic texts in various fields. And it is precisely the use of isagogical methods across various fields that reveals the pervasiveness of isagogics, making it difficult to define it as a literary genre. This characteristic, together with the role it plays in schools, must not lead us to dismiss isagogics as an arid didactic practice with no theoretical basis. The study of the isagogical crossroads, i.e. the intersection of philosophical, philological, literary, and scientific concerns in relation to the issue of introductory methods, texts, aspects, and questions, can provide new knowledge of the theoretical and

philosophical principles shaping the way in which authoritative texts were read and thought of in Antiquity.

This makes it all the more astonishing that very few studies so far have reviewed exegetical patterns and schemata isagogica in a comparative way: in particular, comprehensive research on how literary, scientific, and philosophical aspects of different disciplines complement one another is still lacking. With the exception of Marian Plezia's volume published in 1949, interest in isagogical themes and writings probably reached its apex with Jaap Mansfeld's seminal book Prolegomena. Questions to Be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text, and its 'spin-off', Prolegomena Mathematica. More than twenty years have now elapsed since the publication of these volumes, and scholars have been exploring new texts and issues, especially with respect to early Imperial and late antique philosophy, and developing Mansfeld's groundbreaking research in a number of directions. On the other hand, some aspects of Mansfeld's Prolegomena have been submitted to criticism. For instance, Harold Tarrant6 referred to it as "a picture of unity in diversity": according to Tarrant, it is impossible to find and compare fixed schemata; instead, it is possible to speculate on the practical needs of the students who had to learn certain things and of the mentors who has to teach them.

With this volume we wish to reopen the debate and to shed new light on isagogical topics, especially by exploiting recent discoveries pertaining to the aforementioned philosophical contexts and by framing isagogical writings in a wider interdisciplinary framework – most notably, that of scientific, religious, and doxographical texts. This is even more important given that a mutual influence (the 'crossroads') between different schools and perspectives from the early Imperial age to Late Antiquity has been widely and authoritatively acknowledged over the last thirty years: this does not imply that literary and philosophical commentators all employ such patterns in the pursuit of the same goal, but it encourages us to take the nature, forms, and goals of this crossroads seriously into account. This is our main goal: through a selection of case-studies, we aim to show that introductory schemata and isagogical forms can reveal both essential connections and intriguing contrasts between different fields, and that the interaction between these fields had seminal implications also from a theoretical point of view. By avoiding compartmentalisation, we provide a detailed yet comprehensive picture of the crucial intellectual approach represented by isagogical literature, which will prove to be not just a didactic or introductory tool, but a formally codified means to address intellectual, scientific or philosophical issues.

We too have an isagogical question to address, which stems from our main goal: this question is whether it is possible to find any standard conception of isagogics transcending the field of philosophical isagogical texts. Investigating this issue means providing some test cases in the field of philosophical writings, and then comparing the results with isagogical writings in other fields. In turn, this implies first establishing a methodological premiss, and then addressing some related questions. As to the former aspect, we do not aim to produce an ossified picture, in which the same isagogical patterns occur over and over again. Rather, what the volume highlights is that crucial issues and exigencies related to the introduction of certain authors or disciplines, or of discussions on important problems, are regularly addressed in isagogical writings, which also reveal a consistent theoretical outlook. This leads to further questions: what are the origins of these shared aspects? How are they chosen and proposed, or – conversely – how and why are they modified in specific cases? More particularly, what is the deep cultural meaning of isagogical writings? What is their 'ideological' import? On the basis of the chapters collected in this volume, we will provide some general answers to such questions in sections 4 and 5 of this introduction. First, however, let us briefly outline the Hellenistic background to our research (section 2) and unravel our narrative from the early Imperial age to the end of Antiquity by referring to the contents of each chapter (section 3).

## The Background. A Quick Survey

Hellenistic literature and philology had a considerable impact on the classification of literary genres and hence of isagogics, a 'genre' which was given a significant boost in the Alexandrian age, when scientific, grammatical, and philological studies became widespread. As a matter of fact, Alexandrian philology marks a decisive moment not only for the choice of 'canonical' authors – and the conservation and loss of works from the past – but also for the definition of interpretative rules and the constitution of the philological-exegetical apparatuses of texts. Although many of the writings produced in this context have been lost, it is quite evident that the work of editing and interpreting the texts of Alexandrian philologists paved the way for the creation of isagogical texts and schemes in Late Antiquity. Moreover, the activity of the Alexandrian philologists enabled the creation of a common educational path in schools, under the control of grammatici, which is to say teacher of rhetoric and philosophers. It was precisely the school milieu – or, rather, a school path common to literary, juridical, scientific, and philosophical disciplines and involving grammarians, rhetoricians, and philosophers – that promoted the intersecting of rules contained in handbooks, which in Late Antiquity came to be defined as isagogical schemes.

In particular, the training offered by the school or 7r^^^^^^ system managed by municipalities or via Imperial decrees is a Hellenistic legacy that developed in tandem with the development of a general literary culture, once grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy had become part of the school system in the era of, with grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy running along parallel tracks. The study and teaching of different disciplines, which included the detailed exegesis of the great masters and an analysis of the aesthetic components of classic texts, took place within the same cultural traditions. Accordingly, the background of isagogics is characterised by the historical evolution of the relationship between the compositio of an oral or written text and school praxis, which is to say the analysis of the best way to give unity and consistency to a text, which progressively – and more precisely in the Hellenistic age – led to the literary criticism of the Alexandrian philologists, i.e. to the analysis of how texts had been composed. The following step concerns the encounter of Alexandrian literary criticism with philosophy and especially Platonism: this encounter made it possible for the Platonists to demonstrate the consistency of Platonism and to read Plato's dialogues as an image of the unity of their own metaphysical system.

In fact, this crossroads between rhetoric and philosophy is, in a sense, the development of a more ancient link: the one between the rhetorical rules of discourse composition and philosophy already established by Plato. In a well-known page of Plato's Phaedrus, Socrates explains to Lysias that the rhetor (or sophist) has little real awareness of the overall process of composition in terms of the development of a coherent structure or plot, because "every discourse must be organised, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole" (264c). Not only in the Rhetoric, but also – and especially – in the Poetics (8.1451a30–35), Aristotle appears to be consistently interested in the organic unity of what constitutes a whole and in the realisation of its potential. By assimilating Aristotelian tragic criteria to the whole of poetic literature and making it more radical, the Epicurean Philodemus highlights an aspect of the approach to the arrangement of a discourse as an organic whole. He stresses the fact that a piece of rhetorical art, like any work of art, can only be understood when it is perceived in the totally of its component parts. The Stoics introduced the concept of syntax into the discussion of the rhetorical arts by emphasising the notion of a natural or right, that is logical, order. According to Stoic theory, all reflection about the arrangement of a discourse falls within the system of dialectics, which is also how it tended to be defined in the Socratic-Platonic critique of the sophist tradition and in Aristotle's discussion of the arrangement of parts.

Traces of the development of the rules for parts of speeches are found in authors ranging from the early Stoics to the Alexandrian grammarians. Consequently, there is evidence that the ancient rhetorical theories of discourse provided the basis for the literary criticism of Alexandrian philology to flow into isagogical texts. And it is only possible to detect these developments by reflecting on the isagogical crossroads, as this emerges from an overview of the narrative of the present volume.

## An Overview of the Narrative

Each chapter in this volume has a twofold nature. It is, of course, a study of an author or a piece of writing, but at the same time its focus on isagogical aspects contributes to defining our crossroads. The dawn of the early Imperial age coincided with a new stage in the contest for philosophical supremacy: the dominant position of Stoicism was challenged by the comeback of dogmatic Platonism and a new use and circulation of Aristotle's esoteric writings. This is the dynamic and fascinating framework for the first three chapters, which explore case-studies revealing how post-Hellenistic Peripatetics and Platonists dealt with the issue of developing isagogical material for the new philosophical agenda of their traditions. In the first chapter, Federico M. Petrucci provides an attempt to grasp the isagogical approach of pre-Alexandrian Peripatetics (chapter 1). This is a somewhat daunting task, as the transmitted evidence for Peripatetic isagogai is extremely scarce, though we know that such writings existed and circulated. Rather than simply giving up on the possibility of grasping them, in this chapter Peripatetic isagogics is reconstructed by referring to traces of it which may be found in commentary writings by authors such as Andronicus, Boethus, and Aspasius. This will reveal that such texts attest to the existence of isagogical patterns, and even to something more, that is an overall conception of Aristotle's corpus and writings: these authors present Aristotle's corpus as a continuous progression of philosophical steps, corresponding to a series of writings and a series of goals to be achieved; in turn, each piece of writing is developed according to a continuous argumentative style, which is distinctive and determines both Aristotle's obscurity and the need for readers to become specifically acquainted with it.

The study of exegetical patterns in the Platonist tradition instead touches upon the debate surrounding the perfectissima disciplina platonica and the need to develop a 'system': this is indeed the goal which the Middle Platonists pursued by establishing and employing isagogical patterns useful for reading Plato. This is what emerges from Franco Ferrari's enquiry into the third book of Diogenes Laertius' Lives (chapter 2). Exegetical proposals, such as the ^^^^^ ^7r^ 7r^^^^7r^^, the classification of dialogues and the reading order, suggest intriguing remarks about the (important, yet not decisive) stimulus which the 7r^^^^ ^^^^^^ between the Sceptics and the Dogmatists provided for the development and the application of hermeneutical criteria.18 In addition to Greek Middle Platonism and its introductory texts and patterns, we need to take into consideration another crucial testimony from the Latin world, which provides important isagogical material: Apuleius' De Platone. This is still a very puzzling text, and before assessing its isagogical content, it is necessary to really understand what kind of work it was. This is precisely what Justin A. Stover sets out to do in chapter 3. Through an analysis of the manuscripts containing the text of Apuleius' De Platone and philological and philosophical observations on isagogical questions, it is possible to set this Platonist introduction in relation to other authors, such as Alcinous and Atticus, so as to come up with the picture of a new De Platone – that is, a text with a different structure and title – and, above all, to reconsider its introductory role. More specifically, this kind of isagogics aims to produce a specific outline of Plato's corpus as a whole: Apuleius' introduction to Plato's corpus is a joint description of Plato himself and of the body of his philosophy in terms of the body of his work.

All this paves the way to the Neoplatonist development of the isagogical technique and outlook. The first author we need to take into account in this respect is certainly Porphyry, whose writings play a crucial role in this narrative. It is tempting to think that most of what we can grasp about Porphyry's isagogics comes from the Isagoge. But this is only partially true, as Irmgard Männlein-Robert shows in

chapter 4. Through a joint examination of the Isagoge and the Life of Plotinus, she reveals how, even after the full establishment of Platonism as a systematic philosophy, isagogical patterns served not only as didactic instruments, but also as hermeneutic ones in Porphyry's pursuit of his philosophical aims. Indeed, Porphyry's isagogics is implicitly used to support two strong philosophical projects: on the one hand, to harmonise Aristotle with Plato in terms of logic, physics, ethics, and especially metaphysics; on the other, to bridge the gap between Middle Platonism and Plotinian Platonism by adapting philological devices and literary features well-known from Middle Platonist teaching – e.g. composing an introduction or a vita with lists of works to be appended to the beginning of a complete edition – and then using them to further one's own philosophical agenda. Porphyry's writings, however, are only the starting point of this enquiry, for later Neoplatonist works highlight further features of the isagogical genre, particularly with regard to the role of pedagogical concerns and their philosophical functions. Interestingly enough, the theoretical development of the genre proceeds in parallel to a refinement of its formal construction, which owes much to the consideration of pedagogical concerns and needs shared by rhetoric and philosophical schools. This emerges from Anna Motta's discussion of the development of the division of the parts of philosophy and the construction of a reading order for a philosopher's writings (chapter 5). As a matter of fact, a comparison between rhetorical isagogics and the development of Platonist isagogics shows how Platonists (especially Albinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus) appropriated specific aspects of the rhetorical debate, namely ones allowing them to make the cosmos of Plato's dialogues fit within the unitary cosmos of Plato's doctrine, and hence to overcome the problems associated with the image of Plato as a swan, "darting from tree to tree and causing great trouble to the fowlers, who were unable to catch him."19 All this sets the stage for an outstanding – and hitherto understudied – case of isagogical patterns embedded in commentary writings, namely that provided by Proclus. As Gerd Van Riel shows (chapter 6), Proclus further developed isagogical tendencies in two ways: on the one hand, he maintained the need to establish a consistent and systematic representation of an authority (namely, Plato); on the other, he allowed 'controlled' contradictions to appear in his isagogical sections. This produced a consistent new isagogical strategy, which Proclus exploited in order to support his own philosophical agenda – as Porphyry had done before him – which included a straightforwardly theological reading of the Timaeus.

The first six chapters represent the philosophical core of the project, exploring crucial case-studies in philosophical isagogics: in some respects, this is a narrative in itself. For the very same reason, however, this section is an effective starting point to broaden our perspective to the reciprocal influence between philosophical writings and other fields of research. Hence, the next chapters have the aim of shedding light on isagogics across different fields, from theology to medicine, from astronomy to musical theory – or, in brief, to outline our crossroads.

In the last few years, increasing attention has been paid to the relation between early Imperial and late antique philosophy, on the one hand, and the formation and development of Christian thought, on the other: scholars have emphasised not only the significant degree of proximity between the two as far as theoretical tools and arguments are concerned, but also a mechanism of appropriation of ideological perspectives and methods that appears to be at work. Sébastien Morlet's enquiry (chapter 7) confirms this trend by detecting isagogical schemata and perspectives in a Christian author, namely Eusebius, and by emphasising their continuity with respect to previous Greek, and especially Platonist, literature. At the same time, Morlet highlights how Eusebius' appropriation is shaped by specific exigencies, which led to a new way of interpreting the schemes: Eusebius has his own agenda, one implying a polemic against the Jews, and, as part of his isagogics, develops an introductory discourse designed to help the reader make spiritual progress, as well as an attack on his opponents.

Interestingly, a similar double pattern of appropriation and targeted rethinking also emerges from a very different field, that of scientific isagogical writings – namely medical, astronomical, and musical ones. Late antique medical isagogics, analysed by Giulia Ecca (chapter 8), displays astonishing general parallels with philosophical isagogics. These concern not only isagogical literary genera (the presence of introductions to specific texts and general prolegomena) and patterns, but also ideological aspects – for instance, the representation of a curriculum according to progressive degrees of 'authoritativeness' (namely, from Galen to Hippocrates). On the other hand, medical isagogics also introduces specific patterns in order to exploit their didactic nature, and this is clearly based on the nature of the discipline, which has to be practically applied – obvious as this may seem, medical isagogics is meant to produce physicians! While Ecca's study is focused on rather late texts, Victor Gysembergh's research on the prefatory letter in Hipparchus' Commentary on the Phaenomena gives us the opportunity to return to the Hellenistic age (chapter 9). As the author clearly explains, this is justified by the fact that Jaap Mansfeld has widely enquired into later mathematical isagogics in his 1998 book. Hipparchus' work strengthens the case made there for isagogical patterns in mathematical writings and, at the same time, crucially contributes to our narrative in a particular way. On the one hand, Hipparchus' Hellenistic isagogical treatment of Aratus' Phaenomena already reveals the presence of certain introductory issues that were to be discussed by later authors; on the other, it highlights the tendency to use isagogics in order to bestow new authority on particular theoretical readings. Interestingly, in this case the heading in question is the one formulated by Hipparchus himself, who attempts to establish his own astronomy as authoritative. Hence, as in relevant philosophical cases, isagogics here becomes an instrument combining introduction and scientific advancement, teaching and research.

However, the plausibility of the hypothesis that such complex use was made of isagogic texts also depends on the historical development of given disciplines at the time in which these texts were produced: while Hipparchus' aim may have been to establish his own 'astronomy' as authoritative, later technical isagogical works often merely acknowledge the authority of some predecessors. This does not mean that such texts do not have an agenda, though, as the case of the musical introductions by Cleonides and Gaudentius show. Writers of musical introductory works were in a position to rely on a stable technical authority, Aristotexenus, and this also conditioned the formal structure of their works. After providing a wide-ranging survey of early Imperial and lateantique musical introductory writings, Eleonora Rocconi shows (chapter 9) that Cleonides' main aim was to preserve all the basic notions of Aristoxenian harmonics by following a more or less standard 'Aristoxenian' pattern of topics. In other words, teaching harmonics, in his view, meant teaching Aristoxenian harmonics, and doing so according to a rational introductory path and specific instruments, namely a selection of capital points and simplification. This scenario is enriched by the analysis of Gaudentius' musical isagoge, which Andrew Barker presents in the Appendix, along with an introduction to the text and a new English translation of it. Gaudentius would indeed appear to have pursued a similar didactic plan, with the aim of providing not so much a challenging discussion, as a clear (and clearly arranged) system of notions to be absorbed by the reader. Furthermore, while the core of Gaudentius' introduction confirms the primacy of Aristoxenian harmonics, the text also includes a section which transmits a different version of harmonics, namely a 'Pythagorean-Platonist' one. By embedding this material too into his work, Gaudentius assigns his text an even wider goal, namely to preserve, "for the benefit of his contemporaries and of posterity, as much of the harmonic 'wisdom of the ancients' as he could within a restricted compass."

## The Crossroads of Isagogical Methods

In skimming the chapters of this volume, readers will not find something that it would indeed be unreasonable to expect from a book like ours, namely: perfect unity. Of course, in outlining an isagogical crossroads, we cannot simply aim to flatten out the differences springing from the wide number of disciplines, historical settings, and even intellectual features of introductory writings.

What we do find at the crossroads of these different perspectives, however, is a series of formal affinities, revealing some significant forms of communication and cultural exchange across the centuries. This is in itself a first feature shared by isagogical writings, for our chapters frequently and recurrently acknowledge the mutual indebtedness between different fields: philosophical isagogical writings draw on the legacy of literary and rhetorical ones, just as Eusebius draws on philosophical introductory writings (especially Porphyrian, or Porphyrian-like, ones); medical isagogical texts seem to present strong ideological similarities with philosophical ones (especially as regards the establishment of an authoritative corpus of texts to be read); finally, astronomical and musical isagogical works share with philosophical ones a specific concern as to the establishment, or preservation, of an authoritative version of a discipline. On the other hand, this kind of fluid communication is also reflected by the literary genres incorporating isagogical material. As a matter of fact, the wide-ranging analysis conducted in this volume shows that isagogical forms are present in both relatively short introductory writings (as in the case of Cleonides and Gaudentius, but also Porphyry) and quite extensive ones (Eusebius), but also in commentaries (Aspasius, Hipparchus, Proclus, Galen, and Stephanus), handbooks (Apuleius), and even biographies (Diogenes Laertius and, even more specifically, Porphyry). In other words, isagogics is not only a literary genre in itself, but a sort of literary form, which can be adapted to suit different literary contexts and meet specific needs. Most importantly, this protean quality of the genre can be detected across all fields we have taken into account.

It is within this already rich framework that one should search for more specific formal affinities. First, there is a crucial point emerging from the chapters, which strongly confirms Mansfeld's seminal research: isagogics takes the form of patterns of questions to be settled. This does not mean that all introductory writings deal with the same questions, but that – first of all and more generally – in order to have a good introduction, it is of primary importance to develop relevant contents according to an orderly pattern of questions. This point granted, it is also true that some of the standard isagogical issues which are famously detectable in the most renowned philosophical introductory writings are well-attested in almost all isagogical texts taken into account here: 1) the aim or purpose of a work, 2) its place within an author's corpus, 3) its usefulness , 4) the explanation of its title, 5) the issue of its authenticity, 6) its division into parts, 7) the question of what section of a particular (sub)discipline or literary (sub)genre it belongs to , 8) the clarity or lack of clarity of the author or text, 9) the qualities required of the student and/or the teacher, 10) in the case of a canonical corpus, what the first work to be studied is. Either implicitly or explicitly, topical issues systematically recur in philosophical, theological, medical, and astronomical introductions.25 The (partial) exception of musical isagogical texts can easily be explained by referring both to their nature as technical introductions and to the nature of the readership or audience these works are intended for. However, it should also be noted that these writings too follow a pattern for introductory issues, although this differs from the 'mainstream' one, and that this pattern was in turn used in philosophical writings including sections devoted to technical isagogics and exegesis.

A further recurring formal feature is related to the intrinsic tension between the aim of systematisation (whose import we will explore in the next section) and didactic requirements. On the one hand, a good introduction is meant to encompass everything that is needed to outline a 'system' of knowledge related to a text, a discipline, or a specific topic. On the other, it can neither dwell on minute points or provide a full examination of relevant topics. Even in the case of very extensive introductory writings (such as Eusebius' work, which can be taken as an extreme case in this respect), what an isagogical piece of writing provides ideal readers with is therefore a systematic selection of what they would need, in order to be effectively introduced to the knowledge of a discipline – and, if applicable, to its practice (this is particularly evident in the case of medical introductory texts).

Of course, this 'methodological map' of the isagogical crossroads must also be considered in the light of the historical development of each discipline. This is crucial, for the chapters show to what extent the production and shaping of isagogics also depends on the specific way in which authoritative backgrounds came to be produced for each discipline. As we shall more boldly emphasise in the next section, introductory writings can serve as a means both to establish the grounds of a discipline (in the specific sense we will clarify), if no orthodoxy can be found (this is the case with Hipparchus, who revolutionised Hellenistic astronomy), and to transmit a body of knowledge which has already been recog nised as authoritative (as in the case of late antique medical and musical introductions). The same tension between the establishment of new grounds for a discipline and the transmission of existing knowledge can after all be also found in philosophical introductory texts. The Peripatetics and Platonists of the Imperial age (but this also applies to Eusebius) had to lay the foundations for a new systematic approach to their philosophical systems on the growing market, whereas later thinkers – especially Platonists, such as Proclus – aimed to strengthen specific views within a system whose foundations and authoritativeness had already been established. Interestingly, this historical progression is mirrored by formal aspects of isagogical writings, especially with respect to their specialisation and the increasing number of questions which were usually dealt with. However, this is not just a methodological point: we are already approaching a deeper aspect, which rather concerns the 'theory' of isagogical writings.

## The Crossroads of Isagogical Theory

Obvious as this may be, from what has been argued so far it should already be clear that introductions were not merely introductions. This even applies to a function of these texts which might be regarded as self-evident, namely their didactic aim. As all chapters of this book show, isagogical writings did indeed pursue such an aim, yet they did so to varying extents and at different levels. Sometimes this didactic scenario was just 'virtual', and in any case 'teaching' a body of knowledge was never the only theoretical pay-off of writing an introduction. The main pay-off rather consisted in the establishment, or transmission, of an authoritative body – or, better, system – of knowledge in such a way as to effectively guide students or, more generally, one's target-readership. The fact that isagogics is also related to the establishment of a system of knowledge is of primary importance, for it ensures that introductory writings proceed in parallel with it and exploit it in different intellectual contexts. In this sense, integrating and improving didactic-exegetical suggestions within a philosophical or technical system meant establishing a theoretical standard: this applies both in the case of models that no longer had any rivals or anything to prove, but only needed to preserve their (textual and doctrinal) unity, and in the case of the establishment of new authoritative paradigms. In turn, establishing such standards also had the function of demonstrating, for each individual discipline, that in a number of respects it satisfied the theoretical and technical conditions for being properly scientific and reliable, and hence of ensuring its prestige and of attracting pupils and followers. A very effective example of the establishment of new authoritative paradigms is represented by Hipparchus, whose specific astronomical agenda and research is embedded within isagogical remarks on Aratus. Similarly, Eusebius' introductions are meant not only to convey basic Christian notions, but also to outline an overall 'theoretical model' for Christianity against a specific adversary, namely the Jews. However, Eusebius was in a position to use previous pagan (especially Platonist) isagogics as a model for this. In effect, post-Hellenistic philosophical isagogics may be interpreted as an attempt to shape the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as systems able both to compete with, and defeat, the dominant philosophical system of the Hellenistic age, that is Stoicism – a philosophy which, not by chance, had little need for isagogics, as is shown by the simplifying function of Chrysippus' – and to avoid the risk of scepticism. It is within this framework that we should interpret the isagogical writings by Peripatetics (such as Andronicus, Boethus, and Aspasius) and Platonists (such as Apuleius and Diogenes Laertius' sources). After a system had been established, however, isagogics could still help reinforce or re-orientate it. This is the case with late

Neoplatonist introductions, which were made compatible with the core theoretical tenets of Neoplatonism and used to justify certain doctrinal innovations; but it is also (and already) the case with Porphyry, who aimed to bridge an apparently puzzling gap between the Middle Platonists and Plotinus, and with Proclus, who was even willing to introduce alleged contradictions into his isagogical remarks on the Timaeus in order to support his own overall reading of Plato's dialogues.

Interestingly, a similar 'systematic' orientation also emerges from lateantique medical introductions: albeit within a relatively complex scenario, medical isagogical works seem to share with Platonist ones the precise aim of outlining medicine as a system of knowledge encompassing – in due order and according to a theoretical progression – Galen's and Hippocrates' writings. Finally, a similar point emerges – though on the basis of very different requirements – from late antique musical introductions: neither Cleonides nor Gaudentius felt the need to establish a system – for Aristoxenus was already a widely acknowledged authority, at least as far as musicology was concerned – but their introductions reflect a desire to systematically and suitably present a standardised system, which could potentially even prove inclusive with respect to more marginal trends in musicology.

In the light of what has emerged from this and the preceding section, it is clear that isagogical writings are intrinsically related not only to the tension between theoretical production and didactic transmission, but also to that between the attempt to make an individual contribution to a discipline and the reception and strengthening of a shared standard. The latter tension manifests itself through oscillations within a spectrum ranging from strong individual theoretical contributions – as in the case of Hipparchus – to the complete lack of any individual theoretical contribution (as in the case of Cleonides and Gaudentius); but in most cases one encounters a compromise, whereby individual contributions strengthen existing models. This applies to medical models,32 to Eusebius' appropriation of philosophical isagogics from the perspective of his own constructive yet at the same time polemical Christian isagogics, and especially to philosophical introductions, which sometimes also encompass considerable theoretical innovations (as in the cases of Porphyry, Proclus, and late antique Neoplatonists more generally) within a well-established system of doctrines, which is meant to be enriched, and not just reaffirmed, by these theoretical contributions. This also explains why the didactic function of isagogics often consists in an effort to help ideal readers progress along their path. It is not just a matter of conveying notions: the point is rather to allow readers to improve in the relevant field, and this is possible only if they are provided with the most effective systematic presentation of the fundamental notions in the relevant discipline. <>

## **PHILOSOPHY IN OVID, OVID AS PHILOSOPHER** edited by Gareth Williams and Katherina Volk [Oxford University Press, 9780197610336]

Ovid has long been celebrated for the versatility of his poetic imagination, the diversity of his generic experimentation throughout his long career, and his intimate engagement with the Greco-Roman literary tradition that precedes him; but what of his engagement with the philosophical tradition? Ovid's close familiarity with philosophical ideas and with specific philosophical texts has long been recognized, perhaps most prominently in the Pythagorean, Platonic, Empedoclean, and Lucretian shades that have been seen to color his **METAMORPHOSES**. This philosophical component has often been perceived as a feature implicated in, and subordinate to, Ovid's larger literary agenda, both pre- and post-exilic; and because of the controlling influence conceded to that literary impulse, readings of the philosophical dimension have often focused on the perceived distortion, ironizing, or parodying of the philosophical sources and ideas on which Ovid draws, as if his literary orientation inevitably compromises or qualifies a "serious" philosophical commitment.

**PHILOSOPHY IN OVID, OVID AS PHILOSOPHER** counters this tendency by considering Ovid's seriousness of engagement with, and his possible critique of, the philosophical writings that inform his works. The book also questions the feasibility of separating out the categories of the "philosophical" and the "literary" in the first place, and explores the ways in which Ovid may offer unusual, controversial, or provocative reactions to received philosophical ideas. Finally, it investigates the case to be made for viewing the Ovidian corpus not just as a body of writings that are often philosophically inflected, but also as texts that may themselves be read as philosophically adventurous and experimental.

The essays collected in this volume are intended at the individual level to address in new ways many aspects of Ovid's recourse to philosophy across his corpus. Collectively, however, they are also designed to redress what, in general terms, remains a significant lacuna in Ovidian studies.

- Addresses a significant gap in Ovidian Studies
- Fresh attention to Ovid as seriously engaged in diverse and unexpected ways with the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition
- New readings of many Ovidian texts and passages from a philosophical perspective

## Review

"This volume will do a lot to advance the idea that there is much more to Ovid than his lascivia. More broadly, it will help to reframe in very positive ways how we understand the relationship between philosophy and Latin poetry." -- Joseph Farrell, University of Pennsylvania

"This excellent book mightily exceeds the expectations of a collaborative volume. The multi-author collection not only takes stock of philosophical themes and intertexts in Ovid's oeuvre but also opens up fresh perspectives grounded in the proposition (really developed here for the first time) that Ovid is seriously engaged with Greco-Roman philosophy. A groundbreaking volume that charts totally new paths towards more fully understanding an underappreciated dimension of Ovid's poetry." -- John F. Miller, University of Virginia

Contents

## The Project

The sixteen essays collected in this volume began life as papers delivered at a conference held at Columbia University in March 2019. This event, organized by the present editors under the title of Ovidius Philosophus: Philosophy in Ovid and Ovid as a Philosopher, brought together a distinguished group of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic in an attempt to explore from different but mutually informing viewpoints Ovid's profound engagement with philosophical sources and influences across his poetic corpus.

Ovid's close familiarity with philosophical ideas and with specific philosophical texts has long been recognized, perhaps most prominently in the Pythagorean, Platonic, Empedoclean, and Lucretian shades that have been seen to color his Metamorphoses. This philosophical component has often been perceived as a feature implicated in, and subordinate to, Ovid's larger literary agenda, both pre- and post-exilic; and because of the controlling influence conceded to that literary impulse, readings of the philosophical dimension have often focused on the perceived distortion, ironizing, or

parodying of the philosophical sources and ideas on which Ovid draws, as if his literary orientation inevitably compromises or qualifies a "serious" philosophical commitment.

The Columbia conference sought to counter this tendency by (i) considering Ovid's seriousness of engagement with, and his possible critique of, the philosophical writings that allusively inform his works; (ii) questioning the feasibility of separating out the categories of the "philosophical" and the "literary" in the first place; (iii) exploring the ways in which Ovid may offer unusual, controversial, or provocative reactions to received philosophical ideas; and (iv) investigating the case to be made for viewing the Ovidian corpus not just as a body of writings that are often philosophically inflected, but also as texts that may themselves be read as philosophically adventurous and experimental. Few scholars would now hesitate to call Ovid philosophically informed; but what further light might be shed on his poetics if he should be perceived as philosophically confident, adept, and resourceful? To what extent can or should Ovidius philosophus be seen as an abiding or evolving presence in our reading of his oeuvre? In what ways did the post-Ovidian literary tradition at Rome recognize philosophical import in, and/or perhaps the philosophical idiosyncrasy of, his writings?

Certain of these questions have been well treated in important contributions on specific Ovidian texts in recent times,1 but we hope in this volume to broach the topic of Ovid's philosophical engagement frontally, so to speak: to prioritize the philosophical component, that is, and to show how Ovid uses his literary apparatus to deploy, test, and experiment with ideas received from a range of schools and thought systems. Even though this area of Ovidian studies continues to show encouraging signs of growth, much work remains to be done: it is telling that in both the Brill and the Cambridge Companions to Ovid, each of which was published in 2002, there is no index entry on philosophy, let alone any dedicated chapter on Ovid's treatment of philosophical ideas; and the same holds true of the Blackwell Companion of 2009.4 Against this background, the essays collected in this volume are intended at the individual level to address in new ways many particular aspects of Ovid's recourse to philosophy across his corpus. Collectively, however, they are also designed at least partially to redress what, in general terms, remains a significant lacuna in Ovidian studies.

...Against this background, the ironic flippancy that has long been detected in Ovid's earliest work, his Amores, represents a youthful spirit of nonconformity--a voice that is not anti-Augustan per se, but sets itself in tension, however playfully, with the new values and conventions of Augustan discourse. This tendency may undergo adjustment as Ovid expands the scale of his literary ambition in the Heroides, Ars amatoria, and Remedia amoris and then, in the early years CE, in the Fasti and Metamorphoses down to his exile in 8 CE. But if in these works Ovid serially tests the underpinnings of Augustan meaning and authority, his independence of outlook suggests the freethinker's detached viewpoint, not the more disciplined form of Roman mindset (focusing "the individual's thoughts upon his role as an individual in the state") that Braund associates with Virgil. So in the matter of Ovid's experimentation on a philosophical front: in an age when the fissures between the Augustan legend and reality were becoming increasingly open to interrogation, when fanciful hypothetical scenarios were all the rage in the declamatory schools, and when the compass of Roman self-identity was being sorely tested in the transition from Republic to Empire, in many contexts Ovid can be seen to probe and play with philosophical ideas rather than ideologically building with and on them in the Virgilian sense; to posit ideologies of the self rather than of the state (witness the erotic "philosophy" of the Ars), and even, in his erotodidaxis, to explore certain "techniques of the self" that touch on and redirect the ethical-therapeutic strain in philosophy from the Hellenistic age onward; and, in his restless appetite for experimentation, to be more interested in the intellectual process of inquiry than in its end result. In effect, the advancing Augustan times set for Ovidius philosophus an agenda very different from that of Virgil in particular: Ovid is no less seriously engaged with philosophical ideas than Virgil, but the sociopolitical context gives a different ideological meaning to and motivation for his probings. True, after his banishment to Tomis in 8 CE, a more somber

philosophical demeanor prevails, with notable shades of a Horatian turning-within; but there, too, the exploratory impulse still remains visible, as several chapters in this volume seek to show.

Second, and to modify the sociopolitical thrust of this first point: experience of Ovid's habit of reapplying received literary tropes with a startling panache and an eye for extreme effect (hyperbole, bathos, parody, etc.) should put us on our guard on a philosophical front. In the Metamorphoses, for example, epic burlesque competes against itself when, after battle has already been spectacularly waged at the wedding banquet of Perseus and Andromeda in Book 5, a still greater battle rages between the Lapiths and Centaurs at the wedding feast of Pirithous and Hippodamia in Book 12: there, ever more bizarre weaponry of an impromptu kind—goblets, a table leg, even a far-flung altar—vastly diversify what now looks like the much more banal, relatively conventional weaponry (a mere brand from an altar, say, or the odd mixing bowl) deployed in the Perseus-Andromeda scene." Here is only one, albeit extreme instance of how Ovid characteristically challenges the received tradition: might we not anticipate a similar appetite for inflationary elaboration or arch provocation in his deployment of philosophical ideas? Take, for example, Pythagoras' discourse on the universality of change in Metamorphoses 15: one of the many conundrums posed by this speech arises from Pythagoras' stress on the wonder-inducing effects of inquiry into nature's secrets. Lucretius' Epicurus is a major source of inspiration for Ovid's cosmic adventurer; but Pythagoras' eye for wonder is directly at odds with the Lucretian rhetoric of reason that seeks systematically to demystify natural marvels.15 A paradoxical mismatch results between the Lucretian literary aspiration of his discourse and its philosophical thrust—just one of the eccentricities that contribute to the episode's capstone value in Book 15 as a bravura philosophical parody, not paradigm. Again, the Lucretian component in Pythagoras' Empedoclean epos underscores the depth and scale of pre-Ovidian experimentation in philosophical poetics. But Ovid's flamboyance in treating inherited literary topoi might yet lead us to anticipate a similar idiosyncrasy in his philosophical excursions and appropriations: his treatment of Pythagoras in Metamorphoses 15 offers but one example of how the literary and philosophical impulses are inextricably conjoined in him, and how the same capacities of bold initiative are to be expected and looked for on both fronts simultaneously.

Third, a major aim of the chapters in this volume is to show that philosophical appropriation is not just an ornamental feature of Ovid's poetics, but in many ways instrumental to them: the philosophical component drives contextual meaning rather than offering mere window dressing. The same is evidently true of Lucretius, say, or Virgil; but the point bears stressing in Ovid's case partly to counter any lingering suspicion of philosophical superficiality or dilettantism in him, and partly to highlight what is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of Ovidius philosophus: the singularity of effect that he achieves in any given context where philosophical ideas are invoked, adapted, or exploited to carefully calculated ends. Hence the chapters that follow are surveyed from two perspectives in the rest of this Introduction. First, the individuated focus: our overview of each contribution is meant to stress not just the restless diversity of Ovid's philosophical probings across his corpus, but also how a fresh or renewed sensitivity to philosophical considerations can enrich, deepen, and even transform our understanding of particular works or contexts. Second, the collective focus: in tracing certain patterns of thematic commonality and continuity among the chapters, we aim to capture something of the tension between part and whole that we find to be central to the functioning of Ovidius philosophus across his oeuvre. The localized context may crucially condition the point of his philosophical maneuvering in the moment, but allowance has equally to be made for the possible accumulations and networks of philosophical meaning that transcend the localized viewpoint. In effect, our goal is to examine Ovidius philosophus both in toto and per partes, and to explore the possible interdependence of those categories.

## The Chapters in Overview

A single chapter occupies the first of the five sections into which this volume is divided. In Part I ("Ovid's sapientia"), Francesca Romana Berno's "Ouidius sapiens: The Wise Man in Ovid's Work" anchors the collection with a wideranging exploration of the term sapiens and its cognates throughout Ovid's oeuvre: in exploring the evolution of his use of such terms, Berno argues that a progressive thread of meaning in the concept of sapientia can be traced from his erotic and erotodidactic writings into the "middle" phase of the Fasti and Metamorphoses and finally into his exilic corpus.

The global span of Berno's chapter sets the stage for the schematic division of the Ovidian corpus in Parts II—IV. The five chapters in Part II ("The Erotic Corpus") focus on Ovid's erotic corpus from a variety of perspectives. In Chapter 2, "Elegy, Tragedy, and the Choice of Ovid (Amores 3.1)," Laurel Fulkerson takes her starting point from the epiphany first of personified Tragedy and then of Elegy in Amores 3.1, where both vie for the poet's attention: which poetic path will he take? Elegy wins the day; but in relating Ovid's dilemma to Prodicus' famous "Choice of Hercules" between vice and virtue, Fulkerson argues that Ovid's undoing of the traditional generic opposition between elegy and epic through the insertion of tragedy in Amores 3.1 allows him to explore a more sophisticated and complex view of "choice" than the Prodican model allows for: philosophy and virtue, she argues, rarely center on a single life decision, and by adding tragedy to the generic mix in Amores 3.1, Ovid folds the Prodican dimension into a wider reflection on the nature of philosophical, poetic, and life choice.

The focus turns to Epicureanism in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, "Ovid's Ars amatoria and the Epicurean Hedonic Calculus," Roy Gibson explores Ovid's engagement in his amatory corpus with the Epicurean calculus of pleasure. That calculus is spread unevenly over the three books of the Ars. It appears largely absent from Book 3, except in those instances where Ovid recommends gradually decreasing pain and increasing pleasure for men. Conversely, the concept of Panaetian-Ciceronian decorum is strongly in evidence in Book 3, but less prevalent in the books addressed to men. In exploring this relative imbalance of philosophical emphases for the sexes, Gibson argues that Ovid turns the spotlight on the Epicurean calculus at certain significant junctures of the Remedia as well as the Ars to negative effect: in the midst of his erotodidaxis he expresses serious doubts about fundamental aspects of the Epicurean project.

In Chapter 4, "Criticizing Love's Critic: Epicurean parrhesia as an Instructional Mode in Ovidian Love Elegy," Erin M. Hanses argues that throughout his erotic corpus Ovid engages with a key element of Lucretian didactic, Epicurean parrhesia. The relationships nurtured or displayed between student and teacher in Lucretius' De rerum natura are manipulated by Ovid as he shifts his own persona from that of student of love in the Amores, to teacher of love in the Ars, and finally to doctor of love in the Remedia. Each of these shifts mimics a different aspect of Epicurean parrhesia: talking across (student to student), a mode evinced in the Amores; talking down (teacher to student), as in the Ars; and talking up (student to teacher), a mode actualized when the Remedia is read as a response to Lucretius. In progressing through the ranks of these didactic relationships, Hanses's Ovid directly challenges Lucretius qua philosophical authority on love.

The Ars features centrally in the two remaining chapters in Part II. In Chapter 5, "Ovid's imago mundi muliebris and the Makeup of the World in Ars amatoria 3.101-290," Del A. Maticic argues that Ovid, in the instructions he delivers on female cultus in that section of Ars 3, subverts the technique of ekphrastic world depiction in the well-known imago mundi shield tradition. For Maticic, Ovid redirects that tradition by constructing not an imago mundi but a mundus muliebris ("woman's world")—a description not of a work of art but of an aesthetic system encompassing the body of the female practitioner of cultus. The protective connotations of the heroic shield are also carried over to this mundus muliebris: Ovid delineates a cultus shield that is forged in the worldly experience of

his female reader, and the alternative "cosmology" so portrayed is that of her relations with the sociocultural systems surrounding her. On this approach, Ovidian cultus engenders not so much a quality of worldliness as an aesthetic of what Maticic terms "worldedness," where the materials of the female body are enmeshed as phenomena with the apparent beings surrounding her.

Then, after our tour of the localized world of 3.101-290, Katharina Volk takes a broader view of the Ars, and also of the Remedia, in Chapter 6, "Ovid's Art of Life." Volk contends that Ovid's erotodidactic poems, the Ars and Remedia, constitute philosophical texts, in the senses (i) that both are very much like philosophy, in that they are influenced by philosophical doctrines and discourses popular in Ovid's time; and (ii) that these poems are philosophical in their own right, deploying their own theories of anthropology, psychology, and ethics to promulgate a method of "loving wisely." For all its humor, all its reveling in artifice, and its willing suspension of disbelief, Volk finds a positive vision at the heart of Ovid's ars; and this "philosophy" shows numerous similarities to the Foucaultian "techniques of the self" that we touched on earlier: methods of cognitive and behavioral conditioning designed to achieve the desired inner state of mind and outer practice of virtue.

In what ways does Ovid's range of philosophical vision and experimentation expand outward when he progresses from erotic elegy to the "higher" generic callings of the (still elegiac) Fasti and the (qualifiedly) epic Metamorphoses? The five chapters in Part III all focus on the Metamorphoses in particular, and a concerted effort has been made to explore parts and aspects of the poem that have thus far received relatively little attention from a philosophical perspective. In Chapter 7, "Keep Up the Good Work: (Don't) Do It like Ovid (Sen. QNat. 3.27-30)," Myrto Garani begins from Seneca's grandiloquent visualization of the universal cataclysm at the climax of Natural Questions 3 to argue that Seneca draws on Ovid's account of the mythical flood in Metamorphoses 1 as a proto-scientific text. According to Garani, Seneca suggests that he himself is about to build on those earlier "scientific" discoveries so as to elucidate more effectively, from a philosophical viewpoint, the recurring phenomenon of the cataclysm that heralds the end of each world cycle. Through selective quotation from the Metamorphoses, Garani's Seneca systematically demythologizes Ovidian storytelling and then turns both mythical and historical events into integral parts of his own cosmic narrative, thereby formulating an effective Stoic praemeditatio futurorum malorum, that is, the best means of reconciling his addressee, Lucilius, to the inevitability of cosmic catastrophe. In effect, Seneca invests Ovid's mythical flood with a heuristic value so as to create a "diachronic analogy" with his own flood narrative, and so to invoke his Ovidian source as reinforcement for the cosmic projection delivered at the end of Natural Questions 3.

In Chapter 8, "Venus discors: The Empedocleo-Lucretian Background of Venus and Calliope's Song in Metamorphoses 5," Charles Ham considers a particular aspect of the song contest between the Heliconian Muses and their mortal challengers, the daughters of Pierus—an aspect that has major ramifications for the broader Empedoclean presence in the Metamorphoses. Focusing on the Muse Calliope's performance, Ham argues that her song, and specifically its representation of Venus, are to be read against an Empedocleo-Lucretian background. Ham's Calliope represents Venus not simply as a version of Empedoclean Philia/Aphrodite or the Lucretian Venus of the proem to De rerum natura 1, but rather as a chiefly discordant figure akin to Empedoclean Neikos or Strife. Further, in exploring Venus' representation in the song, this chapter also considers some of the ways in which Calliope's Empedocleo-Lucretian background bears on her status as an important ideological symbol in the Augustan period.

The Lucretian/Epicurean accent then recurs in Chapter 9, "Labor and pestis in Ovid's Metamorphoses," where Alison Keith examines Ovid's engagement in three episodes with two famous "problems" of Epicurean philosophy, labor ("toil") and pestis ("plague"). For Keith, Ovid's reference to human toils in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode—genus experiens laborum (Met. 1.414)—implies the impossibility of mankind's attaining the chief goal of Epicurean philosophy,

pleasure. Ovid uses the same phrase late in his account of the plague at Aegina when describing the Myrmidons (7.656), a hardy new people created by Jupiter from ants. The unexpectedly happy outcome of Ovid's Aeginetan plague narrative, in which Aeacus' piety is rewarded with the renewal of his people, comprehensively undoes the devastation of Lucretius' plague narrative in De rerum natura 6 and systematically opposes the Epicurean logic that underpins it. In his account of Hercules' demise on Mt. Oeta, Ovid again conjoins the motifs of labor and pestis in the hero's mental review of his labors as he lies dying. In his final words on the pyre, Hercules questions the very existence of the gods in a phrase (9.203-4: "Can anyone still accept that the gods exist?") that recalls Epicurean skepticism of traditional religion. But Ovid's subsequent narrative of the hero's apotheosis methodically refutes this Epicurean position in an episode that heals the cosmic and physical desolation symbolically embodied in Hercules' death on the pyre.

Plato enters in Chapter 10, Peter Kelly's "Cosmic Artistry in Ovid and Plato:' This chapter explores the particular appeal that Platonic philosophy held for Ovid, especially when Plato operates at the border with myth and fuses cosmic and human artistry. Kelly argues that a main attraction for Ovid lay in the fact that the first major rendition of creationist cosmogony in the Greco-Roman tradition is found in Plato. Plato continually utilizes the imagery of artistic production and mimesis to interrogate the relationship between how the world is formed and how we can come to knowledge of it, which leads to a pervasive parallelism between the structures of the world and the text—a dynamic that is evident throughout Ovid's work, not least in the suggestive identification of cosmogony and textual creation in Metamorphoses 1. Further, Plato repeatedly blurs the interface between myth and philosophy when attempting to represent the fluid and bodily nature of the material world in a way that, Kelly proposes, was foundational for Ovid.

After this Platonic interlude, Lucretius again looms large in Chapter 11, Darcy A. Krasne's "Some Say the World Will End in Fire: Philosophizing the Memnonides in Ovid's Metamorphoses." The cremation of Memnon and the subsequent generation and destruction of the Memnonides in Metamorphoses 13 have primarily drawn attention as one modulation of the Homero-Virgilian Trojan cycle of Books 12-14. In launching her different trajectory of argument, Krasne proceeds from the concluding lines of the episode (13.600-22). There, Ovid appears to be engaging with scientific terminology, especially the language and imagery of Lucretius' cosmogony in De rerum natura 5. Taking this observation as her starting point, Krasne presses its ramifications further, both within and beyond the Metamorphoses, tracing Ovid's intertexts back to Virgil, Lucretius, and Empedocles. Through this complex of intertexts, Krasne argues, the Memnonides become a metaphor for Rome's birth in fratricide and its resulting cyclical trend of ekpyrotic civil war and rebirth.

We move in Part IV ("The Exilic Corpus") to Ovid's place of exile on the grim Pontic shore in Tomis (modern Constanta in Romania). K. Sara Myers sets the scene in Chapter 12, "Ovid against the Elements: Natural Philosophy, Paradoxography, and Ethnography in the Exile Poetry:' The four Empedoclean elements that underlie the metamorphic physics of the Metamorphoses reappear in Ovid's descriptions of the environment of Tomis. But Myers shows how, in Pontus, these elements are largely reduced to three: air, water, and earth, all of which behave in unnatural or disordered ways. Ovid's frequent use of adynata further underscores the cosmic disarray of the natural world of his exile, and the regression to disorder and Chaos. Missing in Tomis, Myers observes, is the element of heat that could thaw the icy water, make the land fertile, and set in motion a harmony of the elements; instead, a continual state of elemental strife persists. Ovid's exilic cosmos can thus be seen as the opposite of the universal flux and change posited by Pythagoras in Metamorphoses 15; in Myers's Tomis nothing flows and all stays the same. Yet she demonstrates how Ovid's employment of the traditional explanatory discourses of natural philosophy, ethnography, geography, medical theory, and aetiology signals his continued mastery of these modes of knowledge, even as he finds

himself in an environment where the impossible becomes real, and in a world that seems beyond the reach of human understanding.

A different but complementary challenge to human (self-)understanding is then explored by Donncha O'Rourke in Chapter 13, "Akrasia and Agency in Ovid's Tristia." Elegy often illustrates a particular condition of personal agency known in ancient ethical discussion as akrasia, whereby individuals find that they are powerless to stop themselves from engaging in actions that they rationally understand to be objectionable or harmful. O'Rourke examines how this elegiac concern with akrasia plays out in Ovid's exilic oeuvre, when the object of the poet's unrequited amor is replaced by faraway Roma, access to which is now denied by an emperor whose indulgence has given way to unremitting anger. The exilic poetry's obsessive concern with the terms crimen, culpa, scelus, and error can similarly be read as an urgent attempt to understand the degree of Ovid's agency in his own downfall. For O'Rourke, however, the exiled Ovid deploys a technical-ethical vocabulary not just to articulate and explore his own responsibility for his actions, but also to mobilize a philosophical evaluation of Augustus' assent to anger and his doubtful capacity for meaningful clemency. If philosophical therapy in the exilic works seems to offer Ovid only slight mitigation of his psychological anguish, O'Rourke argues that it does at least enable him to take a view of the emperor as one who ultimately is possessed of no higher self-control than the poet he has sought to disempower.

In Chapter 14, "Intimations of Mortality: Ovid and the End(s) of the World;' Alessandro Schiesaro brings together different strands of thought and imagery in the Metamorphoses and the exilic poetry to compare and contrast Ovid's treatments of eschatology in the two works. Schiesaro duly stresses the role that eschatology as a theme plays throughout the entire Ovidian oeuvre, but with a particular focus on recurrent conceptualizations, as well as significant changes, across the divide between the Metamorphoses and the exilic corpus. Whereas in the Metamorphoses Ovid deftly balances the illusion of permanence with intimations of an end through metamorphic inevitability, in Tomis "the end" is ever wished for but endlessly deferred: as the corpus expands into book after book without offering any sign of change or alleviation for the poet in Tomis, Schiesaro stresses the gradual hardening of our realization that a standstill has been reached on the Pontic shore. It is as if the endless cycle of repetition that characterizes the Stoic cosmos—and Pythagoras' speech in Metamorphoses 15—were now taking shape in the form of serial, yearly collections of poetry.

Part IV concludes in Chapter 15 with Gareth D. Williams's "The End(s) of Reason in Tomis: Philosophical Traces, Erasures, and Error in Ovid's Exilic Poetry." Williams focuses on the extent, manner, and consequences of Ovid's philosophical "failure" in exile, but with the ultimate goal of reflecting anew—from a philosophical standpoint—on the nature of his elusive error. Partly through appeal to Empedocles' sub-presence in both Ovid's preexilic and Tomitan writings, this chapter first sets the lack of any sustained philosophical appeal in Tomis against the very different structuring principles that prevail in the Metamorphoses and Fasti: this move from structure to unstructure after his banishment in 8 CE importantly preconditions, Williams argues, the phenomenon of philosophical failure in the exilic corpus. That failure is then explored in relation to Ovid's infamous error: the error is so fundamental to his exilic plight—implicated no less (through the "mistake" of Augustan misreading) in the incrimination of the Ars than it is in Ovid's fateful mistake—that the poet can never construct any fully rationalized understanding of his fate; and he therefore struggles to form any coherent philosophical response to exile on a foundation that is so undermined by factors of judicial inexplicability and nontransparency.

Finally, in Part V ("After Ovid"), a single chapter, Philip Hardie's 'Philosophizing and Theologizing Reincarnations of Ovid: Lucan to Alexander Pope," offers an important platform for further inquiry into the reception of Ovidius philosophus. The more recent reception of Ovid has largely denied his works serious engagement with philosophical issues; but the longer history of reception shows that over many centuries Ovid was read as a source and repository of philosophical—and theological—

wisdom. Hardie presents a selective survey of this history, with a particular focus on Ovid as a cosmological and natural-philosophical poet. The chapter builds outward from aspects of Ovid's reception in later antiquity (Lucan and Claudian), including among Christian poets who drew on Ovidian cosmogony to lend a philosophical coloring to versifications of the creation story of Genesis. Turning to early modern English poetry, Hardie then examines Edmund Spenser's use of Ovid in the underpinning of The Faerie Queene with a philosophizing doctrine of mutability (the Garden of Adonis, the Mutabilitie Cantos); John Milton's use of the Narcissus and Echo story to teach lessons about human psychology and theology; and finally, in the eighteenth century, Alexander Pope's self-alignment with Ovidius philosophus in his Essay on Man.

## The Collective Viewpoint

If the summary of the individual chapters as offered earlier is essentially centrifugal in orientation, conveying the range and versatility of Ovid's philosophical commitments in particular contexts, certain centripetal tendencies also conjoin many of the chapters in ways that lend at least a measure of coherence to the textual personality of Ovidius philosophus. Our aim in this section is hardly to posit any generalized Ovidian "philosophy" on the basis of the findings of the sixteen chapters; rather, we briefly take stock of those chapters by sketching what they reveal of Ovid's recurrent philosophical tendencies and interests.

Berno's tracing of the evolution of the term sapiens and its cognates across the Ovidian corpus usefully initiates the balance that this book seeks to achieve between attention to specific texts, on the one hand, and, on the other, sensitivity to broader philosophical developments throughout the oeuvre. Beyond the Empedoclean epos of Pythagoras' speech in Metamorphoses 15, Ovid's engagement with Empedocles is explored in Books 5 (Ham) and 13 (Krasne), and then traced into the exilic corpus by Myers and Williams. Lucretius, too, is profoundly implicated along with Empedocles in the Metamorphoses (so Keith) and the exilic poetry; but Gibson, Hanses, and Volk all demonstrate the breadth of Ovid's part-interrogation and part-appropriation of Epicurean ethics in his erotic and erotodidactic works, while Williams also touches on the relative "failure" of Epicurean therapy in Tomis. O'Rourke on akrasia and Schiesaro on eschatology in the Metamorphoses and the exilic corpus complement Berno's range of vision by stressing connectivity between different Ovidian parts; and those chapters that invoke other reference points—Fulkerson on Prodicus' "Choice of Hercules" in Amores 3.1, Maticic on the imago mundi shield tradition and female "worldedness" in Ars 3, and Kelly on Plato in connection with the Ovidian cosmogony in Metamorphoses 1—all enlarge the philosophical mosaic that is an expanding work in progress throughout Ovid's career. As for the reception of Ovidius philosophus, Garani contributes another perspective on the Ovidian cataclysm and conflagration in Metamorphoses 1 and 2 in her treatment of Seneca's response to Ovid in Natural Questions 3, while Hardie widens the reception horizons yet further in a survey that whets the appetite for future inquiry in this area.

Empedocles, Epicurus/Lucretius, Prodicus, Plato, the imago mundi tradition: beyond the representation in this volume of these different philosophical authors, schools, and tendencies, three broader concerns create further networks of linkage between the chapters. First, ethics: several contributions (Berno, Fulkerson, Gibson, Hanses, Volk, O'Rourke, Williams) are centrally concerned with the emotions and their control, social ethics, consolation, life choice, and the ars uitae, and in combination these chapters usefully convey the breadth of Ovid's vision in an ethical direction. Second, physics: multiple chapters (Garani, Ham, Keith, Kelly, Krasne, Myers, Schiesaro) treat this topic from diverse perspectives, especially in reference to the Metamorphoses and the exilic corpus, focusing notably on the relation of cosmos and chaos; the Empedoclean elements; and eschatology, partly through cataclysm and apocalypse in the Metamorphoses, and partly through Ovid's portrayal of Pontus as a place of physical extremities and "end-of-the-world" desolation. Third, aesthetics: various chapters (Fulkerson, Maticic, Kelly) relate Ovid's appropriations in ethics and/or physics to

aesthetic concerns that often involve self-conscious reflection on the poet's own art. These three broad categories are themselves hardly mutually exclusive, and their points of interpenetration further enhance the overall unity of the collection.

Through thematic connectivity between various chapters, then, and through the linkage in multiple contributions between different Ovidian contexts, we hope that this book offers at least the beginnings of a holistic appreciation of Ovidius philosophus. But no volume of this sort can seek to offer fully satisfying coverage of a subject as multifaceted as philosophy in Ovid. While certain parts of his oeuvre are well represented here, others are not: the Fasti in particular has suggestive philosophical properties that are not addressed in these pages (though see Kelly and Williams on the figure of Janus in Fasti 1); any potential that the Heroides has in this direction goes unexplored; and even though several chapters are devoted to the erotic corpus, the Metamorphoses, and the exilic corpus, the philosophical potential of all three areas far outruns the dimensions of this current project. We nevertheless hope that the quality and interest of the essays assembled here will significantly offset any restrictions of scope in the volume and, still more important, that this effort will provide a catalyst for further examinations of Ovidius philosophus. <>

## **Re-inventing Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: Pictorial and Literary Transformations in Various Media, 1400–1800** edited by Karl A.E. Enenkel and Jan L. de Jong [Series: Intersections, Brill, 9789004424890]

This volume explores early modern recreations of myths from Ovid's immensely popular Metamorphoses, focusing on the creative ingenium of artists and writers and on the peculiarities of the various media that were applied. The contributors try to tease out what (pictorial) devices, perspectives, and interpretative markers were used that do not occur in the original text of the *Metamorphoses*, what aspects were brought to the fore or emphasized, and how these are to be explained. Expounding the whatabouts of these differences, the contributors discuss the underlying literary and artistic problems, challenges, principles and techniques, the requirements of the various literary and artistic media, and the role of the cultural, ideological, religious, and gendered contexts in which these recreations were produced.

Contributors are: Noam Andrews, Claudia Cieri Via, Daniel Dornhofer, Leonie Drees-Drylie, Karl A.E. Enenkel, Daniel Fulco, Barbara Hryszko, Gerlinde Huber-Rebenich, Jan L. de Jong, Andrea Lozano-Vásquez, Sabine Lütkemeyer, Morgan J. Macey, Kerstin Maria Pahl, Susanne Scholz, Robert Seidel, and Patricia Zalamea.

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## Re-Inventing Ovid's *Metamorphoses* by Karl Enenkel and Jan L. de Jong

The importance of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* as a source for the visual arts and literature is undeniable. The amount of illustrations, representations, adaptations and variations is endless. After the Bible, the Metamorphoses may be the text that was most often reworked, illustrated and recreated in other media. ^spec^ally in the early modern age, when knowledge of classical Antiquity was rapidly expanding and admiration for its literature and culture correspondingly growing, there were so many representations, adaptations and variations created, that it makes one wonder if these were not better known than the text of the Metamorphoses itself. Certain representations, or traditions of representing the Metamorphoses, may even have influenced the way we now read or interpret the text. For instance, in a fairly recent study, the author explains that in Ovid's account of Perseus noticing Andromeda chained to a rock, as a prey for a sea-monster (*Metamorphoses IV*, 670-690), the girl's embarrassment may also be due to the fact that she is naked: The author further thinks that, it is peculiar [...] that Ovid never says that she would cover her nudity if she could.' In fact, Ovid writes that if Andromeda had not been tied, she would have covered her face with her hands. That seems certainly strange if she had indeed been naked, but Ovid never says she was! This explains why she only wanted to cover her face. It is, moreover, quite unlikely that Ovid even imagined her to be nude, as contemporary Roman paintings illustrating the tale show Andromeda chained to the rock with her clothes on. The modern author's presumption that Andromeda was naked seems to result from a reading of Ovid's tale through eyes that have been preconditioned by the early modern tradition of representing Andromeda without clothes. The list of examples by Perino del Vaga, Giorgio Vasari, Annibale Carracci, Rubens, Rembrandt and Pierre Monnot can be easily extended with many more cases in various media.

Should these and other artists be blamed for taking liberties and not following the text of Ovid precisely? According to some authors writing after the Council of Trent (1545-1563), they should be. During the Council, it was decreed that artists representing scenes from the Bible must strictly adhere to the holy text and to the Church's interpretation of it. This was understandable, as deviations could lead the faithful astray. Along similar lines, there was a growing expectation that representations of historical events would correspond to the historical facts and not offer an imaginary rendition of what had happened. But what about mythological stories, which were neither sacred texts nor accounts of historical events? Were artists representing or reworking them expected to stick to the letter of poets such as Ovid who had told these tales? Or were they allowed to handle Ovid's text with the same creative freedom as Ovid himself did when he versified the mythological stories first told by others? In 1564, Giovanni Andrea Gilio da Fabriano opined in his Dialogue on the Errors and Abuses of Painters that when an artist represents poetic (meaning: mythological) subjects, `... I think that it is legitimate for him to paint everything that his own imagination [capriccio] dictates, with those actions and movements, however, that are appropriate to the figures he is representing: Twenty years later, Raffaello Borghini voiced a contrary opinion. In Il Riposo from 1584 he stated that painters and sculptors representing a mythological or historical story must follow the letter of their written source. As an example, he blamed Titian for not sticking to the details of the Metamorphoses in his painting of Venus and Adonis: `... Titian granted himself those liberties, that painters should not take:

One may wonder how authoritative or even representative Borghini's opinion was. In an article from 1988 on `Illustrating Ovid', Nigel Llewellyn has made it clear that, 'in medieval and early modern Europe most of the artists producing Ovidian pictures were illustrating a text which they could not read in the original Latin.' Moreover, they had to transfer the Ovidian stories from one medium (text) to another: 'Many painters and carvers thus became "poets".' Accordingly, one of the aims of Llewellyn's article is to show, using representations of The Rape of Europa as an example, `how painters can properly work in the spirit of Ovid without necessarily always having to follow every word of his poetry.' His observations and remarks concern sculptures and paintings from the 15th through the 18th century, which means that if Borghini's opinion had any impact, it was not universally heeded and artists acted more in the spirit of Giovanni Andrea Gilio da Fabriano (although their notion of 'appropriateness' may have differed).

It is interesting, however, that Borghini's estimation is tacitly adopted in many 'modern' studies of artworks illustrating scenes from the *Metamorphoses*. The question of how exactly artists followed Ovid's text — and if they didn't, which translation or other text they used as a source — is often the starting point and seems to dominate. This is not necessarily a bad thing, however. Ralph J. Hexter has rightly observed that, `often it is only an awareness of subsequent hypercriticisms that make us aware of former freedom and artistic license.' It is this understanding which is the point of departure for the present volume. We assume that early modern writers and artists were not convinced that a precise rendition of a textual source would guarantee the best result. Writers were trained in rhetorical and poetical methods of textual variation, creating narrative evidentia, and in other methods of re-interpretation and re-use of all kinds of texts and topics. Furthermore, they were aware of the different requirements of the various genres of literature, as for example tragedy, comedy, epos, elegy or lyrical poetry. Painters and other visual artists were trained in techniques of the 'invention' of images, either on the base of texts or pictorial traditions. They were conscious of the fact that visual representations require other elements and devices than textual narratives, and they felt free to apply them. Moreover, they were well acquainted with pictorial traditions and their use. This is certainly relevant in the case of the Metamorphoses, because extended sets of images were available via the numerous editions, translations, versions and synopses that were illustrated with woodcuts or engravings, for instance by Bernard Salomon, Virgil Solis, Pieter van der Borcht,

Chrispijn van de Passe, Antonio Tempests and Hendrick Goltzius. But even then the artists were also aware that in the case of pictorial traditions, creative variation was an important principle, and that various media and dimensions (such as large oil paintings, tapestries, sculptures, bronze plaques or small prints) required different artistic devices and compositions.

The authors of this volume have studied this phenomenon of creative invention, trying to detect and single out elements in the artistic and literary reception of the Metamorphoses that differ from Ovid's narrative. What elements, devices, perspectives, and interpretative markers were used that do not occur in Ovid, what aspects were brought to the fore or emphasized, and how is this to be explained? They have tried to expound the whatabouts of these differences, especially with respect to underlying literary and artistic problems, challenges, principles, and techniques, the requirements of the various literary and artistic media and genres, and the role of the cultural, ideological, religious, and gendered contexts in which these artefacts and writings were created. They have paid special attention to the role of allegorical and moral interpretations, and the role of the nude and the erotic in visual representations. But they have foremost tried to show how writers and artists 'can properly work in the spirit of Ovid without necessarily always having to follow every word of his poetry', thus highlighting their creative ingenium.

Yet this is not the only or main aspect of the studies in this volume. Readers of its various contributions will notice that artists and writers re-creating (stories from) Ovid's *Metamorphoses* did indeed exploit their 'creative ingenium', but that the results they produced may contain details or elements that can only be understood by an attentive reading of Ovid's text, in combination with knowledge of other writings from classical Antiquity. This does not necessarily mean that we should assume that — after all — artists did personally read the original text or an accurate translation of the *Metamorphoses*. It may indicate that artists produced their recreations in some sort of collaboration or cross-pollination with advisors, patrons or clients who, thanks to their literary knowledge, could suggest including or elaborating specific details that would further enhance the result and satisfy the predilections of an educated public. Thus an audience that was probably more familiar with the original text and the particulars of the *Metamorphoses* than most artists were, could enjoy both the metamorphosis of Ovid's stories into artworks of a different medium, genre or language, and still recognize `pure' Ovidian elements acquiring a new meaning in a different context. It would be an interesting starting point for further study to uncover how the recreation of Ovid's Metamorphoses in early modern times was not just a matter of transfer from one medium to another, with its possible consequences, but also a process to which both artists and `consumers' contributed through a creative interaction of deploying and counterbalancing their own specific skills, knowledge and predilections. <>

## Plato's Cratylus: Proceedings of the Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense

edited by Vladimír Mikeš [Series: Brill's Plato Studies Series, Brill, 9789004473010]

The present volume offers a collection of papers on one of Plato's most intriguing dialogues. Although not a running commentary, the book covers the majority of difficult questions raised by the dialogue in which the subjects of language and ontology are tied closely together. It shows why Plato's Cratylus has been highly regarded among readers interested in ancient philosophy and those concerned with modern semantics and theory of language. This collection also presents original views on the position of the dialogue in the whole Plato's œuvre and in the context of Plato's contemporaries and successors.

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## Making Sense of the Cratylus

This volume is a collection of papers originally presented at the Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, held in Prague in November 9th and 10th, 2017.

Some dialogues in the corpus of Plato's works have a straightforward importance, position and overall role. The Cratylus is not one of them. In this dialogue Plato touches on questions of longstanding importance to him – as we can conclude from other dialogues – and raises new questions which, given the space dedicated to them, should be worth asking when one is dealing with "correctness of names". And yet there has been wide disagreement about the dialogue's meaning. It contains queries about speech and its parts, about things having their own natures versus consisting in mere appearances, about general flux versus the good and beautiful remaining always the same. There are examinations of semantics and of Forms behind names, and a famously lengthy exploration of etymology. Although for some of these questions we see where Plato's leaning is, we cannot be sure about his views of almost anything that is explicitly stated. And scholars indeed differ so much in saying what Plato's opinions are in this dialogue that it is almost without parallel in the whole corpus. Is Plato conventionalist or rather non- conventionalist in what concerns names? Is he giving any genuine answer to the initial question of the correctness of names? Are his etymologies to be taken seriously? Is he entirely sceptical about words and language as means to achieve knowledge or does he rather make distinctions with a purpose to show the way forward? Is the dialogue aporetical in its nature or does it convey some positive message we should retain? These are the main questions which have been raised. Most of them have not only received different answers from different scholars – which would not be exceptional – but to an unusual extent these answers are directly opposite. This controversial status of the dialogue has not escaped anyone's attention. It is therefore not surprising that there is something like a golden thread that can be observed going through many different interpretations. Very often interpreters have not taken their task to be to merely explain this or that particular theory or problem of the Cratylus, but to make sense of the dialogue as a whole, to defend its overall meaning, or to propose the way it should be understood in the collection of other dialogues, even in cases when they seek to interpret only a part of the text. We can observe this with a higher than usual frequency in the interpretations adopting an approach which can be seen as the most traditional, offering a closer scrutiny of chosen passage or passages. Very often the question of what makes the Cratylus worth reading is recognizable in the background. But there are also other approaches which are more directly related to its puzzling

nature like larger summarising overviews of its arguments and different attempts to show how the dialogue appears in the context – the context of Plato's other dialogues, of ancient thought more generally or, last but not least, of distinctions made by modern semantics and philosophy of language.

All the aforementioned approaches are represented in the present volume. This may be taken as one of the features making it a worthy contribution to the debate. In relatively little space, it displays the controversial standing of the dialogue by exemplifying the variety of interpretations and approaches it allows for – and yet it does this without falling into repetition or stalemate. The texts offered here either propose new points of view or build upon preceding literature to make further steps in directions which have already been advocated. On the whole the volume proves that the Cratylus is an inevitable starting point for anyone who wants to learn about Plato's views on speech – logos – and the ontology related to it. It also makes clearer that it is a very complex dialogue that does not offer straightforward answers but necessitates a careful reading and evaluation of individual arguments against other arguments. This is an important achievement in that it shows a general way to approach a highly literary author whose style of thought and expression is everything but simple. Moreover, the Cratylus is probably the dialogue most resistant to the simplifying either/or kind of interpretation, as this volume makes sufficiently plain. For all these reasons, this collection of papers is readable as a single book from beginning to end. It might be also of some interest that it is the first collective monograph on this dialogue.

The volume starts with Steffen Lund Jørgensen's contribution advocating a new way to look at Socrates' interlocutor Hermogenes as a means to better understand certain puzzling claims of the first part of the dialogue. It is followed by Francesco Ademollo's paper in which the author of the only modern commentary on the dialogue expands his views and provides a helpful comparison with modern semantics of Kripke, Russel and Frege, thereby giving a fine example of the context-widening interpretation as mentioned above. A not- dissimilar approach – taking an overview of central passages against a background of modern notions of referentiality and intentionality – is offered by Francesco Aronadio. In the same vein, the author of this introduction offers summary of the first part of the dialogue in order to make a case that even without bringing in modern concepts we can distinguish here a valuable insight into the nature of language. The paper by Anna Pavani is then a natural follow- up, defending the view that a key conceptual distinction is made in one of the arguments of the first part, namely the argument of the Forms of names.

The paper by Jakub Jinek revisits a much-debated etymological part of the dialogue, in particular the etymologies of divine names, offering a new look at the combination of metaphysics and irony implied in them. Starting from Socrates' etymological analysis of Hermogenes' name, the paper by Olof Pettersson leads us to the second part of the dialogue and towards its conclusion about the relation of names and knowledge of things behind names, where the author sees a thoroughly sceptical stance on this point on Plato's part.

The three following papers have in common the emphasis on the wider contextualisation which is necessary, according to them, for the correct understanding of the dialogue. Thus Mariapaola Bergomi gives a very new impulse by arguing that Gorgias, though not mentioned in the dialogue, is present behind, and targeted by, some of its central arguments. Frédérique Ildefonse then proceeds in the previously suggested but insufficiently explored direction of reading the dialogue in connection with later dialogues, like the Sophist, and later philosophers, the Stoics, in her case. Filip Karfík makes yet further important steps on this ground, advancing arguments for a sceptical reading of the Cratylus, advocated already by Pettersson, in which the dialogue mainly shows impossibilities and is therefore Plato's preparation for the Sophist and the claims made there about different relations between language and reality.  Forms and Names: On Cratylus 389a5–390a10 by Anna Pavani

In discussing the way "the artisan of names" works, Socrates introduces the puzzling notion of the "pephykos onoma" (Crat. 389d4–5). What is usually downgraded to a "ghostly name" (R. Robinson) is to be understood within its argumentative context. Within the framework of the "tool analogy", Socrates defines both the kerkis (a weaving tool to be identified not with a "shuttle", but rather, as I argue, with a kind of comb) and the name as instruments whose specific function is to differentiate. As the structural and terminological parallels testify, producing a name is presented as strictly analogous to producing a kerkis. To refute Hermogenes' conventionalism as unfolded in the first part of the dialogue, Socrates shows that producing a name, just as producing a kerkis, entails two non- arbitrary components. There is room for arbitrariness when it comes to the actual choice of the phonetic material and this is the reason why lawgivers from different places can produce names that are equally correct. By contrast, there is no room for arbitrariness for the Ideal Name, which the artisan has to look at, and for the pephykos onoma, which the artisan has to put into sounds and syllables. What different concrete names share, if they are to be equally correct, is the same pephykos onoma. This does not correspond to a "Platonic Form" nor to a "linguistic type" nor to a "meaning", but rather, as I argue, to a concept.

### Commerce, Theft and Deception: The Etymology of Hermes in Plato's Cratylus by Olof Pettersson

In the light of Socrates' largely neglected etymological account of the name Hermes, this article reexamines the dialogue's perplexing conclusion that reality should not be sought through names, but through itself. By a close scrutiny of three claims made in this etymology – that language is commercial, thievish and deceptive – it argues that Socrates' discussion about the relation between names and reality cannot only be meaningfully understood in terms of his characterization of language as deceptive and therefore tragic, but that this point is also confirmed by the dialogue's larger comedic structure and by Cratylus' framing joke about Hermogenes' name. As a consequence, the article also suggests that a closer examination of the etymology of Hermes can both help to assess a certain unwarranted optimism common in contemporary scholarship and the claim that the dialogue's overarching purpose, rather than being an explanation of how human language grants access to the truth about the existing things, is a critical examination of such a project and of its hubristic assumptions. <>

## Ptolemy's Philosophy: Mathematics as a Way of Life by Jacqueline Feke [Princeton University Press, 9780691179582]

The Greco-Roman mathematician Claudius Ptolemy is one of the most significant figures in the history of science. He is remembered today for his astronomy, but his philosophy is almost entirely lost to history. This groundbreaking book is the first to reconstruct Ptolemy's general philosophical system—including his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics—and to explore its relationship to astronomy, harmonics, element theory, astrology, cosmology, psychology, and theology.

In this stimulating intellectual history, Jacqueline Feke uncovers references to a complex and sophisticated philosophical agenda scattered among Ptolemy's technical studies in the physical and mathematical sciences. She shows how he developed a philosophy that was radical and even subversive, appropriating ideas and turning them against the very philosophers from whom he drew influence. Feke reveals how Ptolemy's unique system is at once a critique of prevailing philosophical trends and a conception of the world in which mathematics reigns supreme.

A compelling work of scholarship, **PTOLEMY'S PHILOSOPHY** demonstrates how Ptolemy situated mathematics at the very foundation of all philosophy—theoretical and practical—and advanced the mathematical way of life as the true path to human perfection.

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Excerpt: Claudius Ptolemy is one of the most significant figures in the history of science. Living in or around Alexandria in the second century CE, he is remembered most of all for his contributions in astronomy. His Almagest, a thirteen-book astronomical treatise,' was authoritative until natural philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries repudiated the geocentric hypothesis and appropriated Nicolaus Copernicus's heliostatic system of *De revolutionibus*. Ptolemy also composed texts on harmonics, geography, optics, and astrology that influenced the study of these sciences through the Renaissance.

Ptolemy's contributions in philosophy, on the other hand, have been all but forgotten. His philosophical claims lie scattered across his corpus and intermixed with technical studies in the exact sciences. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' development of discrete academic disciplines let the study of Ptolemy's philosophy fall through the cracks. When scholars do make reference to it, they tend to portray Ptolemy as either a practical scientist—mostly unconcerned with philosophical matters, as if he were a forerunner to the modern-day scientist—or a scholastic thinker who simply adopted the philosophical ideas of authoritative philosophers, especially Aristotle. This latter portrayal no doubt evolved in part because Ptolemy cites Aristotle in the first chapter of the Almagest. Liba Taub proved that the philosophical claims in *Almagest 1.1*, as well as in Ptolemy's cosmological text, the Planetary Hypotheses, are not Aristotle's, and with this debunking of the assumed view Taub opened the door for my own analysis of Ptolemy's philosophy, including how it manifests throughout his corpus and how it relates to several ancient philosophical traditions.' This monograph is the first ever reconstruction and intellectual history of Ptolemy's general philosophical system.

Concerning Ptolemy's life we know nothing beyond approximately when and where he lived. In the Almagest, he includes thirty-six astronomical observations that he reports he made in Alexandria from 127 to 141 CE. Another unaccredited observation from 125 CE may be his as well.' The Canobic Inscription, a list of astronomical parameters that Ptolemy erected at Canopus, Egypt, provides a slightly later date: 146/147 CE. Because the Canobic Inscription contains numerical values that Ptolemy corrects in the Almagest, it must predate the Almagest. Therefore, Ptolemy completed the Almagest sometime after 146/147 CE. In addition, Ptolemy makes reference to the Almagest in several of his later texts. The life span that this chronology requires is consistent with a scholion attached to the *Tetrabiblos*, Ptolemy's astrological text, indicating that he flourished during Hadrian's reign and lived until the reign of Marcus Aurelius, who became Roman emperor in 161 CE but ruled jointly with Lucius Verus until 169 CE. Thus, we can estimate that Ptolemy lived from approximately 100 to 170 CE.

Concerning any philosophical allegiance, Ptolemy says nothing. In his texts, he does not align himself with a philosophical school. He does not state who his teacher was. He does not indicate in what his education consisted or even what philosophical books he read. In order to discern where his philosophical ideas came from, one must mine his corpus, extract the philosophical content, and, with philological attention, relate his ideas to concepts presented in texts that are contemporary with his own or that were authoritative in the second century. Unfortunately, what survives of the ancient Greek corpus is but a fraction of what was written and we have very little from Ptolemy's time. It is impossible to determine what exactly he read or even where he read it, as it is dubious that the great Alexandrian library was still in existence. At best we can place Ptolemy's thought in relation to prevailing ancient philosophical traditions.

The first century BCE to the second century CE is distinguished by the eclectic practice of philosophy. The Greek verb eklegein means to pick or choose, and the philosophers of this period selected and combined concepts that traditionally were the intellectual property of distinct schools of thought. Mostly, these philosophers blended the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, but they also appropriated ideas from the Stoics and Epicureans. The label "eclecticism" has long held a pejorative

connotation in philosophy, as if eclectic philosophers were not sufficiently innovative to contribute their own ideas, and the philosophy of the periods before and after this seemingly intermediate chapter in ancient philosophy were comparatively inventive, with the development of the Hellenistic movements, including the Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptic, and the rise of Neoplatonism, respectively. Nevertheless, John Dillon and A. A. Long revitalized the study of eclectic philosophy. So-called middle Platonism and the early Aristotelian commentary tradition have received more attention in recent years, and their study has demonstrated that the manners in which these philosophers integrated authoritative ideas are themselves noteworthy.

I aim to prove that Ptolemy was very much a man of his time in that his philosophy is most similar to middle Platonism, the period in Platonic philosophy that extended from the first century BCE—with Antiochus of Ascalon, who was born near the end of the second century BCE and moved from Ascalon, in present-day Israel, to Athens to join the Academy—to the beginning of the third century CE, with Ammonius Saccas, the Alexandrian philosopher and teacher of Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism. Both Antiochus and Ammonius Saccas are known for their syncretic tendencies. In response to Academic skepticism, Antiochus argued not only that knowledge is possible but also that the old, pre-skeptical Academy was in broad agreement with the Aristotelian and Stoic schools. Centuries later, Ammonius Saccas argued that

Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies were in fundamental agreement. Middle Platonism manifested in a variety of literary forms, styles of argument, and attitudes toward authoritative figures, but a significant trend emerged in this period where philosophers asserted the harmony of previously distinct schools of thought. They drew concepts, theories, and arguments from philosophers attached to once competing schools. To be a Platonist at this time entailed not only clarifying the meaning of Plato's texts but also appropriating ideas from the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions in the course of developing Platonic philosophy. Epicurean philosophy had less of an impact, but several of its terms had by this time become common intellectual property. It is this harmonizing tendency of middle Platonism, coupled with its emphasis on certain key themes in Platonic philosophy, that fundamentally influenced Ptolemy's own contributions in philosophy.

Ptolemy's seamless blending of concepts from the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions and, to a lesser extent, the Stoic and Epicurean, is itself impressive, but its greater significance lies in its radical and even subversive character. Ptolemy adopted ideas from these many traditions but his integration of them yielded a philosophical system that upended the entire edifice of ancient philosophy. In *Almagest 1.1*, Ptolemy denounces attempts by philosophers to answer some of the most central questions of philosophy, and he argues that the fields of inquiry that philosophers study are merely conjectural. Against the vast current of ancient Greek philosophy, Ptolemy maintains that theology and physics are essentially guesswork and that mathematics alone generates sure and incontrovertible knowledge. This epistemological position—that mathematics alone, and neither physics nor theology, yields knowledge—is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and would have been extraordinarily controversial. Moreover, Ptolemy's appropriation of ancient virtue ethics is equally subversive. He maintains that the best life is one where the human soul is in a virtuous, or excellent, condition, and in his adaptation of Platonic ethics he affirms that the highest goal of human life is to resemble the divine—to be, as much as humanly possible, like the gods—but, according to Ptolemy, the one and only path to the good life is through mathematics.

Ptolemy deems mathematics epistemologically and ethically superior to every other field of inquiry, but that is not to say that he eschewed philosophy. For Ptolemy, mathematics is philosophy or, rather, a part of philosophy. It is one of the three parts of theoretical philosophy, alongside physics and theology. In addition to these three theoretical sciences—where, in ancient Greek philosophy, a science is simply a branch of knowledge—there are the three practical parts of philosophy: ethics, domestics, and politics. Ptolemy argues in *Almagest 1.1* that the theoretical part of philosophy is

more valuable than the practical, and that, of the three theoretical sciences, mathematics is the best in its abilities to render knowledge and transform the human soul into its most perfect condition. Mathematics reveals the objective of human life, to be like the heavenly divine, and it provides the means to achieve it. Ptolemy does not claim, however, that one should study only mathematics. He argues that mathematics contributes to physics and theology, and, furthermore, that it guides practical philosophy and even the ordinary affairs of life. Positioning mathematics at the foundation of every one of life's activities, Ptolemy advances the mathematical way of life.

Consistent with Plato's account of the philosopher's education in Book VII of the Republic, Platonists upheld mathematics as a useful means of training the soul, where mathematics is propaedeutic, preparing the way for other, higher, more valuable studies, such as dialectic or metaphysics. Yet, for Ptolemy, mathematics is not simply useful; it is not merely a path to another science. For Ptolemy, it is the highest science. Only mathematics yields knowledge. Through its study alone human beings achieve their highest objective, to become like the divine. Human beings come to comprehend, love, and resemble divinities through the study of astronomy and harmonics, which, according to Ptolemy, are both mathematical sciences. Astronomy is the study of the movements and configurations of the stars; harmonics is the study of the ratios that characterize the relations among musical pitches. Astronomical objects serve as ethical exemplars for human souls, and both astronomy and harmonics give rise to souls' virtuous transformation.

Ptolemy's texts testify to his additional interest in mathematics' application to theology and physics, especially. In the Almagest, Ptolemy's astronomy informs his theology, and his natural philosophical investigations are extensive. Just as he argues in *Almagest 1.1* that mathematics contributes significantly to physics, time and again Ptolemy studies bodies mathematically before investigating their physical properties. Mathematical study informs the analysis of bodies' physical qualities, and, though physics is conjectural, the application of mathematics affords the best guesses possible of bodies' physical natures. In the chapters that follow, I examine Ptolemy's applications of geometry to element theory, harmonics to psychology, and astronomy to astrology and cosmology.

The only one of Ptolemy's texts devoid of mathematics is *On the Kritêrion and Hêgemonikon*, an epistemological study that examines the criterion of truth, the method by which a human being generates knowledge, as well as the physical nature and structure of the human soul, including the hêgemonikon, its chief part. More than any other text of Ptolemy, *On the Kritêrion* has provoked controversy concerning its authorship, no doubt in part because it contains no mathematics. Nevertheless, thematic, stylistic, and linguistic arguments support Ptolemy's authorship, and I argue that it is one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of Ptolemy's extant texts.' In *On the Kritêrion*, Ptolemy proposes a dually rational and empirical criterion of truth, where the faculties of sense perception and thought cooperate in the production of knowledge. Ptolemy adheres to this criterion in the rest of his corpus, but when he wrote *On the Kritêrion* he had not yet mandated the application of mathematics to physics. After he composed it, he devised his mathematical-scientific method, which he employed in every one of his subsequent studies. Every other of Ptolemy's texts constitutes an inquiry into or an implementation of mathematics.

In addition to *On the Kritêrion*, the texts I analyze are those of Ptolemy that contain manifestly philosophical content.' Again, the Almagest is Ptolemy's most famous astronomical text. It comprises thirteen books—likely in homage to the thirteen books of Euclid's Elements—and it consists in the deduction of geometric models that, according to Ptolemy, truly describe the mathematical objects in the heavens, the combinations of rotating spheres that give rise to the movements of celestial bodies, the fixed and wandering stars. In the first book, Ptolemy situates astronomy in relation to the other parts of philosophy, he describes the structure of the ensuing text, and he establishes the fundamental hypotheses of his astronomical system, such as the heavens' sphericity and the earth's location at the center of the cosmos. In the latter part of Book i through Book 2, he presents the

mathematics necessary for the rnathematical deduction, including the "Table of Chords," used in the trigonometric calculations that follow. The remainder of the Almagest, Books 3 through 13, contains the deduction itself of the astronomical models, accounting for the movements of the sun, moon, fixed stars, and five planets. These models are both demonstrative and predictive, since by using the tables an astrologer would have been able to approximate the perceptible location of any celestial body on any given date.

The Planetary Hypotheses is Ptolemy's cosmological text. In the first of the two books, he presents astronomical models, mostly consistent with the Almagest's models; he specifies the order and absolute distances of the celestial systems; and he determines the diameters of the celestial bodies. In Book 2, he presents his aethereal physics, describing the heavenly bodies in physical terms, and he discusses celestial souls, which, in Ptolemy's cosmology, control the aethereal bodies' movements. Only a portion of the first book of the Planetary Hypotheses exists in the original Greek. The second of the two books and the remainder of the first book exist only in a ninth-century Arabic translation as well as a Hebrew translation from the Arabic.

The Tetrabiblos delineates Ptolemy's astrological theory. In the introductory chapters, he defines astrology and defends this physical science's possibility and utility. Thereafter, he summarizes its principles, including the powers of celestial bodies, the rays by which stars transmit their powers, and the effects these powers have on sublunary bodies and souls. Book 2 examines the celestial powers' large-scale effects on geographic regions and meteorological phenomena, and Books 3 and 4 address celestial influences on human beings and their individual lives.

In the Harmonics, Ptolemy elaborates on his criterion of truth and employs it in the analysis of the mathematical relations among musical pitches. The text contains three books, and, after completing his study of music theory in Harmonics 3.2, he examines the harmonic ratios that exist among psychological, astrological, and astronomical phenomena. Unfortunately, the last three chapters, 3.14-3.16, are no longer extant; only their titles remain. In the chapters that follow, I also make reference to Ptolemy's Geography, Optics, and two works—On the Elements and On Weights—that are entirely lost to us but which Simplicius, the sixth-century philosopher, attests to in his commentary on Aristotle's De caelo.

Ptolemy's texts offer few clues to their chronology. In the Tetrabiblos and Planetary Hypotheses, as well as in the Geography, he refers to his "syntaxis" or "mathematical composition", manifestly the Almagest. Consequently, Ptolemy must have completed these texts after the Almagest. Noel Swerdlow has argued that the Harmonics predates the Almagest because the titles of the three lost chapters indicate that they examined the relations between musical pitches and celestial bodies tabulated in the Canobic Inscription. Considering that Ptolemy must have written the Canobic Inscription before the Almagest, the Harmonics probably predates the Almagest as well, and I argue that Ptolemy completed On the Kritêrion before the Harmonics. Thus, one reasonably can conclude that Ptolemy composed the texts most relevant to this study in the following order: (1) On the Kritêrion and Hêgemonikon; (z) Harmonics; (3) Almagest; and (4) Tetrabiblos and Planetary Hypotheses, in an indeterminate order.

I take *Almagest 1.1* as the starting point of this study, as it functions as an epitome of Ptolemy's general philosophical system. My chapters 2 through 4 are analyses and intellectual histories of the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical statements of *Almagest 1.1*. In chapter 2, I argue that the metaphysics Ptolemy presents when differentiating the three theoretical sciences—physics, mathematics, and theology—is Aristotelian, though not Aristotle's, and that Ptolemy underlays his ontology with epistemology. In chapter 3, I show how Ptolemy blends an Aristotelian form of empiricism with a Platonic concern for distinguishing knowledge and opinion, and he thereby produces a new and subversive epistemology where mathematics is the only science that generates

knowledge rather than conjecture. Moreover, I analyze Ptolemy's argument for the contribution of mathematics to physics and theology, and I examine the case studies of how astronomy informs his theology and geometry drives his element theory. In chapter 4, I demonstrate how Ptolemy's distinctly mathematical ethics emerges from his response to a contemporary debate over the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy. Ptolemy argues that practical philosophy is dependent on theoretical philosophy and that mathematics, in particular, reveals the ultimate goal of all philosophy and even directs the ordinary affairs of life.

Thereafter, I address the philosophical statements Ptolemy propounds in the rest of his corpus. In chapter 5, I argue that Ptolemy's concept of harmonia, which he examines in the Harmonics, is crucial to his ethical system. Harmonia is a technical term whose meaning differs from our notion of harmony. I dissect the concept in detail and argue that it is because of harmonia that the human soul is able to resemble astronomical objects. In chapter 6, I analyze the relationship between harmonics and astrology, which Ptolemy portrays as complementary mathematical sciences, and I determine whether, when examining these sciences in the Harmonics and the remainder of the Almagest, Ptolemy maintains his position in *Almagest 1.1* that mathematics yields sure and incontrovertible knowledge. In chapters 7 and 8, I turn to Ptolemy's application of mathematics to the physics of composite bodies. In the former, I argue for the development of his psychology from *On the Kritêrion* to the Harmonics, where he strives to improve his account of the human soul by mathematizing it. The development in his psychological theory, I contend, marks the maturation of his scientific method. In the latter chapter, I argue that Ptolemy maintains the epistemology and scientific method that he articulates in *Almagest 1.1* and applies in the Harmonics in his studies of astrology and cosmology in the *Tetrabiblos* and *Planetary Hypotheses*. Overall, Ptolemy's philosophy remains remarkably consistent across his corpus.

At the foundation of Ptolemy's complex philosophical system is his ethics. The explicit motivation for his study of the theoretical sciences is his objective to transform his soul into a condition that resembles the divine, mathematical objects of the heavens, the movements and configurations of the stars. That Ptolemy required such a motivation for his prodigious and influential scientific investigations may be surprising, but we must remember that in antiquity mathematicians were rare. In any one generation in the ancient Mediterranean, no more than a few dozen individuals studied high-level mathematics. Given the scarcity of advanced mathematical study, an individual who concentrated on it would have made a deliberate choice to disavow more dominant intellectual practices, including the conventions of philosophers, and assume an unconventional way of life. Mathematicians play a special role in the ancient philosophical landscape in that they studied philosophy to varying degrees but they were not philosophers. In Ptolemy's case, he was well versed in the philosophy of his time. He appropriated ideas from authoritative and contemporary philosophical traditions for his own philosophical system. What led him to set aside the nonmathematical study of philosophy and focus on mathematics? We know so little of Ptolemy's life that it is impossible to say for certain. It would be easiest to suppose that he simply found mathematics to be captivatingly interesting. Nevertheless, I aim to present a more complex portrait, where the clues lie in the philosophical claims scattered across his corpus, and I propose that it was Ptolemy's appropriation of Platonic ethics and the formulation of a radical philosophy—the mathematical way of life—that motivated him to devote his life to mathematics.

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*Almagest 1.1* functions as an epitome of Ptolemy's philosophical system. He structured it in such a way as to mimic the opening chapters of philosophical handbooks, a contemporary genre used to introduce the philosophical ideas of authoritative figures like Plato. Ptolemy employs this format to establish the authority of his own philosophy, where mathematics reigns supreme. Like so-called middle Platonists, Ptolemy appropriated concepts from the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions as

well as, to a lesser extent, the Stoic and Epicurean, but the end product of this amalgamation is not a derivative philosophy or one of optimum agreement among schools of thought. Ptolemy's philosophy is subversive. He puts forward claims that would have been extraordinarily controversial at the time, and that discredit attempts by philosophers to answer the very questions of philosophy. According to Ptolemy, philosophers will never attain knowledge, they will never agree on the nature of theological and physical objects, because theology and physics are conjectural. Ptolemy argues that mathematics alone yields knowledge and that, furthermore, it is the only path to the good life.

Despite the singular status of mathematics in his philosophy, Ptolemy does not dispense with the other sciences. He improves them by means of mathematics. He argues that mathematics contributes to theology and physics and that, moreover, mathematics is foundational to practical philosophy and even the ordinary affairs of life. Mathematics reveals the ultimate goal of human life: to be like the divine, mathematical objects of the heavens, the movements and configurations of the stars. The best life is one where everything an individual does is guided by and in the service of this mathematical-ethical objective. Positioning mathematics at the foundation of all philosophy, theoretical and practical, as well as each and every one of the ordinary activities of life, Ptolemy propounds the mathematical way of life.

Ptolemy's corpus suggests that he lived in accordance with this way of life. Every one of his extant texts is a study or an application of mathematics, *except On the Kritêrion and Hêgemonikon*, which I argue he composed first of all of his extant texts and before he formulated his mature scientific method, including the persistent and necessary application of mathematics to physics and theology. In his corpus, Ptolemy applies geometry to element theory; harmonics to psychology; and astronomy to astrology, cosmology, and theology Besides *On the Kritêrion*, every one of his texts is an inquiry into or an implementation of mathematics. Yet, for Ptolemy mathematics is not propaedeutic; it is not preparatory to another, higher science. Mathematics is the highest science, and Ptolemy dedicated his life to it. If we take him at his word, he did so with the aim of transforming his soul into a condition that resembles divine, astronomical objects, which are constant, well ordered, commensurable, and calm. Ptolemy's ethics justifies his study of mathematics and provides the foundation for his many philosophical and scientific contributions.

Ptolemy defines rnathematics alongside the other two theoretical sciences in *Almagest 1.1*. Although he cites Aristotle, Ptolemy's definitions of physics, mathematics, and theology are not Aristotle's. They are Aristotelian. Ptolemy distinguishes the sciences according to their objects of study, and he classifies the three fundamental types of objects in the cosmos according to epistemic criteria. In other words, he incorporates epistemology at a foundational level to his metaphysics. More specifically, whether and how an object is perceptible to human beings defines what type of object it is. The Prime Mover, the object of theology, is imperceptible; physical objects are special sensibles, meaning they are perceptible by only one of the five senses; mathematical objects are common sensibles, perceptible by more than one sense.

Ptolemy fuses an Aristotelian theory of perception with the Platonic concern for distinguishing knowledge from opinion, which he associates with conjecture. According to Ptolemy, whether a human being is able to construct knowledge or mere conjecture when studying one of the sciences depends entirely on the properties of the objects the science studies. These properties are epistemic and ontological: perceptibility, clarity, and stability. A human being can have knowledge only of something perceptible. Because the Prime Mover is imperceptible, it is ungraspable and its study, theology, is conjectural. Although physical objects are perceptible, they are unstable and unclear. Their instability and lack of clarity prevent the human intellect from making clear and skillful judgments from their sense impressions, and therefore physics, too, is conjectural. Ptolemy calls physics conjectural not only in *Almagest 1.1* but also in the Tetrabiblos and Planetary Hypotheses. Nevertheless, Ptolemy mitigates the epistemic deficiency of physics and theology by systematically

placing them on a rnathematical foundation. He first studies entities mathematically before investigating their physical or theological nature.

The objects of mathematics, on the other hand, are stable and clear. A human being can skillfully examine clear sense impressions of them and thereby create knowledge. Among the mathematical sciences, harmonics and astronomy are complementary. Harmonics studies the relations among musical pitches, which are perceptible only by the sense of hearing; astronomy studies the movements and configurations of celestial bodies, which are perceptible only by sight. Moreover, harmonics and astronomy each employ an indisputable method, or instrument, of mathematics: arithmetic or geometry. Ptolemy indicates that harmonics generates sure and incontrovertible knowledge—as he claims all mathematics does in *Almagest 1.1*—but astronomy does so only inasmuch as it both employs Ptolemy's criterion of truth—the interplay of reason and perception—and relies on geometry, one of the indisputable instruments of mathematics. In the Almagest, Ptolemy takes the existence of eccentric and epicyclic spheres to be certain, but the quantitative aspects of his astronomical models are not exact. They are approximate rather than precise. The eccentric and epicyclic hypotheses follow from his criterion of truth and derive from geometry, but the spheres' parameters and periods of revolution do not follow from geometry and they depend solely on observation for their determination. Hence, Ptolemy concludes that mathematicians cannot know and should not claim that the quantitative features of astronomical models are true. They forever remain approximate.

Why, then, does Ptolemy even attempt to quantify his astronomical models? I suggest that he does so because astronomy, like astrology, is by definition a predictive science. Ptolemy defines astronomy in juxtaposition with astrology in the first chapter of the Tetrabiblos. Consistent with Almagest 1.1, he claims that the judgments of astronomy are sure, whereas astrology, like every other study of material quality, is conjectural. Yet, the claims of astrology are still possible, as opposed to impossible, and therefore they merit study. Astrology relies on the prior, complete study of astronomy, because it examines the effects the stars' movements and configurations have on sublunary bodies and souls. The stars' powers affect sublunary events by means of rays, which travel through the heavens and into the sublunary realm. Ptolemy also discusses the stars' powers and rays in the Planetary Hypotheses, and just as his astrology depends on astronomy, so, too, does his cosmology. In the Planetary Hypotheses, Ptolemy presents his astronomical models before he propounds his aethereal physics. According to Ptolemy, the heavens are animate. Celestial souls instigate and maintain the uniform circular motion of the spheres and parts of spheres that constitute their aethereal systems. Moreover, celestial souls cause these movements, I argue, as a result of their desire for the Prime Mover, which Ptolemy calls in *Almagest 1.1* "the first cause of the first motion of the universe?"

At the foundation of every one of Ptolemy's studies is his ethics. It is because mathematics furnishes the good life that Ptolemy pursues its study and application. I suggest that in Ptolemy's philosophical system both astronomy and harmonics produce the virtuous transformation of the human soul, just as in Plato's Timaeus the study of the heavens and harmony facilitate the ordering of the human soul's orbits.' For Ptolemy, it is because harmonia causes the existence of harmonic ratios among the constituent parts, movements, and configurations of the most complete and rational objects in the cosmos—human souls, musical systems, and heavenly bodies—that harmonic and astronomical objects serve as exemplars for human souls. As corruptible, human souls fall out of attunement. They require an exemplar, an instantiation of harmonic ratios in a body physically unlike themselves on which to model their formal configuration. By studying and practicing harmonics and/or astronomy, human beings attain good order in their souls. Through astronomy, they come to love the heavenly divine and transform their souls into the constant, well-ordered, commensurable, and

calm condition of the stars' movements and configurations. Restoring the harmonic structure of their souls, they resemble the divine. They become godlike.

By late antiquity, Ptolemy was celebrated as an authoritative figure. He acquired the epithets "wonderful," "excellent," and even "divine." Both Simplicius and Philoponus call him "the wonderful Ptolemy" , John Lydus—the sixth-century CE bureaucrat and author of a compilation of celestial and meteorological omen literature—refers to "the most divine Ptolemy", and Synesius remarks on "the excellent Ptolemy and his divine company of successors." They use these epithets when discussing Ptolemy's contributions in astronomy, astrology, and physics, but did Ptolemy's reputation extend to his more traditionally philosophical contributions? Were his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics influential?

I already have pointed toward some areas of possible influence. Similarly to how Ptolemy identifies mathematical objects with common sensibles, Philoponus and Sophonias, the late thirteenth- to early fourteenth-century Constantinopolitan monk, address the nature of mathematical objects in their studies of Aristotle's De anima. They define mathematical objects as forms, abstracted by thought from matter, that are comrnon sensibles.' In addition, Syrianus, the fifth-century Neoplatonic philosopher, addresses the possibility that mathematical objects are common sensibles abstracted by thought from perceptible objects.5 It is possible that Ptolemy's identification of mathematical objects with common sensibles influenced Syrianus, Philoponus, and thereafter Sophonias.

The influence of Ptolemy's epistemology was evidently long lasting. In the early fourteenth century, the statesman and scholar Theodorus Metochites examines mathematics in comparison to the other species of theoretical philosophy in the opening chapters of his Stoicheiôsis astronomikê, and he calls mathematical objects the only type of objects that are "really knowable" . Moreover, he describes mathematics as, with the exception of theology, superior to the other species of theoretical philosophy.' Similarly, in the sixteenth century the French mathematician Oronce Fine characterizes mathematics, as well as its relationship to physics and metaphysics, in a manner that recalls *Almagest 1.1*: "Mathematics is intermediate between the natural or physical investigation and the supernatural or metaphysical investigation (which deserve to be called conjecture rather than knowledge), taking part, with the natural, in matter, and joining the supernatural in the fact that it considers the same things as if they were separated from matter"' Fine appropriates both Ptolemy's argument for the intermediate status of mathematics and his epistemological assessment of the three theoretical sciences. Albert the Great in the thirteenth century cites Ptolemy in his commentary on Euclid's *Elements*. He calls Ptolemy "great in all divisions of learning" and paraphrases the epistemological argument of *Almagest 1.1*, which judges physics and theology to be conjectural and mathematics alone as productive of knowledge.' Albert's student, Thomas Aquinas repeatedly cites Ptolemy in his commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*. When affirming the trichotomy of the theoretical sciences, he appeals to Aristotle and Ptolemy side by side, and he quotes Ptolemy not only with respect to the sciences' epistemological status, as knowledge or conjecture, but also with respect to the indisputability of mathematical demonstrations: "But as Ptolemy says in the beginning of the Almagest, `Mathematics alone, if one applies himself diligently to it, will give the inquirer after knowledge firm and unshaken certitude by demonstrations carried out with unquestionable methods: "

Ptolemy's and Hero of Alexandria's claim that geometrical demonstration is indisputable echoes through the Greek corpus in the works of at least ten historical figures from the third to the fourteenth century. Notably, Proclus, in the fifth century, claims that Euclid improved on the work of his predecessors by reforming their propositions into irrefutable demonstrations, and he appropriates the geometrical style of proof in his studies of theology and physics, the Elements of Theology and Elements of Physics, respectively. In a way, Proclus combines Ptolemy's characterization of geometrical demonstration as indisputable with his mandate to apply

mathematics to theology and physics. For Ptolemy, this application means inferring the nature of the Prime Mover by way of an analogy with mathematical, specifically astronomical, objects and studying bodies mathematically before investigating their physical properties. For Proclus, mathematics' application entails composing discourses on nonmathematical objects in the style of geometry. It is the demonstration of theological propositions on the procession and characteristics of the various classes of gods as well as the demonstration from first principles of the existence of an unmoved cause of motion and change in the world. For Proclus, the irrefutability of geometrical demonstration extends to other fields of inquiry when their discourses are constructed in a geometrical style.

The appropriation of the geometrical style for nonmathematical studies flourished in the seventeenth century. Prompted by Mersenne, Descartes, for example, presents the central arguments of his Meditations in a geometrical form at the end of the Second Replies. He divides them into definitions, postulates, axioms or common notions, propositions and their demonstrations. Similarly, Spinoza employs the geometrical style in several works, most significantly in his Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. Thomas Hobbes embraces the geometrical style in his Leviathan. Contributing to the *Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum*, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debate on the scientific status and certainty of mathematics, he calls geometry "the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind," and he observes, concerning philosophers, "For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable."' Could the appropriation of the geometrical demonstration and the extension of its indisputability to nonmathematical studies have its roots in Ptolemy's epistemology?

The influence of Ptolemy's ethics likewise requires further study. Notably, in his commentary on the Almagest Theon of Alexandria proclaims that the overall message of *Almagest 1.1* is ethical. He paraphrases Ptolemy as claiming that the human being who lives well maintains the fine and well-ordered state. It is possible that the authors of commentaries on Ptolemy's Almagest, including Theon, adopted Ptolemy's ethical theory. At the very least, we know that later philosophers ascribed some ethical value to mathematics, as a type of mental or spiritual exercise. Matthew Jones has shown that Descartes, Pascal, and Leibniz considered mathematics to be avenues to the good life.' According to these philosophers, mathematics cultivates the mind. It exercises the intelligence and reveals the powers and limits of human reason. Yet, none of these philosophers took mathematics to be necessary or sufficient for the good life. For Ptolemy it is. Ptolemy's ethics is distinctly mathematical. It is only through mathematics that a human being achieves the good life.

Is Ptolemy alone in his devotion to the mathematical way of life? At the very least, we know that he was not alone in ascribing some ethical benefit to mathematics. Ptolemy's ethics is, after all, Platonic, and it resonates with mathematical practice well into the seventeenth century. What requires further study is why mathematicians throughout history chose to be mathematicians, or why individuals who concentrated their studies on mathematics did just that. In the modern world we ascribe a high value to mathematics and the mathematical sciences—particularly with respect to the economic rise of the so-called STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics—but a benefit supplemental to this economic payout and the value in the liberal, economically independent, study of mathematics are not self-evident. To choose to devote one's studies and the better part of one's life

to mathematics, an individual requires some reason or purpose for doing so, and, according to Ptolemy, the benefits mathematics provides are epistemological and ethical. Mathematics is the only field of inquiry through which human beings can acquire knowledge, and it is the only path to the

good life. In Ptolemy's philosophy, the best way an individual can live his life is to live the mathematical way of life. <>

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## Intercultural Modes of Philosophy, Volume One: Principles to Guide Philosophical Community by Eli Kramer [Philosophy as a Way of Life, Brill, 9789004468979]

Until rather recently, philosophy, when practiced as a way of life, was, for most, a communal enterprise of mutually reinforced personal cultivation. In these times of social isolation, including in academic philosophy itself, it is time, yet again, to revitalize this lost, but vital, intercultural mode of philosophy. This volume characterizes a neglected communal mode of philosophy — the philosophical community — by describing the constellation of metaethical principles (general, axiological, cultural, and dialectical) that cultivates its values. The book draws on examples from across the globe and history, including interviews of adherents of living philosophical communities.

> In general, the idea of a completely contemplative life of studious leisure, whose pleasantness would be still further enhanced by the pure pleasure of the spiritual friendship, exerted on all of Antiquity a fascination which seemed to only increase at the end of the Roman Empire. One hundred years after Plotinus, Augustine, too, before his conversion, would dream of a phalanstery of philosophers, where, in leisure and complete communal ownership of possessions, he and his friends could "flee the noise and annoyances of human life.

As Hadot, suggests, this desire for philosophical community was influential across antiquity, and can be found in its most prominent figures, such as, for example, in Marcus Aurelius:

> The main cause of Marcus' lassitude, however, was his passionate love for moral good. A world in which this absolute value was not recognized seemed to him an empty world, in which life no longer had any meaning. As he grew old in such an enormous empire, in the huge crowds which surrounded and acclaimed him, in the atrocious Danubian war as well as in the triumphal parades of the city of Rome, he felt himself alone. Marcus felt a void around himself, since he could not realize his ideal (ix, 3,7): to live in community with others, in search of the only thing necessary.

This desire for community on the quest for wisdom, away from the noise, annoyance, and tragedy of the heart of society, was not only desired in the Western World. For example, in Korea, drawing on the legacy of Zhu Xi in China: "In particular, the Wuyi Study Hall [of Zhu Xi] captured the imagination of Korean scholars: it became the imagined ideal of a scholar's paradise where the master sage speaks freely with his disciples, enjoys the beauty of nature, and devotes his time to moral cultivation and poetry." It is no exaggeration to say that such longings have been felt across history and the globe.

But whatever happened to this hope of a shared philosophical life? Sure, present professional philosophers create small groups of friends during their graduate philosophical education. Yes, some of them may become lifelong friends. A few of them may even discuss dreams of a "better" institution, where they could do "philosophy how it should be done." But mostly these dreams come to naught, and the graduated professor of philosophy continues a journey to build "a solitary philosophical burrow."

Despite the dominance of individualized modes of philosophy today, the conception of philosophy being solely an isolated enterprise is a rather new occurrence in the history of philosophical praxis:

> The figure of the desert saint or the solitary philosopher is alien to the ways in which ancient philosophy was lived. The life was not conceived of as an exercise in introspection and isolation from others, unless for brief moments, as was the case with Democritus (9.38), the Academic Xenocrates (4.11), and Pyrrho (9.63). It was instead characterized by an interpersonal dimension, with interlocutors and auditors who were sometimes outside the school and not focused exclusively on adhering to its tenets.

There was (and still are in a few corners of the world) robust houses, societies, schools, monasteries, social movements, and other forms of associated philosophical living, in dialogue with their culture(s). In fact, for a long time, associated, community living was one of the identified "modes" of philosophical praxis, hence the deep desires for it in the ancient world; it was even understood as the central mode of doing philosophy. Today, most academics are only familiar with the individualized modes of philosophy. More radically, individualized philosophy is so pervasive that other modes of philosophy are treated as almost de facto non-existent, or at best superficial to the real business of philosophy.

Of course, there are important individualized modes of philosophy that have deep roots in the philosophical tradition. There are philosophical speculators who create and maintain philo-dynamic cosmic images for reconstructive contemplation (such as Kant and Peirce). There are also philosophical wanderers, who enact reflective life as the force that, as an exercise in being obnoxious, awakens culture out of its settled dogmatisms and onto new and more ethically rich routes in the wider world (such as Diogenes of Sinope and Cornel West). There is however another primary and largely neglected mode of philosophy which is mutually reinforced ethical praxis rooting in a shared cosmopolitan place. I call this mode of philosophy, philosophical community. Together, these three modes of philosophy can be thought of as the "three tripod legs" that support (ground) robust philosophical life within, and effective for, a culture.

In this volume, I characterize and defend the neglected mode of philosophy, philosophical community, by describing the constellation of metaethical principles – general, axiological, cultural, and dialectical – that cultivate its values. One can find the origins of this mode of philosophy in ancient philosophical schools and monasteries. In the Western and Middle-Eastern traditions, a pivotal philosophical community was Plato's Academy, which integrated the Athenian higher education model of the Sophists, with Socratic philosophy and dialectics.

My philosophical methodology is radically empirical philosophy of culture. I take all experience, and especially the relationships we find in experience, as real and concrete. The principles will be drawn from an imaginative interpretation of the experiences of philosophical community, considered diachronically, or globally and historically, and which are then organized as a synchronic coordinate whole.

I take community as ever-overlapping personal relationships. These relationships are a "community of interpretation," or the relationships that build increasing determinacy of meaning in the universe. A philosophical community, then, is not reducible to a collection of people but can be thought of as made of a special kind of community of interpretation as it shares some sort of place.

The "principles" of philosophical community, as I envision them, are indebted to Edgar Sheffield Brightman's idea of "moral law," and in certain aspects of Kant's logic. Brightman defined a moral law as "a universal principle to which the will ought to conform in its choices." Brightman saw these moral laws as ideal articulations of the principal values already presupposed in our actions. The "laws" were not supposed to articulate prescriptions for what one ought to do a priori, but rather were supposed to articulate the values we already have in our successful a posteriori self-regulated activity. While I recognize the insight of Brightman, I reject his rationalistic and transcendental tendencies in favor of a milder, radically empirical approach. I only postulate principles, without claiming these have any ontological necessity as the form of what we must value when we value. For our purposes, a principle, at the very least, is a postulated articulation of emergent practices that lead to predicable success at achieving our ends-in-view. These principles should articulate for us what philosophical communities have done to be successful, through refinement over generations, at cultivating and maintaining robust praxis. They are reflective aides on our own successful inquiry. Although the principles articulate certain kinds of means to successful inquiry, they do not bear ontological necessity unto themselves. When we think about principles, we super-add that mongrel breed of necessity which enables us to recognize the relation of such principles to our successes and failures. The principles carry no necessity save as practical aides to reflection on philosophical community life at its most intense and successful. Together, this constellation of principles can help us refine for ourselves a vision of what the shared places of philosophical life should look like, and further they should help us frame what a "brocard" for philosophical life should be in the twenty-first century. Despite my sometimes novel articulation of them, these principles are not new, but rather revitalize in us the tradition of praxis that has kept robust communal philosophical life alive through the last three millennia.

Although the principles are systematized through careful and reasoned philosophical reflection, this volume is not meant to be read like a typical contemporary philosophical essay or treatise. It is an artistic, philo-dynamic image, or a reflectively charged version of what Susanne Langer called a "presentation symbol." For Langer, presentational symbols are what the arts give us, like dance, painting, and music. Symbolic reference (a concept) as an indexical function, is replaced by a field of connotative engagement (an art). Such presentational symbols offer a significant form, that can provide knowledge, but a kind of knowledge not reducible to serially related, referred, and exclusively classed, parts. Think of the way a painting, or a good novel, can be educative and enriching for us, and yet we cannot fully determine a discursive story that exhaustively captures the kind of knowledge it gives us. A good presentational symbol offers its own knowledge, and can be, but by no means has to be, a tremendous resource for reflection. A great piece of music can be very educative for us, without ever being brought to reflection or full discursive reasoning.

Unlike a presentational symbol, a phil-dynamic image needs to be charged to incite a reader, student, or audience, to new reflective and discursive engagement with the subject matter. Plato's dialogues, Montaigne's Essays, Emerson's Nature, and Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit are examples of works written as phil-dynamic images. Unlike a Van Gogh painting, the whole purpose of their significant forms was to incite our reflective life and discursive reasoning. Further, the great philosophical speculators offer, in their full philosophies (especially their metaphysics), dynamic images of cosmos.

In the American tradition of Emerson's Nature and Essays, instead of writing another interesting, but ultimately passive piece of academic writing, I have attempted to create an organized constellation of principles that helps provide a modest dynamic image, filled with resources for reflection, both discursive and non-discursive. It is an "existential," or "spiritual," exercise, in Pierre Hadot's sense of the term, as a technique of developing active habits of reflective, personal cultivation. Its aim is to lead to educative self-reflection. This will be discussed in further detail later in Part 1 of this work.

In the rest of Part 1, I articulate what I mean by "modes of philosophy" and "philo-dynamic images." I then offer two essays, one that gives a brief sketch of some traditions of philosophical community across the globe, and another that explores its utter marginalization due to the rise of professional philosophy. We will find out that these are overlapping narratives. I then briefly summarize my site visits to a few exemplary philosophical communities (and related places) still in existence. Only afterwards will the need for the philosophical community in our current period be understood. Without the tripod leg of philosophical community, it will become apparent that philosophical speculators and philosophical wanderers, by themselves, are either too divorced from their broader culture, or belong to an all too transient mode of philosophy, to be sustainable and continually improve cultural life. Further, it will become apparent that the technical philosophical mode runs rampant without sustained places for philosophy as a way of life. In the last section of Part 1, given the peculiar organization of this work, I will lay out the logic of "principles" for a radically empirical philosophy of culture. I will also discuss my research protocol. Why and how do principles "work," and what service do they provide in understanding and revitalizing philosophical community?

In Part 2, Chapter 1, I first elucidate the order of exhibition for the principles. I lay out the systema (the organic general phases, see below). Only then will I be able to explore the peculiar general principles of philosophical community. These principles are the most general structures of the form of life that is philosophical community. The other principles fill out the content of these general principles. In Chapter 2, I will explore the personal axiological principles of philosophical community. These principles fill in the more concrete qualities of the general principles, and each axiological principle shares an analogical relationship to one of the general principles. In Chapter 3, I will explore the concrete cultural principles of philosophical community. These principles are the most concrete in the sense that they illuminate the relationship philosophical community has with the meanings and practices of the larger culture. The concrete cultural principles further determinate

(make further concrete) the meaning of philosophical community as part of a broader community of interpretation. Upon returning to these concrete principles from higher systema (phases of generality), the whole system will be further genetically specified. Within each section, several dialectical tensions will become apparent and will be "propitiated" (an appeasing gift). In other words, imminent principles will be illuminated at the heart of these tensions. In Chapter 4, the principles drawn from these series of dialectical transformations will be explored. Finally, in the conclusion, the role for philosophical community today will be addressed.

In Appendix 1, in order to clarify the variety of special categories and terminology I use in the volume, I lay out what I call the "Systemic Scheme," in the tradition of Alfred North Whitehead's "Categorial Scheme," which provides a summary and glossary of the systema, principles, and axioms of transformation of the coordinate whole. In Appendix 2, I discuss my primary site visit, research interview protocol. I also include two example interviews from site visits. <>

## WHAT MAKES A CHURCH SACRED? LEGAL AND RITUAL PERSPECTIVES FROM LATE ANTIQUITY by Mary K. Farag [TRANSFORMATION OF THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE, University of California Press, 9780520382008] A free open access ebook is available upon publication. Learn more at www.luminosoa.org.

### Caught between Justice and Mercy: The Sacred in Late Antiquity

What is the purpose of a church? Who owns a church? Mary K. Farag persuasively demonstrates that three groups in late antiquity were concerned with these questions: Christian leaders, wealthy laypersons, and lawmakers. Conflicting answers usually coexisted, but from time to time they clashed and caused significant tension. In these disputes, juridical regulations and opinions mattered more than has been traditionally recognized. Considering familiar Christian controversies in novel ways, Farag's investigation shows that scholarship has misunderstood well-known religious figures by ignoring the legal issues they faced. This seminal text nuances vital aspects of scholarly conversations on sacred space, gift giving, wealth, and poverty in the late antique Mediterranean world, making use not only of Latin and Greek sources but also Coptic and Arabic evidence.

St. Laurentius has been celebrated for his wit in a time of grave distress. In the mosaic featured on the front cover of my new book, **WHAT MAKES A CHURCH SACRED?**, he stands prominently, carrying an open volume. Next to him, Bishop Pelagius of Rome holds a miniature model of the church that he dedicated to St. Laurentius—the very church in which this mosaic once stood. By Bishop Pelagius's time, St. Laurentius was a figure of the distant past, but stories continued to be told and retold about the saint.




The cover photo shows part of the triumphal arch mosaic of San Lorenzo fuori le mura. Photo credit: Charles Barber.

This mosaic is a pictorial rendition of the cunning that costed St. Laurentius his life. It also succinctly captures the main subject of my book.

Laurentius was said to have rebuffed the government's attempt to seize the church treasury over which Laurentius served as steward. Laurentius did so by cleverly deceiving the city prefect. When the prefect summoned him to hand over "the treasure of the church," Laurentius brought forward lepers, the poor, and widows. Coming to collect the expected wealth, the prefect was instead confronted by the complaints and appeals of neglected members of society.

With this action, Laurentius deliberately interpreted "the treasure of the church" to mean the people. But the prefect had clearly intended on collecting material things. We see these two conflicting interpretations of the church's treasure within the cover image. Bishop Pelagius holds the miniature model of a church gleaming with gold and gems. St. Laurentius's book names the people, declaring "He has distributed freely; he has given to the poor," and Laurentius's presence as a haloed saint evokes his legendary equivocation of the two meanings. In Bishop Pelagius's time, the connotative exchange had even made its way into the laws of the church, in which thieves of the church's wealth were labeled "murderers of the poor."

In **WHAT MAKES A CHURCH SACRED?,** I focus on these two concepts of the church as sacred treasure. The miniature model represents what I call a legal discourse, while the open book represents what I term a ritual discourse. These two perspectives on the church often clashed in late antiquity. The legal discourse favored the perpetual maintenance of material things. Legally speaking, dissolving church assets was tantamount to sacrilege. By contrast, the ritual discourse prioritized the people. As some church leaders argued, if churches were built for the sake of people, then the needs of the people should take precedence over the perpetual maintenance of church assets. With this rationale, bishops committed sacrilege to take care of the poor by illegally repurposing church treasures. Such pious acts of mercy were inescapably political, however, as they (un-)intentionally threatened the legacy of the donors who gave the treasures as gifts.

My book calls attention to the unease between these two perspectives. It does so by distinguishing and juxtaposing legal ways of preserving church property in late antiquity with ritual ways of celebrating it. What it meant for a church to be sacred depended on whether one's eyes focused on the miniature church or the words of the open book in this image. It was hard to toggle one's eyes back and forth from one to the other, but that is exactly what good bishops in late antiquity were expected to do.

General Index

Excerpt: "When I say 'the church,' I do not mean only a place." John Chrysostom said these words in April 400. Rumor had it that the bishop refused to welcome a fugitive who sought protection in his church. It was said that a certain Count John got arrested because John Chrysostom denied him asylum. John Chrysostom delivered a homily in the church that day, telling his listeners not only what happened from his perspective but also what it meant for a church to be a church. He told them that a church was not just a special shelter, a place where people could expect that they would not be assaulted no matter what their crime. He told them that the church was "faith and life". One should not just rest under the protective sacrality of the church. One should conform to the sacred "mindset" of the church; one should become the church.

John Chrysostom was one among many bishops who tried to define what it meant for a church to be sacred. In the homily cited above, he urges his listeners to see beyond the legal definition of a church as a res sacra, a "sacred thing." I will return to the story of John Chrysostom at the end of part I, but until then the topic of this book will be the very legal definition that John Chrysostom sought to transcend—the legal definition that, for John Chrysostom, governed the church as though it were a mere body without a mindset guiding it. In part II, I will resume the theme of John Chrysostom's "mindset" of the church or the ritual discourse concerning "the sacred."

The making of churches into res sacrae occurred, legally and canonically, from Constantine to Justinian. But even though church property in many ways was already treated as a res sacra by Constantine and his successors, it was not until the time of Justinian that church buildings and their properties explicitly became res sacrae. Part I tells the story of how a definition of "the sacred" conceived for traditional Greco-Roman temples was applied to ecclesial property and expanded in scope in the process. I craft this story on the basis of two kinds of rules: the laws of emperors and the canons of bishops. A canon was an ecclesiastical statute usually promulgated as a result of a council. I use the term "law" in the broadest and most neutral sense to refer to emperors' constitutions, rescripts, leges, and so on. Civil and ecclesiastical authorities in late antiquity differentiated between laws and canons, even though they were not hermetically sealed sets of rules.

Imperial chanceries and episcopal synods did not act independently of one another. Emperors convoked some episcopal synods, sent officials to oversee or even preside over proceedings, and enforced certain canons by issuing corresponding laws. Bishops petitioned emperors for legislation that supported their practices, resulting in the expansion of what the designation res sacra entailed. While both the imperial and episcopal bodies sought to synchronize their rules, they disagreed as to the direction in which the synchronization should occur. At times, emperors refused episcopal petitions; at other times, bishops persisted in practices that civil authorities outlawed. The discursive construction of ecclesial property as a res sacra took place in the midst of such cooperation and tension.

Imperial and episcopal rule-making bodies from Constantine to Justinian granted ecclesial property the same characteristics that the emperor and his civil laws had. Church property became sacred things. That meant they were inviolable: they were protected by God, and in turn provided protection and safety. Just as the emperor and his laws were inviolable, divinely protected, and ensured protection and safety, so too were churches. Although emperors ceased to bear the title of pontifex maximus ("high priest") by the end of the fourth century, they nevertheless continued to wield important control over sacred things. Such is the image of ecclesial property that laws and canons paint.

I will follow the contours of this image in part I and show that familiarity with it sheds a different light on well-known episodes of ecclesiastical history. Disputes commonly considered theological in nature had as much to do with the control and administration of ecclesial property as they did with

knowledge of God. For one thing, church buildings and property played no small role in the deposition of bishops such as John Chrysostom and Ibas of Edessa, among others. For another, disputes created stigmas for centuries among Christians in North Africa on account of res sacrae. Rules regarding ecclesial property mattered. Rule-making bodies provided the blueprint for churches by setting conceptual parameters on what could and could not be done with sacred property.

In part I, the reader will encounter three distinct but interrelated structural components: analysis of juristic pedagogy, compilation of rules from various regions of the Roman Empire, and case study. The compilation of rules does not make for light reading. I have compiled and organized rulebooks in order to make a cumulative point. No matter where one looks—north or south, east or west, canon or law—one general principle appears again and again in the late antique Roman world: sacred things are divinely protected and protecting.

It is not because copies of rules from one region migrated to another that such a general principle can be found across the Mediterranean. Rather, it is because of pedagogical practices. Even after the last western emperor died, legal practice in both East and West continued to rely on classical jurisprudence produced in the second and third centuries. The general principles outlined in such jurisprudence were taught all across the Mediterranean.8 Nevertheless, every locale applied the general principles in its own way. Therefore, I have also included many of the specific details of the rules cataloged in part I so as not to level out the granular texture of regional particularity. However, I do not place or analyze each rule in its specific context. To do so would detract from the main point: that classical juristic principles taught in Roman law schools surface again and again in the rules produced by both imperial consistories and ecclesiastical councils. Instead, I include select case studies at the end of each rulebook. The case studies make the significance of some rules come alive through reports of bishops' trials and show how knowledge of the rules supplies us with a new reading lens by which to interpret well-known conciliar proceedings and other reports about the individuals at the highest level of ecclesiastical administration, the bishops.

It would require another book altogether to evaluate the enforcement (or lack thereof) of the rules amassed in part I. This book is not about how or to what extent prescriptive ideologies affected the real lives of human persons. This book is about naming those prescriptive ideologies and noting how thoroughly they pervade the Roman Empire in late antiquity. The bottom line of part I is that, ideologically-speaking, the sacralization of things made them unowned and unownable. Scholars have sought in vain for individual or corporate owners of church property. In the late antique Roman juristic mindset, the concepts of "sacred" and "ownership" were mutually exclusive.

Whereas part I contributes to the legal turn in the study of the later Roman Empire,10 offering a more or less comprehensive assessment of the legal status of church property, part II is not comprehensive in scope. Because jurisprudence specifies the ritual of consecration as the means by which "sacred things" are made, I turn in part II to the ritual context of the consecration of churches in order to evaluate what kind of relationship existed between the ritual discourse of consecration and the legal one. I examine select pieces of evidence: dedicatory images and inscriptions, homilies and hymns composed for church consecrations, and narratives composed to commemorate the anniversary of consecrations. I chose textual and material evidence pertaining to the ritual of consecration that a late antique audience could have likely interpreted with reference to juristic pedagogy.

I argue in part II that the discourse about church assets in dedicatory and consecratory ritual contexts is different from that of the legal one, yet not always mutually exclusive. To carve the contrast in high relief, I borrow language from social anthropologists. Legal protection of ecclesial property entailed limiting their exchangeability, a process anthropologists call "singularization." Ritually, however, exchange of ecclesial property was the very means by which humans became living

temples and were socialized into the celestial kingdom. In both legal and ritual contexts, ecclesial property was a "gift," but the legal discourse restricted the possibilities for regifting it, whereas the ritual one celebrated such opportunities.

"Commodity," of course, is a term foreign to the historical sources analyzed here. However, it is a useful term for describing how donors reacted to the ritual discourse. To donors, regifting amounted to the recommoditization of their singularized gifts. For this reason, when bishops prioritized the ritual understanding of how to use church assets over the legal one, donors could pursue them. Sometimes bishops did suffer the juridical consequences for their ritually sound but illegal repurposing of donations.

When Christian groups did not have the law on their side and were imperially repressed, they created a ritual discourse to push back against the regulatory one in another way. Such groups resorted to the composition of pseudepigraphy about consecratory rituals to claim for their churches the status of "sacred thing" that had been denied them legally. For the pseudepigraphers, the grantor of sacrality was Christ and his agents without the intermediary of the civil government.

I distinguish ritual from law in order to indicate how the former responded to the latter. In fact, however, the two are related. It is the juridical context that authorized the ritual of consecration, making the ritual a subsidiary aspect of the law. Indeed, it is this dependence that the pseudepigraphers discussed in chapter 6 sought to undo.

The purpose of part II is not to show that such ritual discourses were somehow unique. In fact, scholars of traditional Greco-Roman ritual practices, Christian monasticism, premodern gift-giving, and still other fields will notice innumerable similarities. The purpose of part II is to show how ritual practices responded to legal strictures. Imperially endorsed bishops generated a ritual discourse surrounding res sacrae that, when taken to its logical conclusion, turned the legal discourse on its head. Those bishops who were not imperially endorsed created a ritual discourse that pulled the rug out from under the legal framework.

This book offers an account of how ecclesial property was socially constructed as sacred in late antiquity. It evaluates the relationship between legal and ritual views of what made church property sacred. Like tectonic plates, the perspectives "fit," but events on their colliding boundary "shook" late antique societies in discernable ways.

Chapter 1 identifies the way in which a "thing" (res) became "sacred" (sacra), by whom and how such "things" were administrated, and how others' "sacred things" were delegitimized. A case study of a dispute that Synesius of Cyrene reports shows one way by which the legal making of churches could be abused for the purpose of usurping territory outside one's jurisdiction. A case study on the trial of Crispinus of Calama demonstrates how bishops in North Africa petitioned for laws against their rival bishops in order to delegitimize them and their sacred places.

Chapters 2 and 3 examine what it meant for a thing to be sacred. Chapter 2 shows that the sacred was protected by God, while chapter 3 demonstrates that the sacred was protecting of those in need. Chapter 2 explains that ecclesial property was protected from alienation and damage. A case study on a contested early sixth-century episcopal election in Rome (the so-called "Laurentian schism") shows how the matter of churches' protection could be employed to question the validity of an election and become an opportunity for the relationship between church and state to be worked out. A case study on the problem of interests of bishops' kin demonstrates that issues of financial misconduct were as important as problems of blasphemy or heresy in trials of bishops.

Chapter 3 draws a picture of how protected places became protecting sanctuaries by analyzing three legally regulated ways in which sacred places offered protection to those in need: manumission of

slaves, asylum of refugees, and ransom of captives. Although textbooks of Roman law did not teach that res sacrae had any protecting characteristics, bishops petitioned civil authorities for legal support of churches as places of sanctuary. The classical legal category res sacra was not applied inflexibly to Christian temples but rather morphed in the process of application. In particular, bishops advocated for expanding the types of sacred property exempt from the rule against alienation. Case studies on bishops accused of sacrilege for their practices of mercy bring into high relief the fine line between financial misconduct and care for the needy.

Chapter 4 examines the material remains of late antique church floors and walls, particularly images and inscriptions installed to dedicate churches to their celestial patrons. In certain ways, such material culture visually reproduced juristic rhetoric: that God and his saints protect their churches. In other ways, however, images and inscriptions invited viewers to learn that the rules governing wealth investment strategies in the celestial realm differ from those of the terrestrial realm. Chapter 4 pairs with chapter 3 in that it resumes the topic of churches as protecting spaces.

Chapter 5 analyzes compositions produced for performance on the occasions of church consecrations. This chapter argues that orators and hymnographers ironically downplayed the significance of the church building during the festivities of its consecration. Such performers used the occasion instead to pinpoint human beings as the true temples of God and explain how humans must enter into athletic competition with church buildings and surpass their value. Chapter 5 pairs with chapter 2, showing how performances did not define ecclesial property in terms of alienability (as jurists did) but as a blueprint for the human soul's perfection.

Chapter 6 first offers a brief overview of the many ways in which consecrations were commemorated with anniversary celebrations. The chapter then focuses on one particular set of literature produced in Egypt: pseudonymous homilies for the annual anniversary of imperially repressed churches in Egypt. These homilies reframe scriptural stories to offer narratives of how the respective churches were originally built and consecrated. The chapter argues that the writers composed such stories in order to defend the sacrality of their churches despite the government's refusal to grant them the status of res sacrae. Chapter 6 pairs with chapter 1, analyzing ritualized responses to the juridical question, "what makes a thing sacred?"

The term "sacred" has been a difficult one to define, with most historians resorting to modern anthropological descriptions in order to make use of it. I show that there was a juridical definition of "the sacred" in late antiquity, one originally conceived for "pagan" sacred spaces but later applied to Christian temples. This legal definition of "the sacred" has far-reaching consequences for understanding why Christians fought over ecclesial property and composed pseudepigraphy from AD 312 to AD 638. Management of church wealth was a major issue—just as important as theological questions during this period of "the early church councils"—and scholars misunderstand well-known figures and events by ignoring the legalities. <>

## Theosophical Appropriations: Esotericism, Kabbalah, and the Transformation of Traditions edited by Julie Chajes and Boaz Huss [Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 9789655361797]

"The thirteen chapters of this volume examine intersections between theosophical thought and areas as diverse as the arts, literature, scholarship, politics, and, especially, modern interpretations of Judaism and kabbalah. Each chapter offers a case study in theosophical appropriations of a different type and in different context. The chapters join together to reveal congruencies between

theosophical ideas and a wide range of contemporaneous intellectual, cultural, religious, and political currents. They demonstrate the far-reaching influence of the theosophical movement worldwide from the late-nineteenth century to the present day" Contributors: Karl Baier, Julie Chajes, John Patrick Deveney, Victoria Ferentinou, Olav Hammer, Boaz Huss, Massimo Introvigne, Andreas Kilcher, Eugene Kuzmin, Shimon Lev, Isaac Lubelsky, Tomer Persico, Helmut Zander.

CONTENTS



Excerpt: Appreciation of the historical importance of the Theosophical Society (henceforth, TS) and related movements is growing, and rightly so, yet the extent of theosophical influences can still be surprising, even to scholars in the field. The chapters of this volume contribute to our increasing recognition of the global impact of the TS and its ideas and illustrate lesser-known instances of theosophical appropriation around the world.

From its very beginning, the TS was an international movement. Its founders were an Arnerican lawyer and journalist, Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832-1907), an Irish-American lawyer, William Quan Judge (1851-1896), and a Russian occultist writer and adventurer, Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891). Following its founding in New York in 1875, the TS soon became a worldwide organization. In 1879, its headquarters moved to India, first to Bomaby, and later to Adyar, Madras. From the 1880's, theosophical lodges were established around the world: in America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia. Today, the movernent has branches in about sixty countries. The first objective of the Society (as formulated in 1896) was "to form a nucleus of the universal brotherhood of humanity without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or color," and it was open to members of diverse religious, national, and ethnic backgrounds. The universalistic nature of the TS was expressed in its interest in different religious and esoteric traditions: first, in Western esoteric, ancient Egyptian, and Kabbalistic doctrines, and later, in Hindu and Buddhist ones. As a

movernent, Theosophy encouraged the comparative study of religion and integrated into its teachings concepts and thernes derived from a large variety of contexts. Unlike other esoteric movements, the TS included many non-Christian and non-Western members from the outset. These members participated in theosophical adaptations and interpretations of their traditions. Despite these interpretations being offered by adherents of the traditions themselves, they were usually predicated on a modern esoteric perspective, within a Western discursive framework. Theosophical appropriations had a considerable impact on the way different religious traditions were perceived in modern Western culture. In particular, they had a decisive and significant impact on new developrnents in, and transformations of, modern Kabbalistic, Hindu, and Buddhist currents.

The chapters that follow are the product of an international workshop held at Ben-Gurion University in December 2013, funded by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) and the Goldstein-Goren Center for Jewish Thought at Ben-Gurion University. Scholars attended the conference from Israel, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Holland, the United States, Japan, and Sri Lanka. The workshop was part of a four-year research project funded by the ISF (Grant 774/10) on Kabbalah and the Theosophical Society.

As part of that project, we studied Jewish involvement in the TS, the formation of Jewish theosophical groups, and the adaptation and interpretation of Kabbalah by Jewish and non-Jewish theosophists. These topics were also central to the workshop, a centrality reflected in this volume, with its section on Kabbalistic appropriations. The workshop considered Judaism's often-ambivalent placement between the categories of "East" and "West" and the TS's role in the construction of modern Jewish and non-Jewish identities in relation to those categories, inter alia. Since we believe questions relating to Jewish theosophists and the appropriations of Kabbalah in the TS should be understood in wider context, the workshop also examined theosophical adaptations in other cultures and traditions as well, especially within Anthroposophy, which emerged directly from the TS.

The chapters in the volume examine intersections between theosophical thought with areas as diverse as the arts, literature, and poetry, scholarship, modern interpretations of Judaism and of Kabbalah, Orientalism, and politics, especially nationalism. How may we explain the extent of these theosophical influences? Although they are very different from one another, these chapters join each other in pointing towards congruencies between theosophical ideas and the cultural logic of a wide range of contemporary currents. In other words, we suggest that Theosophy was exceptionally successful (and influential) because it was a key expression of some of the central cultural, intellectual, and political developments of the period. Yet, for all these congruencies between theosophical, artistic, literary, political and scholarly themes, there were also important differences and tensions. Max Müller's negative stance towards his theosophical admirer, Madame Blavatsky, and Gandhi's ambivalent attitude towards the TS (even though it had influenced him) are just two of the examples discussed in the chapters that follow.

## Chapter Survey and Outlines

The present volume includes thirteen chapters, each of them a fascinating case study of a theosophical appropriation of a different type and in a different context. They are divided into three thematic sections: Theosophical Transformations, Kabbalistic Appropriations, and Global Adaptations. The first section, Theosophical Transformations, focuses on the appropriations that took place in the early TS, especially in the thought of Madame Blavatsky.

In the opening paper, Julie Chajes discusses two of Blavatsky's early works that refer to Kabbalah: "A Few Questions to Hiraf' (1875) and Isis Unveiled (1877). The chapter elucidates Blavatsky's doctrines of Kabbalah in those texts, each of which have distinct emphases. In "A Few Questions," Blavatsky emphasized Rosicrucianism and Spiritualism, identifying Kabbalah with the current doctrines of the

Theosophical Society: conditional immortality and metempsychosis. Blavatsky abandoned these doctrinesin her later works. In "A Few Questions," she alluded to three main types of Kabbalah: An original, Oriental Cabala, its Jewish derivation, and the Rosicrucian Cabala, which drew on the Oriental and Jewish varieties. Blavatsky was influenced in her understanding of the Jewish Cabala by the work of the Polish Jewish scholar, Christian David Ginsburg (1831-1914), and many of her ideas about the Rosicrucian Cabala carne from the work of the freemasonic writer Hargrave Jennings (1817-1890). Blavatsky brought these two sources—the work of a professional scholar and that of an amateur historian—together in her narrative.

Two years later, in Isis Unveiled, Blavatsky postulated a Buddhist source for Kabbalah, a position unique to that work. The universalism of her Kabbalah was now more pronounced, and her treatment of Kabbalistic doctrines much more detailed. In proposing a Buddhist source, she was influenced by C. W. King (1818-1888), an expert on gemstones who wrote a book about Gnosticism. Other sources cited in Blavatsky's discussions of Kabbalah include the early-modern Christian Hebraist and Kabbalist, Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636-1689), and the nineteenth-century French Jewish scholar, Adolphe Franck (1809-1893). Although Blavatsky does seem to have known Franck's renowned 1843 work on the Kabbalah in the original French, at least in part, her citations of Franck and of Knorr were derived largely second-hand through the works of the Boston lawyer, Samuel Fales Dunlap (1825-1905). One again, therefore, Blavatsky drew together an assortment of scholarly and non-scholarly influences.

In her narratives, Blavatsky drew on these diverse sources to affirm Ain Soph as the true source of the cosmos in explicit opposition to the idea that Jehovah was the creator. The true origin of the cosmos in Ain Soph was, Blavatsky claimed, attested in the Bible, and in philosophies and religions the world over from time irnmemorial, but only in their correct, Kabbalistic interpretations. Thus cast as the sole legitimate form of Biblical hermeneutics and as an ancient science, Kabbalah was used to attack the hegemony of the Catholic and Protestant Churches and the prepotence of "materialism," especially within the natural sciences. Kabbalah therefore empowered Blavatsky to pronounce boldly on the ongoing disputes arising from the baffling modern diversification of scientific and theological developments, attempting to lead all branches of human knowledge back to their clairned original integrity.

Blavatsky's Kabbalah, Chajes argues, was a modern form of Kabbalah. It incorporated numerous and diverse modern sources and it was related to rnodern discourses of religion, science, progression, and decline, and, importantly, to modernizing interpretations of Buddhism, Judaism, and Kabbalah. All of this was marshaled in the proposition of solutions to modern "problems" such as the "conflict" between religion and science and the perceived growth of nihilism. This discursive entanglement and integration of seemingly incongruous sources was of central importance to the shape modern (and post-rnodern) Kabbalah would come to take, both in subsequent theosophical literature and in the myriad of theosophically influenced movements within New Age and alternative spirituality.

In the following chapter, Isaac Lubelsky charts the relationship between Madame Blavatsky and the renowned German-born Oxford Orientalist, Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900). Blavatsky's references to Müller are often mentioned in passing in accounts of her sources, but this is the first detailed exploration of this topic, looking at the relationship from both sides. For Blavatsky's part, she revered Müller as a scholar and quoted his works in corroboration of her theories both in Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine. Müller began with a curious and relatively friendly attitude towards the Theosophists but it cooled over time, ending in explicit dislike. In Lubelsky's account, other characters play minor but important roles in the ongoing drama of Blavatsky vs Müller: Henry Olcott, Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883), Annie Besant (1847-1933), Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) and Alfred Percy Sinnett (1840-1921).

Considering Blavatsky's two major works alongside Müller's article "Comparative Mythology" (1856) and his 1892 Gifford Lectures, later published as Theosophy or Psychological Religion (1893), Lubelsky highlights the common ground, as well as the antagonism between the two authors. Commonalities include their related (yet differing) images of "Aryan" India as a land of pristine and ancient wisdom as well as the concrete political influence Müller and the Theosophists enjoyed on the subcontinent. In his docurnentation of this unique relationship between the philologist and the matriarch of the "New Age," Lubelsky deepens our understanding of intersections between scholarship and occultism in the nineteenth century as well as the reception of Theosophy among some of Blavatsky's contemporaries.

In the third chapter, John Patrick Deveney clarifies the nature of early Theosophy vis a vis what the Society became from the 1880's onwards, arguing that the differences between the two are so great that we are justified in speaking of two Theosophical Societies. Redressing an unfortunate under-acknowledgement of the nature of early Theosophy in the scholarly literature, Deveney analyses Blavatsky's Isis Unveiled as well as her early articles and letters. He also considers the writings of other central early theosophists, such as Damodar Mavalankar (b.1857), Williarn Quan Judge, Albert Rawson (1829-1902), and Colonel Olcott. These demonstrate, Deveney argues, that the Society as established in 1875 was devoted to practical occult work, and specifically to the development of the ability to project the astral double. This ability was considered an indication of the fusion of the student's "individuality" with their "divine spirit" to create an "individualized" entity capable of surviving death. The early theosophists attempted to prolong life long enough to achieve this goal and to that end they instituted a number of rules, including temperance, fasting, and some forrn of sexual abstinence. A system of three degrees was established to indicate the student's progress. From the 1880's, these practical, magical, and occult aims were downplayed, discouraged, and even condemned by the theosophical mahatmas as "selfish." Blavatsky began to describe the individual as the "false personality." Rather than teaching that this individual could become immortal, she now taught that after death it disintegrated and that the only human principles to survive (atma, buddhi, and part of manas) do not constitute the individual who desires immortality here and now, but rather are impersonal in character. The failure of the Theosophical Society to produce the practical occult instruction they had promised and the change in the Society's teachings prompted some theosophists to look elsewhere, for example to the occult movements the Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor and the Golden Dawn. The Theosophical rejection of individual immortality was also one of the principle elements that led to the anti-Blavatskyan Christian Theosophical current.

Deveney's clarification of the Society's early teachings and change of doctrinal direction is important when considering the issue of theosophical appropriations because to a significant extent, the "two Societies" must be considered separately in terms of their influences and legacies. The first Society was the heir of ideas associated with the Rosicrucians and with Cagliostro (1743-1795), the Italian mage who spread a system of practical occultism across Europe. An heir of this early type of Theosophy was American New Thought. Like Cagliostro, New Thought teachers taught some form of occult sexual practice. This rnay have involved the retention or ingestion of semen, and was predicated on the idea that sexual energy rnade psychic and spiritual development possible. This idea was an open secret, Deveney argues, known to all in the quarter century before World War I. Although Deveney does not attribute explicitly sexual practices to Blavatsky and her followers, the early theosophists were well aware of a connection between sexual energy and the achievement of conditional irnmortality. Whatever the details of the practical work they pursued, Deveney concludes, it is clear that there was such work, focused on lengthening life and developing an individualized rnonad capable of surviving death. This was later concealed and (almost) forgotten.

In Chapter Four, Tomer Persico argues that Krishnamurti's famous dissolution of the Order of the Star in 1929—including his abandonment of the role of messiah assigned to him by Annie Besant and

Charles W. Leadbeater (1854-1934)—did not represent his negation of religious tradition or the establishment of new one, but rather his embrace of an existing current: the "Tradition of No Tradition" with roots stretching back to Protestant Pietism and articulated most clearly by Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882). In his writings, Ernerson rejected ritual and tradition and articulated a perennialist view of religious truth, positions that are uncannily close to Krishnamurti's later statements. Persico considers the biography of Krishnamurti (1895-1986), including his native Brahrnanism, his "discovery" by Leadbeater, his Theosophical training, and his brother's tragic and traumatizing death. Examining Krishnamurti's writings closely, Persico demonstrates a continuity in his thinking despite his apparent doctrinal volta face. Indeed, iconoclastic elements had always been present in Krishnamurti's thought to some extent, alongside a certain ambivalence towards Theosophical teachings. Persico highlights Krishnamurti's time in England and France, but especially in America, as formative in the development of his thought. It was after this period abroad that Krishnamurti's criticism of Theosophy intensified, his latent iconoclastic tendencies consolidated, and he fully and publicly turned away from Theosophy towards the position exemplified so eloquently by Emerson: the Tradition of No Tradition.

The second section of the volume, entitled Kabbalistc Appropriations, deals with various theosophical transformations of Kabbalah, a theme already introduced in Chajes's paper. As Boaz Huss explains in the first chapter of this section, many theosophists of Jewish origin studied Kabbalah, translated kabbalistic texts, and published articles and books about Kabbalah, in which they created theosophically inspired modern forms of Kabbalah. Huss redresses a lack of academic research on these Jewish theosophists, and offers a preliminary survey of the biographies and literary contributions of key Jewish figures in theosophical centers around the world—Europe, America, the Middle East, China, India, and South Africa—from the foundation of the Society in 1875 into the third decade of the twentieth century. He considers the formation of Jewish theosophical groups, especially the Association of Hebrew Theosophists, founded in Adyar in 1925 following the Jubilee Congress of the Theosophical Society. He also tells the story of another (controversial) Jewish theosophical group, founded in 1926 in Basra, Iraq, by Kaduri Ani and his supporters, which included around 300 families. The members of this Jewish community were excommunicated because of involvement with Theosophy and they established their own congregation until the ban was finally lifted a decade later, when they were reabsorbed into the wider community.

Huss surveys the numerous books and articles of Jewish theosophists, demonstrating that overall, Jewish theosophists had greater access to primary texts of Kabbalah than did non-Jewish theosophists, and some even had enough knowledge of Hebrew and Aramaic to prepare their own translations. Nevertheless, their knowledge of primary sources was limited and even those who did have some language skills largely based themselves on secondary literature, including Western esoteric, theosophical, and academic texts. Thus, the Jewish theosophists emphasized kabbalistic themes that were close to Theosophy (such as reincarnation and the divine origin of the human soul) but ignored Jewish kabbalistic notions that were incompatible with Theosophy (such as the theurgic import of the Jewish commandments and the unique status of Jewish souls). The Jewish theosophists believed Kabbalah reconciled Judaism and Theosophy, and saw themselves as having a double mission: to increase knowledge about Judaism, especially Kabbalah, amongst theosophists, and to help Jews to better understand Judaism, through Theosophy. Although influenced by Blavatsky, unlike her, they presented Kabbalah as unequivocally Jewish and as a force for the renewal of Judaism.

Huss situates these Jewish-theosophical interpretations of Kabbalah within a wider current of modern Jewish interest in Kabbalah, demonstrating that some of the basic assumptions of the Jewish theosophists about the nature and significance of Kabbalah resemble the perceptions of modern scholars of Kabbalah. Their positive reevaluation of Kabbalah took place within the framework of a

neo-Romantic and Orientalist fascination with the "mystic East" that often intersected with Jewish nationalism and which portrayed Kabbalah as Jewish "mysticism."

Developing the discussion of Kabbalah and Theosophy, Eugene Kuzmin's chapter is the first academic study of the place of Kabbalah in the thought of the renowned Russian poet, literary critic, and painter, Maksimilian Voloshin (1877-1932). A polymath and highly original thinker whose life and work spanned the Silver Age through the Soviet Era, Voloshin's poetry and prose contain numerous references to Kabbalistic works and principles, as well as to Voloshin's wider occult and philosophical ideas. Kuzmin analyses several key texts (including poems and letters), identifying Kabbalistic references and themes, and exploring their sources in contemporaneous literature on the Kabbalah. Although Voloshin had an interest in Hebrew and Judaism, he was primarily influenced by the occultist versions of Kabbalah that have roots in the Christian Kabbalah of the early-modern period. In particular, Kuzmin explores the influence of of Eliphas Levi (1810-1875), Madame Blavatsky, Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925) and Antoine Fabre d'Olivet (1767-1825). He demonstrates how Voloshin's texts contained elements drawn from these authors, but that Voloshin was guided in his interpretations by an ideologically based sense of freedom that was the outcome of his perspectives on the unique roles of the artist and the initiate. Kuzmin's chapter provides a fascinating glimpse into some of the adaptations of Kabbalah by Russian intelligentsia, contributing to our understanding of some of the religious aspects of Silver Age, but especially Soviet culture, during which religion was officially repressed.

Andreas Kilcher's chapter also discusses the thought of a Kabbalistically inspired intellectual, the Austrian zionist, Ernst Müller (1880-1954), who, despite his participation in circles that included many well-known figures, is himself relatively obscure. Kilcher focuses on the alliance between Kabbalah and Anthroposophy as understood by Müller. In A History of Jewish Mysticism (1946), Müller's conclusion was in sharp contradiction to Gershom Scholem's, as published in Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism just four years previously. Scholem (1897-1982) understood Kabbalah as essentially Jewish, whereas Müller saw it as universal, especially when interpreted through Theosophy and Anthroposophy. Müller was introduced to Rudolph Steiner around 1909, in Vienna. He considered Steiner's new vision of Theosophy (which would be institutionalized as Anthroposophy just three-four years later) as much closer to the Judeo-Christian tradition than the Eastern-oriented Theosophy of Blavatsky. Müller's perspective on Anthroposophy reflected Steiner's own assessment that Anthroposophy would recover the true, mystical, "old Hebrew" understanding of the scriptures. Although Steiner referred to Kabbalah relatively infrequently, Müller took Steiner's ideas and constructed a more elaborate alliance between Anthroposophy and Kabbalah (especially the Zohar). He was helped by his friend, Hugo Bergmann (1883-1975), who, like Müller, was a zionist with anthroposophical leanings. Kilcher's chapter analyzes Müller's anthroposophical perspectives on Kabbalah, including how they were revealed in his studies and translations of the Zohar. He concludes with an analysis of Gershom Scholem's critique of Müller's attempted alliance, which Scholem saw as fragile.

In the final chapter of this section, Olav Hammer discusses theosophical appropriations of Kabbalah in the writings of the leader of The Summit Lighthouse, Elizabeth Clare Prophet (1939-2009). He demonstrates how information taken from a spectrum of sources (ranging from older and newer Kabbalah scholarship to occultist works) was adduced by Prophet as support for doctrines of a fundamentally theosophical nature. Beginning with an introduction to the establishment of the Summit Lighthouse Movement—one of the most controversial theosophically derived movements of the twentieth century—Hamrner discusses some of Prophet's central doctrines and their Theosophical bases. Some of the Theosophical influences were direct but some were indirect, such as those mediated by another theosophically inspired religious leader: Alice Bailey (1880-1949). Summit Lighthouse teachings include such Theosophical staples as the chakras, karma, reincarnation,

the Masters, and a septenary spiritual anthropology, as well as doctrines derived from Christianity and other sources. Elizabeth Clare Prophet combined all these elements in a perennialistic vision. Hamrner focuses in detail on Prophet's book, Kabbalah: Key to Your Inner Power (1997). He considers the place of distinctive Kabbalistic terminology such as Ain Soph, the sephirot, and the shekhinah as well as the importance of Kabbalah in Prophet's presentations of ethics, gender polarity, spiritual progress, and human occult physiology.

The third and final section of the volume, Global Adaptations, opens with Shimon Lev's chapter, which brings together a range of secondary and primary sources, to explore the relationships between Mohandas Gandhi (1883-1944) and his Jewish-theosophist supporters in South Africa. Lev begins with a biography of the main founder of the Johannesburg theosophical lodge, the English Jew Louis W. Ritch (1868- 1952), before focusing in greater depth on the lives and theosophical connections of three more English Jews: Henry Polak (1882-1959), Gabriel Isaac (1874-1914), and William M. Vogl, as well as the German Jew, Hermann Kallenbach (1871-1945). Lev discusses the political activism of these Jewish theosophists, their involvement in the satyāgraha struggle and their friendships with Gandhi, which were often very close. Lev highlights the tension between South-African Jewish identification with the ruling white elite and Jewish critique of that establishment, speculating about a self-perception shared between Jews and Indians as "Oriental" immigrants in South Africa. He notes the appeal of a Theosophical Society that enabled the exploration of unorthodox ideas but which, at the same time, did not require the abandonment of Jewish identity.

Gandhi's own involvernent with Theosophy is also considered, especially his membership of the Esoteric Christian Union established by Anna Bonus Kingsford (1846-1888) and Edward Maitland (18241897). Lev notes Gandhi's selective intake of theosophical notions, his adoption of the ideas of brotherhood, universalism, and spiritual development (as representative of what he saw as "practical" Theosophy)

but his rejection of what he deemed "formal" Theosophy, which he described as "humbug" involving an unfortunate search for occult powers. Although Gandhi discouraged his Jewish-theosophist friends from participating in the Society formally, it was the theosophical notion of brotherhood, Lev argues, that was a motivating factor in both his— and their— political activism in the context of South-African racial discrimination.

Moving from Africa to Europe, in her chapter on theosophical appropriations in early-twentieth-century Greek culture, Victoria Ferentinou argues for a greater appreciation of the importance of theosophical syncretism in the history of modern Greece. She focuses on five case studies of Greek intellectuals and artists who integrated theosophical themes into their work: the journalist, politician, and academic, Platon Drakoulis (1858-1934), the poets, Kostis Palamas (1859-1943) and Angelos Sikelianos (1884-1951), and the painters, Frixos Aristeus (1879-1951) and Konstantinos Parthenis (1878-1967). Ferentinou charts the gradual institutionalization of Theosophy in Greece, with the establishment of the first lodge in 1876 and the proliferation of Theosophy in the 1920's. As she argues, the early reception of Theosophy in Greece is a complicated and sensitive matter and must be framed in the interplay of nationalist politics, identitarian discourses, Greek Orthodoxy, and secularism during the early-twentieth century. Of central importance was the negotiation of Greece's unique identity vis a vis consolidation of its position as a progressive European nation, as well as its struggle to expand its borders, all the time subject to influences perceived as conflicting: West vs. East; secularism vs. Christianity; modernization vs. tradition. Within this context, there was considerable ambivalence towards Theosophy, which drew criticism from the Orthodox Church as well as the scientific community.

A central theme in Ferentinou's analysis is the notion of "occultist Orthodoxy," first coined by Palamas, and which was part of a wider Helleno-Christian synthesis central to nationalist narratives.

This was expressed in art and ideology, especially in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Occultist Orthodoxy, Ferentinou argues, was neither homogeneous nor always religious, but chiefly cultural. It involved Greek intellectuals' adaptation and fusion of ideas drawn from occultism (including Theosophy) with their visions of Hellenism, Paganism, Christianity, and other elements. An understanding of the contours of occultist Orthodoxy and its place in the history of modern Greece can help explain the unique character of individual theosophical syntheses and their ambiguous relationships with wider European culture. Greek intellectuals often desired closer ties with modern Europe, but also had an attachment to Orthodoxy and the idea of "the East." The reassessment Ferentinou proposes as a basis for analyzing these writings and artworks provides us with a more workable theoretical frarnework than those hitherto proposed by scholars of modern Greece. It illuminates identitarian and nationalist discourses and the interactions between heterodoxy and Christian Orthodoxy at the same time as it elucidates intersections between Theosophy and Greek modernity.

Moving now to Asia in our tour of global theosophical adaptations, Karl Baier's chapter reveals the Theosophical Society to have been a significant influence in the popularization of the cakras from the late-nineteenth century onwards. Baier considers the earliest and most intense period in the history of the appropriation of the cakras by the Society. He discusses pre-modern conceptualization of the cakras, demonstrating the differences between these complex and historically contingent Asian systems and the modern, recognizable depiction of the cakras, which derives largely from the Satcakranirūpana (Description of the Six Centers) by the sixteenth-century Bengali tantric, Pūrnānanda, first published in Sanskrit and Bengali in 1858.

Baier then moves on to theoretical considerations, arguing that the history of Theosophy in South Asia is not one that documents the interactions of representatives of more-or-less well-defined traditions, but rather a history of complex reciprocal processes of transculturation involving protagonists of cultures-in-the-rnaking. He outlines the processes involved in such transculturation, including what he terms "welcoming" and "releasing" structures. The welcoming structures involved in the theosophical appropriation of the cakras included Orientalist concepts of "selfness" and "otherness." Baier draws on Gerd Baumann's theorization of Orientalism as a grammar of identity/alterity based on "reversed mirroring," arguing that this paved the way for the theosophical reinterpretation of the cakras as part of the perennial ancient wisdom, confirmed by post-materialistic science.

A second welcoming structure was the result of previous Euro-American-Asian cultural transfers, in particular those involving Romantic-influenced images of the "mystic East" to be found in works such as Joseph Ennemoser's Geschichte der Magie (1819), Godfrey Higgins Anacalypsis (1833), Louis Jacolliot's Le Spiritisme dans le monde, L' initiation et les sciences occultes dans l'Inde et chez tous les peuples de l'antiquité (1875), and Hargrave Jennings's Indian Religions, or Results of the Mysterious Buddhism (1858). As part of their assimilation of the cakras, the theosophists had to overcome the negative image of Tantra (to which the cakras are closely related) that was pervasive in the literature of Orientalism and Hindu reform movements (such as Dayãnanda Sarasvatï's Arya Samaj). Baier highlights the important role of the Mahãnirvāna Tantra, probably written in eighteenth-century Bengal, and which bridged the gap between tantrism and the Hindu Renaissance. Negative attitudes towards Tantra were reappraised in the Society following the publication of an article in The Theosophist by the anonymous "Truthseeker," initiating a series of contributions about tantrism and yoga practices written by South Asian mernbers. "Vedantic Raj Yoga Philosophy" was written by Sabhapaty Swami, published as a booklet by the Society, and advertised in The Theosophist. It taught a modern hybrid form of cakra meditation different to that of Pūmānanda's influential Satcakranirūpana. The Satcakranirūpana itself was introduced to the theosophists in articles by the knowledgeable Bengali Baradã Kãnta Majumdār, who later went on to assist Sir John

Woodroffe (aka Arthur Avalon, 1865-1936), author of the highly influential work The Serpent Power (1918). Ultimately, pro-tantric theosophical figures such as Majumdār overcame the anti-tantric perspective of those such as Dayānanda Sarasvatï, convincing the leaders of the Theosophical Society of the value of Tantra. Nevertheless, Blavatsky accornmodated both positive and negative views of Tantra by proposing the existence of both a "black" and a "white" Tantra, analogous to her dualism of black and white magic.

Another welcoming structure in the theosophical reception of the cakras involved perceived convergences between the cakras and preexisting cultural elements, especially those deriving from Mesrnerism, for example, the notion of the "solar plexus." Mesmeric irnages of the body were used for the interpretation of yogic practices, which facilitated the integration of the cakras and kundalinï into the evolving theosophical worldview. The final welcoming structure that Baier identifies is the enrichment that the theosophists expected from the appropriation of the cakras. This enrichment involved the hope for a more detailed understanding of the subtle body, and for a more precise conceptualization of the theory and practice of astral projection, a point that ties in with Deveney's arguments in his chapter about the importance of such practices in the early TS.

Returning to the theme of theosophical nationalism discussed in Victoria Ferentinou's paper, but now in the context of twentieth-century Canada, Massimo Introvigne discusses the celebrated Canadian artist and theosophist, Lawren Harris (1885-1970). Introvigne charts Harris's life and relationships with numerous spiritually minded collaborators, his involvement with the Theosophical Society, and his ideas about "theosophical art." Introvigne focuses on the ways in which Harris's ideas about art and Theosophy converged with his Canadian nationalism, influenced by an existing tradition that drew on a Romantic valorization of the unique Canadian topography. Despite Blavatsky's teaching that a new sub-race would emerge in the US, Harris believed that Canada would be the true location, and he differentiated between the ethos of Canada (associated with its special natural environment, as well as art, and culture) and the ethos of the United States (associated with business and a lack of spirituality). Harris viewed his renowned depictions of the Canadian wilderness, and his work in general, as truly "theosophical art." He insisted that a work of theosophical art must not transport its audience outside of itself to the "subject" of the painting, but rather draw the audience into the art itself, to enjoy a unitive, spiritual experience. Harris described this process through reference to the theosophical concept of buddhi. Despite his explicit rejection of symbolism, Harris depicted buddhi as part of his painting representing the three theosophical principles, atma, buddhi, and manas. Nevertheless, Harris denied any attempt to depict Theosophical doctrines and refused to accept any symbolic interpretation of his work. Rather, in his elaborations of the meaning of theosophical art, he argued that his paintings were intended to provide a divine experience of beauty and of essential forms, which was an end in itself. Harris's perspective was part of his broader ascetic aestheticism, which included a sexually-abstinent marriage to his second wife, Bess, the attempt to eradicate all personality in art and an emphasis on impermanence that was influenced by Buddhism, mediated by Theosophy. Harris's views, Introvigne argues, constitute just one interpretation among many of what it means to be a theosophist and produce "theosophical art." They demonstrate that Blavatsky's ideas about aesthetics and art were sufficiently equivocal to lead theosophist-artists in quite different philosophical and aesthetic directions, and that they could easily be combined with other discourses, such as nationalist ones.

Our final stop on the tour of global theosophical adaptations is Germany. In his chapter on the transformations of Anthroposophy from the death of Rudolph Steiner to the present day, Helmut Zander considers Steiner's life and legacy, focusing on the various practical applications of Anthroposophy that are popular in Germany as well as internationally: Waldorf schools, anthroposophical medicine, anthroposophical farming methods, and many more. Zander considers the various conflicts that have arisen within and in relation to the Anthroposophical Society, such as

the "discovery" of Steiner's ideas on race and the challenges posed by increasing historical-critical enquiry into Steiner's life and works. Considering the internationalization of Anthroposophy, Zander discusses Kfar Raphael ["the village of the archangel Raphael"], an anthroposophical community in Beer Sheva, Israel, which provides a home and employment for adults with special needs. Zander concludes his chapter by considering the "self-defeating success" of the proliferation of the practical applications of Anthroposophy, exploring how the Society might respond to the numerous practical and intellectual challenges it faces in a twenty-first-century world marked by individualism and pluralization.

In conclusion, we would like to thank Mr. Asher Benjamin, for his exeptional contribution to the organization of the workshop and for his help in the preparation of the volume. We are grateful to the scholars who reviewed the articles and provided important comments. We are especially indebted to John Patrick Deveney, who kindlky agreed to read rnost of the articles in the volume and offered invaluable feedback. Special thanks are due to Prof. Howard Kreisel, the head of the Goldstein-Goren International Center for Jewish Studies and the editor of the Goldstein-Goren Library of Jewish Thought, who accornpanied the preparation of this volume and contributed much to its publication. <>

## **Divine and Demonic in the Poetic Mythology of the Zohar: The "Other Side" of Kabbalah** by Nathaniel Berman [IJS STUDIES IN JUDAICA, Brill, 978900438618 1]

Nathaniel Berman's **Divine and Demonic in the Poetic Mythology of the Zohar: The "Other Side" of Kabbalah** offers a new approach to the central work of Jewish mysticism, the Sefer Ha-Zohar ("Book of Radiance"). Berman explicates the literary techniques through which the Zohar constructs a mythology of intricately related divine and demonic *personae*. Drawing on classical and modern rhetorical paradigms, as well as psychoanalytical theories of the formation of subjectivity, Berman reinterprets the meaning of the Zohar's divine and demonic *personae*, exploring their shared origins and their ongoing antagonisms and intimacies. Finally, he shows how the Zoharic portrayal of the demonic, the "Other Side," contributes to reflecting on alterity of all kinds.

CONTENTS

## Introduction: Poetic Mythology for a Broken World

Hollow! It's all hollow! A chasm! It's cracking!
Can you hear?
There's something – down there – that's following us!

> Away! Away!
> ALBAN BERG, Wozzek (1923)

...

> Why has the abyss remained in this world? ... The reason is that each time the blessed Holy One works a great miracle, he sifts siftings from [it] ... And from this raw material come into being creations that the blessed Name creates through his wonders. And this is the mystery of "the abysses were congealed in the heart of the sea" [Exodus 15:8]. Also the King Messiah has already sifted several times from it.
> NATHAN OF GAZA, Discourse on the Dragons (1666)

...

> Come and see: among these evil species [demons], there are levels upon levels; the highest level of these are those suspended in the air ... [In regards to] one who has only merited a life-force [nefesh], and this life-force wishes to receive tikun and receive a spirit [rua^]: ... something issues from this life force, and seeks, and does not seek, to rise – until it encounters those [demons] suspended in the air and they tell him matters, some near, and some far. And by means of this rung, he goes and becomes connected to his dream, and acquires a spirit.
> SEFER HA-ZOHAR

## Otherness and Brokenness

The relationship to the "Other" – ethnic, racial, sexual, religious, unconscious – is the central challenge of our time. From the bloody wars that ravage the planet to the "culture wars" of academia, from parliaments to the streets, from theological walls between religious denominations to concrete walls between countries, from divided families to divided selves, the contemporary world seems in a veritable state of hysteria about alterity. Embrace or exclude? Efface difference or respect it? Protect or crush? Celebrate or ignore? Repress or express? Our world poses all these alternatives and more.

We oscillate between wildly divergent responses to the confrontation of our collective and individual Selves with the Others that fill us with love, hate, desire, and revulsion. In a world that is painfully divided, divisions also found within our souls, we rush from one stance to another, seeking to overcome, or at least manage, that pain – propelled by a deep-rooted resistance, even if often unconscious, to this alienation from the Other, this transformation of the Other into an alien, and by our desire for harmony with the Other, indeed for the Other's embrace.

This book is about the poetic mythology of Otherness in the Zoharic tradition in kabbalah. "Kabbalah" is the common appellation for a vast and heterogeneous array of texts and practices that emerged on the historical stage in the 12th and 13th century in Provence, Catalonia, and Castile, and spread all over the Jewish world and beyond it. "The Zohar" – or "the Zoharic literature" – the crowning glory of the formative period of kabbalah, is an array of homiletical, mythological, and mystical texts composed primarily by mid- to late 13th century Spanish writers, largely in Aramaic. These unsigned texts articulate their teachings through the imagined discussions of a group of 2nd century sages, the "Companions," the ^evraya, during their peregrinations across an imaginary Holy Land. These texts, gradually collected over the generations, were published in Italy in the mid-16th century as the Sefer Ha-Zohar, the "Book of Radiance," and, a few decades later, in an additional volume of such texts, the so-called Zohar ^adash, "New Zohar."

While focusing on these textual collections, this book will also often discuss passages from two slightly later Spanish works, also anonymous and composed primarily in Aramaic, the R'aya Mehemna, the "Faithful Shepherd," and Tikune Ha-Zohar, the "Adornments (or Rectifications) of the Zohar," written in the late 13th or early 14th century – works that are partly pastiches of the main body of Zoharic literature, partly dramatic stylistic and substantive departures from it. Beyond these

works, reference will be made to kabbalistic precursors of the Zoharic literature, particularly the Sefer Ha-Bahir, the "Book of Clarity," which appeared in Provence in the late 12th century, and successors to the Zoharic literature, particularly works written during the great kabbalistic flourishing in 16th century Safed. I will primarily discuss works outside the Zoharic literature only to illuminate texts within that literature.

The genre of Zoharic literature that will be my focus consists of mythical portrayals, written with a literary audacity and virtuosity that can only be compared to poetry, indeed often avant-garde poetry. Myth: dramas of divine and diabolical personae, male and female, engaging with each other through love and hatred, desire and repulsion, grace and judgment. Myth: a world in which there is nothing, neither plant nor animal, heaven nor earth, ocean nor land, star nor planet, that does not symbolize, or rather embody, some archetype or persona. Myth: the wedding of a divine King and Queen, chaperoned by their Supernal Mother, wars of a God with a Great Dragon, seduction of a divine Woman by a diabolical Serpent and of a divine Man by the diabolical Lilith, and on and on. Poetry: a proliferation of evocative images, often shifting kaleidoscopically, swamping the efforts of generations of interpreters to reduce them to conceptual paraphrase or symbolic decoding. Poetry: rhythm, rhyme, meter, alliteration, parallelism, defiance of conventional syntax, all in the service of arousing, provoking, startling the reader. Poetry: not a round-about way of stating the prosaic, but true poetry, a conjuration of that which cannot be evoked any other way.

Alterity is the explicit theme of much of this textual proliferation: Zoharic poetic mythology is centrally preoccupied with the relationship between the two "sides" of the cosmos, the divine Sitra di-Kedusha, the "Side of Holiness," and the demonic Sitra A^ra, literally the "Other Side." Zoharic texts on the demonic are marked by all the fear, desire, violence, and love – as well as the reciprocal projections, constructions, and illusions – one finds in all profound confrontations with alterity. Zoharic writers articulated their poetic mythology through audacious adaptations, reconfigurations, and often subversions of the entire Jewish textual legacy. Indeed, the vast set of discourses and rituals concerned with evoking, naming, repressing, domesticating, annihilating, and embracing the demonic Other are central to kabbalistic reinterpretations of Judaism as a whole.

One way to read Zoharic writing on the demonic is to treat it as a set of "etiological" myths or mythemes, narratives and images that recount the origin of deeply disturbing features of the world as we live it. The appeal of such myths generally does not rest on their ability to satisfy causal, logical, or normative criteria, but on their narrative, dramatic, or poetic force, often, though not exclusively, of a tragic dimension. They construct a poetic mythology of a world marked by the break between Self and Other: not seeking to deny the brokenness as an illusion, as in some acosmic theologies, nor to provide a justification of apparent injustice, as in theodicy, nor to attribute the world's ostensibly perverse state to the limitations of human cognition, as in negative theology. Rather, they elevate mundane brokenness to metaphysical drama, in often theologically scandalous terms, indeed often aggravating the theological problem that provoked the myth.

A short example can serve to illustrate this etiological quality:

> It has been taught: one day, the Companions were walking with Rabbi Shim'on. Rabbi Shim'on said: 'I see these nations are all elevated and Israel is the lowest of all. What is the reason? Because the King has cast the Queen [Matronita] away from him and inserted the bondwoman in her place.

This passage virtually declares itself to be an etiological myth: the unacceptable political condition of the world, which one can "see" everywhere, leads us to a narrative of the divine King who has rejected his true, divine consort, the Queen, to dally with her bondwoman. The remainder of this passage, which I discuss more fully in Chapter 3, associates this bondwoman with the female diabolical persona commonly known as Lilith, as well as with one of the archenemies of the earthly

Israel, the Egypt of slavery. It also explicitly identifies the bondwoman with alterity: the "alien crown" and the "Other Side."

The text does not theologically rationalize the degraded condition of Israel, but rather sets it in a mythical frame. Without any reference to human sin or any other normative justification, the text portrays the perverse state of the world as a product of the desire of the divine King for the demonic Other, here in the form of illicit heterosexual desire. The personified, gendered, demonic Other is indispensable to the etiological narration, as is the erotic desire of the King for her.

The Other is thus both absolutely alien to proper metaphysical and political selfhood and yet cannot be kept away from it, either narratively or libidinally. The two realms, divine and demonic, Self and Other, continually intermingle, here impelled by the unstable vicissitudes of erotic desire – but elsewhere, as we shall see, also by a myriad of other, equally intimate drives, ranging from tender suckling to fierce rage. This passage evokes the disturbing features of divine/demonic relations – the power struggles, often of a transgressive, as well as violent character, struggles pervasively gendered, sexualized, and nationalized. But it also suggests the hidden desire for reconciliation with, indeed the love of, the Other.

The text implicitly attributes the esoteric nature of the knowledge it offers to the gap between the surface appearance of quotidian reality and the mythical narrative which holds the key to its truth. The narrative is recounted by Rabbi Shim'on, the master sage of the Zoharic literature, as a revelation to the few of a truth hidden to the many. Everyone can "see" the perverse state of the world, but not its participation in a perverse state of the divine. Without Rabbi Shim'on's narrative, his disciples would be beset by a classical theological quandary: how can a world ruled by an omnipotent and beneficent God be marked by injustice (even if we understand "God" in the Zoharic sense of a unification of male and female personae)? Rabbi Shim'on's myth teaches them that, though it may look like the divine male and female rule the world, and though this should be the truth, in fact the male deity's consort is a diabolical female persona. Without Rabbi Shim'on's mythological creativity, one could never know, or even dare to suggest, that the divine King is united with a demonic consort.

This account not only makes the theological problem far worse, scandalous in every sense, but presents a most terrifying existential predicament: the difficulty of distinguishing between divine and demonic, good and evil, friend and foe, theology and demonology. Such indeterminacy, the existential difficulty, and yet urgency, of discernment between divine and demonic, is itself a feature of our world for which Zoharic tales serve as etiological myths. Absolute opposites that continually interpenetrate, absolute opposites that appear indistinguishable: these are features of our world for which Zoharic myth serves as a poetic etiology.

Alterity, however, is never simply a brute material fact. On the contrary, it is always constructed – socially, libidinally, politically, and so on – and always in culturally, historically, aesthetically distinctive ways. In this book, my primary focus is on the textual construction of alterity in the Zoharic literature. I analyse this construction primarily along two axes: rhetorical technique and ontological portrayal. Both concern the distinctive ways Zoharic texts produce meaning – as opposed to treating them as vehicles for concepts or narratives of which they would be more or less adequate expressions. Zoharic writings must be read not only for their pervasive brooding on Otherness, but for their construction of that Otherness.

The rhetorical axis of my analysis demonstrates the detailed techniques by which Zoharic texts construct a cosmos split between the structures and personae of the Side of Holiness and those of the Other Side. This analysis reveals a startling feature of these techniques: their destabilization of the cosmic split in the very act of constructing it. I explicate these features of Zoharic textuality using both classical and contemporary methods of rhetorical analysis.

Zoharic rhetoric, however startling, produces an elaborate ontology of divine and demonic structures, personae, indeed entire cosmic realms. This ontology is itself paradoxical: featuring an Other who is not only an absolute opponent of the (divine or human) Self, but also an inseparable intimate of that Self. My analysis, accordingly, explicates not only the ontological split between the two realms, but also their simultaneous emergence and ongoing relationships, relationships of desire, intimacy, nurturance as well as fear, revulsion, violence. A full understanding of this paradoxical construction of alterity can only be achieved by an analysis of Zoharic rhetorical techniques; those techniques, in turn, generate the complex ontology of the "two-sided" cosmos.

The fundamental paradox of the Zoharic demonic thus pervades both the rhetorical and ontological dimensions of my analysis. It is the most crucial thing in the world to establish, to know, and to reinforce the difference of the Other Side from the Side of Holiness; yet that difference is nonetheless continually destabilized, dissolved, transgressed by the very rhetorical techniques and ontological structures that establish it. It is this paradox of alterity, this irreducible criss-crossing between Self and Other, the pyrrhic quality of all attempts to definitively disengage absolute opposites, which this book explores.

I note that I will often have recourse to psychoanalytic terminology to explicate Zoharic ontology, particularly drawn from psychoanalytic discussions of the formation of human subjectivity. Such terminology, while emerging from observation of the most earthly phenomena, is highly productive for understanding Zoharic mythologies of the formation of divine and demonic personae. A key theorist upon whom I draw is Julia Kristeva, whose oeuvre spans the fields of linguistics, literary theory, religion, and social criticism, as well as psychoanalysis. This broad vision makes her a particularly productive reference for understanding the broader implications of the Zoharic mythology of the Other Side. Thus, a third, if more implicit, axis of this book concerns the social and psychological insights into Otherness that are the fruit of Zoharic mythology.

I emphasize that it is not my intention to directly engage the debate about the relationship of psychoanalysis, or psychology generally, to kabbalah, or religion generally. A number of scholars have already discussed the complex and vexed relationship to psychoanalysis of Gershom Scholem, the founder of the academic study of kabbalah.10 Nonetheless, I will often employ concepts such as ambivalence, splitting, and abjection heuristically, as a way of reading, organizing, and making sense of the heterogeneous portrayals of the divine/ demonic relations so fundamental to Zoharic writing as well as to much of kabbalistic literature. Moreover, although a demonstration of this point would go far beyond the scope of this book, I believe that 20th century psychoanalysis could be shown to be heir to the kinds of traditions of which 13th century kabbalah is also a part (a hypothesis that has nothing in common with fanciful notions of an "influence" of kabbalah on Freud). In any case, I believe that each of these discursive worlds can contribute to illuminating some of the deepest truths of the other.

## A (Very Short) Kabbalistic Primer

For those readers for whom 13th century kabbalistic writing is unfamiliar, I offer here an extremely brief introduction to its terminology. I caution that this section only presents some basic kabbalistic vocabulary. The Zoharic literature, by contrast, is its poetry, its mythology, its poetic mythology. Knowledge of the basic vocabulary is indispensable for understanding Zoharic writing, but it can also stand in the way of a deep appreciation of it. An imperfect analogy: while a working knowledge of French is indispensable for reading the convention shattering writings of Apollinaire or Mallarmé, adhering too closely to a dictionary may easily stand in the way of knowing anything about their poetry. With this caution in mind, here is the primer.

In all works of kabbalistic theosophy, beginning at least in the late 12th century, the basic structures of the divine, cosmic, and human realms consist of ten archetypal "Sefirot" (singular: Sefirah), each of

which is invested with a great abundance of mythical imagery. The word Sefirot originates in the Hebrew words for numbers and counting. In accordance with their order and terminology as they crystallized in the 13th century, the ten Sefirot are: Keter (Crown), Shokhmah (Wisdom), Binah (Understanding), Chesed (Lovingkindness), Gevurah or Din (Might or Judgment); Tif'eret (Beauty), Netsah (Endurance), Hod (Majesty), Yesod (Foundation), and Malkhut (Royalty or Kingdom). Furthermore, beginning with the 13th century kabbalists whom Scholem called "the Castilian Gnostics," these ten divine Sefirot are doubled by ten demonic Sefirot – known variously as the "Left Emanation," the "Left," and, from the Zoharic literature onwards, the "Other Side."

A key sign that the Zoharic writers did not wish the vocabulary of kabbalah to overshadow their poetic mythology: the word "Sefirot" never appears in Zoharic texts. Though they assume knowledge of the ten-Sefirot structure throughout their writings, and though "Sefirot" had by their time become the standard term in kabbalistic writing, the Zoharic writers apparently desired to prevent their readers from reifying the cosmic entities whose dynamic, protean, and destabilizing narratives they recounted. The Zoharic writers use, instead, a variety of other terms, such as "levels," "crowns," "kings," "lamps," "lights," "sapphires," "rivers," "names," "places," and so on. In this book, when I engage in the widespread practice among commentators of decoding Zoharic images in terms of their "sefirotic" associations, I generally say that this or that image is "presumably" associated with this or that Sefirah. I thereby seek to register the Zoharic writers' own reticence to make such direct associations explicitly and to evoke the poetic distance they were careful to safeguard between their multivalent images and any one referent. In Arthur Green's formulation, one should approach the Sefirot as "clusters of symbolic associations," rather than seeking any univocal "reference points." It is, therefore, just as proper to refer to these ten "clusters" as "sapphires" or "crowns" as Sefirot, though, following convention, I will tend to use the latter term – even at the risk of offending the authors of the texts themselves.

Zoharic texts pervasively associate the Sefirot with a variety of divine personae, both male and female, mythical figures with whom this book will be centrally concerned. Two male/female erotic and nuptial couples feature prominently: the "Supernal Father" and "Supernal Mother" and their children, the male "blessed Holy One" and the female "Shekhinah" – also known as the "Bridegroom" and the "Bride," the "Son" and the "Daughter," and many other appellations. The Father and Mother are associated with second and third Sefirot, ^okhmah and Binah; the "blessed Holy One" and the "Shekhinah" are primarily associated with the sixth and tenth Sefirot, Tif'eret and Malkhut – though the blessed Holy One is also frequently associated with the six Sefirot from ^esed to Yesod. The blessed Holy One is also often called Ze'er Anpin, the "Lesser Countenance" or "Impatient One," especially in the Zoharic treatises called the Idrot, the "Assemblies." The endless cycles of separation and reunification of the lower male/female couple, the blessed Holy One and the Shekhinah, form the central drama of Zoharic mythology. Above these two couples stands the Holy Ancient One [Atika Kadisha], associated with the first Sefirah, Keter. The Holy Ancient One is also called Arikh Anpin, the "Greater Countenance" or the "Patient One."

Different Zoharic texts emphasize varying sets of these five personae. Such sets often consist of three personae: for example, the Mother, her Son (the Bridegroom), and her Daughter (the Bride); or the Holy Ancient One, the Lesser Countenance, and the Shekhinah (also called, in this context, the "Orchard of Holy Apples"). Other texts may foreground the two couples.

I note also that the five personae are associated with the Hebrew letters of the Tetragrammaton, YHVH, Yod-Hei-Vav-Hei: the Holy Ancient One with the upper tip of the Yod, the Father with the Yod, the Mother with the first Hei, the blessed Holy One with the Vav, the Shekhinah with the last Hei.

My designation of these figures as "personae" follows the practice of scholars such as Wolfson and Benarroch – even though the Zoharic literature, curiously, does not employ any general term to refer to them. Later kabbalistic texts, particularly beginning with the Lurianic corpus, pervasively designate them with the term "partsufim," a rabbinic Aramaic word for "faces" or "facial features." "Partsuf" is itself a loan word from Greek, deriving from prosopon, whose original meaning was "mask" or "face." "Persona" is the Latin equivalent of prosopon. Ancient Greek culture viewed the prosopon as revealing the identity of its wearer, even while covering him or her, a paradox well-suited for the play of revelation and concealment which the Zoharic writers attribute to divine names, Sefirot, and personae.

Both the Greek and Latin words played central roles in the history of Christian debate about the relationship between the three members of the Trinity. No normative Jewish kabbalist, of course, would explicitly refer to the formulation of the Christian theologian Tertullian (ca. 155–240), "three personae, one substance" [tres personae, una substantia], even if expanded to the full five Zoharic personae. Nonetheless, Zoharic writing contains equivalent formulations. Writing of the Father, Mother, and Son, one Zoharic text declares, "All these three are one in one unity" [^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^].

Zoharic writers, moreover, often associate each of the Sefirot with biblical figures. For example: ^esed with Abraham, Gevurah with Isaac, Tif'eret with Jacob, Netsa^ with Moses, Hod with Aaron, and Yesod with Joseph. Binah and Malkhut are associated with a variety of female figures, for example with Leah and Rachel, respectively – though Malkhut, the Shekhinah, is also associated with almost all biblical heroines. I caution, moreover, that none of these associations are rigid: Moses, for example, may also be associated with Tif'eret, Solomon with Binah, David with Malkhut. The Zoharic writers were composing poetry, dynamic, associative, kaleidoscopic poetry, not establishing a codebook.

On the Other Side, the main personae are Sama'el, the diabolical homologue of the blessed Holy One, and his consort Lilith, the homologue of the Shekhinah. Zoharic texts often emphasize the resemblance between the erotic relationships of this diabolical couple and those of their divine counterparts. A second couple, Ashmedai and the Lesser Lilith [Lilit Ze'irta], appear at a lower level of the diabolical hierarchy in pre-Zoharic kabbalistic texts, particularly the 13th century Treatise on the Left Emanation of Yits^ak Ha-Kohen, a crucial precursor to Zoharic writing on the demonic. There would thus be two male/ female couples within each realm. However, while this tradition lived on, for example in the writings of the 16th century kabbalist, Moshe Cordovero, this second couple makes no appearance in the Zoharic literature. Ashmedai himself, however, the Talmud's "King of the Demons," does appear with some prominence.

Zoharic writers, like other 13th century kabbalists, refer to the primordial divine as the En-Sof: literally, "without end," an originally adverbial phrase that, in a characteristic kabbalistic gesture, was transformed into a noun. At least in regard to its use in the Zoharic literature, I would not use the term "proper noun" to refer to the En-Sof, since, as we shall see, it precedes the crystallizations of bounded divine personae. Indeed, it may be better to refer to the En-Sof as the "proto-divine." Divergences in kabbalistic metaphysics often turn on the issue of the relationship of the En-Sof to the Sefirot. Some kabbalists identify the En-Sof with the first Sefirah, Keter. This position yields a more immanentist vision of the relationship between the divine and the cosmos. This position seems to be that of the bulk of the Zoharic literature. The opposed position, that the En-Sof is above the Sefirot, yields a more transcendentalist view.

Zoharic writers designate the demonic realm with a variety of names. For reasons suggested in the preceding section, I generally favor the term "Other Side," the Sitra A^ra. This "side" is also often called the "Side of Contamination" [Sitra Di-mesav'uta]. It is also the realm of demonic entities,

called kelipot, literally husks, shells, or peels – by contrast with the mo'ah (Hebrew) or mo^a (Aramaic), the "kernel," "essence," or, "brain," designating the divine. In Chapter 2, I discuss the different valences of these two principal names for the demonic, the Other Side and the kelipot – although the Zoharic literature and, particularly, post-Zoharic kabbalistic works often employ them interchangeably.

I also follow the general convention in English-language scholarship of using the term "demonic" to designate the opposite of the divine. I caution, however, that this term can create confusion between the metaphysical structures and the ruling personae of the evil realm, on the one hand, and the everyday "demons" [^^^^, shedim] who have permeated the everyday life of the rabbinic and popular Jewish imagination since at least Talmudic times, on the other. Though I will at times distinguish between "devils" for the former category and "demonic spirits" for the latter, the pervasive use of the word "demonic" for the Other Side in the academic literature makes this distinction impractical to follow consistently. Whenever possible, therefore, I use the term "Other Side." It foregrounds both the "otherness" of the demonic, and its embodiment of the other "side" of a cosmos whose totality includes both divine and demonic. This ambivalence is the major theme of this book.

## Overview of the Book

I now offer a brief overview of the book's trajectory and structure, even if many of the theoretical terms I introduce here will only be clarified by the discussion in Chapter 1. At the broadest level, the book is structured by a heuristic division into two large sets of rhetorical techniques and corresponding ontological constructions, as a way of organizing the vast number of Zoharic texts concerned with the divine/demonic relationship. The first set is concerned with the establishment of a cosmos split between divine and demonic realms, the second with the dynamic relationships between the two realms' forces, entities, and personae. In both sets, the rhetorical construction of the ontologically split cosmos both establishes and destabilizes the split, generating a pervasive ambivalence about this most fundamental feature of the Zoharic vision. Chapter 1 explores the theoretical assumptions underlying the relationship between these two sets, as well as the contours of the ubiquitous Zoharic ambivalence; Chapters 2 and 3 each take one of the two sets as its primary focus.

Chapter 2 thus concentrates on the ontological splitting between the divine and demonic realms and the rhetorical parallelism through which that splitting is textually constructed. I borrow the term "splitting" from psychoanalysis, as a way of describing the ontology of a cosmos in which two realms are posited as absolutely different, one good, one evil. In particular, I am concerned with the positing of bounded entities – natural or linguistic entities, Sefirot, and personae – who face adversarial Others who are nearly or utterly indistinguishable from them. This split cosmos is textually constructed through the rhetorical techniques of parallelism, the most important of which is anaphora, the composition of small textual units through a series of phrases each of which begins with identical words. As I suggested above, texts marked by ontological splitting and rhetorical parallelism both construct and destabilize the fundamental division of the cosmos between the two realms. Indeed, the very term, "splitting," hints at a primordial common origin, and an ongoing process of differentiation, the themes of Chapter 3.

Chapter 3, then, focuses on dynamic relationships between the two realms, specifically genealogy, intimacy, and nurturance. In other words, I look at texts concerned with the ontological genesis of the two realms out of a primordial undifferentiation, as well as with their ongoing relationships after their emergence. The latter include relationships of intimacy, especially erotic intimacy, and nurturance, particularly those called "suckling." Such dynamic relationships may be generally described as involving a two-step process, abjectionand-crystallization, terms inspired by the work of Kristeva and which I explain in detail in Chapter 1. These relationships are textually constructed

through the rhetorical technique of tropes of transition, specifically, tropes of limitation and tropes of representation, terms inspired by the work of Harold Bloom. Tropes of limitation, such as irony (for example, the irony of a divine being emitting some form of inchoate refuse) give way to tropes of representation, whose fullest expression is the crystallization of that inchoate refuse into a fully constituted and formidable demonic realm, including demonic Sefirot and personae such as Lilith and Sama'el.

In sum, Chapters 2 and 3 explore two different portrayals of the relationship between the demonic and demonic realms, those of splitting and abjection-and-crystallization, constructed through rhetorical techniques of parallelism and tropes of transition. I associate the first with the construction of bounded entities, especially divine and demonic personae, in the face of adversarial Others. I associate the second with the primordial and ongoing dynamics of identity-formation, the constitution and perpetual reconstitution of bounded entities and personae.

The second of these portrayals, that of abjection-and-crystallization, may be taken as the deeper of the two, since it explores the constitution of the entities whose opposition is the affair of the first portrayal. Portrayals of abjection-and-crystallization concern "secret and invisible" processes, depict the "uncertain spaces" of "unstable identity," and evoke the "simultaneously threatening and melding ... archaic dyad," phenomena over which language has no hold without being "interlaced with fear and repulsion." Nonetheless, Zoharic portrayals of splitting coexist with the portrayals of abjection-and-crystallization. Zoharic texts unfold within the ambivalences and multiple layers they construct, rather than masterfully deploying them in the service of a doctrine, even a doctrine as paradoxical as abjection-and-crystallization. The textual complexity of passages comprised of both sorts of processes forecloses a reduction of one to the other – just as it forecloses the reduction of the rhetorical dimension to its ontological referents.

In Chapter 4, I explore two polar consequences of the processes described in the preceding chapters, returning to the themes of etiology with which I began this Introduction. First, I turn to Zoharic portrayals of a split cosmos thoroughly pervaded by the crystallization of a mighty demonic realm, nearly indistinguishable, both linguistically and ontologically, from the divine realm. The ultimate danger in such a world, our world, is that of the impersonation of the divine by the demonic. This danger results from a method of combat between the two realms I call "aggressive enclothing," the capture of the divine by the demonic in such a way that one can no longer tell of particular entities to which realm they belong. In this reified world, a world of grotesque masquerade, beset by terrifying dangers of misprision and indeterminacy, meaning itself may come to seem always already captured by its opposite. And yet, as I shall show, this horrifying convergence of divine and demonic may contain a secret path to redemption, towards the reunification of a broken world.

I then turn to the opposite danger implicit in the cosmic vision elaborated in the earlier chapters – the dissolution of meaning, a danger embodied in the biblical abyss, the Tehom. In this section, I show how Zoharic texts portray the abyss as the ultimate danger to established beings and meanings, but also as the ultimate source for new beings and meanings. The return to the primordial source, a return fraught with the possibility of catastrophe, is also the key to unlocking reification and re-opening creativity. The abyss is portrayed variously in Zoharic texts as the dwelling-place of lethal demonic forces and as the reservoir of flowing metaphysical abundance, as an apocalyptic threat to the cosmos and as the indispensable source of the primordial Creation and the renewal of creativity in an ossified world. The ontological ambivalence of the abyss is that of the primordial undifferentiation from which emerge both subjects and their abjects, both Selves and Others. "Re-birth," indeed, any kind of truly creative internal or external renewal, must draw on the menacing, yet vital resources of the ambivalent abyss, which is the matrix of both Self and Other, portrayed by Kristeva as "re-birth with and against abjection."

Finally, in the Conclusion, I draw together some of the most radical hints about the divine/demonic relationship broached throughout the book. I recast the separation of Self and Other as a "primordial crisis," rupturing both language and being, and suggest that their primordial kinship is the ultimate secret lurking in the Jewish tradition – with implications for thinking about "Otherness" of all varieties. Zoharic texts, the very same texts that fiercely construct the adversarial relationship between Self and Other, also just as surely destabilize the notion that one can definitively distinguish them. The Zoharic Self that both is, and is not, the Other; the adversarial relationship that originates in a secret etiology that may only be mythologically and poetically portrayed; the ongoing relationships of often illicit desire and nurturance – all these point the way towards the most difficult, and yet surprisingly realistic, descriptions of the concrete struggles with alterity in a world, our world, a world broken and longing for redemption.

### A Final Introductory Note

As I have emphasized throughout this Introduction, this book offers a new interpretation of the textual construction of divine/demonic relations in Zoharic writing. In Chapter 1, I situate this kind of work in the rich and diverse field of contemporary Zohar scholarship. While much of that scholarship offers new interpretive approaches to reading Zoharic texts, crucial strands of that scholarship focus on other concerns. These include new historical contextualizations of the emergence of kabbalah in 12th and 13th century France and Spain, as well as meticulous text-critical work exploring the complex processes by which the texts that began circulating in late 13th century Spain came to be gradually collected and eventually published in the 16th century as Sefer HaZohar. In Chapter 1, I suggest how the specific approach of this book may offer one bridge between interpretive scholarship and text-critical scholarship.

It is, however, one of the advantages of this richly creative era in Zohar scholarship that one can situate one's own work in a collective endeavor, whose individual components shed light from many different directions on the fascinating spiritual, intellectual, and aesthetic phenomenon that emerged onto the historical stage in the 12th and 13th centuries. One may view the evergrowing international fellowship of scholars creating new approaches to this phenomenon as an academic equivalent of the mythical band of the Zoharic ^evraya, the Companions, out of whose discussions Zoharic poetic mythology emerged. My hope for this book is that it takes its place as one voice in the rich conversation of this new fellowship. <>

## Demons and Spirits in Biblical Theology: Reading the Biblical Text in Its Cultural and Literary Context by John H. Walton and J. Harvey Walton [Cascade Books, 9781498288781]

Some people believe that a battle of cosmic proportions is raging as Satan and his demons seek to destroy Christians and undermine God's plans. Others believe that all talk of demons in the Bible and theology only reflects pre-modern superstitions that should be re-interpreted in philosophical and psychological terms. Despite their contrasts, both believe that the Bible directly or indirectly intends to teach readers about reality. Another path is possible. What if references to demons in the Bible are similar to references about the shape and structure of the cosmos representing the beliefs familiar to the ancient audience but used only as a framework for teaching about the plans and purposes of God? This approach is here worked out through detailed examination of hermeneutical method, the ancient Near Eastern and Greco-Roman contexts, each of the biblical terms and passages, and the essentials of biblical and systematic theology. Unlike many scholarly treatments of demons, readers will not find an assessment of the metaphysical realities. Instead they will be

introduced to a hermeneutical, exegetical, and theological feast regarding what the Bible, understood in its ancient context, teaches.

## Review

"The authors argue against two diametrically opposed interpretations of demons in the Bible: demythologizing and reifying. They present a third approach, understanding references to the demonic within the cultural framework and mindset of each of the biblical authors. Their book is an original and cogent contribution to biblical scholarship, and absolutely essential for the scholarly study of the Devil." --Jeffrey Burton Russell, Professor of History, emeritus, University of California, Santa Barbara

"This is a timely and critically needed resource that I really hope church leaders--and as many people as possible--will read. We need to have a correct understanding of the nature and schemes of evil today more than ever." --Dan Kimball, on staff at Vintage Faith Church and the ReGeneration Project

"Demons and Spirits in Biblical Theology is a sophisticated yet very readable assessment of the problem of good and evil and how appeals to demons and evil spirits have played a role in the debate. This well researched and well-thought-out book makes major contributions to discussions about Conflict Theology, Prosperity Theology, and Open Theism. The authors wisely conclude that the Bible contains no theology of demons as such, only references to beliefs found in some contexts and settings. I strongly recommend this book." --Craig A. Evans, Professor of Christian Origins, Houston Baptist University

"In Demons and Spirits in Biblical Theology, the authors develop in a new direction the long-term Waltonian program that is designed to make us better Bible-readers by helping us to read Scripture in its ancient contexts. Readers may not agree with every conclusion that arises from their important distinction between reference and affirmation in the Bible. They should, however, recognize the utility of the method in helping us to ensure that, on the matter of demons and spirits, we are people of biblical faith rather than (in reality) polytheists or practical atheists. I warmly commend this book to all who need help in thinking this matter through." --Iain Provan, Professor of Biblical Studies, Regent College

## Why a book about demons and spirits?

A book like this one is needed because it matters—it matters how we understand the world around us; it matters how we think about the Bible's authority and how it informs our understanding of the spirit world; it matters because how we think about the spirit world influences how we think about God, both his person and his role. We cannot afford to be inconsistent in our methodology or careless in our interpretation. Most of all, we cannot afford to diminish our great God and his revelation to us by misrepresenting them. Christianity is in need of a more careful assessment of these issues and we hope to put further information on the table so that we can think together through the complex issues that are involved.

## Demythologizing and conflict theology

"There are two equal and opposite errors into which our race can fall about the devils. One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to believe, and to feel an excessive and unhealthy interest in them." So writes C. S. Lewis in the preface to The Screwtape Letters. When examining modern trends in biblical and systematic theology, we find that the fields are, for the most part, neatly polarized into both of these errors. On the part of unbelief, there is a tendency, often referred to as "demythologizing," to attempt to redefine the Bible's various references to demons in terms of psychology, sociology, or other abstractions that can be fitted within the constraints of a worldview defined by scientific materialism. The part of "excessive and unhealthy interest" is more complicated. It does not refer to what Lewis called "magicians"; that is, those who worship demonic spirits and/or invoke their power. Rather, it takes the form of the practice of constructing a theological system wherein the role and activity of demons takes a prominent, or even central, role, which we refer to heuristically as "conflict theology" due to its emphasis on an ongoing conflict between God and Satan and their respective servants or underlings. In recent decades, this position has gained some popularity among evangelical scholars: "One cannot engage in a Biblical study of the power of God without simultaneously exploring the opposing sphere of power—Satan and his principalities and powers. The Bible from beginning to end highlights the theme of conflict with the powers of evil. It is integral to the Biblical worldview." Likewise, "believing in [. . .] the devil and demons is not inherently more difficult than believing in a supreme being that is good and may, in fact, be implicit in such a belief." Finally, "the fact that [good and evil spirits warring against each other] constitutes a central component of Scripture's understanding of God and the cosmos should surely inspire us to do so." Statements like these seem to suggest that a major purpose of the Bible is to teach about demons, and that the Christian worldview simply cannot function without them. (For a comparison of priorities, we may note that demons are totally absent from any of the creeds of the church—that is, the documents that establish the fundamental and integral essentials of Christian doctrine—until the Twelfth Ecumenical Council in 1215, where the first canon mentions the devil in passing: "The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the prompting of the devil."

In our assessment, neither of these approaches is adequate. Through the book we will evaluate them as we consider the methodologies used in approaching the biblical text, and the exegesis of the pertinent texts. Finally, we will engage with them regarding their conclusions concerning theology and the problem of evil. To begin, however, we will briefly examine the approaches and their limitations.

## The limits of demythologizing

"Demythologizing" is an attempt to salvage meaning or value from certain biblical texts whose original meaning cannot be reconciled with what is known to be "real" and "true" as those words are defined by a worldview grounded in scientific materialism. As Rudolf Bultmann, the fountainhead of the demythologizing hypothesis, states: "it is impossible to use electric lights and [. . .] to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles."6 Likewise Walter Wink: "it is as impossible for most of us to believe in the real existence of demonic or angelic powers as it is to believe in dragons, or elves, or a flat world." These statements are not admonitions or conclusions; rather, they are observations that serve as an initial premise. Wink continues, "thus a gulf has been fixed between us and the biblical writers. We use the same words but project them into a wholly different world of meanings. What they meant by power and what we mean are incommensurate." The goal of demythologizing is to interpret biblical teachings in forms that are generic or abstract enough to pass over this gulf and thus retain meaning and relevance for a modern audience who are in point of fact incapable of conceiving anything beyond the material. The exact form that these interpretations take varies between theologians and typically follows the broader themes and categories of larger theological movements such as existential theology (e.g., Bultmann) or liberation theology (e.g., Wink). The biblical passages themselves are read as broad insights about the general nature of such things as evil and power, or merely as stories intended to provoke a particular reaction in the reader upon encountering them.

For our purposes, the problem inherent in the demythologizing approach to biblical texts is not the recognition of the gulf, but rather the method used to cross it. It is true enough that modern readers can have no comprehension of the words and meanings of words that were used by the original authors, for the same reasons that modern readers who understand only English can have no comprehension of the original words written in Greek. The gulf in both cases is the same, and in both cases can be bridged by translation. The problem with demythologizing is that the demythologizers are, metaphorically speaking, poor translators. When translating the Bible's language, a linguist must first understand the ideas represented by the Greek, and thereafter choose the English words that most clearly convey the same idea based on what those words mean in English. However, a demythologizer who approached language in the same way that they approach theology would not use this method. Instead, they would look at the Greek letters and observe, correctly, that they have no meaning to modern English speakers. They would then consult their own instinct, experience, reasoning, and circumstances to formulate an idea of what would be appropriate for the text to say. They would then formulate those truths in English words and declare that this must be the meaning of the indecipherable Greek, because the Bible is true and therefore its teachings must accord with the truths that they, the demythologizers, have come to know as members and observers of humanity.

This method of interpretation is a problem because it effectively shifts authority away from the text-in-context and onto the reader. Wink writes, "When we 'let the text speak,' therefore, we do not value equally everything it has to say, but fashion an order of ranked priorities in terms of the resonances it establishes with our own unknown but higher potentialities."10 Note that the valuing, fashioning, ordering, ranking, prioritizing, and resonating are all done by the reader, not by the authors and composers of the documents. Whatever meaning the author wished to convey, or what purpose that conveyance was meant to serve, matters not at all. In this conception, the text does not serve as a medium for the communication of meaning, like a book; it serves rather as a medium for the Holy Spirit to act on the reader, like an icon. The act of reading the text is not a search for comprehension of knowledge, like study; rather it is a rote act of ritual that indirectly initiates contact with the divine, like veneration. The awareness of its content and message is not achieved through the mechanics of semiotics, but by the direct intervention of the Holy Spirit. The words of

the text itself are incidental to this process and may as well be written in gibberish. Proponents of this method sometimes claim that it accords with the practice of the church in the apostolic age, but it is worth noting that the Christians in the apostolic age had no Bible (the New Testament had not been written and the Septuagint was not circulated) and therefore needed no Bible. If we are going to imitate them, then, it follows that we should have no need of a Bible either, and therefore we need not bother to use it. (It is also worth noting that they did have a source of apostolic authority that could respond—positively or negatively—to particular interpretations of the gospel in real time, which is something Protestants specifically wish to do without.) In contrast, a reader who wishes to treat the text itself as carrying some form of authority must pay attention to the values and priorities evidenced in the text itself and discernible through its composition and presentation, just as a translator who wishes to respect the integrity of the source document must pay attention to the identifiable grammatical and semantic values of the existing words.

## The limits of conflict theology

"Conflict theology" is a label we assign for convenience to a trend, most notably within conservative evangelical or fundamentalist theology, of assigning superlative or primary doctrinal priority to the idea of an ongoing war between God and Satan and their respective underlings, either as a dogma in itself (i.e., "something all Christians must believe") or as a necessary element for understanding fundamental points of doctrine such as the power of God, salvation and atonement, or the mission and role of the church. Conflict theology is a trend, not a school, but nonetheless the arguments offered by various interpreters in its defense are relatively consistent. First and foremost, conflict theologians universally insist on the "real existence" of spirit beings as personal entities possessing agency and will, as opposed to personified abstractions. This is because conflict theology sees the powers as active participants in a war, not as passive obstacles to be demolished. Conflict theology also takes care to emphasize that Satan is a creature, not a god, and that God's ultimate victory in the conflict is certain, thus distinguishing itself from similar yet unorthodox movements such as Manicheanism (where the patrons of good and evil are equal and opposite gods) or process theology (where God's victory is contingent on people choosing to work to bring it about).

Conflict theologians, especially when contrasting themselves with demythologizers, pride themselves on "taking the teaching of the Bible seriously." What this normally consists of is treating the biblical text as a series of propositional statements, each of which, considered independently, is factually true. These propositions, or "proof-texts," are lifted from the text and arranged like a jigsaw puzzle into a coherent system of interconnected logic. Any gaps in the system that are not provided by the text are supplied by appealing to any combination of tradition, philosophy, logical deduction, experience, or common sense; these are verified by the further internal coherence of the system as a whole. If any of these propositions seem to contradict, one or both are adjusted by appealing to literary or historical context, mitigating cultural factors, or semantic elements such as grammar, semantic range, or even copying errors. As a last resort, the conflicting elements can be simply accepted and held in tension as a paradox. The final result is that the "Bible's teaching" is assumed to consist of the entire system and everything that can be deduced or derived from it, not merely those statements that can actually be quoted from the biblical text. In this conception, the biblical documents themselves are merely the tip of the iceberg of God's revealed truth.

This method of interpretation is also a problem because it shifts the Bible's authority away from the text-in-context and onto a philosophical construct. It is true that not all of the Bible's statements can be weighted equally; this is the meaning of the conservative evangelical caveat that the Bible's teaching is true "in all it affirms." But while the relative values of statements—that is, what is or is not affirmed—cannot be determined on the basis of their significance to the reader, as demythologizers do, they also cannot be determined by coherence or dissonance with a broader system of logical propositions. The only way the text's statements can be evaluated is by their own

context, within the logic and structure of the literary form in which they are presented. Statements cannot be lifted off the page as propositions; they must be considered according to their function within larger units of composition and discourse. Only at the end of a literary analysis can the text's "teaching" be turned over to the systematic theologians for integration with broader concerns of philosophy.

## The scope of this study

As indicated by these simplistic summaries, this book is not only about demons and spirits; it is also a study in how the Bible is read and interpreted. In particular, it is a study about how we can possibly attain some measure of certainty that our claims about the Bible's teaching can actually trace their warrant to the Bible's text, as opposed to merely deriving from our own speculative philosophy, however sound or persuasive that philosophy may turn out to be. This is the only way by which we might have any basis to claim that the teaching we ascribe to the Bible is actually based on Scripture alone. Consequently, even readers who are not especially interested in the particular topic of demons and spirits might find something of value, in the form of a test case for a method of biblical theology that prioritizes the importance of the text-in-context.

One of the more unfortunate side-effects of the polarization between demythologizing and conflict theology is that rejection of one is automatically assumed to entail adherence to the other. Consequently, many arguments offered in support of either school consist of criticism of the other, with the assumption that their own position will serve as the default alternative. This study is written primarily as a critique of conflict theology, because that is the majority position of our intended audience. However, the criticism that we will offer of conflict theology does not therefore mean that we support the demythologizing process. We consider both of these approaches to be flawed and therefore seek to offer another alternative that falls in between them.

We assume that the various references, direct and indirect, to demons and other spirit-beings, were included in the text by the authors for some particular purpose. What that purpose was, we do not know—at least, not until we read the text they produced. We assume that the text in its final form was written for the purpose of communicating something relatively specific, and despite the gulf of time and culture we believe that comprehension of that message is possible. However, in order for the message to be received it must first be read, and in order to be read it must first be translated. The task of the biblical theologian is to serve as the translator, not primarily of the language and grammar (a task for linguists), but rather of the structure and logic of the discourse that gives semiotic elements their particular meaning. In this way, we can discover what message the text was intended to convey to its original audience—that is, why it was written—and thereby also discover what specific words and ideas are required to communicate that message to us today. <>

*** Christian Gnosis: Christian Religious Philosophy in Its Historical Development by Ferdinand Christian Baur, edited by Peter C. Hodgson, translated by Robert F. Brown [Cascade Books, 9781532677403] Translation of Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwiklung. Tübingen: C. F. Osiander, 1835

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Excerpt editor's foreword: *Die Christliche Gnosis* appeared from the same publisher (Osiander in Tübingen), and at the same time (June 1835), as David Friedrich Strauss's Das Leben Jesu, kritisch gearbeitet. In fact a notice of Strauss's work is bound into the back of Gnosis. The furious controversy that immediately erupted over Strauss's critique of the gospel narratives completely eclipsed his teacher's monumental study, and only gradually has it come out of the shadows and received the recognition it deserves. Baur published another book in 1835, *Die sogennanten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels Paulus*, which was as revolutionary in Pauline studies as *Die christliche Gnosis* was in the history and philosophy of religion. It demonstrated that Paul could not have been the author of the epistles to Timothy and Titus, and it anticipated Baur's later conclusion that only four epistles (Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Romans) can be regarded as assuredly written by Paul.

Baur's interest in Gnosticism arose from his early studies in the history of religions, specifically his inaugural dissertation of 1827–28, which examined the idea of Christian Gnosticism and compared it with Schleiermacher's theology, and his 1831 monograph on the Manichean religious system. But the specific motivation that led to the present book is the dispute that arose in the period 1832–34 between Baur and his colleague on the Catholic theological faculty, Johann Adam Möhler, over the doctrinal differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. Möhler had argued in a lengthy treatise that Protestantism represents a Gnostic inward turn that rejects historical Christianity, and

Baur had responded with an equally lengthy defense of Protestantism and its turn to the subject against false charges of subjectivism. Evidence suggests that *Die christliche Gnosis* was written very hastily in response to various pressures of publication and academic dispute. Baur was establishing himself as a New Testament scholar and as a historian of the Christian church and theology, so there was a lot on his plate in the mid-1830s. The German text of Gnosis contains a number of flaws— typesetting mistakes, erroneous citations of primary sources, and the like—that are not recognized in the Errata at the end of the volume. The translation silently corrects these flaws wherever they were noticed, but has not attempted to verify the accuracy of Baur's citations of pagination in the secondary sources he discusses.

The work as a whole has an uneven quality. The section on Boehme (the least helpful part of the book) is largely a string of long quotations interspersed with brief interpretative comments. This is true of other sections as well, but to a lesser extent. Baur often directly quotes his sources, noting them but sometimes without providing quotation marks, a common practice at the time. His method of citations is erratic. Sometimes he uses footnotes, but at other times sources are indicated in-text. Sometimes he provides publication information, other times not. We have attempted to make the notation style more uniform and to provide more complete bibliographic information. Interspersed with Baur's notes are quite a few editorial notes, designated as [Ed.]. Brief editorial insertions are marked by square brackets, or in some instances italics. We have referred to existing English translations of ancient texts, using the abbreviations ANF to designate The Ante-Nicene Fathers and LCL to designate the Loeb Classical Library. There are a few major headings in the text itself, but Baur introduced detailed headings into the table of contents. Some of these are sentences rather than normal headings. We have put all these headings into the text and have broken up the long paragraphs, which often run for several pages without a break. Baur sometimes adds lengthy footnotes in or near the end of a section, as though he has thought of more that needs to be said, and he even provides additions through the Index and the Errata. The work has the feel at some points of being made up as it goes along. In its original form it is difficult to read, and unfortunately a critical German edition of it has never been published.

Despite all of this, Die christliche Gnosis is a brilliant book and a true tour de force. It reveals Baur's remarkable grasp of the history of religions, the history of Christianity, the philosophy of religion, and philosophical theology, ranging from ancient sources to the nineteenth century. This range is a hallmark of all his scholarship, and it is first revealed here. Despite a few earlier works, Die christliche Gnosis is Baur's first major scholarly presentation, and his first major engagement with the modern thinkers who deeply influenced him, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and especially Hegel. Hegel was the most recent, Baur having assimilated his ideas very quickly after the posthumous publication of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion in 1832. For these reasons, this book is foundational for Baur studies.

The word gnosis is written the same way in Greek, German, and English, and simply means "knowledge," especially religious knowledge or (esoteric) knowledge of spiritual truth. "Knowledge" in English comes from the same Indo-European root as gnosis, namely gnō. We capitalize the term in this translation because Baur uses it to refer not only to the concept of Gnosis but also to the movement known as Gnosticism (for which he also employs the term Gnosticismus). The more customary term for "knowledge" in German is Wissen, which (along with English "wise" and "wisdom") derives from a different root. Wissen forms the basis for Wissenschaft, which means scientific or scholarly knowledge. In Baur's day academic theology was regarded as a Wissenschaft, along with other human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Writing about the goal of Gnosis as "clear self-consciousness" (in the section on the Pseudo-Clementines), Baur says that Gnostic systems assumed an identity between being and knowing such that "being can only be for knowing, that it can only be 'being as thought and known.'"

As the subtitle of Baur's book indicates, his usage of the term Gnosis goes beyond ancient Gnosis to designate the concept of "Christian religious philosophy" (christliche Religionsphilosophie) in its historical development. The term Religionsphilosophie poses a problem for translators. On the one hand it can refer to "philosophy of religion" in the sense of a philosophical analysis of the concepts and shapes of various religious traditions without the philosopher necessarily sharing any convictions with these traditions other than a recognition of their importance. This is the modus operandi of most current Anglo-American philosophy of religion. On the other hand, the term can apply to the work of a religious believer or sympathizer who uses philosophical concepts and methods to describe and/or construct the belief system of a specific religion—Christian religion (and its antecedents) in the case of christliche Religionsphilosophie—as well as to defend it against criticism. This practice might be called "religious philosophy" or "philosophical religion" or even "philosophical theology," and it is the one followed by Baur in this book. He also reads Schelling and Hegel as "religious philosophers," and he interprets Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube* (Christian Faith) as containing a religio-philosophical aspect because it intends to be a science (Wissenschaft) of faith. When Religionsphilosophie occurs in the section on Hegel, we translate it as "philosophy of religion" because the reference is to what Hegel himself called Philosophie der Religion in his lectures on the topic and elsewhere. These distinctions are of course not hard and fast.

Gnosis as used by Baur involves a theory of religious history as well as of religious philosophy or philosophical theology. Religious history is concerned with the relations among three major forms of world religions: paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. Baur devotes a great deal of attention to this matter in Part 2 and offers a classification of the Gnostic systems based on how they construe the relationships. The first major form of Gnosis links Christianity closely to both Judaism and paganism, and includes the systems of Valentinus, the Ophites, Bardesanes, Saturninus, and Basilides (Part 2.1). The second major form separates Christianity from both Judaism and paganism, and is represented only by Marcion (Part 2.2). The third major form identifies Christianity with Judaism, and opposes both of them to paganism (Part 2.3). Baur finds a historical exemplar of the latter in the Pseudo-Clementine system (the Recognitions and the Homilies). Volker Henning Drecoll points out that this is a logical rather than a history-of-religions construction of religious history, and that a fourth major type is conceivable in which Christianity is linked to paganism while rejecting Judaism. Baur can find no historical representation of this final form because a Christianity "reduced to the same level as paganism" would be a contradiction of the singular character of Christianity, and thus does not appear in the history of Gnosis (although aspects of it are present in Manicheanism).

There are two major drawbacks to Baur's theory of religious history. One of them is summarized by Drecoll, who explains that Baur's portrayal of Gnosis

sets out from the concept and then goes on to classify the phenomena. Baur certainly does know his sources, and he develops his concept in such a way that he can order the phenomena accordingly. All the same, his procedure is altogether deductive. It would therefore be unthinkable for him to have a loose structure of categories based on common features, or even a "typological model," of gnosis . . . This procedure does not take into account the full spectrum of types of Gnosticism (nor, accordingly, the extensive new discoveries of the twentieth century, since Baur's definition of gnosis can seem no longer serviceable today).

The logical character of Baur's typology is revealed when, in turning to his third type, he writes: "The self-advancing concept of Gnosis has not yet run through all the moments in the course of its development." He was convinced that logical patterns are displayed in historical events, but he analyzes the events (and writings) themselves in strictly empirical fashion. Religious history draws on philosophical and theological ideas at the macro level, but on the micro level it is historical-critical.

The other drawback concerns Baur's use of the category of "paganism" in his account of the historical trajectory of world religions, moving from paganism to Judaism to Christianity. This is in fact a very traditional typology going back to early Christianity. The issue comes up in an interesting way when Baur offers a critique of Hegel's organization of religions in the second part of his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hegel does not employ the category of "paganism" at all but speaks rather of "determinate religion" (die bestimmte Religion). In the edition of Hegel's Philosophie der Religion available to Baur, Determinate Religion is divided into two main parts: nature religion, which includes the religion of magic, Hinduism, and transitional religions (Persian and Egyptian); and the religion of spiritual individuality, which includes Judaism, Greek religion, and Roman religion. Baur by contrast wants to expand the category of nature religion to include all the so-called pagan (non-Judeo-Christian) religions, and to distinguish Judaism from them because it reorients divine mediation away from nature to history. Hegel finds a progression within Determinate Religion itself toward "spiritual individuality," including Greek religion as well as Judaism, each of which contributes important elements to Christianity. Roman religion is a retrogressive form of spirit and provides the immediate context for the birth of Christianity. Hegel's scheme is more innovative, but it relativizes Judaism; Baur's scheme is more traditional, but it requires use of the negative category "paganism," under which the majority of world religions are lumped. Both schemes are hierarchical, placing Christianity as the "absolute" or "consummate" religion at the top. The critical edition of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion points out that Hegel was constantly experimenting with the organization of Determinate Religion and could never arrive at a satisfactory arrangement. In fact, his final effort in 1831 gave nature religion a very minor role and distinguished the Asian as well as Near Eastern religions from it—just the opposite of the direction advocated by Baur.

Baur's attitude is ambivalent in that, while using the negative category, he says that paganism has been given "a less restricted role" in the more recent philosophy of religion (Schelling and Hegel). "In paganism, nature is regarded as the mediatrix who envelops the spirit that, in the realm of nature, is rising to the stage of religion but of course is cloaked with nature's veil woven from so many colorful images, while at the same time also graphically setting forth in this veil the models or typology of the gods." The epistemological mode of paganism is a way of seeing or perceiving things in nature (Anschauung). It is foundational for and is taken up into the reflective understanding (reflectirender Verstand) of Judaism and the reason (Vernunft) of Christianity. What remains externally related in nature becomes reflectively assimilated in Judaism and then through Christian rationality grasps the inner connection of things.

Part 3 of Christian Gnosis discusses the conflict of Gnosis with Neoplatonism and the teachings of the early church. Baur points out that this conflict played a decisive role in the historical development of Christian dogma, especially by Irenaeus and Tertullian, and that Clement of Alexandria was both a critic and a proponent of Christian Gnosticism. "Clement concurs with the Gnostics above all on the fact that there must be a Gnosis as knowledge of the absolute. Historical faith cannot suffice. Belief must be elevated to knowledge if Christianity is said to be the absolute religion." This Gnosis is not only theoretical but also serves as practical wisdom. At the beginning of Part 4, Baur provides a very brief survey of the role of Gnosis from Augustine to post-Reformation theology before arriving at more recent religious philosophy (Boehme to Hegel). We pass over these parts of his religious history.

"Gnosis," Baur writes, "is a matter of religious history (Religionsgeschichte) only inasmuch as it is at the same time religious philosophy (Religionsphilosophie), such that we gain a proper concept of the essence of Gnosis from the distinctive way in which these two elements and orientations—the historical and the philosophical aspects—have become intermixed in one totality." Our attention

now turns to religious philosophy. In a key passage early in Part 1, on the concept of Gnosis, Baur writes:

The philosophical perspective . . . catches sight of an organic whole in which one and the same living idea moves forward in its concrete configuration, through a series of forms and stages of development. In the idea of religion, all religions are one; they are related to it as appearance or form relates to essence, the concrete to the abstract, what mediates to what is immediate or unmediated. The entire history of religion is none other than the living concept of religion, unfolding and advancing itself and, in so doing, realizing itself . . . For the idea of religion, the history of religion is not merely the history of divine revelations, for these revelations are at the same time the process of development in which the eternal essence of deity itself goes forth from itself, manifests itself in a finite world and produces division with itself in order, through this manifestation and self-bifurcation, to return to eternal oneness with itself . . . Gnosis is the remarkable attempt to grasp nature and history, the entire course of the world, together with all that it comprises, as the series of moments in which absolute spirit objectifies itself and mediates itself with itself.

One should not be surprised that this concept of Gnosis, which can be extracted from its ancient history, is also strictly analogous to the most recent religious philosophy. Baur thus anticipates Part 4 of his book, where he takes up Jacob Boehme's theosophy, Friedrich Schelling's philosophy of nature, Friedrich Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, and G. W. F. Hegel's philosophy of religion. Boehme's theosophy stands in the Protestant mystical tradition and is characterized by a duality of principles posited within the divine nature itself and carried over to the created world. It is still couched in mythic and symbolic categories, and Baur does not do much with it other than to quote long passages. His presentation of Schelling is rather brief and idiosyncratic, describing his relation to Boehme (as shown by his treatise Of Human Freedom, which also in part uses figurative terminology), his relation to Gnosticism (his concept of God as becoming, which involves identity, difference, and return), and his nature-spirit dualism.

Our interest in this final part focuses on its treatment of the relationship between Schleiermacher and Hegel, and the movement from the former to the latter. Schleiermacher emphatically insisted that his Glaubenslehre does not contain a philosophical grounding for Christian faith. Baur, however, begged to differ.

While the contents of the Christian faith should hardly be based on philosophy, a science (Wissenschaft) of the Christian faith . . . can only be accomplished in a philosophical way by the use of philosophical methods and certain philosophical elements, those which theology takes up within itself and works with. But this scientific procedure is completely the same as the one we have already become specifically acquainted with as religious philosophy, in other words, Gnosis.

Schleiermacher's great work in dogmatic theology is not simply Glaube but Glaubenslehre, the doctrine of faith or teaching about faith. (Glaubenslehre is a shorthand expression used by Schleiermacher himself for Der christliche Glaube.) The "doctrine" part includes a theory about human subjectivity and how the objects of religious faith (such as God and Christ) are modifications of religious consciousness. Christian faith also requires Christian knowledge—knowledge of a wissenschaftlich character.

From what Baur says about Schleiermacher at the beginning of his treatment, we gain the impression that, despite their obvious differences in character and content, his own book, *Die christliche Gnosis*, is intended as a supplement to and corrective of *Der christliche Glaube*. This certainly comports with his view, expressed throughout this book and elsewhere, about how faith and knowledge, pistis and gnosis, are intrinsically connected. As the Apostle Paul expressed it in First Corinthians, a knowledge

(gnosis) that is not "puffed up" is a knowledge that is engaged in practices of love and is congruent with faith. At the same time it is a knowing by which faith in something historically given is "raised up" to the true concept of what is given. Faith is based on subjective conviction or certainty, while knowledge provides rational backing for it.

As for the transition from Schleiermacher to Hegel, Baur is tracking his own intellectual journey when he writes that "Schleiermacher's subjective standpoint—that of an absolute feeling of dependence without an absolute that has objective content— involves of its own accord the necessity of proceeding on to the Hegelian standpoint of objectivity." If the feeling of dependence is "absolute," if it refers to an "absolute causality," the mind finds itself propelled toward this absolute itself. While Schleiermacher assumes that philosophy can have nothing to do with faith, "Hegel insists on nothing more emphatically than recognizing that it is philosophy's task to bring religion to the true concept of itself and to elevate faith to knowledge, since philosophy and religion coincide as one and religion's object, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its own objectivity: the absolute, or God." Subjectivity and objectivity are unified when it is understood that the mind's journey to God is at the same time God's self-knowledge returning to itself—that finite and infinite spirit are connected in the act of knowing. This connection is what the figure of Christ is all about.

Hegel distinguishes three moments in the doctrine of Christ: the moment of history (a nonreligious perspective), the moment of faith (a religious perspective), and the moment of knowledge (a philosophical perspective). Baur describes the transition to the philosophical (or "spiritual") perspective as follows:

This faith [in Christ] must therefore now first be elevated to knowledge. The spiritual content must be raised up from the element of faith into the element of thinking consciousness, where it is no longer based on the historical account as of something past and done with, but instead becomes justified by philosophy or the concept, as truth existent in itself, as absolutely present reality. For the truth existent in itself is absolute spirit, God as triune, the identity of the human being with God.

Where Hegel is heading is summed up by Baur:

From the standpoint of speculative thinking, God's becoming human is no solitary, one-time, historical event. Instead it is an eternal determination of God's being in virtue of which, in time, he becomes human (in each individual human being) inasmuch as God is human from eternity. The finitude and the painful humiliation Christ suffered as God incarnate is something God endures as human in every age. The reconciliation Christ accomplished is his deed occurring in time. But God reconciles himself with himself eternally, and Christ's resurrection and ascension is none other than spirit's eternal return to itself and to its truth. As human, as the God-man, Christ is human being in its universality. Not a singular individual, he is instead the universal individual.

Baur, however, wants to descend from these abstract heights of speculation and "go once again to the lower sphere in which the difference between the historical and the ideal fittingly applies," that is, to the sphere where "Christ retains a standing and importance no one else can share with him." Here "Christ" refers to Jesus of Nazareth, the one who was believed to be the Christ. In accord with the usage of the day, it functions as a name as well as a title. Baur introduces a statement that establishes his own critical perspective on Hegel:

Hegel's philosophy of religion regards Christ as God incarnate only as this relates to faith, and without speaking specifically about which objective features of Christ's appearing faith in him actually presupposes. But how would faith in Christ as God incarnate have been able to arise unless he was, in some way or other, what faith took him to be? In any case the necessary presupposition is that the truth existent in itself, the unity of the divine nature with human nature, had become concrete truth, become known self-consciously, for the first time in Christ, and had been expressed and

taught by him as the truth. This is also therefore the distinctive prerogative or preeminence of Christ.

This statement raises the question as to who the historical Christ was and how he in fact was what faith took him to be. Baur himself investigated the teaching and activity of Jesus and established on that basis a connection between history and faith. The idea and historical reality can never be completely identified in any single individual; rather the idea can fully actualize itself only in an infinite series of individuals. But the non-identity of the ideal and the real can be reduced to a minimum in a single individual, and this is in fact the case with the individual through whom the idea of divine-human unity enters into the consciousness of humanity at a specific point in time.18 In this sense history provides a foundation for faith, but only faith can affirm that God is present in Christ.

Hegel recognized that the teachings and sayings of Jesus are couched in the language of faith and representation, not that of speculative knowledge, and it was Hegel who established the famous distinction between Vorstellung and Begriff, representation and concept. But only the form differs, not the content. The content concerns the oneness of divine and human spirit, and this is articulated by Christ in his own way, through teachings, parables about the kingdom of God, and his own messianic self-consciousness. Because the form differs, there must be a distinction between the historical Christ and the ideal Christ, but not, in Baur's view, a separation or disjunction. Baur summarizes his own view as well as that of Hegel when, in a section just preceding the conclusion to the book, he says that Christianity is the mediation of religious consciousness, not in the form of nature (paganism) or the theocratic state (Judaism), but as "the history and person of a single individual." However, "this single individual is at the same time the human being as such or in itself (der Mensch an sich)." Only Hegel's philosophy of religion can "make this connection between this form, the history and person of God incarnate as a single individual, and truth existent in itself." Thus Hegel's philosophy of religion must be distinguished from the docetic and dualistic tendencies that were everywhere present in ancient Gnosticism, especially in the system of Marcion.

In his "Concluding Remarks" Baur says that "Christianity had to leave behind it all that is polytheistic and dualistic, the many different versions of the antithesis of spirit and matter, of a higher and a lower god, and the whole figurative, symbolic presentation of religious and speculative ideas." In place of all that it inherited from paganism and Judaism, "the idea of absolute spirit—which took shape in all these forms so as to manifest its own proper nature in them, and through this mediation to grasp itself in its own eternal truth—is what first had to become conscious [of itself] in its freedom and purity." The idea of absolute spirit could only develop on the basis of objective Christianity, and this same objective Christianity serves as a check on religio-philosophical speculation.

Baur's Christian Gnosis was written in 1835. Over a hundred years later, in 1945, a trove of fifty-two hitherto unknown Gnostic writings was discovered buried in a jar near Nag Hammadi in Egypt. Different literary genres were represented: gospels (like the "sayings source" used by Matthew and Luke), apocalypses, prayers, and non-Christian writings. These were Coptic translations of more ancient manuscripts, which date to the second century but may contain traditions older than the New Testament gospels. Scholars who have written about the find, such as Elaine Pagels, draw upon the Gospel of Truth, the Gospel of Philip, the Apocryphon of John, and the Apocalypse of Peter, among others, plus some of the ancient sources, especially Valentinus. Prior to Nag Hammadi, in 1896, the so-called Berlin Codex was also discovered in Egypt, containing the Gospel of Mary, the Secret Writing of John, the Wisdom of Jesus Christ, and The Acts of Peter. Obviously, none of these mostly gospel-type writings were known to Baur, whose information was based strictly on ancient Christian sources critical of Gnosis as a heresy. If nothing else, the new discoveries confirm that Gnosticism, in its great diversity of forms, was a massive presence in early Christianity.

Pagels makes a point of the fact that these writings were regarded as heretical, and that early church theologians together with the ecclesiastical hierarchy did everything in their power to suppress them. Her history of modern research on Gnosticism starts with Adolf Harnack, who shared the consensus view that the Gnostics propagated false, hybrid forms of Christian teaching, which he called the "acute Hellenizing of Christianity." She does not mention Baur, for whom the category of "heresy" had an entirely different meaning. Heresy simply designated for him teachings and viewpoints that did not prevail in early controversies over the meaning of Christian faith. These controversies were essential to the formation of Christian doctrines, and the victors in these struggles designated everything that did not conform to their point of view as heterodox or heretical. They tried to suppress the rich diversity of conflicting viewpoints and practices in early Christianity, a diversity that Baur attempted to recapture in his historical studies. So, in this respect recent Gnostic studies share a common interest with Baur's monograph. In other respects, however, his discovery in Gnosticism of a Christian religious philosophy that came to modern fruition in the philosophies of Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Hegel would likely leave contemporary Gnostic scholars astonished and unengaged. They regard Gnosticism in religiohistorical rather than religio-philosophical categories, and its modern significance lies in the diversity of religious practices it discloses, as well as its interaction with Judaism and other religions.

Another point made especially by Pagels is that the Gnostics used an abundance of female symbolism to describe the nature of God, the creation of the world, the hierarchies in the world, and the redemptive figure. This reflects the fact (in part) that in its earliest years the Christian movement was remarkably open to women; but by the second century patriarchal authority had become entrenched and suppressed gender as well as other forms of diversity in the Christian movement, driving it underground. Baur recognized and described in detail the female imagery in Valentinian and other Gnostic systems; but he attributed it to the influence of paganism, which gave a much larger role to female forces and figures than did Judaism (despite the fact that certain key words in Hebrew such as "wisdom" and "spirit" are feminine in gender). In all the pagan systems there was a strict hierarchy between male and female, with the female occupying the lower level. Yet "the primal being is male-female, inasmuch as the thought still enclosed within the most profound silence of his essence . . . is distinguished from himself." The female is the principle of distinction and separation, thus giving birth and vitality to what would otherwise be a solitary lifeless male monad. Sophia (or Achamoth) is both a mother to and a consort of Christ, a role assumed by Mary in canonical theology.

In her final chapter Pagels addresses a theme that aligns her to some degree with Hegel and Baur. The way to the knowledge of God is not through external revelations and authorities but through knowledge of oneself. By turning to the "light within," one discovers the light that enlightens the world. The Gnostics taught that the relation between God and humanity is reciprocal, each creating the other. Humans discover from their own inner potential the revelation of truth. "Many Gnostics then," she writes, "would have agreed in principle with Ludwig Feuerbach . . . that 'theology is really anthropology.' . . . For Gnostics, exploring the psyche became explicitly what it is for many people today implicitly—a religious quest." The religious quest is for knowledge because it is ignorance, not sin, that creates suffering (a motif central to Buddhism). "Both Gnosticism and psychotherapy value, above all, knowledge—the self-knowledge that is insight." The question then becomes what prevents theology from simply being anthropology? Why call this a religious quest rather than a psychotherapeutic quest? Hegel and Baur were very clear that theology is not simply anthropology, that it is God as absolute spirit who overreaches the difference between the infinite and the finite, incorporating the finite into Godself as a differentiating moment, and returning to Godself as the true or genuine infinite. Hegel worked this conviction out with a philosophical rigor that could be beneficial for those who want to retrieve Gnostic themes today. Baur showed how the ideality of divine-human unity must be actualized in concrete historical events and figures, and how that ideality

has progressed through history from Catholic orthodoxy to a modern Protestantism that stresses both the turn to the subject (Schleiermacher) and the objectivity of God (Hegel).

Cyril O'Regan, a Catholic theologian, has written the best (and virtually the only) study in English of Baur's *Die christliche Gnosis*. His thesis, using tools of literary and philosophical analysis, is that the "Gnostic return" in modern Protestant discourses represents a third option in addition to orthodox and liberal Protestantism. O'Regan believes that "Gnostic ascription" is superior to other forms of heterodox Christianity: apocalyptic, Neoplatonic, and Kabbalistic. But the line from Boehme to Hegel calls into question the Christian biblical narrative, substituting for it another, ontotheological narrative, rooted in ancient Gnosis, which argues that God as trinitarian is "not given but becomes, . . . through the economy of creation, incarnation, redemption, and sanctification, in which the pathos of the cross has an essential place." An extension of this model is found in post-Hegelian thinkers such as Berdyaev, Soloviev, Altizer, Tillich, and Moltmann.

O'Regan criticizes this model from the same perspective as the Catholic Tübingen School in the nineteenth century, recalling the debate between Möhler and Baur. He regards the Gnostic return as both "haunting" and "deranging," and he calls it a "fabulous catastrophe." It is fabulous because "the narrations are magnificent in their speculative adventurousness and their aesthetic appeal," and because they offer an "alternative to both the dead letter of Christianity in the post-Reformation period and the death of Christianity in the post-Enlightenment period." But it is a catastrophe because the biblical narrative "is systematically disfigured." The "grammar" of biblical narrative is briefly described by O'Regan as constituted by classical versions of the central Christian doctrines: Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as determinate personal entities), creation (the world as radically distinct from God), fall (through disobedience to the rule of God), redemption (through Christ as the incarnate Son of God), resurrection, and consummation. This is the consensus view from Irenaeus to the Reformers and Protestant scholastics.

In response, we may point out that, for one thing, the biblical narrative is not as sui generis as this distinction makes it sound. It too is embedded in its historical nexus and draws upon non-biblical sources. But more importantly, modernity has uncovered tensions in the story that cannot simply be papered over—historical, logical, metaphysical, psychological, scientific tensions. History is violated by repeated supernatural incursions into it and by mistaking myths and legends as historical fact. In its literal form the story is riddled with logical contradictions, and it is based on a static metaphysics for which God is regarded as an unchanging entity beyond the world (the "supreme being") rather than as a spiritual process interacting with, suffering in, and being enriched by the world. The story can be illuminated by what has been learned about human beings from the psychological and social sciences, but if construed literally it conflicts with a scientific understanding of nature. Baur belonged to a generation of early nineteenth century theologians and philosophers who attempted to render the Christian metanarrative intelligible once again by rethinking central Christian doctrines, drawing upon repressed resources from the tradition, and employing bold speculative ideas. Whether they failed or succeeded, and to what degree, has been debated ever since. <>

# Wandering, Begging Monks: Spiritual Authority and the Promotion of Monasticism in Late Antiquity by Daniel Caner [The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, University of California Press, 9780520233249]

An apostolic lifestyle characterized by total material renunciation, homelessness, and begging was practiced by monks throughout the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries. Such monks often served as spiritual advisors to urban aristocrats whose patronage gave them considerable authority and independence from episcopal control. This book is the first comprehensive study of this type of Christian poverty and the challenge it posed for episcopal authority and the promotion of monasticism in late antiquity.

Focusing on devotional practices, Daniel Caner draws together diverse testimony from Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and elsewhere—including the Pseudo-Clementine Letters to Virgins, Augustine's On the Work of Monks, John Chrysostom's homilies, legal codes—to reveal gospel-inspired patterns of ascetic dependency and teaching from the third to the fifth centuries. Throughout, his point of departure is social and cultural history, especially the urban social history of the late Roman empire. He also introduces many charismatic individuals whose struggle to persist against church suppression of their chosen way of imitating Christ was fought with defiant conviction, and the book includes the first annotated English translation of the biography of Alexander Akoimetos (Alexander the Sleepless). Wandering, Begging Monks allows us to understand these fascinating figures of early Christianity in the full context of late Roman society.

## Reviews

“Groundbreaking for those who study asceticism, monasticism, the uses of Late Antique biblical exegesis, church history, and most importantly church politics. . . . The very valuable translation of the *Life* of Alexander Akoimetos is an added benefit of the book." — *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*

"A detailed examination, with meticulous documentation, of the phenomenon of wandering and begging monks that appeared in the late 4th and early 5th centuries, especially in the eastern Mediterranean region and North Africa, during the formative period of Christian monasticism." — *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*

"A first-rate study of how the politics of reputation, bonds of patronage, and competition for scarce resources culminated in the bishops' tightened grip on monasteries and their networks of supporters. In addition to advancing scholarship on urban monasticism, ecclesiastical responses to poverty, and the social history of doctrine, Caner's thoroughly researched study will enhance future work on asceticism and pilgrimage." — *Catholic Historical Review*

"Caner has written in an entertaining and engaging style and packed this monograph fully and comprehensively with the details and impressions of what was the dilemma of Christian asceticism in the third-fifth centuries. Caner takes the reader a lot of places, and it is gratifying to see the significant role of Syriac-speaking asceticism being given its proper and measured place in the history." — *Hugoye: Journal of Syriac Studies*

“A model of scholarship: beautifully written and engaging, it clearly situates its subject in the larger

historical context, demonstrates an impressive command . . . of relevant sources, and provides clear and compelling support for his interpretation." — *Journal of Theological Studies*

"Caner draws together traditions, episodes, and groups from across the geographical expanse of the Roman Empire (the Syrian Orient, North Africa, Constantinople), to present the wandering monk as a figure around whom the ecclesiastical battle for authority fought between bishops and ascetics took on acute articulations. By focusing on religious practices rather than doctrinal teachings, Caner is able to weave together hitherto separate discussions to reveal a larger pattern of profound change in late antique Christian culture, as different models of monasticism competed for economic and political power in urban centers. This is very important work. It makes major contributions to our understanding of early Christian asceticism, the emergence of monasticism as an institution within church and society, and church-state relations in the later Roman Empire."—Susan Ashbrook Harvey, author of *Asceticism and Society in Crisis: John of Ephesus* and the *Lives of the Eastern Saints*.

"Caner has cut through to the heart of central issues in the study of early Christian asceticism: social stability, economic self-sufficiency, and the reliability of the sources at our disposal. Those who were apparently unstable and dependent, the wanderers and beggars of his title, occupy the foreground of his account; but his chief argument is that they have to be placed in a broader social and historical context that softens the edges of their idiosyncrasy, and that we have to be careful not to take at face value the exaggerated categories of mutually belligerent parties in the church. . . . The second half of the work begins by tackling the "Messalian" movement—asking whether it is appropriate to talk of a "movement" in so distinctive a way. The supposedly typical "Messalian" inclination—an inclination to dramatic indigence in the service of continuous prayer—seems less sui generis, when placed alongside more moderate forms of ascetic dedication. We are warned, therefore, not to accept too readily the paradigms of heresy-hunters like Epiphanius. Caner's account marks an important step forward in our understanding of such patterns of ascetic behavior. Caner also ventures upon an equally fresh and welcome investigation of what lay behind the contentious attitudes of John Chrysostom and Nilus of Ancyra, and then—perhaps even more exciting—explains how the whole study transforms our understanding of the maelstrom of politics that impinged upon religious debate between the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. We are thus brought to realize how eagerly and disruptively ascetic rivals struggled to attract and retain the patronage of the Christian élite, even to the imperial level."—Philip Rousseau, author of *Pachomius: The Making of a Community in Fourth-Century Egypt*, and *Basil of Caesarea*

Excerpt: This book explores social and economic concerns that contributed to the promotion of certain forms of Christian monasticism over others between roughly 360 and 451 C.E. Its focus is ascetic poverty and competing claims to material support made by ascetic poverity and compelling claims nastic movement was just taking shape: How should monks interpret scriptural pronouncements on poverty? What relation was there between early monastic practice and apostolic tradition? What were the implications for members of the clergy? To what extent, and on what conditions, was material dependency acceptable in late Roman society?

Although we will pursue these questions mainly in Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, the issues involved are best introduced by the warning that Augustine, bishop of Hippo, sent to monks of Carthage in 401:

> Slaves of God, Soldiers of Christ, may you thus ignore the deceits of that most fervent enemy, who, desiring with his customary foulness to obscure in every way your good reputation,... has scattered everywhere so many hypocrites in the garb of monks, who wander around the provinces never sent, never stationary, never settled, never stable.... all seek, all demand either the expenses of their profitable poverty or a reward for their pretended holiness. ... Under the general name of monks your good and holy profession, which in the name of Christ we desire to spread throughout Africa as it has through other lands, is being reviled.

Augustine bears witness here to the pervasion of wandering monks throughout the Roman Empire at the turn of the fifth century. Such hypocrites, he claims, feigned holiness to reap material gains. Their begging threatened to discredit monasticism as a whole. Against their example he implored his readers to "show people you are not seeking an easy meal in idleness, but that you are seeking the kingdom of God through the straight and narrow life of [this monastic] profession." That meant manual labor, practiced within the confines of a monastery.

In these passages Augustine reveals a preoccupation with the impact of wandering, begging monks on public opinion and the problems they raised for the social acceptance of the "good and holy" monastic profession he wished to promote in North Africa. Similar concerns for public opinion were shared by church and monastic authorities throughout the Roman Empire, as we shall see. But the issues raised by such monks in the late fourth and early fifth centuries were far more complex. Augustine wrote On the Work of Monks not simply to exhort his readers toward a more respectable form of monastic life, but also to discourage them from emulating certain long-haired, itinerant ascetics who had reportedly gained a considerable following as spiritual teachers among local monks and ordinary

Christian laymen Such "long-hairs" did not work, that is did not practice manual labor. Instead they offered admirers spiritual edification in exchange for material support, while seeking to live like the "birds of the sky" that "neither sow nor reap," or the "lilies of the field" that "neither toil nor spin," in literal accordance the "freedom from care that Jesus encouraged his disciples to embrace in his Sermon on the Mount (Mt 6: 25–34; cf. Lk 12:22–31). It was against their notions of ascetic propriety that Augustine composed his treatise. In his view, they had not only misinterpreted and abused evangelic precepts by refusing to work, but by claiming a right to material support on the grounds that they were teachers, they were also claiming for themselves the apostolic privileges that rightfully belonged only to vested members of the clergy.

Inasmuch as it served to discredit such ascetic teachers, Augustine's depiction of "hypocrites in the garb of monks" must not be taken at face value. The same goes for denouncements of wandering "pseudomonks" made by his Eastern counterparts at this time. As we shall see, such accusations and condemnations of ascetic vagrancy and begging were often expressions of a rivalry for social and spiritual authority. Indeed, often what caused concern was that the monks in question had gained prestige not only among their ascetic peers but also among the Christian laity, who rewarded them with alms. So observes the emperor Julian, whose treatise To the Cynic Heracleius preserves our earliest (ca. 361) explicit testimony for wandering monks:

Long ago I gave you a nickname, and now I think I will write it down. It is apotaktistai [renouncers], a name applied to certain persons by the impious Galilaeans. They are for the most part men who by making small sacrifices gain much, or rather everything, from all sources, and in addition secure honor, crowds of attendants, and services. Something like that is your method, except perhaps for uttering divine revelations.... And perhaps too there is this difference, that you have no excuse for levying tribute on specious pretexts as they do; which they call eleemosyne [alms], whatever that may mean. But in other respects your habits and theirs are very much alike. Like them you have abandoned your homeland and wander all over....

Julian's sketch is, of course, as much a caricature as Augustine's, meant to chasten ascetics of his own calling. It nevertheless makes plain what Augustine and other Christian writers only imply certain wondering monks

received both popular acclaim and alms by virtue of their material renunciations (i.e., their ascetic poverty) and their charismatic behavior or utterances (here specified as propheg).syin From an ecclesiastical perspective, such acclaim could prove challenging indeed. At Constantinople it became pivotal a eri s of confrontieh tions betw e churc officials, whose claims to spiritual authority derived mainly from their church office, and monks, who derived both apostolic authority and aristocratic patronage by virtue of their ascetic practices and spiritual services.

As vagrant beggars, spiritual teachers, or charismatic "enthusiasts," wandering monks raised the basic question of what it meant to be a monk wherever they appeared. When the Council of Chalcedon in 451 issued the first church canons that addressed the movements of monks and placed their activities under episcopal control, monasticism was still an evolving phenomenon. One purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the sequestered form of monastic life that the Council favored, as well as the self- sufficient, work-based ideal that authorities like Augustine promoted, were in fact novel developments in monastic history, supplanting an earlier, widely practiced ideal in which an ascetic elite, observing apostolic principles, provided spiritual edification to Christian communities in return for their material support. But this book is also a study in cultural history that explores why certain Christian holy men became recognized as legitimate, while others, who embraced Jesus' most demanding precepts for Christian perfection, became marginalized and repudiated in this most crucial period for the establishment, spread, and acceptance of monastic institutions.

THE MODEL HOLY MAN

With the victories of Constantine in the first quarter of the fourth century, a cultural revolution gained supremacy in the Roman Empire that would eventually transform or supplant traditions held for centuries. The process of Christianization that followed is most notorious for its violence against pagan temples, sacred groves, and statuary, and for imperial legislation against the practice of ancient rites. Yet this process required more penetrating suasion than could be effected by the swift and irregular destruction

of outward symbols of the cultural past or imposed by the threat of punishment. Ancestral customs tended to reassert themselves where neglected by church and imperial forces. Christianization required that imaginations be reoriented toward new cultural icons, based not only on scriptural examples bt alliimlhvividlbodied the ideals that the Scriptures described. At the same time, church leaders had to acknowledge and accommodate the sensibilities of their large congregations, now being filled with the mainstream of Roman society. The pressures on these leaders to persuade and accommodate were exerted in turn upon a figure that rose to prominence in the rhetoric, literature, and society of the late fourth century: the Christian monk.

In previous centuries Christians had already celebrated men and women within their communities who made sexual and material renunciations in order to distance themselves from the ordinary "world" and prepare themselves for the world to come.8 But as Christianity gained a more central position in Roman society after Constantine, church rhetoric increasingly favored those solitaries whose aske¯sis (spiritual exercises, practices, renunciation, or mode of life) placed them outside the normal (urban or village) course of human interactions and concerns. Around such monachoi crystallized the most otherworldly ideals. "To go to the monastery of a holy man," John Chrysostom told congregations in Antioch (modern Antakya) in the 380s or 390s, "is to pass as if from earth unto heaven," for in that solitude visitors would find neither the self-indulgence of luxuries nor the burdens of ordinary living.9 And none seemed to offer a better example than the monks of the Egyptian desert:

> If you go now to the desert of Egypt, you will see that this desert has become better than any paradise, with countless choruses of angels in human form. ... They display the same strictness [akribeia] in the great diligence of their lifestyle as they do in their doctrine of faith. For though they have stripped themselves of all possessions and crucified themselves to the whole world,

they push themseves still further, nourshouring those n neetrough their own physical labors. For though they fast and keep vigils, they don't think it right to be idle during the day; instead they devote their nights to holy hymns and watches, applying themselves durng the day to prayers and the work of their hands together at once, imitating the apostles' zeal.

Anyone would know this who went to Egypt, Chrysostom says; but if they could not, he suggests they consult the biography of "him whom Egypt brought forth after the apostles, namely the great and blessed Antony." By reading his Life they would learn precisely "what sort of lifestyle Christ's laws demand."

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It will become clear that an aspostolic lifestyle characterized by wandering and material dependency was widely advocated and practiced in the fourth and fifth centuries all around the Roman Empire.44 This form of monastic life went back at least to the third century and was justified by a literal understanding of the New Teatament (e.g., Mt 6:26– 34, Lk 10:38–42, Jn 6:27, Acts 6:1–4, and 1 Thess 5:17).45 It was based on the notion that strict imitation ofJesus and his apostles (meaning absolute poverty, prayer, and spiritual teaching) was the highest form of Christian life. Though its most radical proponents in this period became identified as heretics (e.g., "Manichaeans," "Eustathians," "Messalians"), it was also represented by those ascetics whom Augustine and others identified as "pseudomonks," who offered urban patrons spiritual services in exchange for material support. We shall see how this form of monastic life was marginalized by church and monastic authorities either through accusations of heresy or through their insistence (justified by giving different interpretations to the scriptural passages cited above, or by placing greater emphasis on such passages as Acts 4:32–35, 5:1–4, Eph 4:28, and 2 Thess 3:6–10) that withdrawal from urban areas, manual labor, and moderate poverty truly constituted strict monastic discipline and apostolic mimesis. This study therefore establishes that authorities like John Chrysostom who have been most associated with promoting Christian asceticism in this period were not promoting asceticism per se, but rather certain kinds of asceticism. In addition, we shall see that their reasons for doing so derived not merely from spiritual principles but from social preoccupations as well.

The late fourth and early fifth centuries were troubled times for the Roman Empire. Though still prosperous, it was not a world in which many could easily attain amerimnia (freedom from care), a word that wealthy citizens of Antioch inscribed in the floors of their suburban villas. Barbarian pressures invasian taxed all levels of society. Nothing reflects these developments more starkly than the imperial legislation preserved for our horror in the Theodosian and Justinian Codes. With authoritarian certitude successive emperors sought to guarantee stability by prescribes were made hereditary obligations, where anyone who tried to seek improvement of his status or make for pastures new was promptly dragged back to the place and calling of his origo." Thus at the lowest levels of society Emperor Theodosius I in 393 decreed that peasant tenants of large estates in Thrace, even though they appear freeborn by natural condition, shall nevertheless be regarded as slaves to the very land on which they were born, and shall have no right to take off wherever they like or to change their place of inhabitation.

His successors forbade even urban guild members to change their occupations and residences in concern that many such skilled laborers had already "deserted the service of the cities to pursue a life in the country, taking off for hidden and out-of-the-way regions."49 Official policy was no less rigid toward citizens whose birth and resources qualified them to serve on local city councils. Edicts were issued nearly every year from 313 to 418 to stem the "flight of the councilors," that is, to restore the many decurions who sought to evade this financial burden (formerly assumed by local elites as a matter of voluntary competition, and the main basis for urban prosperity in earlier centuries) by slipping into the imperial administration and other professions, or by simply wandering off on peregrinatio (travel abroad).

Historians are rightfully skeptical whether such legislation was enforced or had any real effect on late Roman society. The imperial laws nonetheless illustrate a deep concern for establishing a fixed socioeconomic hierarchy (and thus a dependable tax base) for the late Roman world, and that

stabilitas loci was a guiding ideal for promoting economic and social stability in the imperial domain before it became advocated in monastic circles. We may be sure that such civic policies and concerns influenced the contemporary church leaders, many of whom now came (especially in the East) from decurion social ranks or higher. It has often been observed that church leaders of this period identified ascetic practices as a rejection of manual labor, male and female cohabitation, liberation of slaves, and the wearing of long hair (by men) or short hair (by women) with heresy partly because such practices effaced commonly recognized categories on which the Roman social order and hierarchy was based. But the monastic movement also challenged notions of proper social order in less dramatic ways.

Although historians have recognized that monasticism provided a new way by which late Roman citizens might improve their social standing, few have studied how contemporary monastic leaders responded to this sudden confluence of men and women from different social origins, or how such mobility influenced contemporary monastic discourse. Yet it is apparent from Augustine's letters as well as his treatise On the Work of Monks that "social inequalities were maintained" in monasteries that he and his peers established around Hippo and Carthage. Describing the proper distribution of labor in the monastery, Augustine explained that monks who came from humble origins (ex paupertate) should continue to perform the manual labors that characterized their former existence, but those who came from affluent backgrounds (ex divite) must not be required to perform such physical toils: they should be given administrative duties instead. Augustine sought to promote compassion between rich and poor members of his monasteries rather than to break down existing social categories. For it would "in no way be decent" (nullo enim modo decet), he reasons, that men of senatorial ranks who adopted monasticism should become laborers while workmen became idle, or that peasants (rustici) should live luxuriously in monasteries where landed gentry (praediorum domini) had retired after renouncing such a life. Thus Augustine accepted and reinforced the distinctions of social rank, status, and privilege of the secular world within his monastic "commonwealth of Christians."

Few monastic writers of this period make such overt reference to social rank and decorum as Augustine does here. However, the criticism that Nilus of Ancyra laid against wandering, begging "pseudomonks" in Eastern cities of the early fifth century responded to similar concerns. These monks, as we shall see, pursued patronage by offering themselves as ascetic teachers to wealthy urban Chistiians, which Nilus attributes to their having no source of support from home. Yet urban households were not the only venue through which the gyrovagi of this period could achieve upward social mobility. While commenting on the wayward practices of certain bishops under his jurisdiction, Pope Siricius of Rome (384–399) complained that it is hard to imagine anything more illicit than the fact that [certain bishops] refuse to provide sustenance to those who pass through (whether they really are or simply pretend to be monks, as they call themselves), but rather make these men—whose way of life and baptism we can know nothing about, and whose faith we consider uncertain and unproven—their deacons, or hasten to ordain them as priests, or, what is more serious, do not hesitate to make them bishops.... Since [such ordained monks] are not used to restraint, they first exult in pride, then soon fall into falsehood; for those who are complete strangers to the world cannot be assumed to have learned true faith in churches.

Such readiness to hustle wandering monks into church service is otherwise unattested. Siricius' letter points out, however, what was happening in church dioceses outside our view, as well as the ease with which some monks assumed positions of authority in the ecclesiastical domain. It was not until the mid-fifth century that monks (and other laymen) were expressly forbidden to preach. Siricius bears witness to two problems we shall find repeatedly associated with wandering monks of the East: questionable orthodoxy and a vexing ability to gain recognition as leaders in Christian communities. His letter alerts us that in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, the boundaries

between the ecclesiastical and the monastic worlds, as between orthodox and non-orthodox belief, were still often remarkably fluid. <>

## CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING (2 VOLS.) by Jean-Baptiste Du Bos, edited translated with an Introduction and Notes by James O. Young and Margaret Cameron [Series: Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, & Brill's Texts and Sources in Intellectual History, Brill, 9789004448292]

Jean-Baptiste Du Bos' **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING**, first published in French in 1719, is one of the seminal works of modern aesthetics. Du Bos rejected the seventeenth-century view that works of art are assessed by reason. Instead, he believed, audience members have sentiments in response to artworks. Their sentiments are fainter versions of those they would feel in response to actually seeing what the work of art imitates. Du Bos was influenced by John Locke's empiricism and, in turn, had a major impact on virtually every major eighteenth-century contributor to philosophy of art, including Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Rousseau, Herder, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Kames, Gerard, and Hume. This is the first modern, annotated and scholarly edition of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** in any language, that takes all the editions into account.

Earlier in his life Du Bos was a diplomat and historian, as well as a traveler with knowledge of intellectual life in England, the Netherlands, and Italy. He published the fourth version of his **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING** but the book is best read in the enlarged and rearranged later editions, the fourth (1740) being the last Du Bos supervised. Our editors consulted all editions. It is divided into three parts, of which the third is devoted to the archaeology of classical drama, not addressed here. The first part, formally a discussion of the relative beauties of painting and poetry, is also an informal flow of ideas set off by differences between the arts, often with finely detailed instances; the second part is an anthropology of art. "It is not a methodical book; but the author thinks and makes the reader think" (Voltaire). He is commonly associated with the new empiricist psychology of John Locke, although too much can be made of this.

It is the function of the arts to feed the soul's hunger for activity at times when attention to both external perception and internal reflection is disordered, the painful condition of ennui. The most immediate medium for this is an appeal to the passions—these being what we are destructively led into by our need for psychic activity—as surrogates for passions: thus strong subject matters. But painting differs from poetry in many ways. It engages our attention through manner more than matter of representation, its mecanique being more difficult than that of poetry and able to retain attention even with banal matter. But its subject matter is defining: it cannot represent complex thoughts in its actors, and only generic passions; but it is inherently more specific about individual character and attributes like age and temperament than would be tolerable in poetry. It must represent one instant. Unlike poetry it can only represent matter already known to the beholder; yet its power derives partly from using not the artificial signs of language but natural signs (including

gesture) whose energy does not depend on the beholder's culture. Taste, a sixth sense as it were, is determined by individual physical organization, different persons being most affected by different stimulations, so it is not discussible; anything like the debate between color and design in painting is absurd.

Part 2 is a sustained discussion of three interrelated topics: genie, its constitution and nurture; historical, moral, and climatic determinants of genie, with regard to periods and regions; and the mechanisms of reception and "the public". The public has less authority and effect in evaluating painting than poetry because painting is the more technical, and also because, unlike the case of poetry and language, the public has no active experience of creation in its medium.

The book, much reprinted, was translated into English in 1748, but Du Bos's ideas were particularly fruitful in Germany. He was important to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and Johann Georg Sulzer valued him, strangely, for making the first attempt to base the theory of art on a general principle. In the next century some of his ideas were still crucial for the aesthetic of Jena Romanticism, though they were not explicitly acknowledged, presumably because no longer directly derived.

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# Excerpt from Editors Introduction

## Du Bos' **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS**

jean-Baptiste Du Bos' Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting is a remarkable and erudite book. By turns fascinating and frustrating, insightful and misguided, it occupies an important place in the history of aesthetics, philosophy of art, art criticism, art history, and related disciplines. It was enormously influential in the eighteenth century: it was in the library of every educated European for over half a century. It was certainly in David Hume's library and had a huge impact on his thought. Moreover, it continues to provide insights into questions that still occupy philosophers of art. Despite the work's importance, it continues to be under-appreciated, in part because of the lack of a good English translation, and the lack of an annotated scholarly edition in any language. This publication aims to make Du Bos' work accessible to a wide audience and to make the case that it is a work of very considerable historical importance and continuing philosophical interest.

Du Bos' book certainly deserves to be widely read by those interested in aesthetics and art Voltaire wrote that it was "the most useful book ever written on these matters in any European country." It has been described as a book that was "for at least fifty years ... the most influential work of its kind." Lord Chesterfield recommends it in a letter to his son: "I shall point out a book, which I believe will give you some pleasure; at least it gave me a great deal. I never read it before. It is **REFLEXIONS SUR LA POESIE ET LA PEINTURE, PAR L'ABBEE DE BOS**, in two octavo volumes; and is, I suppose, to be had at every great town in France. The criticisms and the reflections are just and lively." It remains essential for understanding the development of aesthetics as an independent philosophical sub-discipline. As Rémy G. Saisselin wrote, it is "indispensable reading for those who would understand eighteenth-century French and other European aesthetics, even the British." A good critical edition is long overdue.

After this brief introductory section, this Introduction to the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** is divided into nine additional sections. Section 2 of this Introduction provides a biographical sketch of Du Bos, one of the most important men of letters in the first half of the 18th century, but a man whose life is, today, almost corn-pletely unknown. Next (Section 3), this Introduction provides a brief overview of this sprawling, baggy, but intriguing and influential work. The subsequent sections provide more detailed expositions and evaluations of the most influential and important parts of Du Bos' work These detailed sections include (Section 4) an assessment of Du Bos' contributions to the development of aesthetics as a sub-discipline within modern philosophy; (Section 5) an assessment of the impact of the Critical Reflections on David Hume; (Section 6) an overview of Du Bos' important contribution to the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns; (Section 7) a review of Du Bos' theory of the influence of climate on genius; and (Section 8) an investigation of Du Bos' views on epistemology and philosophy of science, views that are strikingly original in the context of early-18th-century France. After a note (Section 9) on the text and this translation, the Introduction concludes with suggestions for further reading (Section 10).

## An Overview of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS**

As already indicated, Du Bos' book is rather rambling and unsystematic. Du Bos is much given to digression. One of his digressions, on ancient theatrical performances, was eventually expanded into a treatise on the subject. (This expanded digression was transplanted from Volume One of the early editions of the Critical Reflections and became Volume Three of the 1740 edition and subsequent editions.) Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the important themes that run through the work.

Du Bos begins by considering the question of what makes experience of poetry and painting sources of a "striking pleasure" (94). (He focuses on these two arts, but in the course of the book he considers sculpture, engraving, dance, and music. Du Bos makes clear that these are all imitative arts

and we value experience of them for the same reason.) His answer is that poems and paintings are imitations of objects in the world. This answer situates Du Bos in a long tradition, stretching back to Plato and Aristotle, that regards the fine arts as imitative arts. The question then becomes one of why imitations are a source of a striking pleasure.

Du Bos' answer is that imitations produced by the arts arouse in us emotions that are weaker versions of the emotions that these objects would have aroused, had we experienced them. When these emotions are pleasant, Du Bos has an easy answer to the question of why we enjoy experience of works of painting and poetry: they arouse the same pleasant emotions as the pleasant objects they represent arouse. It is more difficult to explain why we enjoy experience of imitations of unpleasant subjects: Du Bos' examples are a representation of the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter and Le Brun's painting of the Massacre of the Innocents. We feel unpleasant emotions when viewing these works, yet we return to them time after time, apparently enjoying the experiences. The enjoyment of representations of tragic subjects is sometimes called the Paradox of Tragedy. Du Bos tells us that the experience of representations of unpleasant subjects is rewarding for two reasons. For a start, although representations of unpleasant events will arouse the emotions that experience of these events would arouse, these emotions are not as intense or enduring. Secondly, he holds that these emotions, while unpleasant, are better than the alternative: the ennui that habitually besets people whose minds are unoccupied. The unpleasant emotion aroused by Le Brun's painting is not very unpleasant, is fleeting, and better than the pain of ennui, which is an existential state of pain or suffering, and certainly more than what we today call `boredom In the course of the Critical Reflections Du Bos supplements this account of the pleasure that we take in the experience of works of art.

Du Bos returns to the Paradox of Tragedy much later in 1.44. There, Du Bos adopts a position akin to that adopted by Aristotle in his Poetics. Aristotle spoke of catharsis, or the cleansing, of emotions such as fear and pity. Du Bos speaks of the purging of emotions. "The faithful depiction of the passions suffices to make us afraid and make us resolve to avoid them with all of the determination of which we are capable" (318). Du Bos uses the example of Medea, the subject of an opera by Marc-Antoine Charpentier and a play by Pierre Corneille. Medea "is depicted in such a manner that we acquire a horror of the passion for vengeance, that is capable of compelling us to such disastrous excess" (320).

In the course of his opening remarks, Du Bos introduces a key concept that will play a role throughout the work: the concept of sentiments. According to Du Bos' view, works of art cause sentiments in us. The capacity of artworks to cause these sentiments is what gives artworks their value. But Du Bos never carefully defines sentiments. He comes closest to doing so when he says that 'The first ideas born in the soul, when it receives a lively stimulus, ... we call sentiments" (237). The sentiments that art arouses are not, on Du Bos' view, some special sort of aesthetic experience. On the contrary, as already noted, these sentiments are fainter versions of the sentiments that objects in nature inspire in us. According to Du Bos, everyone is born with a sense of beauty, that is, a capacity for forming the sentiments aroused by works of art. He holds that, "We have in us a sense intended to judge the value of works that imitate touching objects in nature." He refers to this as a "sixth sense" (519). Du Bos also compares the sense of beauty to gustatory taste. He was among the first 18th century writers to do so and the analogy between taste in art and taste in food had enormous implications for subsequent aesthetics.

In addition to commenting on the state of mind to which artworks move audiences, Du Bos has a good deal to say about the artist's state of mind. He believes that artists feel the sentiments that their works inspire in audiences: the artist's "goal is to make us share his sentiments" (354). The same is true of performing artists. Du Bos refers to "Horace's maxim: to make others cry one ought

to be emotionally afflicted." The artist, perhaps, experiences more intense sentiments than the audience does. The artist must be in a state of 'enthusiasm' in order successfully to create. This state of enthusiasm can border on madness. Du Bos is not as clear as he could be on this point, but this state of enthusiasm is the experience of intense sentiments inspired by objects the artist experiences or imagines. Enthusiasm must be balanced by "a fortunate arrangement of the organs" (360) of the brain. (Notice the physical explanation of the creative process.) Here Du Bos is pioneering an expression theory of the arts, according to which artists express emotions in their works.

Du Bos explicitly states that we judge artworks by means of sentiment, not by means of a process of rational appraisal. In emphasizing the importance of sentiments or passions, Du Bos breaks with a long tradition of art criticism. According to this tradition, criticism is a matter for rational judgement. According to Du Bos, in contrast, we feel that an artwork has aesthetic value; we do not judge that it does. According to Du Bos, "imitations have their effect ^n us, they make us laugh or cry, they engage us before reason has had the time to act or examine. We cry at a tragedy before having discussed whether the object that the poet presents to us is capable of touching by itself or whether it is well imitated" (2.22). Du Bos ridicules what he calls a "geometrical" (2.23) evaluation of artworks: a dispassionate and a priori appraisal. Experience, not reason, tells us that a work is pleasing. Someone can tell that a ragout tastes good without knowing anything of cookery or its rules. Similarly, audience members can `taste' that a poem or a painting is pleasing.

There are, Du Bos believes, rules that artists ought to follow in creating works of art In essence, the rules that artists ought to follow come down to being faithful to nature, that is, imitating nature well. Painters, for example, must ensure that the objects represented in their works observe the laws of physics. Du Bos calls this mechanical vraisemblance. (See below, Section 6, for an explication of the concept of vraisemblance.) Painters ought also to strive for poetical vraisemblance. "Poetic vraisemblance consists, in short, in giving to the persons in a picture their features and their known characteristics." People ought to be represented in ways that are appropriate to their age, sex, nation, and social status. Writers of pastoral poetry are criticized for peopling their works with characters who "have no resemblance to the inhabitants of our countryside or to our contemporary shepherds" (1.22). This said, although artists ought to follow certain rules, since artworks are judged by means of sentiment, we do not judge using rules, and successful artists can break the rules. Du Bos holds that, 'people always prefer poems that touch over poems that obey the rules" (246). He illustrates this point by saying that nearly everyone prefers Ariosto to Tasso, despite the fact that Ariosto breaks many rules of poetry.

Although Du Bos believes that copying nature is essential to the fine arts, there is an important distinction between an artist and an historian. The artist must represent "events in a way that moves us." "This is what distinguishes an artist from an historian, who must not embellish his narrative with circumstances drawn from his imagination or invent situations to make the events he describes more interesting" (201). The artist, in contrast, imagines nature as it could be. Consequently, imagination is a crucial feature of the successful artist. Tragic poets are permitted to make their heroes more admirable than ordinary people, but comic poets ought to imitate people as they actually are. According to Du Bos, while experiencing works of art, there is no suspension of disbelief. He makes clear (1.43) that we are fully aware, while viewing a play that we are not seeing the events represented in the play. Similarly, with rare exceptions, we are not deceived by paintings. We are aware that we see an imitation and not the object imitated.

All of the arts are representational in Du Bos' view, but not all arts represent in the same way. In the course of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POETRY AND PAINTING**, Du Bos makes a contribution to philosophy of language by distinguishing between the natural signs found in painting

and the artificial signs found in language. The artificial signs of language are employed by the poet (1.40).

Du Bos makes this distinction in the context of the discussion of a question that was of considerable interest to him and other 18th-century writers. This is the question of whether poetry or painting is the more affecting art. Du Bos' verdict is that, at any given moment, a painting is more affecting than a poem. He adopts this view on the grounds that vision is the dominant sensory modality and painting employs natural, rather than artificial signs. Du Bos recognizes, however, that poetry has certain advantages over painting. In particular, a play can represent a series of events over a period of time and, in this way, have a huge emotional impact. Setting poetry to music can also enhance its emotional effects.

The view that we judge works of art by means of sentiment, in conjunction with the view that everyone has the capacity to form these sentiments, leads to one of Du Bos' most striking conclusions. This is the view that the general educated public is the best judge of the worth of works of art. Professional artists will often be less capable judges than informed audience members. This is because professional artists will tend to judge works by rational assessment of technique and fidelity to rules rather than by concentrating on the sentiments they feel. Professional artists may also be prejudiced by membership in an artis- tic clique. They may uncritically repeat received judgements of artworks rather than relying on their sentiments.

Everyone is endowed with a sense of beauty but this sense can be refined. In particular, the sense of beauty can be improved by experience of a wide range of works in some genre. Taste can become more delicate. Even after taste has been refined, it will vary from nation to nation, and according to certain circumstances of the person who judges. Certain works will please us best when we are young, and others when we are older. Certain works please the French, given their national interests, more than they please audiences from other nations.

While there is some variation in the works that please audiences, there will be widespread agreement about which are the most pleasing works. One of Du Bos' most striking hypotheses is the view that the broad, educated public is the best judge of the quality of artworks (2.22). This public is a more reliable judge of aesthetic value than are artists and professional critics, who may be prejudiced. The broad, educated public can generally determine within a short time, certainly not more than a few years, whether a work of art is good. It may, however, take longer, on Du Bos' view, for the full value of a work to be known. He states that it may take a century to know a work's full merit. Here Du Bos is defending the Test of Time: when a work can repeatedly please audiences over a lengthy period of time, this is decisive evidence of its high value. That is, the fact that a work has consistently pleased audiences establishes that a work will continue to please.

The reputation of works, once established, will not be undermined and will continue to grow. In particular, the reputation of the best Greek and Roman poets will, on Du Bos' view, never decay. Du Bos is also confident that the best French writers of the 17th century, including Corneille, Molière, and Racine, certainly wrote works of high value. Du Bos contrasts the case of artworks with that of scientific theories: the fact that a scientific theory has been held for a long time by a lot of people does not guarantee that it is true. The difference here is attributable to the fact that people feel that a work of art is valuable, and feelings of pleasure cannot be mistaken, while there is an element of reasoning in science and reason can go astray. Moreover, people often accept scientific and philosophical views on the authority of other people, while they make their own judgements about artworks on the basis of what they feel.

Although Du Bos maintains that art is valuable as a source of pleasure or, better, pleasing sentiments, there are passages in his book that suggest that works of art can be valuable in other

ways. In particular, art can promote virtue. "Dramatists worthy of writing for the stage have always regarded the obligation to inspire hatred for vice and love for virtue as the primary obligation of their art" (319). Artists promote virtue, not by providing audience members with moral knowledge so much as by inspiring them with proper passions: "The depiction of virtuous actions stirs up our souls. Somehow it elevates and excites in us praiseworthy passions, such as love for country and glory". Elsewhere, Du Bos speaks of learning "maxims" from poetry. Still, his considered opinion seems to be that we value art primarily as a source of pleasure: "We can acquire some knowledge by reading a poem, but this is scarcely the motive for opening the book" (244).

A major theme of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** is the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, which will be investigated in Section 6. The Quarrel was a debate, conducted throughout Europe, concerning the relative merits of ancient and modern writers and artists. What had been a long simmering dispute burst into passionate argument with the publication of Charles Perrault's Le siècle de Louis le Grand [The Era of Louis the Great] (1687). The debate continued into the middle of the 18th century in works such as Charles Batteux's Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle (1746). Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Compositions (1759) can be seen as one of the works that sealed the victory of the Modems.

Du Bos' contribution to the debate is judicious and well informed. He carefully examines the visual arts of the ancient world and comes to the conclusion that modem sculptors have not surpassed or even equalled their ancient counterparts, except in the sculpting of bas-reliefs. Du Bos acknowledges that it is difficult to make judgements about the relative merits of ancient and modem paintings since so few ancient paintings survive. He believes, however, that in design, expression, and artistry, the available evidence suggests that modem painters have not attained greater heights than the painters of antiquity. According to Du Bos, in poetry the ancients have a significant edge over modem writers. In part this is owing to the fact that Latin is better suited to writing poetry than modem languages and, in particular, French. Du Bos allows that in the natural sciences, moderns have made significant advances over the ancients. This is not because modems are able to reason better than the ancients, but because modems have had more experience, a great deal of it fortuitous.

Much of Book Two is devoted to a consideration of artistic genius, as we will discuss in Section 7. Du Bos holds that geniuses are born, not made. He breaks with traditional views on the origin of genius. In particular, he rejects the Platonic conception of genius, according to which the genius is divinely inspired. He does say, in passing, that a "poet needs divine inspiration". His considered view, however, is that there is a physical cause of artistic genius. In particular, Du Bos provides a physiological explanation of genius. The genius has a well-formed brain and other physiological advantages over those who lack genius. Artists born without this fortunate arrangement will never be able to make up for its absence.

Du Bos is interested in the question of why certain eras produce more geniuses than others. He identifies four eras when geniuses are particularly numerous. He calls them the era of Plato (the great flourishing of the arts in 5th- and 4th-century BC Greece), the era of Augustus (the period in the 1st century BC and the 1st century AD when Roman art reached its apogee), the era of Leo x (the Renaissance), and the era of Louis XIV (the period when French art thrived in the 17th century). Du Bos considers, in a quite systematic and historically well-informed manner, the hypothesis that moral, or what we would call social, causes explain why certain ages and nations produce more geniuses. He reaches the conclusion that social causes cannot fully explain the phenomenon in question, though social causes can certainly encourage the flourishing of the arts.

Consequently, Du Bos turns to consider the hypothesis that physical causes are responsible for the periodic thriving of the arts. He is sceptical about physical explanations, since he is aware that the empirical evidence is limited and science imperfect. Yet he feels that he has enough evidence to

begin giving an empirical account of artistic genius. Unfortunately, the physical explanation that Du Bos gives for the flourishing of the arts is wildly implausible (Section 7). He defends the view that climate and the quality of air is responsible for the fact that certain ages and nations are more given to artistic genius than others. England is unable to produce painters of the first rank because the climate is too cold. He attributes the quality of the air to types of rock in certain countries and to earthquakes that expose harmful substrata. There is also a long discussion of the baleful effects on air quality, and genius, of Rome's decaying sewer system.

Du Bos' account of genius is not merely implausible. His position is also distressingly prejudiced. He does not believe that certain nations are inherently more talented than others. We are all, he says, children of Adam and any differences in genius are attributed to climate and air quality. Nevertheless, Du Bos' position on genius is, if not racist, then at least guilty of Orientalism and other forms of cultural prejudice. As Du Bos' editors and translators, we have no desire to minimize or excuse his prejudices.

As should by now be apparent, Du Bos takes care to advance empirical evidence for his views. He calls experience "the best teacher that humankind has". As noted above in the biography of Du Bos, he was a friend of John Locke and influenced by Locke's empiricism to the point of swimming against the Rationalist or Cartesian tide in France. In the context of a discussion of whether moderns can think more critically than the ancients (according to Du Bos, they cannot), he articulates an empiricist approach to the philosophy of science. Advances in the sciences are owed to an expanded range of experiences. Scientific advances are not a matter of inferring new principles from a set of axioms (Section 8).

Book Three of the **CRITICAL REFLECTIONS** is, from a modern philosophical perspective, the least interesting. Nevertheless, it is, from a historical point of view, quite important. Modern philosophy of music may be said to have begun in the 15th century when several writers began to ask why the music of their day was not able to have the dramatic effects on listeners that music was reported to have had in the ancient world. We find, for example, Franchino Gaffurio and Bartolomeo Ramos de Pareia asking this question. The most famous answer to this question was given by members of the Florentine Camerata, such as Vincenzo Galilei. The members of the Camerata argued that ancient tragedies had been sung and early operas, such as Monteverdi's Orfeo and Poppea, were thought to be works that closely resembled ancient models. Du Bos argues persuasively that the Camerata's conception of ancient tragedy was seriously flawed. The debate about the relative merits of ancient and modern music lasted almost the end of the 18th century. It is still being contested by Thomas Robertson as late as 1784. Du Bos does not so much contribute to this debate as remove some of the misconceptions about ancient music, and ancient theatrical performances in general. His contribution is a necessary first step towards an assessment of ancient performances.

Book Three is a detailed investigation of the performance practices of the ancient stage. Du Bos advances a number of hypotheses that would have been novel in their day. In particular, he argues that most ancient tragedies were not sung in anything like the way that modern operas are sung. They were notated. That is, the way in which they were to be declaimed was noted on the text, but they were not sung. In conjunction with this point, Du Bos notes that the extension of the term 'music' was much greater in the ancient world than it is in the modern. Acting and the declamation of tragedies came under the rubric of music in the ancient world, while they do not do so any longer. Du Bos also writes extensively about pantomimes in the ancient world. The volume concludes with a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of ancient and modern stagecraft. Book Three is now primarily of interest to students of the history of classical scholarship. Remarkably, however, Du Bos is conspicuous by his absence from standard histories of classical

scholarship. This strikes us as an egregious oversight. However, even for the general reader, Book Three is full of fascinating anecdotes and information. It is still worth reading if only for this reason. <>

## MOLIERE: THE COMPLETE RICHARD WILBUR TRANSLATIONS by Moliere, Foreword by Adam Gopnik, Translated by Richard Wilbur [The Library of America, 9781598537093]

All of Richard Wilbur's unsurpassed translations of Molière's plays–themselves towering achievements in English verse–are brought together for the first time in this two-volume gift set.

One of the most accomplished American poets of his generation, Richard Wilbur (1921-2017) was also a prolific translator of French and Russian literature. His verse translations of Molière's plays are especially admired by readers and are still performed today around the world. "Wilbur," the critic John Simon wrote, "makes Molière into as great an English verse playwright as he was a French one." Now, for the first time, all ten of Wilbur's unsurpassed translations of Molière's plays are brought together in two-volume boxed set, fulfilling the poet's vision for the translations.

The first volume comprises Molière's delightful early farces The Bungler, Lovers' Quarrels, and The Imaginary Cuckhold, or Sganarelle; the comedies The School for Husbands and The School for Wives, about the efforts of middle-aged men to control their young wives or fiancés, which so delighted female theater goers in Moliere's seventeenth-century France; and Don Juan, Molière's retelling of the timeless story, performed only briefly in the playwright's lifetime before pious censure forced it to close and not part of the repertoire of the Comédie-Française until 1847.

The second volume includes the elusive masterpiece, The Misanthrope, often said to occupy the same space in comedy as Shakespeare's Hamlet does in tragedy; the fantastic farce Amphitryon, about how Jupiter and Mercury commandeer the identities of two mortals ; Tartuffe, Molière's biting satire of religious hypocrisy; and The Learned Ladies, like Tarfuffe, a drama of a household turned suddenly upside down. These volumes include the original introductions by Richard Wilbur and a foreword by Adam Gopnik on the exquisite art of Wilbur's translations.

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## Excerpt Foreword by Adam Gopnik

Indispensable translations mark the intersection, and sometimes the head-on collision, of two sensibilities, and usually two eras. In English, the King James Version of the Bible, most obviously, brings Solomon's time and Shakespeare's into direct overlap, while Alexander Pope's Homer is a still more extreme, inspired collision of archaic Greece and eighteenth-century London. Even Scott Moncrieff's version of Proust, though made close in time to the original, marks a distinct space between the severe French symbolist sounds of Proust's fin de siècle and the somewhat more glossily aestheticized sensibility of the English one—so that Proust's austere title In Search of Lost Time becomes the more self-consciously poetic (and Shakespearean) Remembrance of Things Past.

Yet for a translation of a classic to remain impressive in our minds, the original and the new version need somehow to rise from an allied point of view. Some secret concord needs to exist between the two eras for the translation to remain golden. The King James Bible triumphs because it was translated into English at a time when elaborate metaphoric rhetoric and polysyndeton, extended composition through the simple dignity of "ands," were natural to English style. Pope's Homer was united with Homer's Homer by a shared love in their audiences for large-scale poetic storytelling, and more patience than we have today for long speeches in high diction and endless-seeming lists. The same taste that could put up with all the minor dunces in The Dunciad was necessary to put up with all the lists of ships in The Iliad.

No translations mark the intersection of two authors and two ages more strikingly than do Richard Wilbur's translations of ten comedies by the seventeenth-century French playwright Molière (1622-1673). Wilbur's first translation, The Misanthrope, published in 1955, was soon followed by his Tartuffe in 1963, with the last, Lovers' Quarrels, appearing more than a half century later, in 2009. All are now collected here by Library of America in two volumes.

Miraculously theatrical in ways that more academic translations are not, Wilbur's Molière is nonetheless miraculously authentic to the original, written in a flowing, vigilantly smooth version of Molière's rhyming couplets, instead of in the lumpy prose of previous English translations. At once readable and stage-friendly, his translations achieve the improbable end of making seventeenth-century French prosody completely playable in English, while remaining true to the essentials of French grand siècle style. Wilbur took Molière's Alexandrines, the eleven-syllable rhymed line of classic French theatre and turned it into a more English-friendly iambic pentameter, the ten-syllable heroic couplet of Pope. To do this, he drew on living resources in the American language of his time, particularly on the reality that American ears had become accustomed, both in the then-booming business of light verse and in ambitious musical theater—of which Wilbur himself was to write a supreme example in his lyrics for Leonard Bernstein's Candide—to accepting easy rhyme as an aid to emotion.

Well, a better playwright than Molière does not exist, and a better translation of a great writer's plays does not exist—but though that is nearly that, all that need be said, it is not quite that. The intersection of author and translator is something far more than a library or even a theatrical triumph. The overlap between Wilbur and Molière is social as much as stylistic. To put it simply—or perhaps to state it as simply as a complicated case can be put—though Molière made his life in and around courts, his role was to become the first great comic poet of the emerging and ascendant middle classes, portraying their domestic concentrations, their appetite for erudition, their constant insecurities, and their easy readiness to be wowed b^ fashions and trends. Wilbur came to Molière at a moment when that same bourgeoise in America was newly

ascendant in another way—when a highly educated postwar GI culture had taken happy possession of a European cultural heritage then undermined on its own ground, a time when all the heritage of

European culture seemed in need of American succor and American support. Clive James recalled a Wilbur visit to London in 1962, the height of the period, as offering "the epitome of cool ... somehow it seemed plausible that the traditional high culture of Europe should be represented ... by an American who looked like a jet jockey.... The internationalization of a mind like Wilbur's, its seemingly relaxed roaming in the European tradition, fitted the picture perfectly." James, writing in 1972, felt obliged to dilute his admiration with a tincture of derision; later on, he would have muted the tone. But the basic picture is sound; much of the confidence and optimism of that postwar epoch is still caught, however improbably, in Wilbur's translations. Wilbur's Molière lives both as masterpieces of the translator's art and as witness to a hopeful (and still not quite finished) American moment.

Wilbur tells us that he had first come upon the idea of translating Molière in 1948, when he saw a production of Cyrano at the Comedie-Francaise. Wilbur had been one of the great generations of GI aesthetes, those young boys who unthinkingly and instantly threw themselves into the draft and the war, making for a democratized experience of the military alien to post-Vietnam generations—but also meaning that the experience of the war in Europe could offer a sentimental education in European culture, if you survived. (Two great American art historians of Picasso and Rodin respectively, William Rubin and Albert Elsen, would recall in later life how they met on a troopship leaving New York, when they were the only soldiers too aesthetically fastidious to rush to the other side of the deck to look at the Statue of Liberty.) This European education could take very odd forms indeed. The great critic Randall Jarrell came away infatuated with the German romantic culture that had been to some degree causal of the worst of nationalist excess.

Wilbur, instead, became a Francophile. With his elegant French hand-tooled on the soldiers' road to Paris, he was known as a master craftsman already, after the publication of his shimmeringly precisionist first collection of poetry, The Beautiful Changes (1947). But the craftsmanship was metrical and largely expressed in unrhymed verse, and so his decision to write Molière over in English rhyme was far from self-evident. English has, famously but truly, a scarcity of rhyme words, even as it lends itself almost too easily to alliteration. Anyone who dips even a big toe in versification starts to recognize the limited familiar repertory of rhyme words tumbling toward the listener: every chance will produce a romance, and then a dance. An instant, illuminating, ironic illustration of this truth about the scarcity of rhyme in English: a search for rhymes for that word, "scarcity," in English provides ... precisely zero true rhymes. (You could toy with "ferocity" or the like, or go the Larry Hart route and rhyme it, playfully mis-stressed, with a word pair: i.e., "There's always such a scary scarcity / of honest folks here in our fair city.") The French word for scarcity, by contrast, rareté, has such an abundance of rhymes that it makes an English rhymester weep, with engage, écarté, and retardé leading the charge and many more coming up behind. In French, as in Italian and the other Romance languages, rhyme comes so easy that it can just sneak by our attention on its way to speech. That's how Molière uses it. Not quite invisible, it simply adds the artful tone that iambs do in English.

Rhyme in its nature stylizes and distances an emotion. It's why even the most Francophile of English speakers find something puzzling in Racine: that much rhyming seems "ofF' for the tragic passions. A Cleopatra who says, in effect, "Give me that knife from off the shelf / Now I have to kill myself" is inescapably comic. Pope's rhetorical exercises in rhyming pathos—his "Eloisa to Abelard"—are DOA to modern readers, as much as his epistles are alive. In English, rhyme belongs almost exclusively to extravagant humor, with Gilbert and Sullivan being both the apotheosis and the cul de sac of this truth. You can't go further in that direction without becoming wholly mechanized.

Wilbur accepted this circumstance of the difficulty of English rhyme, and its inherent bend to the comic, by ingeniously underplaying it. There is not much showy rhyme in Wilbur's Molière, hardly a

moment when one is self-consciously impressed by the ingenuity of the rhyme scheme. Scrolling down a random page of his version of The School for Wives, one finds all the standards: care and there, bliss and this, two and you, role and soul. (One rhyme alone—you would be / and nonentity—is witty, and works.)

The rhymes themselves can be commonplace, because the act of rhyming is not. Wilbur knows that whereas in French, rhyme is neutral, in English, rhyme, smoothly and consistently appliqued, injects a rolling comic energy irresistibly into the text. Its simple presence is enough to produce an effect of ingenuity. Wilbur himself speaks of the importance of making the repetitions in Molière, which are part of the high style of aphoristic argument, land as elegance rather than irritate as overemphasis—Wilbur points out that there is scarcely a metaphor in all of Molière's writing—and that the rhymed couplet is essential to this task.

Yet if rhyming in English is inherently comic, the art and wit of rhyming in English is, as Ogden Nash understood, to land self-consciously on a "find" when you find one. Impressive on every page, Wilbur's wit is particularly so when stretched out across dialogue, so that the exchanges are both perfectly unstilted and idiomatic, and still delight with the ingenuity of each line "tag." Take, for instance, the moment when Alceste, in The Misanthrope, responds to the miserable sonnet of Oronte. In French, Oronte says, "Je voudrais bien, pour voir, que de votres manière / Vous en composassiez sur la même matière," and Alceste replies, "Je'n pourrais, par malheur, faire d'aussi méchants; / Mais je me garderais de les montrer aux gens." This exchange becomes, in Wilbur, "Come now, I'll lend you the subject of my sonnet / I'd like to see you try to improve upon it," with Alceste's rejoinder rendered as "I might by chance write something just as shoddy / But then I wouldn't show it to everybody." It is typical of Wilbur's skill that the translation is both nearly literal, word for word, and still inspired: Molière's unemphatic rhyme of gens and méchants is expressed as the Cole Porterish, more self-consciously inventive, "shoddy" and "everybody"—a rhyme that, it seems fair to say, has rarely, if ever, been found in English before, and gives us wit along with point.

The insistence on rhyme, particularly the play of invisible, "perfect" rhyme with marked "foregrounded" rhyme, that one finds in Wilbur's Molière was part of a larger, though still select, "return to rhyme" in American literary culture in the fifties and sixties, part of a mini—rappel à l'ordre, a recall to order, of the time. Ignited by the American Auden's long, neoclassical poems of the forties—particularly his wartime meditation written in Swiftian couplets, "New Year Letter," and the slightly later satiric masterpiece "Under Which Lyre"—rhyme for a period of twenty years or so seemed a vital affirmation of tradition that also, in its self-conscious artifice, had a modernist twang: it guyed the undue inaccessibility of high modernism while, with the elegant knowingness of its revivalist urge, remaining under its umbrella of self-conscious irony. Couplets were as romantic as couples. John Updike, who saw himself first as a light-verse writer, wrote in praise of rhyme, with Wilbur perhaps in the back of his mind, in the early sixties. Updike said that "by rhyming, language calls attention to its own mechanical nature and relieves the represented reality of seriousness.... Light verse, an isolated acolyte [isolated, that is, from the main ground of modernism], tends the thin flame of formal magic and tempers the inhuman darkness of reality with the comedy of human artifice." The composer and lyricist Stephen Sondheim, another exact contemporary of Wilbur's, insisted in a parallel way on rejecting in theatre music the increasingly slack—and differently expressive—diction of American pop music, which would lead at last to the sixties revolution in lyric writing. Bob Dylan could, eventually, win the Nobel Prize for Literature while rhyming, in one famous song, "divorced" and "force." Sondheim insisted on lyric writing in favor of true rhyme schemes, seeing in "perfect" rhyme the same kind of formal magic, imposed by the sheer obdurate resistance of rhyme to easy composition—a sign of the resistance of intelligence to kitsch. To this day Broadway circles are the last place in American culture where a prosodic distinction has religious force, with the true-rhyme/near-rhyme distinction inspiring bitter quarrels and feuds. (One

major Broadway composer came away from the great and rap-based Hamilton indignant and unhappy at Lin Manuel Miranda's rhyme of "country" and "hungry" in the now famous line "I'm like my country / I'm young, scrappy and hungry.")

It is no accident, as the academics say, but an act of fraternity that Sondheim, in his slightly perverse way, placed Wilbur's one-time-only Broadway lyrics, for Candide, alongside those of Heywood Dubose, the one-time-only lyricist for Porgy and Bess, at the very top of the American theatrical pile. So Wilbur's is a period style in the best sense. A smooth surface of unostentatious rhyme could suggest a sensibility at once firmly modernist and still comfortably classicized, rather like the glittering windowed surfaces of fifties skyscrapers, the Seagram Building and Lever House, gleaming daughters of the Bauhaus at home among the Beaux-Arts buildings on Park Avenue.

Yet Wilbur's Molière reaches us for more profound reasons than its skillful surface. Wilbur himself has neatly articulated Molière's universality: his subject is what happens to social groups—the microsociety of a family or the larger society of a social class—when an unbalanced figure appears within it. And Molière could speak to an American audience because the moral pluses and minuses were remarkably unaltered. Having an uncomfortable truth seeker and teller in our midst provokes the same mixture of exasperation and admiration in 1952 Cambridge as it might in seventeenth-century Paris. The writer Larry David has made a brilliant career as a comedian on just this basis, as the man who will innocently say the uncomfortable truth—that a parent's death suddenly creates an all-purpose excuse for avoiding obligatory socializing. An unplugged fanatic like Tartuffe is always going to have an unsettling effect on a family—though today our fanatic may as easily be a yoga enthusiast or a New Age seer as a puritanical hypocrite. (There is no more memorable description of a modern Tart^fle than that in Michael Downing's Shoes Outside the Door, of the Zen roshi who, dazzling his adepts with Americanized Zen, turned out to have a lecherous interest in Women students.)

Both timeless and timebound, Molière is not our contemporary in some facile and fatuous way: he is not a radical, certainly, in our sense, nor even a romantic, in the nineteenthcentury sense—he is a common-sense realist, opposed to putting ideas and obsessions and idées fixes in place of people and relationships, and believing not in an ordered but a balanced world. What he is almost uniquely good at doing—perhaps only Jane Austen among the world's masters equals him here—is conveying the quality that Wilbur celebrates in his poetry, that quality of unschooled intelligence we call common sense. Common sense these days is condemned as a conspiracy by the privileged against the excluded; the suspicious circles of what counts as "common" are, we're told, an indictment against the sense. But Molière reaches out across the centuries to remind us that in truth common sense has legs as long as laughter itself The model of patriarchal order in the plays is not merely impotent; the common sense of the other characters, their knowledge of actual human possibility, leaves it instantly disregarded as absurd. The plays are filled with patriarchal impositions, but the patriarchal figure is always ridiculous, and quickly shown to be completely incompetent and ineffective. In both The School for Wives and The School for Husbands the protagonists are men so terrified of femininity and the power of women's minds that they bend their worlds right out of shape in order to keep their wards or fiancees ignorant and subordinate. Molière's point, first made in The School for Husbands and italicized in The School for Wives, is that this is not only a repugnant activity but a ludicrous one, doomed to comic failure. The repressed, cloistered women are instinctively aware of their own repression,

and respond to it by making their own clear-eyed choices of suitors and potential husbands. Sganarelle and Ariste, in The School for Husbands, are counterpoised as bad and good suitors, a grand siècle Goofus and Gallant: Sganarelle treats his intended as both prey and potential danger; Ariste treats his intended as a full human being; one relationship ends absurdly, the other happily. In

The School for Wives, Arnolphe paranoia about feminine choice is so extreme that it compels him to have isolated his object of desire since she was a child. Both Arnolphe and Sganarelle get schooled by the very women they thought they were schooling. The common sense of the women X-rays the patriarchal hypocrisies and then obliterates their absurdities.

Molière's great theme is the folly of fanaticism of every kind: the religious fanaticism in Tartuffe, where a self-seeking pseudo-holy man warps a family's life, or the social fanaticism in The Misanthrope, where the proudly plainspoken Alceste has to be instructed by his mistress and his friends that too much candor is egocentric and vain, not admirable. Molière is no philistine; he is the poet of common sense, not merely in his ridicule of the idea that life can be lived by a rule of excessive piety or in his exposure of erudition for its own sake, but by being most fully alive on the stage when dramatizing their opposite. He holds what every professor wants for a satirist: a set of positive ideas made more positive by not being ideas. Molière loves natural actions and affections, including that of lust. In The Learned Ladies, Molière's feminist point is not that the ladies should not be learned, but that their natural wit, all that they know already from their own experience, is more profound than what their lecherous tutors, with their extravagantly abstract ideas, wish to teach them. Molière escapes fatuity in his candor that what restores a universe unbalanced by intellectual obsession is, most often, normal erotic appetite. In Molière, sex is always the rejuvenating juice of common sense. Alceste loves Célimène, in part because she is clearly his only intellectual equal in the play, but also because he is sexually infatuated with her, and the intensity of his desire, though it makes him miserable, humanizes him. She, in turn, cannot understand his raging jealousy at the attraction she offers to other men; she is not being flirtatious—or not merely flirtatious, or "coquettish"—in her insistence that her plethora of suitors is not a sign of bad faith but exactly an extension of the same sincerity of affect that Alceste claims to admire as a virtue, and cultivates in himself. Being flirtatious with many, she is being true to herself. Tartuffe is shown as a hypocrite in his lecheries, but a human being in his appetites. It's the purpose of comedy to restore energy to sanity—to make common sense come alive to our dramatic imagination by making the pious certitudes that censure common sense look as loony as they are.

Those values are Wilbur's values, too, yet expressed in his poetry more often in an elegiac and wistfully observant key than in a satiric or wholly comic one. Moliere releases Wilbur's lyricism into laughter. There's no harm in small white lies; it's egocentric to give way to undue passion; what matters in life is not hierarchical order but emotional ease. Easy does it, Molière says, and our romantic-trained minds still rebel a little against the fatuity of the injunction. But he's right. A more truly radical feminism, a better form of family piety, emerge when we recognize the folly of trying to live by maxims and morals and principles and plans, instead of by the equilibrium of actual existence.

A romantic Molière has been the desideratum of some since the romantic period began. Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously said that he could not understand why anyone laughed at Alceste, and many a modern reading of Molière tried to make him "radical" in this sense—readings in which the balancing forces are seen as pernicious and the unbalancing disruptive force benign, or subversive.

Perhaps if there is a backward blessing in this latest and hardest recent disruption, the pandemic of 2020-2021 under which these lines are written, it may be its reminder that domestic balance is in itself a good thing, to the degree it can be achieved. Once again subject to the vagaries of an untamable and vindictive-seeming Nature, we have a keener sense of the values of the circle drawn around us to keep Nature

away. On stage as in mid-plague, there is nothing like a mask to regulate our passions. And nothing like high comedy in rhyme, rolling down the page and affirming the primacy of unaffected affection, to blow away our bourgeois blues. <>

# Rider Haggard and the Imperial Occult: Hermetic Discourse and Romantic Contiguity

## by Simon Magus [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004470224]

In **Rider Haggard and the Imperial Occult**, Simon Magus offers the first academic monograph on the world of occult thought which lies behind and beneath the fictional writing of H. Rider Haggard. It engages with a broad scope of religious, philosophical and anthropological ideas. Many of these were involved in debates within the controversies of the Anglican Church, which occurred in the face of Darwinism, and the criticism of the Bible.

The book follows three main intellectual currents involved in the promulgation of these ideas, namely the reception of ancient Egypt, the resurgence of Romanticism and the ideas of the Theosophical Society, all couched within the context of Empire.

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Jean-Pierre Brach: In early 1890, the noted French writer (and future Nobel Prize laureate) Anatole France (d. 1924) remarked that 'a certain knowledge of the occult sciences is becoming necessary for the understanding of a great many literary works of our time'.

Admittedly, Rider Haggard's works may not have been what A. France positively had in mind when he wrote this sentence, but France's words would nevertheless apply to them in a relevant manner. There is, however, more to it than meets the eye, as evidenced by Simon Magus' brilliant analysis, insofar as the present book is not just about Haggard's frequent engagement with occult topics, the supernatural or fringe spiritualist beliefs. What these pages really account for is the subtle cross-fertilization at work between Haggard's literary enterprise and a number of elements pertaining to the religious and cultural environment of the period, inasmuch as their interactions also implicate the use of 'hermetic discourse' and esoteric perspectives, thus pointing to some revealing facets of the author's complex esthetic and spiritual outlooks.

The task undertaken here is obviously much more complex than the (perfectly respectable, at any rate) study of some literary escapade stemming from a practicing occultist, or of an *homme de lettres* peppering his artistic endeavours with occult elements borrowed intentionally - two cases of which we know so many fascinating examples, moreover.

We must be aware that, at all times, but perhaps most specifically during the nineteenth century, with its tendency to uphold poetry and writing as the most exalted form of inspiration, almost on a par with mystical ecstasy, and to extol the creative writer as the priest of the new and superior religion of 'Art', the study of esoteric ideas is really inseparable from that of their literary clothing. This is not, of course, to reduce esotericism to an obscure artistic trope or a bookish mannerism but, on the contrary, to underline the significance attached to its intrinsic expression(s), from Éliphas Lévi's ornate rhetorics to Aleister Crowley's poems or Austin O. Spare's draughtsmanship.

To put it in the words of the Swedish painter and esotericist I. Aguéli: 'To read *within* the words, rather than *behind* them.'

In many ways, esotericism reveals itself as a means of conversing at once with the living and the dead, the visible and the invisible, mankind and angelic or divine entities.

Love is in fact the apex or paradigm of such an exchange, and it is rooted in the eternal 'Other side' of reality - as we understand it - transcending the barrier poetically known as the 'Veil of Isis'.

Seen from this particular viewpoint, esotericism represents an integral part of the dynamics (and perhaps also of the assets) of mainstream European culture, in its attempts to reconcile the inner and outer worlds of man. If, accordingly, imagination forms a constant mainstay of esoteric doctrine as such, its role is of course equally central in fashioning a kind of visionary literature meant to shape 'platonic' ideals and translate them in a manner capable of elevating the mind of the reader towards Beauty and 'perfect Reality', in order to transcend (and transform) more mundane concerns.

This metaphysical halo of literary achievements is one of the foundations of Haggard's beloved New Romance: the perception of any superior truth, including Religion itself, must come from within, and relies on an inner intuition nourished by a higher wisdom source. Such an intuition is in fact a common heritage of humanity in general, whether 'civilized' or 'savage' (to use Haggard's words), and a common feature of nineteenth-century spiritualism, under the frequent guise of the 'individual Self'.

This is not to say that ordinary reality or the common use of reason are being neglected or devalued in the process, but that their role is rather to assist, here, as a reminder of the nature of true spiritual awareness, which is *in*, but not *of*, this world.

Scripture, myth, archeological history, all feed into a type of narrative designed by Haggard to re-enchant the perception of Christian spirituality and transcribe it along the lines of a new cultural and theological atmosphere, that of late Victorian England. Haggard's artistic sensitivity has likely enabled him to tune in to one of the main historical functions of esotericism, which is to revitalize the inner dimension of (any) religion (including of course Christianity), by renewing its sense of the supernatural and revisiting its sapiential core, with both theoretical and transformative aims. This, taking into account that it is of course a commonplace to state that any tradition is also, by essence and simultaneously, a return to the roots as well as an innovative re-reading of its constituent elements - and the more so if one feels tempted to equate 'tradition' with Antiquity (and/or the East) and its criticism/resurgence with Modernity (and the West).

A correlative aspect of Haggard's involvement with esotericism, and one that is highly consistent with other, contemporary understandings of it, is his sustained fascination with Nature and with a potential secret knowledge pertaining to its hidden or 'night side', which appears either as attainable in this world or as a pursuit to be continued in the next, depending on perspective. Here, the topic of Egypt and of its supposedly powerful magic is obviously a case in point, as shown by certain passages of Haggard's *The World's Desire* and of other works examined by S. Magus. Under British control at the time, both Egypt and India were looked upon as the 'keys to the East' and as repositories of arcane lore, since time immemorial. Along with occultism, academic knowledge is called upon to facilitate and enrich the cultural, political and spiritual dialogue between what S. Magus evocatively terms 'the Imperial centre and the colonial periphery'. Through such an exchange, both parties mutually integrate some of each other's religious structures and, in so doing, attempt to reinforce their own core beliefs and values with new themes, perspectives and arguments. If a coming scholarly study by Perry Myers carefully unravels the maze of political and ideological ambiguities at work underneath this type of relations between states and cultural entities, within a British colonial historical context, the present volume is an otherwise prominent showcase for Simon Magus' uncanny flair for literary hermeneutics, in deciphering the very same ambiguities that the so-called metaphysical novel, and Haggard's *oeuvre* in particular, are interlaced with.

*Rider Haggard and the Imperial Occult* represents a remarkably insightful criticism of the intricate relationship between esotericism and literature, *a propos* one of Britain's most popular and admired writers. Among many other merits, it illustrates how adroitly Rider Haggard manages in his works to hold on - so to speak - to both ends ('Home and colonial') of the proverbial stick and, in so doing, to convey his spiritual convictions through a *corpus* of fiction, thus mining one of the mother lodes of literary success : the elusive fence between fact and fiction.

Let Simon Magus be lauded for this eminently readable and captivating academic study, which sheds a revealing - and yet elegantly reticent - light on the mysteries of Rider Haggard's religious and cultural stance. *Jean-Pierre Brach*

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Part I

Although Egypt was never part of the British Empire, the longstanding presence of the British in Egypt and the socio-political backdrop of intercultural exchange between Westminster Hall, the Khedival Palace and the Sublime Porte forms the historical context for the dialectics and dialogism of religious ideas discussed in the following account. By the time of the British occupation in 1882, as Ailise Bulfin observes,

German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck viscerally summed up the relationship between Egypt and the British Empire: "Egypt is of the utmost importance to England on account of the Suez Canal, the shortest line of communication between the eastern and western halves of the Empire. That is like the spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain."

Bismarck had based this assessment at least in part on the shipping access to British India: the canal reduced the journey time by sea to four weeks. History would certainly prove Bismarck correct. As Bulfin has it: 'Sever the cord and the empire would be effectively paralysed,' and indeed the eventual loss of the canal and British withdrawal during the Suez Crisis of 1956, marked the end of British control in Egypt and sounded the death knell of the British Empire itself.

The attitude towards Egypt and its culture changed considerably throughout Victoria's reign. At its commencement, Egypt was very much seen as the biblical Oppressor and the locus of the Israelites' sojourn in bondage. Mid-century Unitarian Egyptologists were more receptive to the Higher Criticism coming from Germany, and though questioning of the Bible, remained critical of Egypt. For example, Samuel Sharpe wrote in his *Egyptian Mythology and Egyptian Christianity* in 1863 that 'Christians shall at length acknowledge that many of those doctrines which together now make up orthodoxy, or the religion of the majority, as distinguished from the simple religion which Jesus taught and practised' reached Europe from Egypt via Alexandria. Sharpe goes on to specify from a Unitarian stance:

The following are the principal doctrines which are most certainly known to be common to Egyptian Mythology and modern orthodoxy, as distinguished from the religion of Jesus. They include the Trinity, the two natures of Christ, and the atonement by vicarious sufferings.

However, during the 1840s to the 1870s Nonconformists lost ground to the next generation of biblical archaeologists who rejected Higher Criticism. As Michael Ledger-Lomas and David Gange have argued: 'Until the later nineteenth century, 'Germanism' occasioned splenetic reactions in both Britain and America. Yet […] the dread of 'rationalism' and 'neology' strengthened commitment to finding concrete proofs of the veracity of biblical narratives.'[6] After 1880 there was a distinct emphasis on Christian apologetics and a more positive view of Egypt as a precursor of and preparation for the Christian dispensation. In addition, the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1882 and the dominance of the 'Egyptian Question' in public political discourse is likely to have influenced the more positive appraisal of Egyptian religion – albeit ancient Egypt – and its comparison and compatibility with Empire as Christendom. It is of note that the archaeological society known as the Egypt Exploration Fund (eef) was founded in the same year as the Protectorate, and it should come as no surprise to discover that Rider Haggard would later become a fully paid-up member with his subscription of £2 2s.[7] As Gange and Ledger-Lomas have observed:

> Although almost all major denominations – from Catholicism and the Church of England, to Methodism and the Plymouth Brethren – are represented in the Early eef, founded in 1882, there are no known Unitarians among its initial membership. Favourable estimation of Egyptian achievements had quickly become, it seems, orthodox.'

The following section considers how the developing ideas of Egyptology and biblical archaeology were absorbed by Rider Haggard and made their way into a number of his Egyptian Romances. The emphasis on religious comparativism in relation to points of Christian doctrine and the search for evidence of biblical narratives in Egypt are particular points of focus.

Haggard was fascinated by Egypt. In particular, this section seeks to delineate his Christian Egyptosophical speculations, and interrogate more broadly the academic biases and religio-political agendas of Victorian Egyptology. It will also seek to contextualise these in terms of the rifts in the Anglican Communion in response to Higher Criticism, and Broad Church liberal reform. It examines

the response of an emergent Egyptology to the attacks on Anglican orthodoxy, including the factionalism between Anglican Trinitarians and the Unitarian Church. We shall open with a discussion of how such doctrinal questions were approached by an Anglican gaze directed towards ancient Egypt in a search for archaeological evidence of biblical narratives, and theological precedence in the primordial truth of Egyptian religion. The section considers in some detail how such debates found their way into Haggard's Egyptian romances, and the influence of his friend Wallis Budge. Budge promulgated the notion of an 'original monotheism' in ancient Egypt: behind the panoply of theriomorphic deities there was a 'hidden monotheism' concealed by the hierocracy from the polis, 'the One for the wise, the many for the mass.' This idea was directly adopted by Haggard. In a number of his romances, Haggard also focuses specifically on the history of the pharaoh Akhenaten during the Eighteenth Dynasty − the so-called 'Amarna heresy.' The pharaoh famously abandoned the pantheon of Egyptian gods in favour of the worship of the solar disc – the Aten. In drawing on this 'Atenism', Haggard conflates a historically veridical monotheism with Budge's speculative 'original monotheism'. The discussion of Akhenaten will also elaborate upon Jan Assmann's mnemohistorical figure of Moses, and deploy Assmann's consideration of the 'Hebrew Moses' versus the 'Egyptian Moses', in a discussion of the reasons for Haggard's specific use of the latter. Finally, as further evidence of Budge's Christian Egyptosophical thought, I have documented what I have termed an *Osiride Christology*, where Osiris is presented as a type of Christ the Redeemer. This idea is again directly adopted by Haggard to emphasise the miraculous aspects of Christ, as described in Pauline epistolary literature; specifically, his divine nature, his death and resurrection, and substitutionary/vicarious atonement, all of which had been recently queried by Broad Church divines.

The discussion broadens to consider the concept of time in ancient Egypt, and the importance of the contrasting 'pagan' cyclical time and the linear time associated with Christian eschatology. It also considers the notion of the cyclical rise and fall of civilisations as manifest in Haggard's oeuvre and his reflections on the fragility of empire and its decay. It considers the *temenos* of ancient Egypt as the progenitor of Western culture, and the sacred locale of the Exodus.

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Part 2

In his *Egyptian Myth and Legend* (1907), the journalist and folklorist Donald Mackenzie wrote that

> Herodotus was informed by the sages of Egypt that souls of the dead passed through "every species of terrestrial, aquatic, and winged creatures", and, after a lapse of about three thousand years, "entered a second time into human bodies". If that belief were as prevalent at present in these islands as it was in Celtic times, we might be at pains to convince the world that Shelley was a reincarnation of Akhenaton.[1]

Whether or not we are in agreement with Mackenzie's assumptions, it allows us to travel with his 'Poet King' and join him born again as the author of *Ozymandias*, to consider Rider Haggard's esotericism in relation to European Romanticism, and its instauration as the New Romance of the 1880s. Inevitably, we must begin our discussion with the perennial – and possibly by now the traditional argument of what constitutes the 'Romantic'. As this will involve some considerable conceptual difficulties, this overview is rather more extended and involved than those of the other two sections. As Hans Eichner has observed, 'Romanticism is an unpleasantly vague term, whose meaning depends only too often on the preoccupations of the person who happens to use it.'[2] Lovejoy also initially averred with considerable scepticism:

> There is no hope of clear thinking on the part of the student of modern literature, if – as, alas! has been repeatedly done by eminent writers – he vaguely hypostatizes the term, and

> starts with the presumption that "Romanticism" is the heaven-appointed designation of some single real entity, or type of entities, to be found in nature.

Indeed, as Hanegraaff points out, Lovejoy's inescapable conclusion was that 'romanticism has meant very different things to different people; apparently it is impossible to reach a consensus even about fundamentals. Lovejoy concludes that scholars should learn to use the word "romanticism" only in the *plural*.'[4] Thus, he saw a number of 'Romanticisms': a German Romanticism beginning in the 1790s, an English one from the 1740s; one French one commencing in 1801 and another in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Lilian R. Furst agreed with the importance of acknowledging *difference* in the Romantic movements of the English, French and German trajectories. As she points out, 'It is in fact perfectly feasible to study and characterise the English poetry of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries without ever having recourse to the epithet Romantic'. In contrast to German and French theoretical writings, it seldom appears in the works of Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley or Keats. This reflects the more practical, empirical-critical tradition in England which was less concerned with the theoretical definition as these authors were less focused on the profundity of philosophical concern found in Germany, or the importance of the contrast with the Neo-Classical tradition in France. As Furst points out, not least amongst the problems is the language difference:

> In each language the word was endowed with special meanings not acceptable nor even readily comprehensible to the poets of other lands; for instance, Friedrich Schlegel's and Novalis' – highly personal elaboration of *romantisch* was totally alien to the English and remote from the French too. Since the word had so diverse a connotation for the various protagonists, it is evidently erroneous to compare these Romanticisms as if they were based on an agreed definition, as if they meant the same thing. Yet this is just what many comparative studies have attempted to do, led on by the outer deceptive similarity of the words romantic, *romantique* and *romantisch*.

Nevertheless, with these provisos in mind, Furst characterises and considers three dominant themes; *Imagination*, *Individualism* and the *Expression of Feeling*, contrasting the different national emphases and elaborations of these: simplifying greatly, the English on the creative imagination, the Germans with speculative philosophy, and the French with unbridled emotion. Likewise, as Hanegraaff again observes, Lovejoy subsequently revised and consolidated his position, considering that there were a series of idea complexes which were consistent with a 'Romantic period'. For the period of the 1780s and 1790s, these idea complexes were associated with 'three characteristic German words: *das Ganze*, *Streben* and *Eigentümlichkeit,* which may be referred to as *holism* or *organicism*, *voluntarism* or *dynamism*, and *diversitarianism*. In other words, an organic living cosmos the Whole of which, in the Kantian sense, was greater than the sum of its parts; a striving for the Infinite characterised by personal spiritual evolution; and the importance of pluralism and diversity of culture and opinion, as opposed to Enlightenment uniformity.

On the question of a 'Romantic period', in *The Roots of Romanticism* Isaiah Berlin highlights the difficulties of making generalisations about the 'Romantic' when describing even a historical time frame, but contends that it is possible to identify recurring elements and themes within Romanticism when conceived broadly as a literary movement. As he remarks:

> One can say, like Valéry, that words like *romanticism* and *classicism*, words like *humanism* and *naturalism*, are not names which one can operate at all. 'One cannot get drunk, one cannot quench one's thirst, with labels on bottles.' There is much to be said for this point of view. At the same time, unless we do use some generalisations it is impossible to trace the course of human history.

This notion of a Romantic movement is extended to that of a Romantic *Weltanschauung* by Gerald McNiece. McNiece stresses the passion for unity, a lively unity pervading a rich diversity:

> A potential unity of purpose for example, of literature, philosophy, science, religion and mythology provided a motive and energy for much Romantic speculation and aspiration. The celebration of imagination and symbol as synthesising powers capable of reconciling oppositions and producing continually novel combinations may be understood in relation to this powerful drive towards comprehensiveness, Coleridge's multeity in unity. A preoccupation with unity seems to be connected with a preference for idealism. Romantic systems of thought were also, therefore, dominated by a persistent and pervasive strain of idealism and elitist psychology which emphasised the self-consciousness of exceptional men, who were also thought to be capable of drawing from profound layers of unconscious thought.

It is not unlikely that the Haggard as litterateur considered himself to be one of these 'exceptional men'. In Part 2, therefore, I shall consider how Haggard's work demonstrates the contiguities of his ideas with that of the Romantic movement in both its English and German forms, and how this established him as a leading proponent of another of the 'Romanticisms' – that of Saintsbury's 'New Romance'.

Romantic ideas are all-pervasive in Haggard. For example, even in such apparently self-consciously sensational adventure stories as *Allan Quatermain* they are not far below the surface – though easily missed. In this particular romance, the adventurers Quatermain, Sir Henry Curtis and Umslopogaas find themselves in a canoe on the lake of a volcanic caldera. Quatermain, as narrator, says: 'There in the bows sat old Umslopogaas, like Pleasure in the poem', and Haggard, as 'Editor', corrects him in a footnote: 'Mr Allan Quatermain misquotes – Pleasure sat at the Helm.–editor.' The poem quoted is Gray's *The Bard: A Pindaric Ode* (1757) set during the reign of Edward I and his conquest of the Welsh.[11] It is significant as a proem to our discussion as Gray's ode is considered to have initiated the Celtic Twilight movements, and thus lies at the very root of English Romanticism. The excerpt is doubly significant as it also borrows from the German tradition by the use of Friedrich von Schlegel's *romantische Ironie*. This is an important concept of the so-called Jena School, the *Früromantiker* ('Early Romantics'). As Furst notes, this group was more complex than the earlier straightforward rebels of the *Sturm und Drang*,

who sought to live and create solely according to the dictates of feeling, while the Romantic strives also for knowledge, consciousness, a mastery of those feelings which in turn produced a certain self-detachment, the key to that curious Romantic concept of irony.

However, as Anne K. Mellor points out, whilst some of the English Romantics, notably Coleridge and Carlyle, were familiar with Schlegel's work and absorbed the concept into their tradition, it was not the only source of irony. As she reports: 'By far the most direct and pervasive source of romantic irony as a mode of consciousness in England was the native eighteenth-century Deist "higher criticism" of the Bible.' More broadly, 'Romantic irony was a significant part of the nineteenth-century English "spirit of the age," a recurrent sceptical reaction to the egotistical sublime of Christian fundamentalism, apocalyptic poetry, and Victorian myths of progress and imperialism.'

We have already seen the sense of personal detachment in action when the protean Haggard shifts identity between 'Author', 'Narrator', and 'Editor.' In common parlance, irony is spoken of as a kind of muted sarcasm, but in the Romantic sense it has a metaphysical connotation whereby it problematizes the ontological status of the writing – in Haggard's case between fact and fiction. Romantic irony is a nuanced concept, and a comprehension of it is key to an understanding of the Romantic project. Mellor distinguishes between literary/artistic and philosophical/metaphysical types of irony, though as we shall see in Haggard these two elements are often combined. In the example above, he is more playful: he provides a 'laying bare of device' by 'correcting' himself.

Therefore, alongside Romantic irony, and taking into account the caveats discussed above, my analysis will include the notions of the Romantic *Imaginatio*, the goddess Isis as a living Nature, and other Romantic themes which obtrude upon Haggard's Ayesha Series of novels: the approximations of Love, Sex and Death; the necessity of the unrequited; the striving for the Infinite. Expanding on some of these themes, Ricarda Schmidt, following Paul Kluckholn, describes a series of shared philosophical assumptions amongst the German Romantics which are fundamental to this section:

> Dialectical and cyclical rather than linear thinking; ideas of infinite unity and infinite multiplicity, of the sublime and yearning for the infinite, of hovering above unresolved contradictions and enthusiasm. A merging of the sacred and the profane, of the sublime and the trivial, characterizes Romantic yearning. But this is often expressed in irony, the awareness of the contrast between ideal and reality, which emerges through self-reflection and seeks distance from the self (Romantic irony). At times this leads to the conscious destruction of aesthetic illusions, escape from an identity which is little more than role-play.

She further summarises, again from Kluckholn that at the core of Romanticism there is

> An empathetic understanding of nature (as opposed to dissecting nature), a participation in its creativity, an emphasis on the unity of body, soul and spirit, an interest in the unconscious forces of the soul, in the so called 'vegetative' life of the psyche in which dream has prophetic function and provides a connection to the transcendental or divine. Fantasy and emotion play the central role in forming Romantic individuality.

Many of these ideas will emerge as we explore the resurgence of Romanticism in Haggardian New Romance. Haggard's fiction draws extensively on Old Testament narratives for his Romantic poeticised histories. As with that of the Romantic movement, his writing gives evidence of a kind of 'theoretical synaesthesia' which links 'poetry, the novel, philosophy and theology as well.' We shall examine how Haggard drew on both English and German Romantic authors (the latter in translation), and the Romantic elements of the Weimar Classicists Friedrich von Schiller and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The necessarily poeticised nature of Romantic literary endeavour contributes at least in part to the difficulties we have encountered in trying to pin down and define 'the 'Romantic'. As Friedrich von Schlegel wrote:

> The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare to try and characterise its ideal.

Thus, as Prickett comments, 'Romanticism here is not so much a thing as an Aristotelian *entelechy*, a process of becoming.' I shall elucidate how, in Haggard, this process of becoming extends to the 'striving' human, and spiritual evolutionism in the form of an amalgamation of metempsychosis and reincarnation.

As we have already seen, metempsychosis was not part of the soul-theory of the ancient Egyptians, but the increasing exposure of European intellectuals to Eastern religion from the 1750s onward meant that it would become a preoccupation of German Romantics who looked to India for the topos of their *Östliche Mystik*. In this context, there are certain commonalities between the Romantic orientalist perspective on Egypt and that directed to India. In Part 1, we explored how Christian comparativism saw itself mirrored in Egyptian religion with the idea of an 'original monotheism' in Egypt. It perhaps comes as little surprise then that a similar European response was directed to India. As Wilhelm Halbfass has observed, the orientalist Friedrich Majer (1771–1818) 'was captivated by the idea of an "original monotheism",' which was thought to be present in the most ancient Indian documents:

> It was his conviction that the religious and philosophical situation in Europe could only be clarified and rectified through a return to the Indian origins, and that the sources of the Western tradition found their integrating context and background in Indian thought: "It will

> no longer remain to be doubted that the priests of Egypt and the sages of Greece have drawn directly from the original well of India; that only Brahmanism can provide those fragments of their teaching which have come down to us with the clarity which they do not possess."

As already noted, Haggard never went to India, and unlike Kipling did not set his romances there. However, he did use Oriental religious and philosophical ideas, and where these are concerned he was very much dependent on the Romantic re-presentations in translation – one thinks of the notion of *Seelenwanderung* ('transmigration') of a German mythic India – and, as we shall see later, he drew on these representations as they were interpreted and integrated in the Theosophy of Helena Blavatsky.

In the Introduction we touched on Faivre's criteria for what constitutes 'esotericism'. These are four fundamental elements and two other 'relative' components which may be present. These are: *Correspondences* (between Man, Nature and the Divine); *Living Nature*; *Imagination and Mediations*; *Transmutation* (Personal Transformation), and the two other possible inclusions: *Praxis of Concordance* (amounting to a *philosophia perennis* common to two or more religions), and *Transmission* (master to disciple). If we compare these criteria with the ideas we have discussed above as constituting Romanticism, the overlap should be immediately apparent. This is hardly surprising because, as Furst observes:

> In fact, the ideas of Blake, Coleridge and Novalis stemmed in important respects from a common source; the hermetic thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which maintained that truth was independent of sensible reality and could therefore only be perceived through mystical intuition.

Part 2 then considers not only the Romantic contiguities of Romanticism and the New Romance but those of the Romantic and the esoteric. It explores in more detail Haggard's Romantic exegesis of Old Testament narratives of Israel in Egypt, the Egyptian Moses and the Exodus. In particular, I shall consider the merging of Romantic and biblical notions of erotic love as a mystical metaphor: the Platonist and Christian ideas of *érōs* and *agápē* – of physical and spiritual love in the context of Haggard's Pauline opposition of the flesh and the Spirit.

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Part 3

concerns Haggard's relation to theosophy in general and Theosophy in particular. By convention Theosophy with a capital 'T' refers to the canon of the Theosophical Society founded by Henry Steel Olcott and the famous Helena Petrovna Blavatsky in 1875. The term theosophy pertains to 'divine wisdom', the transcendental wisdom beyond human *philosophia* which has an ancient lineage. It appears notably for our purposes in the epistles of St Paul − though not as one word, and in various combinations of *theos* and *sophia*. Its appearance as the single word *θεοσοφία* ('theosophia') is generally accredited to the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry. The contiguity of ideas from this *theosophia antiqua* also informs the Christian theosophies of the mystic Jakob Boehme in the context of German pietism, and Emanuel Swedenborg, whose influence has already been explored.

The following chapters will examine Haggard's reception of Theosophy and the reception of Haggardian Romance within Theosophical circles. I shall broaden the compass of Theosophy to consider its interface with anthropology and ethnology. In this regard we consider some of the important antecedents to Theosophical esoteric ethnology and its racial constructs.

We have been concerned in this account with the historicity of Bible narratives. In this context, they are vitally important to an understanding of the origins of Victorian racial anthropology. Central to this development is the history of the so-called Hamitic Hypothesis. This was formulated from the

original biblical anthropology, with humanity being descended from the sons of Noah after the Deluge. The three sons Ham, Shem and Japheth giving rise to the Hamitic, S(h)emitic and Japhetic races, which then diffused through Africa, Asia and Europe respectively. The vagaries of the Hamitic Hypothesis and the historical development of the notion of 'race' are traced by Michael F. Robinson in *The Lost White Tribe* (2016). It has its origin with the Bible story of Ham, who along with his descendants was cursed because he saw his father naked. This became the curse of Ham and his *black* descendants; subsequently this was modified to emphasise the curse of Canaan (Ham's son), thus allowing for the persistence of the notion of Haggard's ancient Egyptians as white and culturally advanced, long after it had ceased to be used to justify the Atlantic slave trade. It is apparent how, divorced from its scriptural roots, the language of Noahic anthropology would fall into confusion and eventual disuse, such that all that remains today is 'Semitic' referring to language, with 'anti-Semitic' indicating a prejudice toward Jewish peoples. Japhetic and Hamitic have disappeared from common parlance. As will become apparent, this discussion is relevant to our study as the theory of the diffusion of the Phoenician Hamites is directly connected with Haggard's anthropology, his creation of the Lost World genre, and his 'lost white races' in Africa.

Central to these final chapters is the emergence of comparative religion, and religious studies as an academic discipline separating from theology. Especially important in this regard, as comparativism took Christianity as its template, is a consideration of the Victorians' reconstructed Buddhism. In addition, I shall further consider how the notions of divine wisdom and secret doctrine are related to the importance of the imagination as a faculty of the seer, and thus the truth of the 'metaphysical' novel.

Theosophy is initially discussed in terms of Haggard's early spiritualistic experiments and exposure to the séance culture of the 1870s and 80s, as this is represented both autobiographically and in his semi-autobiographical fiction. As aforementioned, in his early years Haggard moved in the spiritualist circle of Lady Caithness − the great friend of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831−1891), the famed founder of the Theosophical Society. I shall document the evidence for the influence of Theosophical ideas in Haggard's romances. Firstly, by the appropriation of leading Theosophists themselves as characters, and secondly, by the use of specific Theosophical ideas, including Blavatsky's 'Masters' or 'Mahatmas', cataclysmic civilisational collapse and temporal cyclicity.

In particular I shall adumbrate the influence of Haggard's avowedly favourite author Edward Bulwer-Lytton on his own writing and on the Theosophy of Helena Blavatsky, documenting the triangle of influence and interest formed by the three authors. The influence of both Bulwer-Lytton and Blavatsky is reflected in Haggard's preoccupation with the theme of reincarnation, demonstrating the British reception and construction of Buddhism: a uniquely Victorian transmigration of the soul accompanied by a spiritual evolutionism, which mirrored the social progressivism of the period. Haggard's romances present the equation and conflation of the ideas of karma and reincarnation with those of sin and redemption.

These discussions will be framed in the broader dialogue between Theosophy and the emergent comparative religion of the period. In addition, I shall locate the esoteric aspects of Rider Haggard's 'lost civilisation' and 'lost world' themes within the compass of Victorian anthropology and the racial theories of Theosophical esoteric ethnology. Haggard's engagement with the developing anthropology and comparative religious studies of the period forms an important facet of the study, and reflects in turn the influence of his close friend the *soi-disant* 'psycho-folklorist' and anthropologist Andrew Lang. In addition, therefore, we shall consider how Haggard, along with Lang, combined anthropological and psychical discourse in a discussion of the late-nineteenth century propensity for intertextuality between journalistic, anthropological and fictional narratives. The scope of Haggard's North-South literary axis of Africa is crucial in this regard. The white, pre-

Islamic, proto-Christian religiosity of the initiates of his 'Old Egypt' contrasted with the 'primitive' intuitive power and spirituality of the contemporaneous Zulu in the South African locale.

There is evidence in Haggard's romances of an over-arching esoteric thematic coherence, with parallel streams of what we may call the 'cyclical continuity' of man, the 'world' (Empire) and the cosmos. These are cycles of decay and renewal, separation and reunion, death and rebirth. In addition, this continuity has evolutionary, genealogical and racial facets, and the threat of degeneration – regression as well as progression − is ever present.

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> *Oh, kind is Death that Life's long trouble closes,*
> *Yet at Death's coming Life shrinks back affright;*
> *It sees the dark hand, not that it encloses*
> *A cup of light.*
> *So oft the Spirit seeing Love draw nigh*
> *As 'neath the shadow of destruction, quakes,*
> *For Self, dark tyrant of the Soul, must die,*
> *When Love awakes.*
> *Aye, let him die in darkness! But for thee,*
> *Breathe thou the breath of morning and be free!*

I began this account with an exploration of some of the religious ideas in Haggard's lesser-known novel *Beatrice*. In the front pages, the poem above is given by way of a prefatory meditation, and beneath it is inscribed 'rückert. *Translated by* F.W.B,' specifying precisely the source from which Haggard lifted it. This is an English translation from the German of the Romantic poet and orientalist scholar, Friedrich Rückert (1788–1866). What is not at first apparent is that this is not Rückert's poem. Elsewhere in the original source is the German version, entitled 'Rückert's translation from the Persian,' and it is a translation of a Persian *ghazal* by Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī (1207–1273), more simply 'Rumi', the famous Sufi mystic and poet. The reasons for opening my conclusions with this poem are that firstly, it is typical of Haggard's writing – the importance of examining 'what is not at first apparent'. The occult is that which is hidden, and one might say that the esoteric is that which is 'hidden in plain sight', after the manner of the hieroglyph, and therefore that which is 'not at first apparent'. During this account, I have had cause to examine Haggard's esotericism, and many of his allusions and source materials, and what is now apparent is the breadth and depth of his reading. Of course, one can always speculate, as his critics often did, as to his awareness of what he was writing, and whether he knew that this poem was ultimately by Rumi, but given his interest in Romantic authors it is safe to accept that he knew of Rückert. My second reason for using this ghazal is that it encompasses one of Haggard's greatest themes. A ghazal is typically written in praise of love in spite of pain, loss and separation; it is often written from the perspective of the unrequited lover. This is the perennial theme of Haggardian romance: that love belongs to eternity and survives physical death; a transcendental *agápē* which outlives the perpetual war of the flesh and the Spirit, and which he derived principally from the letters of St Paul.

We saw previously how in *Stella Fregelius*, the bereft Morris sets out in earnest on an esoteric path to contact the drowned Stella:

> Now, by such arts as are known to those who have studied mysticism in any of its protean forms, Morris set himself to attempt communication with the unseen. In their practice these arts are as superlatively unwholesome as in their result, successful or not, they are unnatural.[4] Also, they are very ancient. The Chaldeans knew them, and the magicians who stood before Pharaoh knew them. To the early Christian anchorites and to the gnostic they were familiar. In one shape or another, ancient wonder-workers, Scandinavian and mediaeval seers, modern Spiritualists, classical interpreters of oracles, Indian fakirs, savage witch-

> doctors and medicine men, all submitted or submit themselves to the yoke of the same rule in the hope of attaining an end which, however it may vary in its manifestations, is identical in essence.
>
> This is the rule: to beat down the flesh and its instincts and nurture the spirit, its aspirations and powers.

In many ways, this passage neatly summarises the breadth of Haggard's knowledge of the history of esoteric ideas, how their countries of origin have contributed to the Imperial Occult, and how they have been approached in this account. From Bulwer-Lytton's Romantic Chaldean Zanoni, to the magicians and 'Pharaoh' of the Exodus and biblical Egyptology; Haggard's near-gnostic dualism and melancholic acosmism; his Scandinavian seers including Swedenborg, and his Danish extraction and mysticism; the Spiritualists of his youth; the fakirs, Tibetan Mahatmas and Indian mystique of Theosophy; and, of course, the witch-doctors – the Zulu sangomas in the Africa of his youth. As ever with Haggard, it is the Pauline opposition of the flesh and the Spirit which for him is central to these endeavours, as it is to his own religious philosophy. In his Introduction to Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, H.D. Traill said of the author that he would not have considered himself a philosopher, 'whose own metaphysic was a mere tissue of poetic rhapsodies'.[6] I hope that whilst at times Haggard may have been said to have written rhapsodically, the substance of his philosophy is apparent.

This exploration of that religious philosophy has taken us through a progressive 'unveiling of Isis', dealing with that which is hidden, be it unconscious, forgotten, buried or veiled. This in turn has demonstrated that the 'Veil of Isis' is a polysemic image. To the occultist it conceals the hidden laws of Nature, yet to be revealed. To the Romantic, it is a *natura naturans* that can never be revealed by mere scientific rationalism. Blavatsky felt that her 'occult science' of Theosophy had unveiled Isis; Haggard seems at times to have doubted her conviction. The over-arching concept of the Imperial Occult has allowed us to impose a structure on the processual mechanisms and topoi of syncretic theology, how these ideas appeared in Haggard's romances, and were thus transmitted to the reading public.

Clearly the recourse to the integration of alien religious formations cannot be a restoration of orthodoxy. The implicit Anglo-Catholic theological position involved in revitalising the Anglican faith by restoring the supernaturalism stripped away by attempted Broad Church reform is a problematic one for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is debatable whether one can term such religious structures 'new'. For example, the apparent incorporation of Hindu and Buddhist reincarnationism into Christianity, when a belief in reincarnation -albeit in the form of Greek metempsychosis – persisted amongst individuals that self-identified as Christian as late as the Enlightenment, and was certainly prevalent in the ante-Nicene era. This makes broad statements concerning 'hybridisation' and 'syncretism' problematic, when on occasion what is actually meant is a return to an earlier religious structure, albeit in a modified form. The propensity to accept even the possibility of such changes can be seen superficially as promulgating a liberal and reformist Broad Church perspective. But its aim is quite the contrary – to support and shore up the supernaturalism stripped away by liberal reform, associated with orthodox scriptural and doctrinal doxa. In other words, the originary trajectories of British occultism were not countercultural at the *outset* – though they would come to have this association – but rather, directed toward the repair of the damage done to High Church Anglican theology, notably following *Essays and Reviews*, with an appeal to tradition, hierarchy, ritual, sacerdotalism, and supernaturalism. The necessity of an instauration of these five elements took the syncretic Victorian *religio mentis* throughout the Empire and beyond.

In Egypt, as we have seen, the retrojective imagination was often as much a motive for archaeological exploration as the much vaunted, nominally dispassionate and scientific approach. Thus, in the

Victorian period Egyptology as an emergent science was not always the dominant trajectory. In Colla's observation:

> Textual representations of Egyptian antiquities and fictional narratives on Pharaonic themes were not simply posterior reflections of material practice. On the contrary, archaeology and museum culture anticipated, as much as they proceeded from, the cultural imaginary of Egyptomania and Pharaonism.

As we have seen, just as the forged artefacts are text-objects for Haggard's romances so the actual archaeological finds became text-objects for biblical narratives. In both cases the object serves an identical purpose: it is given as tangible physical evidence for the reality of the narrative. This propensity for intertextuality, the blending of 'fact' and 'fiction', is a key to the understanding of Haggard's literature and its relationship with Victorian Egyptology and anthropology. As we have seen, although Haggard often follows Egyptological disciplinary perspectives and their changes closely, he is selective in terms of how he deploys these for his fictional narratives and their didactic purpose. It is true that in his memoirs and the romances he changes the name of the 'Pharaoh' of the Exodus three times – apparently in order to retain the plausibility of a biblical Egypt in the face of emergent archaeological evidence. In a more specifically esoteric context, Rider Haggard appealed to the 'primordial wisdom' of Egypt. In Haggard's writing, the Egyptosophical and biblical discourses coalesce in the milieu of an Imperial Occult. The comparativism of his religious speculations on a proto-Christianity in Egypt take him away from the proscriptions of a dogmatic or revelation theology. What has to be emphasised is the importance of this idea of hidden Nature behind the 'Veil of Isis,' or in Haggard's use of St Paul's phrase, 'the curtain of the unseen'. Crucial to Haggard's esoteric, proto-Christian Egypt is a Romantic construction of a Saitic Isis as Nature, and the transmission of secret knowledge concerning this hidden Nature, possessed by the initiated Egyptian priesthood.

As I have demonstrated, this New Romantic view of Haggard's owes much to contiguities with the ideas of the English and German Romantics. He provides evidence of the Romantic notions of the Weimar Classicists Goethe and Schiller amongst others. We have seen how German Romanticism looked not only to Egypt but to India. In addition, this led us to explore Victorian constructions of Buddhism and the importance of these in Haggard's romances and correspondence. I have emphasised in particular the Romantic appropriation of the Bible, and have explored how Haggard combines the Romantic ideas of the *Liebestod*, with Platonic *érōs* and Pauline *agápē* in his own philosophy of an *amor aeternus.* For Haggard, 'Love Eternal' survives the grave and his lovers are reincarnated and reunited.

I have marshalled evidence to challenge the argument that Haggard's novels employed esoteric themes merely as literary propagandist devices for the imperialist project. Rather, that the British archaeological presence in Egypt and the importance of this to British culture, combined with a more overt political involvement with the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1882, led to a counter-invasion of religious and philosophical ideas. Likewise, the colonial presence of the British in South Africa during the tumult of the Zulu War and Two Boer Wars, the process of missionising and the associated rise of comparative religious studies led to a dialogue between the Imperial metropolitan centre and its academics and the colonial periphery, and Haggard engaged with this dialogue. India as the third of our Imperial locales had several centuries of exchange of ideas with Great Britain, but notably after the establishment of the Theosophical Society in 1875 and the hybridisation of religious structures which ensued. We have showed ample evidence for Haggard's deployment of ideas from the Theosophical corpus, notably in the context of his combination of Christian eschatology, temporal cyclicity, and the rise and fall of civilisations.

I would argue that, in the colonial context, the counter-invasion of ideas which is coeval with the New Imperialism served to act as a critique of modernity in general and the colonialist project in

particular. In this regard, there was a 'reverse-missionising' aimed at the revitalising of metropolitan religiosity discussed above. I have argued that the engagement with alien religious structures at the turn of the century was the crib of the British nineteenth-century occult revival. Hanegraaff has suggested a qualified definition of occultism as '*all attempts by esotericists to come to terms with a disenchanted world or, alternatively, by people in general to make sense of esotericism from the perspective of a disenchanted secular world*'.[8] In this context, the notion that a Weberian 'disenchantment of the world' ever took place has now been seriously critiqued.[9] It would be more accurate to say that, rather than an attempt at 're-enchantment', there was an attempt at restoring the supernatural to Christian religiosity, albeit in the form of a 'natural supernaturalism', and a failed attempt at buttressing Anglican orthodoxy. These ideas and processes are evident in Haggardian romance, and Haggard was instrumental in their promulgation. In this fashion the rise of the New Romance in literature with its esoteric themes acted as an amplification of biblical narratives – with or without biblical themes – in which the metaphysical novel replaced the pilgrimage with the mystical quest.

We have traced the importance of Africa in Haggard, both in terms of Egypt and Southern Africa. Haggard's North-South spatial axis of Africa is accompanied by an axis of temporal engagement in terms of spirituality: ancient Egypt in the North and contemporaneous i.e. nineteenth-century, 'modern' Africa in the South. In the North he saw ancient progenitors of modern western monotheistic religion; in the South, a paradoxical combination of atavistic intuitive animism and modern savage and 'degenerate' superstition. Haggard's romances evoke the Victorian anthropological legerdemain whereby the Ancient Egyptians became dead moderns and contemporary tribal Africans became 'living fossils'. Nonetheless, we have seen how Haggard problematized and unsettled the ingrained notions of racial hierarchy and assumptions of the superiority of the white male. As Allan Quatermain would have it, 'Civilisation is only savagery silver-gilt. A vainglory is it, and, like a northern light, comes but to fade and leave the sky more dark.' As Chidester remarks, following Chrisman's argument, imperial political economy and spiritual enchantment were not easily separated in Haggard:

> Here was an Imperialist advocating the empire, celebrating its military and economic interests, actively promoting the Shepstone system of indirect rule, and reinforcing all of the racialized, gendered and sexualized tropes of empire through his best-selling novels. But here also was a spiritualist, of sorts, believing in reincarnation, even vaguely recalling his own past lives as a caveman, a black savage, an ancient Egyptian, and a medieval barbarian, while holding on to a romantic ideal of British pastoral life.

Whilst there is no doubt about Haggard as an imperialist, I hope that this account has successfully contested and complicated some of the assertions made in this quote concerning Haggard's use of 'racialized, gendered and sexualized tropes of empire'. Haggard was told about the possibility of his reincarnations as we recall by a 'mystic of the first water' and certainly wrote in fiction about Quatermain's past-lives, amongst others, but there is no documentation of a personal anamnesis, however vague. Likewise, he had been involved in spiritualism in his extreme youth, but as we have seen, his belief system became more complex with age. It is the importance of the exploration of this belief system which I have argued for alongside the well-travelled route of 'Haggard the imperialist', and the evidence for syncretic theology and occultism in his fiction and correspondence.

It is admittedly difficult to comprehend from within a modern or perhaps 'post-modern' *Weltanschauung* inured to the explosion of information technology which has occurred during the 20th and 21st centuries – where people can communicate across vast distances in seconds – that the syncretism and hybridity of ideas described in this account of British nineteenth and early twentieth-century occultism, and its multifarious sources, depended much more on the geopolitics of Empire and the movement and often direct physical contact of different peoples. 'Syncretism' did not simply belong in some abstract realm of ideas but was derivative of a cultural

rapprochement. Arguments have been many concerning the nature of these nexi: Self and Other, colonizer and colonized, Imperialist and Subaltern. I have tried to emphasise the counter-invasion of ideas resulting from the Imperialist project and the importance of their interrogation of the colonialist stance. The cultural rapprochement was most important in the missionising project which Haggard critiqued, and which as we have discussed often had in view the promulgation of the miraculous Christ of Pauline Christianity.

In this regard, it is my contention that Haggard turns to St Paul because of the apostle's essentially mystical theology. This goes beyond the scriptural evidence of the Apostle's Damascene *kataphasis* and conversion. It fits readily with the idea of Paul as a promulgator of the miraculous Christ, at least in part responsible in this account for the Osiride Christology prevalent amongst Victorian Egyptologists and Haggard. It dovetails readily with Romantic philhellenism and Paul as an initiate of the Mysteries, and with Blavatskian Theosophy which also draws on the latter and makes Paulinism a continuation of the initiatic Graeco-Egyptian Mysteries, and a component of the Hermetic discourse. To what extent Haggard considered Paul an 'initiate' is another question – but that is not our concern. Haggard's own interest in the spiritual and the mystical led him to seek out the apostle's work, citing him frequently because Pauline mystical theology comports with his own. He did even on occasion hint at personal mystical experience and its transience. Lilias Haggard records a conversation between Haggard and Kipling on the nature of mystical communion. Haggard says:

> I told him that I did believe that as a result of much spiritual labour there is born in one a knowledge of the nearness and consolation of God. He replied that occasionally this had happened to him also, but the difficulty was to 'hold' the mystic sense of this communion – that it passes. Now this I have found very true. Occasionally one sees the Light, one touches the pierced feet, one thinks that the peace which passes understanding is gained – then all is gone again. Rudyard's explanation is that it meant to be so; that God does not mean we should get too near lest we become unfitted for our work in the world. Perhaps …

Here, Haggard contemplates Paul's Epistle to the Philippians: 'The peace of God which passeth all understanding'– the ineffable, apophatic bliss of the *Unio mystica* – and its transience.

As aforementioned, Haggard is also concerned with transience at a more mundane level: the cyclical rise and fall of Empire. As we have seen, these events are often associated with a recrudescence of the Hermetic narrative, and recourse to the wisdom tradition to bolster and revitalise the sclerotic structures of Church and State. As with the collapse of Byzantium and the rise of the Italian Humanism in the *quattrocento*, so with the fading of British Imperialism and the 'occult revival' in the late nineteenth-century, and beyond the Great War. The resurgence of occultism in the nineteenth century was however complicated by an internal tension between the Hermetic-Theosophic and the Romantic; the former with its wisdom attained and the latter which emphasised wisdom's unending pursuit. This aporia of Occultism and Romanticism, as we have seen, found its point of equilibrium in Carlyle's 'Natural Supernaturalism' where there are hidden laws of nature (Occultism) which can never be revealed (Romanticism). Haggard's romance tapped into and revealed these important currents.

The revealing process is as we have seen intimately related to literary hermeneutics. It is at first sight a strange and manifest contrast that the 'progressive' English Realist literature of the mid-1800s deployed biblical typology, whilst simultaneously rejecting the Bible. Haggard's New Romantic literature of the *fin de siècle* transitioned typological hermeneutics into reincarnation, finding, as did the Theosophists, evidence for reincarnation in Scripture. Typology and reincarnationism are intimately linked because of their contrasting interpretations. Typology fits with a linear eschatology, but reincarnationism can only be accommodated if the cycles of reincarnated lives are equated with purgatory/the intermediate period, representing a purification of the soul prior to final judgement

and the entry into eternity. However, Haggard's New Romanticism and Theosophical perspective moved beyond both – by conflating the Providential Aesthetic with *karma* and rebirth, and finding the perceived moral economies of the latter as equated with sin and redemption.

The conveyance of such religious and anthropological ideas in Haggard's fiction has foregrounded the importance of text and specifically intertextuality in locating his oeuvre. The Protestant emphasis on the significance of scripture especially in terms of its historicity in turn drove the emphasis on textuality in comparative religion as we have seen. This supremacy of the text fostered in turn the importance of the academic footnote in comparativism, and in turn the use of the footnote by Haggard in his fiction, where he used it both for the purposes of immersion and for factual education. In turn, in the form of Romantic Irony, it problematized the ontological status of his texts as fact or fiction. The footnote remains a mainstay of academicians up to the present day, though the historical links with Higher Criticism, and orientalist and comparativist discourse are largely lost. In any case, as opposed to the strictly historicist approach to historiography, as Gordan Djurdjevic avers, there is an alternative perspective in which

> The presence of imaginative construction or fiction is an inescapable condition in the formulation of *any* account about reality. Reality is structured as fiction (Lacan). There are no facts, only interpretations (Nietzsche). The priest, the poet, the scientist, and the historian are each and every one, from this other point of view, in the final instance all storytellers.

And Rider Haggard was, of course, the 'Great Storyteller'. In this context, the question remains as to why he chose fiction as the main, if not sole vehicle, for his thought. The simple answer is this: for a man who perceived himself as a staunch Anglican, placing his work in a fictional context provided him with a get-out clause – a theological alibi, if you will. In the last analysis, he could simply dissimulate and say that these were merely products of fantasy.

We have considered how the importation of new religious structures was used to revitalise Anglican confession in the face of the threat posed to Scripture by the internal divisions generated and epitomised by the Anglican *Essays and Reviews*, continental biblical historicism and Darwinism. The questions remain as to how such hybridisation could possibly take place. Given the considerable structural differences between, as an important example, Christian and Buddhist doctrine – how can such antipathetical eschatologies and religious structures fit together, and, indeed, why should this process have a revitalising effect? A close study of the complex relationships between *karma* and Providence, reincarnation and typology, and the hybridity with sin and redemption in Haggard's oeuvre has provided us with some possible answers. Given the history of reincarnation in Christian thought, perhaps rather than 'hybridisation' it is a question in such circumstances of revitalising by the restoration of older religious ideas, which naturally reflects the Hermetic ethos of the return of the *prisca theologia.* The Anglo-European and – in recent years – transatlantic Imperial trope of 'former greatness' and its restoration semantically engages in the History of Ideas with a biblical pre-lapsarian state, a classical Golden Age, a Renaissance *prisca theologia*, a Theosophical ancient wisdom, and a post-modern *Ur*-technology.

What, then, are the logical processual mechanisms involved in adapting such historical, or rather, historiographical schemata of Buddhist and/or Hindu thought to Christianity? The larger questions concerning elective salvation and eternal damnation raised in the Anglican Communion were addressed by changes in attitudes toward linear time and temporal cyclicity. Cyclical time was adapted to a linear eschatology in part by changing the Anglican 'intermediate period'/Catholic Purgatory to a series of earthly reincarnations during which the required spiritual purification takes place. This approximated more closely to a reversion to the Greek influence conferring metempsychosis on Early Christianity prior to the establishment of conciliar orthodoxy. The 'counter-invasion' of Buddhism and Hinduism promoted a resurgence of these older ideas.

The questions raised about human agency and autonomy by the challenge to elective salvation and eternal damnation were reflected in *karma* and its contingent rebirth becoming conflated with the moral economies of sin and redemption as we have seen. *Karma* becomes not a law of necessity as in un-reconstructed Buddhism, but of retribution. The emphasis on what is strictly metempsychosis rather than reincarnation resulted in the substitution of an *ethos of perfectibility* for karmic necessity. Old Testament typological criticism relies on Providence and the idea of an over-arching and at least in part predetermined temporal structure. The advance of science and the attacks of historiography served to make typological hermeneutics obsolete, and the Old Testament less relevant, increasingly reduced to the status of fable and allegory. However, as fictional religiosity appropriated the *figura* from the scriptural, typology was continued in the literature of the Victorian period. With the New Romance of the 1880s onward, the emphasis was shifted from the typological to reincarnationism – as promulgated in the reincarnation romances of Rider Haggard. In addition, the religiosity of the Haggard's New Romance acts as an adjunct to scripture by re-presenting Bible stories in fictional form. These reconfigurations pose questioning alternate histories. Although as we have seen, Haggard asserts the literal truth of Scripture, his mystical and esoteric theology simultaneously sidesteps and endorses its historicity, whilst amplifying its religious content.

The shift from typology to reincarnation thus further revitalised a religiosity bogged down with the question of human agency, by postponing the question indefinitely. Reincarnation supports the notion that karmic necessities are responsible for apparent free will: these necessities were presented by the free will of the previous life – and so on in infinite regress. We have seen how Haggard worked through this quandary in *Stella Fregelius.* To summarise the above, the bridge between linear and cyclical time is provided by the substitution of reincarnationism for typological hermeneutics. Reincarnationism dispels (or at least, suspends) the conundrum of the coexistence of Free Will and Providence.

As we have seen, to a certain extent this shoring-up of a beleaguered Anglicanism was an Imperial concern. Inevitably, if the Empire is seen in the guise of Christendom, and part of the 'White Man's Burden' of civilising is Christian missionising i.e. the justification of Imperial expansion as civilising and Christianising, then the failure of Christian theology to present a coherent front in the face of a scientific *Weltanschauung,* and as a result of doctrinal schism in the Anglican communion, leaves the argument for the Imperial project fundamentally flawed. Haggard remained deeply ambivalent about colonialism, whilst working for the British Empire all his life and having that fact written on his grave. He was doubtful of the value of 'civilising' the 'savage', and was impressed by the power of indigenous spirituality, which he felt that the white man had lost. As a result, he spent much of his life in ideological vacillation as is evident in his work: in this regard we have demonstrated how he frequently subverts conventional colonial hierarchies. In his Introduction to *Allan Quatermain*, Haggard makes his concerns explicit when he says that it is a 'depressing conclusion, but in all essentials the savage and the child of civilisation are identical'. His ambivalence about modernity and civilisation is evident. Although in favour of technological advance, he wrote on afforestation and coastal erosion and was an ecologist and perhaps 'deep' ecologist *avant la lettre.* As a prominent figure amongst London society intelligentsia, he could nevertheless see in urban decay metaphors for the Cities of the Plain: not simply a New Jerusalem among these 'dark satanic mills', but – alongside his New Amarna, Alexandria, or Thebes – a New Sodom and Gomorrah.

In conclusion, though at first sight often assumed to be countercultural and reflective of an alleged Romantic reaction to scientific materialism, we can see that British occultism had the coterminous trajectory with Anglo-Catholicism of restoring the supernaturalism stripped away by attempted Broad Church reform in the wake of *Essays and Reviews.* It sought to restore initiation and the sacerdotalism of the High Church ritual. The challenged 'evidences' were replaced – typology with reincarnation, the miraculous with the magic of occult science, even Christ with Osiris. On a

broader canvas, the Imperial Occult is not a simple epiphenomenal manifestation of the attempt to buttress Empire as Christendom, but also an ecumenism extending beyond the Christian church, and the counter-invasion of a panoply of diverse ideas from the Imperial locales which complicated the issue. In the last analysis, the Imperial Occult was not countercultural *ab origine*, but it would eventually interrogate modernism and the imperial project, notably with the Theosophist Annie Besant as a founder of the Indian National Congress. The number of neologisms and other terms which challenge the very notion of objectivity, 'mnemohistory', 'metageography', 'intertextuality' and 'mediation' are salutary of how much esotericism relies on Romantic theories of knowledge. Rider Haggard's thorough engagement with all of these discourses provides evidence for the internal ambiguities, tensions and perpetual conflicts of an ambivalent imperialist. As Vance succinctly puts it, with regard to the religio-philosophical ideas discussed, 'The popular author of *King Solomon's Mines* (1885) and *She* (1887), and many other works, deserves to be taken more seriously as – among other things – a multicultural religious novelist.'

Amongst those many cultures, Haggard was most at home in Egypt. His romantic fealty with the god Thoth and the Hidden Wisdom of Isis was always profoundly significant for him. It links him – Romantically and otherwise – with the Hermetic discourse and its various tributaries, which we have been concerned to follow during the course of this book. Thoth-Hermes, as the god of writing and magic epitomises the Romantic idea of the imagination and its literary manifestation as a noetic organ which apprehends 'Hidden Wisdom'. Haggard had his letterhead and library stamp written in Egyptian hieroglyphs, and given his love of Egypt it is therefore fitting that we should close with this. It translates as:

> *H. Rider Haggard, the son of Ella, lady of the house, makes an oblation to Thoth, the Lord of writing, who dwells in the moon.*

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## **Reformation, Revolution, Renovation: The Roots and Reception of the Rosicrucian Call for General Reform** by Lyke de Vries [Universal Reform, Brill, 9789004250222]

At the centre of the Rosicrucian manifestos was a call for 'general reformation'. In *Reformation, Revolution, Renovation*, the first book-length study of this topic, Lyke de Vries demonstrates the unique position of the Rosicrucian call for reform in the transformative context of the early seventeenth century. The manifestos, commonly interpreted as either Lutheran or esoteric, are here portrayed as revolutionary mission statements which broke dramatically with Luther's reform ideals. Their call for reform instead resembles a variety of late medieval and early modern dissenting traditions as well as the heterodox movement of Paracelsianism. Emphasising the universal character of the Rosicrucian proposal for change, this new genealogy of the core idea sheds fresh light on the vexed question of the manifestos' authorship and helps explain their tumultuous reception by both those who welcomed and those who deplored them.

CONTENTS

## Confessio Fraternitatis

> Whence it is right that deceit, darkness, and slavery withdraw, which, by the gradually advancing instability of the great globe, crept into the sciences, actions, and human governments, by which these have been for the better part obscured [...]. When finally all of this will be removed, as we trust, we shall see it instead substituted with a similar rule that will perpetually remain equal to itself. –Confessio Fraternitatis

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At the beginning of the seventeenth century, three mysterious texts stirred up much debate in the intellectual world: The Fama Fraternitatis (Fame of the Fraternity, 1614), the Confessio Fraternitatis

(Confession of the Fraternity, 1615), and, different from but related to both, the Chymische Hochzeit: Christiani Rosencreutz (Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosencreutz, 1616). While the Chemical Wedding presents a fictional autobiographical narrative, the first two texts are manifestos, mission statements. Their authors remained anonymous, but claimed to be members of a secret fraternity founded by a Christian Rosencreutz in the early fifteenth century. Written during the third generation of the Reformation, in the midst of early modern scientific transformations, and on the eve of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), these two provocative manifestos called for a general reformation of religious, scientific, and political life and announced the coming of a new era.

No sooner had the manifestos been published than their call received responses from all quarters of Europe. In the years immediately after their publication, hundreds of letters, pamphlets, and books were written by enthusiasts who wished to come into contact with this elusive brotherhood, and all over Northern Europe authors claimed to be members of that enigmatic fraternity. They penned their support and admiration for these revolutionary texts and hailed the harbingers of a new time of prosperity. In response, academic authors, shocked and outraged by these subversive writings, wrote harsh letters and tracts fulminating against the Rosicrucian brethren, their paradoxical mission statements, and the followers that wrote in their wake.4 The Rosicrucian manifestos stirred up so much controversy that for over a decade they were the focus of a large international and intellectually pervasive dispute. By 1625, the Rosicrucian controversy had been discussed in over four hundred texts.

The Rosicrucian response had begun in a somewhat clandestine manner already several years before the first manifesto, the Fama, was published in 1614. The German Paracelsian theosopher and first commentator on the manifestos, Adam Haslmayr (ca. 1562–ca. 1631), gained access to this mysterious material as early as 1610, and soon wrote an Answer to the Fama. Printed in 1612, two years before that manifesto itself would appear in print, he claimed in his audacious reply that he awaited with anticipation the emergence of the brethren from their hiding place. 1610 was also the year that his friend, the German alchemist and editor Benedictus Figulus (real name Benedict Töpfer, 1567-after 1619), acquired a copy of the Fama, presumably thanks to Haslmayr, and ensured its wider distribution. Such was the allure of this manifesto that before long the German ruling elite became involved. In 1611, Prince August von Anhalt-Plötzkau (1575–1653) expressed an interest in the Fama. In a letter dated that year, he asked both Haslmayr and the collector of Paracelsian and Weigelian manuscripts, Karl Widemann (1555–1637), to write a public response to the text.8 Haslmayr's Answer was his fulfilment of this request, and was soon printed numerous times, first by an unknown and presumably secret press, but in subsequent years it was often republished together with editions of the Fama and the Confessio.

Meanwhile to the west of Plötzkau, in Marburg, the Paracelsian physician Johann Hartmann (1558–1631) read the Fama in 1611, in a copy apparently given to him by Figulus. Soon the text reached an international readership as Hartmann gave it to the Danish physician and antiquarian Ole Worm (1588–1655). Whereas the former might have taken a favourable view on the text, the latter was quick to dismiss the Rosicrucian message. Not much later a second Dane, Erik Lange (1559–1643), brother-in-law of the famous astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), received a copy of this manuscript and rushed into writing a sympathetic letter in support, addressed to the "Lords and brothers of the fraternity and brotherhood of the admirable and everlasting Order of the Rose Cross" (1613).

After the publication of the Rosicrucian manifestos in 1614 and 1615, word of these inventive texts spread much more widely across Northern Europe. A large number of responses ensued to the Rosicrucians' call for reform and their appeal to readers "to examine their own arts precisely and keenly [...] and reveal to us their thoughts in written form in print." Back in German lands, the

anonymous author of the preface to a work entitled About the Highest, Very Best and Most Expensive Treasures (Echo, 1615), attributed to the alchemist Julius Sperber (ca. 1540–1610?), argued that the manifestos were echoes of Adamic and ancient wisdom recently voiced in the works of Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Agrippa von Nettesheim. In the same year, 1615, Rosicrucian texts appeared under the pseudonym Julianus de Campis, while in 1617 and 1618 the famous alchemist Michael Maier (1568– 1622) defended the brotherhood against various attacks. In the meantime, the court astronomer and later physician Daniel Mögling (pseudonyms Theophilus Schweighart and Florentinus de Valentia, 1596–1635) discussed, extolled, and defended the manifestos in several of his writings.

Simultaneously in England, the manifestos found an early apologist in the prominent physician and astrologer Robert Fludd (1574–1637), who defended them against fierce attacks by the German physician and putative author of the first chemistry textbook, Andreas Libavius (1555–1616). A few years later Fludd found himself defending Rosicrucianism again, this time against the attacks of the French mathematicians and friends of the famous philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) and Marin Mersenne (1588–1648).

Shortly after the written debate between Libavius and Fludd, the tutor and travelling Rosicrucian prophet Philipp Ziegler (ca. 1584-?) came into the picture back on German soil, as he claimed to be a member of the brotherhood. Inspired by the Rosicrucian texts, in March 1619 he announced his arrival in the Bavarian town of Fürth, calling himself "[...] King of Jerusalem, Shiloh, Joseph and David, crowned by the grace of God, foremost brother of the Rosicrucians and invincible Scepter of the King in Sion." Further north, in the town of Giessen just a few years later, in 1623, the physician Heinrich Nolle (Nollius, 1583–1630?) published a work entitled Mirror of the Philosophical Parergon, which was inspired by the Rosicrucian Chemical Wedding and informed by the brethren's reform plans. Also in 1623, posters appeared on church walls across the Rhine, in Paris, proclaiming that the Rosicrucian brethren had now established a presence in the French capital. This was the year that Descartes had returned to Paris, and the philosopher was somewhat perturbed by false accusations of his being one of the Rosicrucian brethren and of having brought the Rosicrucian furore with him to that city.

The manifestos generated also a great deal of excitement in the Dutch Republic, with followers in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Leiden. The movement was thought to be propagated by the enthusiast Peter Mormius (ca. 1580-after 1632), the painter Johannes Symonsz van der Beek, known as Johannes Torrentius (1589–1644), and the printer Govert Basson (d. 1643), who published many Rosicrucian works and owned even more. Torrentius was arguably the best still-life painter of his age. His paintings puzzled all his colleagues and peers, none of whom could discover how they were made and which materials were used—qualities which combined to add to his allure as a mysterious Rosicrucian.

By 1626, the main Scandinavian advocate for the Rosicrucian cause was the Swedish antiquarian Johannes Bureus (1568–1652), who famously claimed that this new movement was in fact a new manifestation of ancient, divine wisdom. Bureus was in contact with the book collector and publisher Joachim Morsius (pseudonym Anastasius Philaretus Cosmopolita, 1593–1653), who must also have been acquainted with Torrentius, as a portrait of the latter in Morsius' album amicorum testifies. Morsius had tried to contact the top-secret brotherhood in a public letter to which, against all odds, he received a reply—a unicum since none other elicited a response.

The overwhelming flood of heterodox tracts and pamphlets written in support of the Rosicrucian movement was met by an equally prolific current of authors, like Libavius and Gassendi, who were shocked and outraged by these outlandish texts and condemned their authors and supporters alike. But the reaction to Rosicrucianism was not limited to words alone, and soon authorities took legal

action against its supporters. Even as early as 1612, Rosicrucianism was perceived as dangerous: in that year, Haslmayr's support of the Rosicrucians got him sentenced to the galleys. He had sent a letter to Maximilian iii (1558–1618), Regent of Tyrol (1602–1612) and later Archduke of Austria (1612– 1618), to ask for money to travel to Montpellier in search of the mysterious brethren. In response, Maximilian did send him to travel, not to Montpellier, but to the galleys departing from Genoa instead, to work as a galley slave for four and a half years. On the day he was sent to the galleys, 31 October 1612, the authorities in Tyrol also issued a warrant for the arrest of his friend Figulus, who was subsequently imprisoned until November 1617.

A few years later, self-professed Rosicrucians were investigated and tried by Lutherans and Calvinists alike. In 1619 the German engineer and Rosicrucian follower Johannes Faulhaber (1580–1635) was placed under investigation by the Lutheran university in Tübingen. In the same year, Philipp Homagius and Georg Zimmermann (dates unknown) were condemned by Calvinist prosecutors by the order of Landgrave Moritz von Hesse-Kassel (1572–1632). No sooner had Homagius found refuge in Giessen than he was investigated again, together with Heinrich Nolle, this time by Lutheran investigators of the Land-grave of Hesse-Darmstadt, Ludwig V (1577–1626).

Heterodox thinkers suspected of Rosicrucianism in the Dutch provinces were treated particularly harshly. Such was the fear of subversive views that when the Court of Holland examined the Rosicrucian matter, they made sure that Torrentius was also investigated, whereupon the artist was interrogated and brutally tortured. Shortly before the case against Torrentius, in 1625, Dutch translations of the Fama and Confessio, the Echo attributed to Julius Sperber, and other unnamed books were sent by the Court of Holland to Calvinist professors of Theology in Leiden for investigation of their "Rosicrucian teachings." In their report, the professors concluded that the Rosicrucian "sect" was an

> error in doctrine [...], possessed, superstitious and magical; in her philosophy she is a fabrication of an erratic mind and a monstrous spirit, vain, useless, and filled with deceit; lastly rebellious towards the state [...].

Religiously, politically, and philosophically, the manifestos and their followers provoked the authorities and were to be condemned. For one reason or another, the Rosicrucian case truly became a Europe-wide controversy.

The Rosicrucian manifestos might easily have been overlooked or ignored, but instead their impact on early seventeenth-century Europe was enormous. What was the controversial message of these short texts that triggered such a passionate response? Literature on the Rosicrucian manifestos and the subsequent movement has largely been concerned with questions of authorship, the networks from which these pamphlets arose, and the early furore. While context is obviously important, the first place to look to understand these manifestos and their explosive aftermath are the contents of the manifestos themselves.


Fama Fraternitatis
Oder
Entdeckung
der Brüderschafft
des löblichen Ordens deß
Rosen Creutzes/
Neuchen der
CONFESSION
Oder
Bekantnus derselben Fraterniter,
an alle Gelehrte vnd Häupter in
Europa geschrieben.
Auch etlichen Responsionen von H.
Haselmeyern vnd anderen gelehrten Leu-
ten auff die Famam gestellet.
Gedruckt zu Dantzigk / durch Andream
Hünefeldt. Im Jahr/ 1615.

This book studies the manifestos' call for a general reformation in its historical context. This call emerged in a period, the early seventeenth century, that witnessed a large variety of calls for, and attempts at, change. Yet, the "keymarkers" of change in the scientific and philosophical realms are still Francis Bacon and René Descartes. In the religious world they are most prominently Martin Luther and John Calvin. But any understanding of early modern projects of change which relies on the figures just mentioned would be anachronistic. It would also rule out of consideration concepts of reform beyond the strict boundaries of science and religion, respectively. The Rosicrucian manifestos—as well as other texts and movements that call for change, but that are much less known than the heroes just mentioned—fit much less comfortably in, and often challenge, the strict boundary between science and religion. They require fresh,

investigation in order to further develop our understanding of early modern concepts of change and projects of reform.

## The Rosicrucian Story

The Rosicrucian manifestos and the related Chemical Wedding give an account of the life of the well-travelled and highly-educated Christian Rosencreutz, who is described as the father of the Rosicrucian fraternity. Rosencreutz is said to have been born in 1378 and to have lived for 106 years, until his death in 1484. His message had been kept secret for 120 years until 1604 when, coinciding with the purported discovery of his vault, the Rosicrucian secrets would be revealed.

The Fama describes the life of the founder of the fraternity and the foundation of the Rosicrucian brotherhood. In his early years, Christian Rosencreutz travelled to the Arab world where he studied physics, mathematics, languages, magic, and Kabbalah. In the Arab cities Damcar and Fez he learned various secrets of nature and translated into Latin the mysterious "Liber M." After his travels in the East, Rosencreutz had become convinced of the necessity for a general reformation and felt compelled to teach others in Europe what he had learned in distant places. He visited several countries, but was disappointed at being unable to find anyone at the time willing to abandon their own teachings and philosophies, which Rosencreutz considered to be false. When he finally returned to Germany, he gathered around him three men who were to become the first brothers of the Rose Cross. Rosencreutz taught them the secrets of nature and worked with them in private in order to instigate the desired reformation. After four more companions had joined their cause, the eight brothers parted and went their separate ways throughout Europe to improve their knowledge. Once every year, on Rosencreutz's anniversary, they were to return to the house "Sanctus Spiritus,"

the house of the Holy Spirit, a building constructed by Christian Rosencreutz that was to become the Rosicrucians' sanctuary. They identified themselves as physicians, adapted to the style of dress of the country in which they worked, while each using as their secret mark "r.c." It was agreed that "none should practice any other profession than to cure the sick, without payment." The brethren were supposed to keep the brotherhood secret for 120 years after Rosencreutz's death, and to find a successor each so that the fraternity would continue to exist even after their own deaths.

In 1615, one year after the publication of the Fama, another provocative text issued from the printing presses, the Confessio. Christian Rosencreutz's hope for a general reformation was further developed in this closely related second manifesto, which had already been announced in the Fama. In this text, the authors discussed in more detail the philosophy of their fraternity. The brethren understood the workings of the world according to the hermetic analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, with humans as the microcosm of the universe. The macrocosm—the universe—was full of secrets that were to be revealed, and this revelation, the reader was told, would happen soon. The disclosure of secrets coincided with the dawn of the Rosicrucian philosophy, which was to replace traditional natural philosophy, to provide a new foundation for the sciences, and to form the basis of a broader reformation.

On the reverse side of the brethren's hope for a different future was their negative judgement on contemporary society. In their view, religion and philosophy were deeply rotten, and the contemporary state of affairs needed to be overhauled. At the time when the manifestos were drafted, the old worlds of Roman orthodoxy and of Aristotelian natural philosophy were irreversibly losing their foothold in the Western world. The Lutheran and Calvinist reformations had permanently changed the religious landscape, while the voices of so-called "novatores," challengers of Aristotelian natural philosophy and the medieval university curriculum in general, grew stronger. Religiously and scientifically, the world was undergoing substantial transformations. The authors of the manifestos observed and encouraged these changes, and spread the hopeful prediction of "a general reformation of divine and human things," to which coinciding with the purported discovery of his vault, the Rosicrucian secrets would be revealed.

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Religiously, the brethren defined themselves in opposition to the Turks and the Roman Church, condemning "the blasphemies against our Jesus of both East and West (that is, Mohammed and the pope)," and claiming that they acknowledge only Christ. The manifestos unmistakably originated from the Protestant world, but argued that still further religious changes were necessary.

Scientifically, the academic institutions and their educational programmes were to be reformed and replaced. University scholars ("Gelehrte") were accused of being guided by "pride and ambition" in their studies, which led them to misinterpret the world, spread lies, and sow destruction. The brethren's critique included not only Aristotelian (natural) philosophy, but also academic medicine. Their commitment to medicine as their main task, and one that should be practiced without reward, was contrary to the traditional procedure of ordinary Galenic physicians. Most alchemical practice, too, was considered "an offence to the glory of God." Alchemy was not meant for the making of gold, the brethren insisted, but should instead be used for the production of medicine and the acquisition of knowledge.

The Rosicrucian notion of reform was inherently general: All arts were to be reformed, religion was to be sanctified, philosophy to be changed, and medicine and alchemy to be purified. This transformation was to be initiated by the Rosicrucian brotherhood, and the reader of the Fama was encouraged to reflect upon the arts himself and was hoped to be "sincere and heartfelt towards us," so as to potentially contribute to their reformation. But this reformation implied changes within the divine realm as well, since God was involving himself in new ways in earthly matters.

While the Fama and Confessio were overtly optimistic manifestos, designed to inspire hope, they were also highly enigmatic, and without any attempt to provide a clear explanation of the brethren's philosophy or a detailed description of the changes announced. But their general reformation entailed more than an interpretation of the contemporary situation and a call for action. The language of the reform that was about to take place was infused with what might loosely be called millenarian expectations of a new age. The brethren believed themselves to be living in the last days prior to a new era, which was to precede the Last Judgement and the End Times. These days

witnessed the first signs of a hopeful future which would soon be made manifest. The brethren believed that they "may soon rejoice in a happy time." The imminent changes were not only an effectuation of Rosicrucian designs, but were also part of God's plan. The central theme in the Rosicrucian manifestos, the general reformation, is intimately related to the expectation that the end of the present age was at hand and that a new, perfected time would soon be upon us.

While these philosophical and apocalyptic aspects are clearly visible in the Fama and Confessio, the third text, the Chemical Wedding, is very different. The Chemical Wedding is presented as an autobiographical story from the perspective of Christian Rosencreutz. There are neither references in this text to the manifestos, nor do the manifestos refer to the Chemical Wedding, and the central element is no longer a general reformation but a description of a journey culminating in an allegorical alchemical wedding of the King and Queen. The story is divided into seven sections, each covering one day, over which the story plays out.

At the beginning of the story, the protagonist, Christian Rosencreutz, receives from an angel an invitation to the wedding of the King and Queen. He accepts, albeit hesitantly, and he sets out on his arduous journey the following morning.56 After a long and difficult walk on the second day and having overcome several hurdles, Rosencreutz arrives at the castle, his destination, only just in time. There, (the souls of) the guests will be weighed the next they would eagerly contribute. Soon, so went their message, the world would be thoroughly transformed for the better.

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**THE DAYS WHICH FOLLOW ARE TAKEN UP WITH FESTIVITIES, DINNERS, TOURS IN THE CASTLE, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, PREPARATIONS FOR THE WEDDING, DURING WHICH THE SELECT FEW FURTHER DEMONSTRATE THEIR WORTH. THEY ENGAGE IN WORK OF AN ALCHEMICAL NATURE. WHEN SIX ROYAL PERSONS ("KÖNIGLICHE PERSONEN") PRESENT AT THE CASTLE ARE EXECUTED ON THE FOURTH DAY, AS PART OF THE WEDDING PREPARATIONS, THEIR HEADS ARE USED FOR AN ALCHEMICAL PREPARATION FROM WHICH ULTIMATELY THE KING AND QUEEN ARISE, BROUGHT TO LIFE THROUGH FIRE FROM HEAVEN.**

**ON THE FIFTH DAY, ROSENCREUTZ SECRETLY OBSERVES THE SLEEPING VENUS, WHO WAS ALSO IN THE CASTLE BUT WHOM HE LEONHARD THURNEYSSER, QUINTA ESSENTIA (1574), FOL. XXXVII**

was forbidden to visit. Rosencreutz's spying on Venus is revealed on the final day, and the book ends with his punishment for having seen her: he is condemned to guard the first portal to the castle until someone else commits the same offence and will have to take his place as guard. The text concludes with the statement that two folios—purportedly dealing with Rosencreutz's return home—are missing, thereby rendering the story incomplete.

Overtly allegorical in character, the Chemical Wedding is even more abstruse than the Fama and Confessio. It does not discuss the brethren's philosophical claims and apocalyptic predictions, and rather than a general reformation it describes an alchemical process that can perhaps be best interpreted as an individual transformation. Unlike the Fama and Confessio, it is not a manifesto in the sense of a mission statement, and hence it does not discuss the mission of the brotherhood to reform the world. For this reason, this book will make only passing references to the Chemical Wedding, while the focus will be on the two manifestos.

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Like their contemporaries, the authors of the manifestos and their followers appealed for what they called a general reformation, which was highly heterogeneous and not restricted to, or informed by, any one confession. According to Reformation historians, "confessionalization" was a widespread process between 1550 and 1650, linking religion and confession to society and politics through social discipline. The formation of confessions, the transformation of the state, and the use of social discipline are seen as interrelated processes, while early modern religion and confession structured, influenced, and transformed social and political life through indoctrination, education, and rituals. This, in turn, created social groups defined and divided according to their confession. This book aims to show how the Rosicrucian manifestos attempted to circumvent this contemporary process of "confessionalization," and in fact opposed confessional doctrines in their proposal of universal change.

The Rosicrucian reformation and its immediate aftermath should be understood against the background of this enlarged perspective of reformation. In the following chapters, several aspects of the manifestos' call for change—in the form of a reformation, a revolution, or a renovation—will be retraced to medieval and early modern traditions up to the start of the Thirty Years' War. Part One (Chapters One and Two) is devoted to the sources of the manifestos. In order to understand the Rosicrucian call for a general reformation, it is essential to study first the origins of this idea. Medieval and early modern interpretations of, and prophecies about, the course of history will be analysed and compared in order to clarify the theme of a general reformation in the Rosicrucian texts. In the first chapter, the manifestos will be compared with related medieval Catholic and early modern traditions and studied from the perspective of the (radical) Reformation.96 Chapter Two is devoted to Paracelsian themes. Although the Paracelsian inspiration of several of the manifestos' tenets has been investigated previously, here the Paracelsian impetus will be investigated specifically from the perspective of the notion of a general reformation and related apocalyptic expectations. The aim is to provide a fresh understanding of the Paracelsian influence on the manifestos. Likewise, not only genuine works of Paracelsus need to be reviewed but also early Paracelsian and pseudo-Paracelsian texts, which were published shortly before the manifestos were drafted and which are generally neglected in studies on Rosicrucianism.

Only after the origins of the contents of the manifestos have been sufficiently dealt with, is it appropriate to discuss the origins of the texts themselves and to return to the question of

authorship. In Part Two (Chapter Three), we will first briefly review the question of authorship of the manifestos and, secondly, analyse the findings of Part One, and the key element of a general reformation in particular, in relation to the views expressed by the authors in other manuscript and printed texts. To what extent can the importance of the general reformation be observed in their other writings and what does this suggest about the manifestos' authorship and purpose?

Part Three (Chapters Four and Five) will in turn concentrate on the response to the manifestos. The aim of this part is not to trace the course of the Rosicrucian furore, but instead to analyse through several case studies specifically how the notion of a general reformation and related themes developed among the early readers of the manifestos. This approach will shed fresh light on the reasons for specific authors' support or dismissal of the Rosicrucian cause. To what extent was this theme appealing to Rosicrucian followers and controversial to those condemning the manifestos? Chapter Four will specifically concentrate on the early Rosicrucian furore, in order to describe in detail the role of the Rosicrucian call for reform in the early welcoming response. Chapter Five will then study debates between authors vehemently attacking the Rosicrucian movement and authors defending it, in order to examine what was at stake in the views of both proponents and opponents of that movement. These texts will also be compared with formal reactions to Rosicrucianism within universities and courts, in which scholars were sometimes investigated and prosecuted for their Rosicrucian sympathies.

In the Conclusion, the findings of the previous chapters will be reviewed, analysed, and compared, and some thoughts on further research will be provided. <>

## JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EAST AND WEST: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES FROM JAPAN edited by Konoyu Nakamura and Stefano Carta [Routledge, 9780367766894]

It is well known that Jung's investigation of Eastern religions and cultures supplied him with an abundance of cross-cultural comparative material, useful to support his hypotheses of the existence of archetypes, the collective unconscious and other manifestations of psychic reality. However, the specific literature dealing with this aspect has previously been quite scarce. This unique edited collection brings together contributors writing on a range of topics that represent an introduction to the differences between Eastern and Western approaches to Jungian psychology.

Readers will discover that one interesting feature of this book is the realization of how much Western Jungians are implicitly or explicitly inspired by Eastern traditions – including Japanese – and, at the same time, how Jungian psychology – the product of a Western author – has been widely accepted and developed by Japanese scholars and clinicians.

Scholars and students of Jungian studies will find many new ideas, theories and practices gravitating around Jungian psychology, generated by the encounter between East and West. Another feature that will be appealing to many readers is that this book may represent an introduction to Japanese philosophy and clinical techniques related to Jungian psychology.

CONTENTS

This is a collection of papers presented by prominent analysts, analytical psychologists, and scholars from all over the world at the 2019 International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) Regional Conference, titled "Jungian Psychology: East and West, encountering differences", in Osaka, Japan, the first such meeting held by the International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) in Asia. This event was held at Otemon Gakuin University and was supported by the Japan Association of Jungian Psychology (JAJP). I had the honor of hosting the conference as chair.

Kiley Laughlin and I came up with the theme. As is well known, in the early 1920s C. G. Jung's interests drifted toward Eastern religion and culture (Jung 1936, 1939, 1944, 1948, 1953, 1954). This turning point in Jung's career serendipitously coincided with his study of Richard Wilhelm's Secret of the Golden Flower and Heinrich Zimmer's Artistic Form and Yoga in the Sacred Images of India. Jung's investigation of Eastern religion and culture supplied him with an abundance of cross-cultural material to compare with his hypotheses of archetypes, the collective unconscious, and other manifestations of psychic reality. There was something else in the East, however, that seemed to form the nucleus of his personal myth. In fact, this myth seems to have culminated with a figurative journey to the East, where the sun is continuously reborn, a motif that Jung referred to as a night sea journey, symbolizing an effort to adapt to the conditions of psychic life. The wisdom found in the East seems to have provided Jung with a sense of psychic orientation, and a partial road map, to

navigate his own journey of individuation. Based on this, Jung further adapted his theories and practices and applied them to his psychology. His encounter with Eastern culture thus marked an attempt to synthesize a greater whole by showing what we can learn from differences.

Our conference, therefore, focused on what is created when differences are encountered, a difficult task indeed. In Japan alone there are various traditions, religions, social systems, and cultures, developed over a long history that has involved adapting science, religious, and cultural influences from abroad (Reischauer 1970). Jung noted:

> To us [in the West], consciousness is inconceivable without an ego.... If there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious of anything. The ego is therefore indispensable to conscious processes. The eastern mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego. Consciousness is deemed capable of transcending its ego condition; indeed, in its "higher" forms, the ego disappears altogether. (1954, Para 774)

On the other hand, Kawai (1976) opined that Japan is a "maternal society" differing from the Western paternal one in that the Japanese ego is nearer unconsciousness. This theme aptly suited the first IAJS conference held in Japan.

A lot of excellent papers were presented, including four keynote presentations, by Iwao Akita, Stefano Carta, Andrew Samuels, and Megumi Yama, plus 25 speeches by Jungian analysts, psychotherapists, and scholars from places as diverse as America, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Latvia, and Taiwan. It was attended by more than a hundred participants from around the globe. It lasted only two days but led to sparkling discussions and sparked enduring friendships. It thus literally embodied meaningful bonds between East and West in the name of Jungian psychology.

This book includes some of the notable papers presented, divided into four sections:

Part I: East and West, Part II: Images, Part III: Clinical Issues, and Part N: Identity and Individuation. The separate chapters are introduced in detail by Professor Stefano Carta.

Readers will note how widespread and deeply rooted Jungian psychology is in Japan. At the same time, they will note how relevant this Eastern perspective is for scholars and clinicians around the world, especially those involved in psychotherapy and cross-cultural studies. Naturally, this group includes more than three thousand members in IAAP, the four hundred members in IAJS, and the six hundred members in JAJP, as well as trainees and university students in analytical psychology. It should also appeal to psychiatrists, sociologists, and medical anthropologists. We expect this book will be recommended reading in university courses in clinical and analytical psychology, both undergraduate and postgraduate, both in Japan and internationally. It will also surely draw the interest of the 30,000 certificated clinical psychologists in Japan, and I believe it will provide new horizons for the whole Jungian community.

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This book represents a further step in a dialogue between two quite complex subjects: the so-called East and the so-called West. The very fact that the contributions that follow this introduction may be seen as a dialogue is perfectly in line with the essence of Jungian thought. In fact, the Jungian paradigm is dialectic and dialogical all the way down: from the fundamental epistemological principle of the structural relationship between a pair of opposites, from which a third — a symbol — may arise (a symbol eventually incarnated in and yet transcending the "material" reality into a fourth), to the clinical setting seen by Jung as a dialectic process between two subjects.

Now, as in the title of this collection of chapters, the two subjects that will weave such a dialogue are the "East" and the "West." From this very first fact I would like to point out one of the essential challenges of Jungian thought — the relationship between similarities (the archetypal level) and

differences (the individual level). In fact, it may well be that neither of them may actually be found in the world — in the object — but only "in the eyes of the beholder." This becomes immediately apparent when we compare the main attitude of anthropology and of analytical psychology in reference to the symbolic world, as I doubt that any anthropologist would agree to recognize something as "East" and "West" as realistic autonomous, homogeneous, and comparable subjects.

This issue, which deeply regards Jung's thought, may be exemplified by a passage such as the following:

> Even a superficial acquaintance with Eastern thought is sufficient to show that a fundamental difference divides East and West. The East bases itself upon the psyche as the main and unique condition of existence. It seems as if the Eastern recognition were a psychological or temperamental fact rather than a result of philosophical reasoning. It is a typically introverted point of view contrasted with the typically extroverted point of view of the West

In my opinion, this dialectical movement between sameness and otherness through big or little differences is a key issue that we must always take into consideration when we deal with comparative issues such as the ones this collection of writings is dealing with. In fact, this is the fundamental starting point for this whole book — the recognition of fundamental differences between the Eastern and the Western psyche and similarities within them while keeping in mind that also what seems similar will eventually reveal specific "individual" differences that are as precious as the similarities. Seen this way, this is not a just good starting point, but it actually is a necessary one.

If we go back to the Jungian paradigm of the dialectic relationship between opposites, we may describe it in psychodynamic terms as the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The more the Eastern psyche seems "introverted" to the Westerner (or the other way around, extroverted for the Easterner), the more probable it is that the latter is actually coming into contact with his own introversion through his extroverted conscious attitude. In this regard, I find quite telling that the text that perhaps was the most revelatory for Jung, a protestant Swiss, was the Secret of the Golden Flower, a Chinese treatise that Richard Wilhelm brought to his attention in 1928.

In Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1989) Jung wrote:

> I devoured the manuscript at once, for the text gave me undreamed-of confirmation of my ideas about the mandala and the circumambulation of the center. That was the first event which broke through my isolation. I became aware of an affinity; I could establish ties with something and someone. (p. 197)

I think that through the Eastern psyche Jung could come into contact with his personal and his anthropological unconscious. Similarly, the most influential Japanese Jungian analyst and author, Hayao Kawai, could initiate his own dialogue with himself and his unconscious through a dream:

> In the dream, I picked up many Hungarian coins. These coins had the design of an old Taoist sage on them. Given my association to Hungary, the dream seemed to suggest that, to me, Hungary was a bridge to East and West. My analyst said that, to judge from this dream, I eventually might gain insights of great value for the relationship between East and West. When I reflect on the course of my life, I recognize that what my analyst surmised indeed has been realized. (1996, p. 17)

Here, the point is not only whether this interpretation about the "typical" introversion of the East or extroversion of the West actually adheres to reality (which would imply that there should be a definitely reduced minority of extroverted individuals in the East and of introverted ones in the West, therefore making of these anthropological worlds wholly disadaptive cultures and anti-symbolic milieus for those who do not fit the typological majority) but also how much, on a

hermeneutic level, this reference to such "typical" characteristics - this way of looking at reality through similarities - instead of revealing actually conceals the complexities of our object of enquiry.

I think that a well-tempered attitude must keep the tension between the two opposite polarities of sameness and difference, for which something like "the East" or "the West" at the same time exists and does not exist. In fact, when we approach our subject from a unifying attitude, we decide to look at the forest from far away in order not only to search but actually see what

all its parts have in common. Yet, at the same time we must also accept to deconstruct this unity into its multiple differences and into the process of their historical unfolding. Therefore, my recommendation is to read this book with this double perspective in mind, for which what may be recognized as the "same" - in our case belonging to an "East; or to a "West" - may be recognized only through different individual vantage points, whose symbolic and historical specificity must be cherished and protected. After all, this may be one of the ways to describe what Jung called the individuation process itself.

For instance, in the first chapter of this book Megumi Yama writes:

> In this era of rapid globalization, it is sometimes heard that it may be doubtful that the concepts of "the West" and "the East" are as applicable as they were in the past. However, I would like to posit that however borderless our globe seems to be at a superficial level, if we go down deep to the roots, we can see a fundamental difference in the structure of each culture's psyche. This is perhaps because they were established on a basis of their own unique psychological histories and backgrounds that should not be ignored.

This issue regarding sameness, difference and identity is specifically discussed by Kazunori Kono in Chapter 5.

Discussing the Freudian concept of "narcissism of minor differences" in clinical and social situations, Kono revisits the concept of narcissism from the perspective of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology. For him, The concept of narcissism has been misunderstood and abused. Contrary to common belief, narcissism as well as sublimation is at the intersection of the individual and society. Encountering differences through others causes us to react in a variety of ways. Worrying about differences, we may fall into the pursuit of objects beyond our reach. Or, the pursuit of differences itself would lead to the denial and annihilation of others. In this regard, we can point out that the pursuit of difference is tied to fear of uniformity. Therefore, it is also important to be aware of that fear and accept the fact that you are, to some extent, the same as others. And yet, we continue to reconstruct our identity with minor differences.

I find this dream, and what it meant for Kawai, very moving and meaningful, as it represents a special form, very noticeable indeed, of Jung's "transcendent function" at work, for which the opposites — in this case Kawai's own Easterness and Westerness — were recognized and transcended.

From many of Kawai's invaluable contributions, another very important feature of the unfolding of this process is that, through his own West, Kawai found his own East in a deeper and highly personal (individual) form. Perhaps, the most interesting example is his reference to Buddhism as something that he did not wholly understand, something that he could not really be. Yet, through his pages one may appreciate how much of such Buddhism he had discovered and recognized in himself. This is to say that the dialogue between West and East may well bring a Westerner to be more conscious of his own Western nature through his own unconscious East and vice versa.

In the case of Jung, this relationship with the unconscious, seen as the relationship with one's other side of the world, has been described in Chapter 1 of this book by Megumi Yama as a descent into the world of the dead, that Jung commenced in his Gnostic diary Septem Sermones ad Mortuos (in

Jung, 1989). Therefore, if from an Ego point of view we are dealing with an East—West relationship, for the point of view of the Self we are actually transiting between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

From my Westerner perspective, reading the chapters that I am trying to introduce I often felt to be in contact with a deep dialogue between differences which have been contaminating each other. In fact, while through these pages the authors were describing the specificities and peculiarities of the East and the West, I kept recognizing also many striking underpinning similarities. This may well be caused by the very nature of my training, profession, and, perhaps, individual inclination, but it may also be due to the very fabric of analytical psychology itself which, together with other psychodynamic currents of thought, such as those by Fromm, Bion, or Winnicott, are able to come closer to a core common to all humans, belonging to the West as to the East.

One example is the reference to the fact that in the Japanese psyche the boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness is much vaguer than in that of Westerners, and that it may actually lack a center at all. Megumi Yama describes this condition through some wonderful examples and images of gardens and art (Chapter 1), yet, while reading her contribution, I could recognize the "Western" trace of Hilman's position, for whom there is no need to posit any center of the psyche. In this situation we experience a fundamental shift of psychological perspectives — from an ego-centric monotheist one to a polycentric polytheist one. Once again, here Hilman and his archetypal approach develop Jung's idea of the plurality of souls/images that compose the psyche/world and idea that we will find again described in other terms in Chapters 6, 8, and 16.

Another essential difference, often discussed in these contributions between the East and the West, is the status and the position of the Ego. It seems that in the West and the East the Ego, as described and discussed in the pages that follow, is quite different. Yet, such differences may also produce projections and, therefore, faulty forms of dichotomic understanding: if in the East the Ego is different, the Westerner may think that there is no Ego in the East. Nevertheless, from the discussions that will follow, we will learn that this state of affairs is not at all true, as differences do not mean any yes/no, either/or approach.

In Chapter 2 Lynlee Lyckberg discusses this issue. She quotes Mokusen Miyuki, who suggested in Buddhism and Psychology, this is an erroneous assumption and common error in Western thinking. From an Eastern perspective, Buddhism does not require a dissolution of the ego; rather, "the ego is strengthened in meditation, and what gets dissolved is ego-centricity.

Now, when, in her discussion of the symbol of the mirror she writes:

> The underlying sensibility in Japan is simply that of impermanence, where the brief moment of existence framed by a unique and personal identity is conceptually nothing more than a mirage (mirror illusion) without substance, arising from the place of no-thing (emptiness) and returning to no-thing, symbolically represented by both the sacred mirror as a most auspicious symbol in Buddhism and by the Zen Enso circle.

I find a very similar trace of such a description of the Enso circle in Bion's concept of 0, and when Lyckberg writes about the two conditions of nothingness and no-thingness, I, once again, recognize Bion's reference to "nothing" and "nothing" as discussed in his Attention and Interpretation (1970). Also, Winnicott's concept of the true self as a potential, implicit, innate space from which reality (and the Ego) flows into the material, relational and historical world flow, seems to me something like a Western version of an Eastern image. Furthermore, in her comparison between Daoist qualitative numbers to the Western quantitative numbers, Lyckberg herself rightly mentions Jung's and M.L. von Franz's adherence to Eastern thought. To this I may add that throughout Western history, its deep counter current (fundamentally Gnostic and Alchemical) always maintained a

qualitative understanding of numbers. The shift from the qualitative numbers to the purely quantitative ones was a product of a historical process, which culminated with the querelle between Kepler and Fludd in the seventeenth century. If, as we know, Kepler's position won and mathematics was since then thought more mathematice ("mathematically"), today it is hard not to see the qualitative aspect of numbers in quantum physics — for instance, the numbers associated with the spin of an elementary particle.

Once again, it seems that the East and the West are contaminating each other in a wonderfully fruitful way.

"Emptiness in Western and Eastern cultures" is the title of Tsuyoshi Inomata's Chapter 15, in which the author draws a history of nothingness, which, in the West wholly devoid of its symbolic pregnancy eventually turned into nihilism.

Quoting W. Giegerich, the author writes:

> Paradoxically, it is the Western way of the soul that — with its process of consecutive negations finally leading to what has been crudely and summarily condensed in the term "nihilism" — in fact produced an "emptiness consciousness: an "emptiness consciousness" as a real (i.e., inescapable) condition of the subject in real social reality and an objectively prevailing cultural mindset.

The connection of the emptiness of the modern Western psyche with the sacred, creative void of the Eastern one may transform Western nihilism into "a precondition for the creation of a rich animated world in which diversity is tolerated, if attitudes towards it change from pessimistic and rejective to empathic and receptive."

In order for this to occur, a change should also take place within the Eastern - in this case the Japanese - psyche, as its empty center (Kawai, 1996) lacks a subject "with its own will and freedom" This is something that, again quoting Giegerich, Inomata describes as "the Arctic vortex, a force of nature that swallows everything; which may be a concurrent cause of the spreading of autism (and perhaps, I might add, the hikikomori condition, now present also in the West?) within the Japanese psyche.

The image of the Enso is also discussed by Kojiro Miwa in Chapter 11.

Referring to the theories of Jung and of the Zen philosopher Shinichi Hisamatsu, Miwa discusses the encounter between the Western Jung and the Eastern Hismatsu. His contribution deals with the fundamental component of silence and nonverbal communication within psychotherapy, such as the use of the Tree Test, or, in more general terms, the use of nonverbal approaches, such as art therapy or sandplay. Equating the Self with the "Buddha nature; Miwa discusses the transformative, productive density of silence and of apparent void of nonverbal communication.

The clinical meaning of the tree and the use of the Tree Test is also discussed in Chapter 12 by Himeka Matsushita. In both these chapters, the theme of compassion emerges. A theme thoroughly discussed, in comparative terms, also by Shoichi Kato in Chapter 10.

Through two moving clinical cases, Kato highlights the fundamental importance of compassion. Once again referring to the transformative power of silence, Kato writes:

> in the depth of self-consuming emotions, a silent moment would arrive in which we could see the person so far recognized as the source of our misfortune in a new light, as a genuinely Other person. It is in this I — Thou relationship that Compassion would rise from our deep psyche to surround the two remotely separated individuals with silence.

In Buddhist scriptures, compassion (in Mahayana Buddhism: /karupa/) is often coupled with sadness and friendship. Reading Kato's chapter my mind went to Heinz Kohut's contributions on empathy and to the fundamental nature of the analytical relationship in analytical psychology, which is indeed based on a sort of friendship between two human beings - analyst and patient - who try to integrate the emotional meaning of life and its challenging, sad, mournful aspects (Carta, 2013).

Such a deep attitude of mutual understanding, the key to the Jungian psychological method, for which the analyst should "go where is the patient" and for which any real encounter implies a mutual transformation, is echoed in Ryutaro Nishi's Chapter 17 in which he discusses "Makoto Tsumori's philosophy of care and education in relation to Jungian psychology." For Nishi, both Jung and Tsumori "emphasised the need to understand children's inner world, without reducing it to the limited confines of past experiences." In fact, both demonstrated how children's expressions are always meaningful and should never be rejected or refused through a castrating form of education.

These considerations show some important common features of Tsumori's early childhood care and education (ECCE) method - based on play and imagination and a sustained relationship between children and practitioners - and play therapy, although the latter is conducted within the confines of a playroom.

In Chapter 14 Evija Volfa Vestergaard explores "leadership styles in Japan (East Asia) and Latvia (which is on the boundary between East and West) as an important element in creating a sustainable future for humanity."

Analyzing the apparent overlapping of the mythological images of the dragon in Latvian and Chinese cultures, she suggests that in general, both the Japanese and Latvian psyches are characterized by a greater permeability between their conscious and unconscious layers, expressed in a heightened sense of embeddedness with their surroundings, and the multiplicity of perspectives held by their leaders. Using the language of myths, these leaders find ways to dance with the dragons rather than slaying them. They form a relationship with the surrounding natural environment and human-made worlds, rather than striving to separate and cut away one from the other. While, from a Western perspective, this permeability may be viewed as lacking a healthy ego, [she argues] that a sense of interconnectedness is beneficial in a world of expanding global interdependencies.

For Vestergaard, the mythological beneficial kinship with dragons is connected with a life well-balanced with nature in agrarian Latvia and with the Yin/Yang opposites in the East. It describes an Ego development that resembles that of both the Latvian and the Eastern Egos.

Quoting Akita Iwao (2017), Vestergaard describes the Ego's relationship with the unconscious as a "dancing with the shadows: instead of "integrating the shadow in the Ego: Quite a compelling image, indeed.

In Chapter 13, Hirofumi Kuroda also focuses her contribution on the peculiar nature of the relationship between subject and object and its representations in the East versus the West.

She writes:

> In the Western individualistic perspective, the focus is on subject and object, and the one-to-one interaction between subject and object. There is a center point where the image of self/I resides, which is the ego. However, in the Eastern collectivistic perspective, the focus is on the context, the circumference, and the many-to-many interactions in foreground and background.

In Chinese, the central field, in which the relationship between subject and object takes place, is expressed by the expression (heart, soul, and mind), which, in ancient times, was represented by the image" "fangcun," which literally means square inches.

Through a clinical case with a psychotic patient Kuroda describes the progressive reintegration of the psychotic patient's Ego, which took place along the development of recurrent images of the house imago:

> [From this case] we learn that the constellation of the house imago is an attempt for reintegration, which brings the individual back to /fangcun/ the heart and the Self. The creation of circumference provides a sense of being grounded without locating the center point. This is consistent with Jung's statement that "the Eastern mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego." Because of this core difference, I would propose that the process and product of symbol formation (in Jungian's term, the "constellation") should be different between Western psyche and Eastern psyche.

In Chapter 3, David Fisher discusses the "Implications for Japan's maternal culture" of the meeting — indeed a clashing — of West and East. His starting point is Hayao Kawai's description of the Japanese psyche as essentially based on a strong maternal principle and of the discussions that have arisen out of such an interpretation.

He writes:

> If we take Kawai's assertion at face value, how does that square with Japan's very masculine Bushido and martial Imperial past? It seems that we have a very different thing, a radical restructuring of psychic energy that occurred rapidly, violently, and emerged from the extreme tension between two things of opposite polarity: in short, an enantiodromia.

A valuable aspect of Fisher's contribution is its historical perspective, which places the Japanese psyche within the flow of events that ultimately led Japan to the catastrophic defeat of World War II. Japan's "unconditional surrender; unbearably humiliating, caused an archetypal trauma which led to the enantiodromia of the Father principle into the Mother.

The issue of the relationship between the Father and the Mother principles is also discussed by Elly Lin in Chapter 4. In her contribution, the author gives two clinical examples of the very deep divide between a male American patient (from the United States of America) and a female patient living in the United States but of Asian origin.

She writes:

> In my experience, cultural differences, if ignored or interpreted in a narrow, personalistic frame, fall flat and meaningless at best; at worst, they are cause for misunderstandings and mishaps. The archetypal considerations, however, can expand the interpersonal dyad into a much larger and deeper context where differences become portals into a previously unknown psychic realm of richness and aliveness.

This becomes particularly true since

> While, according to Neumann, the image of the Mother remains relatively constant across cultures, the image of the Father tends to vary from culture to culture. (Neumann, 1970)

In the case of the Asian patient, the Father archetype and complex were structured along Confucian principles based on filial piety, family and social hierarchy, and shame. Using Edinger's model of the Ego-Self axis, Elly Lin shows us how such an overly dominant, in this case negative "Confucian Father complex," was hindering the patient's development and individuation process. This was the opposite for the American man, for whom the weakness, if not absence, of the Father image was equally blocking his individuation for the opposite reason.

In the case of this interesting contribution, as a Westerner my mind goes to such a pervasive issue of the historical evaporation of the Father that has taken place in the last 50 years. Yet, I also see that within the West there still exist quite many differences between, for instance, the Protestant and the Catholic ethics. This plural aspect of a shared phenomenon such as the crisis of the Father image (a

crisis which today is slowly finding new avenues and potential symbolic solutions) shows us how important it is to place our psychology within a historical and (trans)cultural perspective.

Such a perspective is wholly assumed by Andrew Samuels, who, in Chapter 9, discusses another extremely complex and quickly evolving issue of the intimate relationship between genders, i.e., between differences.

He writes:

> The very idea of gender also has a hidden bridge-building function: it sits on a threshold half-way between the inner and outer worlds, and thus is already half-way out into the world of politics.

On the one hand, gender is a private, secret, sacred, mysterious story that we tell ourselves and are told by others about who we are. But it is also a set of experiences deeply implicated in and irradiated by the political and socioeconomic realities of the outer world. The notion of gender, therefore, not only marries the inner and outer worlds, but actually calls into dispute the validity of the division.

This perspective, which unites such apparently far realms of human life — gender intimacy and politics — has a truly invaluable epistemic significance, as it makes it possible to produce new metaphors to express the human complexity and therefore deal with fundamental questions such as those which Andrew Samuels discusses in his contribution: "Can men change? Are men powerful? Do men hate women?"

A number of the chapters of this book deal with images, as the affect-laden image is considered in analytical psychology the building block of the psyche.

The historical perspective on images is discussed by my colleague and coeditor Konoyu Nakamura, who, in Chapter 7, draws a short history of what today are known all over the world as manga. Mangas are symbolic manifestation of images that have often taken the form of monsters. Nakamura compares such images with Jung's contact with the "Others:' the inhabitants of his (our) unconscious — the complexes and archetypal images that form our psychological universe. The Shinto Japanese description is that of a universe full of spirits — kami — everywhere.

A very striking fact regarding these Japanese manga monsters is their enormous impact in the contemporary world, both in the East and in the West. Somehow, the Japanese and the Eastern psyche seems to be communicating something not just understandable but actually urgently needed by the Western psyche.

It seems as if, after the war lost by Japan, the psyche of the winners — that of the West and most of all the American psyche —has eventually been conquered by the Japanese manga, some of which actually represent the long and difficult elaboration of the post-traumatic effect of the defeat (for a thorough discussion, see also Allison, 2006).

The mythical-historical roots of such a universe full of soul is also described in Chapter 16 by Mayumi Furukawa, as she discusses the importance of the Ainu culture, which thrived for 10,000 years, for the Japanese psyche.

Furukama writes:

> the Ainu had a worldview that the very essence of all human beings, all animate beings, including animals, and all inanimate beings had an eternal and immortal soul that was part of their very essence. The word "Ainu: means human beings and "Kamuy: deities. The Ainu believed that human beings had their unique afterlife and so as Kamuy, as divine, had the ability to circulate back and forth between their respective present life and afterlife. Kamuy

> for the Ainu, however, is not equal to God or Gods, the higher deity of many faiths. Kamuy is not an overarching "master" of human beings but rather on an equal footing with human beings. Nakagawa (1997), a linguist, stated that Kamuy should be dose to "nature." In other words, sparrows do not have their own divine nature. Every sparrow is Kamuy and every tree is also Kamuy.

Furukama connects this "animistic" worldview with the dream phenomenon that Hayao Kawai (1995) called "interpenetration," in which Kawai noted that the distinction between oneself and others was ambiguous in medieval Japanese tales. In fact, as Furukama writes:

> these tales portrayed a state of mind where realities and dreams, and life and death, could freely communicate with each other. [Kawai] continued, "The remarkable synchronicity of events in dreams, this world, and the land of death was not considered unusual."

As I have already noted, this deep layer of an Eastern culture such as Japan not only is expressed through literature (for instance Murakami) or cinema (Miyazaki) but, along with the Mangas discussed in Chapter 6 by Konoyu Nakamura, seems to act as a powerful compensative symbolic force for the Western psyche, as the immense success of these Japanese forms of art have literally conquered the contemporary Western psyche.

The Shinto view of the world as a wholly animate reality is somehow similar to the Italian Saint Francis, whose story of conversion is discussed in Chapter 8 by Jun Kitayama. It is impossible to underestimate the stature of Francis of Assisi, who anticipated the second millennium after Christ to come (which marked the end of the Age of Aries and the beginning of the Age of Pisces). The dawn of the second millennium AD marked the inversion of the vertical orientation of the Spirit — for which God was far and alien to the material world and nature — therefore spiritualizing what is horizontal — this natural, physical world? As I wrote, it is of course impossible to summarize the complexity of the figure of Saint Francis, yet, within this book it is interesting to notice how much some of fundamental views of the Japanese Shinto religion, for which everything is alive and full of soul, was one of the key factors that, through St. Francis' re-sacralization of nature, radically transformed the Western psyche of the Middle Ages into the modem one. Today, it seems that this aeonic movement has exhausted its path and, while the Age of Pisces enters in the Age of Aquarius, the spirit that had to animate matter in the West seems to have wholly drowned into materialism?

In Chapter 7, Adelina Wei Kwan Wong formulates the hypothesis that Chinese hieroglyphs are a stylized form of archetypal pattern, similar to the archetypal themes of the myths and fairy tales. Following this interesting hypothesis, she carried out two clinical researches using clinical expressive materials, sand pictures and drawings, created by patients who are well versed in Chinese written characters. The therapeutic modes for the patients with early-life traumas often involve non-verbal expression and imagination like body movement, imagery painting, or Sand-play with 3D images on the sand (Manuhin 1992, Bradway 1997, Klaff 2003, Malchiodi 2014). All these are means for the patients to access the instinctual emotions of their "wounded inner child;' to create images embodying the emotions, and to be acknowledged by the consciousness.

In conclusion, I hope that these collections of writings, so rich in contents and comparisons, may interest and stimulate the readers as an incentive for further discussions on such fundamental issues that involve the potential totality of the psyche, embedded, as it is, within the symbolic, cultural world and its historical development. <>

# CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: LECTURES DELIVERED AT ETH ZURICH, VOLUME 2: 1934 by C.G. Jung, edited by Ernst Falzeder [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691228570]

Jung's lectures on consciousness and the unconscious—in English for the first time

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of topics, from dream analysis and yoga to the history of psychology. They are at the center of Jung's intellectual activity in this period and provide the basis of his later work. Here for the first time in English is Jung's introduction to his core psychological theories and methods, delivered in the summer of 1934.

With candor and wit, Jung shares with his audience the path he himself took to understanding the nature of consciousness and the unconscious. He describes their respective characteristics using examples from his clinical experience as well as from literature, his travels, and everyday life. For Jung, consciousness is like a small island in the ocean of the unconscious, while the unconscious is part of the primordial condition of humankind. Jung explains various methods for uncovering the contents of the unconscious, in particular talk therapy and dream analysis.

Complete with explanations of Jungian concepts and terminology, **CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS** painstakingly reconstructs and translates these talks from detailed shorthand notes by attendees, making a critical part of Jung's work available to today's readers.

## Review

"Discovering these lectures, we begin to appreciate that the interplay Jung experiences between what he can and cannot know is how the psyche energizes him. We follow him in respecting our own amateur status, weighing what we will and will not accept in his assertions."—John Beebe, author of Energies and Patterns in Psychological Type: The Reservoir of Consciousness

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Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung lectured at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology (^^^). He was appointed a professor there in 1935. This represented a resumption of his university career after a long hiatus, as he had resigned his post as a lecturer in the medical faculty at the University of Zurich in 1914. In the intervening period, Jung's teaching activity had principally consisted in a series of seminars at the Psychology Club in Zurich, which were restricted to a membership consisting of his own students or followers. The lectures at ^^^ were open, and the audience for the lectures was made up of students at ^^^, the general public, and Jung's followers. The attendance at each lecture was in the hundreds: Josef Lang, in a letter to Hermann Hesse, spoke of six hundred participants at the end of 1933, Jung counted four hundred in October 1935. Kurt Binswanger, who attended the lectures, recalled that people often could not find a seat and that the listeners "were of all ages and of all social classes: students ... ; middle-aged people; also many older people; many ladies who were once in analysis with Jung." Jung himself attributed this success to the novelty of his lectures and expected a gradual decline in numbers: "Because of the huge crowd my lectures have to be held in the auditorium maximum. It is of course their sensational nature that enchants people to come. As soon as people will realize that these lectures are concerned with serious matters, the numbers will become more modest."

Because of this context, the language of the lectures is far more accessible than Jung's published works at this time. Binswanger also noted that "Jung prepared each of those lectures extremely carefully. After the lectures, a part of the audience always remained to ask questions, in a totally natural and relaxed situation. It was also pleasant that Jung never appeared at the last minute, as so many other lecturers did. He, on the contrary, was already present before the lecture, sat on one of the benches in the corridor; and people could go and sit with him. He was communicative and open."5

The lectures usually took place on Fridays between 6 and 7 p.m. The audience consisted of regular students of technical disciplines, who were expected to attend additional courses from a subject of the humanities. But as it was possible to register as a guest auditor, many of those who had come to Zurich to study with Jung or undertake therapy attended the lectures as an introduction to Analytical Psychology. In addition, Jung also held ^^^ seminars with limited numbers of participants, in which he would further elaborate on the topics of the lectures. During the eight years of his lectures—which were only interrupted in 1937, when Jung travelled to India—he covered a wide range of topics. These lectures are at the center of Jung's intellectual activity in the 1930s, and furthermore provide the basis of his work in the 1940s and 1950s. Thus, they form a critical part of Jung's oeuvre, one that has yet to be accorded the attention and study that it deserves. The subjects that Jung addressed in ^^^ lectures are probably even more significant to present-day scholars, psychologists, psychotherapists, and the general public than they were when they were first

delivered. The passing years have seen a mushrooming of interest in Eastern thought, Western hermeticism and mystical traditions, the rise of the psychological types industry and the dream work movement, and the emergence of a discipline of the history of psychology.

## Volume 2: Consciousness and the Unconscious (Summer Semester 1934)

This volume presents twelve lectures from 20 April 1934 to 13 July 1934. Jung commenced with lectures on the problematic status of psychology, and attempted to give an account as to how the various views of psychology in its history, which he had presented in the first semester, had been generated. This led him to account for national differences in ideas and outlook, and to reflect on different characteristics and difficulties of the English, French, and German languages when it came to expressing psychological materials. Reflecting on the significance of linguistic ambiguity led Jung to give an account of the status of the concept of the unconscious, which he illustrated with several cases. Following these general reflections, he presented his conception of the psychological functions and types, illustrated by practical examples of their interaction. He then gave an account of his concept of the collective unconscious. Filling a lacuna in his earlier accounts, he gave a detailed map of the differentiation and stratification of its contents, in particular as regards cultural and "racial" differences. Jung then turned to describing methods for rendering accessible the contents of the unconscious: the association experiment, the psycho-galvanic method, and dream analysis. In his account of these methods, Jung revised his previous work in the light of his present understanding. In particular, he gave a detailed account of how the study of associations in families enabled the psychic structure of families and the functioning of the complexes to be studied. The semester concluded with an overview of the topic of dreams and the study of several dreams.

On the basis of his reconstruction of the history of psychology, Jung then devoted the rest of this and the following semesters to an account of his "complex psychology." As in the other semesters, Jung was confronted with a general audience, a context that gave him a unique opportunity to present a full and generally accessible account of his work, as he could not presuppose prior knowledge of psychology. Thus we find here the most detailed, and perhaps most accessible, introduction to his own theory. This is by no means just an introduction to previous work, however, but a fullscale reworking of his early work in terms of his current understanding, and it presents models of the personality that cannot be found anywhere else in his work. Thus, this volume is Jung's most up-to-date account of his theory of complexes, association experiments, understanding of dreams, the structure of the personality, and the nature of psychology...

"[T]he fundamental psychological truths can never be couched in delineated terms," because "the sharper a psychological term, the less it designates." Therefore we would have "to learn the art of coming up with terms that are quite general and indeterminate, and yet are still able to convey something." We always have to bear in mind that we are dealing with the totality of a person. It is no use "to isolate a psychic process" for the purpose of study, because then we will have "killed the psychic life in that process."

"There is nothing simple in the psyche." The psyche that reacts to something simple is never simple itself. Each of us perceives differently, so how do we construct a fact or evidence? And how do we faithfully convey the facts we experience? For example, "what do I mean when I assert: `I'm feeling fine'"? An external observer might register something we are unaware of. "The difficulties arising in this connection were among the reasons," according to Jung, "that led to the recognition of the unconscious as an interfering factor." This gave Jung the opening to enter into a discussion of the concepts of consciousness and the unconscious, and their respective characteristics, which he illustrated with various examples, whether from everyday life, from his clinical experience, from his travels, from the literature, or, quite frequently, from what he still called "primitives."

He described the conscious and unconscious states alternately, stressing their difference but also their interdependence and interrelationship. Consciousness, for instance, "needs an effort, demands energy and work, and thus tires us." It is also "very limited" and "very narrow[,] and excludes a good many ideas." The unconscious, on the other hand, "is present at all times" and "the primordial condition of mankind." "The unconscious is always dreaming." It is also always "active at work, and I am completely dependent on this work." "[C]onsciousness swims on the unconscious world like a round disc, or is like a small island in the ocean. Consciousness can never be identical with the soul, it is only a part, perhaps a very small part, of the soul. The soul is the whole." "Consciousness is to all intents and purposes an organ, an eye or an ear of the soul." The unconscious, on the other hand, "has a fabulous memory. There are things we never knew, so to speak, but that existed nonetheless" and had a discernible effect on us.

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Perhaps also as a reaction to this feedback [about not addressing his own theories to the public], in the second semester Jung did talk much more about his own method and theory. He did this by sharing with his audience the path he himself had taken; nota bene, not by recounting his experiences of recording and assessing what he had encountered in his own inner world, but by dealing with experiments and concepts that had earned him scientific renown, beginning with his association experiments, and how he himself discovered "the" unconscious, eventually leading up to various methods of getting to know its contents, in particular, dream analysis.

What Jung did not do, for the time being, was to enter into a discussion of the theoretical and methodological differences between his own views and those of Freud (or Adler). Indeed, he did not even mention the name of Freud at all in this particular semester, which in itself seems to be a conspicuous omission, since without doubt Freud played a crucial role in the very development he was describing. With hindsight, however, we can see this as a strategy to prepare his audience for a detailed discussion of and comparison with those differences later on, which he did indeed undertake in the following terms. Now that we can see what he was leading up to, we can also appreciate how much an underlying, but still implicit, rivalry with Freud was behind this. As this will become much clearer in the third volume of this series (forthcoming), a commentary on their different approaches and Jung's way of presenting them will be reserved until we consider Jung's specific lectures on this issue. However, here I already want to point out the underlying rationale of Jung's strategy, in which—besides other motives—the long shadow that Freud still cast seems indeed to have played a major role.

Jung began his first lecture by saying, "In my experience, it was in general the basic terms which caused difficulty. I have therefore decided to discuss simpler matters this semester, namely basic terms and methods, with the help of which I hope to explain to you how the notions with which I work came into being."

The first question he addressed is a seemingly simple one: What is psychology? This leads to further questions: What is the present state of psychology? What is its subject? How subjective is it, and how objective can it be? Jung was a dedicated psychologist, and what he mentioned in the seventh lecture could be taken as a motto for his whole enterprise: "[^]he human being is the noblest task of science, towering above all its other tasks. It is the highest and most interesting task, in my unauthoritative opinion." This is reminiscent of Nietzsche, who had demanded "that psychology again be recognized as queen of the sciences, and that the rest of the sciences exist to serve and prepare for it" (1886 [2002], p. 24). It seemed to be more than a rhetorical question when Jung had asked, in 1930, will "Nietzsche be proved right in the end with his `scientia ancilla psychologise' [science is the handmaid of psychology]?" (Jung, 1930a, Introduction).

"Psychology is ... first of all about what is valid in general," he stated, notwithstanding one's own "psychology," but it is also subjective; it is about what occurs to us directly. Its subject is "what is called the soul," das was man Seele nennt. And not only is "everything we experience psychic" but "everything was once psychic, there is nothing that had not been psychic before, such as the fantasy of an artist or an engineer. Take a railway bridge, or a work of art—or indeed this lectern. Everything that we learn and experience is at first psychic. The only thing that is immediately given and perceptible is something psychic, that is, a psychic image. This is the first and only basis of experience. `I sense [emp finde]' is the first truth." Thus, psychology is both a general phenomenon and something subjective, an almost personal matter. Jung stressed, however, that it was not an arbitrary matter but rather "a phenomenology, a symptomatology."

This led him to the question of how the various views of psychology in its history, which he had presented in the first semester, had been generated, and later to account for national differences in ideas and outlook, in particular to reflect on the question of language, social and religious convictions, institutions, and geographical differences (soil, climate) in general, and on the different characteristics and difficulties of the English, French, and German languages when it came to expressing psychological materials in particular. "Psychology is ... dealing with a great number of facts," he noted. "But it is extremely difficult to accept these facts as they really are." Once we do accept these facts, there arises the next difficulty, that is, the representation of the material, which is a great difficulty indeed: "[^]t is almost impossible to faithfully convey the facts of the matter."

"[^]he fundamental psychological truths can never be couched in delineated terms," because "the sharper a psychological term, the less it designates." Therefore we would have "to learn the art of coming up with terms that are quite general and indeterminate, and yet are still able to convey something." We always have to bear in mind that we are dealing with the totality of a person. It is no use "to isolate a psychic process" for the purpose of study, because then we will have "killed the psychic life in that process."

"There is nothing simple in the psyche." The psyche that reacts to something simple is never simple itself. Each of us perceives differently, so how do we construct a fact or evidence? And how do we faithfully convey the facts we experience? For example, "what do I mean when I assert: `I'm feeling fine'"? An external observer might register something we are unaware of. "The difficulties arising in this connection were among the reasons," according to Jung, "that led to the recognition of the unconscious as an interfering factor." This gave Jung the opening to enter into a discussion of the concepts of consciousness and the unconscious, and their respective characteristics, which he illustrated with various examples, whether from everyday life, from his clinical experience, from his travels, from the literature, or, quite frequently, from what he still called "primitives."

He described the conscious and unconscious states alternately, stressing their difference but also their interdependence and interrelationship. Consciousness, for instance, "needs an effort, demands energy and work, and thus tires us." It is also "very limited" and "very narrow[,] and excludes a good many ideas." The unconscious, on the other hand, "is present at all times" and "the primordial condition of mankind." "The unconscious is always dreaming." It is also always "active at work, and I am completely dependent on this work." "[C]onsciousness swims on the unconscious world like a round disc, or is like a small island in the ocean. Consciousness can never be identical with the soul, it is only a part, perhaps a very small part, of the soul. The soul is the whole." "Consciousness is to all intents and purposes an organ, an eye or an ear of the soul." The unconscious, on the other hand, "has a fabulous memory. There are things we never knew, so to speak, but that existed nonetheless" and had a discernible effect on us.

Having introduced this basic differentiation between consciousness and the unconscious, he then proceeded to discuss consciousness as a "perceptual" or "orientation organ," and "those functions of

consciousness that serve our orientation toward the inside," or the "inner sphere." Leaving aside his distinction between introverted and extraverted types for the time being, he introduced the well-known four functions that, according to Jung, guide this orientation—sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition—and, as always in these lectures, illustrated them and how they are "curiously interrelated" with the help of many examples. We also hear more about his distinctions between rational and irrational functions, and developed (superior) and underdeveloped (inferior) functions. Sensation tells us what a thing is, thinking what it means, feeling how we valuate it, and intuition gives us "the invisible aura that surrounds the thing," something best rendered as Ahnung (presentiment, premonition, inkling, hunch, foreboding). " In effect, the latter is an excellent term while `intuition' allows for many different meanings." It is a "function of perception by unconscious means." The intuitive "does not look at things, but sees," and simultaneously has "a truly remarkable capacity for non-observation." Foreshadowing his concept of synchronicity, Jung spoke about the "law of the series" and the "laws of coincidence." "Since intuitions are never completely conscious, intuition is a strange borderline function ... that is never really tangible, and we know as much of it as we do of the fourth dimension. Therefore, my definition of intuition is somewhat makeshift, and in fact a declaration of scientific bankruptcy." In fact, we find here probably the most detailed and simultaneously most accessible discussion of the intuitive function in Jung's work.

At the center of the functions there is the "I," and all functions relate to it. The I usually has a main thought and a large number of secondary thoughts that it keeps to itself, "for otherwise there would be no individuality." "These secondary thoughts make the I the keeper of the great seal of all secrets."

Although functions are subject to the will and can be directed, they can occur involuntarily in consciousness or can also proceed unconsciously. This unconscious course of our functions "is ... a very comforting fact. For it allows us to expect with some certainty that what we do not think, perceive, and intuit with our consciousness, will be done for us by the unconscious."

Jung stressed that these "functions were not discovered by myself, I only stumbled on this treasure trove, for the functions are an ancient fact." "In Lamaism, this theory of functions is developed to a significant extent. There, it is called 'mandala.'"

All of this is a reformulation of views he had already expounded elsewhere, most famously in Psychological Types (1921), but here in layman's terms and in an easily accessible form, and as such already a valuable addition to the Jungian oeuvre, or even, with only slight exaggeration, a Jung for Beginners by the man himself. In addition, however, we also find bits and pieces, snippets and asides, which may open up new perspectives. For instance, he introduced still another "function" that is particularly characteristic of consciousness and "a distinct cultural phenomenon": "the function of the volitional faculty [Funktion des Willensvermõgensj, in short, the will. If it were on a par with the other functions, we might call it a fifth function, but it is better to see it as a superordinate, central function of the I. It reflects the fact that a certain amount of energy is freely available in consciousness, like a mobile division or reserve unit. This psychically available energy stands at the disposal of consciousness."

Jung then turned to a more detailed discussion of the so-called unconscious, personal and collective. "Unconscious" simply means "that which we do not know." "It is not even possible to prove that these things exist when they are in the unconscious, for the essential character of the latter is that it is unknown." The unconscious is thus "a negative boundary term, one which indicates: it is dark there. We have no knowledge of what actually happens there. We postulate, however, that the things of which we are not conscious at this moment somehow nevertheless exist." As to his distinction between personal and collective unconscious, he stated that there is "nothing mythical about it, for it is really a very practical idea."

"The unconscious evidently comprises psychic processes that have either already become lost to consciousness and become forgotten, or ones that do not yet exist and have not yet been born." "What emerges from the personal unconscious is 'my business'; what emerges from the collective unconscious are matters related to humanity in general and therefore not my business in this sense." "[^]heir personal aspect is only a metaphor." Filling a lacuna in his earlier accounts, he gave a detailed map of the differentiation and stratification of its contents, in particular as regards cultural and so-called racial differences.

There follows an exposition of methods for rendering accessible the contents of the unconscious. From early on, Jung had looked for additional methods to do so, apart from the "only rule that psychoanalysis lays down in this respect is: let the patient talk about anything that comes into his head," because, apart from conscious resistances, the patient's "not talking to the point [danebenreden] does not prove that the patient is consciously concealing certain painful contents; it can also occur quite unconsciously." In these cases, "the analyst has to resort to other measures. One of these is the association experiment.... A second expedient is the analysis of dreams; this is the real instrument of psychoanalysis" (1913, §§ 531-533). And this is exactly what Jung did in these lectures, giving a detailed exposition of these measures.

Thus, he first turned to the association experiment and the psychogalvanic method, with many examples, including their use for Tatbestandsdiagnostik or diagnosis of evidence in forensics, or how a detailed account of the study of associations in families enables the psychic structure of families, the spiritus familiaris, to be revealed. All of this is further evidence, by the way, of how important these researches remained to him, and how useful he continued to find them for didactic purposes.

"The main finding" of these experiments was "the insight into the existence of complexes." "Complexes have to be taken seriously, they have dynamic energy, they live in our psyche, and they seem to be bad things, yet it is these very complexes which lead us to our fate." Or: "Complexes are so to speak our family ghosts." And: "For the complex has the unpleasant characteristic that one forever does what tempts one, thereby inducing a kind of vicious circle." It is possible, however, that "complexes can be made to disappear by taking certain provisions ... through atonement or a confession, either by the patient resuming a reasonable life style, or through reintegration into the community." "There is still another way of ridding oneself of a complex, namely by getting into some kind of continuity that commits the same sin."

Gradually, however, Jung came to realize that a quasi-objective measure of complexes, with the stopwatch in hand, as it were, is not possible. The subject's response depends on what they think this is about and on who is asking. A sobering and embarrassing experience for Jung must have been his expert opinion in the trial of one Hans Näf in November 1934, §§ accused of murdering his wife, in which Jung concluded, on the basis of the Tatbestandsdiagnostik arrived at through the association experiment he had conducted with him, that "the subject's psychological situation, as revealed by the experiment, in no way corresponds to what one would empirically expect in an innocent person" (Jung, 1937 [1934], § 1388). Näf was found guilty and sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. Jung even used this case, in an interview with the Daily Mail in 1935, as evidence for the soundness of his method. A retrial in 1938 revealed, however, that Näf was in fact innocent of the charges and resulted in his acquittal. The fact that the experiment was not an objective measure surely contributed to Jung's turning away from it—although he continued, as here, to use it for didactic purposes—and instead to concentrate on psychological analysis.

The semester—and the book—concludes with an overview of the topic of dreams and the study of several of them. It "occurred to me early on that dreams are simply complexes." Both represent "an invasion of the unconscious." Dreams "are actually like association experiments turned inside out. In these experiments, we have stimulus words that strike the complex and elicit it to emerge, whereas

dreams themselves produce the test words.... If you emphasize these words and certain motifs that often recur in dreams, it is really revealing when you ask: 'What comes to your mind about this?"

This is reminiscent of Freud's method of free association, but with one crucial difference. Whereas the Freudian analysand is asked to associate on and on, to "go off on a tangent," string-wise, as it were, from A to B, from B to C, from C to D, and so on, in the expectation that the associations will ultimately lead to the hidden meaning of the dream, a postulated X, which had been distorted and rendered unintelligible by the mechanisms of censorship and dream-work, Jung started out by using "controlled association." The dreamer is asked to approach the motifs and images of a dream in a circumambulatory manner, so to speak, and not to lose sight of them, because they are not distortions or "compromise formations" of opposed forces within the psyche. According to Jung, dreams are "spontaneous products of the unconscious soul. They are pure nature, and therefore convey an unadulterated, natural truth." They represent a "communication or message of the unconscious, of the all-one soul of humankind" (Jung, 1933b, §§ 317-318; my trans.). "But nature is not, in herself, a guide," as he noted elsewhere, "for she is not there for man's sake. Ships are not guided by the phenomenon of magnetism. We have to make the compass a guide." Thus, products of the unconscious, such as dreams, have to be used "with the necessary conscious correction that has to be applied to every natural phenomenon in order to make it serve our purpose" (1918, § 34).

The "compass" he gave to his listeners sounds simple enough: "A dream should always be written down at once, otherwise we inevitably lie to ourselves. It is best to note it down on a sheet of paper that one divides into three columns: The first column is for the text; the second is for the context, that is, comments on the keyword and associations we have to it, as if this were a complex word. In the third column we can note the interpretation. This is the way to work on a dream humbly, by oneself, when there is no accomplished analyst at hand to do it for one."

The deciphering of dreams, and reading and accepting the message from the unconscious, however, is not just a party game. The lectures break off with the analysis of one particular dream, the interpretation of which "did not enlighten the dreamer. He learned nothing from it and refused to accept my explanation of this dream. So, unfortunately, he went on following his ambitions and a disastrous situation followed." Obviously, there was more to be said on the topic, and so Jung started the following, third semester (forthcoming) by saying: "Those of you who attended last summer's lectures will remember that they dealt with methods for revealing the inside of the human psyche. We spoke of the word association method, combined with breathing, of the psycho-galvanic method, and finally of dream analysis. This semester we will proceed along the same path and study the psychology of dreams. The investigation of the inner psyche is a practical possibility for doctors; it is the investigation of the unknown motive. Just to know that a thing exists is not enough, one must know what it is and all about it. The human psyche is the most important object of all."

It is to this quest that Jung devoted his lifelong work—the sum total of which up to that point he was now ready to convey to a general audience of "educated people" in these lectures at a prestigious university. Welcome to what could be called his own Introductory Lectures to Analytical Psychology. <>

# PSYCHOLOGY OF YOGA AND MEDITATION: LECTURES DELIVERED AT ETH ZURICH, VOLUME 6: 1938–1940

## by C. G. Jung, edited by Martin Liebscher, translations by John Peck and Heather McCartney [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691206585]

Jung's lectures on the psychology of Eastern spirituality—now available for the first time

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of topics, from dream analysis to the psychology of alchemy. Here for the first time are Jung's illuminating lectures on the psychology of yoga and meditation, delivered between 1938 and 1940.

In these lectures, Jung discusses the psychological technique of active imagination, seeking to find parallels with the meditative practices of different yogic and Buddhist traditions. He draws on three texts to introduce his audience to Eastern meditation: Patañjali's *Yoga Sûtra*, the *Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra* from Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, and the *Shrî-chakra-sambhâra Tantra*, a scripture related to tantric yoga. The lectures offer a unique opportunity to encounter Jung as he shares his ideas with the general public, providing a rare window on the application of his comparative method while also shedding light on his personal history and psychological development.

Featuring an incisive introduction by Martin Liebscher as well as explanations of Jungian concepts and psychological terminology, **PSYCHOLOGY OF YOGA AND MEDITATION** provides invaluable insights into the evolution of Jung's thought and a vital key to understanding his later work.

CONTENTS

Carl Gustav Jung's university lectures, conducted in the winter semester of 1938/1939 (28 October-3 March) and the first half of the summer ester 1939 (28 April-9 June), and announced as "Introduction to the Psychology of the Unconscious," were dedicated to the topic of Eastern spirituality. Starting out with the psychological technique of active imagine, he sought to find parallels in Eastern meditative practices. His was on meditation as taught by different yogic traditions and in Buddhist practice. The final four lectures of the summer semester 1939 (16-7July) dealt with those meditative practices in Christianity that saw as equivalent to the aforementioned examples from the East. Jung was particularly interested in The Spiritual Exercises of Ignagious of Loyola, which formed the main topic of the following winter semester 1939/1940. Those four lectures will be published together with lectures of 1939/1940 as volume 7 of this series. After a break over summer of 1940, Jung restarted his lectures with a summary of the previous semesters. As Jung briefly returned to the topic of Eastern meditation as part of a summation, the first and second lectures of the winter semester 1940/f/1941 are published at the end of this volume.

Jung's engagement with Eastern spirituality and yoga can, at least, be iced back to the time of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido's (1912), which included a psychological reading of the Upanishads and Rigveda. His acquaintance with John Woodroffe's (aka Arthur alon) The Serpent Power—Jung owned a copy of the first edition of 1919—which was basically a commentary on the Sat Cakra Nirupana," gave Jung his initial knowledge of Kundalini Yoga. This interest in Kundalini and Tantric Yoga culminated in the seminar series by the Tubingen Sanskrit scholar Jakob Wilhelm Hauer in the Psychological Club Zurich in 1932. Hauer's lectures were accompanied by a psychological commentary from Jung. At the same time Olga Frobe-Kapteyn was organising the first Eranos conference which took place in her house near Ascona in the summer of 1933. The idea of dedicating this annual conference to the topic of the relationship between Eastern and Western philosophy and religion came from Jung himself. Consequently the first conference was on 'Yoga and Meditation' in the East and West. At Ascona in the 1930s Jung had the opportunity to discuss Indian thought and spirituality with scholars, colleagues, and friends such as the Indologist Heinrich Zimmer, the French Orientalists Paul Masson-Oursel, and the scholars of Buddhism Caroline Rhys Davids and Jean Przyluski — to on but a few. And, finally, Jung experienced India at first hand he was invited by the British government to take part in the celebrations of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Indian e Congress Association at the University of Calcutta. He left Zurich at the beginning of December 1937 together with Harold Fowler ormick and travelled through India for three months. Afterwards wrote two articles entitled "The Dreamlike World of India" and t India

Can Teach Us" (1939)—the latter being a clear reference to Muller's 1883 article by the same title. Another text of Jung's, pubin Calcutta in 1936, was specifically dedicated to the topic of Yoga and the West."

In his lectures of 1938/1939, Jung chose three texts for introducing audience to the practice of Eastern meditation: Patanali's Yoga Sutra, Amitayur-Dhyana-Sutra from the Chinese Pure Land Buddhist tradition, and the Shri-chakra-sambhara Tantra, a scripture related to Tantric Yoga…

Lecture 1: 28 OCTOBER 1938

In earlier semesters, I spoke a lot about dreams and attempted to outline how dreams are structured and how we can get at their meaning. Now, in this semester I will follow up by describing the phenomenon of "active imagination."

You will recall the dream of the concert where, at the end, a glowing bauble emerged out of the Christmas tree. In particular, I said this:

> This bauble is not an ordinary object, but rather it is a symbol that reaches far back into the intellectual history of humanity. It is an example of how contents from the collective unconscious impose themselves upon consciousness until they become conscious. If we were to proceed anthropomorphically, it could be said that it is as if these contents of the collective unconscious have a certain volition of their own to become manifest. However, this is only a hypothesis, and I ask you not to take this literally. In any case, such contents appear first in dreams. These are phenomena that take place at the edge of consciousness, contents that emerge into consciousness. I was impressed by this fact very early on. You see this phenomenon extremely frequently in patients, as well as in the mentally ill. I asked myself if it might not be possible to make an impact upon that background where the unconscious originates so that it would give up its contents more clearly, or if it were possible to make these traces of the unconscious clearer so that one could discern them and understand them better?

I found that if one directs attention to these traces and concentrates upon them, a curious phenomenon of movement gets going, just as when one stares at a dark spot for a long time which then begins to become animated. We are then suddenly able to discern the forms of one's own internal background. "Gazing into the glass or bowl of water" opens onto the background to one's own soul, to the extent that one ultimately perceives the images— though of course not in the water. This is a technique used by the ancient Egyptian priests, for example, who stared into a bowl of water. There is nothing present in the water, but the intense gazing arouses the soul into seeing something. It has a hypnotic and fascinating effect. For this purpose, the ancient magicians used a glass button or jewel, or Egyptian priests a beautiful blue crystal, in order to impart unconscious perceptions to their clientele. It was not understood in this way back then but was employed for the purposes of prophecy, divination, and healing. The ancients were well aware that to heal the soul, or even the body, a certain assistance from psychic experiences was necessary.

We find similar ideas in the ancient Asclepius cult. That is why medical clinics in antiquity had incubation chambers in which the ancients would have a dream that proffered the correct diagnosis, or often even indicated the right cure for healing. Similar practices are still used today by Indians and medicine men of primitive tribes. If someone is troubled by an evil dream, the medicine man has them go through this process in order to bring them back into harmony with their psychic backdrop. For it is well known that someone who no longer has this connection has lost their soul. The loss of soul is typical for primitives. It is absolutely imperative that the soul be recaptured. This can be achieved by restoring the connection with the unconscious by capturing the psychic substratum. With children, for example, images sometimes even start to come alive: the locomotive begins to

move or the people in the picture book begin to do something. It is thought these are only children's experiences, but some primitives have much more experience with the background than we who live orientated to the external world. We must get to know this. We live through our eyes. However, that is not characteristic for all peoples, but simply a peculiarity of the West.

If one concentrates on such a fragment, it is necessary to clearly retain the initial perception of it in the soul. This is where the Westerner has a tendency to inhibit the arousal of fantasy. He can shut off something from the environment, i.e., he so holds to one and the same standpoint that noting disturbs him. This differentiation is characteristic for Westerners, but not for people from the East. It is almost impossible to acquire precise information from them. They have no meditation on a specific area. If I bend down over a specific blade of grass and ask what it means, the Eastern person will give me the entire meadow. For them that's a demanding task that wears them out. This has also struck me about spiritually significant people from India or China. They cannot concentrate exclusively on one tiny detail.

But active imagination does not imply such singular concentration, which kills off anything happening. It must be possible that while the image stays firmly in mind unconscious fantasy can also join in. If this can be done, then something gets going. If one observes with the most relaxed attention possible, then one can perceive that some other material enters in that enlivens the situation. If one practices this, one can allow an entire system to unfold from any point of departure. In doing so, one always thinks that one does it oneself, one is inventing it, but in reality these are spontaneous thoughts. With such images one may not say that one created them oneself. If a roof tile falls on your head, you have not made it happen, nor have you done it yourself. These are "freely arising perceptions" as Herbart has already said. If one gives up tense expectancy and only gazes at the emerging possibility, then one perceives what the unconscious is creating from its perspective. In this way, an image is stimulated. When this occurs, a glimpse into the unconscious can be gained. People often dream in a very fragmentary way, or the dream breaks off in one place— then I ask the dreamer to imagine it further. I sort of ask for the continuation. In principle, this is nothing other than the usual technique of creating the dream's context. I elicit the entire texture in which the dream is embedded. As it appears to the dreamer. There are some simple ideas: we believe water is the same for everyone, but that's not the case. If I ask twelve people what they associate with water, one is amazed at what they say. So, if, instead of asking for the entire fabric of the dream, I were to ask how they would dream it onwards, then I would get as a reply material that would correlate exactly with the meaning of the dream. One can also sabotage such a quest. Someone already brought me a dream right out of the dictionary which I was supposed to be convinced by. Unfortunately for them I noticed this.

Active imagination is a making conscious of fantasy perceptions that are manifesting at the threshold of consciousness. We must imagine that our perceptions possess a certain energy through which they can become conscious at all. It is a great achievement to be conscious. For this reason, we are exhausted after a relatively long period of consciousness. Then we must sleep and recover. If primitives are asked quite simple questions, after a while they too become exhausted and want to sleep. If you leave them to their own devices, they think of nothing, sit around, don't sleep, but they also do not think. Something is happening that is not in the head, that is quite unconscious. Some are insulted if you ask what they are thinking. "Only crazy people hear something up there in the head," not them. You see from what night our consciousness in fact comes awake.

There are four different states of psychic content:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | 0—0—0—0 | Conscious perceptions. |
| Threshold perception | 0—0—0—0 | Contents on the threshold of consciousness, below which darkness reigns (background perceptions). |
| Personal unconscious | 0—0—0—0 | Unknown or forgotten contents which however belong to the personal domain. |
| Collective unconscious | 0—0—0—0 | Thoughts which have already been thought in other epochs. The most interesting are these most profound contents which are not individually acquired but can be thought of as instinctive fundamental patterns, and thus as a type of category. |

Each of these layers, even the uppermost, is influenced and modified if content from the collective unconscious arises. If the process of becoming conscious takes a natural course, not convulsively, then the whole of life proceeds according to the basic pattern of the collective unconscious, naturally shadowed individually, although the individual motifs are repeated in everyone. Hence, we find the motifs of the collective unconscious in the folklore of all peoples and in all times, in my theology, in the religions, etc.

Any concentration of attention in this technique is very difficult. This is something that can be achieved only through practice. The great majority of people lose themselves immediately in chains of associations, or they inhibit them and then absolutely nothing happens. Occidental man is not educated to use this technique, but rather to observe all external sense perceptions and one's own thoughts, although not to play host to the perception of the background processes. The East is way ahead of us in this respect. This is a meditation, i.e., an impregnation of the background, which becomes animated, fructified by our attention. By this means, objects of still- developing circumstances emerge clearly. The Latin word contemplatio comes from templum— a zone for living encounter is defined, a specific field of vision in which observation takes place. The augurs used to delineate a field, a templum for observing the flight of a bird. A protected domain from which one can observe the inner contents and can fertilize them with attention. And the word meditatio actually means to consider or ponder.

In antiquity, as far as I am aware, there were no detailed descriptions or instructions for this technique. It actually contradicted the classical spirit. By contrast, in the Middle Ages certain ideas were already emerging. The old alchemists—by which you must by no means imagine just any old crazy gold makers but rather natural philosophers— defined the term meditation as a dialogue with another who is invisible. This other may be God or oneself in another manifestation, or the good spirit, the guardian spirit of the person with whom they can be led into dialogue in meditation. St. Victor106 had such a conversation with his own soul. The Middle Ages thus already had the inner counterpart in contrast to the external counterpart; and that inner counterpart possesses a meaning in its own right, so that one can, in a sense, have a conversation with this other. So, in one word: this internal other replies. This procedure is called imagination. I not only surrender myself to fantasy but I also concentrate my attention on what is to be contemplated and observe what happens in the process.

In the Middle Ages the philosophers used this term to describe the possible transformation of the elements. They can be transformed through meditation. By concentrating on the chemical matter, the image that is within us is imprinted upon matter. This image within us is the soul, and it is round. Roundness is perfection, therefore gold has a round form because it is a perfect body. One can imprint a model upon the image of one's own soul, and then it must be transformed into gold. One thinks that gold is meant. In truth, however, one is taught that it is not normal gold but the gold of the soul. It is difficult to understand these lines of thought, because things were not understood in our sense of the term, instead they took place in matter, thus in matter that one handles. It is as if the unconscious were located in chemical matter, in minerals.

But we must not forget that the chemical constitution of bodies was a great puzzle in the Middle Ages, a great dark puzzle. There was no knowledge about these things, hence their internal world was understandably projected onto them. The same is true for us. If we do not understand someone, we impute every sort of quality to him all the same, and assume a great deal about him, when in fact it is precisely what is within us. We can say nothing about him except what we see though our own lens, and we humans do this utterly without shame. We try to get in close with concepts, but we mystify our own mystery into matter. The same happened to the Middle Ages. Gradually people became a bit more conscious, but not enough. Then came the scientific age and interrupted this entire development. Not so in the East. There it was possible for these ideas and efforts, which had been preent from time immemorial, to develop analogously: they had not been interrupted by exclusive concentration on external things. Very early on, we find in Indian texts the concept of the tapas, i.e., heat, glow.107 It is used as an expression to represent the fructifying influence of attention, hence is translated as "creative heat." In the Rigveda it says: tapas is seen among the things that carry the earth.108 The earth is carried through truth, size, strength, through rita, i.e., the law of right action, tapas, brahman, and sacrifice. This idea is almost immutable in its form.

A hymn from the Rigveda says:

> What was hidden in the shell,
>
> Was born through the power of fiery torments.
>
> From this first arose love,
>
> As the Germ of knowledge,
>
> The wise found the roots of existence in non- existence,
>
> By investigating the heart's impulse.

Goethe said the same:

> You follow a false trail;
>
> Do not think that we are not serious;
>
> Is not the kernel of nature

In the hearts of men?

These verses from the Rigveda propose that the existence of the world is in fact a psychic function. They would have us understand that these human qualities constantly generate heat, and that this glow begets the world. The world to our way of thinking is not begotten in this way, but to the Indian that's what the world is: namely, consciousness. That is why he can also say: the figures

created internally are the world, an illusion— and in that sense the concept of mâyâ invites a similar understanding. Another passage where the concept of the tapas plays a role occurs in the myth of the creator of the world, Prajâpati. In the beginning, he was alone. Apart from him there was nothing:

Prajâpati had the desire of creating beings and multiplying himself. He underwent (consequently) austerities. Having finished them, he created these worlds, viz., earth, air and heaven. He heated them (with the lustre of his mind, pursuing a course of austerities); three lights were produced: Agni from the earth, Vayu from the air, and Aditya from heaven. He heated them again, in consequence of which the three Vedas were produced.

This means "he heated himself with his own heat," in commutatio. "He brooded, he hatched." He incubates himself. This is the word used for the technical concentration exercises out of which yoga developed.

The similarity between this technique, which we use in a psychological way, and Eastern Yoga should not be overlooked. The Western technique is a pitiful thing in comparison to what the East has to say about it. In any case, there exists a certain principal difference, not only because the East surpasses itself with a rich literature and an exceptional differentiation of methods. Yoga as it is practiced now and has been practiced for many hundreds of years is a system. The Western technique is not a system, but a simple process. In the East, it is a technical system. As a rule, the object of revaluation or meditation is prescribed there, which it is not in active imagination, where it arises quite naturally from a dream, from intimations that manifest in consciousness in a natural way. In the East, the guru, i.e., the leader, gives the tschela, i.e., the student, a particular instruction about the object he is to meditate upon. Guru and student are not outlandish peculiarities. Every moderately educated person in the East has his guru who instructs him in this technique. It has been this way since ancient times, a form of education practiced by one whose qualifications as a leader are not endorsed by any university.

This is the teaching of yoga in broad outline. The classic text offering an overview of yoga teaching is a work from the second century BCE: the Yoga Sûtra by the grammarian Patañjali. It is an exceptionally deep book containing a plenitude of profound ideas, incredibly difficult to translate because it presents the secrets of yoga in an exceptionally concise language: four texts for a total of 195 tenets.

The goal of the practice is the promotion of samâdhi, i.e., rapture, ecstasy, contemplation, also suppression. Hauer also translates it as enfolding in contrast to an unfolding.116 One could also translate this as introversion. After that, the practice of yoga intends a diminution of the kleshas. By this term one understands instinctive elements in the unconscious that actually should be repressed or at least diminished. The goal of yoga is to conquer these unconscious impulses, hence yoga, i.e., yoke; the yoking of uncontrollable powers of the human soul and in a different manner from how we do it. We simply suppress or repress certain emotions. The difference is this: when they repress, they know that they are doing it. If we repress, the content disappears but then neurotic symptoms develop out of this repression. One turns his attention away from something unpleasurable. This is an hysterical mechanism that takes place not only in the life of the individual but everywhere, even in politics. The Yoga Sûtra says: egoism, ignorance, attachment, aversion, and fear of death weaken you. Ignorance (ávidyâ) is the ground for all other vices or kleshas. <>

# COINCIDENCES: SYNCHRONICITY, VERISIMILITUDE, AND STORYTELLING by Michael Jackson [University of California Press, 9780520379954]

Most people have a story to tell about a remarkable coincidence that in some instances changed the course of their lives. These uncanny occurrences have been variously interpreted as evidence of divine influence, fate, or the collective unconscious. Less common are explanations that explore the social situations and personal preoccupations of the individuals who place the most weight on coincidences. Drawing on a variety of coincidence stories, renowned anthropologist Michael Jackson builds a case for seeing them as allegories of separation and loss—revealing the hope of repairing sundered lives, reconnecting estranged friends, reuniting distant kin, closing the gap between people and their gods, and achieving a sense of emotional and social connectedness with others in a fragmented world.

## Review

**COINCIDENCES**, Michael Jackson has produced an impassioned and wonderfully written essay that weaves strands of narrative and philosophical reflection into a powerful and seamless tapestry that underscores a central theme of human being…its irrepressible ambiguity. —Paul Stoller, author of *Yaya's Story: The Quest for Well-Being in the World*

Excerpt: Our lives are, for the most part, made up of unremarkable events. Inevitably, however, the course of every life is punctuated by events that disturb and astonish in equal measure, and when we recount our lives as stories we often single out such events as turning points or moments of truth. This book is about such events. Its particular focus is on coincidences, the "remarkable concurrences of events or circumstances that have no discernible causal connection," and the notions of luck, fate, and providence to which these events give rise. Whether coincidences are construed as fortunate or unfortunate, tragic or transformative, they always evoke wonder and, as the saying goes, "make us think."

As I am writing, my faculty assistant, Andrea Davies, appears in the doorway of my office, and we fall into conversation. At one point, Andrea mentions that she wrote her MFA thesis on James Baldwin's nonfiction and his use of coincidence.' When I mention that I happen to be writing a book about coincidence and ask Andrea which of Baldwin's works I might refer to, she suggests I read the opening lines of Notes of a Native Son.

On the 29th of July, in 1943, my father died. On the same day, a few hours later, his last child was born. Over a month before this, while all our energies were concentrated in waiting for these events, there had been, in Detroit, one of the bloodiest race riots of the century. A few hours after my father's funeral, while he lay in state in the undertaker's chapel, a race riot broke out in Harlem. In the morning of the 3rd of August, we drove my father to the graveyard through a wilderness of smashed plate glass.

As we drove him to the graveyard, the spoils of injustice, anarchy, discontent, and hatred were all around us. It seemed to me that God himself had devised, to mark my father's end, the most sustained and brutally dissonant of codas. And it seemed to me, too, that the violence which rose all about us as my father left the world had been devised as a corrective for the pride of his eldest son.

This coincidence of a personal tragedy and a social calamity prompted Baldwin, "the eldest son," to ponder the connection between his father's generation and his own as well as the connection between the race riots in America and the biblical apocalypse.

Coincidences typically occasion quite different interpretations, and my ethnographic research in Aboriginal Australia and West Africa has taught me that while Western intellectuals tend to refer coincidences to that landscape of shadow that has been termed, directly or indirectly, "the unconscious," preliterate peoples tend to invoke unknown forces like witchcraft and sorcery, lying at the periphery of their social fields. As Michel Foucault observes, the unthought may be construed as deep within "like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history" or as something exterior to us, in the penumbra as it were, an "Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality." Although Foucault draws a distinction between the unconscious and the unknown, the former being "an abysmal region in man's nature" and the latter "an obscure space" inhabited by unknown others, he

refuses to accord greater weight to either perspective. It could be argued, however, that the dominant episteme since the late nineteenth century has centered on the intrapsychic, not the intersubjective. For Sigmund Freud, as for Claude Levi-Strauss, delving into the depths of the unconscious mind was the royal road to understanding human thought and action, while Carl Jung interpreted synchronicity as the irruption of archetypal figures and mythological motifs into our conscious life.4 Although these thinkers evince an intellectual habit that Henri Ellenberger characterizes as "unmasking," it is practically impossible to sustain any hard and fast distinction between a mode of thought that focuses on the unconscious mind and a mode of thought that focuses on the dilemmas and difficulties of social relations. As Baldwin's compelling account of the coincidence of his father's death and the 1943 Detroit race riots indicates, theological, sociological, and psychological interpretations may all be inspired by the same event. Aboriginal people speak of the Dreaming as an ancestral yet timeless field of being that is occasionally and partially glimpsed by the living in their dreams. For many African people, the mysteries of the invisible can be penetrated by diviners gifted with second sight or assisted by spirit allies. In religions throughout the world, the invisible is a numinous realm to which one rarely gains direct access, though it can be reached by means of prayer, ordeal, and ritual. For scientists, the invisible consists in hidden laws of cause and effect that rational inquiry and sophisticated instruments can bring to light. For many anthropologists, the field of intersubjective life is the subject of their concern: the social matrices in which we are embedded and the dynamic forces that govern our interactions—love and hate, reciprocity and exchange, attachment and separation, certainty and uncertainty, power and powerlessness, war and peace.

What is common to all these interpretive traditions is the mysterious relationship between the visible and invisible dimensions of human existence, the "landscape of shadow" that lies between the known and the unknown and is at once exterior and interior to us. Whether one approaches the phenomenon of coincidence from an intrapsychic or intersubjective point of view, the same assumption is made—that the "obscure space" between the known and the unknown, or between thought and the unthought, can be illuminated, and that the world without and the world within can thereby be seen as one. Methodologically, one therefore needs a bifocal perspective that, in the words of D. W. Winnicott, does justice to the "intermediate area of experiencing to which inner reality and external life both contribute." This dialectical approach is also suggested by Carl Jung's comment that synchronicity involves a "peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with subjective (psychic) states of the observer or observers."8 But Jung's fascination with the collective unconscious leads him to downplay the dynamics of intersubjectivity—the passions that unite and divide us, coming together and moving apart in the course of our journeys through life. Historical and even prehistorical events shape our consciousness, to be sure, but we reshape those events in the multiple ways we respond to them after the fact, and any interpretation of a coincidence is inadequate unless it considers the lived experiences and immediate circumstances of those to whom the coincidence happens.'" Although I do not uncritically embrace either Jung's metaphysical interpretations of coincidence" or the Freudian view that our tendency to see meaning in coincidences is an expression of an infantile fantasy of omnipotence (a defense against our anxiety of not being in control of our world), psychoanalysis remains one of the most compelling approaches to understanding "clusters of unexplained facts," not by glib reiterations of the view that facts speak for themselves but by acknowledging that our evolutionary, genealogical, historical, mythological, and biographical pasts bequeath to us a constellation of elements that emerge in different permutations and combinations at different moments in life, and that our perception of reality reflects these ever-changing assemblages that are never the same for everyone, or for any one person in any given situation. This is why one cannot entirely explain a person in terms of any one variable, be it class, culture, gender, ethnic or religious affiliation, or even personality. This is also why it is imperative to deploy a double perspective that encompasses both the object of experience and the experiencing subject, allowing that human beings are shaped by external forces

and conspire in their own fates, seeing the world through the lens of their own preoccupations and interests and creating gods in their own image. One is led, therefore, to broach the philosophical problem of verisimilitude: of speaking truth-to-life, of questioning every truth claim not in order to finally arrive at the truth for once and for all but in order to more deeply appreciate the complexity of what is at play for any person, in any moment of time, or in any one place.

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In **MINIMA MORALIA**, Theodor Adorno speaks of "the impossibility of a coincidence between the idea and what fulfills it?" There is always a surplus or excess of being over knowing. This is as true of the idea of coincidence as it is true of our concepts of personality, nationality, and ethnicity. It is not simply the lack of fit between a concept and the lived experience it supposedly covers that concerned Adorno, but the danger of becoming so infatuated by an idea that we forget the singular individuals whose lives call every abstraction into question. Avoiding the subordination of people to ideas or the sacrifice of human lives to the false gods of ideology might be less urgent if it were simply a matter of striking a balance in academic writing between the general understandings we seek and the individuals, including ourselves, whose particular experience is at once the means and end of that understanding. But ideology enforces and reinforces social and racial divisions between those who deem themselves worthy of life and those they turn their backs on as unworthy of care.

Consider the notions of duty, law, and faith. Although these notions are often espoused as ultimate values, they can readily absolve us from the burden of thought since the thinking has already been done for us by God, or the ancestors, or an authority figure in whom we place our trust.

Hence, Adolf Eichmann's repeated assertion at his trial in Jerusalem, that he upheld the law and was a conscientious servant of the state. "He did his duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law."

I do not want to claim that dutifulness, obedience, or fidelity to a transcendent ideal is intrinsically incompatible with being a loving parent, a loyal friend, an ethical human being, or a good citizen. But swearing allegiance to a charismatic leader or a high ideal can, under certain circumstances, make one complicit in unspeakable deeds.

In Nuremberg in 1945, several high-ranking and well-educated members of the Nazi Einsatzgruppen (the mobile killing units on the eastern front) were tried for war crimes and sentenced to death. One of these men, Dr. Otto Ohlendorf, was found guilty of murdering ninety thousand Jews. In his defense, Ohlendorf argued that Hitler had good information that the Russians were planning to attack Germany. Since Hitler was better informed than he was, Ohlendorf was in no position to question this intelligence, and it was perfectly lawful for Germany to act in anticipatory self-defense. The chief prosecutor at this trial was a twenty-seven-year-old Jewish American lawyer, Benjamin Ferencz. Ferencz found Ohlendorf to be honest and rational, and in an interview some seventy years after the war he pointed out that the Pentagon would make the same argument today if it believed the United States was in danger of attack by a foreign power. By implication, history continues to repeat itself, and the ominous mantra that extraordinary situations call for extraordinary measures will be inevitably invoked to justify torture, mass incarceration of political enemies, the suppression of free speech, and the persecution of ethnic minorities.

In the same pessimistic vein, Ferencz observes that Ohlendorf was not incapable of humanity to his cats and dogs, his family, and the men under his command. The SS general did not believe in killing Jewish infants by bashing their heads against a tree. Instead, he told his men that an anguished mother should be allowed to hold her crying child against her breast. Then a single bullet would suffice to kill them both. This would spare his men from unnecessary distress and save bullets. It

would also, presumably, lessen the possibility that the executioners should see their victims as human beings like themselves.

Perhaps because he did not want to be guilty of the same indifference as those whose crimes he was judging, Ferencz visited Ohlendorf in his cell shortly after his sentence had been handed down. The prosecutor hoped to better understand the mind of a mass murderer. Perhaps, too, he was worried that a desire for vengeance was affecting his professional commitment to due process. In any event, Ferencz soon experienced the same double bind that Hannah Arendt would experience sixteen years later after covering the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. To devote time and energy to understanding a person whose actions are unequivocally "evil" might be seen as compromising the judgment by finding mitigating circumstances or simply showing the "human side" of an alleged monster. Ferencz quickly discovered that Ohlendorf felt no remorse. "You'll see that I was right," he told the prosecutor. "The Russians will take over the Jews. The Jews in America will suffer." He then reiterated the arguments he had made to the court. Ferencz saw that nothing could be gained by continuing the conversation, and he ended it.

Reason without emotion is dangerous enough. But when entrenched ideas preclude the possibility of seeing other human beings as though they were oneself in other circumstances, reason becomes split not only from feeling but also from intersubjective reality.

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For the idealist, whether religious or political, the idea to which he is attached is always transcendent. As such it cannot be questioned by a mere mortal, and its summons cannot be ignored. One has no choice in the matter. The idea carries its own necessity, whether this be the law of history, the law of nature, or the law of God. The idealist vows that he would give his life to the realization of the ideal. Ironically, he does not realize that he gave up his life the very minute he embraced the ideal as supreme or sublime.

When thinking becomes totally self-absorbed or fixated on an abstract idea, it becomes potentially as dangerous to self as to others. Although Hannah Arendt subscribes to Plato's idea that thinking is essentially talking to oneself (*eme emautõ*), this intrapsychic two-in-one is inseparable from the action of talking to others, in which interior monologue becomes a dialogue between people. This interplay between what goes on in the privacy of one's own mind and what transpires in the course of conversations and exchanges with others is suggested by her phrase, "the coincidence of thinking and thanking.

The question of whether and in what ways the life of the mind ever coincides with the life we lead with others has been central to this book. To explain a coincidence in terms of unconscious forces or archetypal forms is to assume that inchoate ideas generate events. By contrast, we might argue that events are more random than we like to think, and though we are continually ascribing meaning to events after they have occurred, life is continually outstripping our efforts to comprehend or control it. For Hannah Arendt, the very idea that we are the authors of our own fate is questionable. Although we recount our histories as we recount our lives—as narratives of good and bad choices—"the real story in which we are engaged as long as we live has no visible or invisible maker because it is not made." Although stories require agents, who make things happen and to whom things happen, in reality we act and speak without ever being arbiters of our destinies or lives, and history is "an endless new chain of happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is utterly incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand."

There appears to be a contradiction here between Arendt's view in Eichmann in Jerusalem that we can be called to account for our actions, and the argument she makes in The Human Condition that all human action reflects a plethora of often competing influences, interests, and persuasions that are

the outcome of previous experience, and that have ramifications that go far beyond what any actor knows, desires, imagines, says or does. The "simple fact," she observes, is that "we don't know what we are doing when we are acting," and we can neither grasp, practically or intellectually, "the manifold influences that bear upon us or the future implications of what we do." This is not to reduce human existence to contingency, for our lives would be unthinkable without at least the ideas of agency and design. What Arendt wants to emphasize is the fact that human action always involves more than a singular subject; it occurs within fields of interaction that she calls the "subjective in-between?' Accordingly, whatever anyone does or says is immediately outstripped by what others do or say in return. Every action calls out a reaction that "strikes out on its own and affects others."

The resolution of this apparent contradiction between being responsible for our actions and being in thrall to circumstances beyond our comprehension and control lies in the recognition that both perspectives are entangled in any event. Thus, when a coincidence occurs, we are often undecided about whether a meaning inheres in the event or we have ascribed meaning to it in retrospect. It is the same with history and biography. Every critical event is inherently ambiguous, and it is often impossible to decide whether we can be blamed for having made a bad choice or forgiven because we were victims of circumstance, our passions, or the baleful influence of someone else. This ambiguity accounts for why Hannah Arendt can hold Eichmann accountable for his crimes while dismissing him as a clown or a sociopath. Finally, however, we are called on neither to explain or exonerate but to find the means of recovering life in the face of loss. Of starting over. This, Arendt writes, is the meaning of forgiveness, which implies neither loving those that hate us, nor absolving them from their crime, nor even understanding them ("they know not what they do"). Rather, it is a form of redemption in which one reclaims one's own life, tearing it free from the oppressor's grasp, and releasing oneself from those thoughts of revenge and those memories of one's loss that might otherwise keep one in thrall to one's persecutor forever.

These strategies, she says, reflect the fact of natality—the power of action to bring the new into being. Thus, when we recount a story about any event that has befallen us, we play down the boundless field of influences and consequences that impinge on us, thereby creating the impression that our lives and histories are, at least to some extent, ours to have and to hold.

So it is with a coincidence. We are always in two minds about whether it holds a key with which we can unlock the secret of our lives or is random and devoid of any significance. As such, a coincidence encapsulates the ambiguity of human existence, for while life would be unbearable without meaning, we have no way of knowing for certain whether the meanings we invest in are true or false, harmful or harmless, and the relationship between ideas and life remains as indeterminate and mysterious as the relationship between two events happening to occur at the time in the same place. <>

## Human Beings or Human Becomings? A Conversation with Confucianism on the Concept of Person edited by Peter D. Hershock & Roger T. Ames [SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture, SUNY, 9781438481838]

Argues that Confucianism and other East Asian philosophical traditions can be resources for understanding and addressing current global challenges such as climate change and hunger.
Great transformations are reshaping human life, social institutions, and the world around us, raising profound questions about our fundamental values. We now have the knowledge and the technical expertise, for instance, to realize a world in which no child needs to go to bed hungry—and yet,

hunger persists. And although the causes of planetary climate disruption are well known, action of the scale and resolution needed to address it remain elusive.

In order to deepen our understanding of these transformations and the ethical responses they demand, considering how they are seen from different civilizational perspectives is imperative. Acknowledging the rise of China both geopolitically and culturally, the essays in this volume enter into critical and yet appreciative conversations with East Asian philosophical traditions—primarily Confucianism, but also Buddhism and Daoism—drawing on their conceptual resources to understand what it means to be human as irreducibly relational. The opening chapters establish a framework for seeing the resolution of global predicaments, such as persistent hunger and climate disruption, as relational challenges that cannot be addressed from within the horizons of any ethics committed to taking the individual as the basic unit of moral analysis. Subsequent chapters turn to Confucian traditions as resources for addressing these challenges, reimagining personhood as a process of responsive, humane becoming and envisioning ethics as a necessarily historical and yet open-ended process of relational refinement and evolving values.

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CONTENTS

Humans, at least since the first uses of fire, have been technological animals. The inventions of the wheel, the compass, the printing press, the internal combustion engine, and the telephone each have dramatically changed humanity's relationship to the world, as well as our relationships with one another. Yet, the transformations of human experience being precipitated by technology today are unprecedented.

We now know that human activity is capable of affecting planetary processes like climate. Humanity is experimenting with cloning, gene editing, and other forms of bio-engineering, mapping the neuro-topography of thought with functional magnetic resonance imaging, and realizing new kinds of human—machine interactions. Most profoundly, perhaps, artificial intelligence and related technical developments like machine learning and big data are blurring boundaries between both the commercial and the political, and the technical and the ethical.

These latest products of human ingenuity have the potential to radically augment human capacities or to entirely supplant them. They are already a catalyst for the emergence of new societal infrastructures and will fundamentally transform work and employment in the coming decades, challenging in the process all extant understandings of decision making and agency. In the face of such transformations—a decentering of the human that will be at least as consequential as that which occurred through the so-called Copernican revolution—serious and sustained reflection is required on what it means to be (or to become) human, and on the ethical and social safety implications of our new technologies.

The changes being driven by contemporary science and technology raise profound questions about fundamental values. We can now realistically contemplate the colonization of the moon and the development of brain—computer interfaces that could bring about truly digital consciousness. We have built computational machines that by themselves can learn how to design racecars and that can process tens of thousands of research papers in a single afternoon to predict new discoveries. We now also have the knowledge and technical expertise to realize a world in which no child needs to go to bed sick or hungry. And yet, hunger persists.

This disparity of human potentials and human realities is not merely factual—it is moral. The conjunction of remarkable technical expertise and continued failure to provide adequate nutrition to all stands as a powerful indication that we have yet to determine with sufficiently broad consensus what would count as a "solution" to world hunger. We have not yet persuaded ourselves that whatever changes we would need to make in our present ways of life to end hunger are worth the anticipated results. In short, the persistence of world hunger is not a technical problem. It is a moral predicament: evidence of unresolved conflicts among our own core values and interests. And hunger is just one of many such predicaments that we now face.

To address predicaments like the persistence of hunger in a world of excess food production or rising inequality in a world of historically unparalleled wealth production will require new kinds, scales, and scopes of ethical resolution. The global nature of these predicaments necessitates realizing new depths of ethical resolution, not only within communities and nations, but among them. Indeed, a guiding premise of this edited volume is that the interdependencies revealed by truly global predicaments compel questioning whether the resolve needed to address them can be realized within the horizons of any ethics committed to taking the individual—person, identity group, class, corporation, or nation—as the basic unit of moral analysis. The predicaments we now face make evident a new and profoundly unfamiliar and complex moral terrain.

Even at the personal level, the process of predicament resolution is always both contextual and reflexive. It involves us not only in changing how we live, but why we do so, and as whom. Global predicament resolution will require engaging in this reflexive process together, across both national and cultural boundaries. At the very least, it will require us to bracket imaginations of ourselves as singular agents acting in our own self-interest, and to deliberate together in full cognizance that either we win together or we lose together. At the heart of these deliberations will be questions about the meaning of personhood. What is it about who we take ourselves to be that allows global hunger to persist? Why are we falling so far short of doing what is needed to secure dignified lives for all? Who do we need to be present as to engage successfully in the boundary-crossing work of truly shared global predicament resolution?

## Responding from an East-Asian Sinitic Perspective

The chapters in this book constitute an initial response to these questions from within Sinitic philosophical traditions. These traditions Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist—afford distinctive resources for conceiving of persons as relationally constituted and for developing a shared moral compass to guide our efforts to resolve global human predicaments in full recognition of our interdependence. In addition to their intrinsic merits as perspectives on the human experience, these traditions of thought and practice have the practical merit of being part of the cultural inheritance of roughly one-sixth of humanity. The sheer size of China's population and the fact that it will, in the coming decades, become home to the world's largest national economy mean, among other things, that Chinese perspectives must be integral to our shared efforts to resolve the global predicaments that humanity will be facing in this and coming generations.

In addition to this practical reason, there are both historical and philosophical rationales for turning to Sinitic traditions of thought. Although the roots of Confucianism and Daoism as elite traditions indigenous to what is now the Peoples Republic of China can be traced back to the Shang dynasty, they began to consolidate as canonical textual traditions during a time of great upheaval—the so-called Warring States period (475-221 BCE). Buddhist traditions began entering China during a comparable period of social, economic, and political transformation as the long-unified imperial China of the Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE) broke apart into shifting arrays of violently competing kingdoms and warlord alliances. There is thus historical precedent for regarding the resolutely relational character of Sinitic articulations of the human experience as, at least in part, the result of their dynamic attunement to the demands of responding practically to social, cultural, economic, and political disruption and transformation.

Moreover, the philosophical resources afforded by these traditions are arguably the result of what amounted to sustained and substantially intercultural deliberations. By the Song dynasty (1127-1279), the mantra had become "the three teachings as one (sanjiaoweiyi). Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism were being compared-by none other than the Song emperor Xiaozong (r. 1162-1189)—to the three legs of a ding ritual vessel symbolizing Chinese cultural and political authority. That is, they

were understood to be distinct but complementary perspectives on the human experience. In fact, Buddhism had entered China from "the West"—Central and South Asia—as a manifestly "foreign" religion. And from the outset, Buddhist traditions both powerfully affected and evolved in sustained conversation with Confucian and Daoist interlocutors.

Thus, while Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist thinkers have all broadly agreed that human nature is irreducibly relational and dynamic and that personhood is irreducibly interpersonal, they have differed markedly in their recommendations of how best to actualize an ethically informed understanding of who we should be present as to realize our full human potential. The continued vitality of China's philosophical traditions owes a great deal to the internal pluralism in each that has been a significant result of their critical engagements with one another and, more recently, with traditions originating outside of Asia, especially in Europe and North America.

## The Chapters

The scholars who have contributed to this collection were invited to respond from within their chosen philosophical tradition to the question, "Who do we need to be—personally, culturally, socially, economically, and politically—to navigate the great transformations of the human experience that are now under way?" They were tasked, more particularly, with reflecting on the social and political implications of "rethinking personhood" in the context of these transformations in ways that might be deemed valuable by others drawing upon very different sets of resources.

Of the ten chapters included here, eight were written by Confucian thinkers whose work has often been expressly comparative, placing the Confucian tradition in conversation with other global philosophies. These contributions are framed by essays that come from outside the Confucian tradition. While Daoism and Buddhism have remained vibrant as both philosophical and religious traditions, the cultural fabric of China is undeniably woven with predominantly Confucian thread. Moreover, Confucian resources today, with the collaboration of both the academy and political forces, are being actively incorporated in Chinese efforts to address the predicament laden transformations of the contemporary world. The Confucian perspectives offered here are thus justifiably granted centrality.

The two framing chapters—Buddhist and Daoist—serve a bordering function akin to that of the vocalists and dancers in a classical Greek khoros whose role was to create an expressive bridge between actors and audience members. That is, rather than being commentaries on the other contributions, these chapters are intended to establish a field of concerns about personhood that the remaining chapters bring into Confucian focus.

The volume opens with Peter Hershock's chapter, "Compassionate Presence in an Era of Global Predicaments: Toward an Ethics of Human Becoming in the Face of Algorithmic Experience," which sets out the predicament-laden nature of the intelligence revolution now taking place due to the confluence of big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. After briefly exploring human experience as being structurally informed and transformed by powerful and emergent value-deploying systems of agentless agency, Hershock offers a Buddhist response to who we need to be present as to engage successfully in truly shared and global predicament resolution.

Building on this vocabulary of human beings and human becoming, Roger Ames engages in chapter 2 in an extended philosophical meditation on culture and human nature. In "Confucian Role Ethics and Personal Identity," Ames ranges freely among classical sources, the contemporary Confucian thought of Tang Junyi, and the American pragmatism of William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead to explore the embodied nature of what he terms "human becomings." What emerges is an understanding of personal presence based on the dynamic unfolding and consolidating of moral

habits in the context of roles that stipulate the meaning of achieved excellence—a vision of relationally constituted persons in concert with others becoming not just human, but truly humane.

In chapter 3, "'Deference': On Sharing and Community in Confucian Ethics," Gan Chunsong begins with a detailed examination of the often-underappreciated Confucian concept of deference or yielding (rang). Following this, he embarks on a brief survey of the vicissitudes of Confucian thought and culture from the mid—nineteenth century through the final decades of the twentieth century, and its subsequent revitalization. He concludes with a visionary speculation on how the concept of deference might be pivotal in the articulation of a new approach to global governance that gradually decenters the nation-state in favor of modes of agency and communit^ based on the priority of shared interests.

The following two chapters, by Jin Li and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, take social scientific approaches to enunciating Confucian personhood. In "Confucian Self-Cultivation: A Developmental Perspective," Li first outlines in broad strokes the core commitments embodied in Confucian self-cultivation as a lifelong endeavor to craft oneself as a person in community with others. She then fleshes out this conceptual scheme by working through case studies of Chinese parenting and the distinctive ways in which it merges socialization and self-cultivation through the practices of exemplar modeling, combining verbal instruction with embodiment, and following emotional engagement with reasoning.

Hwang is also concerned with developmental issues, but at an historical scale rather than at that of the human lifecycle. His chapter, "Human Beings and Human Becomings: The Creative Transformation of Confucianism by Disengaged Reason," maps Confucianism responsive adaptation to the demands of modernity. Beginning with discussions of personhood as explored by Martin Heidegger and Charles Taylor, Hwang lays out the necessity and root conditions of an "indigenous" psychology that mediates between the lifeworlds realized by cultural groups over the long-term history of their development, and microworlds constructed by individual scientists—a Confucian naturalism on the basis of which to reframe the work of social science.

Taking as his historical point of reference the turbulent Republican period China, Tang Wenming uses mourning as springboard for reflecting on the nature of freedom. His chapter, "Understanding the Confucian Idea of Ethical Freedom through Chen Yinke's Works for Mourning Wang Guowei," draws out the implications of seeing suicide as an ethical expression of "spiritual independence and freedom of thought." After setting the historical stage, Tang works through Axel Honneth's tripartite analysis of freedom realized in the objective system of social life, rather than in Kantian self-reflection or as a mere absence of constraints as in Hobbes. While stressing the immense influence of Hegel on modern Chinese philosophy, Tang argues on behalf of the need to qualify ethical freedom as a capacity for actualizing human relations in the context of an ongoing, normative reconstruction of the Confucian "five relations," grounded in the modern concept of personal freedom.

In chapter 7, "Life as Aesthetic Creativity and Appreciation: The Confucian Aim of Learning," Peimin Ni contests the received view that practices of self-cultivation in Confucianism have the aim of moral subjectivity, and that the Daoist ideal is to realize aesthetic subjectivity. Making use of classical textual materials, Ni links Confucian human-heartedness to tranquility, to virtue/virtuosity, but also ultimately to aesthetic enjoyment. That is, he argues that in Confucian self-cultivation through ritualized roles and relationships (li 4), the ultimate point is not moral virtue (de ), but rather an achieved, aesthetic virtuosity—a capacity for transforming daily life into a field of artistic activity.

Stephen Angle is similarly revisionist in his reading of Confucian tradition in his chapter "Confucianism on Human Relations: Progressive or Conservative?" Angle's argument is twofold. First, he takes exception to the view that Confucian conservatism and roles-defined patterns of

relationality can be reduced to maintaining or restoring traditional relations. He then argues more positively that the Confucian ethos of relational conservation is consistent with an evolutionary Confucian tradition that is capable of critically incorporating modern values. This "Progressive Confucianism," as Angle understands it, sustains traditional emphases on developing virtue, but embraces an extension of these emphases to social relations, accepting that these relations and their parameters must change in significant ways. His chapter concludes with a consideration of how contemporary spousal relations. might be given a progressive Confucian reading.

Concern for the evolution of social relations is central to Sor-hoon Tan's chapter, "From Women's Learning (fuxue) to Gender Education: Feminist Challenges to Modern Confucianism." Like Angle, Tan is critical of any nave traditionalism that would seek the revival of Confucianism as it was understood and practiced historically. Her chapter begins with an in-depth survey of how gendered education within Confucian tradition discriminated against women and entrenched their inferior social position, followed by an account of gender relations in China today. She then explores what Confucian education and self-cultivation for women should mean in the contemporary world, emphasizing the importance of diversity and flexibility in roles and relationships as aspects of a critical and responsive Confucian feminism.

The final chapter in the collection, David Wong's "Perspectives on Human Personhood and the Self from the Zhuangzi," offers a constructive critique of Confucian preoccupations with human social relations. Elaborating on the perspectives on human being and becoming in the Daoist text the Zhuangzi, Wong argues for the importance of pluralism with respect to both values and identity. But he also argues for the merit of a Daoist understanding of pluralism, contrasting it with the position forwarded by Joseph Raz, according to which recognizing the worth of the commitments and values of others undermines an engaged expression of one's own commitments and values. He then turns to address the core ethical question of the meaning of "the good life," making use of Daoist insights to advocate learning practices that encompass all the different parts of ourselves as our potential teachers, even those nonconscious parts of ourselves most intimately related to other aspects of the natural world.

## Direction without Destiny

One of the distinctive features of East-Asian Sinitic philosophies is their refusal to valorize destiny. Although imperial dynasties in premodern China were understood to enjoy a "celestial mandate," this mandate was understood to be revocable. The Sinitic disposition, if we can be forgiven the generalization, has for millennia been nonteleological. That is, it has expressed a resistance to the idea that human nature is one thing or another, or that reality is this way only or perhaps that way. In keeping with their intrinsic pluralism, Sinitic philosophies have tended to sort themselves out through what the contemporary interpreters of Japanese thought, Thomas Kasulis and James Heisig, have characterized as carefully articulated practices of argument by relegation, not argument by refutation. This is a deceptively simple difference. The Sinitic disposition is not to attempt discovering the one and only true destiny of humanity—to specify who we should all seek to be. Rather, the attempt has been to recognize the diversity of what is truly human and also to establish which ways of being truly human are to be given primary.

To state this in perhaps more readily appreciated terms, the Sinitic disposition philosophically has not been to determine who has the truth or what the truth is once and for all, but rather to establish a hierarchy of approaches in this particular historical period—for truing how we are humanly present. In our view, this disposition is one well worth fostering. The "Intelligence Revolution" that is now under way will force humanity to consider—with a practical immediacy that is without historical precedent—what to valorize as freedom, as justice, and as truly humane. Among the merits of Sinitic traditions of thought and practice is their readiness to endorse transformation in

the (nondestined) direction of enhancing relational diversity—that is, to provide conceptual and practical support for realizing how our differences from each other might be crafted into progressively evolving differences for one another.

In a single generation, we have witnessed the dramatic ascendency of Asia, and of China in particular, occurring at the apparent expense of Europe and America—a seismic shift that has transformed what was a familiar geopolitical order. Yet, more positively viewed, Asian development generally and China's growth more specifically have also brought into currency sets of cultural resources that have significant potential for reframing our engagements with the global predicaments that have beset us. The geopolitical order does not have to be structured in a way that is biased toward zero-sum, win-loss dynamics.

In seeking resources that will enhance human capabilities for resolving global predicaments like climate change, world hunger, or the algorithmic pairing of greater choice and control, primary among them are values and practices that will support replacing the familiar competitive pattern of single actors pursuing their own self-interest with collaborative patterns of players strengthening relations as a way of coordinating shared futures in which everyone is a winner. In our view, these are values and practices that will elicit appreciation of the possibility that freedom can be an expression of qualitatively deepening commitment and not just the enjoyment of numerically expanding experiential options.

As is now widely appreciated, the Sinitic traditions of Confucianism, Daosim, and Buddhism evince some persistent cultural assumptions and values: the holistic, ecological nature of the human experience; the high esteem accorded integration and inclusiveness; the yinyang interdependence of all things within their environing contexts; an aspiration toward deep diversity as the foundation of mutual contribution and achieved harmony; and the always provisional, emergent nature of natural, social, political, and cosmic orders. Collectively, these traditions celebrate the relational values of deference and interdependence and foster a modality of self-understanding rooted in and nurtured by unique transactional patterns of relations.

The shared argument of the authors included in this volume is not that the Sinitic cultures provide wholesale answers to the pressing problems of our times. That would be an argument aimed at refutation. Instead, the recommendations found in this collection are forwarded in a spirit of accepting accommodation tempered with practical considerations of what must, in any given instance, be granted priority. In an era of intensifying global predicaments, there is considerable urgency in taking full advantage of all of our world's cultural resources. Plurality is an undeniable fact of the contemporary world. Pluralism is among its necessary core values. What is to be avoided at all costs is advocacy of any single perspective, a one truth/ one reality construction of human experience.

Who do we need to be present as to resolve the global predicaments of the twenty-first century? Our hope is that a chorus of offerings will be forwarded from within African, American, Asian, Australasian, European, Pacific Islander, and other indigenous perspectives. This volume is, we hope, but one of many contributing to the articulation of a diversity-enhancing vision of human and planetary flourishing in an era of unprecedented "creative destruction" that is at once technological, economic, social, cultural, political, and spiritual. <>

# STUDYING LACAN'S SEMINAR VI: DREAM, SYMPTOM, AND THE COLLAPSE OF SUBJECTIVITY by Olga Cox Cameron and Carol Owens [Studying Lacan's Seminars, Routledge, 9780367752835]

The second volume in the *Studying Lacan's Seminars* series, this book is the first comprehensive study of Lacan's Seminar VI: *Desire and its Interpretation*. A natural companion to Bruce Fink's recent translation of the seminar into English (2019), this book offers a genuine opportunity to delve deeply into the seminar, and a hospitable introduction to Lacan's teachings of the 1950s.

This important book brings together various aspects of Cox Cameron's teachings and systematic, careful, and critical readings of Seminar VI. Lacan's theorizing and conceptualizing of the object *a*, the fundamental fantasy, and aphanisis, as well as the ambiguous treatment of the phallus in his work at the time, are all introduced, contextualized, and explored in detail. The trajectories of his thinking are traced in terms of future developments and elaborations in the seminars that follow closely on the heels of Seminar VI – Seminars VII (*Ethics of Psychoanalysis*), VIII (*Transference*), IX (*Identification*), and X (*Anxiety*). Consideration is also given to how certain themes and motifs are recapitulated or reworked in his later teachings such as in Seminars XX (*Encore*), and XXIII (*The Sinthome*). Also included in this volume are two further essays by Cox Cameron, a most valuable critique of the concept of the phallus in Lacan's theories of the 1950s, and an overview of Seminar VI originally presented as a keynote address to the APW congress in Toronto 2014.

The book is of great interest to Lacanian scholars and students, as well as psychoanalytic therapists and analysts interested in Lacan's teachings of the 1950s and in how important concepts developed during this period are treated in his later work.

## Review

"What a fantastic guide this book is, I was wishing Olga Cox Cameron could lead me through all of Lacan's seminars. This is a beautifully clear and funny and insightful reading of Seminar VI, showing us that there is no one Lacan, but many, and that self-critical attention to what is of dubious value in his work is the only way to discover what is so amazingly useful. At the same time the book is conceptually dense and enjoyable. I laughed out loud at points, especially the "Here is the News" example, and there is so much in here that I learnt and thought about." **Ian Parker**, *Fellow of the British Psychological Society, Emeritus Professor of Management at the University of Leicester, Co-Director of the Discourse Unit, and Managing Editor of* Annual Review of Critical Psychology

"Cox Cameron has written an elegant and clear study of Lacan's rich and complex *Seminar VI*. She skilfully walks the reader through the key tenets of one of Lacan's most important seminars and at the same time locates his teaching in the movement of his thought. A reflective and informed study that pairs beautifully with the original text." **Russell Grigg**

"In this book on *Lacan's Seminar VI*, Desire and Its Interpretation, Olga Cox Cameron provides extensive, lucid, and inspired commentary on some of Lacan's densest formulations, deftly elucidating such complex notions as being, the phallus, fantasy, and the object. As she contextualizes the work Lacan does here with respect to the Seminars that preceded it and the Seminars that followed it, she nicely outlines where Lacan remains Freudian and where he parts company with Freud—as regards dream interpretation and the interpretation of works of art, for example. The material is brought alive with references to mother-child experiences and myriad literary texts. The reader will thank her for providing us with such an eye-opening guide to a sometimes murky

Seminar!" **Bruce Fink**, *Lacanian psychoanalyst, analytic supervisor, and Professor of Psychology at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania*

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This book is arranged in three parts.

Part I consists of six chapters: these are the written up and expanded lectures Olga Cox Cameron delivered in various formats over the course of her teachings on Seminar VI, most recently to the Dublin Lacan study group.

Part II contains three chapters which consist of the transcripts of three out of the original four lectures Olga gave to the study group between 2016 and 2017; lecture 3 on Hamlet being lost.

Part III (Chapters 10 and 11) reprints two essays previously published by Olga in other publications

Together, all three parts assemble almost 25 years of teaching, essays, and other addresses on the theme of Lacan's Seminar VI: Desire and its Interpretation.

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While presenting as one of the longest, most unwieldy of Lacan's seminars, the seminar on desire is in fact quite tightly organized, falling as it does into four sections: the dream of the dead father, the Ella Sharpe dream. Hamlet, and lastly, summarizing these three sections, Lacan indicates how they might usefully illuminate the everyday symptomatology of the psychoanalytic clinic. So in three different configurations, as he points out himself in lesson three, Lacan presents a father, a son, death, and the relation to desire. While the sections echo each other thematically they also each represent, and in entirely different ways, unheralded points of entry into a more expanded exploration of Lacan's mantra "The unconscious is structured like a language" than the two rhetorical tropes, metaphor and metonymy, already well established in previous seminars.

This dimension is tragedy. Over the next two years and to a lesser extent in Seminar VIII this dimension will be deepened and made explicit to the point that the final section of Seminar VII will bear the title "The Tragic Dimension of Psychoanalytic Experience". In Seminar VI the opening up of this new dimension will be tightly, even impressively, corralled within the coordinates of Freudian doctrine. But by the end of Seminar VII when in the manner of all effective anamorphoses the hidden otherness begins to impose itself more insistently on the viewer, Lacan although still referencing this

foregrounding of tragedy to Freud's appropriation of Oedipus Rex via the Oedipus complex, acknowledges its inadequacy. He in fact then radically modifies the classic Freudian position, suggesting that if tragedy is at the root of our experience this is so "[I]n an even more fundamental way than through the connection to the Oedipus complex" (Lacan, 1992, pp. 243—244).

Rather extraordinarily the harbingers of this new topic had appeared for the first time in lesson thirteen of Seminar V right after a kind of rock hard installation of certainty and confidence supposedly attendant on the successful outcome of the Oedipus complex, where the subject, with the title deeds to the penis stuffed tranquilly in his pocket goes on his merry way into grown-up life (Lacan, 2017, p. 189). Following on the heels of this inspiring pen-picture, the phrase "the pain of being" a pivotal concept in Seminar VI appears for the first time; "this pain of being that, for Freud, seems to be linked to the very existence of living beings" (ibid., p. 229). In point of fact, this is a very Lacanian reading of Freud's rather dry discussion of the interweave of Eros and Thanatos in "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (Freud, 1924c, pp. 159-173). Annihilation is spelt out in this lesson similarly to later in Seminar VI as "reducing his existence as desiring to nothing and reducing him to a state that aims to abolish him as a subject" (Lacan, 2017, p. 221), and the phrase "me phunai" "better not to be", taken from Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus,, attributed correctly in earlier seminars to the chorus now for the first time is (wrongly) cited as the final curse on existence of Oedipus himself, a misquote which will be hugely expanded on in Seminars VI, VII, and VIII. Also in this lesson, the Saint Augustine story which had featured in Lacan's work since the 194os reappears with a new tragic resonance. From the seminar on desire to that on anxiety it will be invoked as the specimen story for the founding catastrophe which marks the birth of the Imaginary. When one reads lesson thirteen of Seminar V from the vantage point of Seminar VI, it sounds like an overture. But as mentioned above, this is typical of the forward momentum of the seminars. Brush-strokes appear very briefly, vanish for extended periods, then reappear fully elaborated. While Lacan in Seminar VII can insist that as analysts, tragedy is at the forefront of our experience, this bias was much less visible in the early years of his seminar. It is true that already in Seminar II he quotes Oedipus, blind and crushed at Colonus: "Am I made man in the hour I cease to be?" (Lacan, 1988, p. 230), highlighting the bleakness of this essential drama of destiny. And already in Seminar II, for Lacan this ultimate suffering is captured in the phrase "me phunai", translated as "better not to be". But by Seminar VIII, Transference, this phrase will have undergone a number of metamorphoses and will now designate the true place of the subject as subject of the unconscious. By Seminar IX tragedy will have abruptly vanished from the seminar, giving way to topology.

That said, in certain respects Seminar VI, Desire and its Interpretation, stands clear of this Mahican structure. Gateway to the great middle seminars, it explicitly signals new directions. Unusually right from the start Lacan announces these departures. They are several, and they are significant. The earlier seminars had consistently relied on Freud's sexed distribution of "being" and "having" as specifying the outcome of the Oedipus complex. From Seminar VI onward, this fulcrum will be increasingly tipped by a new emphasis on "being" heralded by the recognition in lesson two that he may have irked his listeners with too much juggling between being and having (Lacan, 2019, p. 35). A number of other earlier accents are also explicitly re-calibrated. Speaking of a stage in the specular experience he tells his listeners that "[W]e shall use all of this in a context that will give it a very different resonance" (ibid., p. i9). And towards the end of the year he punctures the tranquil possessiveness of the successfully assumed paternal metaphor by pointing out its status as fiction, the fact that this metaphor is just a mask for the metonymy of castration (cf. Cox Cameron, 2019; also Part III of this volume). The entire seminar will also be a rewriting of "the object", now no longer metonymical (without quite ceasing to be so) but which by the end of Seminar VI is no longer an object at all in the strict sense of the word, but an index of impossibility. In lesson twenty-three he signals this re-write of the object which is he says "no longer simply a question of the function of the object as I tried to formulate it two years ago" (Lacan, ibid., p. 412). It is also in this seminar on

desire that we can locate the inception of a new definition of the subject, a progressive re-write which will culminate in the gnomic statement three years later that it is the signifier which represents the subject for another signifier. The "big Other" too is rewritten. Without explicitly referring to his admirably clear definition of this big Other in his third seminar The Psychoses he effectively demolishes the status accorded it in the earlier seminar where the Other "is that before which you make yourself recognized. But you can make yourself recognized by it only because it is recognized first [...] It is through recognizing it that you institute it [...] as an irreducible absolute [..]" (Lacan, 1993, p. 51). By the end of Seminar VI this necessary reciprocity has been bankrupted. On the 8th of April 1959 he clarifies that; "I have absolutely no guarantee that this Other, owing to what he has in his system, can give me back [...] what I gave him-namely his being and his essence as truth" (Lacan, 2019, p. 299).

Well aware that his critics decried Lacanian psychoanalysis as overly intellectualist, Lacan in the opening lessons of this seminar, mocks the poverty of so-called theories of affect and then goes on to situate this seminar right at its coalface.

The Lacanian vocabulary that has been the armature of his teaching, will continue to be used, but freighted now with these new meanings. The stated purpose of the five earlier seminars — a return to Freud — continues to be the banner under which Lacan advances, and one of the most remarkable features of the seminar on desire is a reading of Freud that is seemingly exact and faithful but also angled to reveal an altogether new dimension to psychoanalytic theory.

This, hopefully, is the book I would like to have had in hand myself when I first began to read Lacan's seminars more than 3o years ago. Many of the early seminars — between IV and X say — are hugely wordy, and the initial experience of reading is like standing under an avalanche, a hail of brilliant ideas, stunning one into either admiration or indignant befuddlement. It takes a while to see that these huge unwieldy masses are actually carefully structured, and that working through each lesson with this overall structure in mind permits one to step out from under the avalanche and engage critically with what is being said. Hence the rather plodding approach adopted here. Many of the previous books published on different seminars turn out to be a series of highly engaging riffs by different authors on topics germane to the seminar in question, rather than a step by step commentary. My own approach stems from a youthful attempt to read Finnegan Wake, and the useful footholds provided by writers such as Anthony Burgess and Roland McHugh who by shadowing Joyce's great work, illuminated it, releasing the baffled reader into the enjoyment of "laughters low".

As with all the other seminars Lacan's sixth seminar on desire confronts the reader with levels of complexity that are both exhilarating and daunting. What one must try to hold onto in this vertiginous venture is some exercise of one's own intelligence. There is a fine line to be drawn between close reading and swamping one's brain to the point of mere glazed iteration. In his delightful series of essays entitled The Consolations of Philosophy, Alain de Botton invokes Montaigne in the section on "Consolations for Intellectual Inadequacy" in order to put forward the view that boredom can sometimes be an indication of robustness of mind: "Though it can never be a sufficient judge (and in its more degenerate forms, slips into willful indifference and impatience), taking our levels of boredom into account can temper an otherwise excessive tolerance of balderdash" (2000, p. 158). As de Botton goes on to say, every difficult work presents us with the choice of judging the author inept for not being clearer, or ourselves stupid for not grasping what is being said. The challenge is to remain open to both possibilities.

One more warning before we start. Reading Lacanian theory as a series of successive stages in his thinking, elaborated over the course of z6 seminars, is on the one hand, standard teaching practice, and on the other, a fraught and foolish undertaking. Not that the stages aren't there, but inceptions,

reversals, foreshadowings, and retrospective inclusions blur the outlines of definitive departure. In his tenth seminar L'Angoisse, Lacan describes an insect creeping along a Moebius strip. Starting on the inside, the insect, simply by crawling cussedly on, will pass without perceptible transition to the outer surface and back again, the apparently radical distinction between inside and outside having been effaced by the loop which creates one continuous surface. A novice reader of the seminars will empathize with this insect. So for example, "the cut", a major feature of the topological seminars will appear without warning towards the end of this seminar on desire and without anything like the lengthy elaboration it will later receive in the ninth seminar dentification. <>

## EARLY PSYCHOANALYTIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS edited by H. Newton Malony and Edward P. Shafranske [Series: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies, Brill,

**EARLY PSYCHOANALYTIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS** presents, in one edited volume, many of the foundational writings in the psychoanalytic study of religion. These translated works by Abraham, Fromm, Pfister, and others, complement Freud's seminal contributions and provide a unique window into the origins of psychoanalytic thinking. The volume includes the Freud-Pfister correspondence, with a brief introduction, which reveals the rich back story of friendship, mutual respect, and intellectual debate. These essays are anchored in Freud's early theory-building and prefigure and are linked to later developments in psychoanalytic thought. The issues raised in these essays are of relevance still today – how is religions thinking shaped by unconscious processes reflecting primary relationships and drives?

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## The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion: Past, Present, Future by Edward P Shafranske

> [T] hose ideas — ideas which are religious in the widest sense — are prized as the most precious possession of civilization, as the most precious thing it has to offer its participants. It is far more highly prized than all the devices for winning treasures from the earth or providing men with sustenance or preventing their illnesses, and so forth. People feel that life would not be tolerable if they did not attach to these ideas the value that is claimed for them. And now the question arises: What are these ideas in the light of psychology? Whence do they derive the esteem in which they are held? And to take a further timid step, what is their real worth? (FREUD, 1927/1964, p. 20

We begin with Freud's words, with his acknowledgment of the value culture ascribes to religion and, in the same breath, his challenge to its merits. The questions that Freud posed have relevance not only for the psychology of individual religious experience but, as we will see, form the basis of his critique of culture and influenced early psychoanalytic exploration of religion.

### The Psychoanalytic Impulse

Psychoanalysis aims to understand religious experience from the perspective of the complex dynamics of the mind. Its vantage examines religious beliefs and experiences as products of ever-present psychodynamics. These dynamics operate for the most part outside of conscious awareness and bear the imprint of countless human interactions. Freud's anthropology (and psychoanalysis, in toto) would be incomplete without considering the function of religion in the life of the individual (Vergote, 2002, p. 6) and in the transmission of cultural forms and ethics. Conversely, the study of religion or spirituality would be lacking without a means to examine the unconscious psychological and developmental vicissitudes that contribute to its potency. As an "initiator of discourse"

(Foucault, 1970) on society and culture, Freud employed "psychoanalytic perspectives to diagnose the psychological roots of cultural trends, unearthed archaic patterns in 'civilized' behavior and illuminated the relationship of the individual to society" (cf. Fischer, 1991, p. 108). Throughout this volume we see attempts to interrogate the manifest content found in Biblical and religious texts and to mine unconscious meaning by applying psychodynamic principles obtained in clinical psychoanalysis. These early works of Freud and others established applied psychoanalysis in which a

critical analysis of individual and cultural experience could be undertaken which incorporated an appreciation of unconscious phantasy and psychodynamics.

Although incapable of authoring an objective opinion regarding the truth claims of religion or the veridical status of beliefs (Rizzuto & Shafranske, 2013), Freud's cultural texts initiated an approach to investigate the psychological means by which transcendent realities are apprehended or imaginatively created and to examine how culturally given religious forms influence individual and corporate subjectivities. In addition, the psychoanalytic perspective illuminates the possibility that human tensions, struggles, and compromises may be given expression through the cultural idiom of religion and other cultural texts. Contemporary psychoanalytic scholarship builds on this foundation, offering critique and extending Freud's theory of the genesis of personal religiousness as well as illustrating the pervasive influence of unconscious wishes and fantasies in human affairs. Such investigations necessarily fall into the temptation to reduce religious experience exclusively to the categories, methods, and models employed within the psychoanalytic paradigm. Such reductionism results in an emphasis on the intrapsychic functions religion performs outside of consciousness. Freud (1913b/1964), although confident in his discoveries, appears to have understood the inherent limitations in his approach and so concluded that, "There are no grounds for fearing that psychoanalysis ... will be tempted to trace the origin of anything so complicated as religion to a single source" (p. 100). The essential meaning of the findings derived from psychoanalytic inquiry ultimately rests on the fundamental faith perspective of the interpreter (cf. Wulff, 1997, p. 276) — for the theist such studies illuminate the psychological processes that shape one's relationship to transcendent realities, and for the atheist, religion is unclothed to be a cultural artifact, a delusion. No matter the resolution of this fundamental question, "Without psychoanalysis," as Robert Jay Lifton (200o) noted, "we don't have a psychology worthy of address to [individual] history and society or culture" (p. 222), of which religion holds a central position.

In this chapter Freud's seminal contributions to the psychoanalytic study of religion are discussed with multiple intents — to present a summary of his analysis and critique of religion, to consider his ideas in light of contemporary psychoanalytic scholarship, and to provide context to examine the contributions of his contemporary psychoanalytic colleagues.

## Preliminary Considerations

Psychoanalysis takes as its primary method a clinical approach in which religious material obtained within the treatment setting is analyzed, paying particular attention to the patient's web of associations, which reveal wishes, defenses, and fantasy as well as the influences of internalized objects and cultural forms within the context of transference. Applied scholarship, such as Freud's contributions, involves the use of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutical method in which cultural texts are reinterpreted and meanings are reconstituted. Knowledge and theory, derived primarily from clinical experiences, are applied to cultural phenomena, in an attempt to "unfreeze" the symbolic potential embedded in language and ritual (Obeyesekere, 1990). In both clinical and applied contexts, the problem of meaning is "the central disclosure of psychoanalysis" and involves apprehending the "multivocal relations within a symbolic sphere" (Kovel, 1988, p. 89). In these endeavors, analysts, beginning with Freud, have labored to understand the unconscious constituents of individual and cultural experience in which wish and illusion play dominant roles. For Freud, clinical experiences illuminated the ways in which psychological conflicts, originating in early development, come to be represented and repetitively expressed within the mind as unconscious fantasy and discharged through behavior, as exemplified in the cases of neuroses and in religious beliefs and rituals. This clinical discovery provides the foundation on which Freud constructed a psychoanalytic account of the psychological underpinnings of religion. Although Freud assumed that the origins of religion were found in prehistory and transmitted through phylogeny (Ritvo, 1990), his ideas today are better appreciated through an understanding of ontogeny and through the application of semiotics.

In light of its focus on non-material essences in the formation of conscious and unconscious meaning, psychoanalysis is best situated among the historical hermeneutic sciences rather than considered an empirical-analytic science (Habermas, 1971) as Freud had originally intended. Such an epistemological stance is advantageous for the psychoanalytic study of religion, which involves the analysis of the psychological function and appearance of religious forms within individual and cultural existence (DiCenso, 1999, p.1). Its purview does not permit investigation of the correspondence between such religious forms and objective reality or history; rather, it performs a study of symbolization and its motivation, inspecting the mental processes that mediate between the subject and the real. Its findings are therefore delimited and require the posit, as Ricoeur (cf. 1970, p. 242) suggested, of the double possibility of "faith" and "nonfaith" in which the question of the actuality of transcendent realities is suspended.

In addition, much of Freud's theory is conveyed through inventive literary expositions2 and speculative essays, which offer insights into unconscious psychological dynamics rather than establish historical truth. Ultimately, Freudian theory, itself, is embedded in and limited by the specific historical/cultural context in which it germinated. Freud's oeuvre reflects the assumptions of his time, i.e., materialism, Aristotelian faith in the ability to obtain knowledge of reality, and the valuation of reason over subjectivity, as well as a form of psychological essentialism based on his belief in the universality of the Oedipus complex. These works present a case for the coherence of psychic life, in which "unconscious wishes and fantasies are not constructed within particular cultural worlds, but are universal, a common ground of meaning that articulates or 'expresses' itself with some limited variations within different historical and cultural contexts" (cf. Toews, 1999, p. 99).

Freud's texts outline the central role religion plays in what Obeyesekere (1990) refers to as "the work of culture [whereby] symbolic forms existing on a cultural level get created and recreated through the minds of people" (p. xix). Beyond the sociological perspective of the social construction of reality, psychoanalysis amplifies the dynamic nature of these processes in which religion instills powerful moods and motivations. In a complementary fashion, culture reflects the mental contents of its citizens, which are then expressed and transmitted in the symbolic forms which culture supplies to be introjected by future generations. These dynamics involve the civilizing forces of moral systems in which desire becomes known within a specific cultural context and is expressed, sublimated, or repressed.

## Commentary

Freud demonstrated through his cultural texts the utility of applying psychoanalytic theory and clinical method to investigations beyond the consulting room. These expositions on religion contributed not only to an examination of unconscious dynamics in religious observance and belief but also provided, in Freud's view, additional support for the tenets of psychoanalysis. First, the universality of the Oedipus complex could be demonstrated through the study of the religious beliefs and ceremonies of primitive peoples and their analogous ceremonies in contemporary religious observance. The parallels between the past and the present, the primitive and the contemporary, suggested to Freud the existence of a universal intrapsychic dynamic. The thread of the Oedipus complex, which he perceived as woven throughout the history of the individual and the culture, was clarified in his speculation concerning the origins of Judeo-Christian religion. As in neurosis, the cultures beliefs and practices were shaped by long repressed conflictual events; however, derivatives of the events could be discovered through an analysis of the symbolism contained within the rituals. Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, in particular, present the findings of such an analysis. Second, clinical experience furnished empirical evidence of the workings of unconscious mental processes which contributed to Freud's appraisal of religion as a disguised wish fulfillment and illusion. The latent content of religious ideas and practices could be inferred in keeping with the principles of psychoanalysis as practiced in the consulting room. These

investigations served one hierarchical purpose: the demonstration of unconscious psychic determinism within human existence. Through these texts Freud could assert the workings of primeval history in the unconscious life of the individual. He could peer into the heart of the culture through his inspection and analysis of religious experience. His view that religion contains truth, but that this truth was of the veracity of a past event, and not the material truth of the existence of a deity, paralleled his understanding of neurosis and prepared the way for his radical critique of culture and "after education" (Freud).

In his critique, Freud placed religion at the nexus of cultural development. He viewed religion as contributing to an immature mode of instinctual renunciation that was established in the Oedipal complex and was in response to the repressed guilt and anxiety originating in prehistory. Freud (1927/1964) called for:

> a re-ordering of human relations ... which would remove the sources of dissatisfaction within civilization by renouncing coercion and the suppression of instincts, so that, undisturbed by internal discord, men might devote themselves to the acquisition of wealth and its enjoyment (p. 7).

For Freud, religion was the cultural expression of neurosis. The influence of the rational was overshadowed by the claims of the irrational. Civilization was held captive by the dynamics of oedipal conflict enshrined within religion. This examination concludes with a final question to which we now turn: "What is the value of Freud's critique of religion today?"

As we have seen, Freud's critique was established on the interplay between phylogeny and ontogeny. His acceptance of the phylogenetic hypothesis remained immutable throughout his life. Anna Freud remarked in a letter to Lucille Ritvo, "Personally, I remember very well how imperturbed my father was by everyone's criticism to his neo-Lamarkianism. He was quite sure that he was on safe ground" (Ritvo, 1990, frontispiece). The phylogenetic basis of Freud's understanding of religion is untenable. Although an appreciation of evolutionary biology in psychological functioning is developing [See Slavin & Kriegman, 1992], Freud's reliance upon specific Lamarkian principles of inherited characteristics is not supported. His view of religion as the cultural expression of an archaic event, as transmitted through biological inheritance, is unfounded. It was Freud's examination of ontogeny that has been the springboard for contemporary psychoanalytic study of religion. Ontogeny was conceived by Freud as psychosexual development culminating in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. In a footnote to Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud (1905/1964) asserted:

> It has been justly said that the Oedipus complex is the nuclear complex of the neuroses, and constitutes the essential part of their content ... Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex ... With the progress of psycho-analytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex has became more and more clearly evident; its recognition has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psycho-analysis from its opponents (p. 226).

In keeping with this view, Freud's critique of religion rests firmly on the cornerstone of the Oedipus complex. Belief in god finds its origin in the child's desire for maternal protection and care. From this origin, religious belief evolves into the form of a father-god in keeping with the increased focus and conflict with the father within the Oedipal constellation. Is Freud correct in his reduction? In my view, Freud was both correct and limited in this assessment. He was correct in illustrating the dynamics of identification and projection in God-representational processes. He was also correct in placing emphasis on God-representational processes in the oedipal phase. Further, there are instances in clinical practice in which the leitmotif of the Oedipal, ambivalently held God the Father, articulates accurately an individual's God representation, its dynamic origin and the compromise formations that it serves. As salient as this model is, it is inadequate to describe the legion of self and

object representations and the multiple dynamics which are contained in religious experience. Freud's view was limited by his unidimensional understanding of the Oedipus complex.

Freud brought both the method and theory of psychoanalysis to bear on Feuerbach's critique of religion as a human enterprise of projection. Psychoanalysis views these processes of identification and projection within the context of unconscious conflict. It is its approach to religion as a solution to an intrapsychic conflict as well as a response to humanity's ontological situation that marks a significant contribution. Freud's analysis leads to an appraisal of the function of God-representations and religion, in toto, along topographic, structural, economic, genetic and dynamic lines. This perspective posits religious experience to be a dynamic, multi-dimensional process. For example, within the structural approach, the influence of religion, vis-a-vis, processes of internalization and projection, may be seen to contribute significantly to super-ego functioning. Religious experience, seen in this light, is far more than theistic beliefs; rather, as an ingredient of the structure of the psychic apparatus it contributes to the psychological equilibrium of the human organism. Religion participates silently in the mental operations, which dictate behavior and consequence. Religious ideas and object relations serve a multiverse of functions. This view expands the horizon of inquiry into the nature of religious experience. In Freud's analysis, however, this horizon was contained within the Oedipus complex. This leads to a consideration of the Oedipus complex: its universality and comprehensiveness.

For Freud the Oedipus complex referred to specific libidinal and aggressive conflicts centered around the gradual triangulation of child's relationship with his or her parents. Anthropological studies for the most part have not substantiated Freud's thesis of the universality of the Oedipus complex; debate continues to ensue regarding the interpretation of such investigations [See Malinowski, 1927; Spiro, 1982]. The failure to support the universality of the Oedipus complex necessarily calls into question the claim that all religious experience bears the mark of Oedipus. This leads to a second concern regarding the comprehensiveness of the Oedipus complex as a template for understanding religious experience.

The Oedipus complex remains for many psychoanalysts today the cornerstone of psychoanalytic work and theory [ See Panel, 1985; Feldman, 1990; Greenberg, 1991; Loewald: 1979; Wisdom: 1984]; however, for many theorists it refers to processes that go beyond the categories of drive theory. For example, Loewald (1983, p. 439) points to its function as "a watershed in individuation" in which drive conflict is seen within the context of the developing self. In his view emphasis is placed on object relations that become internalized as structures of the self within the oedipal phase. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1988), although not convinced of its phylogenetic nature, nervertheless views the Oedipus complex as an innate schema through which the capacity for establishing categories and classifying impressions leads to structure formation. Kohut (1977, 1984), although rejecting the psychobiology of drive theory, maintains the importance of the Oedipus complex in terms of the parents' attunement to the child's emerging Oedipal self. When we examine the validity of the Oedipus complex as a template for religious experience we must first establish which Oedipus complex do we mean?

Freud's understanding of the Oedipus complex is restrictive and inadequate to capture all of the facets of development and conflict. Toews (1999) finds that,

> Freud assumed a universality apparently incompatible with contemporary notions of cultural otherness, difference, heterogeneity, and pluralism. With the theory of the Oedipus complex (however variable and flexible, it might work itself out in individual cases) Freud affirmed the ultimately homologous character of processes of acculturation in all humsan cultural formations across space and time; the production of the human was presented as a single plot with variations (p. 111)

However limited, his theory does articulate important constituents of Godrepresentational processes as related to drive conflict and structural theory. He locates religious belief and experience within the intrapsychic realm of conflict and compromise and demonstrates the utility of God-representations in the economy of psychic operation and structure. Although Freud did not develop a comprehensive understanding of object relations, his inquiries into internalization and the processes leading to the formation of the super-ego anticipated a more complete explication of the internal world of objects.' Was Freud incorrect in positing that a God-representation is a displacement from the Oedipal father vis-a-vis processes of identification and projection? No, Freud was not wrong, however, he was limited by the metapsychology that he invented. His limitation lies in the narrowly conceived catalogue of meanings for religious experience posited by drive theory. In a more contemporary view of psychological functioning, considering multiple developmental lines within the realms of pre-Oedipal and Oedipal experience, religious experiences are seen to hold the potential to express a host of meanings and serve a number of functions. Rizzuto (1979), in her landmark study, The Birth of the Living God, proposed that the formation of the image of God is an object representational process that originates within the transitional space and that occurs, shaped by ever-present psychodynamics throughout the life of the individual. Although God-representations may derive in part from the processes which Freud described in terms of identification and projection of the father, her understanding goes beyond Freud's in asserting that "[God-representation] is more than the cornerstone upon which it was built. It is a new original representation which, because it is new, may have the varied components that serve to soothe and comfort, provide inspiration and courage — or dread and terror —far beyond that inspired by the actual parents" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 46). It may be concluded that Freud initiated an inquiry into the psychodynamics, which are involved in God-representations.

His view of wish fulfillment as the basis for religious illusions represents a partial understanding. If the notion of wish is construed beyond the parameters of drive, then Freud's thesis accounts for many aspects of religious motivation. Psychoanalysis does not have the ability to reduce all religious motivation and experience to the determinants of wish. Nor would a demonstration of such an occurrence establish or deny the veracity of religious beliefs or experience. Psychoanalysis provides a unique perspective and method, however, to examine a particular class of influences. This leads us to his critique of culture. Does religion serve the function of renunciation? A definitive answer cannot be found outside of an individual's psychodynamics. Freud's analysis of the function of religion as renunciation, and his comparison of religious practices to the obsessive actions of neurotics, in certain instances yields a valid appraisal. However, as Meissner (1991,1992,1996) and Vergote (1988) have convincingly argued, it is not religion per se but rather how an individual is religious that determines the function of religious belief and practice. It is within the consulting room that the nature of the influence of religion in the resolution of conflict and the formation of identity can be surmised.

Freud's contributions to the study of religion are significant in terms of the perspective that he offers; it is one which posits the crucial influence of unconscious processes in religious experience. Although Freud's reliance on phylogeny and his exclusive focus on the Oedipus complex is inadequate, in light of our current knowledge, these speculative texts, nevertheless, demonstrate the potential of applied psychoanalysis in which insights gleaned from clinical investigation may be employed in the study of culture. His contributions offer a perspective and a method of inquiry into the unconscious constituents of religious experience. His significance lies not in his definitive analysis of religion and culture but rather in commencing the psychoanalytic study of religion. <>

# FICTIONAL PRACTICE: MAGIC, NARRATION, AND THE POWER OF IMAGINATION edited by Bernd-Christian Otto and Dirk Johannsen [Series: Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004465992]

To what extent were practitioners of magic inspired by fictional accounts of their art? In how far did the daunting narratives surrounding legendary magicians such as Theophilus of Adana, Cyprianus of Antioch, Johann Georg Faust or Agrippa of Nettesheim rely on real-world events or practices? Fourteen original case studies present material from late antiquity to the twenty-first century and explore these questions in a systematic manner. By coining the notion of 'fictional practice', the editors discuss the emergence of novel, imaginative types of magic from the nineteenth century onwards when fiction and practice came to be more and more intertwined or even fully amalgamated. This is the first comparative study that systematically relates fiction and practice in the history of magic.

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Excerpt: There is no such thing as magic — *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone* 2001

*Fiction*, so we read in a contemporary etymological dictionary, is "that which is invented or imagined in the mind". The word goes back to old French *ficcion* ("dissimulation, ruse; invention, fabrication")

and from there to the Latin *fictio* (which implies two distinct meanings: (1) "the act of modeling something, of giving it a form"; and (2) "acts of pretending, supposing, or hypothesizing":), with its verb *fingere* ("to shape, form, devise, feign") which also means "to form out of clay." Practice, in turn, goes back to old French *practiser* and Latin *practicare*, with its root meaning of "to do, to perform." From the fifteenth century onwards, it also acquired the meaning of "to perform repeatedly to acquire skill, to learn by repeated performance".

If we consider *fictional practice* to refer to a repeated performance which is based on, or strives towards, something that is invented or imagined in the mind, we might think of all sorts of things. Generally speaking, any fabrication of cultural symbols or artefacts may be interpreted as fictional practice in the sense that the symbols and artefacts originated in the human mind. For Ernst Cassirer, for instance, any type of cultural production was ultimately a fictional (or in his wording 'symbolic') enterprise (Cassirer 1944). Turning towards religion, 'new atheists' (who of course latch onto a much older debate) such as Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett consider basic religious tenets such as God/s, sin, karma, nirvana, or prophecy to be mere products of human fancy with no empirical correlate whatsoever (e.g., Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006). From their perspective, many different types of religious behaviour might be interpreted as fictional practices, including prayer, sacrifice, baptism, funerals, the Eucharist, meditation, divination, or the carrying of religious cloth, symbols, amulets, or mojos. And then there is magic.

Magic has often been interpreted as one of the most stereotypical types of fictional practice, insofar as it seems to rely on weird combinations of essentially powerless ritual ingredients, actions, or principles, which purportedly cannot, either by themselves or in combination, produce any of the effects envisaged by its practitioners. In fact, one of the first basic connotations of the 'magician' in classical Greece (where the Western concept of 'magic' was originally shaped: Otto 2011, 143f) was that of a 'fraud': a private ritual entrepreneur who tricks and deludes naïve clients for the sake of his own enrichment. The notion of fraudulence is one of three basic anti-magical stereotypes present throughout Western cultural history, flanked on the one hand by blasphemy and on the other by immorality (see further Otto 2019a, 199–202). The idea that magical practices are inherently fraudulent gained particular impetus during the European Enlightenment, when magic gradually ceased to be interpreted as a crime against God and turned instead into a crime against reason. The assertion that believers in magic are prone to irrational and deluded (or ultimately delusive) thinking and behaviour had a lasting influence on the scholarly discourse from the nineteenth century onwards, and informed important early theorists such as Edward B. Tylor and James G. Frazer (see also Pasi 2006, 1134f.). Tylor, for instance, claimed that man, "having come to associate in thought those things which he found by experience to be connected in fact, proceeded erroneously to invert this action, and to conclude that association in thought must involve similar connexion in reality" (Tylor 1903, 112). Frazer followed in Tylor's footsteps by arguing that magic is based on a false "association of ideas" and thus depreciated it as "a false science as well as an abortive art" (Frazer 1922, 11).

Magic was thereby turned into 'fictional practice' *by definition*, and continued to function as a contrasting foil for the scholarly understanding of what may be considered true or false, modern or obsolete, what may count as accurate, trustworthy knowledge or what should rather belong to the realm of mere fancy (or fiction). The paradigmatic conviction of magic's fictionality built one of the normative foundations of academia as such in that it "served as a potent tool for the self-fashioning of modernity" (Styers 2004, 224). In fact, most twentieth-century scholars who participated in the exuberant debate on magic took its inherent fictionality for granted and focused almost exclusively on explaining its purported effects by positing socio-psychological or cognitive 'make-believe' processes. The only question that remained to be clarified was: why do practitioners of magic adhere to an apparently fictional enterprise?[1]

The present volume does not intend to follow along these argumentative paths. It moves beyond the question of whether magic is objectively or (only) subjectively real or efficacious, and approaches the matter instead from the perspective of cultural and discursive history, thus acknowledging magic as a complex, multifaceted, and powerful historical phenomenon that apparently had an enormous impact on Western history. Rather than engaging in the aforementioned debates on whether magic is factual or fictional, the volume instead poses a question that has occasionally been asked in the scholarly discourse but has never been explored in a systematic manner that encompasses a broad historical, geographical, and genealogical scope. We will pursue this goal by employing another meaning of *fiction* that is attested from the early nineteenth century onwards, namely that of "literature comprising novels and short stories based on imagined scenes or characters" (Harper 2020a; Schaffer 2012 speaks of 'fictional narrative'). We contrast this literary or narrative understanding of *fiction* with a notion of *practices* that refers, first and foremost, to the performance of rituals by people who have labelled these practices as 'magic' and/or who have adopted the title 'magician' when referring to themselves (that is to say, we employ a discursive understanding of 'magic': see concisely Otto 2018b). One of the editors of this volume has suggested that such actors and their practices can be subsumed under the analytical notion of 'Western learned magic' and has analysed this textual-ritual tradition over the past years (see Otto 2016; Bellingradt/Otto 2017; Otto 2018a–c; Otto 2019b). Based on these premises, the present volume explores the inter-relationship between, on the one hand, fictional narratives on magic (as they appear in myth, poetry, and literature, as well as in theological or historical texts) and, on the other, the ritual performances of practitioners of learned magic (as they are preserved in ritual scripts, whether in manuscript or printed form, or ego-documents such as experience reports or ritual diaries). To what extent were practitioners of learned magic inspired by fictional accounts of their art, and to what extent were fictional accounts of magic inspired by real-world practice/s? Are there types of 'fictional practice' in which fiction and practice came to be intertwined or even fully amalgamated?

## Western Learned Magic and the Entanglement of Fiction and Practice

The volume thus ties in with recent works on the literary dimensions of Western esotericism. In doing so, we also seize on the recent debate about 'hyper-real', 'invented', or 'fiction-based' religion and apply the research questions and perspectives of this debate to the study and history of learned magic. All chapters in this volume deal with sources that, in one way or the other, belong to the textual-ritual tradition of Western learned magic, whereas the main prerequisite for the authors was to include both fiction and practice on equal terms in their contributions. The volume thus adds to works in literary studies that have mainly dealt with magic in the sense of a narrative trope or plot device. By highlighting the practical—especially ritual—dimension of learned magic, it likewise expands upon research perspectives on Western esotericism that remain predominantly focused on 'knowledge', whether deemed 'higher' or 'rejected'. Essentially, the volume advocates a 'practical turn' in the study of both esotericism and literature.

The textual-ritual tradition of Western learned magic is eminently suited for this endeavour, as its theories and practices were highly heterogeneous, hybrid, and constantly in flux over the course of history (see Otto 2016, 189f), features that led to a tendency to appropriate a great quantity of fictional elements. In contrast to the debate on 'fiction-based' religion, which mostly focuses on developments of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (with Jedi and Tolkien spiritualities as prime examples: see Davidsen 2016, 2019), 'fiction-based' magic is significantly older: it goes back to the very roots of the concept. In fact, after 'magic' was detached from its Persian origins around 500 bce—where it had mainly referred to an Achaemenid priestly title (see Bremmer 2002)—the vast majority of sources that have discussed magic in the ancient Mediterranean world were authored by poets, lyricists, and satirists. Aesop, Sophocles, Euripides, Aischylos, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, or Lucian, to name only a select few, employed magical motifs in their works, thus significantly

contributing to the concept's semantic—and especially polemic—foundations (see, exemplarily, Graf 1996; Dicki 2001; Ogden 2002; Stratton 2007; Otto 2011). It has also been argued that the world's very first 'novel' was Apuleius of Madaura's *The Golden Ass*, which, authored in the mid-second century ad (see Kenney 1998), is essentially a story about magic and a failed animal transformation spell.

The first fully-fledged corpus of texts written not from a philosophical, poetic, or literary perspective, but from the perspective of the practitioner—namely, the late ancient *Greek Magical Papyri*—emerged almost a millennium after magic had begun to circulate as a largely polemical concept in ancient discourses (Otto 2013, 338; see also Frankfurter 2019). Unsurprisingly, we find numerous fictional patterns and narratives interwoven into its ritual scripts. These include the instrumentalisation of fictional practitioners as pseudepigraphs (such as Solomon [pgm iv, 850f], Democritus [pgm vii, 168f], or Moses [pgm xiii, 1f]), or the use of so-called 'historiolae'—a ritual technique that implies the re-narration of a short mythical tale during the ritual (see, for instance, the love spell in pgm iv, 1471f). Kyle Fraser, in the first contribution to this volume, further demonstrates that the authors of the *Greek Magical Papyri* engaged not only in what he calls 'stereotype appropriation', but also in a 'strategic response' to fictional tropes that circulated in the ancient Mediterranean—by creatively re-interpreting (or even reversing) these stereotypes and adapting them to their own needs and beliefs.

Fraser's finding is representative of the history of Western learned magic at large. Fictional stereotypes, tropes, clichés, and narratives have—to a greater or lesser degree—influenced or inspired real-world practitioners from late antiquity up to the twenty-first century. Yet, the appropriation of fictional elements by practitioners of learned magic was usually highly strategic, in the sense that it served their self-protection (e.g., through pseudepigraphy), self-traditionalisation (e.g., through positing fictitious lineages), or self-legitimisation (e.g., through appropriating rhetorics of religious legitimacy and authenticity; see, for example, the case of John of Morigny, discussed by Claire Fanger in this volume). Eventually, fictional tropes or narratives make their way into ritual scripts, with the intention of heightening the perceived efficacy of the rituals. For instance, the early modern legendary practitioner 'Dr Faustus'—who became the prototype of a misguided demon-conjuror from the late sixteenth century onwards—turned into a spirit to be invoked in a Scandinavian invulnerability spell of the eighteenth century (see Owen Davies' contribution in this volume for further details). Wiccans of the twentieth century drew upon an ancient narrative trope about 'Thessalian witches' when referring to one of their most pivotal rites as 'drawing down the moon' (see Ethan Doyle White's contribution in this volume). Some modern 'Chaos magick' groups read the supernatural horror fiction of Howard P. Lovecraft before and during their ritual procedures, thus intending to invoke and embody the 'Great Old Ones' (see Justin Woodman's contribution in this volume). Clearly, Western learned magic has always resonated with fiction, a tendency that seems to reflect its century-long shady underground existence, as well as its constant challenging of the limits and boundaries of the human condition.

The flipside to such types of 'fiction-based magic' is to be found in fictional narratives about magic that have been inspired by real-world practices or practitioners: 'practice-based fiction', as it were. Yet, whereas fictional elements are rather easy to identify in practice-oriented texts of learned magic, the question of whether real-world practices or practitioners have inspired fictional narratives is often much harder to elucidate. There are cases where the reference is explicit—Hugh Urban, for instance, in his contribution to this volume, discusses English novels of the 1920s and 1930 that are directly modelled on Pierre Bernard and Aleister Crowley. However, there are numerous fictional or legendary accounts of practitioners who may never have existed. Sometimes it is simply impossible to verify their historicity (as in the cases of Theophilus of Adana or Cyprianus of Antioch; on the latter see Ane Ohrvik's chapter in this volume); sometimes legendary practitioners are

modelled after real-world persons (consider the early modern polemics surrounding Johann Georg Faust or Agrippa of Nettesheim), evidently not with the goal of providing a historically accurate account, but rather to promote fear- and fascination-driven stereotypes and clichés about magic (see Bernd-Christian Otto's chapter in this volume for further details). Finally, there is a vast corpus of legendary narratives about magical practices the historicity of which remains unclear. Aðalheiður Guðmundsdóttir, for instance, in her contribution to this volume, discusses the degree to which Icelandic legendary (*fornaldarsögur*) literature, especially legends that revolve around the utterance of a spell (*álög*), function as a historical window onto medieval and early modern Icelandic conceptions—and practices—of spell-casting. It is worth pondering whether her critical questions and findings can be made relevant to the study of other legendary texts that display magical motifs.

## The Rise of Fiction

While the premodern history of Western learned magic is already full of examples of 'fiction-based practice' and 'practice-based fiction' (as well as back-and-forth movements between the two), the relationship between fiction and magic has become ever more dynamic in the modern era. A crucial trigger for this development was the emergence of a large-scale international market for fictional literature in which the creation, promotion, and distribution of literary works was more and more professionalised. By the nineteenth century, the main product for this market had become genre fiction: works of fiction that were easy to promote because they catered to the expectations of audiences who were already familiar with similar works. In the realm of magic, it is, above all, the genre of the so-called Rosicrucian novel that attests to the increasingly complex web of fiction-practice relationships.

The foundational texts of the Rosicrucian movement—namely, the *Fama Fraternatis* (1614), the *Confessio Fraternatis* (1615), and the *Chymische Hochzeit* (1616), all authored, in all likelihood, by Johann Valentin Andrae (1586–1654)—combined legendary narrative about the life and deeds of Christianus Rosencreutz and his alleged fellowship with references to practical arts, such as alchemy, kabbalah, or natural magic (see van Dülmen 1973, 18f.; Otto 2011, 510f.). Even though these texts sparked an intense public debate throughout the seventeenth century, the existence of non-fictional Rosicrucian groupings at that time is disputed in present-day scholarship and considered to be a literary trope. Yet the Rosicrucian legend not only led to the foundation of Rosicrucian orders in the 18th and 19th centuries—the earliest and most prominent example being the *Orden der Gold- und Rosenkreuzer*, founded in 1757 in Frankfurt am Main—but also to novel literary representations.

One of the first representatives, or even the prototype, of the Rosicrucian novel was Pierre-Henri de Montfaucon de Villars' widely read *Comte de Gabalis*, first published (anonymously) in 1670. Connecting into the Rosicrucian excitement of the seventeenth century, *Comte de Gabalis* was composed as a conversation, spread across five dialogues, between a *Comte* and his student (the narrator) about the so-called 'secret sciences'. Curiously, the bulk of these dialogues are almost exclusively concerned with the Paracelsian concept of the four 'elemental spirits' (gnomes/earth; nymphs/air; sylphs/water; salamanders/fire). It was especially the idea of a spiritually beneficial marriage to elemental spirits, put forth in dialogue four, that left an enduring imprint on European literature, theatre, and art from the late seventeenth century onwards. As a method for receiving supreme wisdom or achieving spiritual rebirth, this type of 'marriage' was also put into practice. For instance, a detailed recipe of the practical necessities involved in attracting and marrying a sylph survives in a German manuscript that is today preserved in the Leipzig collection of 'codices magici' (Ms. Cod. Mag. 44; the recipe is outlined in detail in Bellingradt/Otto, 126–28). This text was written some time around 1700, that is, only a few decades after the first edition of *Comte de Gabalis*. From this first spark of 'fiction-based magic'—marriage with elementals—the Rosicrucian legend began to reveal further multi-layered interrelations between fiction and practice.

By the late 18th century, the burgeoning literary market had facilitated mass production and an increased access to formerly exclusive writings. Underpinned by changes in legal regulations with regard to blasphemy and censorship, the international book market now allowed for the wide distribution of material that had, until then, belonged to esoteric manuscript cultures. We see the effects of these developments in a new intertextuality created by new publication formats. Selective editions of esoteric writings, such as Francis Barrett's *The Magus or Celestial Intelligencer* (1801), suggested, already by way of compilation, occult connections between different textual traditions. The modern novel had likewise become a highly intertextual format, borrowing widely from disparate storytelling traditions and exploring their literary "reality effects" (Barthes 1969). At the interface of both developments, the Rosicrucian novel now became a standardised literary format with a growing popularity. Conceived of as a sub-genre of the gothic novel, works such as Shelley's *St. Irvyne the Rosicrucian* (1810), Ainsworth's *Auriol* (1814), or Bulwer-Lytton's *Zanoni* (1842) gained their fascination from firmly anchoring the storyworld of the Rosicrucian legend to the recent esoteric compilations, casually mentioning the names of authors and writings that Barrett and others had publicly promoted as part of a clandestine tradition.

The persuasiveness of this novel intertextual format became strikingly apparent in its impact on the constitution of a large number of self-proclaimed Rosicrucian societies from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, such as the *Fraternitas Rosae Crucis* (founded in 1858), the *Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia* (founded in 1865), the *Theosophical Society* (founded in 1875), the *Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor* (founded around 1884), the *Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn* (founded in 1888), or the *Ordre Martiniste* (founded in 1891). Many of these newly founded orders drew on the Rosicrucian novels for their backstories, and began to translate fiction into practice. The *Hermetic Brotherhood of Luxor* and the *Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn*, for example, developed elaborate rituals for marrying elementals based on the *Comte de Gabalis* (see Godwin, Chanel, Deveney 1995, 107–120; Nagel 2007). In many strands of late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century occultism and learned magic, fiction became part of the curriculum (see, for example, Aleister Crowley's *A ∴ A ∴ Curriculum*, Crowley 1919, 22–26).[2] With fictional literature actively promoted as a source of occult knowledge and inspiration, we also see an increasing number of practitioners engaged in writing fiction (see Marco Frenschkowski's chapter on Helena Petrovna Blavatsky in this volume, and the overview of practitioner-novelists in Bernd-Christian Otto's concluding chapter).

## The Power of Imagination

The enhanced entanglement of practice and fiction in learned magic from the nineteenth century onwards was, however, not only due to an increased access to esoteric sources and a growing market for occult fiction. Conceptual shifts happening in this period also allowed for a more theoretical alignment of magic and fiction. This alignment gave rise to what we, in this volume, identify as 'fictional practice' in a narrow sense, in which acts of engaging with or creating fiction, on the one hand, and magical practices, on the other, are in some form equated and coalesced. This somewhat counterintuitive blending of different cultural domains became possible through fundamental reconfigurations in the discourse on religion.

Conceptual historian Lucian Hölscher has shown how in the European political discourse of the transitional "Sattelzeit" between 1750 and 1870, the shift from the complementary "spiritual vs. temporal" dichotomy to a more conflicted "religious vs. secular" dichotomy gave the concept of religion a "contradictory" character (Hölscher 2015, 73). With religion being criticised for being based on myth, notably by David Friedrich Strauss in his *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined* (1844 [1835–36]), and theorised as a human phenomenon, notably by Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), its object was denied relevance for the public discourse. However, religious belief remained a political factor to be accounted for, and religion's allegedly 'invented' (or fictional) character did not necessarily detract from its cultural and social role. The field of inquiry where this

conceptual development had its most striking repercussions was the study of myth, the "remote reality" of which (Hölscher 2015, 87) became palpable in the nation-building endeavours of the nineteenth century—with the creation of political myths that connected modern nations to ancient cultural traditions. The theories proposed to explain the origin of myths in human minds and societies just added to their political relevance. Things declared to be based on 'objectively false' premises—such as religion, myth, or magic—could now be argued to be nonetheless of utmost cultural, social, and psychological efficacy.

These conceptual developments had a major impact on the general notion of fiction as well. By the early nineteenth century, fiction still simply denoted "something feigned or invented" or "the act of feigning or inventing" (Johnson 1805, "Fiction"). Over the course of the century, however, it became the core term of the literary craft, denoting "one of the fine arts", even the most ancient one (Besant 1884, 3). Fiction "suggests as well as narrates", Walter Besant (the brother-in-law of theosophist Annie Besant) famously declared in 1884; it is as creative as it is descriptive (Besant 1884, 16). Even if understood as pretence and make-believe, the art of fiction was of intrinsic value and had an important cultural impact (James 1888).

The specific ingredient that allowed for this conceptual alignment of the notion of fiction with the contradictory understanding of religion—as false, but effective—was the demarcation of fantasy and imagination. These terms had previously been widely treated as synonymous, deriving from the Greek *phantasía* and the Latin *imaginatio* respectively. Denoting an "interior sense" with an ambivalent function as a source of knowledge as well as illusions, both fantasy and imagination had been key terms in philosophical and religious discourses since antiquity (Traut & Wilke 2015, 23–32). In esoteric discourse, in particular, they gained a "functional role in magical practice" through the Neoplatonic theory of attraction that first emerged in Arabic traditions of learned magic (Doel & Hanegraaf 2006, 608), for instance in al-Kindī's treatise *De radiis stellarum*, which was also one of the foundational texts of the early modern discourse on 'magia naturalis' (Otto 2011, 442f.). From the twelfth century onwards, scholastic theories of imagination led to a proliferation of religious practices based on imagination in medieval Catholicism ('kataphatic spiritual practices' in Egil Asprem's wording: see Asprem 2016b). These have, however, been gradually "separated out by disjunctive strategies rooted in the policing of orthopraxy" over the following centuries (ibid., 29). As a consequence, the much-debated use of imagination in the Renaissance (see, e.g., Yates 1964), that is, "key practices that we now associate with Western esotericism," stand in direct historical continuity to "the kataphatic trend that has been dominant in Catholic spirituality" ever since the late Middle Ages and should thus rather be considered as "leaves on a major branch of European intellectual and religious history". The association of the human faculty of *phantasia* / *imaginatio* with the creation of fictional literature, however, was mostly a later romanticist notion (Tarkka 2015, 19), and it was in the literary discourse of the nineteenth century that their demarcation came to take on a crucial importance. Suggested by Albertus Magnus (Asprem 2016b, 14) and later also by Paracelsus (Doel & Hanegraaf 2006, 612), the distinction between fantasy and imagination as two separate mental faculties was installed as a lasting discursive demarcation by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1817):

> Repeated meditations led me first to suspect,—(and a more intimate analysis of the human faculties, their appropriate marks, functions, and effects matured my conjecture into full conviction,)—that Fancy and Imagination were two distinct and widely different faculties, instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power.

Coleridge disconnected fantasy from its etymology, stating that the "apposite translation of the Greek phantasia" needs to be the Latin *imaginatio* to allow for the differentiation between two distinct human faculties that produce formally similar results (notably: artistic expressions), but of fundamentally different quality. Whereas fantasy is merely associative, imagination is creative. The

nature of this creation remained a subject of debate throughout the following decades, but the claim of an epistemological difference between fantasy and imagination remained a guiding principle. In the growing book market, assessing a literary trend as 'mere fancy' became a crushing blanket judgement. Claiming an 'imaginative' inspiration for a work of literary art, by contrast, valorised it. While still make-believe, 'imaginative fiction' could provide society with genuinely new ideas, tap into the soul of a nation, or express eternal truths.

The conceptual developments in various European countries of the time were not fully synchronised, which added additional layers of complexity to the theoretical blends of literature and religion that emerged in the nineteenth century. When Ludwig Feuerbach identified "die Phantasie" as "the original organ and essence of religion," he connected fantasy to Kant's "Einbildungskraft" and Hegel's "Vorstellung," all three of which, however, were translated as "imagination" in the first English edition of *The Essence of Christianity* (1854, 212). With religion thus being born from a romantically understood, genuinely creative and valuable notion of 'imagination', the prevalent critique of religion became religiously productive. By the end of the century, leading critics of religion such as Ernst Haeckel and leading evangelicals such as Henry Ward Beecher could agree, in a sense, that "the great schoolmaster of the soul, is the imagination, which the New Testament calls […] 'faith'" (Beecher 1904 [1873], 272), and that all faith was "a product of poetic imagination" (Haeckel 1905 [1899], 90). The imaginative artist had found a substantial theoretical foundation for claiming the status of a prophet, while the fanciful artist remained an entertainer, catering to the popular demand for distraction.

It is against the backdrop of such terminological repercussions that theories of imagination became core to the 'occult sciences' of the late nineteenth century as well. In the teachings of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, Coleridge's literary theory transformed into an underlying principle of all magic: "Imagination must be distinguished from Fancy—from mere roving thoughts, or empty visions […]. Imagination is the Creative Faculty of the human mind, the plastic energy—the Formative Power" (W. W. Westcott, *Flying Roll* v: King 1997, 51). Practitioners of learned magic were now able to resolve the inherent contradiction inscribed in the modern notion of religion, myth, and magic by advocating the "remote reality" of the imagination, with fiction being its "most ancient" manifestation: "The uninitiated interpret Imagination as something 'imaginary' […]. But Imagination is a reality" (E.W. Berridge, *Flying Roll* v, King 1997, 47).

## Fictional Practice

With imagination re-interpreted as the creative faculty of the human mind—whereby the outer world was reduced to its mere 'canvas' (to use the famous wording of Henry Thoreau [1849, 306])—, with the Euro-American book markets thriving, and with an ever larger number of occult societies and fraternities blossoming, the relationship between fiction and practice took on a new dimension. Whereas until the nineteenth century this relationship was mostly one of mutual inspiration (with cases of both 'fiction-based magic' and 'magic-based fiction', as well as back-and-forth movements in varying degrees), fiction and practice now intertwined in such a way that the two could become more or less indistinguishable. In order to designate and analyse this novel development in the history of Western learned magic, we suggest the use of the term 'fictional practice'.

Going through the case studies in this volume, it seems that different types of fictional practices have emerged since the nineteenth century. The most obvious type pertains to the idea that the writing of fiction now came to be interpreted as a magical act in and of itself. Unsurprisingly, it was a well-known poet and practicing magician who first advocated this idea, namely William Butler Yeats. Yeats not only implemented Golden Dawn symbolism in his poetry of the 1890s, he also crafted it with the explicit intention of invoking certain 'moods' in his readers, and thereby affecting and

literally enchanting them, creating nothing less than 'talismanic poetry' (see Johannsen's chapter for further details). Similar approaches were advocated by several practitioners of the twentieth century, among them pivotal figures such as Dion Fortune, Kenneth Grant (on whom see Christian Giudice's chapter in this volume), or Alan Moore.

From the interpretation of the creation of fiction as a magical practice, it was only a small step to interpreting the reading of fiction in a similar way, thus tying to the (now) stereotypical notion of fiction as 'a place for wonder', as a possibly enchanting process that may transform its readers or miraculously take them into another world. The contributions of Katheryna Zorya and Justin Woodman in this volume show, with examples drawn from post-Soviet practitioner milieus as well as contemporary London-based 'Chaos magick', that perceiving writing *and* reading of fiction as magical practices has become a standard trope in modern practitioner discourses. Both contributions also demonstrate that fictional practices may go so far as to affect the perception of one's everyday surroundings, as in the case of the Lovecraftian group *The Haunters of the Dark*. Its members not only strive towards 'Cthulhu gnosis' through invocations taken verbatim from Lovecraft's works, but also projectively re-imagine Lovecraftian themes within the urban cityscapes of London (see Woodman's contribution for further details). In such cases, fictional practices are not merely immersive, but can be discussed as attempts to create an 'augmented reality' constituted by blends of imagined storyworlds and the external world.

Making a distinction between a mundane outer world and a hidden magical world has been a common strategy in the history of Western learned magic, but it was only during the late nineteenth century that the idea of blends or overlaps between the two worlds became a popular trope in fictional literature. During the late Victorian age, in particular, cross-world fantasy novels in which the protagonist discovers a portal to another realm or gains the ability to sense an alternative, underlying reality gained widespread popularity (in addition to the examples mentioned in Frenschkowski's contribution, see, for example, Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* (1865), William Morris' *The Wood Beyond the World* (1894), George MacDonald's *Lilith* (1895), Edith Nesbit's *The Story of the Amulet* (1906), or Arthur Machen's *The Hill of Dreams* (1907)). In occult practitioner milieus, such novels were read—as well as produced—as a form of instructive fiction that illustrated the imaginative practice of 'astral projection' (or 'astral vision') as a means of travelling on the 'astral plane'. It remains an open question as to whether the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn's 'tattwa' meditations, for example, in which painted symbols are used as portals to the respective element's 'astral plane', were partly inspired by fictional literature. The concepts of an 'astral plane' and 'astral projection' had become crucial elements within the practitioner discourse of the late nineteenth century, often with reference to the publications of Alphonse Louis Constant, alias Éliphas Lévi. In his widely read *Dogme et Rituel de la haute Magie* (first publ. in two volumes in 1854 and 1856), Lévi had popularised the notion of the 'astral light' ('lumière astrale') as the 'great magical agent' ('grand agent magique') which may be accessed and controlled by the magician's imagination. Indeed, the imagination was, for Lévi, an 'inherent property of our soul'. Even though the formulation 'astral plane' was a later and somewhat curious theosophical amalgamation (given that Lat. 'astrum' literally means 'star' or 'celestial body') of a range of different concepts—among them Lévi's 'astral light'; Neoplatonic and Paracelsian notions of 'natural magic'; the Mesmerist concept of the magnetic 'fluidum'; and the Hindu doctrine of the three bodies ('Sharira Traya')—it created a lasting connection between magical practice and fantasy literature. [*Browsing through digital archives of the nineteenth century, it is possible to trace the consolidation of the concept of an 'astral plane' on which it is possible to travel. This process appears to have taken place initially in the theosophical literature, starting from the early 1880s, with the first steps being taken in Anna B. Kingsford's and Edward Maitland's The Perfect Way (1882). The 'astral plane' was popularised in a fictional format shortly afterwards, notably in Alfred Percy Sinnett's novel Karma (1885). The term 'astral projection', denoting travels on this plane, also gained prominence in fiction during this time, e.g., in Perdicaris' Mohammed Benani (1887). It thus seems that both concepts were creative products of the theosophical*

*discourse and from there inspired magical groupings of the time, such as the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn or the Ordre Martiniste.*] This is captured in the cover illustration of our volume, taken from one of the many publications of Gérard Encausse (Papus), who was an avid reader of Lévi and a former member of the Theosophical Society. The image, drawn by Louis Delfosse, displays a conjuration procedure in which the 'physical' and the 'astral' planes are portrayed as two complementary realms, making the magician a mediator between the worlds.

This is also mirrored in the most recent example covered in our volume, the *Grey School of Wizardry* (discussed by Carole Cusack), a case in which an amalgamation of Golden Dawn and Neopagan (Wiccan) practices is re-accessed through the lens of the *Harry Potter* novels and movies. The founder of the school, Oberon Zell-Ravenheart (born 1942), claimed in a vice interview in 2014 that the colourful energy-bursts that spout the wands of the protagonists of the *Harry Potter* movies reflect the imaginative reality of practicing magicians. There are surely contemporary practitioners who might consider the idea of energy-bursts spouting from their wands to be unrealistic and non-efficacious. For Zell-Ravenheart, however, it is nothing but a logical step towards resolving the boundaries between the 'fantasy' magic of the *Harry Potter* movies and the 'real' (that is, imaginative) magic of his kin, arguing that "we have always drawn from story to enhance our lives. […] Man's first magick was fire, but his second magick was story". The aesthetic of the Potter movies indeed mirror an aesthetic of magic that goes back to the aforementioned notion—and imaginative practice—of late nineteenth-century 'astral vision'. The foundation of the *Grey School of Wizardry* thus perfectly illustrates our understanding of fictional practice: here, magic, narration, and the power of imagination fully converge.

5 The Scope of the Volume

It goes without saying that the contributions to this anthology serve largely as examples. While the volume does include chapters from antiquity to the twenty-first century, there are huge gaps with regard to the premodern history of Western learned magic (e.g., with regard to Jewish or Islamicate discourses), but also pertaining to the potential—practical—roots of imaginaries of magic in modern fantasy literature (which could easily fill up several additional volumes). Nonetheless, the chosen case studies are telling insofar as they reveal basic types of magical tropes and fiction-practice relationships that have pervaded Western discourses of magic from antiquity to today. They also illustrate a specific development in the history of Western learned magic—and thus also of Western esotericism as its overarching category—that is tied to fundamental changes in the relationship between fiction and practice: namely the emergence of novel types of 'fictional practice' from the nineteenth century onwards through a re-interpretation of the human imagination. To further illustrate this significant shift, about half of the chapters deal with pre-modern material, whereas the other half deal with case studies from the nineteenth century onwards.

Instead of providing brief summaries of the contributions in this introduction, we have opted for a different strategy, namely to outline the general idea and rationale of the volume here while saving a more thorough survey and synthesis of all the chapters for Bernd-Christian Otto's concluding essay. This final chapter will attempt to weave red threads through the multifarious materials discussed in the individual chapters, to identify and trace specific developments in the history of Western learned magic in general, and to develop a synthetic narrative that transcends the individual chapters. Furthermore, all authors cross-reference other chapters in the volume, especially in cases where there are obvious historical connections or similarities, thus making visible hitherto unrecognised patterns in the history of Western learned magic. Fictional practices abound in modern magic(k) and esotericism, and we hope that the present volume provides a useful conceptual framework that may facilitate the future analysis of their many-faced manifestations. <>

# A Partial Enlightenment: What Modern Literature and Buddhism Can Teach Us About Living Well Without Perfection by Avram Alpert [Columbia University Press, 9780231200035]

In many ways, Buddhism has become the global religion of the modern world. For its contemporary followers, the ideal of enlightenment promises inner peace and worldly harmony. And whereas other philosophies feel abstract and disembodied, Buddhism offers meditation as a means to realize this ideal. If we could all be as enlightened as Buddhists, some imagine, we could live in a much better world. For some time now, however, this beatific image of Buddhism has been under attack. Scholars and practitioners have criticized it as a Western fantasy that has nothing to do with the actual experiences of Buddhists.

Avram Alpert combines personal experience and readings of modern novels to offer another way to understand modern Buddhism. He argues that it represents a rich resource not for attaining perfection but rather for finding meaning and purpose in a chaotic world. Finding unexpected affinities across world literature—Rudyard Kipling in colonial India, Yukio Mishima in postwar Japan, Bessie Head escaping apartheid South Africa—as well as in his own experiences living with Tibetan exiles, Alpert shows how these stories illuminate a world in which suffering is inevitable and total enlightenment is impossible. Yet they also give us access to partial enlightenments: powerful insights that become available when we come to terms with imperfection and stop looking for wholeness. A Partial Enlightenment reveals the moments of personal and social transformation that the inventions of modern Buddhism help make possible.

## Reviews

Buddhist students and literature lovers will find much to ponder in Alpert's close textual readings. — **Publishers Weekly**

The stories about the Buddha, with their promise of awakening and liberation, are among the richest and most inspiring tales ever told. By focusing on the creation and complexities of a new, twentieth-century Buddhism, and the novels it has produced, Avram Alpert's *A Partial Enlightenment* delivers a brilliant work of literary history less concerned with the mythology of absolute perfection than the embedded, political, and existential realities that make modern Buddhism—an authentic way to 'fail better'—relevant for our lives today. — **Charles Johnson, author of *Middle Passage*, winner of the National Book Award**

A groundbreaking contribution to Buddhist literary studies, *A Partial Enlightenment* provides a new lens through which to examine the influence of modern Buddhist themes in twentieth-century world literature. In his role of scholar-seeker, or contemplative critic, Avi Alpert performs a complex, inclusive, and personal practice of literary exegesis, one that will enlighten academic and lay readers alike. — **Ruth Ozeki, *New York Times* best-selling author of *A Tale for the Time Being: A Novel***

In this stunningly sincere and groundbreaking work, Alpert takes the reader on a strange journey, often personal and always provocative, through a forest of literature to see how Buddhist thought and practice is embedded and intertwined with modern fiction. He shows the reader through novels as diverse as Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, Zadie Smith's *The Autograph Man*, J. M. Coetzee's *Elizabeth Costello*, Severo Sarduy's *Cobra*, Rudyard Kipling's *Kim*, Yukio Mishima's *Sea of Fertility*, among many others, that literature doesn't neatly present Buddhist truths, but complicates the very way Buddhism is received and taught. It is a story of disenchantment and tentative re-

enchantment with Buddhist ideas and meditation practices with a healthy dose of Beckett's robust existential despair. It is a story of intellectual struggle and imperfect readings that enlightens, as well as forces the reader to simply lift her head, breathe deeply, and dive back in. No study of the modern encounter with Buddhism is complete without reading this truly refreshing and wonderful book. — **Justin Thomas McDaniel, author of *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk: Practicing Buddhism in Modern Thailand***

Avi Alpert's timely book makes a significant contribution to re-evaluating Buddhism's role in engaging with the struggles and complexities of the postcolonial world. The book is at once a personal chronicle of disenchantment and discovery and a literary history that charts global Buddhism and the aesthetics of human fragmentation and connectivity. Alpert's compelling readings of modern novels uncover a simple truth of Buddhist ethics at their core: we may be limited in our understanding of the universe, but we have the power to act kindly towards living beings. An ethics of social relationality emerges as the book's most profound insight, making its innovative readings indispensable for students and scholars of religion and literature. — **Gauri Viswanathan, author of *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief***

CONTENTS



Excerpt…I thought it surprising that Foucault was starting to sound a lot like Suzuki. And then I discovered that this was no coincidence: Foucault had been reading works on Zen—including one with an important introduction by Suzuki—while he was working on these lectures. It suddenly seemed as if my journey away from Suzuki had come full circle. And it made me begin to wonder: How much did it really matter if his Zen was not "authentic"? He had certainly made incorrect claims—and we owe a lot to Sharf and others for shaking up the hagiographic picture of him—but it was still the case that he, Foucault, and others were doing something very interesting with the archives that they were, in a sense, inventing. As the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has written, maybe it's time we move beyond noting that traditions are invented and begin to think about "the inventiveness of tradition."" If we accept that modern Buddhism is an invention, then what can we learn from its inventiveness?

My return to Suzuki led me to ask questions about the general dismissal of modern Buddhism. Could it really be the case that so many people were wrong about Buddhism for so long? If meditation really worked, did it matter that none of the monks I met in Dharamsala did it? And what were we to make of all those modern writers from Asia—D. T. Suzuki, Anagarika Dharmapala, Taixu, the Dalai Lama, B. R. Ambedkar, and many others—who were arguing as vociferously for modern Buddhism as the Western Orientalists? And especially, how did it matter that some of them, like Nhat Hanh and Ambedkar, were so committed to equality and justice through Buddhism? Indeed, this has long been one of the main critical concerns about Orientalism: that in its fascination with what is wrong about Western knowledge of the East, it allowed very little room for how thinkers in other parts .of the world thought about themselves."

Why, then, is this not a book that explains the globalist, Buddhist worldview via the Asian philosophers who outlined it? Because, while I think such an account of modern, global Buddhist philosophy would be useful, the overwhelming focus on Buddhism as a philosophy was what got me—and most Orientalists—into trouble in the first place. Buddhism first appeared in the West in primarily two ways: as an exalted philosophy and as a degraded practice. Western writers upheld the marvelous philosophical insights of Buddhism at the same time that they excoriated its present condition in Asian countries. I learned in Dharamsala that this division was precisely what was occluding our understanding of Buddhist actuality. One cannot understand Buddhism as a pure philosophy or as a specific set of practices; one has to understand it, like most things, as part of an articulated and socially embedded web of relationships among different actors, ideas, and historical facts. And one of the best ways to do this is and has always been through stories.

Donald Lopez, one of the main critics of our impoverished understanding of Buddhism, puts the point precisely in his The Story of Buddhism:

> Most Buddhists throughout history have not engaged in meditation. Many monks have not known the four noble truths. But everyone, monk and nun, layman and laywoman, knows stories about the Buddha, about the bodhisattvas, about famous monks and nuns. These stories, sometimes miraculous, sometimes humorous, sometimes both, have provided the most enduring means for the transmission of the dharma, more enduring even than grand images carved in stone. Each retelling of a story is slightly different from the one before, with embellishments and omissions, yet always able to be told again, its plot providing a coherence to the myriad constituents of experience, from which we may derive both instruction and delight.

What I have set out to do in this book is to show how modern novelists from around the world—from Botswana, Cuba, Japan, South Africa, Tibet, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have told the story of modern Buddhism. I have tried to understand and rearticulate the instruction they provide, the ways they have used Buddhism to make sense of the world around them and their place in it.

I argue that one of the most intriguing things we learn from this study of Buddhism in world literature is that no attempt to extract Buddhism from the complexity of its life-worlds is possible or even meaningful. It is not possible, as I have already mentioned, because every attempt to do so has inevitably found that even the most abstracted claims can only be based on and respondent to material frameworks. And even if it were possible, it would not be meaningful because to have a philosophy, as Foucault argued, is not to have a simple vision of the way the world works that may or may not be liveable. It is to think through how our ideas about the world succeed or fail to coincide with what we are able to make possible. It is thus equally about how we create the practices and institutions in which to effectively embed our ideals. My literary history of global Buddhism is the story of this ongoing dynamic between the promised ideals of Buddhism and their embedded histories.

Here's a story, for example. At the turn of the twentieth century, a powerful and well-connected Tibetan monk leaves his home on what appears to be a religious pilgrimage. The timing is somewhat suspicious, since there is no particularly good reason for him to be on pilgrimage now, especially since it is an extremely intense moment for his country. It is, after all, the height of the "Great Game" of empire, and Tibet is being threatened by both Russia to the north and Britain, via India, from the south. Tibet's fraught relationships with Mongolia and China—whose patronage powerful Tibetan religiopolitical figures have sought for centuries—also continues. Along the way, the monk has a surprising number of contacts with the British and their imperial agents, and an outside

observer—at least one savvy enough to know that monks are political figures—might begin to wonder if his trip is indeed just a religious pilgrimage, or somehow a covert excursion related to geopolitics.

Readers of British literature may recognize the plot I've described as more or less that of Rudyard Kipling's Kim (1900/1901), and in a sense, it is. But it's also a description of a 1905 journey by the Panchen Lama (the second most powerful figure, after the Dalai Lama, in the Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism) who went to India on a pilgrimage to Buddhist holy sites. The trip was certainly in part a genuine pilgrimage for the lama, who by all accounts found it profound and moving, but it also functioned as "'religious cover'" for covert political meetings with the British. That such a political context for the lama of Kim might underlie his trip to India has not, so far as I know, been broached by another literary critic, although, as I will argue in chapter 1, there is ample evidence for this within the text of Kim itself. Indeed, the lama figure in Kim is based on this very lama.

Such a critical lapse has occurred because we take the lama to represent only our own ideas about Buddhism. Because literary critics assume Buddhism to be otherworldly, they take it at face value that the sole purpose of his journey is to find a mystical "river of the Buddha's arrow," where he will find salvation. Because they assume that Buddhism and politics don't mix, they take it that the interesting political plot of the novel has to do with British imperialism in India, and ignore the obvious Tibetan context. If we change such assumptions, we learn something about both modern Buddhism and modern literature. We learn that modern Buddhism has never been otherworldly or removed from everyday concerns, but has always been embedded in the politics of its time. And we learn that literature, far from simply representing Orientalist fantasies, in fact often registers a complexity that the critics have tended to ignore. This is even the case, as we will see, with Edward Said's own writing on Kim.

This is the kind of reading I do throughout this book. I want to show how what we have taken for Buddhist abstraction is in fact embedded in modern life-worlds, and to discuss the lessons that begin to emerge once we pay attention to this. While I will primarily focus on the thematic lessons we may learn, I will also discuss what this teaches us about the formal aspects of these novels in greater detail in each of the chapters that follow. It includes, for example: the meaning of the frame story in Conrad's Heart of Darkness; the way literary language and characters are reincarnated in Jamyang Norbu's Mandala of Sherlock Holmes and J. M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello; the interpretation of seemingly nonsensical phrases or plot twists in Severo Sarduy's Cobra; and the structuring power of parables in Zadie Smith's The Autograph Man. In these and other instances, the application of vague ideas about what Buddhism is stops us from understanding how these novels formally operate. Once we know how Buddhism has informed these novels at a complex, formal level, we will see their composition in a new light.

Like all stories, my global literary history of global modern Buddhism has to begin and end somewhere. This is a literary history; not the literary history. Some of the choices I have made in telling this story may surprise readers. You will not find in what follows a discussion of Herman Hesse's Siddhartha, James Hilton's Lost Horizon, Jack Kerouac's Dharma Bums, the stories of Jorge Luis Borges, or any other fictions generally associated with modern forms of Buddhism. Part of the reason for this is precisely that they are expected, and I have tried to discuss Buddhism in authors and countries generally less associated with it. This includes Buddhism's often unremarked appearance in canonical works like Heart of Darkness and writers like Coetzee. And it also includes a greater diversity of writers than are often considered in studies of Buddhism and literature: novels like Bessie Head's A Question of Power—a novel about founding a new kind of Buddhism in the midst of insanity and domestic abuse—and Severy Sarduy's Cobra—a wild narrative about magic potions, sex changes, and drug dealers spending time with Tibetan monks in India.

The diversity of these selections matters a great deal for the literary history I am telling here. Too often, it is presumed that modern Buddhism is mostly for middle-class, bourgeois white people who have time to meditate and possessions to abandon. There is some truth to this. But focusing on it too heavily erases the many experiences with Buddhism that we find across lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality." And factoring in these experiences presents us with a richer tapestry of modern Buddhist novels. It allows us to understand how seemingly abstract themes like authenticity, liberation, and enlightenment become embedded differently depending on the subject and their identity (or identities). At the same time, it helps us understand how such themes are shared in spite of the remarkable diversity of the authors. That's why I have grouped these novels by their shared themes. Across their diversity, they help to illustrate a singular history of global Buddhism: one in which we give up the hope for total salvation and instead focus on spectral illuminations that can help us work through the burdens of history and identity in our quests for liberation and authenticity.

In each chapter I will also relate the novels to chapters from my own story of learning, unlearning, and relearning global Buddhist history. While some academic readers may be less interested in my personal story, some general readers may find these sections more entertaining than the literary criticism. I have done my best to make the criticism as available and interesting as possible, within the conditions of scholarship, to readers coming from different backgrounds. I situate each novel's encounter with Buddhism at the nexus of authorial intentions, linguistic and narrative choices, and historical and philosophical contexts. I believe this methodological pluralism better explores the complexity of what Buddhism does in these novels than any particular school of interpretation. One tip to readers who do not frequently engage with literary criticism: it is much more enjoyable to read about novels that you have read, so I encourage you to read as many of these wonderful books as you can.

Whatever your background, I hope this book leads you to take critical Buddhist studies more seriously—not just for accuracy but also because factoring in Buddhism can give you a greater amplitude and understanding for dealing with suffering, liberation, history, oppression, and other themes pertinent to our lives today. It may at first be disappointing that in the story I tell about these themes, spectral illuminations of Buddhism cannot save the ruins of modernity, any more than the revelations of modernity could save the ruins of Buddhism. But perhaps the study of the global interactions of Buddhism, literature, and modernity may teach us something about how to appreciate the genuine values of existence in such a fraught and damaged world. And it may remind us of the immense joys and gifts that not only surround but also come through the damage. We may not find absolute enlightenment, the type of blazing revelation I wanted as a teenager, but the spectral illuminations may yet light a path to the world that the best aspects of Buddhism have always imagined. <>

## **GEORGE SANTAYANA'S POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS** by Katarzyna Kremplewska [Series: Value Inquiry Book Series, Social Philosophy, Brill, 9789004506329]

Santayana's political ideas, as contained in **DOMINATIONS AND POWERS** and dispersed throughout his other works, have not been given the attention they deserve. This is the first comprehensive study of Santayana's political hermeneutics as embedded in his general philosophy and intimately connected to his cultural criticism. Managing necessity and harmonizing diversity, negative anthropology, an Apollonian individualism and naturalistic humanism, are only a few of the interpretative categories used to elucidate the dense, ambiguous and ironic ruminations of Santayana

and reveal their timeliness. Discussion of other thinkers—from Plato to Ricoeur—brings to light the essentially dialogical character of his work.

CONTENTS



## Foundations and Contours

The first chapter is devoted to the contours of Santayana's political hermeneutics. I attempt to curb systematically his ideas while preserving the structure of his own design, namely – **a.)** the dynamics between dominations, powers, and virtues as describing the relational position of a given life or lives in respect to their true interests and with vital liberty in view; **b.)** the three, intertwining orders present in the socio-political realm: generative, militant, and rational. An inquiry into the essentials of Santayana's conception of human nature, condition, and constitution allows me to illuminate the pre-political, anthropological and existential pillars of his political hermeneutics. I also introduce certain interpretive keys, such as *negative anthropology*, *managing necessity* (which I later develop into *managing necessity and harmonizing diversity*), and *governing life*, meant to illuminate the critical-hermeneutic potential of Santayana's political thinking. In the same chapter I discuss the twofold understanding of the very notion of "politics" held by Santayana, which, as I argue, is reflected in the dual nature of his endeavor in *Dominations and Powers*. Finally, I draw the reader's attention to the multitude of perspectives present in Santayana's political writings, which expresses his impartiality and adds to his work a dialogic dimension.

## Liberty

In the second chapter, I analyze the evolution of Santayana's ideas about freedom and liberty, with focus on **a.)** the dilemmas and paradoxes involved in what the thinker calls "vacant freedom," and **b.)** the function of a moral horizon in politics performed by his idea of vital liberty. Of all themes central for Santayana's political philosophy, that of freedom allows to illuminate in the most articulate manner its extra-political premises, as well as to establish an intimate connection between his cultural criticism and socio-political reflection. Moreover, it brings to light the threads of continuity – existing regardless of change – in his early and late works. Finally, a look at Santayana's thoughts on anarchy leads me to the conclusion that his considerations of freedom sharply reveal the fact that every conception of freedom contains a seed of servitude and no conception of freedom is impartial.

## Servitude

In the third chapter, in connection with Santayana's materialistic naturalism and his ideas of **a.)** the state and society as sources of multifaceted servitude, **b.)** government as managing necessity, **c.)** liberty as constituted amidst limitations, I examine Santayana's vision of humans as thoroughly dependent beings and discuss basic forms of human servitude, including those of social

and political origin. They embrace the whole range of phenomena – from the fact of having a body and hence, natural needs, through social commitments, military service, ideal allegiances such as patriotism, to a problematic relation of man to technology. I employ, useful in my view, Santayana's distinction among three kinds of servitude: necessary, voluntary, and involuntary yet accidental.

## Militancy

The fourth chapter is devoted to the category of militancy – a generic term referring to the multitude of ways in which initiative, competition, and conflict manifest themselves in the human world. Forms of governmental oppression, the economization of all spheres of life, the power of ideologies and propaganda, as well as military conflicts are discussed. These phenomena have often been framed by Santayana in terms of re-barbarization, militarism, and tribalism, and judged from the perspective of their influence on the possibility of rational human government and self-government and, thus, the attainment of what Santayana calls the life of reason. In particular, I focus on Santayana's criticism of militarism with reference to Arnold J. Toynbee's theory of the decline of civilizations. In connection with the category of militancy, being a moral category indeed, I also argue that Santayana, who opposed a predatory kind of individualism aligned with egoism and power accumulation, proposed an alternative, gentle, "Apollonian" kind of individualism, not deprived of a certain subversive (critical) potential. Santayana's individualism is also unlike social atomism, criticized already by Tocqueville. Finally, this section features *a confrontation between a moralist and a cynic in politics* - a clash of attitudes, which I consider to be one of the most interesting and intriguing motives in Santayana's political thinking.

## Arts as Powers and as Dominations

In this chapter I look at the problem, raised by Santayana, of the relation between the anthropological and cultural function of *arts*, as framed by the ancients, and the status of work as well as liberal arts in mass and consumerist society. Santayana was preoccupied, as I argue, with dehumanization and a phenomenon of a thoroughgoing alienation (to use Marx's term loosely) occurring between man and his activity. In this context, I also look at Santayana's criticism of the social status of the modern art and the artist, with reference to a parallel discussion of the condition of the modern art by Ortega y Gasset. A longer digression on Santayana's approach to secularization and his idea of "secularization without emancipation" completes the chapter.

## The Fragility of Liberalism

This section is devoted exclusively to the reconsideration of Santayana's inquiry into the fragility of liberalism and its unfulfilled promises. I gather the dispersed in Santayana's *oeuvre* pieces of his criticism of liberalism and reflect upon them in a variety of contexts and with reference to other thinkers, John Gray most prominently. The failure of the liberal rule to wed negative liberty with equality of opportunity and the social and political consequences of this failure are among the major points made by Santayana and addressed by me. This is followed by the consideration of Santayana's changing opinion regarding the rise of the interventionist state, which he perceived as one of the ironies of liberalism. The Scylla of state interventionism has an alternative in the Charybdis of the particularism and the factionalism of civil society and both are subject to Santayana's incisive criticism. Finally, I inquire into the intimate connection between liberalism and culture, the very possibility of the former being dependent on the condition of the latter in a much greater degree than we may be habitually inclined to think.

## Reflections on Self-Government, Democracy, and Justice

In this chapter, being one of the most important from the perspective of the contemporary reader, I review Santayana's ideas concerning governmental legitimacy, the paradoxes of representative democracy, the relation between the egalitarian and the aristocratic ideal (and what the latter may mean today), or, in other words, the ways democratic practice on the hand embodies and, on the

other, betrays the ideal of human self-government. With the support of the idea of *managing necessity and harmonizing diversity*, I address the issue of Santayana's universalist and cosmopolitan sympathies and look at the possibility of socio-political arrangements that are alternative to a democratic nation-state and, as Santayana speculated, might become all the more realistic option in the globalizing world. Most importantly, I attempt to reconstruct and interpret Santayana's idea of justice by employing a double hermeneutic key: of harmony and charity. I argue that Santayana held a nuanced, sensitive, decisively modern, and potentially universalistic approach to justice.

## Santayana on Communism

The main theme of this section are Santayana's changing views on communism, the evolution of which I trace by consulting both his philosophical writings as well as private correspondence. More specifically, I **a.)** try to understand the motivation and rationale behind the initial hopes Santayana might have attached to communism, **b.)** take a brief look at the incompatibility of his materialism with dialectical and/or historical materialism, **c.)** analyze Santayana's critical insights into the ways in which communist practice failed, which leads me to conjecture that his scattered comments, general and unsupported by sound knowledge of Marxist thought as they are, tend to be congenial with the conclusions of major critics of Marxism, such as Leszek Kołakowski or Andrzej Walicki.

## Conclusions and Further Reflections on Why Culture Matters

In the final chapter, while summarizing major conclusions reached in the book, I explore broader contexts of the virtues Santayana extoled and the vices he reproached and ask whether they may be recognized as limits to his moral relativism. I also argue that one of a few overarching, though inexplicit, ideas that Santayana has conveyed in his writings on socio-political issues is that *culture is wiser than politics*. It seems to originate somewhere in the vortex of his philosophical commitments as well as personal preferences, which I frame in terms of: **a.)** a humble and self-critical humanism; **b.)** a modest and gentle individualism, which I call *Apollonian* and oppose both to social atomism and to a predatory individualism of power; **c.)** the primacy of culture over politics and the idea of not overestimating politics. Culture may constitute both a safeguard for humanity against the evils of politics and a source of betterment for the political sphere itself. Thus, upon my reading, one may find in Santayana an inexplicit incentive to depoliticize culture in order to save its liberality. This postulate, however, cannot be embraced uncritically and universally given the specificity of the contemporary context. An overarching conclusions is that a set of *principles of human benefit* be elicited from the body of Santayana's socio-political philosophy and cultural criticism. These include the principle of: **a.)** perfection, which involves respect for finite forms, virtues, arts, and a sustained, selective continuity; **b.)** rationality; **c.)** limited benefit from material progress (or: the principle of spiritual vindication); **d.)** *Nemesis*, by which I mean epistemic humility and the recognition of unintended consequences of human action, and **e.)** preserving disinterestedness, which involves the comprehension of autotelia, and an attitude of a sympathetic and supportive distance towards otherness (or: different forms of life), and - as such – may be a moral basis of pluralism.

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Why Culture Matters?

Santayana's political hermeneutics, as it has emerged from this study, is characterized, on the one hand, by syncretism and an intimidating breadth of thematic scope and, on the other, an integrity, which it owes to the naturalistic commitment as well as the humanistic and individualistic orientation of the author, expressed both in the initial assumption that "each man is by nature an end to himself"1 and the idea of vital liberty serving as an ultimate moral horizon for human government. While vital liberty is an individual attainment, it never occurs in a void, but in a society, in a medium of culture, and in specific political circumstances. The question posed by Santayana is this: under

what conditions society and government are more of a benefit for its members than a burden. The relation of socio- political arrangements, then, to the attainability of vital liberty becomes both a target of criticism and the measure of judgment.

The life of reason, modus operandi of a good politeia, is, in fact, a naturalistic and pragmatic ideal of a pluralistic environment in which diverse individuals and groups may achieve completion and satisfaction, with regard to broadly understood circumstances, and while coexisting in a possibly peaceful manner with one another. As I have stressed repeatedly, human diversity, insofar as it reflects the natural variety of endowments and ideals possible, and plays a culture- forming function, being thus conducive to vital liberty, is assumed to be not only an ultimate social fact but also a good to be sought and protected. Now, in the light of the ideal of the life of reason, it is assumed that "[a] rt, which is action guided by knowledge, is the principle of benefit." The basic principle and virtue proper to the art of government and self- government is rationality, a higher- order human prerogative aiming at, first, reasonable satisfaction of needs and desires, and, second, reconciling or harmonizing often irrational and conflicted diversity. Wisdom, which except for rationality involves experience, far- sightedness, and the understanding of the conditions of human well- being, allows for setting major goals guiding action. By associating the art of government with the life of reason, Santayana makes politics – without denaturalizing it at any means – transcend a merely instrumental strategy of controlling animal impulses engaged in an eternal struggle. We are thus – to refer to Santayana's categories – at the level of politics in its "nobler" sense, one ascribed to it both by Plato and Aristotle. It requires of those engaged in governing to represent, except for professional competence, some politically significant virtue. Santayana, in general, is reticent towards the possibility of a beneficent and lasting government relying exclusively on procedural arrangements.

I have stressed throughout the book that the individualistic spiritus movens behind Santayana's political hermeneutics is the pursuit to increase the chances of individuals to live good lives in ways relatively compatible with their natural potential, non- interfering with analogous attempts of others, and, whenever possible, entering in a harmonious relation with them. In correspondence to these aims, my conclusion is that a set of principles of human benefit relevant for human communities may be elicited from Santayana's philosophy. These include the principle o^ 1) perfection, which involves respect for finite forms, virtues, arts, and a sustained, selective continuity; 2) rationality; 3) limited benefit from material progress (or: the principle of spiritual vindication); 4) nemesis, by which I mean epistemic humility and the recognition of unintended consequences of human action, and 5) preserving disinterestedness, which embraces the comprehension of autotelia and an attitude of a sympathetic and supportive distance. These principles may also be seen as a response to what Santayana criticized as dehumanizing tendencies that characterize modern culture and the cynicism permeating politics.

While Santayana is convinced that there is more than one model of a socio- political organization conducive to human well- being, one may still point to what is obviously excluded from the array of acceptable options, namely – a totalitarian system as a radical negation of diversity and vital liberty, or, in Cassirer's words, a system based on "the principle of Gleichschaltung." Totalitarianism, de facto, makes culture as such redundant. To this I would also add any modern system that either by way of neglect or through unnecessary oppression, leads, through material and moral degradation of human life, to the exclusion of large groups of people from a proper participation in culture, thwarting their pursuit of vital liberty.4 One may think of oppressive autocracies, dictatorships in particular, oligarchies, and societies based on uncompromising, rigid, and exclusive hierarchies, based on dogmatic, superstitious or purely egoistic principles, privileging some individuals on the basis of, for example, wealth, heredity, or race.

This being said, one may have an impression that Santayana devoted not enough attention to the issue of justice and did not venture to develop an explicit and complete theory of it. Nevertheless, focusing on what he did say on justice, I have attempted my own interpretation with the support of two hermeneutic keys, namely- the notions of harmony and charity. What emerges from this reading is an eclectic, modern, and reflective approach, which seeks to explain justice in terms of three of its possible motivations – the pursuit of harmony by a disinterested reason, the admiration and recognition of multiform human excellence, and a universal incentive, reflected in different religious and philosophical traditions worldwide, to minimize suffering. While all of them are meant to express some shade of impartiality, the first one is a principle of the life of reason, the second and the third may be described as different facets of love – love as idealization or a premonition of perfection in the other, and love as a sense of sympathy with the suffering other, accompanied by a desire to relief them. The first of the two types of love reappears in Santayana's writing in different guises – for example in the form of the idea that eminence is universally representative, discussed in the section on the aristocratic ideal. The following passage is an articulate expression of the idea:

> To worship mankind as it is would be to deprive it of what alone makes it akin to the divine – its aspiration. For this human dust lives; this misery and crime are dark in contrast to an imagined excellence; they are lighted up by a prospect of good. Man is not adorable, but he adores, and the object of his adoration may be discovered within him and elicited from his own soul. In this sense the religion of humanity is the only religion, all others being sparks and abstracts of the same.

One also reads that in order to approach "the Life of Reason nothing is needed but an analytic spirit and a judicious love of man, a love quick to distinguish success from failure in his great and confused experiment of living." The context of Paul Ricoeur's ruminations on love and justice helped me illuminate the fact that Santayana in his reflections on justice chooses metaphors from beyond the circle of retribution and vengeance, and from beyond the dominant utilitarian model. Other, practical aspects of just politics, such as equality of opportunity and elements of welfare state have also been given attention in this book.

All these dimensions of justice may be associated with the two levels of governance that according to my interpretation may be found in Santayana's thought – that of managing necessity (the level of necessity) and that of harmonizing diversity (the level of liberty). The two represent, as I have suggested, a specific formula of the separation of powers and competences. The art of harmonizing diversity must be founded in the art of managing necessity. As a naturalist, a materialist, and a critical philosopher, Santayana is careful to distinguish between human needs, interests, demands and preferences. Basic needs, as objective and common, part of the dimension of necessity, render themselves to an impartial, non- ideological interpretation in terms of interests and their "scientific" management. Yet, precisely this dimension of governing life or managing necessity forms a sphere of potential abuse, which I have discussed in this book with reference to what I call Santayana's negative anthropology. The thinker has no illusions about the pre- political principle according to which some lives thrive at the price of the belittlement of some other lives. In the absence of virtue, politics is reduced to its "meaner" sense, where government is an instrument of withholding war and distributing necessity and power. Dealing with a plurality of often conflicting units, it may well seek, cynically, to organize their existence according to a principle of enforced domination. Santayana's humanism and individualism stand behind his incisive criticism of the ways politics and society dominate rather than empower individuals.

I have emphasized in the book that, like Plato, who was a critic of the democracy of his own era, Santayana is sensitive to the anthropological placement of contemporary politics. He locates it at the fragile conjunction of material life with language and imagination, and observes that ideologies and fads, spreading like contagions, influence public opinion, and that socio- political phenomena are

often co- fabricated by the language of propaganda, which is an equivalent of unprincipled ancient sophistry. During his lifetime, Santayana observed that the "exercise of autocratic power has become almost normal ... for party leaders ... and it is not in themselves or for what they do that they triumph: they triumph as demagogues" and may become "perpetual dictator[s]." Thus, Santayana's critique of the evolution of the existing democracies may be read as a warning against both totalitarian and autocratic forms of political organization, now transformed and reinforced by modern technology employed in the service of social control and invigilation. While some of the critical tools delivered by Santayana may still be helpful for understanding and judging reality, at least at a certain level of generality, some of his diagnoses have proved more timely than ever, prodigiously timely indeed.

The art of government, any intentional political reform indeed, is limited by the burden of past conflicts and inherited coercion. "People long coerce one another of their private initiative," writes the thinker, "or follow some tradition before they begin to do so through special military or legal agents. [In the generative order] [g] overnment concentrates domination in its own hands, and regulates it. It neither originates nor abolishes domination."8 Santayana repeatedly emphasizes that politics can never be emancipated fully from the ancient bond of necessary servitude, which is suffered by humans primarily in relation to nature and fate (or: contingency), and, then, to custom and law. I have tried to show that this servitude, however, which cannot be superseded fully as it is part and parcel of the human condition, is presented by Santayana as potentially complementary to the highest human good called vital liberty. It is through art (as a form of activity) and virtue that humans may aspire to an equilibrium between powers and dominations, and a harmony between liberty and necessity. The associated role of the government would be, in short, to mitigate the influence of natural necessity and introduce peace where there is conflict.

As John Lachs remarked, we still lack answers to some fundamental questions concerning the relation of individuals to communities. Perhaps no definitive answers exist, in which case, however, we are not exempted from asking the questions. Santayana offers his readers a broad, critical-hermeneutic reflection, which, while establishing a reflective distance from its subject, aims at enhancing self- understanding, illuminating human errors and limitations, revealing paradoxes involved in the practical application of theoretical constructs. As I have tried to show, his philosophy does provide some moral guidance, though without an underpinning of a naïve optimism. It conveys sensitivity to certain – usually overlooked or considered as "dated" – attitudes like criticism, patience, moderation, humility, disinterestedness, understanding of and sympathy with otherness. Meanwhile, the thinker is deliberate in not giving priority to any specific form of government or political doctrine. He sees a philosopher's task in terms of enlightening human will so that it "sees in the first instance how to attain its purpose without making or inflicting unnecessary sacrifices" and is able to "revise or rescind itself."9 These higher-order skills may be crucial given how demanding and fragile liberal and democratic ideals are. Embodying and preserving at least some of them to the common benefit would require a sustained effort and exercise in (self- ) education and (self-) criticism.

Despite the fact that his primary definition of politics and government might suggest otherwise, Santayana explicitly opposes the Hobbesian idea that self- preservation and power accumulation is the highest aim of man and the source of his morality. It is not that these instincts are not real. Yet, there are other, equally real facts "competing" with the grim reality of strife, which is not to say that they ever annul the more "primordial" and violent dimension of human existence. One of them is the indissoluble bond between humans and the medium of culture in which they live. Culture may cultivate other impulses or channel the same impulses differently and assume unexpected forms. Culture may well idealize self- sacrifice rather than self- preservation. It is in the womb of culture that a political culture emerges. Among the sources of human morality culture happens to be one of

the most prominent. It does not alleviate the relativity of morals as an essentialist conception of human rights or a universal and fixed human nature might do, but raises it beyond pure subjectivism, to a supra- individual level and makes it more resistant to momentary caprices and fashions.

Searching for the sources of morality and ideals beyond the individual and his direct circumstances is visible already in The Life of Reason. In it Santayana complains about an unfortunate separation of moral reflection from anthropological and existential one in contemporary philosophy. Rather than starting with asking: What is? Or: What ought to be? one asks an abstract question: "What ought I do?" as if there existed a separate sphere of morals, a self- standing "compartment." Some unfortunate conceptions of human morality, then, seem to Santayana to stem from abstractness, lack of deeper anthropological insight as well as "artificial views about the conditions of welfare; the basis is laid in authority rather than in human nature, and the goal in salvation rather than in happiness."10 Other than that, too often are morals derived primarily and directly from religion, which "unhappily long ago ceased to be wisdom expressed in fancy in order to become superstition overlaid with reasoning." Now, binding morality to the agent and their circumstances on the one hand may confirm relativism, on the other, however, may restrict it as long as this and other agents share a nature, belong to a specific type of natural beings, etc.

I have pointed to the fact that the thinker does not use the traditional notions of natural rights or laws; he preserves the notion of human nature, at least in a weak version, the human condition, and an idea of human constitution - one of a concrete, mortal, psycho- spiritual being, endowed with potentialities, desires, and aspirations, and a propensity to find fulfillment in pursuing them. The said fulfillment does not ask for any additional justification, it is for its own sake and constitutes a sort of a borderline moral idea. This idea, which is one where constitution (or nature) is a source of ideal commitments, is central for Santayana's political thought and makes it at once naturalistic and idealistic, or, in other words, one where the ideal is inspired by nature, but, as I have stressed, not by facticity. What is more, this idea may help free Santayana's political ideas from an individualistic seclusion and the ghost of a radical kind of moral relativism which condemns any moral judgment to sheer arbitrariness as soon as it concerns anything beyond the narrow context of the speaker.

Throughout the book I discuss the way Santayana's moralism and humanism are, in a sense, grappling with his relativism. This is particularly the case in the context of social and political reflection, where certain technical subtleties of Santayana's metaethics, as contained, for example, in Realms of Being, for pragmatic reasons give way to more commonsensical assumptions concerning human agency, rationality, and the ability to form a trustworthy moral judgment concerning others, without which the ideas of moral representation, rational authority, responsibility, and justice would seem dangerously elusive and void. So, for example, an experienced and competent politician, when forming a moral judgment, has at his disposal and takes into account not only his personal, idiosyncratic, psychic impulses and personal preferences but also a rich experience, an insight into the objective needs of the people he represents and the goods that correspond to them, as well as a certain knowledge of the world and the realm of human affairs at large. Additionally, if he happens to be virtuous, his virtue gives him access to the understanding of the aforementioned principles of human benefit, the status of which is natural and aspires to some universality. Some of this knowledge may be conveyed through inherited traditional institutions, but politics, as a sphere of rationality and far- sightedness, cannot rely blindly on inheritance. Now, this heterogeneity of the sources of moral judgment, seems to suggest, tentatively, that there exist limits to Santayana's moral relativism, or, in other words, that his moral relativism tends to restrict itself, especially when regarded in a socio- political context. Such limits, if they exist, will be revealed in the process of examining human nature and the conditions of human well- being. Santayana appreciated the ancient thinkers for, among other things, their continuous effort to do so. More importantly, they will be revealed in and through moral imagination and virtue, which radically expand individual psychic

resources turning them into a more reliable basis for moral judgment and authority, at least in a sociopolitical context. Now, to what extent these limits are universal and fixed for humans, and to what extent they are mutable and culture- specific, remains an open question.

The criticism of the individualism endorsed by Santayana as sterile from a perspective of community may contain a grain of truth but seems to overlook, first, the historical context, second, the significance of individual virtue and attainment to any human community, and, third, the naturalistic and humanistic paradigm to which it belongs. One should keep in mind that Santayana witnessed the rise of mass societies, accompanied by a propaganda of a thorough "socialization" of man, which in the context of the totalitarianisms of his time was, to say the least, ambiguous. George Orwell and Aldous Huxley were warning against anti- individualism. Questions arose about intellectual autonomy and morality when one is incapable of resisting the pull of the crowd or the impersonal mechanisms of the system. It seems important, then, to clarify the type of individualism endorsed by Santayana, a task which I have taken up in this book. I read it as connected to a prominent trait of humanism in his thought, which, next to his naturalism and the idea of spiritual life, constituted one of very few ideal allegiances of the philosopher. While I do not intend to label Santayana "a humanist" in any doctrinaire sense – as a naturalist he enjoyed a belief that humanity is but a form of animal life – I think that it is correct to say that the main context (and rationale) for his well-known critiques of egotism, fanaticism, barbarism, militarism, and, even, capitalism, is humanistic. Actually, one may hardly find a better frame for the idea of wisdom in his thought than a humanistic (and a humane) one. This is illustrated by a beautiful passage from Dialogues in Limbo, where Socrates speaks of the human good: "Are all fashions equally good? Are all transitions equally happy? (...) Have you learned how to live? Do you know how to die? If you neglected these questions your self-government would not be an art, but a blind experiment."

These words encapsulate the meaning of the interconnected ideas of ars vivendi and wisdom. Both are part and parcel of Santayana's humanism and so is his individualism, remaining, as I have argued in this study, at a far remove from a Spencerian- type of egoistic individualism of power. Rather, in its eclecticism, it may be associated with Socratic self- knowledge, an Aristotelian, autotelic understanding of life, a humanistic articulation of individuality by the Stoics, the Spinozist ideal of intellectual autonomy and even, to some extent and despite Santayana's quarrel with romanticism, a post- romantic individualism of authenticity. Furthermore, when Santayana opposes what he calls the "brute humanity" and associates the coming of the brute humanity with the idea that "[c] ivilization is perhaps approaching one of those long winters that overtake it from time to time," he seems to be speaking on behalf and in defense of the virtues of a "polite humanity." Let me stress again, then, that the Apollonian individualism Santayana endorses, is very much unlike both the predatory, modern individualism associated with egoism and the social atomism, which involves depersonalization and in which individualism, especially in large societies, sometimes tends to result.

To connect a few points made by me so far in this chapter, let me evoke once again the issue of the limits of Santayana's moral relativism and say that if they exist, as I am inclined to believe, they originate in the implications of his naturalistic, pluralistic, and individualistic humanism. They reveal themselves, for example, when Santayana discerns within culture certain threads and tendencies that he calls emphatically "inhumane" and describes as "sins against humanity." Even though the thinker does not consider these judgments as "absolute" in any metaphysical sense, he thinks them true and valid from a humanistic (and a humane) perspective and in the light of the fact of human diversity, and hopes, perhaps even believes, that his readers share his moral intuitions, whereby they form a community of certain humane orientation. By calling something "inhuman" he does not mean that it is, in any sense, unnatural or metaphysically evil, but rather, that while being natural, it still conspires against the vital interests of a specific kind of natural being – a human being. Recall that for Santayana the dignity and specificity of a human being rests primarily in understanding, creation and

appreciation of beautiful forms, and sympathy with otherness. When Santayana complains about certain aspects of modern culture, such as loss of chivalry, fear of discomfort, and subservience and conformity to majority option, calling them "a shocking degradation modern society has condemned the spirit," he speaks not on behalf of this or that ancient habit or a way of being but rather of human imagination that has been instrumentalized and enslaved by motivations, aspirations, and interests antagonistic towards human dignity thus understood.

To give a few more examples, in one of his texts, Santayana says "[n] othing will repay a man for becoming inhuman." The inhumanity here consists in egotism and xenophobia expressed in a "hatred of the rest of the world." Elsewhere one reads about "crime against humanity," being a kind of hubris that leads to sacrificing the human good in the name of egoistic and megalomaniac schemes. Faust – a reappearing figure in Santayana's writings and an archetype of these inhuman tendencies – stands for a bearer of an infinite desire that he is keen on realizing without regard to the cost. Thus, he is bound to "grow feeble, vicious, and sad, like other sinners." In politics and society, an inflexibility, an excessive, militant integrity not founded in wisdom, a scary, "absolute singleness of will ... works havoc." Egotism, conceit, and unprincipled craving for power, being flows of character in a private person, turn into a fatal "sin" in a politician, a faction, or a government.

Now, given that "government [in the second, "meaner" sense] is essentially an army carrying on a perpetual campaign in its own territory," Santayana has good reasons for seeing the politicization of life, starting with the politicization of language, as a danger for culture. What sort of danger? The danger of becoming illiberal, inauthentic, and servile, which means losing the emancipatory, formative and dignifying potential that culture, and liberal arts in particular, represent to a human being. For similar reasons Santayana thinks personal virtues are needed for governing oneself and others. Virtues (integrated by individuals but conveyed by culture), as trans- political "powers," may be the only chance to withstand the otherwise irresistible thrust of different forms of competition, conflict, manipulation, and struggle for domination. An inherent idea in Santayana's political thinking, then, is not overestimating politics. To put it in other words, into the relation between an autotelic human life striving for some form of fulfillment, and government, an intermediary or a third party, namely – culture, is introduced.A Santayana's intention is to make this third party an ally of individuals. That is why, as I claim, his political thought is inseparable from his reflection on and criticism of culture. To divorce the two or simply ignore the latter is to deprive the former of some of its most precious insights.

What is more, the individualism and the humanism – both mildly rebellious given their critical potential – endorsed by Santayana are relevant for politics in that they constitute a safe guard against totalitarian tendencies. The quality of human environment is not insignificant for the emergence and success of a totalitarian regime, as authors such as Hannah Arendt or Ernst Cassirer pointed out. It seems that the threat of totalitarianism, the essence of which is anti- individualism, uniformity, and a total politicization of the common world, can hardly be countered without recourse to human individuality. It is an individual who is the bearer of virtues, the primary seat of suffering, judgment, and, when necessary, the source of the spark of multifaceted resistance. Though a single individual, when isolated, may be powerless, a number of similar individuals may constitute a community, a minority of like- minded persons who perhaps may start a movement. But this actual community needs to be founded in and nourished by a virtual human "community," not limited by time and space – in other words, human culture. Humans may and should be able to benefit from the fact that broadly understood culture has deeper roots and longer influence than politics. It remains in their best interest, then, to preserve at least partial autonomy of culture as well as individual, intellectual, and moral independence from the ever- expanding power of politics in its "meaner" sense. In other words, humans may seek in culture protection against the evils of politics.

Now, to counter my own conclusions, I admit that a contrary situation is perfectly possible too! People may and often do seek protection against prejudice or irrational and cruel customs sanctioned by their specific, traditional cultures in the legal and political sphere. This, however, I would reply, is an expression of their longing for justice and a socio- political order which is, at least, an approximation of the life of reason. Thus, we are at the level of politics in its "nobler" sense, where both politics and culture work towards the empowerment of people rather than their enslavement.

Santayana was too well aware of the role of culture as a supra- individual and trans- political medium in forming individuals and communities, to overestimate politics, especially politics of the day. Besides, aware of the significance of unintended consequences of human action, he attaches more hopes to the long- term effects of the development of philosophy and liberal arts for the condition of society, culture, or civilization than about the immediate consequences of current politics. Politics is but one dimension of the world of human affairs, and it sadly happens to be one of the least disinterested ones. Reading Santayana in- between the lines, one may conclude that culture tends to be wiser than politics and less contaminated by the actually competing forces and their interests. However, while culture penetrates social and political life, a reverse process seems to be more potent in the contemporary world. The appearance and global spread of internet made culture more fragile, more forgetful and more sensitive to diffused and unpredictable influences than it has ever been before. This fact prompts one to reconsider both the issue of the autonomy of culture and that of the sources of individual autonomy as even more pressing.

Without intending to cloth Santayana as an idiosyncratic liberal, I have pointed to the fact that, in some respects, such as his endorsement of individualism, tolerance, and pluralism, Santayana is close to the original liberal perspective. In some others, such as his focus on the share of tradition, continuity, and virtue, or, in fact, a set of specific virtues preferred by him, he draws on the heritage of the ancients. I also tried to show that Santayana's criticism of modernity does not make him necessarily an anti- modern thinker. Despite the presence of some conservative traits in his thought and what may seem as a nostalgic sympathy for older, organic forms of socio- political organization, Santayana's anti- dogmatism, his futurist speculations, the hermeneutic- critical form of his reflections, as well as the ambiguity and provocativeness it is permeated by, reveal a modern, if not post- modern dimension of it. Santayana's thinking is always ready to recognize and trespass its own prejudice, even though his very materialism and his views on truth make him an unlikely candidate for a post- modern thinker. As beautifully phrased by Morris Grossman, a "remarkable duplicity" and "controlled ambiguity" are "at the heart of the smiling sadness of the entire Santayanian corpus." As for the ambiguity on Santayana's part, besides being intriguing in itself, it may be considered as a dialogic expression of authentic dilemmas in front of some problems of the human world that – in their intricacy – resist an exhaustive rational analysis and a definitive solution.

Let me conclude by evoking Wilfred M. McClay's humorous remark that "[i] t may seem mildly self-subverting to invoke such a spirit of Gelassenheit [as represented by Santayana] as a form of cultural improvement; and to be sure, one does not want perversely, to turn Santayana into the new guru of moral uplift and self- help." Santayana's astonishingly rich legacy nevertheless remains and one does well to appreciate it "for what it is and what it could mean to us ... and appropriate it on whatever terms make sense to us." My modest aim when writing this book has been to breath into Santayana's political hermeneia some of the vitality it deserves, a philosophical kind of vitality, which arises from and through dialogue and interpretation. Far from hoping to exhaust the interpretive possibilities of his political reflection – which, I am convinced, opens before an inquisitive reader an enormous variety of paths as well as many opportunities for criticism – I seek to provoke further questions and research. <>

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