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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books



Robert Tenor, editor
7-15-2022

New Series Number 100

EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.



Contents Archaeology of Living Faiths

Beatriz Morales: Color Archaeology by Beatriz Morales and Yasmina Jraissati [Kerber Verlag, 9783735607669]

An artist and a scientist collaborate on a multimedia analysis of color

COLOR ARCHAEOLOGY is the first major monographic cross-section of the versatile and engaging work of Mexican artist Beatriz Morales (born 1981). The selection of work represented in this special volume is complemented with texts by Lebanese cognitive scientist Yasmina Jraissati, curator Michel Blancsubé and author Luisa Reyes Retana. A portrait of an unusual autodidactic artist who integrates Latin America, Central Europe and the Middle East in her work, this book also takes a broad, in-depth look at the very nature of color.
Morales' multilayered oeuvre—encompassing painting, installation and video—and Jraissati's scientific, philosophical view of the interplay between color and cultural influence open up to the reader an expanded perspective of color and materiality in art, unfolding between the poles of the traditional and the contemporary, the individuals and the universal. Curator Michel Blancsubé, a renowned specialist on contemporary Mexican art, provides analytical commentary on Morales' oeuvre, while award winning novelist Luisa Reyes Retana engages poetically with the artist's biography between Mexico City, Beirut and Berlin.

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Beatriz Morales draws deeply from a source

of unknown origin. She acknowledges a plethora of energies that inhabit her work. She perceives the space surrounding her as a medium from which to pluck ideas. She feels, she says, accompanied by forces that directly nourish her art. When conditions align in the right way, creation becomes fluid and guided. "Sometimes I feel like I am recreating something that already invisibly exists. I know what I have to do because, somehow, I have already seen it. I have already felt it." Over time, expanding her perceptive abilities and developing a capacity to translate creative impulses into works of art, she learned to identify the sparks that hold the promise of a painting, a sculpture, or a work cycle. She recognizes herself in these sparks and gives herself up to the process. Her nonverbal perception and psychological narratives inform each

other. In this way, her art becomes a conduit for the personal and the magical. Morales's practice draws on daily life; she utilizes what is there, amplifies the implicit thrust

of colors, objects, and ideas, allowing each to reveal itself. Her growth over time as an artist, she states, equals her growing ability to relinquish control. The more she loosens her controlling grip, the more intuition and trust in the generative force of life take over.

Layers of Being

Questions of territory and belonging form a golden thread in the artist's creative process, each open-ended, forming a central tension and interpretative instability in her oeuvre. Morales readily admits that she is often confused about her identity. Her Mexican upbringing, her Lebanese ancestry, and her life in Berlin all contribute to an inner sense of flux. History sneaks into reality. Reality writes history. The multiple layers of identity contained in her, and her quest to uncover the root underneath, provide a possible explanation for her choice of materials and her interest in hidden and revealed layers of meaning.

The series Portals (2021–ongoing) serves as an example. Looking on in a certain frame of mind, we see the suggestion of a figure, maybe stellar bodies; we note technicalities like a finish reminiscent of talcum powder. But something vibrates inside the canvas. If we were to cut it in half with a razor blade, then we would discover previously hidden layers of colors. A language concealed behind the surface, communicating through it. The colors are neither fully hidden, nor actually revealed. They vibrate behind the waxy surface, suggesting that the eye sees more than the consciousness is capable of recognizing, or, possibly, that the body senses color in a way the eye does not. It feels like encountering a coded language.

The Alchemy of Identity

Beatriz Morales experiments with inks, waxes, resins. She explores material resistance, elasticity, the capacity of one material to penetrate another. Her technical approach is sometimes reminiscent of laboratory research. Or, maybe more aptly, of alchemy. She has a playful relationship with materials, and at the same time, a sacred one. Her understanding of color, with each shading of it, is deeply personal. The milestones of her artistic career are fundamentally tied to the quest for identity, manifested in her treatment of color. She speaks of blue as if it were an old friend with whom she has a complex relationship—a friendship that both challenges and defines her. These bonds are emotional.



Relocating to Berlin represented a caesura in Morales's relationship with color. Over a period of four years she devoted herself almost exclusively to black-and-white engraving. "I lost my grasp on color," she confides. In hindsight, she sees this period as a rebellion against the stereotypes of Mexican painters and their abundantly colorful worlds. She overcame this by first claiming a blank canvas for herself, and then, little by little, by transcending the limitations of that rebellion as well.

What followed was a process of rediscovery of color, along a path marked out in neon. Digging beneath the gray surface layer that figuratively and literally covers her chosen hometown of Berlin, Morales became drawn to neon colors, especially hues of red, a color that claims considerable space in her work. Questions of identity and belonging keep surfacing, prompting further exploration.

Purple, for example, is a color she does not understand. It baffles her. She tries to avoid it, yet remains attracted to it. “Colors pertain to their context. They are like words. The richness of one’s visual language depends on the ability to develop a relationship with colors.”

Aspects of a Nonverbal Language Beatriz Morales states that the creative space is intimate and sacred. She does not simplify her processes in description, prefers not to verbalize them. She considers them divine. They are, in a way, untranslatable, and cannot be talked about. The full burden of communication remains on the object of art. Once the creative space has nourished it to being, the rite ends, and Beatriz, the artist, steps aside. “Art ends when a piece is finished.” The creative space closes and a new life cycle begins, subject to rules that are no longer her own.

Morales carries a genetic history of blindness. The sight in her left eye is severely limited. She fears going blind. As a result,

she longs to preserve a relationship with color through nonvisual channels. She feels its vibration. She is aware that society’s link with color is broken. Capitalism has appropriated its language, taking our freedom to know colors for what they are. The market tells us that light blue is for baby boys. Red is for consumption. Who names the colors? Why does pink, a shade of light red, have a name of its own, while light blue does not?

Pondering such questions led her away from evoking familiar emotions such as melancholy or nostalgia in her art. Instead, she aims to invoke sensations associated with color and material. What does yellow provoke in you? How do you relate to an object that looks like a horse’s mane, but in pastel colors and hanging from a canvas? Such is the case of Kihaab (2020), a five-meter-high piece made of agave cactus fiber, inks, and acrylic on jute, as well as her cycle Ts’ul (2020). “Ts’ul,” a Mayan word for “ foreigner,” also describes the white conquerors who never mixed with the native Mayan population. What is Morales expressing with the choice of name? What does the color suggest, when associated with the idea of “foreign”? A feeling.

The oeuvre of Beatriz Morales feels complete and open-ended at once. It comes and goes. It satisfies and frustrates. It embraces its contradictions. Its future is uncertain, but the quest for identity, manifested in and created through colors and textures, imbued with the magic of the intangible process informing it, is an inescapable presence in the artist’s work. <>

Frida Kahlo: Her Universe, Text by Carlos Phillips, Jessica Serrano, Circe Henestrosa, Marta Turok, Octavio Murillo, Beatriz Scharrer, Luis Enríquez, Martha Romero, Paulina García, Pablo Ortiz Monasterio, Jaime Moreno, Tere Arcq, Luz Emilia Aguilar Zinser, Gerardo Estrada. [RM/Museo Frida Kahlo – Casa Azul. 9788417975531]

The iconic Mexican painter as seen through over 300 archival items, from her wardrobe to her personal art collection

This compendium presents the rich diversity of themes, ideas, concepts and emotions generated around two fundamental, iconic figures of modern Mexico: painter Frida Kahlo and her husband, muralist Diego Rivera. More than 300 images from the archives of the Museo Frida Kahlo in Mexico City offer readers a glimpse of Kahlo's distinctive wardrobe and the impressive collections of popular and pre-Hispanic art she assembled with Rivera, her connection with photography and the history of La casa azul, her beloved cobaltblue home that now serves as the museum's main building. This volume welcomes us into Frida Kahlo's universe, exploring the legacy of an indispensable figure in the world of 20thcentury art and culture in her native Mexico and across the globe.

Frida Kahlo (1907–54) began painting at the age of 18 when she was immobilized for several months as a result of a bus crash that left her permanently disabled. From then on, art served as an immense source of healing for Kahlo as well as a vehicle for self-expression and cultural exploration. At the heart of Kahlo's practice was her love for Mexican folk tradition, her staunch communist beliefs and her complex relationship with her body, gender and sexuality. A lifelong

activist, Kahlo died of a pulmonary embolism after participating in a demonstration against the CIA's invasion of Guatemala.

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excerpt: The Blue House has been one of Mexico's official museums since it opened in July 1958. For over 70 years, this highly significant space has been fulfilling its continuous endeavour of displaying and disseminating the artistic and cultural legacy of Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera according to their founding will, which we aim to carry out as a museum day by day.

Rivera entrusted the space's museography to Carlos Pellicer, a museographer, professor and great poet from Tabasco and close friend of the couple. On completion of his task, Pellicer dedicated a letter to Frida, telling her—"that little creature"—what he had conceived for her home in his own poetic words.

Frida's artwork is displayed in rooms one and two. Unique in their style, these works reveal the artist's evolution and the process she used in her paintings. Frida sold most of her masterpieces during her lifetime, so we feel privileged to hold three of her exhaustively elaborated, complex works.

The first of these is an exuberant still life with a frame in the shape of a circle. The second is Frida's posthumous portrait of her father Guillermo Kahlo. The third work is an oil painting on masonite that might be described as a "vivid" life rather than "still" life. It shows watermelons sliced open anti in it. we see Frida's celebratory call to life: "liva la vida". She painted it just days before her death, knowing it would be her last message and only seen by visitors to her home and museum. "You made a true human sacrifice", wrote Pellicer; perhaps this fruit embodies Frida's open heart.

"I left the Tehuana dress you loved so much close by, with its gems and all", Pellicer tells Frida. Those of us at the museum confess that most of the artist's clothing was locked up in the Blue

House's bathroom and some of its storage spaces, including wardrobes and trunks, for 48 years. These spaces were opened up in 2004, considerably enriching the museum collection as well as our understanding of the two artists and, with this, the history of art.

Since these treasures have been classified, complete outfits from Frida Kahlo's wardrobe can now be shared with our visitors. Among them are her hair accessories and the jewellery she used to adorn her iconic face, which is recognized everywhere. "I tucked some of your most beautiful pre-Hispanic necklaces away in a little drawer", wrote Pellicer. These ancestral items, which could be freely purchased in Frida's lifetime, are joined by an original variety from China, Europe and, naturally, Mexico. Frida also had earrings made with the filigree technique and others impeccably crafted in Mexican silver. She wore each of her ornaments with the same pride and flirtatiousness. The elegance of Frida's bearing was such that it conveyed the same value and importance in each of her adornments, regardless of their origin.

The artist also left a large, eloquent photographic collection, which was discovered on the unsealing of her legacy and tells of how she put her outfits together. The photographs give credible evidence to complement Frida's self-portraits and have also provided us with a great deal of information on her social, family and private life. As visual documents, they are complemented by written material dutifully filed away by Frida and perfectly conserved until today. Her archive leaves the impression that she not only wanted us to know her medical history, as told by her doctors, but also her past as a student, when her bad behaviour was offset by good marks. Many other facets of the artist were also expressed and secreted away in the recesses of her home.

Frida and Diego built up a library and left it for our perusal and delight. In it, there are approximately 2,700 works. Some of these have been crossed out, drawn on, underlined and annotated, but no work is more important than any other. Pride of place in the collection, though, must be given to Frida's diary, which Pellicer unashamedly classifies as a literary creation. "There (next to your Tehuana dress) I have left your book, your wonderful book". Amazingly, Pellicer realised that the founding of the museum carries the insinuation that Frida was not writing a private diary but rather a literary one. As her best friend, he understood that he should leave it open to view, and it should be known as Frida's book.

The beautiful hand-crafted kitchen utensils used by the artist and those around her are exhibited in the kitchen, which has also been left "just as it was". The dining room holds pieces of traditional art from the collection Frida and Diego had left as part of their heritage, having defended the high value of such works. Earthenware (piggy banks, pots, cups, pulque vessels, masks); papier mâché (Judas figures); wax (fruit and decorated candles), plant fibre, shellac, wood, metal, paper and glass are "almost the way you left them", says Pellicer. Folk art and crafts are highly important in the Blue House and connect the visitor to quotidian experiences and to Frida as she lived day to day in her home. To look at a clay pot or small papier mâché sculpture in the museum reminds us of the things we keep in our own homes and how we feel that time has not gone by so swiftly, nor has so much identity been lost, which is a particular solace.



FRIDA KAHLO, MEXICO, 1926 PHOTO: GUILLERMO KAHLO

Pre-Columbian art has the same strong presence in the Blue House that it did in Frida's own life. Frida may have initially developed her appreciation for the ancestral forms through the fascination Diego had for them since his childhood years, which was infectious to those around him and communicated to his beloved Frida, in particular. "I placed the best archaeological gifts from Diego to you in a lovely glass case," says Pellicer, bearing witness to the couple's shared pleasure in their possessions. We also know from photographic and written evidence that Frida was enthralled by the sculptures. She displayed them proudly and with great aesthetic care in her home and garden and on her clothing, and they also occupied a significant place in her finances: Frida lent her own financial support to the construction of Anahuacalli; and we might say that the Mesoamerican art at the Blue House introduces visitors to a later encounter with the rest of the "large family of sculptures" at Anahuacalli.

The Anahuacalli Museum is Rivera's temple of the arts and his great artistic legacy, built to display his pre-Hispanic collection. Its mosaic ceilings, magnificent design and other aspects were all conceived by Rivera himself. With visionary, organised foresight, the artist couple arranged for the two museums, Frida Kahlo and Anahuacalli, to be left for the delight and education of the Mexican people. Both were placed under the solid care of the Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo Museum Trust at the Bank of Mexico.

We hope these words will have transmitted the complex, profound transcendence of the Blue House collections.Although there are aspects that went too far beyond the scope of this text to mention, we hope to have sharpened future visitors' curiosity about the undying legacy of Frida and Diego. Two artists, two museums, and a single generous will to enrich the art of Mexico and that of the entire world. <>

Louis Kahn: The Importance of a Drawing edited by Michael Merrill, [Lars Müller Publishers, 9783037786444] 24 × 30 cm, 9 ½ × 11 ¾ in, 512 pages, 919 illustrations

With contributions by Michael Benedikt, Michael Cadwell, David Leatherbarrow, Louis Kahn, Nathaniel Kahn, Sue Ann Kahn, Michael J. Lewis, Robert McCarter, Michael Merrill, Marshall Meyers, Jane Murphy, Gina Pollara, Harriet Pattison, Colin Rowe, David Van Zanten, Richard Wesley, William Whitaker

"The importance of a drawing is immense, because it's the architect's language." — Louis Kahn to his masterclass, 1967

Louis I. Kahn (1901–1974) was one of the most significant architects of the twentieth century and his influence is present today in ways both profound and subtle. Unlike previous publications on Kahn, which have focused on his built work and which considered the drawings foremost as illustrations of these, this is the first in-depth study of drawings as primary sources of insight into Kahn's architecture and creative imagination.

By offering a spectrum of close readings of drawings by Kahn and his associates in a series of incisive and richly illustrated essays, this book is at once an intimate artistic portrait of this important architect and a provocative and timely contribution to the current discourse on representation in architecture. For architects and students of architecture, Kahn's lasting significance is not only in the buildings he built, but in how he designed them.

Based on unprecedented archival research, engagingly presented by a group of eminent scholars and architects, and lavishly illustrated with over 900 highest quality reproductions, The Importance of a Drawing is destined to become a standard work in the literature on Louis Kahn.



Louis Kahn in his office, around 1956, Marilyn Silverstone, photographer, Magnum /Agentur Focus

Louis Kahn and the Importance of (a) Drawing by Michael Merrill

Louis Kahn sits in the drafting room of his office on the corner of 20th Street and Walnut in Philadelphia, lost in thought amid the detritus of work. Spread out on the table in front of him are sketches of a house for Norman and Doris Fisher, together with the essential tools of his craft: roll of tracing paper, triangular architect's scale, drafting tape. He holds a charcoal stick gently in his hand. Kahn must know that the photographer George Pohl is afoot, but he appears so oblivious to him that Pohl's photos [not shown here] let us, too, if only for a moment, become eyewitnesses in the room.' Kahn's posture, with his head bowed and his weight distributed between the edges of the

drafting stool and the table, is a picture of focus. (As is that of his associate Marie Kuo.) Scattered cardboard scraps, used paper coffee cups, skewed drafting lamps, and a desk buried in blueprints tell of the office's create-now-and-clean-later work ethic. Any one of us who has studied architecture knows a space like this one.

And so, we might be tempted by these photographs to project ourselves into the tiny segment of the design process they have captured, which, we might imagine, goes something like this: Kahn thinks about the house he wants to build. Then he pauses for second thoughts. Then he draws the image that he has just conceived in his mind. So far, so good. But wait: although this may at first seem the obvious sequence of events, experience and reflection will soon remind us that it is equally probable that Pohl took his photos in precisely the opposite order. That is, Kahn draws lines on his paper; After which he pauses to consider if more are needed; then he reflects upon what his hand has drawn.

We can study the photos again, and this time more closely, but will find nothing in them that reveals in which of these two sequences they were actually taken. Further reflection, though, will remind us that what is taking place at the drafting table follows a path that is more elliptical or branch-shaped than it is linear. Kahn is at work on something that he can see only dimly in its final form. Although he has an idea, he is repeatedly confronted with its insufficiency, because what he draws on his paper is repeatedly at odds with that idea. And so, he is repeatedly compelled to either change his drawing or to change his idea. In other words, Kahn's drawings continually reshape his idea, while Kahn's idea continually reshapes his drawings. In this, the uncertainty of the photos' sequence reminds us of something so fundamental that it is often left unexamined: in the making of architecture, idea and drawing are ultimately inseparable, and by the time a design is completed it is often impossible to say which—if either—of the two has been primary.

This is a book about Louis Kahn, about drawing, and about architecture—and about their interrelationships. Two simple premises sparked the research that led to the work before you. The first of these is that Kahn's drawings afford us privileged insights into his built and theoretical work, revealing much that would remain hidden without them. The second is that those same drawings make powerful tools for reflection on our own evolving means of thinking and representing architecture. That both premises are worthy of pursuit seems, at this late date, to be beyond question. Kahn's central importance for modern architecture has long been established, and by now we also know that his architecture, to a degree shared by few others, was inseparably intertwined with a rich culture of drawing and representation. And yet, while there are numerous monographs and studies of Kahn's built work and projects, there have been only few explicit and extended attempts to explore the relationships between his drawing and his architecture. This book attempts to partially remedy that lack while projecting its findings both as answers and questions into our own present. Because for students of architecture ("students" in the largest sense), the long-term significance of Kahn resides not only in the buildings he built but, equally, in how he designed them.

On the Research Leading to this Book

The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) together with my employers at the universities in Darmstadt and Karlsruhe, enabled me to dedicate over five years to this project, with over eight months of that time spent in Philadelphia, immersed in the drawings of Kahn and his associates in the Architectural Archives of the University of Pennsylvania. There, I was given the unprecedented chance to study several thousand drawings by Kahn and his associates representing projects spanning the length of Kahn's career. I had the great fortune to be guided in my research by Curator and Collections Manager William Whitaker, and to be joined in the archives

by a remarkable party of scholars, architects, family, and former associates of Kahn, a dedicated group of whom have contributed original research and essays to this book.

The Louis I. Kahn Collection

When Louis Kahn died unexpectedly in 1974, it became apparent that his office owed almost half a million dollars in outstanding fees and bills. Recognizing the importance of keeping Kahn's archive whole, a group of dedicated supporters initiated a movement to settle Kahn's estate by selling his office holdings to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. After a petition was signed by thousands of Pennsylvanians, a bill was initiated, and a fight for funds in the State House of Representatives was won, the sale was finalized in 1977. In the following year the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission placed the collection on permanent loan to Kahn's alma mater and long-time employer, the University of Pennsylvania. The Louis I. Kahn Collection was opened to the public in 1979 and is one of the greatest of many treasures in the Architectural Archives of the University of Pennsylvania, a unique institution that preserves and makes available the work of over 400 designers from the seventeenth century to the present. The Kahn Collection is awe-inspiring, with approximately 6,500 sketches by Kahn, nearly 30,000 office drawings, and 100 models representing around 230 projects. The collection includes several of Kahn's notebooks and private drawings, more than 15,000 photographs, 150 boxes of office files and correspondence, as well as an inventory of Kahn's personal library, awards, and other artifacts.

On the Shape of this Book

Louis Kahn used drawings to see, to see more, to find out, to play, to daydream, to share, to conjecture, to collaborate, to assert, to explain, to seduce, and to delight. Considering the depth of Kahn's built work and the multitudes of—and in—his drawings, no single book on his buildings, nor on his drawings, nor on the relationship between them can claim to be comprehensive. That said, this project has been driven by what Robert Venturi once called "an obligation to the difficult whole." My goal as editor has been to compose something more than a random sampling of essays; rather, I have hoped for the book's parts to add up to a connect-the-dots portrait of Kahn, his creative intelligence, and his work through his drawings. In doing so, I have attempted to present the drawings so that that they might encourage speculation, new ways of seeing, and new work. My coauthors were accordingly wooed, and the themes and drawings selected in an attempt to intimate something of both the depth and the breadth of Kahn's drawing culture; to demonstrate a spectrum of media and techniques used, to trace some of the traditions in which Kahn's drawing practice stands, to shed light on the ways in which drawing was learned and used, and to reflect on the contexts of the drawings' use. Working in this way means that gaps and omissions are necessary in order to cover ground, just as overlaps and repetition are necessary in order to allow for multiple viewpoints. The reciprocal relationship between drawing and design means that the drawings have sometimes served to discuss technique and method, and other times as inroads to better understanding the results of the design process. I, for my own part, have been just as interested in what drawing did with Kahn as with what Kahn did with drawings.

The resulting book, echoing the process of its making, resembles a logbook of an expedition across a large continent. While it was deemed necessary to linger and survey certain major features of the landscape (orthographic drawings and the embodied imagination, the theme of composition, the influences of Kahn's Beaux-Arts education, for example), serendipitous detours along the way revealed unexpected yet telling insights (such as a set of tiny survey sketches of the Salk Institute's site, full-scale drawings for a drinking fountain at the Kimbell Art Museum, a drawn/written letter from Colin Rowe). Limits of time and space meant that a number of fertile landscapes had to be passed swiftly and sketched from a distance, in the hope of animating others to return to them (perspective drawings, diagrams, the vitally important question of scale, etcetera). Since our

exploration was dedicated to Kahn's drawings, his use of other representational means—including models, photography, texts, and print media—can only be referenced here.

The book has been divided into eight sections to structure our findings. Beginning with Kahn's first steps in drawing, we progress: First, over Kahn's use of drawings as an active tool for seeing and discovery. Two sections are then dedicated to the uses of the various drawing types as tools for inquiry in design. Drawings are then used to reveal aspects of Kahn's culture of collaboration. Next, the perennial theme of "composition" is explored through drawings. A section then focuses on a number of special themes in drawing. Redrawing is then shown as a means of understanding Kahn's intentions. Finally, our expedition concludes with thoughts on the relevance of what we have seen for future teaching and practice. Although the essays are arranged to form a narrative or an "epistemological arc," they may be read in any order. They are both analytic and synthetic, alternating between attempts to break Kahn's work into its parts and to gain sight of it as a whole. The essays are self-explanatory, so rather than attempting to summarize them here I would hasten you onward to explore them.

Some Thoughts on How to Use This Book

Although this book includes works from all phases of Kahn's career, it is neither a "complete works" nor a monographic survey. To maximize the area dedicated to Kahn's iterative and exploratory drawings means to minimize those photographs and print-ready images that are the conventional means of presenting architecture. The texts, too, by focusing on drawing and representation, omit much contextual information that belongs in more general project descriptions. And yet, architectural drawings such as those reproduced here work best in the space between what we see and what we know. Those readers who know Kahn's work well will hopefully recognize in this lack of photos and conventional descriptions an invitation: to dwell in that space between seeing and knowing, and so to participate more intimately with Kahn and his associates in their acts of creation. Those who are less familiar with Kahn's work will profit greatly from photos and general descriptions of the buildings. I encourage you to have one or more of the monographs listed in the bibliography at hand.

By ordering the material thematically rather than by project, drawings made in close concert have been separated here for study. So, for example, the floor plans of the Exeter Library are to be found under the theme of "composition," while the library's vertical sections, elevations, and perspectives are studied in essays devoted to each of the respective drawing types. Other projects are distributed in a similar manner. While there is something admittedly violent—and intellectually risky—in doing this, there are good reasons for taking this path. On the one hand, we wish to highlight the particular propensities and virtues (and pitfalls) of the various drawing media and types, and to reflect on some of the ways that Kahn's imagination animated—and was animated by—the innate intelligence of each.' We follow an unhidden agenda here. Although no type of architectural drawing is superior per se (only superior toward certain ends), there currently exists a dogma—at least in large parts of the profession—that holds simulation and three-dimensional modeling to be the measure of all things, usurping the multifarious tools of architectural representation.' Kahn's masterful use of the various drawing types will hopefully give cause to reconsider their respective virtues, while his broad and expansive repertoire of tools will hopefully give cause for emulation. On the other hand, we hope that the book's presentation of its subject matter, by counting on you, dear reader, to actively reassemble the drawings in your imagination, allows you to at least partially reenact our own explorations in Kahn's archives. While my coauthors and I have made all efforts to present our research in a verifiable manner as a basis for further academic study, it has been our

primary intention to make this a creative study book in the spirit of Louis Kahn, that most nonacademic and active reader of history. <>

STRIPPED: READING THE EROTIC BODY by Maggie M. Werner. [RSA series in transdisciplinary rhetoric, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 9780271087764]

The book explores the bodies, acts, and discourses that constitute embodied erotic rhetoric by foregrounding the material communication practices of performing bodies and proposing complementary frameworks and theories for analyzing them.

STRIPPED examines the ways in which erotic bodies communicate in performance and as cultural figures. Focusing on symbols independent of language, Maggie M. Werner explores the signs and signals of erotic dance, audience responses to these codes, and how this exchange creates embodied rhetoric.

Informed by her own ethnographic research conducted in strip clubs and theaters, Werner analyzes the movement, dress, and cosmetic choices of topless dancers and neo-burlesque performers. Drawing on critical methods of analysis, she develops approaches for interpreting embodied erotic rhetoric and the marginal cultural practices that construct women's public erotic bodies. She follows these bodies out into the streets—into the protest spaces where sex workers and anti-rape activists challenge discourses about morality and victimhood and struggle to remake their own identities. Throughout, Werner showcases the voices of these performers and in the analyses shares her experiences as an audience member, interviewer, and paying customer. The result is a uniquely personal and erudite study that advances conversations about women's agency and erotic performance, moving beyond the binary that views the erotic body as either oppressed or empowered.

Theoretically sophisticated and delightfully intimate, **STRIPPED** is an important contribution to the study of the rhetoric of the body and to rhetorical and performance studies more broadly.

Review

"STRIPPED *is an admirable, frank, and at times deliberately fraught read of eroticized performance with the body. Maggie M. Werner's analysis is accompanied by frequent personal, auto-ethnographic interludes. This multimethodological approach to writing is refreshing to read." —Joshua Gunn, author of Modern Occult Rhetoric: Mass Media and the Drama of Secrecy in the Twentieth Century*

"Maggie M. Werner's **STRIPPED** *manages to cover an embodied curriculum that is extremely relevant on and off North American campuses, where issues of bodily consent, control, agency, and expression should be central but have instead often been marginalized. The book is extremely well written, driven by personal vignettes and told through a series of public controversies. Werner successfully argues that embodied rhetoric is not just rhetoric about the body; it is also rhetoric from the body. Explicitly embodied rhetoric cannot exclude sexual behaviour." —Jay Dolmage, author of Disabled Upon Arrival: Eugenics, Immigration, and the Construction of Race and Disability*

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Embodied Erotic Rhetoric's Acceptance and Rejection

I pull up to Isabella's house. When I walk in the living room, she's sitting with three friends, all strippers, all women I know from the club. We all exchange Hey's and nod. They're passing both a joint and the final paper from my rhetorical analysis class called "Dirty Girls and Stinky Guys: A Fantasy-Theme Analysis." It was, at the time, my magnum opus. A harbinger of my assured success as a rhetorical critic. I was so proud of it. The paper features Isabella heavily, as did all of the papers from that class. She was funny, clever, and I was sprung beyond belief on her. I very nearly worshipped her and constantly sought her approval. When I gave her the paper to read, I was all puffed up, assuming she would be impressed by my brilliance. I may not be the type of bar fighting butch dyke she liked, but look . . . brains! I figured that had to count for something.
I stood for a moment taking in the scene. Puff puff pass. Pass the joint, pass a page. Isabella spoke:
"We're reading your little story."
<inhale>
"It's hilarious."
Acceptance. Rejection.

Criticizing the Erotic Body

Historically, rhetoricians and communications scholars have largely been disciplined in analysis of linguistic communication, thus criticism of the body has tended toward textual analysis of discourses about, rather than the material symbolic communication of the body. Recent inter- and transdisciplinary scholarship has brought rhetoric and communication together with performance studies—in which the breathing, sweating, moving body has always been central—to expand theories and analysis of meaning and communication. The resulting collaborations yield an understanding that rhetoric of the body is always a multicoded rhetoric. Although critics can attend to any one symbolic aspect to theorize the body, understanding that it is always impacted by others is necessary to move criticism beyond text-only paradigms that flatten embodied practices. Thus critical methodologies that are attendant to these multiple realms and their interplay are imperative to unpacking complexities of the body's symbolic communication.

In this book, I've provided a series of analytical frameworks that can productively examine the interplay of linguistic and material symbols, and I have applied each to a different site of women's public erotic performance, sites of embodied rhetoric. I've followed one such erotic body—the stripping woman—through club and theater performances, into the streets, and as a cultural symbol, weaving through both discursive and material symbolic forms of embodied rhetoric. The first of these frameworks—delivery--offers an ancient link between rhetoric and performance showing the long-standing connections between the two. Delivery in itself offers an expansive way of criticizing embodied rhetorics because it is composed of various common topics" or topoi—body, genre,

space, and audience—that are each applicable to communication in varied symbolic realms. Delivery can provide an overall way of conceiving embodied rhetoric that other theories can enrich. The topos of the body includes material symbolic codes related to movement and adornment and also discursive codes including identity and persona. In various chapters, I have tracked the body topos through these realms, including movement and adornment in chapters 1, 2, and 3 and discussions of discourses that make and remake identities in chapters 4 and 5. I take up the genre topos explicitly in chapter 2, but as genre itself is composed of various parts—situation, substance, style—encouraging distinct affective responses in participants and yielding various social actions, genre is always shaping and shaped by communicating bodies. I've also taken up the space topos in both literal and metaphorical ways throughout. In the first part of the book, I analyze spatial differences between clubs and theaters (chapters 1 and a), and in chapter 4 I illustrate that situating the stripping body in different spaces—protest spaces versus performance spaces—is part of how identities get dis- and rearticulated. In chapter 5, space is metaphorically invoked as a way to understand how movements, like SlutWalk, that embrace the material symbolic codes associated with sex work, are perceived as either opening or closing spaces for women of color. Finally, the topos of audience is at the heart of all of the critical work in this book. Relationships with audiences create both genres (chapter a) and rhetorical forms (chapter 3). Audiences also have the power to shape rhetors' identities in ways that are fundamentally at odds with the rhetors' own (chapters 4 and 5).

Genre criticism, while primarily concerned with written texts in rhetoric and communication studies, has lately been embodied, largely through the theories of Joshua Gunn, who, drawing on film theory, connects genre to affect. Because rhetorical genres of the body often get collapsed into one another under vast labels—sports, acting, dance, stripping—genre offers critics a way to discern the particular and specific affective dimensions of individual types of body rhetoric. For example, as chapter 2 argues, topless dancing in clubs and neo-burlesque share many symbolic methods of communication but fundamentally differ in the ways that the audience body—both as individuals and as a collective—participate in the performances.

In addition to the application of corporeal-friendly concepts for body criticism like delivery and genre, embodied rhetoric also benefits from applying typically discursive theories because discourse shapes the ways that audiences and rhetors understand performance. One such theory, seduction, is particularly useful to embodied erotic rhetoric, especially when seduction operates both as it is popularly understood as arousing desire and as it is theoretically proposed as encompassing those rhetorical forms that operate outside of rationality and purpose-driven discourse.

Identity, understood in this book as various ideological elements joined into a named unity, is a fundamental part of embodied rhetorics. Articulation theory, because it is designed to look at the joining of parts into wholes, is a valuable approach to analyze what parts are made into which identities and what rhetorical work needs to be done to rejoin new parts into different identities. Because social movements engage in identity reconstitution in order to challenge oppressive ideologies, articulation is a productive conceptual tool for social-movement analysis. Further, articulation is an ideal theory for looking at both discursive and material symbols that are used to build and to communicate identities. Chapter 4 looked at sex worker—a symbolic remaking of identity intended to disarticulate ideologies of victimhood, criminality, and immorality from work in the sex trades; it also looked at the discourses that the sex-worker identity challenges, and the ways that material rhetoric of the body in protest is part of rearticulating this contested identity.

Alterity, like seduction, has a dense theoretical legacy and offers a way to understand not only the mechanisms but also the consequences of rhetorical operations. While alterity has been theorized as "extra-rhetorical;' or "prior rhetorical," via the work of Diane Davis drawing on Emmanuel Levinas, in chapter 5 I propose that alterity can also provide a way to enrich criticism of identities, by

showing how discursive and material symbols as they construct particular identities also exclude others. This fundamental pairing of "this is who we are" (identity) with "this is who we are not" (alterity) is a driver of contemporary social-movement rhetoric in which battles over identity form the core of rhetorical strategies.

This particular selection of concepts shows a range of critical approaches for analyzing rhetorics of the body. This combination of approaches makes clear that taking up one approach doesn't foreclose on another. As the preceding chapters explicate, linguistic and material symbols work together to create embodied rhetoric; thus critical methods must be capable of attending to both. The theories and methods highlighted in this book were also selected for their transdisciplinary utility due to their expansiveness. Although each chapter is intended to stand on its own as a coherent analysis, they are also intended to work together to show the robustness of what rhetoric of the body can entail. In addition to making an argument about body criticism, I make a more specific claim about the affordances of these theories and methods for analyzing embodied erotic rhetoric, in particular, public performances—here presented as entertainment and political actions—by women.

Another goal of this book is to advance conversations about women's erotic performances, which tend to get caught in circular arguments about either empowerment or oppression; such performances are, of course, neither/nor/ both/and. By positioning these jobs and art forms within the realm of performance rhetoric, conversations about their cultural and social impacts can be moved beyond binary positions that close off further discussion. In the case of erotic performers and laborers, ignoring participants' own understandings of the workings of their acts is never in their best interest. Erotic performance as a type of performance rhetoric enables multiple new positions and perspectives that place the body and its contested contexts central. Taken together then, the analyses in this book yield the following insights about embodied erotic rhetoric:

1. Analysis of the body presents openings, not finalities.
2. Methods of criticism for embodied rhetoric should be able to accommodate the differences between the material and the discursive symbolic because rhetoric of the body is a production of both.
3. The body's material symbolic communication, such as the movement, costume, and adornment discussed in this book, cannot be separated from cultural contexts and the different somatic experiences of embodied identities, in particular, racial and gender identities.
4. Delivery provides a heuristic for understanding the multiple common topics of body rhetoric: body (identity), space, genre, audience, which are interdependent and tack between the material and the discursive.
5. As a particularly contested type of communication, the embodied erotic rhetoric of women vividly illustrates the ways that bodies are shaped by cultural discourses, the ways that bodies act as cultural symbols, and the ways that they communicate purposefully.

Beyond Burkean Burlesque

This book fundamentally aspires to advance understanding of methods, analyses, and ways of reading embodied erotic rhetoric, but it also aims to make a contribution to scholarly conversations concerning burlesque rhetoric, arising from Kenneth Burke's work on the burlesque—as a literary parody, not as erotic performance. Because erotic burlesque's origins derive from the same poetic category, however, and because erotic burlesque still relies heavily on mockery and parody, it has long been my goal to end this journey where I began: postulating what—if any—connections can be made between what scholars have theorized as burlesque rhetoric based on the literary form and erotic performance rhetoric. In Attitudes Toward History, Burke presents various poetic categories

as a way of understanding human symbolic structures.' Burke classifies these categories as either frames of acceptance or frames of rejection, which reflect the symbolic action the text is undertaking, one that is either welcoming or combative.' Rhetoricians have been particularly interested in the differences of the modes of humor Burke categorizes, with comedy as a frame of acceptance and the burlesque as a frame of rejection: `comedy emphasizes acceptance by stressing positive aspects, whereas burlesque emphasizes rejection by stressing the negative."' Both modes allow rhetors to seek symbolic change, but rejection refuses symbols of authority in order to shift power.4 Unlike comedy, which as a frame of acceptance emphasizes the oneness of the rhetor with the object of comedy in which all laugh together, frames of rejection stress separation between the burlesque rhetor and the target because the "burlesque rhetor wishes to decry the operations. While alterity has been theorized as "extra-rhetorical;' or "prior rhetorical," via the work of Diane Davis drawing on Emmanuel Levinas, in chapter 5 I propose that alterity can also provide a way to enrich criticism of identities, by showing how discursive and material symbols as they construct particular identities also exclude others. This fundamental pairing of "this is who we are" (identity) with "this is who we are not" (alterity) is a driver of contemporary social-movement rhetoric in which battles over identity form the core of rhetorical strategies.

In chapter 1, I gave a brief introduction to what rhetorical scholars have done with Burke's concept of the burlesque with regard to rhetoric. Rhetorical scholars have been open to the persuasive affordances of this category's approach to social action, finding utility in Burke's definition, but retheorizing it for new contexts. A. Cheree Carlson theorizes the limits of the "charitable" openness of the comic frame of acceptance in "promoting peaceful social change."' In Carlson's analysis of "witty American women of the nineteenth century" she traces the shift in women's approach to humor from comedy to satire and ultimately to the burlesque, concurrent with the rise of women's fights for rights.' Contrary to Burke's insistence on the superiority of frames of acceptance, Carlson argues that such frames are of limited value in social movements because "when the strictures of the social order become totally unacceptable ... a 'positive' frame will no longer suffice as an acceptance frame "requires that the actor identify completely with the social order."' While she does not propose that the burlesque offers a complete solution to addressing inequality, Carlson's work invites women into the conversation of burlesque rhetoric, necessarily shifting assumptions about the potential values of acceptance and rejection depending on body and identity specific contexts.

Similarly, in his analysis of William F. Buckley Jr.'s burlesque rhetoric, Edward Appel argues that Burke's classification of literary categories,"require[s] adjustment" for rhetorical messages because the rhetorical situation "features the recommendation of an action for practical, realistic purposes" as opposed to "artistic or entertainment purposes.' He persuasively argues that burlesque as rhetoric is more than the impoverished and partial frame that Burke shows with regard to literature. Instead, Appel concludes that burlesque rhetoric has the capacity "to adopt a frame of acceptance and a frame of rejection at the same time." Thus rhetorical burlesque has the capacity both to reject and to humanize.' Although Appel offers a more capacious rendering of the burlesque than Burke's original poetic category, he separates the theatrical and the rhetorical: rhetoric is practical and theater is entertaining. This separation doesn't go very far in when the rhetorical is recognized as encompassing both the practical and the entertaining, but Appel's theory of deploying frames simultaneously is useful in thinking about the ways that the erotic performances in this book operate rhetorically.

As I claimed in chapter 1, scholarship on burlesque rhetoric has little to do with burlesque as it is taken up in this book, which begs the question: What do stripping women bring to our understanding of burlesque rhetoric? And perhaps more importantly, does it have to bring anything? What I mean by this is that at the end of this project, I am not convinced that Burke's poetic categories from the mid-twentieth century, drawn from terminology for seventeenth-century

literary forms, usefully contribute to an understanding of women's erotic performance in the twenty-first century. Yet the concept of burlesque rhetoric remains tantalizing to me as a rhetorician studying erotic dance; I keep finding myself drawn back to it, looking for connection, perhaps just looking to be the type of rhetorician who references Kenneth Burke. As an art form, neo-burlesque retains the spirit of mockery and farce that ties it to the literary genre, but conceptualizing the burlesque as partial and impoverished doesn't feel at all appropriate to the complex rhetorical communication of erotic dance and its contexts presented throughout this book.

In analyzing the rhetorical bodies of erotic dancers, mobilized in performance, mobilized in protest, mobilized as cultural symbol, various frames of rejection are apparent, because they are operating within contexts that are hostile to or at the very least misunderstanding of erotic bodies, particularly women's. Like Carlson's "witty women;' erotic performers have no choice but to reject their antagonists, and like Appel's reclassification of the burlesque, they simultaneously adopt frames of acceptance and rejection. But with erotic performers, acceptance and humanizing aspects of rhetorical performance are designed to claim power for the self and those in coalition, accompanied by rejection of antagonists. The neo-burlesque performer mocks and ridicules, rejecting limits regarding the sup. posed proper places and spaces for women to engage in humorous and erotic spectacle. Neo-burlesque's insistence that any body—regardless of age, gender, race, or ability—can belong in burlesque wholeheartedly rejects norms of appropriateness. Neo-burlesque is also often overtly political, especially as relates to feminist, sex radical, and queer politics. Where neo-burlesque does not resemble literary burlesque is in where its rhetors place themselves. Unlike the burlesquers who laugh at others and emphasize their own superiority, neo-burlesque performers include themselves in on the joke, being the first to laugh at themselves and burlesque themselves along with other targets. By insisting that funniness and sexiness are not mutually exclusive, nec-burlesque embraces inclusiveness, opening up the category.

Similarly, topless dancers in clubs simultaneously adopt frames of acceptance and rejection in their performance rhetoric. Discourses about the proper place for women's bodies, particularly their erotic bodies, more particularly, their erotic bodies in commerce, make rejection a fundamental frame for club strippers. Rejection of entrenched sexist attitudes about visibility of women's sexuality is one aspect of this type of performance, often accompanied by selfacceptance. Many strippers of all types speak about the valuation of their own body as a result of erotic dance. This is not a simplistic "Love your body as is!" mentality. Modifications, cosmetics, enhancing clothes of all types are included in seeing one's own body—not as an object, but as an act, as an art, as having material worth. Dual frames of acceptance and rejection are also at work in the complex performances between customers and dancers. As researchers consistently note, the cultivating of sustaining relationships with regulars often requires a stance of fantasy acceptance paired with rejection in reality.

For erotic dancers who are also activists, either because of long-standing commitments to sex-work activism or because attacks on their employment demand it, rejection is a potent rhetorical frame. When the dominant social order and its symbolic world insist that a particular identity doesn't exist, this is an untenable situation, and a frame of acceptance is not useful or acceptable!' As demonstrated in chapter 4, dis- and rearticulation of an identity like sex worker, requires rejecting dominant social discourses about that work. Any who hold an antagonistic position toward this identity are rejected as a means of constructing frames of acceptance for the identity. For example, sex-worker activists reject discourses that say they don't exist, that they are always victims and criminals, and rearticulate their identities to show not only that they exist, but also how they exist: as workers, as activists, as tax-paying citizens, as humans.

Thus radical rearticulation as a rhetorical process rejects identities made by others and accepts those made by the group. Antagonists are placed into the position to accept or reject the new proffered identity. Therefore, the acceptance/rejection pairing is at work in political performances as well.

Finally, with regard to the erotic dancer as cultural symbol, whose material rhetoric becomes adopted as a representation of sexual freedom, inclusion, and anti-rape action, we see an amalgamation of these acceptance/rejection framings!: the rejection of cultural norms about women's erotic bodies and denials of subjectivity and the acceptance of self/comrades and identities that insist, not only on existence but also on presence.

As these examples show, Burke's conception of the burlesque that has thus far been the basis of rhetorical scholarship on the form has limited value for the embodied erotic performances under study in this book, but his theories of orientations of acceptance and rejection toward dominant symbolic orders provides a compelling way to categorize the rhetorics presented here. Although Burke's attitude toward resolving social differences through acceptance of one's antagonists is understandable, the contexts of his work and his life are, naturally, so different from the women in this book that it would be shortsighted to assume that this attitude has to fit vastly different social actors and actions.

Drawing on Carlson's argument that rejection is often the only available option for those with no or limited social power and Appel's argument that these frames can operate simultaneously, I propose that a rejection/acceptance pairing is a useful way to understand the symbolic operations of erotic performance and other similarly complicated rhetorical systems. As I have stressed throughout, rhetoric of the body is multicoded, operating in various material and symbolic universes. Therefore, understanding orientations toward those symbolic universes as similarly complicated—rejection, acceptance, both, neither—can help to uncover the rhetorical features that can be hidden in complex communication. When our rhetorical theories and methods don't fit the subjects of our analysis, the rhetorical tradition has been unable to see them. Embodied rhetorical scholarship that focuses on multicoded bodies and performances—like the performances explored in this book—has the potential to remake rhetorical scholarship from the outside in. By starting with those rhetorically complex performances that exceed a single mode of analysis or theoretical approach, we can make our theory responsive to those who actually practice it. If we fail to do so, we risk erasing remarkable rhetorical performers and performances. We also will continue to generate theory that does not adequately respond to the most powerful rhetorics of the present—those that are trying to remake the world while living in it.

This is my performance. I manipulate my readers. I seduce. I give the illusion of stripping myself down with my confessions. If only someone would give me some dollars. <>

Masterworks of Modern Photography 1900–1940: The Thomas Walther Collection at The Museum of Modern Art, New York edited with text by Sarah Hermanson Meister [Silvana Editoriale in association with the Museum of Modern Art, New York, 9788836648061]

A spectacular clothbound compendium of iconic early 20th-century photography from MoMA's archives

In 2001, the Museum of Modern Art in New York acquired an unprecedented survey of modern photography from longtime collector Thomas Walther. For 20 years, the German-born art enthusiast had dutifully amassed one of the most impressive private collections of photography in the world, replete with pieces from the era between the two World Wars. This time of creative experimentation saw numerous styles and approaches develop in parallel, such as pictorialism, abstraction and candid street photography, before merging into modernism.

Photographers such as Henri Cartier-Bresson brought a new dynamism to their pictures by capturing people as they appeared going about their business on the street, while artists such as Man Ray extended a Surrealist approach to photography, placing props directly onto photo paper and capturing their ghostly silhouettes. Still more photographers continued to experiment with their craft and ultimately defined a generation of photography. Among the pieces included in this clothbound volume are some of the definitive examples of the medium.

Photographers include: Berenice Abbott, Henri Cartier-Bresson, Walker Evans, John Gutmann, André Kertész, Alexander Rodchenko, Man Ray, Paul Strand, Alfred Stieglitz, Edward Steichen and Edward Weston.

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The selection of photographs from the Thomas Walther Collection at The Museum of Modern Art, New York, which is presented here for the first time in Europe, offers far more than just a first-class historical overview of the most important developments in modernist photography in the years from 1900 to 1940.



The approximately four hundred works in the Thomas Walther Collection, the majority of which were acquired for the Museum in 2001 by the then Chief Curator of Photography, Peter Galassi, represent the single greatest addition of works in the history of the world's most important photography collection. Another forty photographs were added to this collection in 2017, when Quentin Bajac was Chief Curator.

This is not only because the collector Thomas Walther, in the years from about 1977 to 1997, tracked down and gathered the best surviving historical prints by the most important photographers of the modernist movements before World War II and a generous cross-section of lesser known practitioners in these movements. Unlike a curator collecting for a museum, the private collector is free from institutional considerations such as acquisition commissions, potential funders, or local preferences. A private collector is bound solely by the criteria he defines for himself—his passion, his intuition, his pleasure (and his own bank account...). Therein lies his privilege and his risk. And that is why private collections can allow themselves a risk-taking and originality, an entirely self-defined stringency and coherence, next to which institutional collections often all look like matte prints of a conventional matrix.

In the ideal case, a private collection, through its idiosyncratic systematics and its unique inner sense, allows a view of the history of art that, while knowing and respecting the scholarly orders, goes far beyond them and blazes new trails in the jungle of artistic phenomena. In this way, aspects suddenly come to view that owe themselves to an individual subcutaneous coherence: in the case of the Thomas Walther Collection, we see in the exhibition and this accompanying publication how modern photography—beyond all schools and styles—keeps focused on a common objective from the beginning of the twentieth century on: an uncompromising liberation of the gaze and of seeing, which has shaped not only painting and the entire fine arts, but far beyond that, the entire visual culture of our world to this day.

Everyone who helped to make this exhibition project possible found themselves working in an intricate and uncertain environment, conditioned by the crisis surrounding the coronavirus pandemic, which is why the following brief acknowledgments are even more heartfelt.

We are profoundly grateful to Thomas Walther, without whose insight and passion this exhibition could never have been presented to the public. His collection is a priceless treasure…

—Tobia Bezzola, Director of the Museo d'arte della Svizzera italiana, Lugano
—Walter Guadagnini, Director of CAMERA - Centro Italiano per la Fotografia, Turin <>

THE FASCINATION OF WHAT'S DIFFICULT: A LIFE OF MAUD GONNE by Kim Bendheim [OR Books, ISBN 9781682192061]

Maud Gonne, the legendary woman known as the Irish Joan of Arc, left her mark on everyone she met. She famously won the devotion of one of the greatest poets of the age, William Butler Yeats. Born into tremendous privilege, she allied herself with rebels and the downtrodden and openly defied what was at the time the world's most powerful empire. She was an actress, a journalist and an activist for the cause of Irish independence. Ignoring the threat of social ostracism, she had several children out of wedlock. She was an independent woman who charted her own course.

Yet Maud Gonne was also a lifelong anti-semite, someone who, even after the horrors of the Second World War, could not summon sympathy for the millions murdered by the Nazis. A believer in the occult and in reincarnation, she took mescaline with Yeats to enhance visions of mythic Irish heroes and heroines, and in mid-life converted to Catholicism in order to marry her husband, the Irish Catholic war hero John MacBride.

What motivated this extraordinary person? Kim Bendheim has long been fascinated by Maud Gonne's perplexing character, and here gives us an intensely personal assessment of her thrilling life. The product of much original research, including interviews with Gonne's equally vivid, unconventional descendants, **THE FASCINATION OF WHAT'S DIFFICULT** is a portrait of a powerful woman who, despite her considerable flaws, continues to inspire.

Review

"With clear-eyed forays into obsession, love, and friendship, Kim Bendheim fleshes out one of the most enigmatic and alluring women in the history of European letters and politics."—Florence Williams

"Thanks to her role as muse to W.B.Yeats, Maud Gonne (1866-1953) is well-known in mythic form to many who have never heard her name. The initial corrective was her own 1938 autobiography, but Kim Bendheim's book is a much more candid and useful book." — recommended in *Tortoise*

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Excerpt: This biography is partly the tale of how several lives entwined through the centuries: Maud Gonne's with that of the celebrated Irish poet W. B. Yeats, who wrote poetry to and about her for forty-three years, and hers with mine for the last twenty-five years. She was his muse but she was also an Irish political activist, a noted human rights speaker, a journalist at a time when women journalists were rare. Altogether she played a far greater role in western European history than she is given credit for. In Ireland, but not without, she is justly celebrated as an agent for change. Most biographies focus on her relationship with Yeats, or on the persona she presented the public rather than the amazing tale of her own life which had a lasting effect on thousands and thousands of people on both sides of the Atlantic. She was much more than a muse.

I first encountered Maud Gonne in 1993 when I reviewed the collection of Gonne-Yeats letters, edited by her granddaughter Anna MacBride White and A. Norman Jeffares, the noted Irish literary scholar. I was living in Los Angeles and writing a "Book Beat" column on new Irish literature for a LA-based Irish monthly. I'd been entranced by Irish literature since college and reviewed some wonderful Irish books for the Los Angeles Times that I still cherish.

Reading the letters, I became seduced not, as one might expect, by the great poet's few surviving letters to her, but by Maud's voice on the page. What the letters unravel, like a lovely colored ball of string, is the connection between Yeats and Gonne and the uniqueness of her voice. She encouraged him in his quest for Irish subjects, Irish myths and legends, and supported his celebration of the particularities of holy places and geographic landscapes in Ireland.

Her own voice is singular, irreverent, a in I smart. She was a formidable political agitator, a feminist before the term was coined. She was prophetic. On August 26,1914, at the beginning of the Great War, she wrote Yeats:

> This war is an inconceivable madness which has taken hold of Europe. It is unlike any war that has ever been.... The victor will be nearly as enfeebled as the vanquished.... Could the women, who are after all the guardians of the race, end it? ... I always felt the wave of the woman's power was rising, the men are destroying themselves & we are looking on.

In the first month of the conflict, she predicted the scope of World War I; due to its use of modern weapons, technology, and chemicals to extinguish an estimated 40 million human lives, it would prove to e the deadliest war in history. She wrote with heart and passion about things that mattered, including the terrible conditions of Irish political prisoners in British jails.

Years later as an NYU graduate student, at the suggestion of my professor, I wrote a paper on Yeats's images of Maud as Helen of Troy. It left me wanting to know even more-about her life. Who was she, apart from a love object in Yeats's poetry? Helen of Troy's beauty sparked a war—and Ulysses's ten-year odyssey home to his wife, the clever, patient Penelope—but Maud had a full life outside of Yeats's poems. My dawning feminism grew along with my curiosity about Maud Gonne. This curiosity has endured over two decades and was finally quenched by writing this book.

I was fortunate in the course of my own odyssey to meet warm, interesting people, including Maud's granddaughter Anna MacBride White, a lovely woman who with her husband, a kindly vet, welcomed me into their Dublin home. We had tea in the garden.

Then two years ago in New York, chatting at a holiday party, I told a publisher about my interest in Maud Gonne. He wanted to know if I'd thought of doing a book on her. I said yes and submitted a short proposal. We had a pleasant lunch to discuss, and he followed up by commissioning me to write a book. Maud Gonne had been at the back of my mind for decades, so I jumped at the chance. This biography, my first book, became a way of figuring out why her character had such resonance with mine and who this elusive, theatrical woman really was: a fiery patriot, a political prisoner, a

mother? A clever wealthy woman who wielded her great fortune to successfully promote the cause of Irish nationalism? Or all the above?

In the hunt to penetrate the mysteries of Maud's character, and explain her enduring allure, I returned to Dublin. On this trip, besides going to the National Library of Ireland, I tracked down two of her great-granddaughters, Iseult White and Laragh Stuart, and had lunch with each of them. Wildly different, each woman was engaging in her own way. Iseult is the executor of her mother Anna MacBride White's literary estate. I met with her first, which was relatively easy to arrange as I had known her mother and sister from my first few visits to Dublin.

Before our rendezvous, I researched Iseult White. On her website, she describes herself as an experienced global market manager for technology companies in Silicon Valley where she lived and worked for a number of years. Then, after having completed a master's program in psychotherapy, she reinvented herself in Ireland as a management consultant, executive coach, and psychotherapist. At Iseult's suggestion, we arranged a brunch on a Sunday in November at the airy, elegant Layla's Terrace on the rooftop of the Devlin Hotel in Ranelagh. We were practically the only ones in the restaurant that morning, so she was easy to pick out when she walked in: a confident, middle-aged woman with gorgeous skin and green eyes. The mother of two daughters, she had a solid, grounded presence and straight, perhaps blownout, shoulder-length red hair. At the restaurant she was very particular, ordering a soy cappuccino and porridge with the extras on the side. When it came, she said, "I asked for a piping hot soy milk cappuccino and that is not. Take it back." And they did.

Here was a woman who knew what she wanted and insisted on getting it. In our conversation, after our first flurry of hellos, she emerged as a strong feminist. Speaking of Maud's parenting, she said, "A child of that class was not raised by their mother." She elaborated: "The myth of motherhood emerged postwar as a way to keep women out of the workplace and give the men back their old jobs."

She dryly remarked of Yeats's extensive commentary on Maud, "as if he were a valid source of information on Madame!" Iseult called her great-grandmother Madame, as she was known in Ireland during the last thirty years of her life. Patiently, Iseult spelled out the complicated connections between myriad cousins and told me that her grandfather, Sean MacBride, didn't make any money until the 1940s or 50s, "because he obviously defended all the Republican prisoners for free." He and his family, including Maud who lived with them, survived on Maud's inheritance. Iseult was visibly proud of her grandfather, whom she knew as a child. As a small child at the time, she was of course aware he'd been awarded the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize for cofounding Amnesty International.

Iseult couldn't answer basic questions about her great-grandmother, since she hadn't known her personally, just through stories. I asked, was Maud Gonne six feet tall? How tall was the woman billed as "a goddess"? Iseult didn't know, but was helpful in other ways. After brunch, she offered to drive me to Roebuck House, where Madame spent the final decades of her life, with her daughter-in-law known as "Kid," her son Sean and their two children, Anna and Tiernan MacBride. We parted, and Iseult drove off. Then I walked around Roebuck House. It looked much as it did in pictures, a big two-story brick structure, except instead of a garden in back there was a parking lot.

In interviews on the web, Iseult discussed how "as a child creativity was my friend. Reading, writing, painting, piano, and ballet created sanctuary from a childhood punctured by trauma." Singular in the current tell-all climate, she refused in-person and via email to discuss the source of her trauma, only explaining that "it should be possible to talk about PTSD without having to describe the trauma." She further added in an email: "If I ever talk/write about the trauma it will be in my own words." Iseult is the author of The Mindfulness Workout: A Guide to Mental Fitness for Teenagers and the Adults in Their Lives, so perhaps one day she will indeed write a book about it.

After meeting with Iseult, I located Laragh Stuart, the granddaughter of Maud's illegitimate daughter Iseult Gonne. Laragh's great-grandfather was Lucien Millevoye, while Iseult White's was John MacBride—two very different men. Like her cousin, Laragh made a vivid impression: she's a smart, slight, ethereal woman with long wavy reddish-brown blond hair. Also a mother, she'd successfully run her own business for twenty-one years, in Dublin, selling delicious-sounding sauces and soups like beetroot, dill, and crème fraiche. On Instagram, her brand is described as "the creators of fine arts soups and sauces taken from the soil and made by humans, additive-free and gluten-free." Since we met for lunch in November 2018, she has shuttered that business and pivoted into art photography. Not surprising that she has been preoccupied with art: Laragh's father, Ian, was the well-regarded Irish sculptor Ian Stuart. In his day, he exhibited at the Paris Biennale, in galleries in Dublin, and museums in New York and London.

Laragh and I arranged via email to meet inside the entrance to the grand Shelbourne Hotel. She had just returned via Paris from a trip to Cambodia with her fourteen-year-old son. Inside, we went to the Horseshoe Bar. Laragh said that her father would take her there for lunch, a happy memory from her peripatetic childhood. When she was little, she learned to walk in the VW van that her parents bought to drive with her and her sister to India. In India, they lived on a houseboat. At twelve, she was sent to boarding school in England. "I didn't know the alphabet. I would go into the kindergarten room at night to learn to read. I was embarrassed, but at the end of the year, I was up to the level of the other children."

Laragh is now forty-eight. Like her cousin Iseult, she obviously suffered some trauma in her childhood, making me wonder at the different ways women can be resilient and overcome their pasts. Clearly Laragh still missed her father, though he was a much older father to her and her two sisters. Ian had married Laragh's mother, Anna, whom he knew because she had been a schoolfriend of one of his three daughters by his first wife, the artist Imogen Stuart. The family, as I was learning firsthand, was quite complicated, filled with half sisters and brothers and cousins. As Iseult White remarked, "In Ireland growing up it was very unusual. I never knew if people were friends of the family or cousins." Laragh had the same issue. At lunch, she speculated that "maybe Lucien Millevoye wasn't Iseult's father." In a follow-up email, she suggested, "Maybe it was Yeats."

It felt as if I were looking through a telescope down through the generations. Each of the two women, via two different men, provided a glimpse into the Maud Gonne of the past. Though neither of the two had known her, both grew up hearing plenty of stories about her, Iseult from her grandfather Sean MacBride and from her mother, the editor Anna MacBride White, who was partly raised by her grandmother Maud. Laragh would have heard stories from her father, the talkative Ian Stuart who, a generation older than Laragh's mother, had known his mother and grandmother quite well. My own perception of this complicated woman, Maud Gonne, developed and changed over the course of the two years it took to research and write her biography. I hope it will give readers yet another angle from which to view Maud Gonne, an international celebrity of her era. Though at birth Maud had been blessed with many gifts—looks, intelligence, and her own fortune—growing up she was an emotional orphan. Her mother died when she was four. Her tender, caring father, a captain in the British Army, posted all over the empire, was away for long stretches of time. He was literally unavailable. Like Princess Di, her empathy for others outside her social bubble seemed infinite. Unlike other debutantes, she found a cause greater than herself to dedicate her life to: that of Ireland, then solidly under Britain's boot and the poorest, most rural country in Western Europe. As an activist, she took on the daunting task of toppling the British Empire by any means possible, including force.

One of the reasons Maud intrigued me was that, though she lived more than one hundred fifty years ago, in some ways her life seemed strangely familiar. When it came to men, Maud's fortune

complicated her romantic life. Her financial assets, while empowering her, were intimidating to men. I understood, because I too have felt money as a burden when dating.

I have insight into obsessive and tormented love like Yeats's for Maud—he proposed four times—because I was pursued by a man for years and years while I was preoccupied with my own unrequited love for a restless philanderer. The role of obsession and love for creative artists, the questions of real love versus passing fancy or fruitless obsession, of when the torment outweighs the pleasure—these continue to intrigue me as a writer and as a woman.

The last American biography of Maud Gonne was published forty years ago. It does not deal with her great wealth, concluding she had "a modest income." The very title of a 2016 Irish biography, The Adulterous Muse, belittles the woman. No one has ever written a biography of Yeats and called it The Adulterous Poet, although he too had a first affair with a married woman. Now that the debate triggered by the Me Too movement has broadened to include women's rights and basic issues of social justice all over the world, her life, loves, and contributions in these areas should be reevaluated. With the worldwide ascendance of dictators and the growing censorship of freedom of expression, the rights of protestors and of political prisoners, which Maud championed for decades, remains an international issue.

The dangers as well as the glories of transcendent nationalism is another timely topic. Currently numerous people choose to martyr themselves in order to murder civilians, giving themselves moments of fame on international TV. Maud is the happy example of a fanatic who, in the course of her long life, became an admirer of leaders who used peaceful means to achieve radical political ends.

In researching this biography these last two years, I learned that the challenges facing a woman born in 1866 remain resonant for women today. We women continue to struggle with questions of political power, money, and independence; we struggle with the question of how to find a loving partner and how to see peace, not war, reign over our planet.

When I began this project, I admired Maud as a strong woman who pursued a challenging path: She was a rousing leader for the cause of Irish nationalism after centuries of exploitation by the British. She became the inspiration for Yeats, one of the greatest poets in the English language, but she was my heroine because instead of just being a debutante, she was a rebel. She forged a highly effective political path before women had the vote or the right to keep their own property under their name when they married in France or in the United States. England had only changed its onerous laws regarding married women's property rights in 1882. An unmarried upper class young woman would normally be accompanied in public by her parents, another relative or spinster as chaperone. Single upper-class young women did not often travel alone and if they did they became prey, like the heroine of a Henry James novel. Maud evaded that fate.

In the process of researching this biography I learned that Maud Gonne was a complex, difficult woman. As I intuited, there was a lot more going on in her life than the little I learned about her in my twentieth-century lit class at NYU. Not all aspects of her character appealed. For instance, I was horrified to discover she was a lifelong anti-Semite, especially given my growing cultural affiliation as a Jew. Nor, I discovered, was she the woman whose image she projected out into the world: that of an Irish Joan of Arc.

Maud Gonne was neither Irish by birth nor by heritage, unless you count one Irish great-grandparent. Nor, like Joan, to whom the press compared her, was she a teenager. She was the mother of two children, one out of wedlock. She lived a long life and died at home, aged eighty-seven, with her daughter-in-law, two grandchildren, and lifelong friends. The real Joan of Arc was a

nineteen-year-old virgin burned alive by the English as a heretic and witch. In the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church began the long process of transforming Joan's reputation, declaring her a saint in 1920.

What did Joan and Maud Gonne, an Irish nationalist celebrated in three countries for her looks, her journalism, and her eloquent public speaking, have in common? Did Maud Gonne pull off one of the biggest publicity shams of the century? Did she accomplish much good in the world? If so, what lives on after her? I had many questions and by now my own obsession with Maud Gonne. This book is the result.

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Last summer, miserable in 108-degree heat in Paris, reading Maud's denunciation of Dreyfus written decades after he'd been cleared of all charges and reinstated as a captain in the French Army, I asked myself if I really wanted to complete this project. I had uncovered complicated shadows to this woman's life—her deep-rooted, irrational anti-Semitism, her constant fabrications and embellishments, her absentee motherhood of her own children. It has been hard to like her.

But the complexity of Maud's character is one of the things that makes her a compelling figure, and her tireless efforts on behalf of human rights and Irish independence deserve respect. Against all odds, she made her voice heard in England, Europe, and the United States. So much of what she fought for and against, and so much of what caused her anxiety, are issues women are still grappling with today. So, despite those aspects of her life and beliefs that were difficult to accept, it seemed important to set the record straight.

Previous biographers have either accepted Maud's self-defined role as the Irish Joan of Arc, or alternatively focused on her life as Yeats's muse. In this brief book, I have labored to show her in the round, as a complex human being. She deserves to be admired for what she accomplished: pushing the door open so that other women could join the Irish nationalist movement. Of lasting significance is her lifetime of work on behalf of political prisoners, work that her son built on in creating Amnesty International, which continues to fight for human rights around the world.

Maud is interesting because of her complexity. She was a debutante and a rebel, a wealthy English Victorian woman who carefully crafted an Irish identity for the press and for the world. She betrayed her class by siding with the underdog, the vulnerable poor and the disenfranchised. In 1913 Jim Larkin led workers in a huge strike for a living wage in what became Dublin's greatest industrial struggle. The authorities and the Church were on the side of the magnates, another dreadful episode in modern Irish history. The workers lost, but Maud helped feed their children in Dublin during their strike, selling the last of her jewels to do so.

I empathized with her difficulties with men stemming from her elegant, appealing looks, her independent fortune, and her adoration of family members who died while she was young: first her mother, then her father. She had the characteristic sadness of a girl who lost her mother in early childhood. That seemed to have been the source of her huge empathy for unfortunates. Usually, she was on the side of the underdog, the most vulnerable members of society, including children, and I admired her empathy with those outside her narrow social circle.

Although a talented theatrical beauty, she questioned her own right to personal happiness. She had to be continually occupied, tied up with meaningful work for a grand cause. The poignancy of a young woman skeptical of the praise elicited by her own face and figures remains timeless. It was one I could relate to because after thirteen years at an all-girls school, having no brothers, and then tragically losing my older sibling—who until her illness was my role model—I found it hard to take my admirers seriously in college. I had never been on a "date" with a boy until then, and the clash

between their attraction to my person and the terrible sense of desolation I felt within was too acute for me to process when I myself was just out of my teens.

Likewise, the question of how a woman with more money deals with a potential mate who has less remains relevant. Women continue to make political and economic strides towards equality in the twenty-first century but our success is by no means assured. All along the way, it has taken groundbreaking women such as Maud to lead us forward.

The role of obsession in art is fascinating and complex. The role of obsession in love is equally interesting. My professional obsession with Maud Gonne has ended with the completion of this book. Yeats wondered whether it was only his yearning after Maud that drove him toward a mastery of words with which to win her and express his frustrations. Obsession can drive the creative work of an artist and open individuals up to what Proust called the malady of love.

Yeats and Maud's enduring caring relationship can serve as an example of obsessive love. Strange though it may appear to those hearing their story for the first time, and although it sometimes tests credulity and defies conventional resolution, I believe very strongly that their relationship should be celebrated. Those who yearn helplessly to possess another human being, body and soul, express an elemental part of human experience, one that we can observe rather than judge.

Even as she aged, Yeats returned to Maud again and again in his magical poems. I found inspiration in Maud's great passions and life's work, seeing how raising her voice in public and on the page had a considerable effect in England, France, and the United States. She's become something of a role model for me. Maud's advocacy for human rights, the rights of political prisoners to be treated like human beings, rather than animals, resonates in our turbulent time, when dictators have popped up all over the world, across a wide variety of geographies and cultures. No one who reads about Maud's life can argue that one woman's voice can't make a difference in the world. She was much more than a muse.

It seems fitting that just as I finished this epilogue I met my cousin, newly moved to New York City, at the statue of Joan of Arc on Riverside Drive at 93rd Street. I had never known it was there in my neighborhood. The statue, I learned, was erected in 1915, during Maud's lifetime, and I reflected on how the fabulously inventive

Maud took on the mantle of Joan of Arc, six centuries after the young Joan was burned at the stake. Maud made Joan relevant half a millennium later to contemporary women, including the two great-granddaughters that I met. I am grateful to Maud Gonne for the journey she has taken me on, writing a contemporary biography of this multifaceted woman, building on the work other writers and scholars have done before. My quest to discover the source of my strange empathy with and fascination for Maud Gonne has ended. <>

THE DIE IS CAST by Robert Desnos, translated by Jesse L. Anderson [Wakefield Press, ISBN: 9781939663696] Originally published as *Le vin est tire . .* by Editions Gallimard in 1943.

A startlingly contemporary portrait of drug addiction in prewar Paris

Published in 1943 (just a year before its author was arrested by the Gestapo for his Resistance activities), **THE DIE IS CAST** was a departure for Robert Desnos: a shift from his earlier, frenetic Surrealist prose to a social realism that borrowed as much from his life experience as his career as a

journalist. Drawing on his own use of drugs in the 1920s and his doomed relationship with the chanteuse Yvonne George, Desnos here portrays a band of opium, cocaine and heroin users from all walks of life in Paris. It is a startlingly contemporary portrayal of overdoses, arrests, suicides and the flattened solitude of the addict, yet published in occupied Paris, years before "junkie literature" established itself with the Beat Generation. An anomaly both in his career and for having been published under the Occupation by an active member of the Resistance, *The Die Is Cast* now stands as timely a piece of work as it had been untimely when it first appeared.

Robert Desnos (1900–45) was Surrealism's most accomplished practitioner of automatic writing and dictation before his break with André Breton in 1929. His career in journalism and radio culminated in an active role in the French Resistance. Desnos was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944, and passed through several concentration camps until finally dying of typhoid in Terezín in 1945, a few days after the camp he was in was liberated.

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Several months before

To readers familiar with the more celebrated selections from Robert Desnos's oeuvre, his late novel **THE DIE IS CAST** (*Le vin est tiré* Literally, "the wine is drawn," a French expression whose English equivalents include this translation's title and "the bed is made," the message being that some actions lead to less than desirable consequences that one must face. Although the English-language idioms capture the meaning of the French, they lack the allusion to intoxication, which is especially pertinent in a book about opium addiction.) will look something like an oddity, a blip of social fiction toward the end of a somewhat irregular output of surrealist poetry. And this impression wouldn't be wrong: the book—which tracks the deterioration of a small band of Parisian opium addicts—is indeed an oddity when set beside the rest of Desnos's literary work, not simply for being social fiction, but for being fiction without any qualifier attached. When **THE DIE IS CAST** was published in 1943, Desnos had written only a handful of other novels: Liberty or Love!, Mourning for Mourning, and The Punishments of Hell, books an anglophone hesitates to even label as novels (the French have always been more generous with the word) owing to their diminutive length and heterodox content. Add to this the fact that **THE DIE IS CAST** was written some two decades after these other fictional works, and the blip stands out even more.

But if we take a closer look at Desnos's work and life, the novel begins to make more sense. Desnos was socially engaged to a degree that was unusual among other early surrealists. He covered any number of political and social topics while working as a journalist in his twenties, and much of his later poetry was overtly political. And he didn't limit himself to words: during the German Occupation, he used his journalistic access to privileged information to aid the French Resistance, an action that would eventually cost him his life.

Other instances of Desnos's political convictions and development can be found throughout his biography. In 1928, he helped smuggle the Cuban writer and dissident Alejo Carpentier out of his home country aboard a France-bound ship. On another occasion, Desnos began smashing glasses in a club after a Black friend was refused admission, on racial grounds, to the dance floor. More specific to the concerns of the novel, Desnos had watched his beloved Yvonne George, a Belgian cabaret singer, succumb to opium addiction—a passive incident compared to the more engaged ones just cited, but it's also the most central to understanding the germination of **THE DIE IS CAST.**

The experiences and impulses necessary to write the novel, then, were there to be drawn upon. Desnos—who'd already written poems and prose, song lyrics, plays, advertisements, and radio jingles—simply had to make the decision to sit down and write it.

Robert Desnos was born on 4 July 1900, to parents on a steady rise toward the middle class. His father sold poultry in Les Halles, a famous and expansive Parisian market, and for most of Robert's childhood the family lived in the nearby Marais neighborhood, a medieval section of Paris whose mystic atmosphere Desnos would credit with spurring his precocious imagination. He was young enough to avoid fighting in the First World War but still had to complete mandatory military service after high school. It was during this time that he first met—through mutual friend Benjamin Peret—Andre Breton and Louis Aragon, who would soon become figureheads of the surrealist movement. It wasn't until Desnos was discharged in 1922, however, that he was fully integrated into the burgeoning group and began making a name for himself as a poet.

The most noteworthy of Desnos's early experiences with the Breton-helmed group were what are known as the automatist sessions, nocturnal séances during which those who gathered—sometimes individually, sometimes in groups—appeared to fall into a trance through a kind of self-hypnosis and then interacted with the others from an apparently heightened or altered state of awareness. How authentic these trances were is debatable, but what's clear from contemporaneous accounts is that

Desnos was far more impressive than the others while hypnotized (an account of this can be found in Breton's surrealist classic, *Nadja*). He would become a seemingly endless fount of short, word play—laden poems, and some of his earliest published works, the "Rrose Sélavy" poems, were a product of these sessions.

Desnos went on composing surrealist poetry through the 1920s while also beginning his career as a journalist. This didn't sit well with Breton, who saw journalism as a profession unworthy of someone with Desnos's linguistic talents. It was an early crack in their friendship, and by the end of the decade—after many boyish internecine battles among the surrealists—Desnos had become, so to speak, unaffiliated, a free agent. Some months later, in April 1930, Desnos went through another life-shifting event: the death of Yvonne George, whom he'd fallen in love with shortly after meeting her in the mid-1920s. By many accounts. Desnos was obsessed with the Belgian chanteuse, and though his love went unrequited, he grew increasingly obsequious as her health deteriorated from the combined effects of opiate addiction and tuberculosis. During the last two years of her life, Desnos had even begun hunting down drugs for her.

So the 1930s, for Desnos, began with ruptured artistic ties and a dead love interest. He soon found replacements for both. In the creative domain, Desnos began work as a radio broadcaster, a job he adored and would continue at until the outbreak of the Second World War. Reflecting his wide-ranging curiosity, Desnos was involved with a variety of programs and hosted several, including one dedicated to the exploration of foreign cultures and another, *La Clef des Songes* (The key to dreams), in which he interpreted listeners' dreams. He also discovered a knack for marketing, and wrote radio ads for pharmaceuticals, furs, the National Lottery, chocolate, perfume, and much else besides. Unfortunately, and owing to the fact that Desnos lived in a time before widespread recording of the radio, only some twenty minutes of his voice have been passed down to posterity.

As for love, Desnos had already fallen for another woman by the time of George's death. Her name was Youki Foujita, a Frenchwoman who'd adopted her decidedly un-French first name—it was originally Lucie—after marrying Japanese painter Tsuguhara Foujita. Desnos and Youki were interested in each other while the marriage was still intact, but the sudden and lasting departure of her husband in 1931, along with his sanctioning of their relationship in a farewell letter, allowed the two to go beyond mere interest and move in together. Though never legally married, they would remain a couple until the end of Desnos's life.

He published scantily in the 1930s, but Desnos was still writing and, for a time, strove to complete a poem every night before bed. It was during this period that Desnos wrote one of his most celebrated poems, "The Tale of the Bear," a response to the interwar political upheaval in Paris and an example of his artistic engagement with society at large. It was a harbinger of the kind of work Desnos would publish in the even more turbulent decade to come.

In the fall of 1939, Desnos was mobilized and sent to Brittany with the 436th Regiment of Pioneers. Upon his return to Paris the following August, he found that the radio stations had become propaganda outlets for the Vichy regime and returned to newspaper work to make a living. His columns were often, to varying degrees of explicitness, politically charged, with pieces on themes like neighbor-on-neighbor denunciation and French unity. He also wrote regular reviews of jazz records, a poke in the eye to the Nazis, who considered the genre degenerate.

The articles weren't enough. Soon after some thirteen thousand French Jews were rounded up in, and subsequently deported from, the Velodrome d'Hiver stadium in July 1942, Desnos joined the Agir ("Act," in English) Resistance cell, for whom, in addition to supplying information gathered using his press credentials, he forged identification documents.

THE DIE IS CAST was released the following year by Gallimard. Employing an ensemble cast of characters to show opium's non-discretionary appeal across class and generational lines, Desnos is explicit in his preface regarding the novel's purpose: "This book attempts, without the author necessarily believing himself to have succeeded, to demonstrate that social circumstances are responsible for the daily increase in the diffusion of drugs, that addicts deserve to be brought back into the fold of daily life, that the current suppression-based laws are absurd, unjust, harmful, and that it's vital, with the assistance of the medical community, to reform our barbaric legal system." The book is antidrug, but it's not anti-addict. The empathy espoused by Desnos, in these lines written nearly eighty years ago, is admirable; the argument he makes is prescient. One need only look at the success of models that have adopted an approach similar to that described by Desnos—Portugal being a notable example—to see how clear-sighted he was.

Though it does at times take turns toward the surrealistic that are reminiscent of—and arguably even allusive to—his earlier writings, the book's straightforward aim renders fruitless the deep, symbol-driven exegesis that can be done with much of Desnos's work: **THE DIE IS CAST** speaks for itself.

Of course, the reader can draw connections between the text and Desnos's life. Barbara—the wealthy, elusive love interest of Antoine, the closest character the book has to a protagonist—is modeled on Yvonne George, and Antoine's continually thwarted relationship with Barbara bears more than a passing resemblance to Desnos's own doomed courtship. Antoine's visit to Barbara's apartment in the third chapter gives an idea of the utter powerlessness Desnos may have felt in his pursuit of George. To take the Antoine—Desnos connection further, the opening scene, a hallucinogenic memory of Antoine's military service in Morocco, is almost certainly based on Desnos's own posting in Morocco before he joined the surrealists. And Les Halles, where Desnos's father worked, is memorably described through Antoine's eyes in one of the book's best scenes.

But such details, in the end, are trivia. What matters is that **THE DIE IS CAST** is a very good book—entertaining, moving, replete with descriptions and scenes that are not easily forgotten—written by a highly and multitudinously talented writer. That Desnos hadn't written any fiction of note for fifteen years only makes his accomplishment here more impressive.

Desnos also published the poetry collection *Etat de veille* (which included "Tale of the Bear") in 1943; the year after, he published another set of poems in *Contrée*. Both books were political in a manner the Germans would not have appreciated, and both were semi-clandestine—meaning they were available in some bookstores but had evaded the collaborationist censors. **THE DIE IS CAST** allowed Desnos to openly address a political issue close to his heart, without fear that it might land him in prison, or worse.

Tragically, Desnos's work in the Resistance was already leading him toward such a fate.

Desnos was arrested on 22 February 1944. A colleague from Aujourd'hui, the newspaper he was then working for, had called his apartment that morning to warn him that the Gestapo were out looking for him. Desnos helped Alain Brieux—a young man he'd taken in to help avoid a forced work program recently instituted by the Germans—escape and then stayed behind to protect Youki. A trio of officers soon arrived and took Desnos away to Gestapo headquarters, on rue des Saussaies. From there, Desnos passed through two transit camps and on 30 April arrived at Auschwitz-Birkenau, where he had his head shaved, was put into a striped uniform, and had the number 185,443 tattooed on his arm.

He made it out of Auschwitz. It seems that those running the camp were surprised to have been sent a non-Jewish convoy, and Desnos's group was sent away to Buchenwald in mid-May. Before the

end of the month, Desnos would be transferred again, this time to Flossenbürg. It was to be another short stay—on 2 June, he left for Flöha, on the Czech border. He arrived the next day and would remain there until April.

His time at Flöha wasn't as hard as it might have been. He was able to receive packages from Youki to supplement the meager rations, and his duties were among the camp's easiest. According to fellow prisoners, he was voluble and often in surprisingly high spirits, telling stories and reading fortunes in the evening. This all changed, however, when a confrontation with a server led to Desnos throwing hot soup into the other's face. As punishment, Desnos would be given the camp's most demanding jobs for the remainder of his stay.

This would last only about a month. It was the spring of 1945, and the Americans were moving inexorably closer, leading to the camp's evacuation on 14 April. The prisoners then began a brutal march toward another camp, Terezin, or Theresienstadt, in Czechoslovakia. Conditions along the way were wretched, and Desnos was much older than most of the other prisoners. Nevertheless, he made it to Terezin alive—in bad shape, but alive—on 7 May. The Allies won the war the very next day; the prisoners were free; the only thing to be done now was find a way back home. Desnos wouldn't make it. He grew increasingly ill, and just days after meeting a Czech doctor who'd recognized him from a photo in *Nadja*, Desnos died on the morning of 8 June. Weeks before his arrest, a film for which Desnos had written the screenplay, *Bonsoir Mesdames, Bonsoir Messieurs,* was released in Parisian cinemas. Two months into his imprisonment, two of his most celebrated works were published, *Contrée* and *Trente chantefables pour les enfants sages a chanter sur n'importe quel air,* a collection of nursery rhymes that's still taught to children today. Later this same year, *Le bain avec Andromède* would come out, and 1945 saw the publication of a play, *La Place de l'étoile*, and a long poem, "*Calixto*."

Desnos's arrest and deportation, it seems, cut short an unprecedented stream of productivity. We can only guess what else might have come of it. <>

DU FU TRANSFORMS: TRADITION AND ETHICS AMID SOCIETAL COLLAPSE by Lucas Rambo Bender [Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 9780674260177]

Often considered China's greatest poet, Du Fu (712–770) came of age at the height of the Tang dynasty, in an era marked by confidence that the accumulated wisdom of the precedent cultural tradition would guarantee civilization's continued stability and prosperity. When his society collapsed into civil war in 755, however, he began to question contemporary assumptions about the role that tradition should play in making sense of experience and defining human flourishing.

In this book, Lucas Bender argues that Du Fu's reconsideration of the nature and importance of tradition has played a pivotal role in the transformation of Chinese poetic understanding over the last millennium. In reimagining his relationship to tradition, Du Fu anticipated important philosophical transitions from the late-medieval into the early-modern period and laid the template for a new and perduring paradigm of poetry's relationship to ethics. He also looked forward to the transformations his own poetry would undergo as it was elevated to the pinnacle of the Chinese poetic pantheon.

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Tradition and Transformation

Among the many lures of literature, perhaps the most addictive is its promise to make sense. Though the point is almost too obvious to merit comment, this promise goes down to its simplest linguistic elements, whose basic function is to mean. As readers and writers, we arrange these promising elements into significant patterns, weave those patterns into intelligible ideas and satisfying stories, and translate those ideas and those stories into visions of our lives and of what matters in them. And we do not do so alone: we are always reading what others have written, reading in community, responding in our own writings. As a shared practice by which we involve each other in these projects, literature thus gives voice to a communal hope, against much evidence, that at least some sense can be made in and of this world.

Literature's entanglement with our passion for sense does not, however, guarantee that the "best" literature will most satisfy it. Quite the contrary, readers often demand of those works that would stand the test of time that they retain a certain reticence when it comes to the sense we can make of them. A number of explanations might be offered for this somewhat unintuitive phenomenon. Optimistically, for instance, dissatisfaction with what comes easy might represent a recognition that easy sorts of sense are flimsy things, that what will survive the Sequent phases of our interests and capacities will necessarily refuse to be comprehended entire on a first pass. Or, more pessimistically, we might intuit that any sense we can grasp will shortly sour, that culture has an inherent tendency to reduce its achievements to ruins. Whatever explanation we give, however, it seems clear enough that it is not always the particular sense we will ultimately make of a text that defines our attachment to it, but sometimes more the hint, the pursuit, even the frustration that precedes any final articulation, as if it were the promise rather than the promised that we cared most about.

This dynamic generates revealing paradoxes, nowhere more obvious than in literary canons. Though classic works must always remain partly elusive if they are to repay rereading throughout readers' lives and across generations, they come, over time, to constitute the shared reference points by which sense is made elsewhere. As the literary cultures they initially addressed pass away and new cultures form themselves around them, moreover, they become obscure not only in themselves but also through time, forcing readers invested in the stability they supposedly offer to invent new ways of interpreting them. For these reasons, canonical texts always exist at a point of crisis. They prove a culture's most cherished visions of sense while also undermining them, and offer to preserve

civilization while simultaneously driving it inexorably to what partisans of any one stage in its progress would recognize as collapse. They are evidence of our need for shared sense and also that we will, collectively, never find it—at least if finding it would mean ceasing to seek further.

These paradoxes are particularly clear in the case of Chinese poetry, where critics of subsequent ages largely remade the art in the image of one medieval poet whose work, written at a moment of quite literal societal collapse, presented an enduring crisis of understanding. This poet is Du Fu (712-70), generally recognized throughout the last millennium as the greatest poet in the tradition, but also as one whose poetry was unusually difficult for his latter-born readers. To reveal what they took to be its secrets, devotees of Du Fu's poetry over a thousand years have engaged in unprecedented feats of historical and biographical research, supplementing his collection with new genres of criticism and inventing new sorts of scholarly apparatus to transform it into the art's most powerful demonstration that sense was always there to be made. In time, these new genres and new apparatus have come to define what it means to make sense of Chinese poetry and have been applied to nearly every important poet in Chinese history, including many who were previously read quite comfortably without them. In this way, the obscurity that has so troubled readers of Du Fu's verse has stimulated the development of new regimes of sense-making for the tradition as a whole.

The obscurity of Du Fu's verse was not merely adventitious, however; nor has it been simply resolved by the work of so many generations of commentators. Instead, his was a poetry originally difficult to make sense of, a fact attested by the limited enthusiasm with which it was received in his lifetime and for the first 250 years after his death. Though this opacity has often been heightened by the passage of time, it derives ultimately from the work's consistent focus on difficult questions about sense-making itself, both in literature and in our lives. For Du Fu, these questions were urgent, sharpened by the sudden violence of the An Lushan Rebellion in 755, which fractured one of the greatest empires the world had ever known. In the wake of this cataclysmic conflict, Du Fu found himself unable to live out the models of the good life provided by "This Culture of Ours" (siwen), the great literary, philosophical, historiographical, and ritual tradition that he and his contemporaries had believed contained the wisdom necessary to guarantee social and personal flourishing. During the fifteen years that remained to him after An Lushan's initial assault on the Tang capitals, therefore, he searched for new ways to make sense of his experience, unmoored from the certainties that had guided him in his youth.

What he found, I will suggest, was less an answer to his questions than a new perspective on them. In the collapse of his civilization's models of sense-making, Du Fu came to recognize that cultural traditions are ineluctably insufficient to changing circumstances; that the understandings of any given cultural moment are, as such, inherently fragile; and that cultural change is thus inevitable. Yet rather than discarding his age's deep investment in the idea of tradition, he came to see value in its inability to offer irrefragable meanings. After the trauma of the Rebellion, he began to discern a richness in his experience's divergence from established paradigms and, in his last years, even began to hope that his apparently failed life might bear a different significance for future readers who derived their models of sense-making from different moral cultures. With increasing self-consciousness, therefore, he came to write a poetry designed to speak to a future he could not predict, as part of a tradition more commensurate with the inevitability of, and more capable of surviving, collapses like that he witnessed in his lifetime.

Over the last thousand years, Du Fu's success in this project has been nothing short of remarkable. Not only has he survived successive waves of cultural change, retaining his position at the apex of the canon in literary cultures organized around values as disparate as loyalty to the emperor and revolutionary solidarity with the masses. Through those changes, moreover, he has also been recognized as a crucial exemplar of virtues he could not have imagined, transfiguring him from a

failure in his own age to an epitome of the ethical life. Yet by virtue of this very success, Du Fu's critics have also been blinded to his own evolving interest in the problems of sense-making itself, the interest that rendered his poetry so open to interpretation in the first place. That interest is the focus of this book.

Modes of Sense-Making

This book thus offers two central arguments. The first concerns Du Fu's poetry and how it changed as he thought through the consequences of his society's collapse; the second, a shift in the modes of sense-making that have prevailed in China in the thousand years since he was elevated to the pinnacle of its poetic pantheon. Though different in scope, these two arguments are interrelated. On the one hand, the millennial shift in sense-making described here is written into the very text of Du Fu's collection, which in all its existing forms has been molded by his commentators. On the other hand, Du Fu's collection, thus constituted, has served as a principal justification for the shift these critics have wrought, retrojecting its origin into the deeper past and thus disguising their innovations. When we unearth, therefore, the contemporary assumptions against which Du Fu was writing, we begin to recognize how different he was. from either his inheritance or his inheritors. And when we identify the eccentricity of his mature verse to the literary culture of his time, we start to appreciate how radical were the changes wrought upon literary sense-making by the later critics who placed him at its center.

It is this historical intertwining of poetic and critical innovation that makes the concept of "sense-making" useful to me here, highlighting as it does the connections between what we do when we write literature, read literature, and integrate literature into larger visions of significance. The concept is also helpful in explaining why the transformations in literary understanding I will describe have not previously been recognized as such. The sense that we make in and of any given poem, that is, we make beyond the text itself, in the connections we draw between the fragmentary markings on the page and the various conceptual and affective domains that underwrite our sense of poeticity. In this way, both reading and writing poetry involve intuitions about the kind of thing poetry is and should be, intuitions that depend upon larger, generally implicit understandings of human psychology, the nature of reality, and the role of art in a good life—to name just a few of the issues at play. And not only do the intellectual networks that underwrite our intuitions thus guarantee that there is at least a rough alignment between our instincts as to what makes sense as a poem, how a successful poem should make sense of the realities and imaginaries it concerns, and how it is that reading and writing poetry make sense as activities people might want to pursue. Just as important, the inchoate extent of these intellectual networks all but guarantees that we only rarely articulate our sense of the poetic in explicit forms. Readers operating on different models of sense-making can therefore appreciate the same literature in vastly different ways, without recognizing that they are doing so.

The salience of these points is particularly marked when it comes to premodern Chinese verse. This poetry is, for the most part, written in an idiom far removed from everyday speech, omitting the particles and grammatical markers even of literary prose. In its language, then, no less than in its imagery, classical Chinese poetry often provides readers only the barest building blocks of scenes, sentences, and thoughts, as if it were a fragment from a lost fullness inviting their active reconstruction. This participatory quality, not incidentally, is one of the main reasons that the tradition of philological and explanatory commentary on Du Fu is so robust that, by the year 1250, publishers of critical editions of his work could claim to have collected exegesis from "a thousand scholars," When we read classical Chinese poetry, that is, we are quite obviously "making" sense, producing it out of some combination of the fragmentary markings on the page and the assumptions we bring with us about what it would make sense for the poet to be saying. And when these assumptions change, everything down to the basic grammatical construal of a poem can change with them.

We do not, unfortunately, have records of the construals, grammatical or otherwise, of Du Fu's poetry from his own time (or, for that matter, from the three centuries that followed his death). What we do have are statements about poetry and its entailments within other domains of significance, statements that can be usefully compared with the ideas that are articulated in later criticism of Du Fu's work. Among the many contrasts that could be drawn from these materials, I will focus throughout this book on the ways in which Du Fu's contemporaries and his critics discussed the relationship between poetry and what can roughly be termed "ethics"—that is, attitudes towards what is good or praiseworthy in a life. Ethics was central to the literary discourse of Du Fu's time, when poetry was more commonly integrated into visions of the good life than it has been since. Indeed, given that poetry figured almost omnipresently in social rituals among the elite, was discussed in mainstream intellectual circles as central to civilization's flourishing, and served as one of the most prestigious paths of access to real political power, Tang China might represent the world-historical apogee of poetry's assumed ethical significance. After the Tang, the art would never again attain the same general approbation as a moral medium—though Du Fu proved that it still could be one in exceptional cases. He has been, for the critics of the last thousand years, the tradition's "Poet Sage," the most moral of all its post-Classical writers. The entanglement of poetry and ethics was thus salient to Du Fu's context and has been important to his reception, albeit in revealingly different ways.

The question of poetry's ethical significance is also central to the narrative of poetic change that I want Ito trace in Du Fu's own work. The early eighth century was a golden age of culture and the arts, a flourishing believed to have been matched only in the legendary epochs of early Chinese history. According to contemporary ideology, this cultural flourishing both reflected and contributed to the surging economic and political might of an empire that by the 750s was closing in on a century and a half of almost continuous political stability, military strength, and economic growth. When the empire suddenly crumbled before An Lushan's armies at the apparent height of its cultural achievements, therefore, Du Fu's confidence in poetry's ethical significance crumbled with it—not to mention his hopes that poetry would earn him entry into the halls of power, where he could accomplish the moral goals he cherished most. Unlike most of his contemporaries—who generally wrote in the period immediately following the war in styles that signaled a retrenchment of the visions of poetry's significance that had underwritten the art for Du Fu in his youth10—Du Fu's acute sense of being cut off from the promised political and moral ends of his early immersion in literature led him to a thorough-going reconsideration of the nature and purpose of the art.

This reconsideration, I suggest, has allowed Du Fu to serve as a pivot between the optimistic assumptions of his time and those of the later ages for which he served as proof, against an ambient doubt, that poetry could at least sometimes be ethically significant. This is partly because his mature work pioneered new ways of understanding poetry's relationship to ethics that would become influential among his critics. His role in catalyzing this shift, however, is even more dependent on the ways in which he did not foreshadow their critical innovations: the ways his reconsideration of the poetic art often presented readers with verse that did not make immediate sense to them. In response to these obscurities, critics from the eleventh century onward have worked diligently to figure out how everything that Du Fu says might, in fact, be what a paradigmatically ethical poet should say, and they have written their conclusions into the text of his collection in the ways they have ordered it, in the paratexts they have provided for it, and in the annotations they have written to accompany it. In these respects, Du Fu's poetry as it exists today is indelibly marked by his postmedieval critics' vision of poetry's ethical significance. What I hope to suggest in this book, however, is that it is possible to read these interventions against the grain as well, as evidence of critical difficulty occasioned by his struggles with the failing ethical paradigms of a cultural world that, by his critics' time, had long since passed. Poetry as a Moral Medium

Some indication of poetry's capacity as this sort of moral medium is suggested by the structure of the thousand-year commentary tradition that has formed around Du Fu's collection. Works within this tradition predominantly endeavor to translate his verse into more straightforward, more elaborated, and more coherent propositions—much as I have done in this book. Yet the interest of those propositions always reposes implicitly on their insufficiency to the poetry itself, since were its riches to be exhausted by them, it would hardly merit commentary in the first place. In this sense, the generic expectation that poetry may require elucidation, while nonetheless remaining both more evocative and more precise than any elucidation could be, inherently predisposes the art to transcending any one articulated moral perspective.

A generic expectation of poetry's greater power as a moral medium, in comparison to more propositional forms of discourse, was a feature of Du Fu's own literary context as well, though contemporary thought turned it to different ends. According to the late medieval model, that is, it was the literary patterning of verse that made it particularly apt for conveying ethical orientations, its rhythms and intensities embodying the writer's emotions and involving the reader's body in the process of re-creating them. This literary patterning, moreover, was commensurate to the patterning that poetry was supposed to promote in the body politic, wen as literature translating into wen as culture to ensure the iteration of normative values throughout society and across time. These moral imperatives were reflected in the short, occasional form of the art, which allowed its allusions to bring the weight of tradition to bear upon the present moments it characteristically discussed, thus modeling for readers the essential moral process they were subsequently expected to perform in bringing the poem's own values to bear upon their own experiences. Poetry was thus formally commensurate to the structure of morality as it was understood in the late medieval period: a system of propagating analogies that formed readers into the sort of moral adepts who would know before reading what the next good poem could say, who would "match tallies with it in their minds."

This account of the art's moral capacities underwrote Du Fu's early verse, and it was by inverting crucial features of this paradigm that he would turn his later poetry from a technology for propagating analogies into an exploration of disanalogies. Like his contemporaries, he continued to write mostly in short, highly allusive forms that allowed him to apply the resources of the past to his ongoing experience. But from the outbreak of the Rebellion onwards, his allusions are often problematic. Instead of invoking the tradition in such a way as to conform the present to it, he makes use of its resources to reflect on the obscurity, the idiosyncrasy, and the ambiguity of his experience. In this respect, his poetry rearranges the iterative chain characteristic of the late medieval model. If the ideal reader in his time was one who already embodied the values a good poem would express, Du Fu's focus on failures of precedent and interruptions in analogy ensures that his readers, no matter how steeped they might be in the cultural tradition, will not know in advance what he is trying to say. His poems become puzzles for his readers, much as the experiences they describe were puzzles to him.

Whereas the late medieval model figured poetry as a chain of normative repetitions encoding civilizational stability across time, then, Du Fu reconfigures it as a chain of bewilderment propelling a search for new ideas. Just as the collapse of his culture's moral certainties drove him to experiment with novel solutions to the puzzles of his life, that is, so too do the puzzles of his poems encourage his readers to seek out innovative interpretations to dispel their obscurities. And in both cases, the difficulty of these enigmas is crucial to their continuing interest. Not only does the problematic applicability of the tradition leave underdetermined both the moral interpretation of Du Fu's experience and the text of his poems that attempt it. When he seeks to ameliorate this underdetermination by treating individual experiences as part of a broader narrative of his life, moreover, he winds up massively overdetermining them, rendering his solutions provisional to an

unknown future and his readers', likewise, dependent on convergent solutions to the rest of his verse. For these reasons, Du Fu never arrived at a final interpretation of his life's moral meaning, and his critics have always found more work to be done.

Yet although their endeavors are thus always incomplete, it is nonetheless in the ongoing attempts of such readers that we fulfill the hopes he articulates in his late works: that his problematic life should be revealed in time to have been a good one. In those rare moments when we break through bewilderment to a satisfying interpretation of a given poem, we discover the sense in what initially appeared not to make it, both to us and, in a different way, to Du Fu himself. Crucially, the over- and unclerdetermination of the verse ensure that the criteria by which we recognize such a discovery are rarely linguistic or historical only. Instead, just as the late medieval model required an adept reader who already knows what a good poet will say, so too can we not be fully satisfied we have understood what Du Fu is saying until it makes sense that he would have been saying it. And as our own ethical and aesthetic predilections inform our solutions to the ethical and aesthetic puzzles of his verse, a striking reorientation occurs. Suddenly, the moral divergences between individuals, eras, and ethical worlds that previously drove the obscurity of Du Fu's life and work prove, on the contrary, synergic, his disjunctive use of past precedents coming to describe the details of his present situation in a way that, from our future vantage point, seems apt and even ethically laudable. In such breakthrough moments, we thread together a tradition very different from that of the late medieval model.

Although recordizing criticism has not generally perceived itself as bringing to bear on Du Fu's work moral ideas that would have been foreign to him, it nonetheless can demonstrate the point. Not only does the millennium-spanning length of the commentary tradition testify both to the enduring obscurity of his collection and its alluring promise to someday make sense. More specifically, the assiduous historical research that animates recordizing reading attests his poetry's undercietermination; the fact that critics still generally ignore large portions of his oeuvre, after a thousand years of such research, suggests the difficulties created by its overdetermination; and the prominent role very different moral theories, from Neo-Confucianism to Maoism, have played in guiding the results of this research indicates how this combination of over- and underdetermination involves readers' ethical intuitions in its interpretation. And yet, despite these difficulties, there has hardly been a commentator who has not claimed his commentary unlocks the previously unappreciated moral significance of Du Fu's life and work. In this way, recordizing reading has been a tradition in two different senses. On the one hand, it has been remarkably consistent in its adherence to the basic idea that poetry should be a transparent record of moral truths immanent in historical experience itself. On the other, its insistence that this paradigm of poetic meaning, in fact radically new, articulates the moral significance of Du Fu's verse and the normative form of Chinese poetry since the Shijing—especially as both keep changing to match the evolving exigencies of different eras—reveals recordizing criticism as creatively maintaining a larger tradition whose unity, ultimately, lies in transformation.

What I have tried to suggest in this book is that it is no coincidence that this tradition, in the limited sense of the word, should also have been secretly committed to the maintenance of tradition in the larger sense as well. Instead, it has in this respect responded both to the articulated hope of Du Fu's mature work and to the poetic mechanisms he found to enact it. It is, finally, this homology between the form of his verse, its moral vision, and the tradition it has created that renders his poetry more compelling than any propositional account of that vision could be—very much including my own. Indeed, if my reading of his work is onto something, it cannot, by its own lights, be complete. It is, rather, merely a means of participating in a tradition that, if we are to remain faithful to Du Fu, must always find new ways of continuing on.

A Shared Moral Project

At a certain point in this research, I thought my contribution to the tradition of Du Fu criticism might involve bringing to bear on his work the insights of recent discussions, in both literary criticism and Anglo-American philosophy, of literature's potential as a moral medium. Over the last century and particularly since the1980s, a number of scholars have explored how homologies between literary form and content create spaces for ethical reflection that cannot be replicated in more theoretical genres, and many of their conclusions seem relevant, mutatis mutandis, to thinking about the role Du Fu's poetry has played in the moral economy of China over the last millennium. Recordizing critics, in fact, have located the ethical import of his verse along each of the four main branches Joshua Landy has outlined in a recent typology of such theoretical accounts: the exemplary, the affective, the cognitive, and the formative. They have, that is, taken Du Fu as exemplifying virtue in an age of disorder, as modeling the emotions that are constitutive of a rich inner life, as providing valuable information about the processes of history, and as teaching us ways of properly appreciating their significance as they play out in our own lives.

Beyond Land's typology, the close adherence of Du Fu's poetry to the contours of his life also dovetails nicely with recent work suggesting that literature's ethical promise lies in its capacities to challenge the abstract thinking that has often dominated moral theory, to complexify the problems such theory works to solve, to ground ethical thought in the dense realities of real human lives, or to encourage us to accept the limitations incumbent upon the sort of moral beings that we are. Given that most of these ideas have been developed exclusively in connection with novels from the modern West, moreover, their application to the work of a premodern Chinese poet seemed likely to be fruitful both in broadening and in specifying their claims.

Yet though Du Fu may in fact have shaped his readers' moral perspectives in all these ways, the difficulty of studying this effect began to warn me away from doing so—not to mention my growing suspicion that he probably shaped different individuals and different eras differently. More important, it gradually dawned on me that the most obvious role he has played in his readers' lives did not fit along any of these lines. Rather, in building on the work of their predecessors and contributing to the cumulative edifice of historical research that supports recordizing reading, his critics have consistently attested, despite the changing details of their particular ethical and political paradigms, to the access his work has provided them to a shared moral project stretching across centuries. That Du Fu should have written in such a way as to make this possible is, I have come to think, an achievement that is ethical in character and conducive, moreover, to his readers' living better lives.

Most concretely, the participatory quality of Du Fu's poetry may render it particularly well suited to encouraging its disparate readers to see themselves as potential collaborators in a community of moral interpretation. Although, as discussed, Du Fu has often been invoked at moments of crisis to distinguish the "Chinese" from "foreign" invaders, his work nonetheless remained canonical in so-called conquest dynasties and may eventually have played some small role in shoring up their mixed communal identities. Despite his importance to Ming loyalists, for instance, the Manchu rulers of the Qing also promoted his poetry and the patriotic values it purportedly encouraged. And despite simmering tensions between China and Japan, his verse has in recent years created opportunities for scholarly exchange between them, with both sides viewing it as, to greater or lesser degrees, part of their own tradition. Going forward, it is to be hoped that similar exchanges will continue between East Asia and the rest of the world.

As Du Fu recognized particularly in his Kuizhou era work, moreover, effective synchronic communities are, to a significant degree, functions of imagined diachronic solidarity. Even more than horizontal linkages, therefore, his poetry encourages his readers to imagine themselves members of a shared vertical community, across time. Such transtemporal communities were always important

to Du Fu, but they became even more so in his exile—a development that partially explains why, as he wrote towards a future he could not predict, his poetry became even more densely studded with allusions to the past. In his late work, these allusions no longer stake a claim to timeless wisdom, but rather suggest the commonality of the moral obscurities he thinks define our lives. As we read Du Fu, therefore, we are invited to consider the possibility that the distant past of his allusions, the middle past of his life, and the proximate past of the commentary tradition are not, ultimately, foreign to us; that instead they may contain crucial elements for our own moral futures.

In this sense, Du Fu's poetry militates against what Samuel Schemer has called "temporal parochialism." According to Schemer, there is a danger that, as "our sense of the connections among different human generations [becomes] increasingly impoverished," we may disregard the good reasons we have to participate in, preserve, and transmit inherited traditions, and may fail to recognize our moral dependence on the future, that "what is necessary to sustain our confidence in our values [ultimately,] is that we should die and that others should live." Schemer identifies this temporal parochialism as a particular danger of our current moment, in which environmental and political crises threaten to leave to future generations neither the moral resources they will need to make sense of their lives nor the material resources necessary for living them well. But it is no coincidence that Du Fu too was responding to what seemed to him the imminent collapse of a great, if flawed, culture. Although the An Lushan Rebellion did not quite endanger the existence of future generations, he likewise had reason to worry that his lifetime would coincide with a decisive break between the past and the future, after which the values he learned in his youth and the tradition that informed them might be forgotten as obsolete. After all, these values and this tradition no longer worked well even for him. With the past threatening to be swallowed up into an oblivion of failed moral and political ideas and the future to become unrecognizable, human history seemed on the brink of transforming from the proving ground for the unbroken thread of This Culture of Ours to a discontinuous series in which no life could remain significant for long.

It was in response to this threat, ultimately, that Du Fu abandoned the comforting communities of late medieval poetry and late medieval ethics for a more speculative solidarity he could live only as an exile. In writing not for his contemporaries but rather for readers whose moral proclivities he could not predict, he seems to have recognized that the exigencies of enacting a particular set of settled values will always conflict with those of bridging the discontinuities between such sets. The rigor, purity, and clarity that motivate the like-minded may come to seem brittle to communities otherwise constituted, and no matter how frustrating it may be to work alongside anyone who cultivates a moral style involving irony, enigma, and plenitude, these equivocal virtues in the here-and-now can play significant roles in the long-term success of endeavors whose fruits lie in the future. For this reason, although any given ethical perspective may allot some narrow space within which poetry can be moral, within the larger scope of human history, any perduring ethical accomplishment will have to be poetry, and will, as such, have to dally with incomprehension, isolation, and failure. And it is precisely as this sort of venture into the unknown that Du Fu's work is both an ethical achievement and an enduring paradox: that precisely in living a failed life according to the standards of the tradition as it was understood in his time, he ended up living well according to the transforming tradition Chinese moral poetics has actually proven to be. <>

THE POETRY OF DU FU translated by Stephen Owen, edited by: Ding Xiang Warner and Paul W. Kroll 6 volumes [Series Library of Chinese Humanities, De Gruyer, 9781614517122] Open Source Funded by The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Chinese, English

THE COMPLETE POETRY OF DU FU presents a complete scholarly translation of Chinese literature alongside the original text in a critical edition. The English translation is more scholarly than vernacular Chinese translations, and it is compelled to address problems that even the best traditional commentaries overlook.

The main body of the text is a facing page translation and critical edition of the earliest Song editions and other sources. For convenience the translations are arranged following the sequence in Qiu Zhao'an's Du shi xiangzhu (although Qiu's text is not followed). Basic footnotes are included when the translation needs clarification or supplement. Endnotes provide sources, textual notes, and a limited discussion of problem passages. A supplement references commonly used allusions, their sources, and where they can be found in the translation.

Scholars know that there is scarcely a Du Fu poem whose interpretation is uncontested. The scholar may use this as a baseline to agree or disagree. Other readers can feel confident that this is a credible reading of the text within the tradition. A reader with a basic understanding of the language of Chinese poetry can use this to facilitate reading Du Fu, which can present problems for even the most learned reader.

Reviews

"To call Du Fu China's greatest poet grossly underestimates his importance. [...] Thus the first full translation of Du Fu's poems into English is a major event, and everyone involved in the study of Chinese literature owes Stephen Owen a great debt. That his edition of Du Fu's poems includes helpful annotation, such as explanatory footnotes, scholarly endnotes pointing out variants and justifying interpretations, and a guide to major allusions, makes it an invaluable scholarly tool. Moreover, the online version is open access, making it even more convenient for students and poetry lovers alike."

Nicholas Morrow Witliams in: China Review International: Vol. 21, Nos. 3 & 4, 2014

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Additional Notes

Excerpt: Du Fu (712–770) came to be referred to as the "poet-historian," shishi t.t, primarily because he bore testimony to the momentous events surrounding the great An Lushan Rebellion of 755–763, which humbled the Tang dynasty (618–907) and from which the dynasty never entirely recovered. Such a version of the "historian," whose attention was always on the center of the polity and on the whole only through the political center, has been supplemented in recent times by a more capacious sense of "history," which includes the local details of contemporary life that were previously considered marginal. In this larger sense of history Du Fu remains the "poet-historian."

In the eleventh century Du Fu was canonized, not simply as the preeminent figure in Tang poetry, but also as the very embodiment of Confucian values, as they were coming to be understood in the Song. He was the epitome of loyalty, unrecognized and unrewarded by the dynasty. Though unheeded, he spoke to and for the polity, praising the worthy, criticizing the unworthy, pointing out the social consequences of policy, and sympathizing with the sufferings of the common people. The selection of his poetry gathered around these values.

All these values are true and amply attested in his poetry (even if we might now be inclined to note his gross political misjudgments). It is, however, time for a broader understanding of his work. No poet in the Tang passed through so many social positions and roles in his poetry — the grown man of good family going about with the fashionable elite of Chang'an, the husband and father trying to get his family out of harm's way, the court officer in close attendance on the emperor, the minor local official complaining about too much paperwork, the itinerant with his family looking for food and lodging, the sycophantic dependent of local power-holders, the neighbor of peasants, all within the crumbling structure of the Tang empire. He often lamented that he was thwarted from gaining office in Xuanzong's (r. 712–756) reign, but during the An Lushan Rebellion that failure perhaps spared him the danger of an enforced office in the rebel regime and the treason trials that followed the reconquest of the capitals by loyalist forces. Just before the Rebellion he declined a post that he considered unworthy of his capabilities, but he received a good post after escaping through rebel lines and making his way to loyalist headquarters. Following the recovery of Chang'an, he lost favor through maintaining political loyalties that were as wrong-headed in political actuality as they were admirable in principle; he was assigned a provincial post that involved too much dreary, bureaucratic work, and resigned. When he finally was named to a purely honorary post in the Board of Works, he proudly carried his insignia of office for the rest of his life.

He had a strong sense of right, and his sense of right was matched by his interest in food. After his youthful years, food became a central concern in his poetry. Upon taking the family to the countryside just before the Rebellion, one of his children died of hunger. He begged for food, celebrated it, foraged, and complained when a promised allotment of vegetables was not up to his standard. He celebrated sashimi, pestered a relative for good Chinese chives, thanked a friend profusely for a pot of bean sauce, and in hard times was grateful for what is called "famine food." He writes about medicines almost as much as he talks about food. Throughout most of his life as a poet he was sick — he never lets us forget it. He suffered from diabetes, lung inflammation, asthma, fevers, aches, and pains. We ourselves are "at pains" to diagnose his illnesses — though we may suspect that he was a bit of a hypochondriac. We first see him in his late thirties and he already claims to be old or "getting old." He remained "old" for most of his poetic career.

We are never sure how to read his complaints. He complained of poverty; and indeed, in parts of his life he seems to have been truly destitute. Poverty is, however, relative. When he was leaving Kuizhou, we learn that his orchard was forty mu in extent (almost six acres), which did not include his gardens and share in the rice fields. When the rice harvest was coming in, he set up house by the fields to supervise. We know the size of his fruit acreage because, unlike any of his contemporaries

or almost any later poet, he tells us in his poetry. We want to tease him for his incessant complaints; but we see him telling a relative, who is temporarily moving into his main domicile in Kuizhou, not to build any fence so that the widow next door will not feel unwelcome or too intimidated to take the fruit from his date tree, which he has always permitted. This could, of course, have been communicated orally. If Du Fu does this in poetry, it is not, I believe, simply to demonstrate to contemporaries and posterity that he is a good person; rather, he seems to write in poetry absolutely everything he thinks is important. He is not like any other Tang poet — and, indeed, he often seems to have entirely forgotten what normally lay outside poetry's sphere of discourse. Later writers wanted to recapture Du Fu's weird engagement with lived experience, but even at their best they could not quite attain that.

Du Fu was, without a doubt, the most imitated poet in the later Chinese tradition, but it was the Du Fu as he was seen in the Song dynasty (960–1279) who was imitated, rather than the full range of our Tang Du Fu. At different times he had three or four servants; but, like no one else in his day, we know his servants by name because he wrote poems for them and named them in his poems. What is usually socially invisible in Tang poetic discourse often becomes visible in Du Fu's poetry — and perhaps for this, more than anything else, he deserves to be called "poet-historian."

In his poetry we see, in passing, those moments we know must have occurred, but which are not to be found in the poems or even the prose of his contemporaries. After the emperor Xuanzong fled Chang'an, leaving the members of the extensive imperial family to fend for themselves in the city soon occupied by An Lushan's forces, we meet a prince of the blood hiding from An Lushan's occupation force. We see divisions of the grand army of Central Asia, which had fought their way as far as Afghanistan, then withdrawn from the frontier and sent to the east to attack the rebel generals; later, under inept generals and a divided command, those soldiers were wasted in the fiasco of the siege of Ye. We see empty villages and hear Du Fu urging his peasant neighbors, driven to desperation by continuous tax-gouging, not to flee their land. We see the dark synecdoche of a riderless horse with arrows in its saddle. In his last years we see Du Fu fleeing Changsha with his family by night, as the local garrison killed its commander and ran amok. Nevertheless, in the midst of the fearful contingency of his life and his poetry, he has moments of consummate vision of the order of the world, the nature of the people that inhabit it, and the way we apprehend it.

Many of his best poems connect the mundane with larger ethical values and a vision of how the world works. He never begins as a moralist; he discovers moral issues in the world he encounters; sometimes the issues he finds are far too grand for the experience, and he laughs at himself. His pervasive irony and humor — in conjunction with his very human crankiness — make him a better model for the "Confucian" than the generations of sanctimonious readers who idolized him. One of his most famous poems is on a storm that blew the thatch from his roof, which was carried off by local children, then a rainstorm that soaked him and his family by night, concluding with his wish to shelter all the poor gentlemen of the world. The noble wish is inseparable from the self-representation as a ridiculous, helpless older man yelling at children behaving badly. If there is a justification for translating all of the poems, it may be deepening our sense of his engagement with the mundane and not allowing it to resolve into simply a way to talk about "big things." It is the persistence of his vision of large significance in the everyday — sometimes ironically — that makes a whole Du Fu more satisfying than a selected Du Fu.

After the An Lushan Rebellion Du Fu took his family on a large loop, from the region around the capitals to the bleak northwest, then down through the mountains in a harrowing journey to Chengdu, and, later, on down the Yangzi to Kuizhou, Jiangling, and across Lake Dongting down to Changsha in Hu'nan. In some of these places the family stayed for years. During all that time, Du Fu was transporting the scrolls of his growing poetry collection, surviving as more than fourteen

hundred extant poems. It is worth thinking of this in the context of the family's escape from the uprising in Changsha (Tanzhou), 23.37:

> My soul melted, escaping the flying arrows,
> I crept fearfully through those wolves and jackals.
> I made myself endure the prick of thornbushes,
> I kept on going with wounds from blisters.
> My son, coming from afar, attended us closely,
> a girl, still nursing, was next to us.

In this dramatic scene of flight, we have to imagine someone bringing along at least fourteen hundred poems, not in the compact codex form, but as early tradition tells us, in sixty scrolls, each with a wrapper. Leizu translated as "crept fearfully," is literally "one foot standing on another," a sign of intense fear. Even allowing for poetic license, a space must be made somewhere in the scene for those sixty scrolls, along with some of Du Fu's favorite household goods, such as his black leather armrest and, no doubt, the rest of his library.

If we credit his claim made in the early 750s that he had been writing poetry since age seven and had composed more than a thousand poems, most of his early work has been lost, which is hardly surprising in the desperate situation surrounding the fall of Chang'an to rebel forces. What we have of his earlier poetry was probably put down later, from memory. Those sixty cumbersome scrolls come from a poet who was already fully mature.

When those poems first appear to us in the Song dynasty, they are divided into two parts, "regulated poems" and "non-regulated poems." Within each of those two divisions the poems are arranged chronologically. In all but a few cases we do not know the original form of Tang poetry collections; we have evidence to guess about others. However, from circumstantial evidence this may have been one of the earliest poetry collections that was originally arranged chronologically, though perhaps with the elementary generic division between "old style" and "recent style." This is another way of saying that Du Fu chronicled his life in poetry. This fact and the unprecedented volume of his poetry became itself an essential part of the image of Du Fu and the way he has been read. While Du Fu's poetry often seems to respond to the contingency of the moment, we also know that he frequently revised his poems — and we never can be sure, in a given poem, how much is immediate response, how much is response from recent memory, and how much is added in retrospect. We find ourselves in between diary and autobiography, the historical person responding to the contingency of the moment and the artist constructing his life, saying the things he should have said. He wrote until he died.

The autobiographical form of the collection, more than anything else, made Du Fu's biography the essential ground from which to consider his poems. While this has become the standard way to approach a poet in China, it was not so in the Tang. The biographies of some poets are credible; others are based on serial conjecture. Du Fu's biography, however, has a level of detail that is approached only by the poet who sought to write even more poetry than Du Fu — Bai Juyi (772–846). Even in Bai Juyi, there is a specific year — at a time when he was closely engaged with Du Fu's poetry of social protest — when his poems begin to be organized chronologically. We do know that the scholarly chronology of "life and writings," the nianpu, had its origins in the second half of the eleventh century, in chronologies of Du Fu and his other devoted admirer, Han Yu (768–824).

Du Fu's biography can be done in a few paragraphs, in a chapter, or in the three volumes of Chen Yixin's Du Fu pingzhuan (Critical Biography of Du Fu). When we reach that final stage, in Chen Yixin's three volumes, we realize how deeply Du Fu's poems are embedded in history, which we know from substantiating bits and pieces from other sources. It is important, however, to recognize that Du Fu's canonical status in the Chinese poetic tradition is based on an intuition of how his

poems are embedded in history rather than the substantiation we find in Chen Yixin's great work. An "intuition" is different from certain knowledge, but it makes readers yearn for certain knowledge, even when it is as impossible to have as it is necessary for the nuance of the poem.

The lesson we learn from this is not that we can ever fully know the context of certain poems — anyone who has read the scholarship knows how often we have two or more competing and equally plausible interpretations for the same lines. The lesson is rather that the poetry called for and engendered a passion for philology grounded in empirical history, the larger meaning appearing only through what those lines meant in that particular historical context. Du Fu has many universal lines — and those are often quoted — but there are other beguiling lines that made readers want to know what the words meant in that context at that time. Perhaps only Du Fu will ever know; perhaps even Du Fu did not know — they just seemed the right words at the moment.

The long tradition of biographical contextualization of Du Fu's poetry is perhaps why William Hung presented his prose translations of Du Fu's poetry in a biographical narrative. The purposes of a complete translation and a critical biography are very different, but in the case of Du Fu some supplementary information is often useful in understanding a poem. Many poems contain "original notes," often assumed to be by Du Fu's own hand. Indeed some such notes — such as one that identifies a person referred to in a poem as a "drinking buddy" — involve either personal knowledge or historical knowledge that is not in extant sources and unlikely to ever have been included in any historical sources. This presumes that in preparing his poetry collection Du Fu already anticipated readers who would not know what he himself realized was necessary context. That means, in turn, that Du Fu was thinking seriously about future readership, which was not the norm in Tang poetry.

The readers of the current translation are farther from the context of Du Fu's poems than the poet himself could have ever anticipated or imagined; his own inclusion of notes invites the current translator to briefly supplement the translations so that the contemporary reader will be able to make sense of a poem. Sometimes such supplementary context will be given in a few lines after the poem; sometimes, when involving particular lines, it will be provided in footnotes. The general principle for footnotes in the text is to provide necessary information for understanding the text and the current translation. When there are problems of interpretation that might invite other translations, these are addressed in "Additional Notes" in the Supplement.

The Business of Poetry

My great-grandfather's sister
was your great-grandfather's mother.
Before your ancestor became eminent
she [my great-grandfather's sister] became the
wife of the [future] minister [your great-great-grandfather]. (23.22)

No other Du Fu poem begins with a banality as memorable as this, yet this is part of the social "business" of poetry, establishing a relationship with the recipient — in this case, a family relationship going back to the founding of the Tang — through which the poem happens.

In reading Du Fu's complete collection we see much of the business of poetry in the Tang. The reader who retains that lofty sense of "Poetry" from the Romantic tradition may be horrified. But there is much to enjoy here. When a friend is appointed to an official position, he is congratulated; when a friend is demoted or exiled, Du Fu commiserates. He writes obsequiously to men in power asking for help — but like no other Tang poet he also writes: "I force myself to be amusing when serving my patrons" and tells of the client's life in the dust of the patron's carriage and dining on "dregs of goblets and cold roasts." He says goodbye to departing friends. This is the usual business of Tang poetry, but there is more everyday "business" than has survived in other contemporary poetry collections; and we do not know if Du Fu simply preserved verses that others discarded or if

he had an expanded sense of poetry in the everyday. No one else, setting up a household, has poems begging for fruit trees and crockery. No one else writes irritated poems when promised grain does not arrive on time or the usual vegetable delivery is substandard. No one else celebrates a bamboo piping system that brings water from a mountain spring into his kitchen or the construction of a chicken coop. Chinese critics wax ecstatic about Du Fu's "realism," but they do not mention these poems that are just too realistic, the persuasively "realistic" voice of a very cranky old man making his complaint about bad vegetables into poetry.

The presence of a significant number of such poems in Du Fu's collected works makes us wonder what Du Fu was doing. A poetry collection — whether edited by a friend, a family member, or the poet himself — was a way of presenting oneself to society and to posterity. Some later Tang poetry collections seem to try to foreground all the famous people the poet knew and with whom he exchanged poems. Du Fu was on very good terms with several Tang princes and prominent political and cultural figures, and we have those poems. But then we have "Meng of the Granaries Section Comes on Foot to Give This Old Man Full Pots of New Ale and Bean Sauce". Meng was a minor functionary in the local bureaucratic establishment of Kuizhou and a friend. Du Fu's role in Kuizhou was the resident cultural figure, writing documents for the court-sanctioned loyalist warlord in charge of the local army and attending parties for passing dignitaries. Perhaps Meng thought that he might get a poem for a gift of a pot of bean sauce and a pot of ale — and he did. It is not surprising that Du Fu wrote such a poem; what is surprising is that he kept it among his poems so that it miraculously survived to the present day, with nine centuries of erudite commentary. Perhaps Du Fu had come to think of his poetry differently from other poets.

This is in no way a critical commitment to "literary realism," either in the nineteenth century mode or in the socialist variety. European "realism" invents the "real" through representation and idealization. Du Fu is much closer to diary and attention to what happens. When that enters the reflective regime of poetry, it is sometimes versified diary, sometimes merely "doing social business," and sometimes the greatest poetry in the Chinese tradition — allowing that all three can occur simultaneously. If, returning to his cottage near Chengdu after an extended period, Du Fu finds that his boat had sunk under the water and rotted, it leads to thoughts about what the boat had meant to him, whether the enabling means of future travel down the Vangzi to the idyllic Southland or simply the means by which to sail around nearby Chengdu and poetically speculate on such a journey. This is diary, which, through Du Fu's singularly ironic self-reflection, becomes great poetry.

Du Fu praises patrons in the common way: their ancestry, their superior nature, the certainty that a high court appointment is inevitable and soon to appear. Perhaps the most remarkable thing is that he finds new ways to praise. Du Fu's praise of his patron Van Wu in Chengdu is displaced into a peasant neighbor expressing his gratitude that his son, in military service, has been released to help with seasonal farm work.

> Turning his head, he pointed to his oldest boy: "He is a master with the crossbow.
> His name is on the light cavalry registers, his term is long in permanent service.
> A few days ago they released him for farm work saving my decrepit body from bitter hardship. I'll do corvee labor and pay my tax until I die, and I swear that I won't run away with the family." (11.2)

This is praise in a very different key from the usual themes, and praise that a devoted senior servant of the empire would surely appreciate. Du Fu touches on perhaps the most pressing issue for the dynasty that other poets rarely mention. Under constant pressures of taxation to support the bloated military, peasant families were fleeing their land and diminishing the tax base, which put an increasingly unbearable burden on the peasants who remained. Du Fu knows that there is no greater praise for the regional military commissioner than an old peasant's promise not to flee his land in return for the grace of temporarily releasing his son to help him bring in the harvest.

It is the quotidian that makes the sublime possible in Du Fu's poetry. Later poets sought the sublime or the quotidian without understanding how much they need each other.

> From old friends with fat salaries letters have ceased coming,
> my children, constantly hungry, have forlorn complexions. (9.28)

These lines are from one of Du Fu's Chengdu poems before Van Wu arrived to take military and political control of the province, providing Du Fu with a stable income by putting him on his military staff. The Chinese poetic couplet always asks us to see the relation between lines. There is little subtlety here: the letters from friends represent potential patronage, which will feed him and his family. Characterizing those "old friends" as having "fat salaries" deserves some consideration. Sentiment is clearly subordinated to utility here; friendship is not simply a natural feeling — though it is always represented as such — but also utility. Du Fu had many friends who were no use at all, and he sustained those friendships. He saw friends who could support him differently.

Du Fu was not much use for anything but writing poetry — but since he was, arguably, China's greatest poet, that is enough. On other levels his sympathy for the suffering of common folk redeems him to some degree, but his political judgments were often misguided, naïve, and biased in favor of his friends. The times needed men with political acumen or the capacity to take action. Du Fu had neither. He had no comprehension of the political balances necessary to preserve the tottering empire. The secretarial post he briefly held in Huazhou seems to have been the appropriate level for his bureaucratic abilities, and he resented the work deeply.

He expected to be supported by others, "old friends with fat salaries." He frequently admitted that he was lazy and not good at managing his affairs — which was true. He seems to have risen to the status of a competent small "gentleman farmer" in Kuizhou, but he gave that up to go chasing friendship and the illusory prospects of better patronage farther down the Vangzi in Jingzhou.

Like other poets, Du Fu used poetry to maintain his social network, and to keep in touch with friends found in Chang'an and later in his life scattered throughout the empire. He received great practical benefit from some of these connections, most notably Van Wu, whose military position permitted him to appoint his own staff. In Chengdu Du Fu was appointed to that staff, and returning to Chang'an for court business, Van Wu acquired for Du Fu his honorary appointment in the Board of Works that served him well for the rest of his life. Du Fu writes to each of his social contacts in kind, drawing on his impressive repertoire of voices: a light-hearted quatrain to ask for pottery, fulsome congratulations to friends for promotions (reminding them that he supported them when he was in court and they were not), answering poems to Wang Wei's (701–761) close friend Pei Di in the then dated style that Pei Di shared with Wang Wei, praising military men for their bravado. There was a range of registers from which to address different individuals in different situations. But nowhere does Du Fu present more problems for the reader of translation than in his long regulated poems (pailü) in the "high style." Most of these — with some famous exceptions — are addressed to people in his network. They can often be recognized by the number of footnotes required to make sense of them and by the designation in the title of how many couplets they contain. In some cases he sends these to two recipients, "A" and "B," filled with couplets whose lines implicitly refer to "A" then "B," or "B" then "A." Even the minimalist annotator has to explain to whom Du Fu was referring.

As with any discourse in social relationship, style adapts to the particular relationship. An easy intimacy is sometimes appropriate, even for those who hold great power over your fortunes. Du Fu often wrote with (deferential) intimacy to his patron Van Wu, when he was alive. When he died, Van Wu was treated in the "high style." Though hard to read now, the "high style" was much loved in the Tang, with a dignity that cultural change largely erased in Chinese poetry in the Song dynasty;

the appeal oof that style is even harder to recover in the present. It is good, at least, to remember what it meant: it was public honor.

Du Fu's Fate

Not only was Du Fu not considered a major poet in his lifetime, he was not a major poet by the standards of his own time. During the last dozen years of his life, when the vast majority of his poems were written, he was out of the social network within which the poetry then most admired was being written. Even if his poetry had been widely known, such neglect would be no surprise: he was writing poems of a kind that no one could then quite knew what to make of. He could sometimes play the game of social poetry with supreme confidence, but his was a talent that also often spilled over and transgressed the decorum of the occasion or the group. One of his most famous poems is "Climbing the Pagoda of Ci'en Temple with Various Gentlemen" (2.9); three other poems from the same occasion have been preserved. Those three other poems are finely polished and, despite some fine flourishes in Cen Shen's poem, utterly predictable. Du Fu's poem is brilliant, but totally out of tune with others.

Through the period of his service in the court of Suzong (r. 756–762), he was part of a court community, and much of his work was stabilized and contained by the community; that community diminished later, and he was often writing largely in isolation. He was in the provinces, but not among the literary circles of Jiangnan, where so many poets had taken refuge. The young poets of three or four decades later were weary of polish; they wanted someone who stood out with genius, and they found that in Du Fu. Eventually his poetry became a standard in relation to which other poets were judged; and when that same standard was turned on Du Fu's own poetry, it was self-evident that he was the greatest of all poets.

The earliest testimony to his posthumous reception is the preface to Fan Huang's "Anthology," written in the decade after Du Fu's death. Here Fan Huang tells us that Du Fu's collection was circulating in the Hubei and Hu'nan region, but the full collection was not yet known by "Easterners," i.e., the literary communities in eastern Jiangnan, primarily modern Jiangsu and Zhejiang. According to Fan Huang, the "Easterners" know only Du Fu's "playful topics and amusing discussions," but "do not know that he had compositions in the manner of the 'Great Odes' [of the Shijing], which made him unique in contemporary times." We have no evidence of Du Fu being read in the capital until 794, when young Yuan Zhen (779–831) got hold of a collection of "several hundred poems" and read them with great admiration.5 In the two following decades Du Fu was elevated to preeminent status by the major Mid-Tang writers Bai Juyi, Yuan Zhen, and Han Yu.

Esteem is one thing, and popularity is another. While Du Fu was referred to with admiration and sometimes imitated throughout the ninth century, he was far from the most popular contemporary or earlier poet. The esteem in which he was held is confirmed by his first appearance in an extant Tang anthology, at the head of Wei Zhuang's (836?–910) Youxuan ji from around 900. A small selection of his poems is followed by a selection from his older contemporary Li Bai (701– 762?), with whom his name had been paired since the early in the ninth century. Wang Wei, whose work had headed an earlier anthology, was relegated to the third position.

In the first part of the Song dynasty, from 960 through the first half of the eleventh century, the dominant literary period of the Tang was not the "High Tang," but the Mid- and LateTang. Bai Juyi retained a lasting popularity among some groups and was, arguably, the foundation of the emergent Song poetic style. Han Yu's prestige as a master of prose and a culture hero was steadily on the rise. The admiration of Du Fu by these two great Mid-Tang masters was the foundation of Song interest in Du Fu, combined with the new literary scholarship that was trying to piece together the Tang literary legacy from surviving manuscripts.

The subsequent canonization of Du Fu in the eleventh century went far beyond anything that happened earlier. In the context of emergent ethical concerns, associated with but not limited to the rise of Neo-Confucianism, Du Fu became the great "Confucian poet," the "sage of poetry," the "poet historian," and the very embodiment of loyalty to the dynasty and moral engagement. He was also the learned poet, for whom "every word has a source," and became the model for writing regulated verse. By the end of the eleventh century he began to attract imitators, who modeled their own poetry on his example, and at least by the twelfth century he began to attract commentaries on an unprecedented scale. In the vastly expanded print culture of the twelfth and thirteenth century, there were a large number of editions, of which only a few survive. There were certainly more editions of Du Fu in the Song than there were anthologies of Tang poetry.

Du Fu's canonical status has remained largely unchallenged to the present day. In part this was inertia; in part this was due to the variety of his collected poems, which could be selected to serve very different interests. Poetry manuals of the late thirteenth and fourteenth century used Du Fu poems as the model by which to teach regulated verse, a tradition continuing in later critical editions that selected only his regulated verse. His poems were the model for socially engaged poems; in dynastic crisis his poems were the model of how to bear poetic witness. By the eighteenth century we begin to see some critics growing weary of Du Fu's iconic status, but Du Fu has retained his preeminence in the tradition to this day. At least one famous mid-twentieth intellectual championed Li Bai; but however much Li Bai was always loved, Du Fu always remained Du Fu. His iconic modern image on an anthology cover has provided recent Chinese adolescents the possibility of a vast repertoire of visual parody.

It wasn't Du Fu's fault that he was turned into this. As Yuan Zhen observed already in the early ninth century, Du Fu's genius was his inclusiveness, his variety. The advantage of having the complete works is discovering how many, very different images of Du Fu there are.

The Tang

It is not possible here to give a full account of the political and social institutions of the world in which Du Fu lived, but these can confuse, even bewilder the most devoted non-specialist reader. Even the reader who has a good understanding of modern and late imperial China will find certain aspects of the Tang strange. The watershed is the great An Lushan Rebellion that began in late 755, though changes in the huge Tang military establishment laid the groundwork for the rebellion, and the consequences continued to unfold even after the rebellion was nominally put down. The earlier and basic political order of the civil bureaucracy had worked with a pool of qualified candidates to make civil appointments throughout the empire. This pool of candidates came from various sources, including the "literary" civil service examination (jinshi) and hereditary qualification, given to the eldest children of high-level civil servants, the "Yin" or "shade" privilege. After qualification, appointments were made by the complicated and highly politicized "Selection" (xuan) process. These were appointments either in the central government bureaucracy, or on the prefectural (zhou) or county (xian) level in the provinces. The imperial center was constantly promoting, demoting, and "exiling" (i.e. appointments to unpleasant prefectures and counties), with the result that officials had to be continually moved around.

From its beginning of the dynasty the Tang had military threats from the Turkic confederations to the northwest. The rise of Tibet and the Nanzhao kingdom to the south, combined with border wars with the peoples of the northeast required a strong military. By the time of Du Fu's earliest extant poems, the Tang had already expanded deep into Central Asia.

Whether the armies in Central Asia and fighting in the northeast were the product of mad military adventurism or a legitimate need to protect the empire's borders against continuing foreign threat is a matter of debate. The consequence, however, was a hard military shell to the north of a largely

demilitarized center. In the decades preceding the rebellion, these armies had become increasingly professionalized, often with the appointment of non-Han generals and large contingents of non-Han, "permanent service" troops. The regular reassignment of generals was replaced by more or less permanent appointments. The result was almost inevitable: when the long-term, non-Han general in command of all the northeastern armies revolted, the center fell with shocking ease.

Tang authority, badly damaged, was eventually reasserted. In the process, however, much of the core of the empire was militarized, which resulted in a two-tier administration. Each of the regional armies constituted a "Circuit" (dao ^), which included many prefectures. The circuit was roughly the equivalent of later provinces in size. The army was commanded by a military commissioner (jiedushi), formally appointed by the emperor. The military commissioner had the power to make appointments to his "staff," bypassing the usual recruitment procedures of the civil administration. After the An Lushan Rebellion the degree of loyalty to the emperor varied, as did the ability to win the allegiance of the regional armies. In the most uncontrollable regions the armies themselves might insist on appointing their general, sometimes hereditary. In the more "loyal" provinces the emperor appointed the military commissioner, the commanding general. Far more important than the commander, the armies themselves became local; even when officers and troops came originally from the outside, their interests were iden tified with the region. These armies were often restive.

Take the case of Du Fu's patron Van Wu, who commanded the two circuits into which modern Sichuan was divided. In early autumn of 762 he was recalled to court for the installation of the new emperor Daizong ^^ (r. 762–779). Summoning military commissioners to court was one way the imperial government tested the loyalty of its military commissioners — and many did not go. Van Wu, however, was a loyal servant of the empire and followed orders. No sooner did Van Wu go to Chang'an than one of his generals rebelled in Chengdu, the capital of western Sichuan. Although the rebellious general was soon killed, the troops continued to wreak havoc. At this point we find Du Fu departing Chengdu for an extended tour of then peaceful eastern Sichuan. Since troops had blocked the difficult passes over the mountains to Chang'an, it took a long time for Van Wu to return to Chengdu and restore order. Only then did Du Fu decide to return to Chengdu.

Although the center was supposed to be in charge of appointing prefects, in this new world of instability and local armies overseeing many prefectures, the old system of central control was complicated and compromised. A military commissioner could have a large say in who was to be the prefect of one of the prefectures under his command. A loyal local strongman with a small army could be confirmed as prefect by the central government.

The fiscal consequences for the empire should be obvious. There was now a very expensive military layer in between the central government and its tax base in the prefectures. The central government had to essentially give up hope of ever getting taxes from the northeast, once its richest source of income. Funds were constantly needed for military operations and for the bloated bureaucracy; largesse was needed to keep the regional armies loyal; the tax base was in many places squeezed to the point of breaking; peasants would leave their land in search of greener pastures, placing an even greater burden on those that stayed. And we should not forget that Du Fu was, from his Chengdu years on, was feeding off that system, largely idle except for writing poetry.

Text and Editions

The scholar of Tang literature ignores the textual sources at his or her peril. With perhaps the unique exception of a part of Xu Hun's (c.788–c.854) collection initially preserved in autograph in the Southern Song for the poet's calligraphy, none of our current literary texts can be traced to an authorial "original." Bai Juyi's extraordinary efforts to leave depository copies of his works is the case next closest to authorial "intention," and our current version of his collected works seems to basically follow the one he made, even if variants were introduced in the transmission process. Quite

apart from the textual variants that inevitably arise in serial recopying, very many Tang poetry collections seem to have been copied selectively in the Tang, Five Dynasties, and early Northern Song. Song editors, seeking "complete" editions, were commonly faced with different versions of a Tang poetry collection, with varying degrees of overlap, but with many poems that were unique to each particular version. The "complete" collections that were recompiled in the Song drew from one or more of such partial collections and pieces included in anthologies. Du Fu's collected poetry, as it took shape in the Song, was based on various partial collections in circulation.

The text of Du Fu's poetry is a unique variation on the usual issues that arise in the transmission of Tang literature through manuscripts into the Song, to scholarly editing and appearance in print, and on how those editions have been transmitted into the versions we now possess. Du Fu differs from less famous Tang poets in the remarkable degree of editorial attention he received beginning in the 1030s. Such attention led to the recovery of more manuscripts, more editions, and more editorial work. All in all the works of Du Fu probably have benefitted more from such attention than they have suffered from it; however, Song and many later editors uncritically preferred the "easier reading"; and deeply held convictions about Du Fu both as a person and as a craftsman seem to have deeply influenced textual decisions and spurred emendation. Behind those decisions among variants, the Song practice of speculatively correcting the text to reflect what Du Fu "must have written" was common, as some Song editors knew and deplored. Once Du Fu entered the hands of the booksellers in the Southern Song, there was an immense marketing advantage of numerous "new and improved" editions. Moreover, Song printers were not always careful proofreaders. What remains is a handful of those Song editions, some complete and some partial, some Song imprints and some recut or recopied, some scholarly and some popular.

In contrast to Bai Juyi's literary collection, the original version of Du Fu's collected works had been lost by the Song. The oldest edition still in circulation in the Song was Fan Huang's Du Fu xiaoji (Anthology of Du Fu) in six scrolls, with 290 poems, completed in the decade after Du Fu's death. In the Song a very brief encomium (zan ^) by Di Zundu is attested as having been attached to Fan Huang's anthology. Fan's preface is, however, attested for the first time only in the 17th century, in Qian Qianyi's (1582–1664) Jianzhu Du gongbu ji, presumably through the Wu Ruo edition. A number of variants represented by readings in the Fan Huang "Anthology" are mentioned in the earliest Song editions. While these should be taken seriously as indications of what was included in the "Anthology," we should always keep in mind that this collection was no less vulnerable to manuscript variation than other editions of Du Fu. There are many variants from the Fan Huang anthology given in the older sections of the "Songben". (Song edition) and the Guo Zhida edition (more on these two editions later). Because of the uncertainties in the transmission of the Fan Huang anthology itself, these have only the authority of early variants; these variants, do, however allow us to know which poems were included in the anthology.

Apart from the handful of poems in Wei Zhuang's Youxuan ji and those mentioned as having been included in Tangshi leixuan li (probably mid-ninth century), the earliest extant corpus of Du Fu's poems of considerable size is in the poems included in Wenyuan yinghua (987), and to a much smaller degree, in Tangwen (completed 1101). The texts of Du Fu's poems in Wenyuan yinghua, a huge, imperially sponsored "anthology" of the literary collections in the imperial library, often differ from the texts in the various Song editions of Du Fu's poems; and while that massive manuscript also suffered the vagaries of copying, its readings are earlier, sometimes clearly superior, and must always be taken seriously.

The state of the manuscript legacy of Du Fu's poetry in the early eleventh century is best represented by a bibliographical note by Su Shunqin from 1036. Su saw three manuscripts, let us call them "A," "B," and "C": B had three hundred poems that were not in A, which was probably a

larger manuscript; C had eighty poems contained in neither A nor B. It is not surprising that two large manuscripts would have so many poems in one that were not in the other (and Su does not tell us how many poems in A were not in B). What is surprising is that C, a smaller manuscript, had eighty poems in neither A nor B. We can only conjecture the situation if Su Shunqin had found ten manuscripts.

For all the Song scholarly dissatisfaction with printed editions, imprints had a level of relatively consistent dissemination that left even the best old manuscripts in oblivion. All Song editions are ultimately traced to the manuscript edition made by Wang Zhu (997–1057), with a postface (houji) dated to 1039. This contained 1405 poems in eighteen fascicles (juan), with two fascicles of other writing. A note in the postface to his edition lists Wang's sources:

> An old edition in two fascicles; the Shu edition in twenty fascicles; an "abbreviated collection" in fifteen fascicles; the "Anthology" with Fan Huang's preface in six fascicles; twenty fascicles with Sun Guangxian's preface; the "Shaoling Collection" with Zheng Wenbao's preface in twenty fascicles; another "Anthology" in two fascicles; Sun Jin's single fascicle; three fascicles of various pieces.

The first two printings of the Wang Zhu edition were by his son Wang Qi in 1059, reportedly in a print run of ten thousand (impossible with a single set of blocks). Here we must mention the Wu Ruo edition of 1133. This was the edition that Qian Qianyi claimed to have owned (in some version) and used as the basis of his commentary on Du Fu. It unfortunately was burned up with the rest of Qian Qianyi's library. In the preface to his Dushi yinde, William Hung argued strenuously that this edition was a fraud. Most modern scholars, on better evidence, credit both Wu Ruo and Qian Qianyi's edition — Zhou Caiquan suggests that Qian may have had a later reprint of the Wu Ruo edition. Qian Qianyi's edition held great prestige in the Qing, and many of the editorial choices reflect Qian's choices — which may or may not represent the Wu Ruo edition.

This comes to what does survive and its relation to Wang Zhu's edition. We have a composite edition from the early Qing, now known as the "Song edition." This is a seventeenth-century Jiguge construction, primarily based on two related early Southern Song editions, with some lost pages filled in from other editions. The small number of supplementary pages have been stripped of commentary, but the two predominant sources are without commentary, which is unique among extant Song editions, suggesting scholarly interest in the text per se and gesturing back to the Wang Zhu edition. One of these two editions cites variants from the manuscripts Wang Zhu used in preparing his edition; since it cites other, later sources for variants as well, it is clearly a later version. The other primary component does not cite the sources for its variants. There is scholarly debate regarding what these editions are — perhaps Wang Zhu with additional variants, perhaps Wu Ruo — but they are both probably among the earliest editions and closest to Wang Zhu.

Next we must consider Guo Zhidás Jiujia jizhu Dushi). The original 1181 edition has been lost, but the 1225 edition (perhaps changed) survived into the Qing. We currently have it most commonly through the manuscript copy in Siku quanshu (which is not always reliable). This was based on a now-lost Song edition in the palace collection; another Song edition, missing some juan and pages, was preserved in the library of the great bibliographer Huang Pilie and was reprinted in 1981. This also sometimes indicates the sources of variants, though less comprehensively than the few fascicles of the "Song edition" that give the manuscript variants. Guo's preface, moreover, addresses the issue of enthusiasts altering Du Fu's text without evidence; and while Guo himself says he fixes "errors," he is clearly interested in preserving what he considers the best text. Collating the poems shows that, while there are differences, the Guo Zhida readings generally are in accord with the two texts that comprise the "Song edition," while there are some striking differences from later Song commercial editions. The relative textual agreement between the two components of the "Song edition" and the Guo Zhida edition suggests that they all come from the same textual lineage.

Some mention should be made of the best Song commentary, the Xinding Du gongbu gushi jintishi xianhou bingjie by Zhao Cigong completed sometime between 1134 and 1151. Twenty-six of the original fifty-nine fascicles survive. As important as the commentary is, Zhao Cigong's edition was based on an earlier edition with frequent Song conjectural readings, to which Zhao added his own conjectural readings. The differences can be seen not only in the surviving fascicles, but also in the readings implicit in Zhao's commentary, which was extensively quoted by Guo and other, later Song commentaries.

I have based my text primarily on "Song edition" and the Guo Zhida edition, with consideration of earlier texts such as Wenyuan yinghua and Tang wencui. I note variants in these texts in my final notes, sometimes adding interesting variants from other early editions and Qiu Zhao'ao's Du shi xiangzhu (1703). Here we need to stress the obvious: the fact that Wenyuan yinghua, the Guo Zhida edition, and the two components of the "Song edition" may agree on a reading is no guarantee whatsoever that this is what Du Fu wrote. It is simply as close as we can come to the manuscript tradition and to a time before scholars were willfully changing Du Fu's texts. We have enough occasions when they are obviously correct — using a term otherwise appearing only in Tang texts rather than a term used in both Tang and Song texts — that we can have confidence that they are sometimes right.

Sometimes the variants give us an insight into a Du Fu rather different from the conventional image. In Du Fu has been brought a gift of bunches for fresh Chinese chives (jiucai). Du Fu praises the chives and at the end concludes:

> In my waning years, my viscera are cold,
> they taste warm, and I have no more worries at all. (8.18)

This seems bland enough, but the variants are interesting: the "Song edition" offers a variant fu ^, "stomach" or more vulgarly "belly" for bing; Guo gives the variant fu "also". The reading bing ("all together," translated as "at all") is odd. Taken together, the two variants, however, give us a clue to what possibly happened.

First we note a technical term of Chinese medicine, guanli "viscera." Tang poets very rarely use the technical vocabulary of Chinese medicine, and the term guanli is used nowhere else in extant Tang poetry. This tells us that the term would have stood out as an oddity to Tang readers. This goes in conjunction with the "cold" and "warm," then as now, standard terms in Chinese medicine. In this context let me suggest that the "Song edition" variant reading of fu (biuk) is correct. This is a play on registers, moving from the technically medical to the everyday:

> In my waning years my viscera are cold,
> they taste warm, my belly has no more worries.

It is easy to conjecture what happened. Radicals of characters were often omitted or exchanged, so a text might read A copyist could easily miss the joke and take the more common reading fu Fu has two readings: bhiuk meaning "return," and bhiòu meaning "also." By the period of copying (10th–11th century) the initials of bhiuk and biuk were collapsing, so it may have been a misunderstanding of sounds. The problem is that fu in the sense of "return" would be very awkward ("return to no worries"), and anyone reading the text would naturally take it as: "and again (bhiòu) I have no worries." The problem then is that in Middle Chinese this would be the painfully cacophonous bhiòu mio qiou. If it were biuk mio qiou ("belly without worries"), it would be perfect, since an entering tone in the third position of the eighth line of a five-syllable regulated verse was very common. Such cacophony begged repair, and a rough synonym for fu (bhiòu), "also," was bing (bieng).

This may not be what happened, but the conjecture brings to the fore many of the issues at work in the production of variants: texts that either do not use radicals or the proper radicals for characters,

homophones and near homophones in the period of copying, the avoidance of cacophony, and semantic variation. In the process a witty line becomes a bland line. I do not know if this was the case in the lines cited — we can never know for certain — but it vividly illustrates what "could have happened." <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHINA by Elizabeth Childs-Johnson [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780199328369]

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON EARLY CHINA brings together 34 scholars to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of archaeological, textual, palaeographic, metallurgical, philosophical, religious, and art historical research on China from the Neolithic through Iron Age periods, ca. 7/6000 BCE to ca. 300 BCE. To date, there has been no systematic or comprehensive study of ancient Chinese archaeology and art, in contrast with the extensive literature on "imperial China," which began with the Qin and Han dynasty, ca. 250 BCE and thereafter. Early China experienced momentous phases of development—heretofore unknown or inadequately described—including, for example, a Jade Age, a long continuous Bronze Age, and an Iron Age. An abundant supply of excavated texts from the late Eastern Zhou (Warring States) substantially changes our understanding of China during those periods.

The abundance of archaeological and epigraphic data available for study, in addition to the fact that little of this material has been published in the English language, makes The Oxford Handbook of Early China all the more significant. China has arguably the world's oldest continuous historical tradition. A more profound understanding of this tradition in the Western world is desperately needed for both general and specialist researchers. In studying ancient Chinese culture, the aim of this volume is holistic: it utilizes not only archaeological and anthropological but also art historical and epigraphic data for its analysis. Scholars who specialize in the archaeology of this region, as well as historians of China or archaeologists who work on other regions, will benefit from this synthetic overview of early China.

Review

"In focusing on early Chinese civilization, this handbook is unique ... THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHINA fills a niche for those needing a detailed focus on early Chinese civilization." -- R. Withers, *CHOICE*

"This handbook is unique.... [It] fills a niche for those needing a detailed focus on early Chinese civilization." -- *CHOICE*

"Authoritative and multidisciplinary in scope, this landmark volume offers a comprehensive overview of the latest research trends, paradigms, and approaches in the study of early China, from the Neolithic era to the Warring States period." -- International Convention of Asia Scholars Book Prize, 2021, Accolades in the Humanities

CONTENTS

I am glad to have the opportunity to bring 34 authors together for a joint project to put early China on the map of ancient world cultures from an interdisciplinary perspective. Too often, surveys of early China have been narrowly focused on anthropological/ archaeological, historical, or literary/paleographical subjects, without the benefit of a broader cultural perspective. Many recent books on early China in English have tended to take a strictly anthropological/archaeological point of view; examples include Campbell 2014 (appeared 2016), Shelach-Lavi 2015, Underhill 2013, and Liu and Chen 2012. Others take a specialized approach to regional studies (e.g., Flad 2011; Flad and Chen 2013; Liu 2004; Liu and Chen 2003; Shelach-Lavy 1999, 2009; Underhill 2002). There have been fewer general histories (including social and cultural history) of the whole time span of early China; see Major and Cook 2017 and Feng Li 2013. Others are comprehensive in outlook but more restricted in time, such as Feng Li on the Western Zhou (2006, 2008) and Xiaolong Wu on the Warring States—period site of Zhongshan (2017).

Anthropological and archaeological studies usually are limited to questions concerning the beginning and rise of civilization, or hierarchies of settlements with a particular culture. Historical studies often concern specific events at the expense of broader context. What has been lacking, to date, is a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach focused on the period before the establishment of imperial rule, encompassing the whole span of time from the Neolithic through Eastern Zhou eras, ca. 5000-250 BCE. This long era was the nursery of Sinitic culture, laying the groundwork for practices, beliefs, and traditions that extended into later periods. Thus, to fill this void in publications about early China we have gathered together various specialists from different disciplines to produce both introductory essays and essays that focus on specific issues in each one of the six chronologically successive eras covered (Neolithic, Xia/Erlitou, Shang, Western Zhou, Springs and Autumns, and

Warring States). Thus, for example, introductions to the Neolithic include one covering the north and one covering the south. One author takes a chronological approach (Early, Middle, and Late phases of the Northern Neolithic) and another analyzes the Southern Neolithic from the point of view of advances in the arts, agriculture, and settlement patterns.

Our goal is to present up-to-date material in a multivarious universe that casts new light on our understanding of early China. Due to archaeological discoveries of the past 30 to 40 years, increasingly rich data in terms of new texts and new material finds from tombs and settlement sites have profoundly enhanced our picture of early China and its cultural achievements in multiple directions. We need to emphasize that this early theater is mainstream China, the major pacesetter for modern China and its belief systems and cultural markers.

Our approach is multidisciplinary in covering fields of archaeology, anthropology, art history, architecture, metallurgy, literature, religion, paleography, cosmology, prehistory, and history. The material covered is analyzed chronologically, beginning with the Neolithic and ending with the Warring States era of the Eastern Zhou period. The northern Neolithic in chapter 1 by Andrew Womack is analyzed in terms of Early, Middle, and Late phases, whereas the southern Neolithic from the same time period (7/6000-2000 BCE) is analyzed according to new and major cultural issues, such as the appearance of rice agriculture and plows, patterns of increasingly formalized settlements, and advanced handicrafts. This approach is exemplified in chapter 2 by Xianming Fang, who describes the artistic style of Songze as "open and liberated" due to the evident humor of, for example, wild boar sculptures that are both naturalistic and symbolic.

What is completely new to the late phase of the Neolithic is what I, in earlier publications, have termed the Jade Age, a period from ca. 3500-2000 BCE during which jade was exploited as a material possessing particular religious and socio-political power. Reinforcing this concept of the Jade Age in the present volume are three analytical essays. Chung Tang and colleagues focus on the earliest (5000 BCE) production of slit Jade earrings in the Xinglongwa culture in the northeast (chapter 3). The creation of jade earrings gave rise to a cultural trait that was to characterize China both past and present—a reverence not only for the beauty and quality of jade but a belief in jade's intrinsic spiritual power and related properties. In chapter 4, I continue the focus on jade by analyzing why three major overlapping cultures exploiting jade (Hongshan, Liangzhu, and Longshan/Erlitou) are responsible for catalyzing civilization in the East Asian Heartland. Two regional studies follow, the first by Bin Liu in chapter 5 on the site of Mojiaoshan in Yuhang, Zhejiang—the richest culture in the evolution of the Jade Age; and the second by Nu He in chapter 6 on the site of Taosi in Shanxi, on the outskirts of the Sinitic world in this era but pivotal to novel advances within the Jade Age time frame. Bin Liu explains why Mojiaoshan may be a "capital" of the Liangzhu civilization—a concept with which many scholars may not agree—but also why the same site may be described as a "water city." Bin Liu, the leader of excavations at the site, describes the most advanced early system of water control in its time and a feat of hydraulic engineering, designed with 51 inner and outer city rivers and streams, most of them man-made but others natural, either tunneled or dammed, surrounding a palatial enclosure encompassing some 3 million square meters.

The Neolithic site of Taosi in Linfen, Shanxi, is equally dramatic due to what has been excavated and examined in detail as an outdoor center for astronomical observations. Nu He, the primary archaeologist directing excavations at Taosi, conjures up a cosmological system of Taiji dualism at Taosi as revealed by excavations of the rammed-earth solar observatory along with later textual data. He illuminates a solar-lunar calendar and Four Directions cosmology based on other unique discoveries, including a lacquered gnomon shadow template and a copper disk with 29 teeth he identifies as a small "moon wheel."

The Erlitou culture or Xia dynasty remains a historical enigma. The site of Erlitou was discovered as early as 1959 but, as of today, there has still been no resolution about the culture's historicity other than abundant archaeological data without any discovery of writing. The debate about whether or not the site is the Xia-dynasty capital of Yu the Great or a late Xia king cannot be resolved by presently available information in the complete absence of inscriptional evidence citing Xia or its alleged rulers. These matters are reviewed in the introduction to the historiography of "Xia" in chapter 7 by Hong Xu. Yet innovative advances in archaeology, as amplified by Xu, show that by the end of the Longshan period, independent walled cities began to lose their turbulent independence in favor of what Xu calls "breaking away" in forming stable settlement complexes, incorporating and integrating other surrounding settlements, as represented at the site of Xinzhai, transitional between Longshan and Erlitou. Erlitou emerged as the most stable city-state, bringing a full stop to warring factions and developing a core government and culture ca. 1750 BCE that is equivalent to "Earliest China" and the first state and civilization.

The other chapters in the Erlitou/Xia section focus on finds identifying new and stunning cultural achievements. Hong Xu and Xiang Li clarify in chapter 8 why Erlitou is the earliest territorial state and capital settlement in Chinese history by describing major archaeologically revealed features and the reach of the Erlitou culture. The metallurgist Yu Liu analyzes the bronze-casting revolution together with Hong Xu in chapter 9, which led to the beginning of the Bronze Age in China. He also presents documentation of the variations in chemical composition of bronze and how the singular technology of piece-mold casting worked during the Erlitou period. The chapter on the Erlitou yazhang [zhangj jade blade with dentated handle, although first published in 2015 in Chinese by Chung Tang and Fang Wang, is considerably updated and revised in chapter ^^. Citing the extensive presence of zhang not only throughout the East Asian Heartland but also beyond its frontiers, Tang and Wang show why the Erlitou yazhang was a material symbol of political order and why this jade blade may be used to define primary states such as Erlitou and Erlitou's influence on competitive states in south China.

The fourth section is devoted to Shang-period topics and new data that help to characterize the period culturally. Jonathan Smith with Yuzhou Fan introduce the culture and history of Shang and oracle bone inscriptions in chapter ii, commenting on their origin and historical significance and offering new interpretations for their periodization, an issue that has plagued the field for years. Guoding Song provides in chapter 12 the latest archaeological data for identifying early Shang finds at the Shang cities of Zhengzhou and Yanshi, in addition to neighboring early Shang city sites, such as Dongxiafeng, Fucheng, and Wangjinglou, and middle Shang cities at Huanbei, Xiaoshuangqiao, and Xingtai in Hebei. Changping Zhang introduces in chapter 14 new data for understanding bronze-casting technology during the late Erligang through Yinxu periods (ca. 1600-1056 BCE), which during the Erligang period were mainly adjustments in balancing bronze vessel attachments and positioning blind cores. The growing complexity of mold divisions by the Late Shang period leads to new casting in the form of a composite mold set and the introduction of casting-on and precasting techniques. One of the most important sources of archaeological and inscriptional data of the Late Shang period came with the discovery of the intact tomb of Fu Zi (Fu Hao). Dingyun Cao presents in chapter 16 a detailed analysis of inscriptions on burial objects found in her tomb, M5 at Xiaotun, and her divinatory texts mentioning her and her relations. She was the first queen of King Wu Ding and produced his first heir, Small King Fu Ji. In my own chapter 131 provide new interpretations for certain architectural structures, such as she altars and pyramidal mounds, leading to a new periodization of those structures at the late Shang capital, Yinxu at Anyang in Henan. Separately, in Chapter 15, I expound on new data for Shang belief systems, characterized by a common belief in spirit metamorphosis, exorcism, and royal ancestor worship. "Yi" is the Shang oracle bone term for this system of belief. Metamorphosis is a concept directly reflecting the ritual image of the

metamorphic power mask—an ancestral spirit power characterized by human and wild animal attributes and standardized conventions of representation.

Strides in ironing out the grooves and ridges in Western Zhou historiography are presented in the introductory chapter of this next phase in Chinas Bronze Age. In chapter 17 Maria Khayutina introduces primary sources; legendary origins; surnames and marital relations; proto-Zhou ceramic chronologies; relations with Shang before, during, and after the conquest; and various accounts defining "Western" Zhou history, the chronology of kings, and political doctrine. She is careful to point out what is known and what is not known about the Western Zhou historical period of ca. 1046-771 BCE. She also makes a point of differentiating Chinese titles and kinship terms from names by italicizing the former throughout her chapters (e.g., Zhou Bo: Zhou is a name and bo is a title/ kinship term).

Nicholas Vogt follows this historical introduction in chapter 18 by analyzing the major characteristics of government and social organization of the Western Zhou period. In developing his analysis, he employs representative transcriptions and translations of inscriptions on ritual bronze vessels. Among these complex and difficult-to-translate inscriptions (e.g., He zun, Mai fangzun, Xiao Yu ding) several noteworthy trends in ritual and political control are identified: rites as concepts of "ritual assemblies;' "nexus ancestors;' "persuasive royal strategies;' and the "relaying of royal rites through bronze [inscriptions]." Although scholars may not agree entirely with his conclusions that early Zhou ritual contrasts with the character of Shang ritual, that hypothesis may only be justified by a close comparison of the two. In turn, Constance A. Cook addresses rites and mortuary practices in chapter 19 by considering data from both archaeological excavations and texts and bronze vessel inscriptions. She observes the gradually increasing emphasis in Zhou vessel inscriptions on de ft (translated as "virtue" or "morality" when referring to Confucian texts of the late Warring States and subsequent imperial times) as something originating from Shangdi and Tian bestowed on the first Zhou king as a form of lineage authority and cosmological power. De may be understood as a "source of life energy and political authority," complemented by ostentatious rites and coercive displays that recognized Zhou power.

Yan Sun's chapter, 20, is devoted to another aspect of ritual bronze evolution, focused less on inscriptional data and more on stylistic change and changes in ritual bronze assemblages during the Western Zhou period. Although she employs mainland Chinese views of inscriptions as historic documentation for a chronological sequence—an approach that many scholars outside of China find unhelpful—she incorporates the latest archaeological data to bring this field of art up to date. Scott Cook presents a superb survey of the many aspects of music and instruments present during the Western and Eastern Zhou eras in chapter 21. He introduces not only archaeological data, instrumental types, and assemblages (various types of bells, chime stones, drums, winds, and strings) but also musical theory, musical practice, musical philosophy, and musical institutions.

Scholars contributing articles to the next phase of Zhou history, the Springs and Autumns period, include Yuri Pines covering not only history but historiography and intellectual developments as well and Wu writing on art and its achievements in chapter 24. Pines in chapter 22 assesses the very convoluted and complex history of the multistate system during the Springs and Autumns period, ca. 770-453. He presents a nuanced and accurate portrayal of what he describes as one of Chinas "deepest systemic crises;' covering the rise and fall of a multistate order, an account of ethnocultural identities (e.g., peoples known as Chu, Rong, or Di), the rise of hereditary ministerial lineages, capital dwellers as political activists, and finally "cultural unity at the age of fragmentation." In a following chapter 25 Pines treats the study of history as represented by two primary Springs and Autumns texts, the Springs and Autumns Annals (of the Lu state) and one of its commentaries, the Zuozhuan. Although Pines states that the former "may well compete for the designation as the most boring and

the least inspiring of Chinese classics;' he explicates why the two historical texts are so different: one is based on flavorless, ritually correct "Zhou-based hierarchal rankings" and the other is "the fountainhead of traditional Chinese historiography." A distinctly aristocratic outlook and a multistate order with a ministerial-lord rulership replaces monarchic rule. Xiaolong Wu tackles the overwhelming excavated data for the numerous states of the Springs and Autumns era in chapter 24, producing in some cases exquisite works of art and in others more mundane works. He divides his study into five geographical sections, describing and tabulating the five areas and their chronologies.

A team of ^^ distinguished scholars address Warring States issues (ca. 453-221 BCE) with fresh and invigorating approaches. Topics range from historical background, reform, and individual philosophers (e.g., Mozi and Confucius) to the rise of iron-working, novel architecture and art, and military arts; and from the position of "shi ±," urbanization, capitals, and population records to Chu religion. Wencheong Lam introduces this era in chapter 26 by sorting out what we know and do not know about how iron-working (iron technology, bloomery iron, and iron-casting) flourished during the Warring States period. His major points revolve around the three most powerful states of Jin (Han, Wei, Chao), Qin, and Chu and their differing contributions based primarily on archaeological evidence along with textual evidence about iron technology during this revolutionary era of change and reform. He is able to reach a preliminary conclusion that iron-working was probably more advanced in the Chu state despite the lack of discovery of any iron foundry in capital areas of Chu. Yuri Pines follows this introduction in chapter 25 by highlighting the historical and related events of competing "her^-states,' providing textual and paleographic sources (or lack thereof) and employing the year 453 BCE as the starting point of Warring States history, since it was then that the state of Jin dissolved into Wei, Han, and Zhao. As background to the history of the multi-state system he analyzes, for example, the decline of the Wei state and the "ephemeral alliances" between Qin and other rival states. His account of peripatetic persuaders (youshui) who could find themselves "serving Qin in the morning and Chu in the evening" helps document the unprecedented geographic and social mobility of the era. His second contribution to this section of the book, chapter 27, relates to institutional reform and reformers, especially as seen in the career of the Warring States Qin diplomat, Shang Yang. Pines takes Qin as exemplary of the new socially mobile yet heavily bureaucratic direction the state and later imperial Qin would take. Aided by the reforms of his adviser Shang Yang, Pines outlines how the lord—later king—of Qin eliminated the hereditary aristocracy, created military conscription for all, and created an "agro-managerial state:'

In addition, other scholars document new aspects of political, military, and economic reforms of the Warring States period. Charles Sanft presents archaeological evidence in chapter 28 for the multiplicity of many state capitals and their need for double, fortified walls. He follows this with new data from written texts about population registries—something that appears unique to this era; he provides concrete examples of new administrative controls, translations of Chu governmental "ledgers" (dian), and registries of households (hu) from Liye, Hunan. Next he documents ritual oaths (shi V); the swearing of covenants (meng); and tallies (fujie), "a class of objects that served as official symbols of authority and authorization over a long period in premodern China, typically in contexts of military command, diplomacy, resource control, and movement through passes and gates." Albert Galvany analyzes a different aspect of Warring States history in chapter 29—the army, military arts, treatises on military affairs (including of course the most famous military text in Asia, Sunzi's Art of War), and warfare itself. Galvany outlines major features of innovative change expressed by: (i) "the rise of instrumental rationality" and a "new total warfare"; (2) "the decline of the warrior and emergence of the commander (the demise of the aristocratic warrior and his traditional values coincides with the emergence of the figure of the strategist or commander)"; (3) "the essential of discipline;' explaining that "[w]ith the introduction of armies consisting of peasant masses, the art of warfare confronted one of its most delicate and decisive tasks: transforming a shapeless and anarchic mass of peasants lacking any trace of a military tradition into an orderly and compliant organism

ready to execute"; (4) "the art of deception," metaphorically represented by water; and (5) "from economic awareness to the idea of deterrence: the art of non-war."

The next part of the Warring States section features "[sjocial, intellectual and religious transformations." Andrew Meyer opens this section on "the shi class, diplomats, and urban expansion" in chapter 30. With engaging anecdotal description, Meyer documents the rollercoaster ride of the so-called shi class of "knights;' the rise of diplomats, and the rapidity of commercialism and urbanization that took place during this disruptive but peripatetic age. Particularly insightful is his contextualization of the literary shi figure, Su Qin, "who is said to have brokered his own rise to the prime ministerial seat of six states simultaneously... and stopped the advance of Qin and brought down the throne of Qi in the third century BCE:' Moss Roberts, a senior scholar of classical Chinese literature, profiles and reviews six thinkers of this age in chapter 31: Confucius along with his later disciple Mencius, Mozi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Han Feizi. Casting Confucius as one who organized a graduate school of political management focusing on the junzi (ideal man) who espouses virtue and intellect, Roberts contrasts this with his disciple Mencius, who re-envisions his ideals in emphasizing the significance of human nature (xing), the seedbed of renyi (benevolence and righteousness). Xunzi was "an institutionalist and a structuralist" hovering between Confucianism and Legalism. Han Feizi was Mencius's opposite, an anti-Confucianist in favor of Legalism and the concept that "Dao is what gave birth to Law" As Roberts points out, the Dao for Laozi negates ancestral authority in subjecting it to the authority often thousand things (wanwu), which embodies a "law" that the Dao must follow. Zhuangzi totally rebels in favoring a oneness with nature, negating the hierarchical social identity so critical to Confucius.

Vincent Leung (chapter 32) and Carinne Defoort (chapter 33) both address the philosopher Mozi or Master Mo, famous in his day but relatively little-known today. Defoort identifies three historic steps (Warring States, imperial periods, and twentieth century) for understanding Mozi and his association with jian ai variously translated as "universal love" or "impartial caring." The idea of "inclusive care" gradually evolved with the writing of the book Mozi. In the second phase, Han classicists used the works of Mencius to support Confucius's values of humaneness and righteousness and relegate Moism to the status of a heterodox theory. That view lasted through the early imperial period until the Tang dynasty, as reflected in "Reading Mozi" by Han Yu (768-824). The rise of jian ai in the post-imperial era is primarily tied to Sun Yirang's magnum opus on Mozi in 1893, along with translations by James Legge, and to the developing modern ideology of Sun Yatsen (1966-1925), a Christian Democrat who elevated Mozi to one of the sages of the world. Vincent Leung, on the other hand, introduces us to new values of Mozi, hidden in what Leung describes as his "etiological method" of writing—his toolbox for analysis of the "etiology of disorder." Mozi says there are "three criteria' to test truth—a forerunner of inductive and deductive reasoning involving invocation of past leaders and sages (good doctors who knew what needed to be done and did it). Yet for Mozi moral principles were not human constructs but a fact of the cosmos: the source of all moral principles is Tian (Heaven). Mozi, as pacifist and antiwar hero and promoter of meritocracy, impartiality, and universal love, perhaps provides instruction for today's world in such matters as universal healthcare, preservation of the natural world, and the cessation of war.

Two chapters, one by John Major and myself (chapter 34), the other by Jie Shi (chapter 35), round out this section on the Warring States with an analysis of Chu religion and art, and of the revolution that characterized all arts of this period, respectively. Major and Childs-Johnson categorize Chu religion as one probably based on a Sinified version of shamanism, probably linked with Shang belief and practice. Jie Shi divides his chapter according to artistic, macro, and micro categories, beginning with cities, palaces, funerary parks, and tombs, followed by the arts of bronze, jade, lacquer, and textiles, and ultimately an analysis of figurative and pictorial art. Everything created seemed to be new and huge, such as the palatial complex of Fangying Terrace No. 1 (Fangying tai R), which

featured a multi-terraced structure, surrounded by endless courtyards and galleries, rising to 23 meters; another example is the palatial palace at Xianyang (Palace Complex No. 1) where another new type of building called guan (literally "building for overlooking") is preserved alongside a novel suspended bridge that once connected two large-scale terraces. The micro arts are equally novel and revolutionary, exploiting new secular interests and new artistic techniques as represented by the lost-wax and welded bronze set of zun and pan shapes from the tomb of Marquis Yi of Zeng, splendid and sculpturally exquisite in their decor of numerous tiny S-shaped dragons densely packed into an intricate composition of openwork on vessel rims.

It is with great pleasure that I offer this rich collection of cutting-edge research on pre-imperial China in one volume, the Oxford Handbook on Early China.

Elizabeth Childs-Johnson, July 20, 2017 <>

ORIGINS OF MORAL-POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY CHINA: CONTESTATION OF HUMANENESS, JUSTICE, AND PERSONAL FREEDOM by Tao Jiang [Oxford University Press, 9780197603475]

- Tells a dramatic and often unexpected story about early Chinese moral-political philosophy through a new interpretative framework that brings to light a new arc and dialectic of its development
- Explores tensions in the works attributed to Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Shang Yang, Shen Dao, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Han Feizi and others, to understand what motivated early Chinese thinkers
- Brings together Sinological and philosophical research of the last several decades
- Structured in such a way that readers can choose to engage the part of the book that interests them most

This book rewrites the story of classical Chinese philosophy, which has always been considered the single most creative and vibrant chapter in the history of Chinese philosophy. Works attributed to Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Han Feizi and many others represent the very origins of moral and political thinking in China. As testimony to their enduring stature, in recent decades many Chinese intellectuals, and even leading politicians, have turned to those classics, especially Confucian texts, for alternative or complementary sources of moral authority and political legitimacy. Therefore, philosophical inquiries into core normative values embedded in those classical texts are crucial to the ongoing scholarly discussion about China as China turns more culturally inward. It can also contribute to the spirited contemporary debate about the nature of philosophical reasoning, especially in the non-Western traditions.

This book offers a new narrative and interpretative framework about the origins of moral-political philosophy that tracks how the three normative values, humaneness, justice, and personal freedom, were formulated, reformulated, and contested by early Chinese philosophers in their effort to negotiate the relationship among three distinct domains, the personal, the familial, and the political. Such efforts took place as those thinkers were reimagining a new moral-political order, debating its guiding norms, and exploring possible sources within the context of an evolving understanding of Heaven and its relationship with the humans. Tao Jiang argues that the competing visions in that

debate can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norm for the newly imagined moral-political order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants, constituting the mainstream philosophical project during this period. Thinkers lined up differently along the justice-humaneness spectrum with earlier ones maintaining some continuity between the two normative values (or at least trying to accommodate both to some extent) while later ones leaning more toward their exclusivity in the political/public domain. Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral-political debate who rejected the very parameter of humaneness versus justice in that discourse. They were a lone voice advocating personal freedom, but the Zhuangist expressions of freedom were self-restricted to the margins of the political world and the interiority of one's heartmind. Such a take can shed new light on how the Zhuangist approach to personal freedom would profoundly impact the development of this idea in pre-modern Chinese political and intellectual history.

Reviews

"Tao Jiang has provided a coherent and sweeping narrative of the development of moral and political philosophy in the classical period of Chinese philosophy. He integrates many plausible insights gleaned from sinology and philosophy to argue provocatively that the classical period can be understood in terms of a struggle to deal with conflicts between the values of humaneness (pertaining to the personal and familial realms) and of justice (pertaining to the political realm). This book is highly recommended both to specialists and to those with a more general interest in Chinese moral and political philosophy." -- David Wong, Duke University

"Tao Jiang in this hugely intelligent monograph provides his readers with an interpretive context twice. First, his project of rehearsing the story of the origins of Chinese moral-political philosophy is located within a state-of-the-art account of the politics of the Western academy and the best efforts of its Sinologists and philosophers to make sense of the complex textual narrative of pre-Qin China in all of its parts. Again, appealing to a cluster of seminal themes—humaneness, justice, and personal freedom—he recounts the way in which different philosophical voices advocated for their own disparate and competing models of structuring and construing personal, familial, and political relations within the overarching context of what are fundamentally different valorizations of the notion of Heaven." -- Roger T. Ames, Peking University

"Jiang ranges over the entire foundational period of Chinese philosophy with effortless erudition, unfailing intellectual sympathy, and, above all, a brilliantly economical conception that shines a uniquely revealing and integrating light on all the major figures and schools of thought. The result is that rare kind of book which has the potential to change the way Chinese philosophy is viewed and practiced, and has all the scholarly and philosophical attributes that should make it a classic in due course." -- Jiwei Ci, The University of Hong Kong, and author of *Democracy in China: The Coming Crisis*

BRIEF CONTENTS

Chapter 3: Justice and Humaneness in a Naturalist Cosmos: Laozi's Dao and the Realignment of Values
Chapter 4: Modeling the State after Heaven: Impartiality in Early Fajia Political Philosophy

Part III: Personal Freedom, Humaneness, and Justice: Coming to Terms with the State Under a Naturalized Heaven
Chapter 5: Zhuangzi's Lone Project of Personal Freedom
Chapter 6: Xunzi's Synthesis of Humaneness and Justice: Ritual as the Sages' Partnership with Heaven and Earth
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FULL CONTENTS

Excerpt: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom

In this book I use the categories of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom to remap the intellectual landscape of classical Chinese philosophy and to recast the narrative of its origins. For the purpose of this book, I will employ thin or baseline definitions of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom in order to, on the one hand, schematize what I see as competing normative values operative in the moral- political project during the classical period while, on the other hand, leaving room for variations on these broad underlying values among different inherited texts and the thinkers they are attributed to.

Accordingly, humaneness is understood in this book as the moral norm that is agent/recipient relative, namely our natural inclination to be partial toward those who are close to us, especially our family/ kin members; justice is defined here as the moral norm that is agent/ recipient neutral, namely our exercise of impartial judgment on the merits of persons and states of affairs, especially in

lieu of articulated and publicized standards and codes, irrespective of their relations to us. In other words, humaneness is partialist in nature, whereas justice is impartialist. Humaneness is understood in relational terms, whereas justice is non- relational by contrast. More importantly, precisely because of the relational nature of humaneness, agent and recipient cannot be switched or substituted, whereas in justice agent and recipient are switchable and substitutable. Personal freedom is understood as the appreciation and cultivation of personal space wherein one can be left alone and enjoy the company of like- minded friends without being entangled in the sociopolitical world.

The terms of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom are used in this book more as organizing frameworks to bring these ideas into the contemporary discussions of Chinese philosophy, rather than terms "with one-to-one correspondence in Chinese" (Ing 2017, 10). Therefore, these terms play an interpretative role in this book, working to "not only accurately describe the texts but also to render them intelligible within contemporary discourses" of Chinese thought. Needless to say, I am writing about early Chinese philosophy, but for a contemporary audience in a way that produces new understandings and opens up new possibilities for contemporary philosophical engagement without misconstruing the native terms and the conceptual apparatuses in those texts.

I make three key points in retelling the story about classical Chinese philosophy. First, the central intellectual challenge during the Chinese classical period was how to negotiate the relationships between the personal, the familial, and the political domains (sometimes also characterized as the relationship between the private and the public) when philosophers were reimagining and reconceptualizing a new sociopolitical order, due to the collapse of the old order. Consequently, philosophers offered a dazzling array of competing visions for that newly envisioned order.

Second, the competing visions can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norm for the newly imagined moral-political order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants, constituting the mainstream intellectual project during this foundational period of Chinese philosophy. In this connection, it is especially important to see the fajia (often translated as Legalist) thinkers, often marginalized in the standard narrative about classical Chinese philosophy, as central players instead of as an embarrassing anomaly, as they have often been portrayed. That is, those fajia thinkers were grappling with the same tension between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice in their effort to negotiate the intractable relationship between the familial and the political, similar to other mainstream thinkers during the classical period.

Third, I argue that Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral- political debate who rejected the very parameter of humaneness versus justice in the mainstream discourse. Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were a lone voice advocating personal freedom. For them, the mainstream debate about humaneness and justice was intellectually banal, morally misguided, and politically dangerous.

Humaneness and Justice

The clearest expression of the partialist humaneness in the classical context was the famous Confucian moral-political paradigm, known as the cultivation-regulation-governance-pacification (xiu qi zhi ping, hereafter XQZP) model, most succinctly articulated in the Great Learning (daxue). The XQZP model integrates the personal, the familial, and the political domains through cultivating one's personal virtues (xiushen), regulating the family/ kin (qijia), governing a (feudal) state (zhiguo), and bringing peace to all under the Heaven (ping tianxia). In fact, the classical moral-political debate can well be seen as a series of efforts to defend, modify, critique, or repudiate this XQZP ideal, even among the Confucians themselves, with thinkers lining up differently in their efforts to engage various aspects of this moral- political model.

The XQZP ideal is based on two premises, both of which were challenged during the classical period. First, politics is grounded in or derived from moral virtues of political actors. Second, XQZP is extensionist in nature, operating on the assumption of a seamless continuum between the personal, the familial, and the political domains. In many ways, this book is a study of the classical moral- political debate wherein ancient Chinese philosophers examined all of the constitutive parts and their relationships in the XQZP ideal. I will argue that the operating moral principle in this Confucian moral-political model, in its attempts to accommodate the familial/ private and the political/ public domains, is humaneness that is partialist in its orientation. Furthermore, in the norm of humaneness, framed primarily in relational terms, agent and recipient are not switchable or substitutable due to the particularity of relations involved.

Against the XQZP model and its operating norm of partialist humaneness was the ideal of impartialist justice, most forcefully represented by the Mohists, the Laoists, and the fajia thinkers under different, but sometimes overlapping, conceptual and ideological registers. In the classical Chinese philosophical context, justice was heavily tilted toward impartiality, understood as the non-discriminatory treatment of people and the state of affairs by applying the same standard and code, irrespective of their status or relationship with the moral, political, or legal authority. Justice is framed in non- relational terms in the classical Chinese philosophical context, which means that within the framework of justice the agent and the recipient are switchable and substitutable, pointing to the impersonal and impartial nature of justice.

The concept of justice has had an overwhelming importance in the history of Western philosophy, with philosophers from Socrates to John Rawls deliberating its meaning, nature, scope, and relationship with other values. I will not be able to engage the infinitely rich and complex Western discourse on justice in this book, as it is not meant to be explicitly and thematically comparative. Instead, I will limit the use of the term "justice" to a relatively "thin" content so that it can be more easily adapted to the classical Chinese context. More specifically, I will highlight the aspects of impartiality, objective standards, and agent/ recipientneutrality, especially in the engineering of an elaborate state bureaucracy, when articulating the operative principle of justice in the classical Chinese context that includes a cluster of concepts like impartiality (jian), impartial care (jian ai), public or fairness (gong ^), and standards or legal codes (fa), etc.

It is important to note that both humaneness and justice are universalist values. The distinction between them, in the classical Chinese debate, had to do with whether or not differential treatments accorded to a family/ kin member and someone unrelated could be justified and on what ground, especially when the two treatments were in conflict. What was the proper way to treat our family/ kin members when they were at fault was at the heart of the contestation between humaneness and justice in early Chinese philosophical discourse. From the perspective of humaneness, impartialist justice can be inhumane since it flattens all our relationships and disregards the critical differentiations among those relationships that are constitutive of who we are as humans; however, from the perspective of justice, partialist humaneness can be unfair since it favors those recipients who are close to the adjudicating agents of the state and it breeds nepotism in politics under the pretense of humaneness.

Tensions between the Familial/ Private and the Political/Public

The contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice can be seen in terms of the clash of norms that govern the familial/ private and the political/ public domains. That is, if we take humaneness as the default governing norm in the familial domain and justice in the political, the key issue in the disputation among classical philosophers was this: should there be an overarching norm that governs both the familial and the political domains? Classical Confucians, with important variations and tension among them notwithstanding, leaned toward exploring humaneness as the

unifying norm to encompass both the familial and the political domains; on the other hand, we see a powerful development in the justice wing of Chinese moral- political philosophy that questions the value or relevance of humaneness in political governance, with the Mohists separating the familial and the political domains and focusing heavily, though not exclusively, on the political, and the fajia thinkers privileging the political while denigrating the familial as often antithetical to or even subversive of the interest of the state.

In this respect, two famous anecdotes would help to put into sharp focus the wide gap in moral sensibility between classical Confucians and Mohists. The first anecdote is from the Analects (Lunyu ^^), a record of sayings and teachings traditionally attributed to the historical Confucius and some of his disciples:

> The Duke of She said to Confucius, "Among my people there is one we call 'Upright Gong' (Zhi Gong). When his father stole a sheep, he reported him to the authorities."
> Confucius replied, "Among my people, those who we consider 'upright' are different from this: fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. 'Uprightness' is to be found in this." (Analects 13.18, Slingerland's trans.)

The second one is recounted in The Annals of Lü Buwei (Lüshi chunqiu), a large collection of texts that was composed and compiled toward the end of the Warring States period under the patronage and supervision of Lü Buwei (d. 235 BCE), a prime minister under the young Yingzheng, the king of Qin who would unify China in 221 BCE and become the first emperor:

> The Mohist leader Fu Tun resided in Qin. His son murdered a man. King Hui of Qin said, "You, sir, are too old to have another son, so I have already ordered that the officials not execute him. I hope, sir, that you will abide by my judgment in this matter."
> Fu Tun replied, "The law of the Mohist order says: 'He who kills another person shall die; he who injures another shall be punished.' The purpose of this is to prevent the injuring and killing of other people. To prevent the injuring and killing of other people is the most important moral principle in the world. Though your majesty out of kindness has ordered that the officials not execute my son, I cannot but implement the law of the Mohist order."
> He would not assent to King Hui's request and proceeded to kill his own son.
> A son is what a man is most partial to. Yet Fu Tun endured the loss of what he was most partial to in order to observe his most important moral principle. The Mohist leader may properly be called impartial. (Knoblock and Riegel 2000 trans.,75, with slight modification)

These two narratives, to the extent they represent typical Confucian and Mohist moral instincts, vividly capture two drastically different moral sentiments and the underlying principles of humaneness and justice, respectively.

However, before we hasten to characterize the moral norms embraced by the Confucians and the Mohists based on the preceding two anecdotes, as illuminating as they might be, let us take a look at yet another famous passage that is also attributed to Confucius and has been enshrined by the Confucian tradition, exhibiting a rather different moral sentiment from the Upright Gong passage in the Analects:

> When the Great Dao prevailed, the world was just. People were selected for their virtues and talents, and people were trustworthy and good- neighborly. Therefore, people did not only treat their own parents as parents, not only treat their own children as children. The elderly received proper care toward the end of their lives, the physically strong were properly employed, the young were brought up properly, widowers, widows, the parentless, the childless, the sick, and the disabled were all properly provided for. Men had their professions while women had their families. People loathed to leave wealth wasted and unused, and yet did not have to store them in private; people loathed to leave their strength unused, and yet did not have to exert it to serve themselves. Therefore, scheming was

> thwarted before it could develop; theft, robbery, rebellion, and betrayal did not arise, therefore one left home without closing the door. This was Grand Unity. Nowadays the Great Dao has fallen into obscurity, the world is treated as a matter of family inheritance. People respect only their own parents, caring for only their own children, horde wealth and exert strength for their own benefit.

This is from the famous Liyun Chapter of the Book of Rites (Liji), the Confucian classic of rituals whose canonical status was evident in its inclusion as part of the Five Classics (wu jing) in the Confucian tradition— or, more appropriately, the state- sponsored official learning— during the Western Han dynasty in late second century bce. Liji was likely compiled, from independently extant ritual texts, and redacted in the Han dynasty, even though much of its content dates back to the Warring States period or even earlier. The authorship and dating of Liyun, one of the most famous chapters of the Liji, has long been a topic of intense debate among scholars. The contemporary consensus is that it was an evolving text through the hands of generations of Confucians from mid-Warring States period to Western Han. What interests me is how Confucius is portrayed, regardless of its accuracy in representing the historical Confucius.

In the passage, Confucius is seen as offering a rather detailed description of a lost golden age, a utopian Grand Unity (datong), when the Great Dao (dadao) prevailed in the world and lamenting its decline in his own days. In the passage, gong, which literally means public, is used as the opposite of family (jia). The contrast is clearly drawn between what is impartial and what is partial, hence my translation of gong as "just." It is striking that the ideal(ized) world described here does not give priority to one's own family at all, in sharp contrast with the Upright Gong story in the Analects. Rather, the idea of justice is front and center in this Liyun passage.

The contrast in the moral sentiments expressed in the Analects and Liyun passages is rather striking. In the Analects passage, Confucius is adamant about the priority of family relationship over other considerations, and he defends the family relations and interest even at the expense of other people adversely affected by the actions of one's own family members. However, in the Liyun passage, we find another Confucius, who laments that very prioritization of family interest over the broader sociopolitical order expressed in the Analects passage. Instead, the Confucius in the Liyun passage recalls (or more likely imagines) a world wherein the young and the old were properly taken care of, irrespective of the relationships involved. In such a world, family relationship did not enjoy a privileged status. This implies that what constituted an ideal world for the Confucians evolved from the fifth century, the time of the Analects, to the third century bce, the time Liyun was compiled.

An obvious question is this: what happened during the years that separated the Analects passage from the Liyun passage? The Mohists, who represented the most serious challenge to the Confucian moral- political project during the classical period, could have come up with a similar depiction of the ideal society touted in the Liyun chapter. We will see that during the intervening period the Confucians engaged in heated and often fierce debates among themselves, as well as with their intellectual peers, most notably the Mohists and other less organized thinkers, especially the Laoists and the so- called fajia thinkers. It is highly possible, even likely, that the Mohist (as well as the Laoist and the fajia) challenges contributed to the evolution of the Confucian imaginaire of an ideal society as a result of the vigorous intellectual cross- pollination during the classical period.

Changing Conceptions of Heaven and Its Relations with Humans

One fascinating component of this story about the origins of Chinese moral-political philosophy is the fact that changing conceptions of Heaven and the evolving relationships between Heaven and humans were at the heart of much of the philosophical disputation. In this connection, there were roughly speaking two different understandings of Heaven during the classical period: caring/ anthropocentric and indifferent/ naturalist. Confucius's and Mozi's thoughts were operating under a

Heaven that cared about and was involved in human affairs. In the excavated bamboo- slip texts that have given us some rare glimpses into the world between Confucius and Mencius, we find a Heaven that, while still in charge of the world, was increasingly naturalized in terms of both its constancy and its capriciousness. In Mencius's thought we can see an intense struggle to hold on to the idea of a caring Heaven, but the hold was rather tenuous, as Mencius was rather critical of Heaven for its failure to bring forth a sage who could save the chaotic world. This tenuous hold and the increasing naturalization of Heaven would eventually give way to a radically new idea of Heaven that was indifferent to human affairs, and the paradigmatic figure here was Laozi. In Laozi's thought we can see a Heaven that is completely detached from care for human well- being. Most of the best- known thinkers from the mid- to late Warring States period, such as Shen Dao, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi, shared the Laoist view of Heaven.

However, we also witness some rather drastically different proposals about how humans should respond to the Laoist conception of Heaven among the last group of thinkers. Laozi still advocated sagely emulation of Heaven, similar to Confucius and Mozi, even though the Laoist Heaven was indifferent to human affairs, unlike the Heaven of Confucius, Mozi, and Mencius. By contrast, Xunzi elevated the ancient sage- kings to be the partners of Heaven (and Earth), instead of simply being its followers or emulators, and made sage- kings the new foundation of the ritual system, almost in defiance of the naturalized Laoist Heaven that did not particularly care about human well- being. In the hands of fajia thinkers like Shen Dao and Han Feizi, Heaven would be further transformed from a supernatural agent to a naturalist system, and they advocated modeling a political system after such a new model of Heaven, with fixed standards and impartial enforcement of standards, laws, and regulations, so that the political system could operate like the naturalized Heaven. In so doing, they sought to reduce the role of any single person in governance, including even the ruler, who is partial to, and hence can be easily manipulated by, those in their proximity.

Personal Freedom

Against the backdrop of the mainstream moral-political discourse in early China we find a remarkable text, the Zhuangzi. One of the major challenges in the scholarship on classical Chinese philosophical discourse is how to deal with the Zhuangzi. This text is arguably the single most fascinating and unusual one in the entire Chinese intellectual history, certainly during the classical period, in terms of its unrivaled literary quality, its playful wit and humor, as well as its penetrating philosophical analysis. The Zhuangzi is simply unlike any other text, and its difference from other texts far exceeds the differences among Confucian, Mohist, and fajia texts. Although it has some resonance with the Laozi and shares the Laoist view on Heaven and Dao, the Zhuangist vision about personhood, nature, and politics is strikingly different from the Laoist one.

Such an interpretative difficulty or cognitive dissonance when dealing with the Zhuangzi has to do with our implicit but problematic assumption, seldom articulated, that Zhuangzi was engaged in the same philosophical project as everybody else during the period. However, in this book I will make the case that in order to better appreciate the singularity of the Zhuangzi, it is better to see it as engaging in the kind of intellectual project that is radically different from the mainstream philosophical debate dominated by the Confucians and Mohists and participated by many others, including the Laoists and the fajia thinkers. The mainstream moral- political project is characterized in this book as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the governing norm of the sociopolitical world. Zhuangzi was skeptical and critical of such a project, deeming it as arrogant, baseless, and even harmful.

I argue in this book that the primary intellectual pulse in the Zhuangzi is its musing of personal freedom. Therefore, I interpret the Zhuangist philosophical project as that of personal freedom, unlike any of his peers during the classical period. Zhuangzi just wanted to be left alone, enjoying the

company of friends and natural wonders. The Zhuangist personal freedom is framed in terms of cautiousness, or even anxiety, toward human entanglement mediated by the concern for humaneness and justice. Being wary of any political entanglement, Zhuangists are portrayed as those living at the margin of the political world or in the interiority of their heartminds, even though we also find cases wherein certain Zhuangist paragons lived in the midst of the political world, aided by their extraordinary discernment and skills. As such, the Zhuangist personal freedom is ultimately outside the parameters of humaneness and justice that characterize the mainstream moral-political discourse in early China. This approach to Zhuangzi's philosophy can offer a fresh perspective on the Zhuangist critique of knowledge, especially its alleged skepticism and relativism. It can also have profound implications in making sense of the project of personal freedom in premodern Chinese political and intellectual history, which I will explore briefly in the Conclusion of this book.

A Note about Translating Xin as "Heartmind"

Throughout this book, I will translate the Chinese word xin in the classical texts as "heartmind," instead of heart, mind, heart-and-mind, or heart-mind, as adopted by other translators. "Heartmind" is obviously not an English word, but a neologism coined to capture the widely shared scholarly consensus that the ancient Chinese language did not differentiate between heart and mind the way contemporary English does. Since this book deals with classical Chinese texts that are translated into contemporary English for contemporary Western readership, it makes sense to highlight the way the word xin is translated. For me, the attraction of "heartmind" as a single term is precisely its ambiguity, much like xin in different texts and contexts. Since it is not yet an extant English word, we get to define "heartmind" in such a way that runs the gamut of the emotive, cognitive, evaluative, calculative, voluntary, and whatever other functions xin performs in classical Chinese texts, with different texts leaning toward different aspects. In other words, the fact that pre-modern Chinese thinkers allowed xin to perform such a wide range of roles without feeling the need to clarify which one suggests the underlying assumption of its unity. The term "heartmind" has the added advantage of being both familiar and strange, not unlike xin in all its complexity and ambiguity in various Chinese texts through the ages.

Summary of Chapters

The central theme in the new narrative offered in this book is that the origins of Chinese moral-political philosophy can be fruitfully understood as the contestation of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom in the early Chinese effort to negotiate the relationships among the personal, the familial, and the political domains, under drastically different conceptions of Heaven and its evolving relationship with the humans. This new narrative provides an alternative paradigm on the peculiar configuration of classical Chinese philosophical landscape and helps to chart a new course in systematically presenting the motivating issues underlying much of the Chinese moral- political debate at its very inception.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I, "Humaneness-cum-Justice: Negotiating Humans' Relationship with Heaven," containing Chapter 1, is devoted to the discussion of Confucius and his teachings in the fifth century BCE. We will see that Confucius struggled with the tension between humaneness and justice in his effort to deal with the relationship between Heaven and humans, setting the stage for the subsequent development of Chinese intellectual discourse. Part II, "Humaneness versus Justice: Grappling with the Familial*Political Relationship under a Naturalizing Heaven," including Chapters 2, 3, and 4, takes on Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, and the early fajia thinkers. In all these philosophical projects, the concerns for humaneness and justice diverged, accompanied by shifting evaluations of the norms operative in the private and the public domains, as well as the increasing bureaucratization of the state. We will see that the rich and nuanced philosophical deliberations during this period unfolded under an understanding of Heaven that was naturalizing, with profound implications on the Heaven- human relationship. Part III, "Personal Freedom,

Humaneness, and Justice: Coming to Terms with the State under a Naturalized Heaven," consisting of Chapters 5, 6, and 7, highlights three thinkers toward the end of the Warring States period, i.e., Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi. They are portrayed as representing three distinct voices, i.e., personal freedom, humane justice, and statist impartiality, as the classical period drew to a close with the eventual unification of China under the powerful but short- lived universal state of Qin. This development in the classical moral- political philosophy was accompanied by new models of Heaven–human relationship and human agency under a completely naturalized Heaven.

In Chapter 1, I start with Confucius (551– 479 BCE), who has long been regarded as the baseline of the Chinese moral- political deliberations to which all subsequent philosophers had to respond, one way or another. Confucius endeavored to salvage the once powerful normative ritual system, whose regulative power encompassed the personal, the familial, and the political realms, by grounding it on the newly formulated idea of ren humaneness-cum-justice, the consummate moral virtue for Confucius. In so doing, Confucius laid the groundwork for the XQZP model that connects sages' moral virtues with familial regulation and political governance, even though the model itself does not appear in the Analects.

However, Confucius clearly struggled with the tension between humaneness and justice in his articulation of ren, reflected in his appropriation of familial virtues as the foundation for ren on the one hand, and his appeal to the Golden Rule in some of his iterations of ren on the other. Confucius's solution was to invoke the moral judgment of a cultivated gentleman or sage who alone could weigh the particularities of a complex situation when making decisions. Confucius's project set up the intellectual agenda for the subsequent philosophical debate about humaneness and justice, while his faith in a moral virtuoso's ability to negotiate the tension between the two normative values heightened the stake of self- cultivation in the ensuing Confucian moral- political project. In fact, self-cultivation remained a powerful premise and commitment, seldom challenged among most early texts, with interesting but also problematic consequences that I will explore in the Conclusion of this book.

The first chapter concludes with an examination of some excavated bambooslip texts with a focus on the Guodian Confucian manuscripts in order to study the state of the Confucian discourse between the time of Confucius and that of Mencius. I look into the idea of Heaven, its mandate, and their relationship with the concept of human nature, which would become central to Mencius's and Xunzi's moral- political philosophy. We will also see that the excavated texts promote the unity and integration of core Confucian virtues as a way to cultivate one's heavenly endowed nature while also signaling tensions among those virtues, indicative of the effort by thinkers to negotiate different contexts wherein distinct virtues were required.

The fermentation stage of classical Chinese philosophy would witness a full-blown exploration of the more latent tension between humaneness and justice in Confucius's moral- political project. In Chapter 2 we see the tension between humaneness and justice dramatically heightened in the hands of Mozi (and the Mohists) and Mencius, so much so that it would result in what I call "the Great Divergence" between the two values in the post- Confucius moral universe. Mozi (c. 470– c. 391 BCE) was a radical moral thinker during the classical period in his advocacy of impartial care, promotion of uniform moral standard, and rejection of differential treatment. Mozi and the Mohists were the pioneers of universal justice in Chinese intellectual history. They were the main rival of the Confucians in early China.

By contrast, I argue that Mencius (c. 372– c. 289 BCE) was more on the humaneness end of this humaneness- justice spectrum, even though the real picture is much more complex. He appealed to human nature, or incipient moral inclinations (xing), to construct a world that was more conducive to human flourishing and advocated the ideal of benevolent governance that appealed to the humane

inclinations of a ruler to be compassionate toward his subjects. Meanwhile, Mencius downplayed the role of the institution of ritual (he internalized ritual into the virtue of propriety), with the result that his project was based more on moral intuitions and sentiments than on articulated rules.

Importantly, however, we will see that although family plays an important role in Mencius's moral philosophy, its place in his political philosophy and the relationship between the familial and the political are much more complicated and ambiguous than commonly assumed. In this connection, I examine two related assumptions about Mencius's philosophy, one concerning the role of family and the other the unity of virtues. I argue that, despite his assertion to the contrary, there are indeed two roots in Mencius's philosophy, the family root and the general sympathy root. These two are sometimes in conflict within his framework, exposing a deep tension therein. To make the case, I distinguish two distinct strands in Mencius's thought, the "extensionist," which has been regarded as normative, and the "sacrificialist," which is more radical and less appreciated. While the extensionist Mencius operates on the assumption of congruity between the personal, the familial, and the political domains, the sacrificialist Mencius recognizes the conflict between the norms of humaneness and justice that govern familial and the political domains that is sometimes irreconcilable under certain circumstances, and he embraces the necessity for self- sacrifice in order to protect the familial.

Chapter 3 covers an enigmatic figure in this period, Laozi, who was the alleged author of the Daodejing (fourth century BCE). We will see that the significance of the Daodejing in classical Chinese philosophy was its radical transformation of Heaven from one that cared about and was deeply involved in human affairs to one that was fundamentally indifferent. The Daodejing signaled a dramatic shift in the philosophical discourse during the fourth century bce, what I call the "naturalist turn," supported by several excavated texts from the similar period. The corollary development of this naturalist turn was the realignment of values within a cosmos wherein the primacy of the Heaven was eclipsed by the Dao as the ultimate cosmic source. This resulted in the naturalization of justice and the rejection of humaneness within the political domain in the Daodejing. In so doing, Laozi naturalized the idea of justice/ impartiality in early Chinese moral political philosophy and completely abandoned the central ideal of ren which was promoted by both the Confucians and the Mohists, albeit under different moral and ideological registers. As a result, justice and impartiality become the Heavenly attribute, beyond the reach of human effort. In so doing, Laozi rejected the universalist projects of both the Confucians and the Mohists. We will see that later classical thinkers all had to grapple with this naturalist cosmology in their own projects, often with unexpected developments.

Chapter 4 discusses the writings of what came to be known as the early fajia (often translated as Legalist) thinkers against the background of the increasing concentration of power in the monarchy and the accelerating bureaucratization of the state in the mid- Warring States period. We look at three prominent political theorists in the fourth to early third centuries bce, Shen Buhai, Shang Yang, and Shen Dao, in this chapter. I argue that in the hands of these early fajia thinkers, classical Chinese political philosophy took a decidedly bureaucratic turn that saw the institution of the state as a domain that had its own operating principle, irreducible to other domains. They embraced the value of impartiality, first formulated and defended by the Mohists and reformulated by the Laoists, as the most important institutional virtue, and ruthlessly instituted it in the state bureaucracy, meticulously mapping the state apparatus onto the Heavenly processes such that the state apparatus could function by itself without constant intervention from the ruler, as if it were the operation of Heaven. Such an approach to the state would bring the problem of the state to the forefront of the classical moral-political discourse.

In the culmination stage of classical Chinese philosophy, all thinkers had to confront the question of how to deal with the increasingly powerful state, conceptualized and engineered by the early fajia thinkers and politicians.

Chapter 5 deals with the first thinker in this culmination period, Zhuangzi (late fourth century– early third century bce). Zhuangzi was simply an extraordinary figure in Chinese intellectual history. His fierce advocacy for personal freedom made him the singular outlier in the moral- political projects of the classical period dominated by the contestations between humaneness and justice. He ridiculed the misguided character of such projects and warned against their potential for inhumanity and injustice, the very opposite of what was intended by the participants of the mainstream discourse. However, the Zhuangist attempt to offer an alternative framework that foregrounded personal freedom and valued pluralism was severely compromised by their aversion to a more active engagement with the state. As we will see, the Zhuangist musing about personal freedom would have a lasting impact on the subsequent development of this ideal in Chinese intellectual and political history, i.e., its marginalization and internalization, as well as its lack of institutional impact in the imagination and construction of an ideal Chinese state.

Chapter 6 deals with the last major Confucian thinker in the classical period, Xunzi (active 298– 238 BCE), whose philosophy operated on the premise of a Laoist or naturalist cosmos that did not particularly care about human affairs. Xunzi's philosophy exhibited a spirit of defiance against the naturalist and indifferent Heaven by valorizing human effort in the formation of a flourishing

human society. His philosophical project focused on revitalizing the inherited, but increasingly discredited, ritual system. For him the traditional ritual system that regulated the personal, the familial, and the political domains was the result of the cumulative efforts of generations of sage-kings in response to Heavenly patterns and conditions on the ground. Xunzi used ritual as a way to reconcile the tension between humaneness and justice by making sage- kings the cocreator of order in the human world in collaboration with Heaven and Earth. The cult of sage- kings provided critical components of humaneness in the human world under an otherwise impartial and indifferent Laoist cosmos, resulting in the norm of humane justice that is mediated by ritual in Xunzi's political thought.

Chapter 7 focuses on the last fajia thinker, Han Feizi (c. 280– 233 BCE), who was a grand synthesizer of many aspects of all classical Chinese moral- political discourse in his effort to perfect the operation of the impartialist state. We will see that his political project explicitly rejected the XQZP model by problematizing its every aspect. In sharp contrast to Xunzi's cult of sage- kings, Han Feizi sought to minimize the role of any individual person, including even the monarch. Like the earlier fajia thinkers, Han Feizi sought a model that provided the intellectual foundation for a system of impersonal and uniform bureaucratic machinery capable of dispensing reward and punishment automatically with as little interference from the ruler as possible. Even though Han Feizi's project might have been motivated by a desire to stabilize and strengthen the state so that it could survive the precarious domestic and international environment, its goal of instituting a set of impartial, transparent, and uniform administrative and legal codes and standards in governing the state, often in defiance of the interests of powerful aristocratic families, points to the principle of justice operative in his statist project. Unfortunately, Han Feizi was not able to solve the core tension between the monarch and the monarchy, dooming his fajia project of building a lasting and impartial political order.

The book concludes by a reflection on the tragic fate of the Zhuangist idea of personal freedom in Chinese intellectual and political history. More specifically, I will scrutinize the widely shared premise of self- cultivation, what I call the "regime of self- cultivation," among most classical thinkers including Zhuangzi, and will explore its constraint on the development of personal freedom in the

mainstream moral- political discourse, as well as in the building of political institutions. Interestingly, in this respect, it was the fajia thinkers who built their theories on the givenness of ordinary human dispositions, instead of on the promissory note of moral transformation. I will reflect on a path that was not taken in Chinese history, i.e., the integration of the Zhuangist idea of personal freedom into the mainstream moral- political project in conceptualizing a polity that can accommodate the ideal of personal freedom institutionally. <>

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHINESE MORAL PRINCIPLES by Mingjun Lu [Series: Modern Chinese Philosophy, Brill, 9789004503496]

In **THE METAPHYSICS OF CHINESE MORAL PRINCIPLES**, author Mingjun Lu seeks to construct and establish the metaphysics of Chinese morals as a formal and independent branch of learning by abstracting and systemizing the universal principles presupposed by the primal virtues and key imperatives in Daoist and Confucian ethics. Lu proposes that the metaphysical foundation of Chinese moral principles, as reinstated in this book, brings to light not only the universality of its core values and ideals but also a pivotal though hitherto neglected key to the enduring vibrancy of a civilization that has lasted several millennia.

CONTENTS

To justify his theory that moral virtues are innate in one's xin 心 (heart or mind) rather than imposed from without, Mencius 孟子 (372–289bc) cites Confucius's 孔子 (551–479bc) commentary on a poem from the Shijing 诗经, The Book of Odes:

> The Shijing says: "Heaven breeds the myriad things, / Things must follow certain principles. /Adhering to these principles, / People are fond of fine virtues." Confucius says: "The poet here really knows what the Dao is! Hence the poetic lines that 'things must follow certain principles' and people are 'adhering to these principles.' This is why they are fond of fine virtues."
> 《诗》曰: '天生蒸民, 有物有则. 民之秉彝, 好是懿德.' 孔子曰: '为此诗者, 其知道乎! 故有物必有则, 民之秉彝也. 故好是懿德.' Mencius 11.61

The word ze 则 in the second poetic line refers to the principles of things endowed by Heaven at their very inception; and the Dao 道 is the Chinese term for the law of Nature. Ze 则 thus indicates the expression of the universal law of Nature in phenomenal beings. As Confucius interprets, it is apprehension of, and adherence to, the natural principles inherent in things that leads to love of fine virtues. Endorsing Confucius's reading, Mencius holds the same view regarding the relation of virtue and the knowledge of natural principles, a view crystalized in his celebrated thesis of siduan 四端, "four moral beginnings."

The relation of moral virtue and the law of Nature as intuited by the poetic mind and philosophized by the two founding masters of Confucian ethics will be the key topic of this project. In engaging with the moral or ethical consequences of the metaphysical assumption of the first principle, this project is a necessary sequel to my book, Chinese-Western Comparative Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Topical Approach (Lu 2020), that deals with the epistemological implications of the primary cause.

The title of this book recalls Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and The Metaphysics of Morals (1797).2 Despite its revolutionary significance in Western moral philosophy, Kant's metaphysics of morals premised upon the primacy of human reason fails to address the first principles informing Chinese morals. A primary objective of this project is to reinstate the metaphysical foundation of the Chinese moral system by rereading the notions and concepts fundamental to Daoist and Confucian ethics as well as their theorization in Neo-Confucian philosophy. While Kant constructs a metaphysics of "pure reason" to serve as the foundation for morals, I seek to extract and systematize the metaphysical principles presupposed by the Chinese moral system at its very institution.

Given their shared concern with the moral claims of right and wrong, or good and evil, ethical and moral studies are intrinsically connected, though with different emphases. Where ethics refers chiefly to specific virtues and rules of conduct, moral theory is concerned with the principles underlying these virtues or rules. Since this book means to tease out the metaphysical or universal principles presupposed by the moral maxims and injunctions informing virtuous character or conduct, I entitle it "The Metaphysics of Chinese Moral Principles." By "Chinese moral principles," I mean the fundamental principles constituting the moral system that builds out of Confucian, Neo-Confucian, and Daoist ethics. In these three different but closely related ethical traditions, moral principles take the form of either maxims, injunctions, or imperatives.

This project adopts Aristotle's (384–322bc) definition of "metaphysics" as the study of the first principle or primary cause, though I distinguish between the metaphysical and the moral first principle. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) famously proposed a Confucian "moral metaphysics" in reference to Kant's philosophy of pure reason. According to Mou (2015, 83), "metaphysics addresses the issue of existence," while "moral metaphysics addresses the issue of existence on the grounds of morality." In fact, a more precise way to put the distinction is that where "moral metaphysics" concerns the first principle in ethics, the metaphysics of moral philosophy deals with the first principle presupposed by the overall moral system and its core concepts or categories. For instance, in his Metaphysics, Aristotle calls the first principle "God" or "being qua being" (1003a33),

but in his Nicomachean Ethics, he regards "happiness" as "a first principle" (1102a1). In like manner, ren 仁, or benevolence, is the moral first principle in Confucian ethics, while the law of Nature or the instantiation of this law in the xing 性, "innate nature," of phenomenal beings, is the metaphysical first principle sustaining not only ren but also its whole moral system. Given that the moral is premised upon the metaphysical first principle, I will use moral metaphysics and the metaphysics or metaphysical foundation of morals as interchangeable terms.

The Chinese moral system has evolved out of three different but closely related ethical traditions. The first refers to the ethics propounded by Confucius and further developed by Mencius and Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 310–237bc). The moral teachings of the classical Confucian masters draw on Liujing 六经, the "Six Classics" edited by Confucius, and become the basis of Sishu 四书, the "Four Books" compiled and annotated by the reputed Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200). Since the Yuejing 乐经, "The book of music," is no longer extant, the Liujing is also called Wujing 五经, the "Five Classics."7 Despite divergences over some specific issues, the core tenets in Mencius's moral philosophy, especially his hypothesis of an originally good nature, build largely on Confucius's ethics, so the two moral systems can be collectively called Confucian ethics. The Confucian-Mencian tradition is only one of zhuzi baijia 诸子百家, the "one hundred philosophical schools" that flourished in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in the Zhou dynasty (1046–249bc). After it was instituted by Emperor Wu 汉武帝 in the Western Han dynasty (206–8bc) as the state orthodoxy, this tradition gained predominance and served as the moral center for Chinese until the present day, though with short periods of interruption.

In positing an evil nature, Xunzi's moral theory tends to depart from Confucian ethics, though most of his ethical views are still conceived within the Confucian framework. Given that Xunzi is the alleged teacher of such well-known Legalists as Han Fei 韩非 (280–233bc) and Li Si 李斯 (284–208bc), and considering the Daoist association of the Legalists, Xunzi is the founder of a synthetic philosophical school that integrates at once the teachings of the Confucians, Daoists, and Legalists. Though touching on Xunzi, however, the focus of this book is the Confucian-Mencian ethical tradition.

Second, the canonical status of the Confucian-Mencian tradition is inherited and reinforced by the Neo-Confucian philosophy that rose to prominence in the Song (960–1279) and Ming dynasties (1368–1644). Neo-Confucianism boasts of two schools. One refers to lixue 理学, "the metaphysics of li or principle" championed by Cheng Hao 程颢 (1032–1085) and his brother Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033–1107) but synthesized by the philosophical guru Zhu Xi. The other, headed by Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 (1139–1193), is called xinxue 心学, "the metaphysics of the mind," and given a systematic representation in the philosophy of Wang Yangming 王阳明 (1472–1529).

A third key component of the Chinese moral system consists in the Daoist ethics as expounded by both Laozi 老子 (ca. 600–531bc), founder of the Daoist philosophy, and his most notable follower Zhuangzi 庄子 (370–287bc). The title of Laozi's treatise Daode jing 道德经, literally "the Dao and its Virtue," declares unequivocally the joining of morals and metaphysics. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, seeks to illuminate the Daoist principles and virtues set out in Laozi's treatise through such heightened means of representation as legendary tales, fables, or allegories. It is my contention that the ethical views expressed by both Laozi and Zhuangzi share the same metaphysical assumption of the first principle with Confucian ethics.

When East and West first came into contact in the sixteenth century, Chinese culture, especially its moral system, struck great awe and wonder into the hearts of Western observers (Lu 2016b). At the initial stage of the East-West encounter, the West knew but little of Confucian ethics, not to say

its connection with Daoism. What amazed them was that this moral system sustained a civilization once contemporaneous with ancient Greece and Rome and that continued to exist alongside Western Europe with unabated vitality. How could a civilization raised up and sustained by such a moral system outlive Greece and Rome, the classical idols of Renaissance Europe? What was the secret force of the Eastern values and ideals that allowed them to rival the theological virtues propagated by Christianity?

This wonder emerged again with the miraculous renaissance of China in the modern, globalized world after about three centuries' dormancy. Within only a short span of four decades, China successfully eradicated poverty and enabled the prosperity of a large middle class. For a country without religion and not based on Western liberal or neoliberal principles, what spiritual force has the power to integrate more than 1.4 billion people in a concerted effort to regenerate, progress, and prosper? Apart from its cultural and political systems, Confucian ethics has played a vital part in ensuring the spiritual integration and social coherence indispensable to the modern renaissance of the country. Then what is the key to the longevity of China?

The vibrancy of Confucian ethics in new historical circumstances has given rise to a host of insightful studies in recent years. The burgeoning of this new interest renders it necessary to examine the metaphysical or universal principles presupposed by this moral system. In regard to the topical urgency and significance of studying Chinese metaphysics in the new historical context, Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins well observe that:

> In the Chinese tradition, the metaphysical and the moral are always intertwined, as the status of values, the nature of the self, and conceptions of order all have metaphysical implications, if not foundations … and studying Chinese ethical theories without examining their metaphysical presuppositions risks misrepresenting moral perspectives. With the advancement of the study of, and deepening research on, Chinese philosophy in our age, confining our study to Chinese political, social, and ethical theories is no longer acceptable. (2015a, 7)

By metaphysics, Li and Perkins mean "theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality." Based on this definition, the essays in Li and Perkins's collection "focus on the metaphysical aspect of the philosophical continuum while showing how metaphysical conceptions connect to other areas of concern" (7–8).

My study shares Li and Perkins's insight that without knowledge of the "metaphysical presuppositions" of Chinese ethics one cannot get a full picture of its "moral perspectives." My approach, however, differs from that of Li and Perkins in adopting a different definition of metaphysics. While Li and Perkins conceive metaphysics as "theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality," I use Aristotle's definition of metaphysics as the study of the first principle or primary cause. It is its foundation in the first principle embodied by the law of Nature, or the instantiation of this law in the xing 性 (innate nature) of phenomenal beings, I argue, that lies at the root of the abiding vitality and relevance of a moral system that has sustained a civilization for several millennia. This metaphysical foundation also accounts for the celebrated notion of tianren heyi 天人合一, "the unity of man and Heaven," registered in Laozi's concept of xuantong 玄同, "metaphysical unity" (ch.4), and Zhuangzi's qiwulun 齐物论, "thesis of universal equality" (ch.2, 31), both of which are different ways of putting the first principle.

In claiming the relevance of Aristotelian metaphysics to Chinese moral philosophy, however, I am not evoking a Western framework to study Chinese culture. Aristotle's definition of metaphysics is adopted because it corresponds closely to the metaphysical system expounded by Daoist and Confucian philosophers. That Aristotle's metaphysics happens to find a close parallel in the metaphysical system conceived by Chinese philosophers bespeaks at once a shared concern with the

first principle or primary cause and the universality of this topic. As will be shown in chapter 3, however, the shared metaphysical assumption does not necessarily lead to similar views regarding such topical ethical issues as the moral end and standard.

The Necessity of Joining Morals to Metaphysics

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle calls metaphysics philosophia prima, the "first science" or "first philosophy" that concerns wisdom or truth (1026a28–30). By "wisdom," he means "knowledge about certain causes and principles" (982a1). Since great wisdom "must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge," Aristotle observes, "wisdom is a science of first principles" (982a20–21; 1059a18). Unlike practical knowledge that concerns action, inquiry into the metaphysical first principle aims at "knowledge of the truth" (993b20–21). Metaphysical inquiry is necessary because, Aristotle explains, "we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles" (Physics 184a12–13).

As philosophia prima or the "first philosophy," metaphysics naturally becomes the root of individual sciences. It is precisely by resorting to the root-branch metaphor that Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650), two famous early modern European philosophers, describe the relation of metaphysics and the branches of learning derived from it. For Bacon (2001, 83), individual sciences are "branches" that sprout from the philosophia prima. Likewise, Descartes (2006,14) compares metaphysics to "a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences."

As a science that deals with moral virtues or injunctions, ethics is necessarily rooted in metaphysics. Accordingly, moral truth relies on metaphysical truth, and moral certainty is premised upon metaphysical certainty. Regarding the knowledge dictated by wisdom of the first principle, Aristotle states in his Nicomachean Ethics:

> Wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be comprehension combined with knowledge—knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion. (1141a16–20)

Wisdom of what "follows from the first principles" could be moral, aesthetic, or methodological. Ethics is a branch of learning that engages with the moral consequences of wisdom of the metaphysical first principle. Put differently, ethical views or positions are inseparable from the metaphysical principles they presuppose, whether explicitly or implicitly.

The root-branch metaphor thus dictates the necessity of investigating the metaphysical principles of morals. As the Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43bc) expressly states in his On Moral Ends:

> The starting-point for anyone who is to live in accordance with nature is the universe as a whole and its governance. Moreover one cannot make correct judgments about good and evil unless one understands the whole system of nature, and even of the life of the gods, as well as the question of whether or not human nature is in harmony with that of the universe … This one science alone can reveal the power of nature to foster justice and preserve friendship and other bonds of affection. (2001, 88)

By "this one science" Cicero refers to nothing else but the metaphysics underlying "the whole system of nature and its governance." In Cicero's view, one could only "make correct judgments about good and evil" by comprehending the universal principles governing the natural system. In other words, metaphysical principles provide a yardstick for the moral sense of "good and evil" and thereby constitute the foundation of ethical virtues like justice and friendship. Similarly, in "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (1751), the English Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) asserts that only by reaching "the foundation of ethics" and finding the "universal

principles" governing it could we learn about the primary source "from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived" (2006, 190).

It is a key argument of this book that the supreme wisdom of Chinese philosophy consists in its metaphysics as well, and wisdom of the metaphysical first principle is what underlies its moral system. The law of Nature or its instantiation in the xing 性 (innate nature) of phenomenal beings, as demonstrated in chapter 1, constitutes the very first principle or primary cause of Chinese metaphysics. The Chinese metaphysical first principle expresses itself in two major forms. As a cosmogonic or cosmological principle, it is called the Dao, tian 天 (Heaven), li 理 (principle), or tianli 天理 (the principle of Heaven). As the substantial principle of unity, the prime mover is called xing (innate nature) by the Confucians and you 有 (being) versus wu 无 (nonbeing) by Laozi. The necessary union of morals and metaphysics is expressly asserted in the Zhongyong 中庸, one of the "Four Books" widely known to English readers as The Doctrine of the Mean:

> Without zhide 至德 [the supreme Virtue], zhidao 至道 [the supreme Dao] cannot be fully manifested.
> 苟不至德, 至道不凝焉. Zhongyong 2014 ch.27, 119

Put differently, only "the supreme virtue" could fully manifest "the supreme Dao." The necessary joining of zhide to zhidao proves a foundational hypothesis of Confucian moral philosophy. Also, this union is unambiguously declared in the very title of Laozi's Daode jing 道德经. While Dao 道 refers to the law of Nature, de 德 means literally "Virtue" and connotes the life-nourishing and preserving attribute of the universal principle.

Now the question at issue is What is the agent by virtue of which the "supreme Virtue" is joined to "the supreme Dao"? The answer resides in none other than xing 性 (innate nature). Innate nature constitutes the cornerstone concept in Chinese moral metaphysics because it provides a conceptual bridge to at once connect the cosmic with the substantial principle and join morals to metaphysics. In his commentaries on the Yijing 易经, The Book of Changes, Confucius remarks

> One yin 阴 [female] and one yang 阳 [male] show the working of the Dao. Observance of the Dao leads to the good, and the actualization of the Dao gives rise to xing 性 [innate nature].
> 一阴一阳之谓道, 继之者善也, 成之者性也. Zhouyi 2015, 36214

What is significant about Confucius's metaphysical account is both his conception of the temporal instantiation of the Dao as innate nature and his association of the universal principle with moral virtues. While Laozi defines the substantial principle as being versus nonbeing (Laozi ch.1), Confucius conceives it in terms of both innate nature and the Dao. In addition to encoding the law of Nature, the Chinese concept of innate nature also distinguishes by its original goodness. Though ancient China produced different accounts regarding the morality of human nature, Mencius's hypothesis of xingshan 性善, "an originally good nature" (Mencius 5.1), prevails as the ruling framework to understand its ethics.

That moral certainty relies on metaphysical certainty proves a fundamental hypothesis of Chinese ethics. Confucius explicitly states that

> What a man of virtue is concerned with is ben 本 [the primary root or foundation], and once ben 本 is established, the Dao naturally follows. Isn't filial piety toward one's parents and brothers the ben 本 of ren [benevolence]!
> 君子务本, 本立而道生. 孝弟也者, 其为仁之本与! Analects 1.2

Junzi 君子 refers to a gentleman or a man of virtue noted for his deliberate and conscientious cultivation of the moral self, and as such it becomes a conventional name for virtuous character in Confucian ethics. The word ben 本 means literally "root or foundation" but connotes the primary cause or first principle of things. According to the Great Learning, zhiben 知本, or "knowledge of the first principles," marks zhi zhizhi 知之至, "the highest point of learning" (ch.6, 17). Once the first principles informing moral virtues are identified and reinstated, the Dao or universal law entailed by these virtues comes naturally to light, which explains why

> The Dao of a virtuous man begins with the relation of husband and wife, but once reaching a supreme state, this Dao [of man] mirrors the law of Heaven and Earth.
> 君子之道, 造端乎夫妇, 及其至也, 察乎天地. Zhongyong ch.12, 70

What is highlighted here is the relationship between the universal law of Nature and the ethical degrees structuring human society. The implicit message is that the moral principles governing the ethical distinctions are but the temporal manifestations of the law of Heaven and Earth in human relations.

In fact, all three great Confucian masters in classical antiquity, Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, expressly address the metaphysical principles presupposed by their ethics. As Mencius quotes, Confucius declares that

> the Dao has two expressions: ren [benevolence] and buren [non- benevolence].
> 道二，仁与不仁而已矣. Mencius 7.2

By Daoer 道二, Confucius does not mean two first principles; instead, he means that the Dao has two different but interrelated expressions. As he openly asserts, "my Dao is a single general principle" (Analects 4.15). Likewise, Mencius himself claims that,

> Heaven's production of the myriad things betokens the existence of yiben 一本 [one and the same root], but Yizi [the Mohist] takes it as erben 二本 [two roots].
> 且天之生物也, 使之一本, 而夷子二本故也. Mencius 5.5

The phrase "one and the same root" here signifies the very first principle embodied by Heaven or the Dao. Refuting Yizi's hypothesis of two first principles, Mencius asserts that "The Dao of all is just one and the same" 道一而已矣" (5.1). Likewise, Xunzi writes,

> The mind naturally knows, and knowledge naturally differs. What is called difference is but the simultaneous knowledge of diverse things. To know diverse things simultaneously is called liang 两 [the dyad]. Though knowledge tends to be dualistic, there is still the yi 一 [the One]. Not to let "that One" harm "this One" is called yi 壹 [single-mindedness].
> 心生而有知, 知而有异, 异也者, 同时兼知之. 同时兼知之, 两也, 然而有所谓一, 不以夫一害此一谓之壹. Xunzi ch.21, 344

Here liang 两 (the dyad) signifies the myriad things produced by the "One," which proves none other than the first principle or primary cause. Xunzi's One-dyad thesis addresses the ontological relation of the One first principle and the "dyad" it produces, as well as the epistemological order to know the One and its temporal manifestations.

In reality, back in the eighteenth century Western philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) had already begun to notice the long tradition of joining morals to metaphysics in Chinese philosophy.15 In his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716), Leibniz writes,

> There is in China a public morality admirable in certain regards, conjoined to a philosophical doctrine, or rather a natural theology, venerable by its antiquity, established and authorized for about 3,000 years, long before the philosophy of the Greeks whose works nevertheless

> are the earliest which the rest of the world possess, except for of course our sacred writings. Cook and Rosemont 1994, 3

As Leibniz recognizes, it had been a "venerable" tradition for the Chinese to join "public morality" to "a philosophical doctrine" since ancient times. One could actually see this union of morality and metaphysics, Leibniz observes, from Father Nicolo Longobardi's 1623 "Religion Treatise":

> The first principle of the Chinese is called Li (2:13), that is reason, or the foundation of all nature (5:32), the most universal reason and substance (11:50) … From the Li qua Li emanate five virtues: piety, justice, religion, prudence, and faith (11:49). Cook and Rosemont 1994, 4; numbering in the original

This quote shows, as Leibniz comments, that the Chinese first principle li 理 is what sustains the five virtues of "piety, justice, religion, prudence, and faith," though by li 理 he refers chiefly to that propounded by Zhu Xi. So, Leibniz concludes, the Neo-Confucian li 理 is "not only the principle of the physical basis of Heaven and Earth and other material things, but also the principle of the moral basis of virtues, customs, and other spiritual things" (5).

The Consequences of Joining Morals to Metaphysics

For Aristotle, the necessary consequence of joining morals to metaphysics is that "a wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles." In Chinese metaphysics, this consequence expresses as the two injunctions of zun dexing 尊德性 and dao xuewen 道学问. The verb zun 尊 means literally showing respect for but connotes the act of going along with the innate nature of things, and the word dao 道 here is a verb that indicates to investigate the epistemological implications of the Dao 道 as the universal law of Nature. Laozi openly declares that we should "respect the Dao and honor Virtue" (Laozi ch.51). The Daoist imperative finds an elaborate account in the Zhongyong,

> Great is the Dao of the sages! How plentiful [the sagely virtue] is! It nourishes and propagates the myriad things, with a sublimity as exalted as Heaven. How ample and grand it is! There are three hundred general principles of li or ritual rites, and three thousand rules governing the application of li, both of which await a man of virtue to implement. So without zhide 至德 [the supreme Virtue], zhidao 至道 [the supreme Dao] cannot be fully manifested. A virtuous man would at once zun dexing 尊德性 [respect the moral nature] and dao xuewen 道学问 [pursue knowledge of the Dao], inquire after the general principle and its subtle working, and grasp the high moral end and its manifestation in zhongyong [the natural Mean]. [The joining of zhide and zhidao] allows him both to infer new knowledge by reflecting upon the old and honor ritual courtesy with honesty.
> 大哉圣人之道! 洋洋乎! 发育万物, 峻极于天. 优优大哉! 礼仪三百, 威仪三千,待其后人而行. 故曰苟不至德, 至道不凝焉. 故君子尊德性而道学问, 致广大而尽精微, 极高明而道中庸, 温故而知新, 敦厚以崇礼. Zhongyong ch.27, 119

What is featured here is the intrinsic connection between "the supreme Dao" and "the supreme Virtue" exemplified by the sages, as well as the moral and epistemological implications of this connection. According to the quoted passage, the Dao relies on perfect Virtue to fully manifest itself, and the union of the Dao and Virtue dictates the necessity to at once "respect the moral nature" and "pursue knowledge of the Dao."

The two injunctions of zun dexing and dao xuewen point to the very principle that moral certainty is premised upon metaphysical certainty. Both injunctions become the central concern of Daoist and Confucian ethics. The unity of zun dexing and dao xuewen is explicitly declared in the title of Laozi's The Dao and Its Virtue (the Daode jing). In this founding text of Daoism, Laozi not only philosophizes the relation of the Dao and its Virtue but also names this Virtue xuande 玄德, "metaphysical virtue" (Laozi ch.51), which is represented as the root from which temporal virtues

spring forth. As will be shown in chapter 4, the distinction between metaphysical and temporal virtue figures prominently in the Confucian commentaries on the Yijing as well.

The injunctions of zun dexing and dao xuewen could be well illustrated by Kant's theory regarding moral laws or imperatives. According to Kant, "moral laws are imperatives (commands or prohibitions) and indeed categorical (unconditional) imperatives," as opposed to "technical imperatives (precepts of art), which always command only conditionally" (6:221). This is because, Kant explains, moral laws "hold as laws only insofar as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to be necessary" (6:215). In his view, there is only "a single categorical imperative" of morality, that is, act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (4:421)

Accordingly, "the canon" of judging whether an action is morally right is to see if we are "able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law" (4:424). So by moral laws or imperatives Kant means "commands or prohibitions" whose governing principles or maxims accord with "a universal law."

Based on the supreme Dao and supreme Virtue, zun dexing and dao xuewen are two moral laws or imperatives whose governing principles naturally accord with the universal law of Nature. In fact, Daoist and Confucian ethics are full of such moral laws or imperatives, which, together with their core virtues, constitute the founding stones of the Chinese moral system. For instance, the moral end of zhishan 至善 (supreme or highest good) dictated by the law of Nature; the moral standard of zhongyong 中庸 that reflects the law of zhonghe 中和 (universal equilibrium and harmony); the cluster of moral maxims centered on cheng 诚, a concept that indicates the truthfulness of both man and Heaven; as well as the two injunctions of fanqiu zhuji 反求诸己 (returning to reflect upon the self for the cause of error or failure) and fanshen ercheng 反身而诚 (returning to reflect upon the truthfulness of one's own self) dictated by the law of fan 反 or fanfu 反复 (return), all of which are moral imperatives on account of the universal law entailed in their very conception. Here lies a key divergence between Kantian and Chinese moral metaphysics. Where Kant's moral agent needs to have the ability to "will" that "a maxim" of his action "become a universal law," the Chinese moral standard, virtues, and imperatives, founded upon the law of Nature and original goodness, entail in themselves the universal principles. This divergence will be further explored in chapter 2.

It is in Mencius's thesis of siduan 四端, "four moral beginnings," that the metaphysical foundation of Confucian ethics finds a most focused and coherent articulation. Siduan refers to the four senses of pity, shame, humility, and morality of innate nature. These instinctive senses, Mencius argues, constitute the "beginnings" or origins of the four primal virtues of ren 仁 (benevolence), yi 义 (justice), li 礼 (ritual etiquette/courtesy), and zhi 智 (wisdom) (Mencius 3.6). These virtues are primal not only because they are the primary expressions of the morality of innate nature but also because they themselves become the seedbed from which other virtues sprout forth. As organic sprouts of an originally good nature, the four primal virtues presuppose the metaphysical first principle in their very inception.

Among all Confucian concepts and categories, Mencian siduan proves both an apt starting point and a meaningful site to explore the metaphysics of Chinese morals, on three major accounts. First, siduan affords a compelling framework for Mencius to organize the various virtues in the Analects into four broad categories, integrating them within a coherent framework by conceptualizing their metaphysical foundation. Second, siduan also allows Mencius to at once identify four primal virtues and ground them in an originally good nature. Third, as Zhu Xi (1986, 1:285) points out, philosophical inquiry should begin with qiejichu 切己处, or "what concerns one's own self most," and Mencius's siduan proves such an apt locus.

The metaphysically charged concept of siduan naturally renders it a fertile site of metaphysical investigations, which explains why studies of the metaphysics of Chinese morals focus mostly on this concept.16 There are two typical approaches to Mencian siduan. One deals with the motivation or specific principles informing morally right actions. For instance, the so-called "internalist thesis" conceives the relation of moral motivation and judgment in terms of emotion and reason. The second refers to the critical tendency to evoke Western moral theory to analyze Mencius's thesis. Shirong Luo (2015) turns to modern "moral foundations theory" proposed by Jonathan Hardt and Craig Joseph to interpret Mencius's virtue ethics. Xiusheng Liu (2002b, 2002c), on the other hand, resorts to Hume's "sensibility theory" to explain the "foundations" of Mencian ethics.

What is neglected in scholarship on Mencius's siduan is its metaphysical assumption of the first principle or primary cause. Rather than motivations as asserted in the "internalist thesis," the research question asked by a moral metaphysics approach should be What is the first principle assumed by the diverse conceptions of morals, be it eudaimonic, deontological, utilitarian, or naturalistic? Put differently, a metaphysical investigation of ethics already presupposes a morally right motivation, and what it seeks to know is the primary cause of such a motivation. The problem with the approaches based on Western moral theory is their neglect of the fact that Mencius's fourfold ethical scheme itself already entails and thereby addresses its metaphysical foundation.

The Argument, Methodology, and Objective of the Project

Despite Leibniz's insight on Chinese metaphysics and morals in the eighteenth century, it has been a prevalent practice in modern Western scholarship to deny a metaphysical discourse in Chinese philosophy and ethics. In his Disputers of the Dao, Angus Graham (1989, 222) famously asserts that "no Chinese thinkers conceive the One and the constant as Being or reality behind that veil of appearance," and while Western philosophers undertake to search for "being, reality, [and] truth," the central question asked by Chinese philosophers "was always 'where is the Way?'"18 Graham's two claims set the stage for the hypothesis of incommensurability prevailing in East-West comparative studies. Following the line set out by Graham, David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames (1998, 247) argue that Chinese philosophy distinguishes by "the absence of ontological assertion," which means that "for the Chinese there is no 'being' behind the myriad beings … no One behind the Many, no Reality behind Appearance." Hypothesis of metaphysical incommensurability is necessarily reflected in scholarship on Chinese ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre (1991) explicitly asserts "incommensurability" in his comparison of Confucian and Aristotelian moral virtues. Referring to MacIntyre, May Sim (2007, 35–36) claims that Aristotle's ethics is supported by metaphysics, but since China lacks metaphysical categories, Confucian ethics has "the support of tradition."

The claim that China lacks a metaphysical discourse, however, has been increasingly challenged by a rising trend to identify a Chinese metaphysics. In addition to Li and Perkins's collection, Alexus McLeod and Joshua R. Brown's attempt (2020) to identify the key concepts and notions of "transcendence and non-naturalism" in early Chinese texts marks another milestone in this new trend. Meanwhile, in my recent book (Lu 2020), I have demonstrated that Chinese philosophy boasts of not only a well-developed metaphysical and epistemological system that corresponds closely to that in the West but also abundant metaphysical concepts and categories that directly address "being, reality, [and] truth."

Drawing on the two opposing trends of scholarship, this project argues for both commensurability and incommensurability in Chinese-Western comparative moral metaphysics. On one hand, since metaphysics concerns the first principle common to all, the subject itself provides a commensurable ground of comparison. But as a discursive study, moral theory is contingent upon cultural, religious, or national differences. Both Chinese and Aristotelian morals are premised upon the law of Nature or the physical world and both conceive a kind of teleological virtue ethics that regards virtue as a

key means to achieve the moral end. But as will be shown in chapter 3, the shared metaphysical assumption does not necessarily lead to similar views regarding particular moral issues or problems due to the cultural disparity between ancient China and Greece. On the other hand, with regard to Confucian and Kantian moral metaphysics, the problem of incommensurability does exist. As will be argued in chapter 2, Kantian moral metaphysics based on the primacy of human reason could not serve as a commensurable standard or measure to gauge Confucian moral metaphysics grounded on the law of Nature. This metaphysical divergence leads naturally to striking differences in Confucian and Kantian moral philosophy.

In reality, in addition to a systematic metaphysics and epistemology, I propose, Chinese philosophy boasts of a coherent metaphysics of morals as well. As with their Western counterparts, Chinese philosophers take upon themselves to at once "possess truth about the first principles" and "know what follows from the first principles." Put differently, they not only respect the moral nature (zun dexing) but also pursue knowledge of the Dao (dao xuewen). Both the Daoists and Confucians openly assert the metaphysical assumption of their morals, and this metaphysical inquiry is continued by the Neo-Confucians who make it a core mission to philosophize and systematize classical ethics. A primary objective of this book is, therefore, to reinstate the metaphysical foundation of Chinese morals by abstracting the law of Nature entailed in its foundational concepts and categories.

Methodologically speaking, the three chapters in part I adopt a comparative approach. The growing attention to Chinese-Western comparative metaphysics necessarily spills into Chinese-Western comparative ethics. So far, however, most comparative studies of Chinese moral metaphysics tend to follow the Kantian line headed by Mou Zongsan. As will be argued in chapter 2, compared with Kant's metaphysics based on the subjective category of pure reason, Aristotelian metaphysics that takes the law of Nature or the physical world as the first principle bears more closely on the metaphysics of the Chinese moral system.

In negating the relevance of Kantian philosophy to investigating Chinese moral metaphysics, however, I do not deny the usefulness of Kant's concepts or notions in helping illuminate some specific issues or problems. Apart from his theory of moral laws or imperatives, Kant's distinction between "analytic judgment" and "synthetic judgment" affords a useful tool to understand the divergence between his and Aristotelian or Confucian metaphysics. According to Kant, the "predicate" in an analytic judgment is contained in "the concept of the subject" (1929, A7); but in a synthetic judgment the predicate is something added to the concept of the subject rather than contained in it (B11). Put differently, instead of the intrinsic qualities of things, synthetic logic concerns extra or external attributes imposed upon a subject. By contrast, the conventional Aristotelian analytic logic deals with what is contained in the nature of things under investigation. Likewise, with its emphasis on the xing or innate nature of things, Confucian ethics, as well as its reformulation by the Neo-Confucians, evokes the analytic rather than synthetic judgment.

Though adopting a comparative approach in Part I and referring constantly to Western philosophers, however, this is not strictly a comparative study. The key methodology adopted in this project is the inductive approach that seeks to infer and extract the metaphysical or universal principles from the core virtues and imperatives in Daoist and Confucian ethics through a close reading of the primary texts. This inductive methodology requires a more meaningful and productive reconstruction of the metaphysics of Chinese morals rather than reliance on an external framework.

To abstract universal principles from moral virtues and imperatives is to tease out the "maxims" governing them. A maxim means literally a short and pithy statement that expresses a general truth. As Kant points out, for a personal maxim to express a general truth, it must "hold as a universal law" (6:226). What distinguishes the maxims governing the foundational concepts and categories in Chinese morals is that they entail "a universal law" in their very definition.

Though detachable at the analytical and methodological levels, however, the moral virtues, maxims, and imperatives discussed in each chapter remain united on the metaphysical terrain within a single and uniform framework. As Zhu Xi (1986, 1:107) points out, "all the four primal virtues are metaphysical categories" that cannot be separated from each other, though to be apprehended by human intellect, these categories should be instantiated and discursively marked out. For instance, without being manifested in temporal beings or events, the virtue of ren or benevolence cannot be recognized or understood as such (1:116). Likewise, universal justice cannot be well grasped without being differentiated into various forms of justness. So it is with the wisdom of universality. To provide insights into ordinary affairs, knowledge of universality should be actualized in phenomenal beings or events. The virtues, maxims, and imperatives involved in this project are, therefore, organic components of an overarching moral system founded on the universal law of Nature.

Significance of the Project—Metaphysical vs. Other Readings of the Chinese Moral System

The uncovering of the metaphysical foundation of the Chinese moral system has four important consequences or implications. First of all, the metaphysical approach not only provides an alternative framework to conceive and systematize the core virtues and imperatives in Chinese ethics but also helps reveal the secret key to its abiding relevance and vitality. The metaphysical root in innate nature and the law of Nature indicates that rather than randomly posited or arbitrarily imposed, the primal virtues and key imperatives in Daoist and Confucian ethics accord with universal principles in their very conception. And it is precisely on account of this metaphysical root that the Chinese moral system could last from antiquity to the present time.

Second, aside from the divergence between Kantian and Aristotelian or Confucian metaphysics, Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment also helps bring to light a fundamental difference in the virtues and ideals esteemed by China and the West. The extra addition to the subject in Kantian synthetic judgment proves revolutionary because it not only affords a new perspective into the subject but also serves as a catalyst for scientific discovery by imposing some external attributes upon the subject. Despite its landmark contribution, however, Kant's postulate of synthetic judgment also unleashes an unprecedented enthusiasm for inventing, adding, and exploring features of things beyond their original nature. Conceived on the model of synthetic judgment, concepts such as "freedom" and "autonomy," Kant himself remarks, are human constructs that cannot be corroborated by the law of Nature or empirical evidence (4:459). By contrast, rooted in the law of nature or the innate nature of things and humans, the moral virtues and injunctions in Daoist and Confucian ethics prove organic sprouts that automatically accord with universal principles.

A third significance of this project consists in the potential educational value it promises. The moral end and standard, the four primal virtues, as well as the related moral imperatives of being truthful and returning to reflect upon the self for the cause of error or failure, are core components of the Chinese value system that has lasted for about five thousand years. Man-made values or ideals can be helpful, but their fundamentally discursive nature and the limitations this nature entails is exposed when severely challenged. By contrast, organic virtues or values inherent in the very nature of things and dictated by the universal law of Nature are supposed to survive and preserve like plants that bud, fade, and resprout with seasonal changes. For morally minded educators, knowledge of the basic principles sustaining conventional ideals and values would provide a surer guide for moral education.

Fourth, a metaphysical reading of Chinese moral theory is only one of multiple approaches to Daoist and Confucian ethics, the most prominent of which include Kantian deontology, consequentialist ethics, "virtue ethics," and "role ethics." Given that metaphysics concerns the first principle or

primary cause, a metaphysical reading can reveal the fundamental hypothesis implicit in these various approaches and thereby throws a fresh light on them.

The revelation of the metaphysics of Chinese morals provides new insights into, above all, Kantian deontology and consequentialist ethics. Kant is noted for his deontological conception of morals, according to which an action must be performed from deon (duty) to have moral worth (4:398). Based on the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (1747–1782), consequentialist ethics claims that "it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong" (1977, 393). Founded on the universal the law of Nature and an originally good nature, Confucian ethics that prizes moral virtues seems to fit uneasily within the deontological and consequentialist frameworks that take "duty" or "utility" as the measure of morality. Indeed, rather than utilitarian considerations preached in consequentialist ethics, moral virtues in Confucian ethics are motivated by the instinctive moral impulses of an originally good nature. But Kantian deontology presents a more complex case. On one hand, as will be shown in chapters 2 and 7, li 礼, the third pillar in Mencius's ethical edifice that evokes the whole liyue zhidu 礼乐制度, "the ritual and musical system" that was established in the Zhou dynasty, does show strong deontological implications with its emphasis on the duties or obligations to observe the ethical degrees and rules prescribed by this system. But on the other hand, as is argued in chapter 2, Chinese ethics does differ fundamentally from Kantian deontology in locating the primary ground of virtues or duties in the law of Nature rather than human reason.

"Virtue ethics" and "role ethics" are two popular methodologies avowedly put foward to counteract Kantian deontology and consequentialist ethics. While deontology prizes duty and consequentialism privileges utility, "an ethics of virtue is an ethical position that makes virtues prominent by using virtue expressions often" (White 2015, 3). Given that virtues feature prominently in Chinese morals, "virtue ethics" is indeed a relevant framework.22 But as I will argue in chapter 2, rather than mere virtue ethics, the Confucian moral system points to a kind of teleological virtue ethics that at once posits an ultimate moral end and takes virtue as a key means of achieving this end. Given the civic dimension of moral virtues, "role ethics" makes sense as well, especially considering the deontological capacity of the liyue system to prescribe duties or obligations in accordance with different social roles and positions.

When viewed in light of moral metaphysics, however, "virtue ethics" and "role ethics" are not as dissimilar or distinct as alleged; instead, the two methodological approaches are not only intrinsically connected but also share the same metaphysical foundation. To elucidate this relation, I differentiate between moral and civic virtues. Moral virtues concern mainly the "morality" of personal character or behavior. As Cicero (2001,139, 140) puts it, morality "inheres in" and "arises from" virtues; accordingly, morality is what is "either actually virtue or is virtuous behavior." Civic virtues, on the other hand, refer chiefly to virtues that bear on one's duties or obligations to tianxia guojia 天下国家, "the world, country, and family" (Mencius 7.5), and as such they are closely related to one's ethical or sociopolitical roles and positions. Cultivation of moral virtues is thus both the basis of, and precondition for, discharging one's civic duties or obligations.

In current scholarship on Chinese ethics, moral virtues usually go under the category of "virtue ethics," while civic virtues are addressed within the framework of "role ethics." In fact, rooted in the universal law of Nature, moral and civic virtues refer to one and the same thing, and they are differentiated only in practical applications. Virtues are moral with respect to personal character or behavior, and they become civic virtues or duties once realized in wulun 五伦, "five cardinal relations." Wulun refers to the relationships between a king and his ministers, father and son, husband and wife, brothers, and friends—five cardinal relations that structure the basic fabric of human community. Thus, while moral virtues are epitomized in Mencius's siduan, civic virtues are

expressed by means of wulun. Mencius gives a vivid account of how moral virtues transform into civic virtues:

> The realization of ren [benevolence] consists in serving one's parents; the realization of yi [justice] consists in obeying one's brother; the realization of zhi [wisdom] consists in knowing that filial piety and brotherly duty are essential to cultivating ren and yi; the realization of li [ritual rites] consists in prescribing the proper boundary for ren and yi; and the realization of yue [music] consists in taking delight in being a just and benevolent person.
> 仁之实, 事亲是也; 义之实, 从兄是也; 智之实, 知斯二者弗去是也; 礼之实, 节文斯二者是也; 乐之实, 乐斯二者, 乐则生矣. Mencius 7.27

By ren zhishi 仁之实 and yi zhishi 义之实, Mencius means the realization or manifestation of the Dao of renyi (benevolence and justice) in temporal affairs, which refers here specifically to the two basic duties within the household—filial piety and brotherly duty. The rationale governing the realization of renyi applies to the actualization of the two other primal virtues (ritual courtesy and wisdom) as well. So, once realized in social relations, moral virtues become civic virtues that bespeak one's sociopolitical roles and the related duties or obligations. Whether expressed as moral or civic duties, virtues in Chinese ethics are rooted in the universal law of Nature. Just as siduan is the expression of original goodness and the Dao, wulun is the temporal manifestation of dadao 达道 or "the universal Dao" (Zhongyong ch.20, 96).

Rather than being confined to the "five cardinal relations," civic virtues extend beyond the household to the broader society, the state, and the world. Hence the use of such conventional terms as renyi 人义 (principles of sociopolitical roles), jiujing 九经 (nine political principles), and liuyi 六义 (six civic duties), all of which point to the affinity of moral and civic virtues. In the Liji 礼记, The Book of Rites, civic virtues are represented as renyi 人义, ten principles that govern ten basic sociopolitical roles:

> Loving fathers, filial sons, good-natured elder brothers, respectful younger brothers, upright husbands, obedient wives, affectionate elders, dutiful youngsters, benevolent rulers, and loyal ministers.
> 父慈、子孝、兄良、弟弟、夫义、妇听、长惠、幼顺、君仁、臣忠.
> Liji ch.9, 43224

What is highlighted here is none other than the inextricable connection between moral and civic virtues and one's sociopolitical roles: where the adjective in each term addresses moral and civic virtue or duty, the noun signals the related sociopolitical role. The bonding of moral and civic virtues informs regulations not only for the household and society but also for rulers of the state. Thus we find the concept of jiujing 九经 in the Zhongyong, which includes:

> Cultivating the self, esteeming the worthy, loving one's parents, respecting the prime minister, showing compassion for all ministers, treating subjects as one's own children, attracting all manner of craftsmen, appeasing distant peoples, and showing concern for the manor states.
> 修身也, 尊贤也, 亲亲也, 敬大臣也, 体群臣也, 子庶民也, 来百工也, 柔远人也, 怀诸侯也.
> Zhongyong ch.20, 97

Represented in this passage are the moral virtues and civic duties required by, or prescribed for, those in sovereign or governing positions. In the Great Learning (Daxue), civic virtues are directly cast as the "six civic duties" of ming mingde 明明德 (making illustrious the bright virtue), qijia 齐家 (putting one's family in order), zhiguo 治国 (engaging in good governance of the state), ping tianxia 平天下 (bringing peace to all under Heaven), xiushen 修身 (cultivating oneself), and zhengxin 正心 (rectifying one's mind) (ch.1, 4). In Confucian ethics, these six civic duties and the moral virtues they

entail are what bind and obligate a junzi 君子, a man of virtue who exemplifies social conscience and political accomplishment.

In addition to their shared foundation in the law of Nature and association with sociopolitical roles, moral and civic virtues are inseparably tied also because both are premised upon the primacy of the self. In other words, individual self is the nexus that joins moral to civic virtues. Xiushen 修身, the moral cultivation of the self, lies at the root of the civic virtues that bind one to one's family, country, and the world. As is stated in the Great Learning:

> All, from the king to ordinary people, should take xiushen 修身 [self-cultivation] as ben 本, the root or fundamental principle. For the root to be disrupted while the branches remain in order is impossible.
> 自天子至庶人, 壹是皆宜修身为本. 其本乱而末治者, 否矣. ch.1, 5

The root-branch metaphor regarding the relation of metaphysics and the sciences derived from it applies as well to Confucian ethics in which the moral virtue of the self is deemed as the root that sustains one's civic duties or obligations to one's family, country, and the world.

Plan of Study

This book consists of three parts comprising ten chapters. Part 1 investigates, through a comparative lens, the metaphysical foundation of Chinese morals in general, the methodological approaches to this foundation, as well as the moral end and standard dictated by this foundation. Chapter 1 sets out the first principle in Chinese metaphysics, and chapter 2 examines the relevance of Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysics to studying Confucian ethics. Chapter 3 deals with the moral end and standard dictated by a metaphysics that takes the law of Nature or the physical world as the first principle. The five chapters in part 2 examine the metaphysical foundation of the core virtues of Daoist and Confucian ethics. Chapter 4 considers the Dao of Heaven and Earth and the metaphysical virtues it dictates. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 undertake to explore the metaphysics of the four primal virtues in Mencius's fourfold ethical scheme. Chapters 9 and 10 engage with the metaphysical ground of two moral imperatives deemed most conducive to realizing the core virtues, upholding the moral standard, and achieving the highest good.

Zhipan's Account of the History of Buddhism in China: Volume 1: Fozu tongji, juan 34-38: From the Times of the Buddha to the Nanbeichao Era by Thomas Jülch [Brill, 9789004396203]

The Fozu tongji by Zhipan (ca. 1220-1275) is a key text of Chinese Buddhist historiography. In the present volume Thomas Jülch presents his translation of the first five juan of the massive annalistic part. Rich annotations clarify the backgrounds to the historiographic contents, presented by Zhipan in a highly essentialized style. For the historical traditions the sources Zhipan refers to are meticulously identified. In those cases where the accounts presented are inaccurate or imprecise, Jülch points out how the relevant matter is depicted in the sources Zhipan relies on. With this carefully annotated translation of Fozu tongji, juan 34-38, Thomas Jülch enables an indepth understanding of a key text of Chinese Buddhist historiography.

CONTENTS

The Fozu tongji (T 2035, Comprehensive History of the Buddhist Patriarchs) is a massive work of Buddhist historiography composed by the Southern Song monk Zhipan (ca. 1220–1275). The present translation project, which is intended to have three volumes, refers to a part of the Fozu tong /e entitled "Fayun tongsai zhi" (Monograph on Success and Obstructions in the Spread of the Dharma). The "Fayun tongsai zhi," covering Fozu tong/e, juan 34–48, is an annalistic chronicle of Buddhism in China. It goes through Chinese history dynasty by dynasty, ruler by ruler, and year by year, listing events following the chronological order. With the present project I intend to offer a complete translation of the "Fayun tongsai zhi." In the present volume, I translate the first five juan (i.e. Fozu tong/e, juan 34–38), which contain the annals referring to the history of Buddhism in China from the time of the birth of the Buddha in the 26th year of King Zhao of Zhou ^^^to the end of the Nanbeichao period. In the second volume I will translate the next four juan of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" (i.e. Fozu tong/e, juan 39–42), which have previously been translated by Jan Yün-hua,1 and refer to the history of Buddhism from the Sui dynasty to the end of the Wudai period. In the third volume I will translate the remaining six juan of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" (i.e. Fozu tong/e, juan 43–48), which refer to the history of Buddhism in the Song dynasty up to the year 1236, the third year of the duanping era of the Southern Song emperor Lizong.

With regard to the overall textual structure of the "Fayun tongsai zhi," it needs to be explained that apart from the main text, the work contains supplements, commentary passages, and annotations. Supplements are enhancements added to the main text in the end of some of the juan: In the end of juan 35 we find the supplements for juan 34 and 35. In the end of juan 36 there are supplements again. In the end of juan 37 there are no supplements. In the end of juan 38 there is a supplement, which is however excluded from the translation, as it repeats things that have previously already been said. Shi Daofa has published a modern edition of the Fozu tong/e, which integrates the supplements into the annalistic display fitting them in wherever they chronologically belong. In the present translation project I do however not follow this approach. Instead I translate the text of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" as it appears in the Taishō. Commentary passages are designed to provide further information on a subject of an entry in the main text or also on a subject of an entry in a supplement. They therefore appear subsequent to the entry they refer to, and are in the present translation project presented as indented to the text of this entry. Annotations appear within the main text, within supplements and within commentary passages. They are of very different content. Those that carry important information are in the present translation project translated in footnotes to the relevant passage. It is however also seen that annotations run to great length pointing out the Chinese equivalents of certain Sanskrit terms and explaining their original meaning. Since today this sort of information is easily accessible, such annotations are excluded from the translation presented in the current translation project.

The main intention of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is to present a positive image of Buddhism in China, and to demonstrate that the presence of Buddhism at all times brought blessings, created miracles, and was of advantage to the country. This intention was common to Chinese Buddhist historiography since its beginnings in Nanbeichao times. To the Chinese sangha, Buddhist historiographic writing was a means of making Buddhism prevail in the face of anti-Buddhist agitation. The charges brought up against Buddhism were manifold. Rather than listing them exhaustively, I would like to point to one essential charge, which in particular was predestined for counters from Buddhist historiography. Confucian scholars claimed that in the Chinese antiquity the Confucian sages (shengren) established the ideal state of "great peace" (taiping), which was regarded as the source of all teachings worth being studied. To Confucian scholars Buddhism, as a teaching from the lands of the "barbarians," was not based on this ancient Chinese wisdom treasury and was therefore seen as an unwelcome defilement of the Chinese high culture. Reacting to this Confucian understanding, Chinese Buddhist historiographic literature seeks to introduce a counter-concept, allowing the presence of Buddhism in China to appear in a more favorable light. Part of the strategy Chinese Buddhist historiography employed in this context was to implant Buddhism into the Chinese antiquity, which made Buddhism appear as part of the wisdom treasury associated with that age. As an expression of this strategy, the history of Buddhism in China presented in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" begins right with the Buddha. According to a tradition deeply rooted in Chinese Buddhist historiography, birth and parinirvãna of the Buddha caused natural phenomena, which alarmed the contemporary kings of the Chinese antiquity. In this way, the birth of the Buddha alarmed King Zhao of Zhou, while the parinirvãna of the Buddha alarmed King Mu of Zhou. This tradition, which goes back to the Chinese Buddhist apocryphal scripture Zhoushu yiji,allows to integrate birth and parinirvãna of the Buddha into the annalistic display shown in the "Fayun tongsai zhi." As far as the case of King Mu is concerned, a reinterpretation of the Mu tianzi zhuan implied. The Mu tianzi zhuan, a legendary account from ancient China, says that King Mu travelled to the West to see the Xiwangmu. The Buddhist historiographic tradition based on the Zhoushu yiji takes up the tradition of King Mu travelling to the West but depicts the journey as motivated by the natural phenomena pointing to the parinirvã^a of the Buddha in India. As the legend of King Mu's journey to the West was publically perceived as an important event of the Chinese antiquity, being able to ascribe a Buddhist causation to King Mu's journey meant to establish a prominent presence of Buddhism within the golden age of the sages.

The references to the birth and to the parinirvãna of the Buddha are part of a full biography of the Buddha, which is placed in the beginning of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" as a means of portraying the superior sanctity of Buddhism. This biography begins with parts referring to matters prior to the birth of the Buddha. They cannot be integrated into the annalistic display, which otherwise characterizes the "Fayun tongsai zhi," as they cannot be contextualized with corresponding events in Chinese history (such as natural phenomena). The first chapter of the biography of the Buddha in the beginning of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is entitled "Understanding the origin and manifestation [of the Buddha]" and explains that on an ultimate level the life of the Buddha is not confined to the Buddha's historical life span as Šãkyamuni, since the Buddha's emanation as Šãkyamuni was merely a worldly semblance of his true supernatural existence. Borrowing a term from Christian theology, Michael Radich has described this understanding as "docetistic" (derived from Greek "dokesis," meaning semblance, appearance). In the second chapter, "The descent from the Tusita-heaven", we are told how Šãkyamuni descended from the heavenly realm where—as part of the docetistic display—he was prepared for his manifestation as the Buddha. The third chapter, "Entering the mother's womb", reveals how Šãkyamuni having descended from the Tusita-heaven entered the womb of his mother Mãyã. Only with the third chapter, "Manifestation in incarnation", which explains how the Buddha was born from Mãyã's womb, the annals of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" begin.

Apart from demonstrating the sanctity of the Buddha by means of presenting his biography, Buddhist historiography still has further means of opposing the Confucian understanding that the Buddha, as a barbarian deity, had to be inferior to the sages of the Chinese antiquity. One tradition frequently employed in this respect is represented in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" rather briefly, but enjoys great popularity throughout Chinese Buddhist historiography. It goes back to Liezi, juan 4. According to Erik Zürcher, the original text of the Liezi was lost early, while the present text of the Liezi "is at least partly a forgery of the third or early fourth century AD," which appears to include components articulating Buddhist ideological positions. The famous passage seen in Liezi juan 4, presents a conversation in which Confucius says that he would not know whether the Confucian sages are real sages, while the people of the West (i.e. the people of India) would however have a real sage. Tang Yongtong has argued that, owing to the Daoist background ascribed to the Liezi, this reference to the sage of the West might also be a statement of Daoist religiosity, thinking of the Buddha as Laozi having reincarnated in India as claimed in the "huahu" legend. However Zürcher does not think so. He argues that, since in the Liezi statements of Buddhist ideology are also seen in other places, we should assume that also this famous passage was meant to be a statement in favor of Buddhism. Be that as it may, the intention with which the passage is employed in Buddhist historiography and in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is clear. The passage is quoted to demonstrate that Buddhism, not Confucianism, is based on the teachings of a true sage.

Again as part of the attempt to anchor Buddhism in the Chinese antiquity, Chinese Buddhist historiography also depicts the history of the spread of Buddhism in China as reaching back to the earliest times. The general conception of the early history of Buddhism in China follows a key pattern which Chinese Buddhist historiographic sources largely agree upon. I here need to confine myself to introducing this conception in a thoroughly succinct fashion: First Buddhism had been spread in the Chinese antiquity through various incidents, the most famous among which may be the spreading of the relics of the Buddha through messengers sent by the Indian King Ašoka (ayu wang). With the burning of books under Qin Shihuang Buddhism however became extinct in China. Yet, even while Buddhism was extinct, there were certain incidents suggesting that it had not completely slipped into oblivion. E.g. Huo Qubing Vim', a general of Han Wudi, on one of his campaigns got hold of a "golden man" (i.e. a Buddha statue), which Han Wudi knew to worship as a deity. The period of Buddhism being extinct in China lasted until Han Mingdi , the second emperor of the Eastern Han dynasty, under whom Buddhism was officially reintroduced. According to a tradition originating from the Chinese Buddhist apocryphal scripture Han faben neizhuan (Inner Transmission of the Root of the Dharma in the Han Dynasty), Han Mingdi, having had a dream of a "golden man" (i.e. of the Buddha), sent messengers to India to find out about this appearance. The messengers came back with the two monk missionaries Kãšyapa Mãta^ga (shemoteng,) and Zhu Falan, who on a white horse brought Buddhist sütras, based on which the first Buddhist monastery in China was named White Horse Monastery (baima si). While this is the general pattern which the conception of the early history of Buddhism in China as seen in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" and in the diverse other texts of Chinese Buddhist historiography is based upon, traditions which are employed for enhancement and illustration vary from account to account.

In the further course the "Fayun tongsai zhi" continues to depict Buddhism as a teaching bringing blessings and positive influence to China by referring to exemplary monks and nuns. Zhipan widely quotes from biographies in the Gaoseng zhuan (T 2059) by Huijiao (497–554), from biographies in the Xu gaoseng zhuan (T 2060) by Daoxuan (596–667), and also from biographies in the Biqiuni zhuan (T 2063) by Baochang E.g. seeking to depict Buddhism as a teaching benefitting both the state and the ruler, Zhipan quotes the biographies of Kang Senghui (Gaoseng zhuan, juan 1), Gu^avarman (Gaoseng zhuan, juan 3), and Fotudeng (Gaoseng zhuan, juan 9), all of whom succeeded in changing rulers for the better by converting them to Buddhism. The conversion talks these monk missionaries held with the relevant rulers are reminiscent of the counselling activity of Confucius, who in the

Spring- and Autumn-Period moved from court to court hoping to guide rulers to better policies. So the biographies quoted in this context do not only demonstrate that Buddhism helped to ease political turmoil in medieval China, but also imply that this was done in a way consistent with the Chinese tradition. Other monastics are commended for their engagement in translating the Buddhist scriptures into Chinese, or for their outstanding virtue.

Also accounts of Buddhist laypeople are included in the "Fayun tongsai zhi." We find a broad coverage of the White Lotus Society (Bailian she), a circle of Buddhist monks and laymen founded by Huiyuan (334–416). Many of the traditions the "Fayun tongsai zhi" quotes in this context can be traced back to Huiyuan's biography in Gaoseng zhuan, juan 6. Other traditions, however, only originate from the Lushan ji (T 2095), a late work authored in the Song dynasty by Chen Shunyu (d. 1074). The "Fayun tongsai zhi" also includes references to Buddhist laypeople, who through their piety brought about all sorts of miracles. Such miracle accounts are frequently adopted from early medieval zhiguai collections, such as the Youming lu, and the Mingxiang ji. Other traditions simply pointing to remarkable acts of Buddhist laypeople are frequently adopted from the official historiography (zhengshi). Based on the official historiography, too, the realm of politics of religion is covered. Rulers supporting the dharma, such as Liang Wudi, are portrayed as shining examples. Rulers responsible for persecutions of Buddhism, such as Beiwei Taiwu di, are depicted as tragically misled.

While the tales quoted from the sources named above primarily refer to sacred people, the "Fayuan tongsai zhi" also quotes miracle tales rather associated with sacred places. A rich source for such traditions is the Luoyang qielan ji (Record of Buddhist Monasteries in Luoyang) by Yang Xuanzhi.

While Luoyang was capital of the Tuoba-Wei dynasty a multitude of Buddhist monasteries adorned the city. As after the end of the Tuoba-Wei dynasty Luoyang was in ruins, Yang Xuanzhi, a low-ranking official, in 547 sojourned in Luoyang, and on this basis composed the Luoyang qielan ji to remind of the city's former Buddhist culture. Since the Luoyang qielan ji mainly presents historical traditions referring to Tuoba-Wei times, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" preferably makes use of the work in the part concerning the Tuoba-Wei period, which is seen in Fozu tongji, juan 38. Here the "Fayun tongsai zhi" quotes the Luoyang qielan ji presenting accounts of miraculous events associated with particular monasteries.

Many of the traditions the "Fayun tongsai zhi" adopts from the above mentioned sources were widely employed also in the Buddhist apologetic treatises written up to the times of Wu Zetian. In those days a rich production of Buddhist apologetic literature was triggered by the following circumstances: (1) As a teaching coming from abroad, Buddhism had to demonstrate how it was relevant to the China society and how it could harmonize with Confucianism. (2) Asa religious system, Buddhism in China stood in fierce rivalry with Daoism, and thus sought to demonstrate that Daoist thought was invalid, subversive, and based on debauchery and plagiarism. The list of Buddhist apologetic treatises arguing along those lines is long. Of particular importance are the Mouzi lihuo lun (Treatise of Master Mou Removing Doubts), which is one of the earliest Chinese Buddhist apologetic treatises, the Erjiao lun (Treatise of the Two Teachings) and the Xiaodao lun (Treatise of Laughing at the Dao) from the Northern Zhou dynasty, the Poxie lun (T 2109, Treatise Destroying Evils) and the Bianzheng lun (T 2110, Treatise Discussing what is Correct) written by Falin (572–640) in the early Tang dynasty, and the Zhenzheng lun (T 2112, Treatise Revealing the Correct) written by Xuanyi under Wu Zetian. On the one hand these apologetic works adopt content from monk biographies, miracle tales and so forth, while on the other hand in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" we find content also seen in previous apologetic writing. So it is clear that contents were exchanged between formats of apologetic and historiographic writing and vice versa. The presentation style in apologetic writing and historiographic writing is however different. While in an apologetic context

content is employed in argumentative style serving the relevant apologetic objective, in a historiographic context the same content would simply be presented as an account of history, even though apologetic intent may also be involved. To make the difference understandable I will offer an example: The Poxie lun is the earliest known work to present the text of the Han faben neizhuan, the original of which is lost. The text tells a story of Daoist priests seeking to demonstrate the superiority of Daoism to Buddhism, when Buddhism was officially introduced to China under Han Mingdi. As we are told, the Daoist demonstration fails, which in fact demonstrates the inferiority of Daoism to Buddhism. In the Poxie lun this story is quoted as part of an apologetic reply to an anti-Buddhist statement presented by the Daoist priest Fu Yi (555–639). The "Fayun tongsai zhi" quotes the Han faben neizhuan at remarkable length (T 2035, p. 329, b17–p. 330, a9), simply presenting the story as part of the historical events under Han Mingdi. Certainly, if a text as polemic as the Han faben neizhuan is quoted this elaborately, apologetic interest is involved. But the presentation style in apologetic and historiographic treatises can still be differentiated clearly.

To fully understand the intention with which the "Fayun tongsai zhi" was written, we do however also need to appreciate the particular context of Buddhist historiography in the Song dynasty. While the history of Chinese Buddhist historiographic writing reaches back to Nanbeichao times, the Song dynasty saw an enormous increase in the production of Buddhist historiographic works. This increase is owed to the competition between the two dominant Buddhist schools of the Song dynasty: the Tiantai school and the Chan school. In the context of this competition, historical treatises were written to depict the history of Buddhism either in favor of the Tiantai school or in favor of the Chan school. In particular, both schools attempted to demonstrate that the own lineage of patriarchs went back right to the Buddha, while the patriarchal lineage of the competing school did not. Already in the Tang dynasty, Shenqing (fl. 779–806) in his Beshan (T 2113, North Mountain Record) attacked the Chan genealogy. Later on the Tiantai historiographers praised and employed him, while the Chan scholars, and among them especially Qisong (1007–1072), criticized him severely. As a Tiantai scholar, Zhipan with the Fozu tong/* composed the most complex among the works authored in the context of the competition between the Tiantai and the Chan schools. The Fozu tong/* in no way confines itself to arguing in terms of this controversy only. Rather than that it also refers to controversies within the Tiantai school, and supports the orthodox tradition of the "shanjia" (mountain house) against the dissenters referred to as "shanwai" (off the mountain). Furthermore, the Fozu tong also contains accounts of other Buddhist schools, such as especially the Jingtu (Pure Land) school. Matching this wider approach, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is, as we have seen, designed to be a general history of Buddhism in China. Yet, despite this broad thematic setting, Zhipan's main intention still was to state the case for the Tiantai school in its competition with Chan Buddhism. The Fozu tong begins by presenting the Tiantai lineage as going back to the Buddha: juan 1–4 present the biography of the Buddha, juan 5 presents the biographies of the Indian patriarchs, and juan 6–8 present the biographies of the Chinese patriarchs. In the "Fayun tongsai zhi" the succession of the patriarchs from the Buddha on is again included into the general annalistic display. Even though the references to the patriarchs are kept brief here, their succession in favor of the Tiantai lineage is again shown.

Yet there are further aspects which give the "Fayun tongsai zhi" a particular Tiantai flavor. Firstly, in the biography of the Buddha, which stands at the beginning of the "Fayun tongsai zhi," the sütras preached by the Buddha are classified according to the Tiantai classification system, which depicts the Saddharma pundarïka sütra (Miaofa lianhua jing) and the Mahãparinirvã^a sütra (Da ban niepan jing) as the highest sutras. Secondly, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" contains many accounts of miracles resulting from recitations of the Saddharma pundarïka sütra. Thirdly, Zhiyi (538–597), the founder of the Tiantai school, is covered particularly extensively. Even though the actual foundation of the Tiantai order in the Sui dynasty does not fall into the scope of what is translated from the "Fayun tongsai zhi" in the present first volume of the translation project, we observe the eye-catching

generosity with which Zhiyi is covered already with regard to his actions in the preceding Chen dynasty. In connection with the broad coverage of Zhiyi, the historiographic works of Zhiyi's main student, Guanding (561–632), i.e. the Guoqing bailu (T 1934) and the Sui Tiantai Zhizhe dashi biezhuan(T 2050), are employed. Fourthly, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" occasionally also includes explicit rejoinders to particular traditions of Chan historiography. In Fozu tongji, juan 37 (T 2035, p. 352, c15–21), we find an attack on a tradition seen in the Jingde chuandeng lu (T 2076), an important historiographic work of the Chan school compiled in 1004. In Fozu tongji, juan 38 (T 2035, p. 356, a22–29), we find a counter to the claim that Bodhidharma, the alleged founder of the Chan school, was after his death seen walking in a realized fashion by the Chinese traveler Song Yun.

It is important to note that, apart from the Buddhist main content, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" also comprises passages referring to non-Buddhist matters. In the main text we observe that space is given to important political developments as well. In particular acts of misled policy, such as the burning of books under Qin Shihuang, attacks on the public order, such as the Yellow Turban uprising, or the persecutions of Buddhism under Beiwei Taiwudi and Zhou Wudi are covered and commented in thoroughly critical style. Apart from that, as the two most important native Chinese traditions of thought, also Confucianism and Daoism are covered. While they already play their role within the coverage of the political situation, Confucianism and Daoism are introduced in their own right in the supplements, which the author designed as the place for matters that do not fit into the main text. Even though, as we have seen, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" in its Buddhist content also opposes Confucian attempts of belittling Buddhism, those passages which introduce Confucianism and Daoism in their own right do so in friendly and respectful style. Written in the age of Neoconfucianism, the Fozu tongji does not have an interest in a confrontation between Buddhism and the native Chinese teachings, but rather seeks to offer a general perspective which does refute anti-Buddhist polemicism but otherwise seeks to present a view conducive to reconciliation.

The coverage of the political situation and the inclusion of Confucian and Daoist content makes the "Fayun tongsai zhi" a precursor to the Buddhist historiography of the Yuan dynasty, in which we find the history of Buddhism embedded in a broad perspective on Chinese history. As far as the competition between the Tiantai and the Chan schools is concerned, the Chan school was able to take the lead, and the dispute between the two schools of Chinese Buddhism gradually dissipated. With the Fozu lidai tongzai (T 2036, A Comprehensive Registry of the Successive Ages of the Buddha and the Patriarchs), completed in 1333 or 1334, the Chan monk Nianchang composed a history of Buddhism which formally still has the character of sectarian historiography, but gives less priority to the sectarian dispute and more priority to the new approach of integrating the history of Buddhism into a more general history of thought in China.

To conclude with, I would like to refer to several studies that can help the reader to gain a broader background to the text translated here. A general study of the Fozu tong/i has been presented by Jan Yün-hua. Koichi Shinohara has published an article discussing the importance of the Fozu tong/i to the construction of the Tiantai lineage of patriarchs. General studies of Song dynasty Buddhist historiography have been presented by Jan Yün-hua and Cao Ganghua. For studies of the life of Zhiyi, see the monographs by Leon Hurvitz and Pan Guiming. <>

Zhipan's Account of the History of Buddhism in China: Volume 2: Fozu tongji, juan 39-42: From the Sui Dynasty to the Wudai Era by Thomas Jülch [Brill, 9789004445918]

The Fozu tongji by Zhipan (ca. 1220-1275) is a key text of Chinese Buddhist historiography. The core of the work is formed by the "Fayun tongsai zhi," an annalistic history of Buddhism in China, which extends through Fozu tongji, juan 34-48. Thomas Jülch now presents a translation of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" in three volumes. This second volume covers the annalistic display from the Sui dynasty to the end of the Wudai period. Offering elaborate annotations, Jülch succeeds in clarifying the backgrounds to the historiographic contents, which Zhipan presents in highly essentialized style. Jülch identifies the sources for the historical traditions Zhipan refers to, and when accounts presented by Zhipan are inaccurate or imprecise, he points out how the relevant matter is depicted in the sources Zhipan relies on. Consistently employing these means in reliable style Jülch defines a new standard for translations of medieval Chinese historiographic texts.

Historical Dictionary of Daoism by Ronnie L. Littlejohn [Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements Series, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781538122730]

Daoism is the oldest indigenous philosophic-spiritual tradition of China and one of the most ancient of the world's spiritual structures. The name *Daoism* comes from the term *dao*, which means a "way" or a "road" through the field or woods to one's village. It is also means the "way" to do something, such as how a master craftsman carves wood, makes a bell, or even butchers an ox. But *dao* is also a nominative in the history of Daoism, referring to the energizing process that permeates and animates all of reality and moves it along. However, both text and practice in this tradition insist that *dao* itself cannot be described in words; it is not God in the sense of Western philosophy or religion. Daoism has no supreme being, even if there is an extensive grammar about nominally self-conscious entities and powers for which the Chinese use the word "spirit" (*shen*). For example, the highest powers of Daoism are variously called *Taishang Laojun* (the deified Laozi), the Celestial Worthy of Primordial Beginning (*Yuanshi tianzun*), the Jade Emperor (*Yuhuang Shangdi*), or

the Perfected Warrior (*Zhenwu*). But these are expressions of *dao* in specific *shen*; they are not identical to *Dao*, except in the most unique case—when Laozi, the putative founder of Daoism and author of its major work, *Daodejing*, is said to be one with the *dao*.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF DAOISM contains a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, an extensive bibliography, and more than 400 cross-referenced entries related to the Chinese belief and worldview known as Daoism, including dozens of Daoist terms, names, and practices. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Daoism.

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Excerpt: Daoism is the oldest indigenous philosophic-spiritual tradition of China and one of the most ancient of the world's spiritual structures. The name "Daoism" comes from the term dao, which is often used for a "way" or a "road" through the field or woods to one's village. It is also used for the "way" to do something, for example, the way a master craftsman carves a candlestick, makes a bell, or even butchers an ox. But dao is also used as a nominative in the history of Daoism. It is used for the energising process that permeates and animates all of reality and moves it along simply as the -Dao"; however, both text and practice in this tradition insist that dao itself cannot be described in words. Dao is not God in the sense of Western philosophy or religion. Daoism has no supreme being, even if there is an extensive grammar about numinal self-conscious entities and powers, for which the Chinese use the word "spirit" (shen). For example, the highest numinal powers of Daoism are variously called Taishang Laojun (the deified Laozi), the Celestial Worthy of Primordial Beginning (Yuanshi tianzun), the Jade Emperor (Yuhuang Shangdi), or the Perfected Warrior (Zhenwu). But these are expressions of dao in specific shen. They are not identical with the Dao, except in the most unique case, when Laozi, the putative founder of Daoism and author of its major work, Daodejing, is said to be one with the Dao.

Daoism is the spiritual tradition at the roots of Chinese civilisation, but it defies any single typological characterisation as either a philosophy or a religion. In fact, while these terms have been used by Western and Chinese scholars alike to understand Daoism, such categorisation distorts the historicity of the tradition itself by forcing it into modern conceptual categories that do not exhaust the richness of practice and belief found within it.

Admittedly, until recently it was common to speak of "philosophical Daoism" (daojia) and "religious Daoism" (daojiao), suggesting that the former was transformed into the latter or replaced by it. Western scholars did not create this distinction. The name daojia, later used for philosophical Daoism, was a creation of historian Sima Tan (d. 110 BCE) in his Shiji (Records of the Historian), begun in the 2nd century BCE and later completed by his son, Sima Qian (145-86 BCE). Sima Qian's use of this term is more like "school" than "philosophy." Daojia is listed as one of the Six Schools known to him: Yin-Yang, Confucian, Mohist, Legalist, School of Names, and Daoism.

Sima Qian probably did not have in mind what Western intellectuals of the post-Enlightenment period mean by "philosophy" as opposed to "religion." Moreover, scholars today kn^w things about Daoism and its origin that even the great Chinese thinkers of the past, for instance, Sima Qian, did not know: For example, there is a critical appreciation for how the classical texts of the tradition, the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, are more like anthologies than singleauthored works. Additionally, within the Zhuangzi there are records of people and practices that are recognisable as what may assuredly be called religious or spiritual in any modern definition of religion. So, we cannot think that there was some original, pure "philosophical Daoism" that later morphed into "religious Daoism."

The strange desire to bleach out Daoism's religious identity shows up rather early in Chinese history. For example, Gu^ Xiang (?232-312), editor of what we now call the "received" Zhuangzi, tells us that he removed large blocks of material, reducing the text from the 52 chapters delivered to him to its present 33. We do not kn^w why this was done, and Gu^ does not tell us. Livia Kohn has suggested it was because he felt the excised materials contained "superstitious" ideas and practices to which he and other educated intellectuals, like his Confucian literati colleagues, objected (Knaul 1982). While this claim is still speculative, Ronnie Littlejohn (2011) has argued that the 4th-century text Liezi may contain passages from the "lost" Zhuangzi in its second chapter and that these are indeed seemingly fantastical in their content.

One way of thinking about whether to label Daoism as a philosophy or a religion is to follow scholar Isabelle Robinet (1997) and consider religious Daoism the practice of philosophical Daoism. This approach can claim support from a growing repository of new discoveries about ancient Chinese texts, practices, and artifacts that have led scholars to appreciate more fully the dynamics of change and continuity in Daoist tradition.

Putting aside this distinction between philosophy and religion as a guiding interpretive frame, how can we best understand the identity of Daoism? Kohn and Harold Roth (2002) have collected a set of scholarly essays that explore just this problem of identity. The model that I think commends itself to us is to focus on how the development of the practices and teachings that show up in Chinese history and display what Ludwig Wittgenstein called "family resemblances" to one another. These we may group, then, as a family, under the concept of Daoism. These teachings and practices do not represent the "essence" of Daoism, because like a human family, there are continuities and differences, with no identifiable movement or historical period containing all of them in an exact way, just as no human family possesses the same traits in each of its members. The resemblances that may be called the Daoist family (daojia) represent a set of repeating, overlapping, and intersecting activities, beliefs, and strategies for engaging in the project of following dao and achieving biospiritual transformation.

Early in Chinese history, certainly by the 4th century BCE but probably earlier, some individuals invested their lives and energies in developing techniques for unifying and harmonising themselves with dao and thereby achieving awe-inspiring biospiritual transformations. We can call the people who succeeded in this project "masters of dao," although the classical texts call them such names as Perfected Persons (zhenren), sages (shengren), utmost persons (zuiren), and immortals/transcendents (xian). Sadly, little is fully appreciated about who those people were and how their teachings are reflections of their practices. Their names are hardly known to anyone, but in the pages of the Zhuangzi, traces of their activities and teachings do seem to be present.

Beginning sometime probably in the mid-300s BCE, these people attracted followers and interested students. We may think of the formation and interrelationship of these teacher-adept lineages as the analogy of a climbing organic plant like a vine growing from a solid trunk. The vine, which is most often called a "lineage," draws its sustenance from the roots sunk into the organic and life-giving source. If we think of the dao as the source of spiritual energy and wisdom employed by these

teachers, who became the trunk, then students or groups of students became the vines. In the 300s BCE, some students began to collect their masters' teachings and the tales told to them about those who had undergone biospiritual transformations of various sorts. These collections we now know as the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. These great classical texts, which are more like anthologies than works by one person, began to circulate among teacher-adept lineages and even found their way into the libraries and homes of the well-educated and the aristocracy. Archaeological discoveries in recovered tombs like those at Guodian, dating to 300 BCE, contain some versions of these works. From these classical texts, all subsequent outgrowths of the tradition gain their strength in varying measures. Even as new teachers had experiences of enlightened and alternative consciousness throughout history, the new lineage vines they created never abandoned these two classical texts.

Already in the Zhuangzi, we find records of many teachers and their adepts, and we notice the interchanges and overlaps between these teacheradept lineages. One teacher may send an adept to another for further instruction or to receive knowledge in an area in which the teacher feels insufficient. This is exactly what happens in the story of Gengsang Chu, in the Zhuangzi chapter by that name. This suggests that even the process of following dao often involved apprenticeship to more than one teacher in more than one location. Later, the classical texts were formed by recording and collating the records of what was taught and practiced by various masters. It should come as no surprise, then, that we find already in a work as early as the Zhuangzi (c. 300-250 BCE) some internal differences on such subjects as whether an adept or master should engage in political activity, or whether reason and argument can move one toward an understanding of what is most fundamental about existence, or even what one's attitude toward death should be. The Zhuangzi is a compendium of textual blocks (logic) arranged by an editor or editors. This seems not to have been a haphasard process, as such scholars as Harold Roth (1991), Michael La Fargue (1992), Liu Xiaogan (1994), and Ronnie Littlejohn (2010) have identified linguistic, historical, doctrinal, and literary criteria useful in classifying the strata in the text.

This process of growth did not stop with the creation of the classical texts but continued, as it was driven by two major forces: 1) lived experiences of consciousness, which we may simply call "revelations," and 2) the emergence of new sources (e.g., the Shangqing and Lingbao texts) and the development of new interpretive methods used in approaching the classical sources (e.g., Xuanxue, or Mysterious Learning).

Each new vine on the Daoist trunk or branch represents a lineage that leads back to a master, even if that master is sometimes thought of only as a spirit medium (jitong) for another higher voice. New lineages each tell a story of their origins. These narratives are usually tales of confirmations given through extraordinary encounters with numinal beings or while one is in an alternative state of consciousness, such as we find in the revelation to Zhang Daoling (34-156) on Mt. Heming. At other times, ways of following dao are disclosed by Perfected Persons through spirit mediums, as in the case of Yang Xi (330-386), or by means of the discovery of books containing mystical messages, for instance, in the "secret formulas of the Celestial Heart" (Tianxin bishi) buried in the ground at a spot where Rao Dongtian (fl. 994) was guided by a heavenly light.

We can imagine that some initial growth, just as a vine extending from its trunk, succeeded and others failed, dropped off, and died out. Just how many atrophied vines there were, what the masters of them taught, and why they failed are issues now lost to history. But what is important is that by using this analogy, we will not think of Daoism as a single identifiable movement, but as the living tangled vines of teacher-practitioner lineages.

One early vine recognisable in this process was what we call now Yellow Emperor-Laozi Daoism. This teacher-adept lineage shows up in the Zhuangzi and in the intellectual exchanges set up by Liu An from roughly the 160s to 120s BCE in the city of Huainan. Liu gathered a great number of

thinkers and practitioners of divergent views at Huainan, and one result of their exchanges was a new compendium known as the Book of the Masters of Huainan (Huainanzi). The importance of this project should not be overlooked in a study of Daoism. Its main goal was to overcome tensions and internal conflicts within the Han imperial system by creating a sort of encyclopedia of learning. In this work, the collected materials offer a new understanding of rulership in which the emperor would not only be well educated in literati learning (i.e., Confucian texts), but also a practitioner of the signature Daoist behavior called wu-wei. The text suggests that acting in this manner can be achieved by following the disciplines and methods associated with the Yellow Emperor of ancient days and advocated by lineage masters present in Huainan; however, when the Book of the Masters of Huainan was presented at court in 139 BCE, the text was not accepted as a policy manual or plan for the future. Perhaps if the outcome had been different, the Han dynasty might have been restructured and prosperous.

Nonetheless, the Han dynasty continued in disarray, but the lineage vines that sought a new afe of Great Peace (Taiping) grew. They show up in Chinese history in several places. One of these is in the Yellow Turbans, who rebelled against the Han in the 180s. The revolutionary seal of this movement and the program it envisioned for a new era is preserved for us in the Classic of Great Peace (Taiping jing, CT 1101a). Then, sometime before 142, a Confucian-trained scholar named Zhang Daoling moved into the Heming mountains in Sichuan probably with the intention of setting up a kingdom of Great Peace in that remote region away from the Han imperial eye. One day, while in a state of clarity and quiescence in the Tiangu cave, Laosi appeared to Zhang and gave him the One True Orthodox Way (Zhengyi mengwei) between Heaven and Earth. Zhang began the Way of the Celestial Masters (Tianshi dao or Zhengyi Daoism).

Unlike the Yellow Turbans, the Celestial Master lineage created communities and began to practice Daoism as something other than an individual or small, collective method of transformation. Zhang and the leaders who followed him set up 24 administrative centers dedicated to the way of Great Peace. The Celestial Masters leaders (libationers) began to produce their new texts for guiding their Daoist communities. One of these was a commentary on the Daodejing (Xiang'er Commentary to the Laozi, S. 6825, Bokenkamp 1997). The families that made up these centers in Sichuan province were dispersed and resettled in 215-216, by Cao Cao, king of Wei. They were scattered in both Northern and Southern China.

The impact of this dispersion greatly weakened the unity of purpose and political power needed to realise the political goals of the Celestial Masters. To guide these newly settled communities and keep them within the path of the One True Orthodox Way, a revealed text emerged known today simply as the Commands and Admonitions for the Families of the Great Dao (Bokenkamp 1997). Later, Kou Tianshi (365-448), often called the founder of the Daoist Northern Theocracy, worked to reform the Celestial Masters communities. The History of the Wei (Weishu) reports that, while practicing in the Songshan mountains of Henan, Taishang Laojun (the Highest Lord Lao) appeared to Kou in 415. Laojun revealed a "New Code" for the people of the dao, and we know some of the details of this new revelation through the text Classic on the Precepts of Lord Lao Melodically Recited in the Clouds (Laojun yinsong jiejing, CT 785). The emperor was convinced to put the "New Code" into practice, and Kou was the designated administrator of this new civil order and addressed as Celestial Master. The "New Code" was extended into towns throughout the Northern provinces, and the theocracy reached its height in 440, when the emperor himself was ordained and changed his reign title to Taiping Zhenjun (Perfected Lord of Great Peace).

Some of the Celestial Masters adherents from Sichuan settled in the regions of Jiangsu, the province from which Zhang Daoling came. One form of renewal for the movement in this area occurred when the spirit medium Yang Xi (330-386), a retainer in the prominent Xu family in Jurong (near

Nanjing, Jiangsu province), began to receive revelations stretching from the years 364 to 370, and originating from perfected beings dwelling in the dimension of Highest Clarity (Shangqing). One of these perfected beings was the numinal Wei Huacun. Yang wrote down the revelations and delivered them to Xu Mi (303-376) and his son, Xu Hui (341—?370). These revelations became the foundation for the Shangqing lineage of Daoism.

There was not only the Xu family in the Jurong region, but also the Ge family. Ge Hong (283-343), who identified himself as the "Master Who Embraces Simplicity" (Baopuzi), was a student of classical Chinese texts and Daoist writings, and a collector of the methods for gaining transcendence and the stories of those who achieved it. Ge Hong was extremely interested in the unique contribution external alchemy (waidan) could make to the methods for becoming transcendent and even immortal. His Baopuzi collects a wide array of techniques and how to practice them. It was Ge Hong's grandnephew, Ge Chaofu (fl. 402), who began to receive revelations so powerful that when they were written down, they became talismans of numinous treasure (Lingbao). These texts disclosed new rituals and provided teachings that created a kind of synthesis with the emerging understandings of Buddhist practice and belief then known in China. The Lingbao texts are mentioned in a list of works by Lu Xiujing (406-477) dated to 437.

By the 400s, then, Daoism had two new major teacher-adept lines that joined that of the lineage of Celestial Masters; however, the Shangqing texts, unlike those of Lingbao, became foundational for an actual movement known as Shangqing. Lingbao seems to have been largely a set of texts exchanged between teachers of both Shangqing and Celestial Masters practice. Shangqing's development into a movement occurred through the efforts of a brilliant thinker named Tao Hongjing (456-536). As a result of his work, Shangqing developed its own liturgies, precepts, and rules of order, identifiable holy sites, and lineage of patriarchs and masters.

Tao, like Yang Xi and the Xu family, as well as Ge Hong and Ge Chaofu, was from Jiangsu. He was born in Moling, not far from the modern city of Nanjing, in close proximity to Jurong, the home of the Xus and Ges. In 483, Tao became interested in the Shangqing revelations that had been granted to Yang Xi, and he decided to collect the original texts because he felt there were already a number of forgeries and false teachings circulating and claiming to have their source in Yang Xi and the Perfected Persons that had disclosed themselves to him. In fact, Tao writes disparagingly in his work Declarations of the Perfected (Zhengao, CT 1016) that, "Ge Chaofu fabricated the Lingbao classics and the teaching flourished." Tao knew the Lingbao writings well because he studied with Daoist master Sun Youyue (399-489), who had been a disciple of Lu Xiujing, the standardiser of the texts. He even received training in chanting those texts and drawing supernatural talismans, both key practices of Lingbao (Pas and Leung 1998). But in 492, Tao resigned his position in court and moved to Mt. Mao (Maoshan) with the intention of editing the Shangqing manuscripts he had collected and writing true interpretations of their teachings. The result was two major works in the Shangqing tradition: Declarations of the Perfected (Zhengao, CT 1016), completed in 499, and Hidden Instructions for the Ascent to Perfection (Dengzhen yinjue, CT 421). Tao was closely associated with Xiao Yan (464-549), founder of the Liang dynasty, who later became emperor of the Southern Ti. Tao was supported by imperial patronage while living on Maoshan, and Shangqing teachers and adepts were favored with funding and the construction of various abbeys. The growth of the association of Shangqing with Maoshan explains why the movement is simply known as Maoshan Daoism.

Daoism gained official status in China during the Tang dynasty, largely because the surname of the Tang rulers was "Li" and they claimed descent from Laosi, who was reported to also have had this surname (Li Er). Such close proximity to power and rule brought influential Daoists of the Shangqing and Celestial Masters lineages to the attention of the imperial court. It also led them into conflict

with both Confucian literati and Buddhist abbots and monks. Various debates between Daoism and Buddhism were held at court. Sometimes Daoism seemed to prevail, and the Daodejing was even included among the textbooks in the civil service exams. But there was no single trajectory for the relationship between Daoism and Buddhism. One text used in the disputes between these two traditions was the Classic on the Conversion of the Barbarians (Huahujing). This work was an incendiary affront to Buddhism, claiming that the Buddha was actually one of Laosi's incarnations. Buddhists responded with polemical works of their own, including Daoxuan's (596-667) defense of Buddhism, entitled Collection Spreading the Light of Buddhism (Hongming ju). This conflict was not a mere academic one. At stake were prestige, power, wealth, and influence.

These forces always involve political and social consequences. In fact, every major persecution of Buddhism, first in 446, under the northern Wei, then in 574, under the northern Zhou, and finally in 845, under the Tang, is at least partly traceable to its rivalry with Daoism.

Several Song dynasty (960-1279) emperors, most notably Huisong (1082-1135), promoted Daoism. In 1106, Huisong began a decade-long search for leading Daoist masters. He issued a call in 1114, that every administrative circuit should send 10 masters of great powers to assemble at court in the capital in Kaifeng. The group included the 25th Shangqing Patriarch, Liu Hunkang (1035-1108), and the 30th Celestial Master, Zhang Jixian (1092-1126). Huisong wanted to make the Song capital of Kaifeng into a Daoist community. He created immense gardens in the city, modeled after his vision of the paradise of Daoist immortals on Kunlun (e.g., the Genyue imperial garden). He also built the great Daoist Temple of the Five Peaks (Wuyue Guan). During the Song period, one of the earliest versions of the Daoist Canon was produced.

One challenge faced during the Song dynasty was creating a national moral culture throughout the country. The strategies to accomplish this goal were many, but one was to use a village lecture system. This system made use of troupes of entertainers and teachers who traveled from village to village. Daoist teachings became part of the Three Teachings (Sanjiao) effort to spread a rather uniform moral value system. One way this was done was by the printing and distribution of morality books (shanshu) and ledgers (shanshu). The morality books in this system included Daoist, Buddhist, and Confucian teachings. They were distributed in Daoist abbeys (guan) and shrines (miao) throughout the country, as well as in Buddhist monasteries (si). The most prominent of these books was Tract of the Most High on Action and Response (Taishang ganging pian, CT 1167), still available today.

After the fall of the Song dynasty in the North (1126) and the transference of the court and capital to Hangshou in the South, a period of war and turmoil followed. In 1159, Wang Zhe (aka Wang Chongyang, 1113-1170), a former military officer, left behind a marginal political career and devoted himself to the practices of meditation and "nourishing life" (yangsheng), known as inner alchemy (neidan). Wang was residing in the Zhongnan mountains in Shaanxi province, where he made a dugout for himself for three years and spent four more years in a mountain hut practicing austerities. One day, when he was 48 years old, he entered into an altered state of awareness. The immortals Zhongli Tuan, Lu Dongbin, and Liu Haichan appeared to him and gave him a set of secret rituals and methods for reaching perfection. In 1167, he traveled to Shandong province, where he accepted a number of adepts as students. They gathered around his modest hut on the grounds of the estate of Ma Vu, and he promised to instruct them in a method he called -Complete Perfection" (Tuanshen). Among the disciples he had in Shandong, Tuanshen tradition focuses on a group who became known as the Seven Perfected Persons (qizhen ren: Ma Yu, Tan Chuduan, Liu Chuxuan, Qiu Chuji, Wang Chuyi, Hao Datong, and Sun Bu'er). They helped Wang establish five communities (hui) in Shandong and thus began the Tuanshen lineage, which endures until the present. He had such trust in these

seven that he planned to take four of them with him back to Shaanxi and the Zhongnan mountain area, but he died in Kaifeng before reaching his goal.

Under the leadership of Tiu Chuji (1148-1227), one of the original Seven Perfected Persons, Tuanshen gained significant official recognition when he met with Mongol ruler Chinggis Khan (Taisu, r. 1206-1227) before the Yuan dynasty was established. The khan summoned Tiu for an audience because he was seen as influential over a national movement. Tiu received a number of official titles and political privileges. After this, Tuanshen grew quickly and began to have widespread institutional identity. Sometimes local officials reassigned Buddhist temples to become Tuanshen sites. Nevertheless, in the 1200s, Daoism had a stormy relationship with the Yuan rulers. In 1281, Shisu (Khubilai Khan) even ordered the burning of all Daoist books in an effort to control the influence of Daoists throughout the country.

During the Ming dynasty, the Celestial Masters lineage was quite powerful, and Tuanshen influence diminished. Daoist centers like White Cloud Abbey (Baiyun guan) were directed by Zhengyi (Celestial Masters) masters. Under the rule of the third Ming emperor, Zhu Di (r. 1403-1425), best known by his era name, the "Yongle Emperor," Zhengyi Daoism grew significantly. The emperor studied Daoist techniques, learning talisman-making from two daoshi masters, and also alchemical practices. He patronised the Perfected Warrior (Zhenwu), the Daoist god of Wudang mountain, and promoted him as the numinal protector of the empire. He also gave an order to have a new canon compiled, and it was printed in 1445, during the reign of Zhu Tishen (r. 1435-1449), whose era rule name was Zhengtong. Thus, the Daoist Canon still in use is officially known as Daoist Canon of the Zhengtong Reign Period (Zhengtong daozang).

By the end of the Ming period, the Dragon Gate (Longmen) lineage had grown .within Tuanshen as a renewal movement. The founding legend of the order goes back to Tiu Chuji. The school's name is traceable to Dragon Gate Mountain (Longmenshan) in Longshou district, Western Shanxi, where Tiu underwent his training. The history of the movement traces the transmission of its methods from Tiu down to the Ting dynasty and the seventh-generation Longmen Master, Wang Changyue (d. 1680). Wang was the abbot of Baiyun guan (White Cloud Abbey), and he gathered many followers there. They went on to open Dragon Gate centers throughout China.

The Longmen vine of Tuanshen gained control of a great number of convents and monasteries throughout the country. The Daoist Canon made during the Ming period contains 60 Tuanshen works. In contrast to Zhengyi Daoism, an adept who decided to follow the Tuanshen Longmen way took up a celibate life. He or she would join a monastery or convent and follow a three-year novitiate life. Afterward, the adept could be ordained and make a commitment to a life lived according to monastic precepts. The Way of the Dragon Gate was and is one of self-cultivation through inner alchemy (neidan). By the Ting dynasty, the Daoist Association of China, with an estimated membership of more than 23,000, officially recognised Tuanshen (including Dragon Gate) Daoists in the country. Its center is now in White Cloud Abbey in Beijing, under the administration of the Dragon Gate sect masters.

During the Ting dynasty, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), led by Hong Xiuquan (1812-1864), was hard on Daoist institutions and practitioners. Hong has been called "God's Chinese Son," and he tried to establish a Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping) in Nanjing following an interpretation of Christianity revealed to him through visions and encounters with the Heavenly Family of God, including his brother, Jesus, and his sister, Guanyin. The Taiping Rebellion was one of the bloodiest conflicts in history. At least 20 million Chinese perished as a result of it. Hong's armies struck out at the "idols" of the Buddhists, as well as the City God (Chenghuang shen) and Daoist temples. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Daoist guan and miao were destroyed. Among those communities

particularly hard hit were the Celestial Masters centers on Dragon and Tiger Mountain (Longhushan).

At about the same time, Daoism was introduced to the West. James Legge ^ (1815-1897), who had worked as a missionary in Hong Kong and China beginning in 1824, returned to England in 1873. He was awarded the first professorship of Chinese studies at Oxford University and soon joined the massive project of translating the Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max Muller. In 1880, Legge published The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism Described and Compared with Christianity (Legge 1880), and, in 1891, he published volumes 39 and 40 in the series, entitled The Texts of Taoism, containing The Book of the Way and Its Power (Daodejing), the Zhuangzi, and Tract of the Most Exalted on Action and Response (Taishang ganging pian).

After the collapse of the Ting dynasty, the Republican government of 1912 sought to confiscate Daoist temples and turn them into public buildings, schools, hospitals, and senior citisen centers. The May Fourth Movement (1919) continued this program. In the 1920s, the New Life Movement encouraged students to destroy Daoist statues and icons throughout the country. During the Anti-Japanese War (i.e., World War II), many Daoist temples were requisitioned as army barracks either by Chinese forces or Japanese ones. This meant that by the time of the establishment of the New China in October 1949, there were only about 300 Daoist temples in Beijing, where a century before there had been 1,000, and only about 50 in Shanghai, where before there had been 200.

Daoist practitioners and institutions had a hard time during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), and then came another attempt to eradicate Daoism during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Daoist holy sites were destroyed or repurposed as community centers or barracks for Red Guards. Dcjoshi of all lineages were forced to cease practice and lineage rituals. Doctrinal and ritual texts were destroyed. Some daoshi were sent to labor and reeducation camps. Daoism was banned during this 10-year period and labeled as a "feudal superstition."

We have to admit that in many ways, Daoism is still recovering from the bitter losses of multiple attempts at suppressing its expression and even destroying its very existence from the time of the Taiping in the mid-1800s to the late 1980s; however, in the late 1980s, leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to recognise Daoism as an important traditional belief system and a potential focus for physical health and improvement for the population at large. So, many of the more scenic temples and monasteries have been repaired and reopened. Daoism is one of the five officially approved religions recognised by the PRC (Daoism, Buddhist, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism). It is administered through a state bureaucracy, one arm of which is the Chinese Daoist Association (CDA). Daoist practitioners are required to register with the CDA, which sets rules about education, ordination, and the construction of Daoist temples and statues, and calls upon adepts to abandon superstition. While control of Daoism's development may be viewed with suspicion and much objected to, it is neither something new nor exclusively Communist. Emperors and imperial ministries wanted to control and administrate Daoism as long ago as the Tang dynasty, and they enacted policies to suppress or encourage it.

It is difficult to know how many Daoist masters there are in the PRC because a number of Zhengyi daoshi are unregistered and deliberately avoid the training and official certification procedures of the CDA. Some estimates are that there are more than 25,000 Daoist masters in China of both the Tuanshen and Zhengyi (Celestial Masters) lineages, but that number may be higher. There are more than 2,000 guan and miao in mainland China that are specifically identified as Daoist, but many Zhengyi masters do their work through associations with such sites as City God temples and even through individual contact with Chinese citisens apart from any official institution. The CDA, through its Daoist Research Office, has encouraged the study of Daoist history and philosophies both generally and in a few of the major universities in the PRC. Some of the most prominent and

respected universities in China have established centers or faculties that focus on Daoism or at least research and write about it historically and philosophically. Several Chinese universities have also begun new comparative philosophy programs, many taught in English, which bring international students to China and foster their study of Daoism and its relationship to the philosophies and religions of the West.

Anyone interested in the training, belief, and practice of a currently living Daoist master could hardly do better than to undertake a reading of the authorised biography of Wang Liping (1949—), the 18th Generation Master of the Dragon Gate (Longmen) branch of Daoism, as told to his students, Chen Kaiguo and Zheng Shunchao. This work was translated under the title Opening the Dragon Gate: The Making of a Taoist Wizard, and it tells the 15-year story of Wang's training, which began in 1962. The work anchors Wang Liping to his three teachers and gives us an inside look at the development of a Daoist master, revealing that much remains unchanged since the time of Zhuangsi.

It is fair to ask whether a tradition as rooted in China as Daoism can ever find the right kind of soil in which to grow in other cultures and parts of the world. At first glance, it may seem impossible; however, perhaps the spread of Daoism to other global communities is not as unthinkable as it might first appear. After all, Anglo-Europe and even the Americas became fertile soil for beliefs and practices attached to a Jewish prophet from Nasareth and an Arab seer from Mecca.

As early as the Tang dynasty, an initial extension of Daoism into Korea and Japan occurred because these cultures were interested in all things Chinese (Kolin 2001). In both cases, Daoism was confronted with a full set of well-established indigenous beliefs and practices. In response, many of the same philosophical and social dynamics operated in these new cultures as they had during the period of the Song, when Daoism grew over, grafted onto, and became a hybrid with a wide range of popular Chinese beliefs, including Buddhist ones. Daoism's cosmology of yin and yang, and its traditions about immortals and numinal beings, as well as its techniques of exercise, meditation, medicinals, and diet, took hold in East Asia outside of China with varying levels of strength.

A second extension of Daoist influence in Korea took place in the 1500s and in Japan under the Tokugawa's (1600-1868). This wave of influence carried the techniques of inner alchemy and the use of the morality books to those cultures. In Vietnam during the early 20th century (1920s), Daoist ritual practices, talismans, and petitions were grafted into the Caodai tradition by Ngo Minh Chien, its founder.

Nevertheless, the situation with Daoism's growth in the West has been different. Edward Said has made us well aware of the problematic nature of the early constructions of the "Orient" as Westerners began to contact Chinese and other Asian worldviews. Orientalism was a way in which the West gained strength and identity by setting itself apart from an imaginary, dreamy, and romantic Orient. It fed the imperialism and colonial domination of the West (Said 1978). And, yet, the Western attitude toward Daoism may not best be characterised under the rubric of Orientalism. Although the early exposure to Daoism in the West was shaped greatly by such figures associated with Anglo-European missionary expansionism as James Legge, Daoism featured only marginally in the Western consciousness during the colonial epoch. It came into view only at the end of that period (Clarke 2000). In his work The Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought, J. J. Clarke explores the rich diversity of the ways in which Daoism has been appropriated and engaged in the cultures of the West.

From 1927 to the end of World War II, the chief proponent of Daoism in the West was generally regarded as Henri Maspero in Paris. Michael Saso was the first Westerner to be initiated as a Daoist priest, and he subsequently served as coeditor of Taoist Resources, the earliest scholarly journal on

Daoism for a Western audience. Although this journal is no longer published, it is indexed in most of the standard library collection searches.

William de Bary insists, and rightly so, that "no tradition ... can survive untransformed in the crucible of global struggle" (1988: 138). We have been witnesses to such transformations of Daoism in films like Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (Wohu canlong, directed by Ang Lee, 2000) and Hero (Ping xiong, directed by Zhang Yimou, 2002), as well as in the fiction of such Western writers as American novelist Ursula Le Gunn. Le Gunn did her own translation of the Daodejing and grafted Daoism into much of her fiction, especially Books of the Earthsea and the novel The Dispossessed. These works represent the hybridisation of Daoism into Germanic and Anglo-European contexts and narrative frames in highly creative ways.

With the worldwide advent of the internet, Daoism is once more in flux, overlapping and intertwining its classical lineages with new versions trying through their minds and hearts to understand the tradition and its contribution to biospiritual transformation. Such Daoist cultivation practices as qigong and its understandings of "nourishing life" (yangsheng) in medicine and diet are being repackaged and made accessible throughout the world.

Some recent attempts to understand the historical interaction between Daoism and its new Western soil have been written. With respect to the United States, Elijah Siegler's The Dao of America: The History and Practice of American Daoism is a thorough work that provides a historical frame, a rather complete list of Daoist organisations in the United States, and a chart of North

provide a comprehensive account of the development of this poorly understood religion. It also provides a detailed analysis of ritual life within the movement, covering the roles of common believer or Daoist citizen, novice, and priest or libationer.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: This book is about an organized, institutionalized religions founded in western China around the middle of the second century of our era. At the time, followers of the religion called it the Way of the Celestial Masters (Tianshidao) and believed that it was founded upon a Covenant with the Powers (mengwei) that was both correct or orthodox (zheng) and unique in the world (yi), giving rise to another term for the religion still in use today, the Correct and Unitary (Zhengyi). Outsiders who noticed that each family was responsible for an annual tithe of five pecks of rice (roughly nine liters) referred to the movement as the Way of the Five Pecks of Rice; some seeking to deny its legitimacy referred to believers as "rice bandits" (mizei). It was not the only such movement at the time; history records other movements like the Way of Great Peace that erupted in revolt a few decades later in eastern China, and there were, no doubt, dozens if not hundreds of similar new religious movements centering on a charismatic founder with a religious message during the early medieval period that arose and disappeared without attracting the attention of Chinese historians.

Over the ensuing centuries, the movement grew and transformed, absorbing a diverse body of practices and beliefs, many of which originated with other religious movements or esoteric traditions. From the beginning, adherents spoke of its tenets as the "teachings of the Dao" (Daojiao), and eventually this became the accepted reference for the movement itself, whereas its religious officiants, initially called "libationers" (jijiu), came to be called "gentlemen of the Dao" (Daoshi). In English, the religion has most commonly been rendered as "Daoism," and its religious professionals have been dubbed "Daoist priests." I will use these terms throughout this book.

Unfortunately, in English we have a limited range of terms to use with regard to traditional China, and this use of "Daoism" has been contested. The term is also applied regularly to certain philosophers from the Warring States era (479-220 BCE), especially those who preserved their thoughts in books called the Laozi or Master Lao and the Zhuangzi or Master Zhuang, and which were grouped together in a bibliographic category called the "lineage of the Dao" (daojia) around 100 BCE. The figure of Master Lao was revered by the Celestial Masters as a deity called Lord Lao, and the book Laozi was given a distinctively religious interpretation in the Celestial Master commentary, but the ideas animating the Celestial Master movement were for the most part quite at variance with the Warring States teachings of either book. The movement stressed explicit norms of moral conduct and the performance of sacred ritual, both of which the two books openly rejected. If one insisted on finding the true origins of the movement in Warring States thought, Confucianism and Mohism are better candidates.

A broader argument has also been advanced, claiming that any group or text that concerns itself with the Dao ("the way") deserves the epithet "Daoist." Since a wide variety of thinkers and groups referred to their preferred way to live or act as their "way," this expands the term to the point where it loses much meaning or utility. Moreover, it puts the modern historian of religion in the position of lumping together groups that clearly saw themselves as distinct. Thirty-five years on, it is high time to agree with Michel Strickmann's pronouncement that Daoism "came into social being with the Way of the Celestial Masters in the second half of the second century AD, and continues under the aegis of its successors and derivatives at the present day."

The early Daoists saw their world as comprising two types of people: the Daoist or the profane (su). In our earliest texts, like t lie Xiang'er commentary to the Laozi, we already see the Daoist (Daoren), sometimes referred to optimistically as the transcendent gentleman (xianshi), contrasted with the "profane person" (suren). Both are mortal and fear death, for example, but the would-be transcendent gentleman "believes in the Dao and keeps the precepts" (xin Dao show jie and is thus able to "unite with life" (he yu sheng), whereas the profane are fated to "shed this mortal coil before their time" (weiyang tuisi). Daoism offered salvation from an unsavory posthumous fate where the demonic agents of the Earth Office might seize the deceased and subject him or her to torture-filled interrogations followed by a variety of punishments, as we see in this third-century passage from a spirit revelation:

> The Daoist and the profane person are indeed distant from each other! Why do I say so? The Daoist is pure and correct, and his name belongs up in the Heavens. The profane person is impure and defiled; when he or she dies, they belong to the Earth Office. Is this not distant? When foolish people keep to the profane and give no thought to serving the Dao, they can be called greatly deluded.

The purity claimed by Daoists derived from their refusal to participate in the most central of traditional Chinese religious rites, the offering of blood sacrifice to deities no different in kind from dead humans, gods who depended on the sustenance of regular offerings of meat and wine, and repaid the sacrificer with divine blessings that assured health, wealth, and good fortune. Daoists worshipped the Dao as a personified yet abstract deity who could temporarily manifest as a supreme deity, first the Supreme Lord Lao and later a trio of Heavenly Worthies, the Three Pure Ones (sanqing). These manifestations of the Dao required nothing of humans and accepted no offerings. They evaluated human conduct, reported by a variety of spirits both within the body of the Daoist and in an external bureaucratic network throughout the natural world, against a code of precepts that were tailored to the individual's level of spiritual development as reflected in religious rank. Their judgments could be swayed only by meritorious action or the ritualized submission of appropriate official documents.

Each Daoist in the early Celestial Master movement held a specific rank within a universal priesthood of believers, conferred through an ordination ritual that transmitted a document called a register (lu). The register installed a group of protective spirits in the believer's body and imposed a code of precepts, both of which increased with rank. Children of either sex and any social class could be accepted as novices (lusheng), where they progressed through a number of stages, learning to read and compose official documents destined for the Heavens while gaining control of progressively larger cohorts of divine protectors and emissaries. Upon completion of the program, novices became libationers (jijiu), who could gather their own followers and establish their own parishes (zhi). Each household contributed an annual grain tithe to the parish and made pledge offerings to demonstrate sincerity when requesting ritual services; both tithe and offerings were not offerings to the gods but contributions to the operating expenses incurred by the ritual activities of the religion. Each household was supposed to maintain a distinct ritual structure for daily devotional activities and to wear distinctive clothing when engaged in these activities. I follow earlier scholars

like Anna Seidel in referring to this self-cognizant, organized, clearly delimited social group as a church.

In this book, I treat the origins and development of this Daoist church from its establishment in the mid-second century through the Period of Disunion, ending the inquiry with the reunification of China at the beginning of the seventh century. By then, the Daoist message had been elaborated and transformed in many ways, with the revelation of new gods, scriptures, and liturgies, and a monastic institution was beginning to form. Daoist communities retaining the ancient social organization survived into the Tang dynasty (618-907) and perhaps far beyond; the modern Yao f ethnic minority of South China and northern Southeast Asia retains a communal Daoism remarkably reminiscent of these original groups. Throughout most of China, however, Daoism eventually evolved into a religion of priests without a lay congregation. They were and still are called on by communities to celebrate specific periodic festivals or by individuals to deal with specific needs on an ad hoc basis. They act as caretakers of the broader common religion, overseeing its sacrificial observances and confirming the official positions of its gods through esoteric Daoist rites that maintain a clear distinction between ritual activities directed toward popular gods and the pure rituals dedicated to the eternal deities of the Daoist pantheon. Even today, Daoist troupes across the breadth of China and in Chinese communities around the world maintain a ritual program that preserves theological concepts, liturgical forms, and divine appellations that originated in the period treated in this book.

This book is divided into two parts: one dedicated to the historical origins and development of the Daoist church, the other describing the ritual activities of its members. The historical section begins by examining in detail outsiders' accounts of the founding and early years of the Celestial Master movement, when it was still largely confined to West China, including the theocratic state that existed briefly (ca. 191-215) in the Hanzhong region of modern southeastern Shaanxi and northeastern Sichuan provinces. Our primary sources are the dynastic histories of China, a uniquely detailed and continuous source, which, however, is limited by its court-centered, elite nature and by generic conventions that limit its reporting of religious phenomena not controlled by the state. The second chapter looks at this same period from the viewpoint of Daoist sources, revealing the way members of the church conceived their founding and early history. A careful dating and sensitive reading of surviving materials reveals a narrative that in some ways confirms the testimony of conventional sources but also sheds new light on the significance of early church institutions and activities. The third chapter makes use of three early sources that can be confidently dated to the third century to trace the development of the church after the fall of the Hanzhong state and the subsequent great diaspora of 215, when church members were scattered across the breadth of North China, the central administration was disrupted in unknown ways, and many believers were left to their own devices. During this fecund period, huge numbers were converted to the faith at the same time that new practices and institutions evolved to cope with changed circumstances. The fourth chapter treats the fourth through sixth centuries. In West and North China we see a series of attempts to reconstruct the Daoist theocracy of the Hanzhong period. Meanwhile, as a result of the disruptions at the beginning of the fourth century, Northerners of all classes flood into South China, bringing with them Celestial Master Daoism. We can trace best the elite families who played significant roles in government, but rebellions like that of Sun En (?-402) demonstrate the prevalence of Daoism among peasants and tradesmen, as well. During this period several new scriptural revelations incorporated elements of southern occult traditions and Buddhism into Daoism. In both North and South China we see evidence of an increasing contestation between Daoism and Buddhism for government patronage.

The second half of the book looks at ritual life within the Daoist church, drawing on a body of liturgical and normative sources that accreted throughout this period, mixing authentically early materials with later additions. Chapter 5 introduces Daoist architecture and apparel, describing the

oratory and parish buildings that were the site of almost all Daoist ritual and the specialized ritual garb that people wore during ritual performances. Chapter 6 focuses on the Daoist citizen (daomin), the most basic level of Celestial Master society. I describe the audience ritual that the head of household performed each morning and evening, bringing him or her directly into contact with potent Daoist deities. I also consider the kitchen-feast, Daoism's answer to the traditional communal sacrificial banquet, which had the same function of exhibiting status distinctions while affirming one's participation in the community. Chapter 7 focuses on the novice or register-student, who learned how to write formal documents to Daoist deities and how to perform the intricate rituals that presented them to the Heavenly Bureaus. There is a detailed description of the ordination as well as an examination of the role of women and those of mean birth within the church. Chapter 8 is about the libationer or parish priest. It introduces the various functions of the libationer as evangelist, director of spirit revelations, judge, and pastor. Here I also present a new interpretation of the development of the parish system, arguing that it transformed from a fixed number of geographically based administrative centers, staffed by a large number of male and female officers with diverse responsibilities, to a diffuse system of smaller units led by a single libationer that functioned as a ranking system. I also look closely at the procedures for composing and submitting ritual documents like the petition and for drawing talismans that assure ritual efficacy. Finally, I describe the understanding of and ritual responses to death in Daoist communities.

I have adopted this dual structure, in part, because the nature of the sources dictated it. The first half of the book relies on datable sources and puts events in a clear chronological framework. Evidence from the standard histories is written by and for elites from a perspective close to that of the state, but even the Daoist sources exploited in this section were produced by church leaders, sanctioned and promulgated by the central administration of the religion. By combining these two types of sources, I hope to produce a much fuller historical account that preserves multiple voices and relates events as both the profane world and members of the church perceived them. Still, this material alone falls short of the sort of thick description that is the standard for studies of religion and society in a post-Geertzian world.

The materials informing the description of ritual life in the second section were used, to be sure, by church leaders and elite Daoists, but they were equally the property of village priests and peasant Daoist citizens. Before being edited into their final form, they went through a long process of manuscript transmission, handed down by generation after generation of local practitioners who added or deleted items according to need. A similar process has generated the handwritten scriptures (shouchao) that Daoist priests across today's China use. Each surviving liturgical manual or precept list is thus the product of a specific lineage of practitioners. The identity and geographical location of these transmitters is lost to history. This rules out a comprehensive overview of the ritual practice of any specific region of China. Nor can we limit our description to a specific period within the five centuries under examination. We can only claim that the social structures, ritual practices, and modes of interaction with the divine described here were broadly typical of the Daoist church during its formative period. But it is only these sources that can give us a sense of Daoism as a dynamic, vital lived religion, to which millions of Chinese over these centuries devoted their lives and pinned their hopes of divine aid and ultimate salvation in a time of near constant political and military strife, foreign invasion, natural disaster, and epidemic disease.

Religion in the Eastern Han

Since the first chapter opens with historical accounts of the early Celestial Master movement, I offer here some background to the religious milieu of the second century CE. The Eastern Han (23-220) was a particularly fecund period in Chinese religious history, when the religious world of imperial China began to take form. There were changes to every aspect of religious life, and some of these were directly involved in the birth of Daoism as an organized religion.

Two developments are closely tied to the interregnum between the Western and Eastern Han (6 BCE-23 CE). The first is the rise of the oracular literature most commonly referred to in English as the Aprocrypha (in Chinese, chenwei, or prognostications and weft texts).18 Although these texts are best known for their use as political propaganda by the usurper Wang Mang (45 BC^-23 CE) and later claimants for the Han throne, they are rich in religious imagery and metaphor. Many of the deities and icons that would be prominent in Daoism are first mentioned in these texts, and their continuing revelation over a number of decades accustomed the populace to the idea of spirit revelation as an important source of religious truth.

The other development at this time is the first recorded popular religious movements. In 3 BCE, near the end of the Western Han, a prophecy appeared in northeast China, claiming that the Grandmother of the West, a goddess connected with death and immortality, would manifest in this mortal world. Thousands left their homes to make a pilgrimage to the capital, singing and dancing in a carnivalesque celebration of the coming divine epiphany. They transmitted plaques that they claimed were imperial commands (zhao) guaranteeing salvation. Some two decades later, in 18 CE, we hear the first reports of the Red Eyebrows, members of a communal religion worshipping Prince Jing of Cheng-yang Liu Zhang (d. 177), who had suppressed the rebellion of Empress L^ and hence represented the restoration of the Han royal house. Interpretations of the their distinctive eyebrows differ, with some claiming that coloring them with cinnabar represented long life, whereas others thought they were red for the fire element that was thought to rule the Han royal house. Members of this uprising traveled with their families in communities and took the titles of their leaders from those of village leaders, much like the later Celestial Master libationers. They were guided by a local spirit medium who conveyed commands from Prince Jing and were able to briefly install a direct descendant of Prince Jing as emperor.

There were also more prolonged manifestations or epiphanies of a deity. The primary figure associated with such beliefs is the divinized Laozi. The Scripture of the Transformations of Laozi (Laozi bianhua jing), studied by Anna Seidel (1969), traces the appearance of avatars of Laozi under a variety of names and guises up through the middle of the second century CE. The last recorded incarnation is in the Sichuan region, close to the founding revelation of the Celestial Masters both geographically and temporally. The text suggests that Laozi might return in the future, and, indeed, the appearance of these messianic manifestations continued for many centuries, sparking numerous popular rebellions. A parallel development was the appearance of popular temple structures (fangsi, fangmiao) dedicated to dead humans. Although periodically suppressed by the government and attacked by Daoists, such popular cults to local heroes or those suffering an abnormal death became the norm and allowed the masses to access divine powers once restricted to elites.

There is a significant change in burial practices during the Eastern Han. We find in tombs from that period land contracts (maidiquan) as well as grave-quelling texts (zhenmuwen) that tell us much about popular understandings of death. The land contracts record the purchase of the subterranean space occupied by the tomb, which is often described in religious terms ("to the limits of the four directions" and so on) and secure the soul of the deceased in that space, often with the stipulation that the dead will remain separate from the living. Grave-quelling texts (also called "infusion-releasing texts," or jiezhuwen) invoke a powerful deity like the Heavenly Thearch or the Yellow God to absolve the deceased from any blame incurred through the construction of the tomb. Both reveal a highly bureaucratized world of the dead and a fear of otherworldly curses on the living by or through their deceased relatives. Although the specific methods and deities were not prominent among early Daoists, worry about such matters led many to seek the protection of the Daoist. church.

The concept of a utopian world of Great Peace (taiping) was an important inspiration for the early Daoists. A text with this term in the title was presented to the Han throne twice in the late first century BCE and again in the mid-second century. Questions concerning the dating, stratification, and filiation of the transmitted text(s) are also complex, but large portions seem early, likely of Han date, and as closely related to Eastern Han philosophical works as to anything found in early Daoist texts. It is equally uncertain if the text reflects the beliefs and practices of a distinct religious community or just personal revelations to one or more inspired individuals. It does seem that some version of this text was known to and used by Zhang Jue, who led a religious rebellion in late-second-century East China known as the Yellow Turbans (huangjin) for their distinctive headgear. The Yellow Turbans shared with the Celestial Masters a belief in the origin of illness in misconduct, the efficacy of confession of sins, and the use of talismans. It is likely that they shared an aspiration for the advent of an age of Great Peace, when social conflicts would be lessened and all peoples would be dealt with equitably, and they may well have thought this would only be attained after an apocalyptic period of social upheaval. There is no evidence, however, that they thought of themselves as "seed people" who would repopulate the world, or that they practiced a sexual ritual like the Merging the Pneumas rite as a prerequisite to such salvation. The Commands and Precepts for the Great Family of the Dao of 255 makes clear that Zhang Jue was not considered favorably by the Celestial Masters.

The most far-reaching development during the Eastern Han was the entry of Buddhism, but the extent of its immediate influence is uncertain. In 65 CE, an imperial prince in modern Jiangsu was already hosting public Buddhist rituals with thousands of participants; in 165, the emperor offered official sacrifice to the Buddha. In both cases, the Buddha was associated with Laozi and the pursuit of immortality. By the late second century, we know of several teams of Buddhist monks and laymen in Chang'an translating Buddhist scriptures into Chinese. Although these translators sometimes turned to Daoist terminology to express unfamiliar Buddhist concepts, no one reading these translations would have failed to notice their alien character. Distinctively Buddhist terminology in a Daoist source is a reliable indication of later composition. Still, several features of the new religious movements of the second century are shared with Buddhism, especially the practice of the confession of sins. Moreover, Buddhists, like the Celestial Masters, rejected blood sacrifice, though their rationales for doing so were different. Buddhism may well have stimulated the rise of Daoism. By the mid-second century, Daoists were claiming that Buddhism was a degraded form of Daoism and the Buddha himself just another avatar of a divine Laozi. By the late fourth century, Buddhism had exerted an undeniable influence on Daoist ritual practice and theological conceptions and was competing with Daoism for official patronage.

All of these changes came together in the rise of Daoism. The fall of the Western Han and the lengthy, strife-torn interregnum had awakened all to the fragility of the Chinese imperial state. Political instability brought warfare, famine, and epidemic disease, leading to large-scale movements of population. Among these frightened and dislocated individuals, a variety of new forms of religious expression arose. The Celestial Masters were one such group. Driven by a revelation from Lord Lao that established a new covenant and guided by ongoing revelations from his representatives as well as deceased leaders of the movement, their teachings on sin as the origin of illness and misfortune, disaster as an apocalyptic punishment for an immoral age, ritualized confession and penance as an effective response to such dangers, and the promise of a utopian age of Great Peace resonated with the masses. Like the new foreign faith of Buddhism, the Daoism they fashioned in Sichuan had a broad appeal, winning converts across China until it was a truly national religion that provided a satisfying answer to the questions of its day. Daoism proved adaptable to changing circumstance, developing new rituals for the salvation of all the living and all the dead, and remains to this day a vital part of the Chinese religious landscape.

Conventions

It remains to guide readers through a few pertinent conventions used in referring to and translating materials from medieval China. Located at the far eastern end of the Eurasian continent, China had traded with the West since Neolithic times but was not significantly influenced by the currents of history that prevailed in the Mediterranean world and later Western Europe. It developed unique ways to understand and describe the natural world and the imagined other world, populated by the dead and the divine, that its East Asian neighbors came to share but were seldom communicated to the Indian subcontinent, the Near East, or Europe. For this reason, translating the vocabulary of early Daoism into a Western language poses certain challenges. In the interests of making this book accessible to scholars of religion and history with no background in Sinology, I have sought approximations in English for every Daoist technical term and conception. Lest these be misunderstood as true equivalents, I note here some of the key problems.

I have followed Bokenkamp (1997) in translating as "pneuma" the word qi which seems etymologically to have referred to the steam of cooking grain but came to mean everything from essence to energy, scent, air, feeling, and spirit. In the Daoist context, it sometimes means a force within the body that can be manipulated, but it often refers to noncorporeal beings, and sometimes these usages are difficult to distinguish. The goal of much Daoist endeavor was the status of xian, which originally referred to nonhuman winged beings who could be found only in mountain fastnesses or divine realms but came to refer to humans who had attained some form of physical longevity or immortality. I translate this as "transcendent" because the word is etymologically related to words meaning "to ascend" and because many xian were not truly "immortal," the other common translation. For the early Daoists, this status was awarded by heavenly bureaucrats in return for exemplary moral conduct and proper ritual actions. Later, internal and external alchemy as well as various physical regimens were also employed. Another key term is zhen, which later came to mean simply "real, true" but originally designated a class of divine beings untouched by vulgar desire or impurity. I follow many others in rendering this as "perfected" in both nominal and adjectival usage, a nod to the austere Perfecti of the Cathar tradition, who eschewed both meat and sex. In Daoism, the perfected are the class of beings above the transcendents and just below the Daoist gods (shen).

Words for deity in Chinese are vexing. It is standard to render shen as "god" and gui as "demon" or "ghost" depending on the context, but guishen was a common locution for divine beings in general. We will see in chapter 2 that even the high god of the Daoists was sometimes called a gui. I have tried to sort these out,

translating appropriately for context, but have sometimes resorted to the ambiguous "spirit" for either term. The high god during the Shang dynasty (ca. 1500-1045 BCE) was called simply di and this remained a popular term for exalted deities, sometimes singular but often plural, throughout Chinese history. Beginning in the third century BCE, it was appropriated by temporal rulers, giving rise to the unfortunate translation "emperor." In an attempt to recapture the sense of a divine ruler, I regularly translate this term as "thearch." Other translation problems are noted as the terms come up.

Although there have been a number of Daoist canons, beginning in the fifth century, the only one to have survived is from the fifteenth. Transmission of these scriptures has been less than ideal, resulting in numerous textual variants. Moreover, up until recently, all Daoist texts were transmitted without punctuation, and only a minuscule number of texts have been published in modern critical, collated editions. For all these reasons and to aid readers interested in the source behind my translations, I have included a punctuated, corrected Chinese text in traditional characters for all of them. Citation is to the 1923-26 Hanfenlou photo reprint of the original Ming edition, cited by chapter, page, recto (a = front) or verso (b = back), and then line number if necessary. Citations of

Buddhist works include the serial number of the scripture in the Taishó edition preceded by the letter "T," followed by the volume, page, and register (a, b, or c) on the page. Citations of the classics are to the 1815 Shisanjing zhushu edition reprinted by Yiwen Publishing in 1974. Citations of the dynastic histories are to the Zhonghua shuju punctuated editions, and other works are as noted in the bibliography. <>

DAOISM IN MODERN CHINA: CLERICS AND TEMPLES IN URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS, 1860–PRESENT edited by Vincent Goossaert and Xun Liu [Routledge Studies in Taoism, Routledge, 9781138889415]

This book questions whether temples and Daoism are two independent aspects of modern Chinese religion or if they are indissolubly linked. It presents a useful analysis as to how modern history has changed the structure and organization of religious and social life in China, and the role that Daoism plays in this.

Using an interdisciplinary approach combining historical research and fieldwork, this book focuses on urban centers in China, as this is where sociopolitical changes came earliest and affected religious life to the greatest extent and also where the largest central Daoist temples were and are located. It compares case studies from central, eastern, and southern China with published evidence and research on other Chinese cities. Contributors examine how Daoism interacted with traditional urban social, cultural, and commercial institutions and pays close attention to how it dealt with processes of state expansion, commercialization, migration, and urban development in modern times. This book also analyses the evolution of urban religious life in modern China, particularly the ways in which temple communities, lay urbanites, and professional Daoists interact with one another.

A solid ethnography that presents an abundance of new historical information, this book will be of interest to academics in the field of Asian studies, Daoist studies, Asian religions, and modern China.

Excerpt: "Wherever there is a Daoist, a temple soon follows. So goes the common saying among the Daoists. Indeed, the modern history of Chinese temples and that of the Daoists seem to go hand in hand. Yet, while both temples and Daoists serve Chinese society, the relationship between the two has yet to be thoroughly analyzed. Most temples, now as before, operate without a Daoist, and many Daoists do not work in temples. So, are temples and Daoists two independent aspects of modern Chinese religion? Are they indissolubly linked? If so, what factors helped forge such a link? How have Daoists and temples fared through the political, social, and cultural changes in modern China?

This volume attempts to shed new light on these and other issues through an interdisciplinary approach combining historical research (tapping on archival resources and recently published material) and fieldwork. It focuses on urban centers because this is where sociopolitical changes came earliest and affected religious life to the greatest extent; it is also where the largest central Daoist temples were and are located. The chapters examine how Daoism interacted with traditional urban social, cultural, and commercial institutions and pay close attention to how it dealt with processes of state expansion, commercialization, migration, and urban development in modern times. By comparing their case studies from central, eastern, and southern China with published evidence and research on other Chinese cities, the authors reach larger conclusions as to how modern history has changed the structure and organization of religious and social life in Chinese cities, and the role therein of Daoism, in particular.

We examine the evolution of urban religious life in modern China, particularly the ways in which temple communities, lay urbanites, and professional Daoists interact with one another. We look at major Daoist sacred sites (both Quanzhen monasteries and Zhengyi temples) and their function as central institutions structuring local religious systems (training other clerics, organizing the large-scale festivals, etc.), but also at clerics working for neighborhood temples or trade and professional guild shrines either as resident specialists or as occasional ritual service providers. While there is a trend among lay temple leaders to marginalize and even replace religious professionals like Daoists, the latter still manage to retain control over important material and symbolical resources.

The political changes during the twentieth century have deeply changed relationships between lay institutions and clerics; yet, the question remains whether lay people or Daoist clerics can or should control temple life. These questions were addressed repeatedly from the last years of the Qing empire through the early Republican and the socialist periods, all the way to the present post-Maoist era. Our chapters follow these moments in sequence. Instead of a more conventional schematic tradition vs. modernity narrative, we offer a more complex and interesting story of continuous negotiation and reinvention over some 150 years.

Historiography

A recent state of the field essay by one of us has outlined how modern history (transformations between the late imperial period and the present) has long been a neglected part of Daoist studies, which have traditionally been strong on textual studies of early scriptures, and on fieldwork-based investigations of ritual and other local practices in rural areas understood as the living tradition, sometimes even within a perspective of salvage anthropology. 1 While these studies are fundamental and must continue, new developments since the early 2000s, such as wider availability of sources materials (archives and local historical records) and an interest among scholars in China in religion as part of local history, have seen the field develop rapidly and strongly. Our volume is part and parcel of this larger movement, and it tries to showcase some of the best studies that have been published so far. It is a result of a cooperative project entitled "Temples, Urban Society and Taoists" conducted between 2007 and 2011 with the generous support of the Chiang Ching-kuo International Foundation for Scholarly Exchange as well as the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche. This volume builds on other publications also stemming directly from that project, including a volume of

primary source materials in Chinese forthcoming from the Religious Culture Press in China, and a special issue of the journal Daoism: Religion, History and Society.

This new research trend that combines social and local history with Daoist studies is also embedded within a larger scholarly interest in the religious history of modern China, and of the first half of the twentieth century, in particular. 3 Rapidly growing interest and studies in the current religious revival and development throughout the Chinese world have led scholars to discard a simplistic opposition between tradition and modernity and to trace the roots of the contemporary evolutions. Many of these roots were found in the effervescent situation of the Republican period that witnessed not only widespread attacks on and destructions of local religion by the modernizing state and anti-superstition campaigners but also vibrant religion innovations: new cults, organizations, rituals, and ideas. While studies of the modern transformations have tended so far to pay particular attention to Christianity and Buddhism, Daoism was by no means a sideshow in that larger history. Therefore, while remaining ever keenly aware that it is self-defeating to isolate Daoism from the larger religious ecology of China, we have provided an intentionally Daoist perspective on the larger religious developments that have been taking place from the end of the empire to the present day. We hope that these Daoist stories add nuance, depth, and richness to the growing and larger picture of contemporary religious revival in China.

Definitions

We need to define from the outset the object of our enquiry. By Daoists we mean, in a broad definition, all professional or amateur providers of services (such as rituals and teachings) identified as Daoist by themselves and/or their clients. While this definition casts a wider net than those used by historians who look specifically to people with an ordination in either the Zhengyi or Quanzhen tradition, it allows us to embrace the continuum of the specialists teaching Daoist techniques and providing Daoist ritual services to urban communities; in any case, most of the specialists living in or employed by temples who are discussed in the present volume are Daoist by any definition. Defining urban can be trickier, as we are fully aware that the urban vs. rural divide has been a rhetorically loaded category in modern China, often serving as a foil for modern rationality vs. backward superstition; furthermore, moving beyond rhetoric and looking at actual situations lead us to discover and argue alternatively for a rural-urban continuum extending from the major metropolises and their suburbs to smaller cities, townships, and large villages. Our focus here is clearly on the largest cities such as Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong, as well as sub-provincial centers such as Nanyang, while remaining aware of the dynamic circulations between these centers and their own peripheries.

We do not mean that these large cities were home to a specific form of Daoism or that there is such a thing as a distinctive "urban Daoism." By contrast, we look at dynamics of change caused by urbanization and other modern processes, how they impact Daoists and their practices and organizations in the urban setting, or indeed how Daoists face and experience the extremely rapid urban expansion. The specific conditions of urban life do not create just new constraints (temple seizures, zoning rules against temples, smaller public spaces for rituals, de-territorialization of identities and social bonds) but also new aspirations and possibilities. Indeed, throughout Asia, cities have been places of religious affirmation and innovations through the modern period. We aim to show that China and Daoism are no exception.

This volume, which has a strong social-historical focus, does not deal with the evolving contents of the Daoist ideas, teachings, and self-cultivation practices. These equally important issues have been addressed by other recent volumes, and we will return to them in future projects. 5 Similarly, we look less at liturgy, which tends to be conservative (even though denying its modern changes would

be a flagrant mistake), than at the social context of rituals: who pays for and organizes Daoist rituals in modern Chinese cities, and where does it take place? Daoists today need access to (and ideally control over) temples to be able to perform their rituals and be recognized, but those with rights and authority over temples may have other agendas. Taking our hint from Kenneth Dean's idea of Daoism as one of the liturgical frameworks that organizes and structures Chinese local societies, we endeavor to explore how this (in relation to other) framework adapts to the social, political, and economical transformations that have shaped modern Chinese cities, notably the sweeping movements of temple appropriation, destruction, and reconstruction.

Structure of the volume

Part I, "Historical Overview," provides a historical framework for looking at our case studies, at two levels: first at the most general level of the Chinese world, and second, with a case study, located in Nanyang ?? in Central China, so as to place the various types of Daoist institutions and their trajectories through the history of modernization and urbanization.

Chapter 1 , "Urban Daoists, from 1860 to the Present," provides an analytical background for the whole volume by describing the various configurations for Daoism in Chinese cities by the late Qing period – central temples, neighborhood and guild temples staffed by Daoists, entrepreneurial Daoist ritual services centers, and lay spirit-writing halls – and the way these types experienced diverging trajectories through the upheavals of the twentieth century down to the present. The chapter concludes by presenting four general models through which Daoist temples adapted to the modern changes (first during the Republican period, then during the socialist period): (1) the classical model of the central temple ordering networks of lower-order neighborhood and guild temples, and negotiating with the state and local elites; (2) the Daoist association model of the temple as a conservatory of Daoist culture providing services to individuals; (3) the entrepreneurial temple ran by closed groups of devotees expanding through charity and ritual services; and (4) the community temple that builds up legitimacy by identifying itself as Daoist (yet often keeps the Daoists at a distance). This line of analysis will contribute to understanding not only what was lost in the process but also how Daoist clerics, rituals, and communal forms of organizations resisted or weathered the twentieth-century modernization processes and embodied tradition and, actually, in an urban context, adapted and invented new ways of operating. The following chapters in the book provide cases for several of these models.

Chapter 2 , "The Martial Marquis Shrine: Politics of Temple Expropriation and Restitution, and Struggles of Daoist Revival in Contemporary Nanyang," traces the history of Daoists and their former temples in Nanyang, a prefectural seat and regional trade town located in the upstream Han River valley, from the 1980s to the present. In that city, the Quanzhen Daoist lineages and their temples had developed over the late imperial period close interactive ties with the local elite, guilds, cults, and local community. But, contrary to the story in other cities (such as those discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), the revival after 1980 has run into tall and seemingly insurmountable obstacles: the initial outright seizure of the temple by the local government in 1949, and the continued occupation and repurposing of the temple complex as municipal museum and tourist site from the early 1950s to the present, even though such occupation and repurposing are directly at odds with the post-Mao era CCP and state policies of religious liberalization and temple repatriation. As a result, Daoists who used to run the famed Wuhou, a temple in honor of the late Eastern Han era brilliant strategist and loyal minister Zhuge Liang, have never managed to date to recover their temple in spite of their sustained activism and mobilization. The story tells us that the local government's secularizing agenda and entrenched political interests have often proven too overwhelming for any Daoist revival to thrive.

Part II, "Spirit-Writing Temples and Their Networks," is devoted to one of the most important types of Daoist temples that developed in Chinese cities during the late imperial and modern periods. These temples are organized around the worship of deities that communicate with humans through spirit-writing (fuji ??) séances and answer individual queries. These divine-human communications and revelations often result in full-fledged scriptures and other sacred texts. Such temples and their communities engage as a rule in charitable activities and thus form a nexus for community organization. The two chapters in this section deal with such networks of temples devoted to the same deity (Patriarch Lü ??) in two different areas.

Chapter 3 , "The Jin'gaishan Network: A Lay Quanzhen Daoist Organization in Modern Jiangnan," describes the emergence during the turn of the nineteenth century of a major spirit-writing cult to Patriarch Lü at Jin'gaishan ??? (a hill just south of Huzhou, northern Zhejiang province) and its subsequent growth into a dense network that by the first half of the twentieth century included over 70 branches in all the major cities of the Jiangnan region, notably Shanghai. These urban branches had genealogies that listed thousands of members, most of them members of the local elites. Through a combination of internal and external sources (revealed texts, liturgical manuals, newspapers, archival documents, ethnography, etc.), the chapter describes the activities of the branch temples (ritual, self-cultivation, charity, and predication), their place in local religious life, and the process of their demise after 1949, to be followed by present-day renewal in some of the branches. This dense description provides new perspectives on the importance of Daoist temples in urban Jiangnan between the late Qing and the Republican period and what is left of this historical moment.

Chapter 4 , "The Dao in the Southern Seas: The Diffusion of the Lüzu Cult from Meizhou to Bangkok," tells a story that dovetails with the previous chapter as it starts with temples dedicated to the same deity, with similar patterns of urban development and elite membership, this time in the Hakka area of Meizhou, and then in the Chaozhou area of southern China. Because of the dense migrant networks of the Chaozhou people, this cult soon spread to Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, where it has since flourished without interruption. Bringing a transnational and diasporic dimension to the volume, the chapter explores how the cult came to be a central institution in the lives of the Chinese settlers in Bangkok, and then it was brought back from there to the mainland in the 1980s.

Finally, Part III, "Householder Urban Daoist," looks at a different facet of urban Daoists: the married priests who are affiliated with urban temples (usually owned by local communities) but do not own or run them.

Chapter 5 , "The Modern Transformations of the Old Eastern Peak Temple in Hangzhou," based on several years of intense fieldwork and archival documentation, explores the modern history of a temple that used to be one of the most famous in the Jiangnan region and now struggles to revive. The Old Eastern Peak temple ???? in the suburbs of Hangzhou was up to 1949 the locus of a huge network of lay devotional associations that converged during the seventh month to participate in the Eastern Peak festival, where local deities and their human servants came to pay homage to their overlord, the God of the Eastern Peak. This was managed by a very large and influential family of Daoist priests, the Zheng. The local power of the Zheng caused their brutal downfall after 1949, and the temple was closed and razed down in 1958 as part of the struggle against "reactionary societies." Yet, the temple was rebuilt during the 1990s and now employs some of the Zheng as ritual specialists. This fascinating story encapsulates many elements of the story where the respective roles of Daoists priests, village leaders, and religious activists had to be reinvented through the contemporary revolutionary struggles, yet it also shows remarkable resilience at the level of ritual and worldviews of the believers.

Chapter 6 , "Zhengyi Daoists and Daily Life in the Baoqing Pier Neighborhood in Modern Hankou," based on archival and textual sources, and fieldwork notes, retraces the origins and history of the Zhengyi Daoist householders' settlement and practice among the central Hunanese migrant community in Hankou (Wuhan) from the nineteenth century to the present. The authors examine the various roles these Daoist householders played in the daily life of the Hunanese migrant laborers, merchants, and sojourners in the modernizing city, and pay particular attention to these householders' negotiation with the state's changing regulatory framework, new urban planning and development, increasing social mobility of the younger generations, and the post-Maoist economic reforms in order to survive and thrive in the swiftly changing social, economic, and cultural settings of Wuhan. <>

ZHU GUANGQIAN AND BENEDETTO CROCE ON AESTHETIC THOUGHT: WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE WENYI XINLIXUE (THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART AND LITERATURE) by Zhu Guangqian, translated and commentary by Mario Sabattini, edited by Elisa Levi Sabattini [Emotions and States of Mind in East Asia, Brill, 97890043921 99]

In *Zhu Guangqian and Benedetto Croce on Aesthetic Thought*, Mario Sabattini analyses Croce's influence on the aesthetic thought of Zhu Guangqian. Zhu Guangqian is one of the most representative figures of contemporary Chinese aesthetics. Since the '30s, he had an active role in China both on the literary and philosophical scenes, and, through his writings, he exerted an important influence in the moulding of numerous generations of intellectuals. Some of his works have been widely read, and they still provoke considerable interest in China, on the mainland as well as in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The volume also presents a revised translation of Zhu Guangqian's *Wenyi xinlixue* (Psychology of Art and Literature).

CONTENTS

Zhu Guangqian is one of the most representative figures of contemporary Chinese aesthetics. Since the '30s, he had an active role in China both on the literary and philosophical scenes, and, through his writings, he exerted an important influence in the moulding of numerous genera tions of intellectuals. Some of his works, and particularly those aimed at the young (Zhu Guangqian has always declared that these readers were his favourites), have been widely read, and they still provoke considerable interest in China, on the mainland as well as in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

In the '30s and '40s, Zhu Guangqian constantly maintained a certain distance from political events, and he never embraced the positions of the Leftwing intellectuals who were at that time committed to sustaining the action of the Chinese Communist Party on a cultural level. Despite this, after 1949, his authority in the academic field was not significantly questioned, and he was able to continue his research and teaching activities in the Western Languages Department at Peking University. Violently attacked because of the idealistic concepts he espoused, Zhu Guangqian published a self-criticism and officially adhered to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, without however renouncing, de facto, the fundamental points of his aesthetic theory. During the Cultural Revolution, he fell into disgrace, like almost all of the intellectuals of his generation. However, with the fall of the so-called "Gang of Four" in 1976, he re-emerged in the Chinese cultural world with unquestioned importance and prestige, such as he had probably not experienced since 1949. Until his death, occurred in 1986, he continued to occupy an important place in the current renaissance and development of aesthetic studies in China, and some of his writings from the '30s and '40s have been reprinted on the mainland, including those which had been more subject to attack in the '50s and '60s.

Western Chinese studies have up to now demonstrated only scarce interest in Zhu Guangqian's work, despite the incontrovertible importance it has had in the cultural history of contemporary China. This is all the more surprising if we consider that Zhu Guangqian has been one of the main artificers of the "mediation" thanks to which the Chinese intellectual world has been able to absorb Western values and concepts. Certainly, his "mediation" has operated in a specific sector, which is that of a theoretical reflection on art and literature, but it is useful to underline the intimate connection existing between the theory and the practice of art and literature, especially as far as critical methodology is concerned. Zhu Guangqian's "mediation" has never signified passive assimilation: he has always "read" and interpreted Western theoretical doctrines and enunciations in the light of some of the fundamental presuppositions of traditional Chinese thought and the concrete practice of Chinese art and literature. This "contamination" in all likelihood helps explain why Zhu Guangqian's writings have been so successful in China and, at the same time, may account for the criteria which have regulated the choice and selection of Western doctrines.

In order to understand the significance of this encounter between Western and traditional Chinese cultures in the work of Zhu Guangqian, it would be worth our while to look briefly at his education, which was subject, as Zhu Guangqian himself has said, to "very old" and "very new" influences. Born in 1897 in the Zhu Guangqian district (Anhwei province), an area rich in cultural traditions, Zhu Guangqian came from a literary family. Up to the age of 15, his teacher was his father, who, according to custom, took great care to transmit to his son the fundamental aspects of classical Chinese culture. Following this period, Zhu Guangqian went to the Tongcheng Middle School (Tongcheng zhongxue), the curricula of which were still strongly in luenced by the literary school of the same name dating from the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). In 1917 he enrolled at Wuchang Higher

Normal School (Guoli wuchang gaodeng shifan xuexiao), where he chose Chinese as his main subject. The following year, however, disappointed by the quality of the teaching in that institution, he left Wuchang for Hong Kong, where, at the University, he began studying English and Western literature. He himself speaks of the effect on him in that period of the development of the "New Culture Movement", whose attacks against tradition and the use of literary language (wenyan) were already well-known nation ally thanks to the May 4th Movement. Zhu Guangqian, steeped as he was in classical Chinese culture, felt like a shopkeeper who had just been informed that all of his money, accumulated over many years of hard work, had lost all its value. At first he was overcome by sadness at the fact that wenyan was to be replaced by the vernacular (baihua), but then it was precisely his studies in Western culture which led him, after bitter inner suffering, to the conviction that the New Culture Movement was necessary.

This youthful distress, which Zhu Guangqian himself tells us about with a noteworthy dose of self-irony, helps illuminate the basic reasons which preceded the evolution of his mature thought. The close links which Zhu Guangqian firmly maintained with the ancient cultural tradition of his own country seemed threatened by the profound crisis into which that same tradition had fallen after the impact with the West. Like many other intellectuals of his generation, Zhu Guangqian turned to the West in order to seek a new cultural identity, and it is significant that, to him, West ern "knowledge" simply ended up becoming a synonym for scientific knowledge. For Zhu Guangqian, however, turning to the West could not mean breaking links with his own cultural tradition. The West assumed, on the other hand, the role of mediator in the identification of a new means of reading and interpreting that tradition, thus re-evaluating its more valid aspects and, consequently, in the final analysis, rendering his own links with that culture much firmer.

Zhu Guangqian spent five years in Hong Kong. Then, after receiving his Bachelor of Arts, he returned to China, where he became an English teacher. However, he did not yet consider his period of learning finished with, and he prob ably did not feel that China in that period could offer him the stimuli he required. In 1925 he went to the West, where he was to spend eight years undertaking intense study in the most diverse fields, from literature to psychology, from philosophy to art history. At first he attended courses at Edinburgh University, then at London University, the University of Paris and, finally, the University of Strasburg, where he received his Doctorate with a thesis entitled The Psychology of Tragedy: a Critical Study of Various Theories of Tragic Pleasure.

It was during this period of study in the West that Zhu Guangqian identified his own specific research area and elaborated the fundamental lines his own aesthetic theory was to follow. He himself states in the introduction to one of his most important works, The Psychology of Art and Literature (Wenyi xinli xue):

> My interests were centred on, firstly, literature, secondly, psychology, and lastly, philosophy. My love of literature leads me on to a thorough study of questions relating to criteria of criticism, and on the relationship between art and life, art and nature, form and content, and language and thought. My love of psychology lead me into a study of the relationship between emotion and imagination, of creation and appreciation as psychic activities, and, finally, of individual differences in taste. My love for philosophy lead me to a study of the writings on aesthetics by Kant, Hegel, and Croce. Thus aesthetics became the link between my favourite studies. I now believe that to neglect aesthetics is a serious lacuna for those who are studying literature, the arts, psychology, or philosophy.

For Zhu Guangqian, therefore, aesthetics ended up constituting a global "scientific" reply to a series of requirements and demands which had come to the fore in the years of his early studies. Emotionally tied to China's "past", in particular to its artistic and literary manifestations, he was however aware of China's "backwardness" in the scientific and technological fields, just as he was aware that the weight of tradition itself, and above all Confucian tradition, was at the origin of this

backwardness. The problem was to separate those artistic and literary ex pressions from their "backward" context, while at the same time making sure that they did not become the object of condemnation that "Westernist" intellectuals formulated in reference to tradition in its entirety. Zhu Guangqian could not identify with the new literary and artistic production, which young Chinese writers and artists were trying hard to realise by basing themselves mainly on West ern models, in that he considered this production to be of a none too elevated quality, and certainly not comparable to that of the West, nor to classical Chinese production. Aesthetics could provide "scientific" critical criteria, in that it studied art as such, as the expression of moods and feelings and as man's creation, beyond the different social and cultural contexts in which the individual works had been produced. Within aesthetics, Chinese artistic and literary tradition could be placed at the same level as Western tradition, all the more so in that certain theoretical for mutations seemed to fit in perfectly with some of the typical expressions of that tradition. What is more, aesthetic "science" found a series of correspondences with Chinese tradition at the level of a critical reflection on art, for which the Chinese experience could offer its own valid contribution to a better definition of some concepts and thus render them more "universal" and comprehensive.

There is also another aspect which must be taken into consideration. For Zhu Guangqian, art and literature had assumed a function and meaning which went well beyond their specific context. As we will see below, they appeared to be connected with the most profound essence of life. Aesthetics, therefore, in that it is a "science" of art and literature, could be intended, in its broadest sense, as a "science" of life and man. Within this conception, which we could define as "aesthetic universalism", the Chinese and Western traditions could come together and reciprocally integrate one another with absolute equality and without contrast.

Zhu Guangqian himself said that he undertook his literary critical studies by beginning with Croce, and then by reading, through Croce's mediation, the writings of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson. Croce's theory has assumed, without doubt, an important significance within the complex of Western doctrines used by Zhu Guangqian. Zhu Guangqian's name therefore ended up being indissolubly linked with that of Croce, both in China and abroad. However, the label of "Crocian" which was given him as early as the '30s (at first certainly with his con sent) led Zhu Guangqian to repeatedly come to terms with Benedetto Croce's philosophy. His thought thus developed and defined itself, in reference to many questions, through constant reference to Croce's thought.

In my article "<Crocianism> in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsueh", I tried to demonstrate that Zhu Guangqian was never, in reality, "Crocian", not even when he himself sustained he was, but that he took advantage of Crocian theory along with other doctrines of Western aes thetics in order to "valorise" a vision of art which was profoundly rooted within the Chinese tradition. A comment on my article by Zhu Guangqian himself, which appeared in 1981 in Dushu, confirmed my hypothesis. The choice of The Psychology of Art and Literature for analysis was not only due to the fact that it is Zhu Guangqian's most important and most "systematic" work, but also to the particular meaning it has in the history of the Zhu Guangqian's "coming to terms" with the Crocian system. In the 1956 "self-criticism", in referring to the development of his thought in the aesthetic field, he distinguishes three different phases: the first, corresponding to the first draft of The Psychology of Art and Literature, is characterised by a complete acceptance of Croce's aesthetic theory; the second, corresponding to the second draft of the work, is marked by the emergence of an ever-more skeptical attitude towards Crocian aesthetics, and therefore contains many in congruent notes; the third, which coincides with the publication of the volume Criticism of Crocian Philosophy (Keluoji zhexue shuping) (1948), records the first sign of doubts regarding Croce's idealist philosophy, after a "superficial" reading of all his philosophical writings and a logical analysis of these.

In the introduction to The Psychology of Art and Literature, the first edition of which dates from 1936, there is a reference to the first draft of the work, written four years before publication, when Zhu Guangqian was still studying in Europe. He underlines that he had added five chapters to the final version (including the one dedicated to the criticism of Crocian aesthetics), and says:

> These five new chapters mark a change in my ideas on aesthetics, which are now very different from those I had when I wrote the first draft. I was then strongly influenced by the formalist aesthetic as it evolved from Kant to Croce. This theory held that aesthetic experience was only the intuition of form. This meant that we contemplated, with the greatest concentration, an image that was completely isolated, and free of all ties with other things. For this reason, abstract thought, association of ideas, moral concepts, etc. were all outside the domain of aesthetic. I now realise that human life is an organism, and that all types of activities, be they scientific, ethical or aesthetic, cannot, in reality, be separated from each other, however possible it may be to distinguish them theoretically. Thus, I am radically opposed to that mechanistic vision that forms the basis of Croce's formalist aesthetic, and the abstract analytical method it employs [...] I modified my first draft twice and on both occasions, this skeptical view I had of Formalism led me to correct the opinions I put forward when I was a follower of the theory. I am certainly not claiming to have demolished formalist aesthetics -there are many principles it has established that cannot be cast into limbo- but it does has the defect of being too restricted. My contribution to it is intended to be only a "rectification". It is a big mistake to reinforce one's prejudice in the course of studies. As soon as one sets out deliberately to reconcile conflicting views, one's prejudices are strengthened, as when one is blindly partisan. In fact, I had no intention of reconciling conflicting views, but, if I did set off on this course, I did so, perhaps, through over-caution, because I could not bring myself to believe with absolute convic tion in one-sided theories and conclusions drawn from insufficient facts.

I have chosen to cite the entire section from the introduction to The Psychology of Art and Literature as I believe that it significantly illustrates Zhu Guangqian's attitude not only towards Crocian theory, but also towards the other Western doctrines he uses in his analysis. This syncretism, which characterises his entire work, at least as far as the Western sources are concerned, seems to be a conscious choice, determined by the desire to arrive at a delineation of a non-"partial" and non-"unilateral" theory. This is why references to the doctrines of Croce, Münsterberg, Bullough, Lipps, Groos, Vernon Lee, Langfeld, Richards, Delacroix, Nietzsche and so on are to be found in perfect harmony in his work. What is the guiding thread linking all of these references? In the pages above, I have already hinted at a reply to this question. Now it might be worth our while to concretely analyse the way in which these different doctrines are fused in the formulation of the concept of "aesthetic experience", which is of seminal importance in Zhu Guangqian's thought.

"Aesthetic experience" is systematically analysed by Zhu Guangqian in the first five chapters of The Psychology of Art and Literature, but almost all his writings either implicitly or explicitly refer to this concept. Croce's theory of intuition is undoubtedly of great impor tance to this definition. There were no substantial modifications in this respect during Zhu Guangqian's "revision" of Croce's theory, which is referred to in the passage cited above. If, therefore, we clarify the meaning assumed by Crocian theory within Zhu Guangqian's concep tion of the "aesthetic experience", then it is possible to locate at the origin the mechanism of that "contamination" between Western doctrines and Chinese tradition mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

Zhu Guangqian defines aesthetic experience as "the psychological activity that occurs when we respond to the beauty of nature and of art", and adds that "[...] conditions, both those caused by nature, as well as those that spring from art, are, in all their variety, the stuff of "aesthetic experience" [meigan jingyan]. The big task of aesthetics is really the analysis of this experience." But

Zhu Guangqian does not limit himself to using the concept of intuition (derived from Croce) in order to illustrate aesthetic experience. Another theory given substantial weight is that of "psychical distance", coined by the English psychologist Edmund Bullough. Zhu Guangqian uses this theory to demonstrate that, during aesthetic experience, it is necessary to look at things with a certain detachment, without allowing oneself to be absorbed by their "normality". Only by grasping their unusual, uncommon aspect, cut off from all possible practical implications, is one able to really appreciate their beauty. The theory of "psychical distance" is anything but secondary in the definition of intuitive activity: it establishes, in fact, the conditions which are necessary so that the intuition of form (= aesthetic experience) can take place. Zhu Guangqian also gives a series of examples of the application of the theory to artistic phenomena, and basing himself on this application he eulogises and defends traditional Chinese art:

> Modern technical advances have brought art gradually nearer reality and nature. This, though, is not necessarily artistic progress. The new Chinese artists consider the technique of Western art perfect -in their view a horse in a painting should look like a real horse, the representation of a moonlit forest should look like the real thing. In this view Chinese art is felt to be unworthy. Without doubt Western art has its merits, and Chinese art has its defects. But the merits of the one do not lie in its closeness to nature, just as the defects of the other do not stem from its failure to be naturalistic.

And again:

> If those who condemn the theatre of antiquity on the grounds that forcing the voice and singing in a high pitch is not reasonable were to see one of Wagner's musical dramas, then perhaps they would realise with surprise that that sort of game is not exclusive to the Chinese. If they were then to examine ancient Greek theatre a little more carefully, they would come to realise that wearing masks, painting the face, and wearing buskins are certainly not characteristic of a primitive art. In painting and sculpture, perspective was certainly a great technical advance, and this advance could lead to artistic progress. But art without technique is, in the end, much superior to technique without art. The sculptors of the medieval monasteries certainly knew that their carvings were not realistically proportioned, but their work lost none of its merit for that. In terms of technique, an ordinary apprentice today is probably more skilful than Giotto was, but the works of Giotto are immortal.

In analysing aesthetic experience, Zhu Guangqian also dedicates much time to the presentation and discussion of the doctrine of empathy (Einfühlung). He examines the theories of Lipps, Münsterberg, Groos, Vernon Lee and Langfeld with the aim of arriving at a general and all-comprehensive definition of the phenomenon. In this case, too, as far as "distance" is concerned, Zhu Guangqian establishes a direct connection between it and the intuition of form:

> When we are concentrated in the contemplation of an isolated image, we usually forget that the ego and the object are two different entities, and we ar rive at ego/object identity. From the ego/object identity we reach the state in which the ego and the object flow one into the other and so we un wittingly introduce our feelings into the object, while the attitude of the object is transmitted to us.

This phenomenon, however, is not for Zhu Guangqian a "necessary condition" for aesthetic experience. The doctrine of empathy is also used to il lustrate traditional Chinese art. In particular, calligraphy is used as an example:

> Simple ink marks come to be seen as things endowed with life and temperament. These qualities at first exist only in the mind of the spectator. Through empathy he unconsciously transfers to the character the image it has given rise to in his mind. Thus the character can provoke empathy, and since, like all other art, it can express the temperament and the delight in the calligraphic act of the artist, it too can be termed "lyrical".

It already seems clear, therefore, that Zhu Guangqian's recourse to the Crocian theory of intuition to ex plain his conception of aesthetic experience (= intuition of form) is of a completely extrinsic character. In order to better understand the real meaning attributed by Zhu Guangqian to the term "intuition", it may be worth our while referring to the Chinese tradition. The concept of "intuition" is not new in Chinese philosophy, but constitutes the basis of the cognitive process proper to Daoism, in which there is no distinction between subject and object: both disappear in the essential unity of things which constitute the natural world. It is interesting to note how Zhu Guangqian, in order to explain the meaning of intuition, at a certain point cites a famous aphorism by Laozi:

> Laozi said: "Studying increases day by day, practising the Dao decreases day by day".

These words can be applied very aptly to aesthetic experience. Study is knowledge derived from experience; Dao is the possibility to intuit form in itself. The more we know about something, the more difficult it is to concentrate on the form in itself, to intuit the form, to stimulate a pure and authentic aesthetic sense. The aesthetic approach involves decreasing study and increasing Dao.

It means that by putting apart everything which has been learnt about an object, such as its composition, its use, its characteristics, it is possible to directly grasp its original form without any conceptual mediation. Just like the daoist sage who, in order to live in conformity with Dao and intuit the laws which govern the continual and incessant mutations of things in the universe, must decreasing study and increasing Dao, in order to experience the aesthetic approach, one must intuit form in itself by letting go knowledge. The attitude is similar: in both cases, one leaves out of consideration everything which is arbitrary and artificial in the logical categories and practical aims which man superimposes on reality in order to bring his own internal state into line with the nature of things.

Those who attain absolute happiness, according to Zhuangzi, identify themselves with Dao, go beyond the affirmations, negations and all common distinctions which constitute inferior knowledge, lose their own ego, because in Dao, the "ego" and the "non-ego" are no longer two things, but coincide in a superior unity. And Zhu Guangqian:

> In pure intuition there is no awareness of self. Self-awareness derives from the distinction between self and things, and when we forget this distinction then we can achieve the state of mental concentration.

It must also be pointed out that going beyond knowledge implies a deeper knowledge, which can be attained only through lengthy preparation and spiritual training. Ignorant people are not able to attain absolute happiness, identifying themselves with Dao and thus intuitively understanding the real essence of things, because they are still immersed in habitual things, still tied to certain instinctive reactions which can distance them from the truth, and they are still exposed to all the dangers that social life implies. First there is knowledge, then non-knowledge, and this latter cannot exist without the former. In the same way, aesthetic experience, according to Zhu Guangqian, cannot be considered an isolated and self-sufficient phenomenon, nor can it be considered an ingenuous way of seeing things. Aesthetic experience also presupposes a long spiritual apprenticeship, which varies from person to person, but which always nonetheless directly or indirectly determines its greater or lesser profundity.

It is in this context that the importance of "psychical distance" theory can be explained in Zhu Guangqian's conception. Ordinary people live their daily lives by paying attention solely to their own immediate needs; the joy, pain and pleasure of existence exert an unquestionable dominion over their mind. But some more fortunate people are able to escape from the needs imposed by the practical world, are able to place themselves above and beyond the normal events of life. That is, they are able to assume a "different" attitude towards things, a "detached" attitude. Intuition

consists in going beyond immediate, habitual reality and in conquering an apparently different reality, but which is in fact deeper and realer. As Zhu Guangqian says:

> As a rule, we think of the world we ourselves see as being real, while the one the artists see as being only an illusion. But which is real, and which is illusory? Has a street its own natural form, or is it only a way of getting to a certain bank or shop? Has this world an intrinsic value or is it only an instrument or an obstacle for man?

In Zhu Guangqian, empathy is also given a specific function, and does not at all appear to be in contrast with "psychical distance" in that the former presupposes the lat ter: it is precisely through "detaching" oneself from things that one can understand (intuit) their essence, and therefore identify oneself with them. What is more, empathy, or the "ego-object identity", also has its basis in the Daoist Weltanschauung. The "loss of the self" is a characteristic of both Zhu Guangqian's aesthetic intuition and Zhuangzi's superior knowledge. There is, at the basis of this conception, and in both cases, a similar awareness of the relativity of judgement and opinion.

Let us now consider the meaning assumed by intuition in Crocian theory. The concept of intuition, as Croce intends it, is based on that vision of reality, which is proper to Italian Idealism, according to which the human spirit is completely separated from nature, conceived as a pure phenomenal world and simple instrument for the attaining of a superior Reign of Values. For Croce, intuition is not a psychological class able to be referred to the world of experience but is rather a moment in the life of the Spirit in its cognitive process, a moment which can only be in tended if placed on a transcendental plane, where men and things lose their concrete individuality to become only manifestation and extrinsication of the Spirit. By identifying art with intuition, Croce makes of art a category of the Spirit, an a priori form distinct from logical thought and practical activity. Through art, the Sprit expresses the external world, and by expressing it makes it exist. If it is true that art-intuition can do without, and it effectively does do without, logical thought and practical activity, logical thought and practical activity cannot however do without art-intuition, in that these include it within themselves.

Zhu Guangqian takes his move from completely dif ferent presuppositions. The classical Chinese conception of reality does not allow for any separation between man and nature, between theoretical activity and practical activity, between thought and action. The individual, in his interior development, moves along with the organisation of society and with the events of the Cosmos, according to the laws which regulate the harmony of the Whole. The Sage is not contraposed to nature, but conforms to it, in that he feels a part, along with nature, of a single spiritual process. This implies an intimate union between thought and its practical extrinsication, such that these two moments seem to be logically inextricable.

We have already seen the close relationship between Zhu Guangqian's aesthetic intuition and Daoist intuition. Now, this latter, more than as a starting point can be defined, in its broadest sense, as a point of arrival. It presupposes, in fact, a profound maturation, which is made up of consciousness, distinctions and practical action. Daoist intuition has a meaning which is the exact opposite of that of Crocian intuition. For Croce, intuition is the first form of knowledge, it is the indispensable presupposition without which there could be no intellectual or logical knowledge. But it is intellectual knowledge, the concept, which grasps the real reality of things. For Daoism, on the other hand, conceptual knowledge, the logical constructions of the intellect and their concretisation in discussion, rather than bringing us closer to the reality of things, lead us away from it: they are nothing other than inferior knowledge. Higher knowledge is a going beyond concepts, it is intuition of the Dao. According to Daoist conception, therefore, intuition does not precede the concept, but goes beyond it; it is not the first form of knowledge, but the last and the most truthful. What is more, it is not a purely theoretical activity, but practical and theoretical at the same time, in an indivisible unity which does not al low for any logical distinction.

The interest Zhu Guangqian displays for Crocian aesthetic theory from the very beginning of his studies on Western culture derived in the first place from the importance given in this theory to intuition, a phenomenon which is intimately linked with the Chinese tradition both in the philosophical and artistic fields. At first, however, the Crocian concept of intuition was without doubt "filtered" through other doctrines, amongst which a consistent importance was given to German psychological aesthetics, English Idealist aesthetics and French Positivist aesthetics. It can be said that German psychological aesthetics decidedly contributed to giving a scientific stamp to Zhu Guangqian's handling of the subject. In fact, intuition as such was not at all in contradiction with a psychological approach to the aesthetic problem. Within German psychological aesthetics itself, numerous authors admitted the importance of the intuitive component in the artistic phenomenon. Crocian intuition was at first interpreted by Zhu Guangqian on an essentially psychological level. But as has already been hinted at, for Croce in tuition was something quite different from a simple psychological function, and the art-intuition identity im plied very precise consequences as far as aesthetic analysis was concerned.

In fact, if Zhu Guangqian shows that he is referring to Crocian theory as far as the concept of intuition is concerned, he openly and declaredly takes his distance from him on other matters of prime importance, such as the one pertaining to the art-intuition identity, that of the distinction between expression and communication and that of the value of the work of art. His confutation of the Crocian theory in reference to these specific matters belongs, according to what Zhu Guangqian himself states in the "self-criticism" of 1956, to the second phase of development of his aesthetic thought, corresponding to the second draft of the The Psychology of Art and Literature. It is, however, difficult to believe that the theoretical presuppositions for this confutation were not already present in the first phase.

Zhu Guangqian says in the chapter of The Psychology of Art and Literature dedicated to a criticism of Crocian aesthetics:

> We follow Croce when we say that aesthetic experience is the intuition of form, when we deny that aesthetic sense is simply pleasure, when we reject the concept of art for morality's sake in the narrow sense, when we state that beauty is neither in things nor in the mind, but in expression. But at the same time, we turn our back on him when we deny that artistic activity can be con fined to the restricted sphere of aesthetic experience, when we admit that art has an appropriate relationship with perceptions and association of ideas, when we oppose the separation of aesthetic man from moral man and from scientific man, and when we maintain that the independence and autonomy of art are limited. Modern aesthetic theorists can be roughly divided into Crocians and non-Crocians. I believe that the Crocians are generally nearer the truth, but we are also very clearly aware of their faults. In our view, Crocian aesthetics has three major defects: -the first is its mechanistic view; the second is the way in which it explains "communication"; and the third relates to its theory of value.

It is necessary at this point to remember that the dis tinctions on which Croce based his philosophical speculation aim at delimitating the individual moments in the life of the Spirit in its unfurling, considered as the only Reality, which transcends common individual experience. They there ore have no bearing, nor could they have, on the individual classifications of empiric psychology, which are deprived, according to Croce, of all truth value. He says in his Breviario di estetica:

> If one asks which of the various activities of the Spirit is real, or if they are all real, one must reply that none is real, because the only real thing is the activity of all those activities, which is not to be found in any of them in particular: of the various syntheses which we have so far distinguished (aesthetic synthesis, logical synthesis, practical synthesis), the only real one is the synthesis of syntheses, the Spirit which is the real Absolute, the actus gurus. But from

> another point of view and for the same reason, all are real in the unity of the Spirit, in the eternal flowing and re-flowing, which is their eternal constancy in reality.

For Croce, this abstraction is necessary because it identifies a moment in the life of the Spirit, not a component of the human psyche considered empirically. Thus, once the theoretical nature of art has been established and once this has been identified with intuition, the only possible consequence was to exclude thought and morality from its field. What is more, the identification of intuition with expression led Croce to distinguish from this, considered solely as a theoretical activity, the moment of the practical extrinsication of the work of art, or rather of communication. This distinction was indispensable if he wanted to remain faithful to his conception of art as a category of the Spirit. Finally, by identifying art with intuition, Croce was forced to pose the distinction of art from non-art on a purely empirical, non-philosophical, level.

The entire difference between artistic intuition and common intuition, therefore, is quantitative, and, as such, indifferent to philosophy, scientia qualitatum. In order to fully express certain com plex moods there are those who have a greater aptitude and are more frequently disposed than others: some expressions, which are rather complicated and difficult, are much more rarely attained, and these are called works of art. The limits of expression-intuition, which are called art, as op posed to those which are commonly called non-art, are empiric: it is impossible to define them. An epigram belongs to art: why not a simple word?

The art-intuition identity, with all of the consequences it implies, is the essential basis of Crocian aesthetics. His originality does not consist in having introduced the concept of intuition to the artistic phenomenon, but in having sustained precisely this identity. Now, if Zhu Guangqian willingly accepted intuition in his own aesthetic theory, giving it the meaning of momentaneous experience, attainable through an intimate process of maturation, he could under no circumstances accept that it be identified with art. How could art be cut off from morality and thought, how could it limit itself to a simple moment, to that fortunate moment in which it is possible to grasp the essence of things and appreciate them in all their beauty?

Completely extraneous to the problematic connected with Crocian speculation, Zhu Guangqian considers the aesthetics-intuition experience to be a form of higher knowledge, which it is possible to reach only after a long period of training (which takes place both at a conscious and unconscious level), and which, once attained, determines a series of modifications within the individual and, equally, within society. Art includes all these moments, and must therefore be considered from a broader point of view, bearing in mind all those factors which go together to form it and mark its development. Thus the association of ideas, morality, technique, all those elements which Croce excluded from the field of art, are once again fully a part of it.

In criticising Croce's theory relative to communication, Zhu Guangqian also indirectly brings into question the concept of expression. He points out, in fact, that the nature of the physical means exerts a determining influence on artistic creation. What is more, the artist is an integral part of a determined society, and cannot do without the act of creation; the artist is someone who speaks to others, not an isolated being speaking to himself. The wonder of art consists precisely in the immortality it confers on the artist because of that living feel ing of sympathy which links him with society.

Zhu Guangqian, in dealing with this question, could certainly not ignore some of the fundamental characteristics of Chinese artistic and literary production: the sense of "tradition", the importance of models, the weight of the influence of the various schools and the very meaning of "originality", which gained value when inserted creatively within a complex of techniques and styles handed down over generations. This "continuity" was determined by surroundings, which the artist felt himself to be a part of and which was the only context in which he could fully express his own personality.

Separating communication from art and expression, albeit only "notionally", must have seemed to Zhu Guangqian as something simply incomprehensible.

As for the question of value, Zhu Guangqian points out that its annulment in Crocian theory derives from the elimination of communication. In the same way, Zhu Guangqian could not accept the exclusion from art of the phenomenon of the association of ideas. In fact, one of the essential instruments Chinese poetry (but not only poetry) uses to express itself is constituted precisely by the as sociation of ideas. Zhu Guangqian points out that

> The emotions in their original expression can simply be accepted deep within oneself, but cannot be described directly. In order to communicate them so that others understand, it is necessary to create metaphors that make use of indirect, concrete images.

Association of ideas, precisely because it presupposes a single reality which transcends man and nature and brings them together in intimate communion, is the most suitable instrument for grasping a certain mood, or, in general, a certain situation in all of its aspects and all of its connections. Each fact, each feeling, if seen artistically, can become symbols of countless other facts, of countless other feelings. Creative imagination sweeps over all reality and gradually encapsulates all the correlations which are determined between its single moments. Then a landscape, a tree or a flower are associated in the mind with a sensation, a memory, an attitude; the images which derive from this are nothing other, in the end, than the synthesis of this process. It is significant that, in order to sustain this theory, which is undoubtedly deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition, Zhu Guangqian should also have referred to Western points of reference, particularly to the aesthetics of the French scholar Paul Souriau and to French Symbolist poetry.

The distinction made by Zhu Guangqian between aesthetic experience and artistic activity inevitably implied the reinsertion of morality within the field of art. But, in Zhu Guangqian's conception, this is not in fact a simple reinsertion: it is clear from some of his affirmations that art assumes the function of vehicle through the agency of which it is possible to attain a higher morality. Art is able to develop these three elements to their maximum levels. Thus, Zhu Guangqian in the end leads the value and function of art back to "knowledge". This "knowledge" can be naturally realised only at an emotive level, in a field dominated entirely by imagination, but, precisely because of this, it is able to reach a higher level, placing man directly in touch with the real nature of things, able in the end to identify the "ego" with the "non-ego". Practical life, dominated by habit, stops us from grasping the real nature of things. Artists, however, are able to break the bonds imposed by daily reality. Real morality corresponds to this real knowledge.

In conclusion, it can be said that Zhu Guangqian is an original Chinese thinker who cannot be placed within any of the Western "schools", least of all the Crocian one. The so-called "third phase" of development of his thought (to which he alludes in his "self-criticism") is nothing other than the natural evolution of the first two: in the third there is no "repudiation" of Crocian philosophy, in that in precedence there had been no real "adherence". Even though he has never been a follower of Croce, Zhu Guangqian has ended up nonetheless becoming a populariser of his thought. Paradoxically, this happened so that he could all the better take his distance from Croce's thought, gradually defining and clarifying the limits of his alleged youthful "Crocianism". <>

TREATISE ON AWAKENING MAHĀYĀNA FAITH edited and translated by John Jorgensen, Dan Lusthaus, John Makeham, Mark Strange [Oxford Chinese Thought, Oxford University Press, 9780190297701]

Dasheng qixin lun, or *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* , has been one of the most important texts of East Asian Buddhism since it first appeared in sixth-century China. It outlines the initial steps a Mahāyāna Buddhist needs to take to reach enlightenment, beginning with the conviction that the Mahāyāna path is correct and worth pursuing. The *Treatise* addresses many of the doctrines central to various Buddhist teachings in China between the fifth and seventh centuries, attempting to reconcile seemingly contradictory ideas in Buddhist texts introduced from India. It provided a model for later schools to harmonize teachings and sustain the idea that, despite different approaches, there was only one doctrine, or Dharma. It profoundly shaped the doctrines and practices of the major schools of Chinese Buddhism: Chan, Tiantai, Huayan, and to a lesser extent Pure Land.
It quickly became a shared resource for East Asian philosophers and students of Buddhist thought.

Drawing on the historical and intellectual contexts of *Treatise*'s composition and paying sustained attention to its interpretation in early commentaries, this new annotated translation of the classic, makes its ideas available to English readers like never before. The introduction orients readers to the main topics taken up in the *Treatise* and gives a comprehensive historical and intellectual grounding to the text. This volume marks a major advance in studies of the *Treatise*, bringing to light new interpretations and themes of the text.

Review

"This Oxford translation is thus a timely and long-awaited event in the field. It is well informed with current research, and well designed in its presentation of the important issues of the treatise; it is lucid in language, and explains difficult concepts and complex background in an in-depth, well-organized, and accessible way; it is thoroughly annotated, providing detailed discussions and explanations to almost all problems in the text. Thus marked by erudition, insightfulness, and clarity, this translation -- despite differences in the understanding of individual details -- makes an important contribution to the study of the treatise as well as Buddhist and East Asian philosophy, and will find its place on the bookshelves of all those in the field for years to come." -- Tao Jin, *H-Buddhism*

"This belongs in every Buddhological collection." -- Lukas Pokorny, *Religious Studies Review*

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Appearing in sixth-century China, the Dasheng qixin lun, Treatise on Awakening Maháyána Faith, has been one of the most important texts of East Asian Buddhism between the late sixth century—soon after it started to circulate—and the present. Conceptual structures derived from the Treatise became a shared resource for East Asian philosophers and religious theorists over centuries. Over three hundred commentaries were written on it in East Asia before 1900. It was crucial in the development of the Sinitic Buddhist schools of Huayan and Chan (Japanese Zen) and had some importance in Tiantai and Pure Land. The text was attractive because it was concise and relatively comprehensive. It seemed to resolve tensions and disparities between competing forms of Buddhist doctrine and practice, providing a model for later schools to harmonize teachings and sustain the idea that, despite different approaches, there was only one doctrine, or Dharma. It provided a theoretical basis for practice and stressed the importance of faith for beginners or those not yet committed to Maháyána Buddhism. <>

THE AWAKENING OF FAITH AND NEW CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY edited by John Makeham [Series: East Asian Buddhist Philosophy, Brill, 9789004471238]

This innovative volume demonstrates how and to what ends the writings of Xiong Shili, Ma Yifu, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan adopted and repurposed conceptual models derived from the Buddhist text **TREATISE ON AWAKENING MAHĀYĀNA FAITH**. It shows which of the philosophical positions defended by these New Confucian philosophers were developed and sustained through engagement with the critical challenges advanced by scholars who attacked the Treatise. It also examines the extent to which twentieth-century New Confucians were aware of their intellectual debt to the Treatise and explains how they reconciled this awareness with their Confucian identity.

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In China, and indeed throughout much of the world, Confucianism is typically presented as an expression of a native system of ideas and values, developed independent of external cultural influences over two thousand years. It is privileged as the true representation of Chinese cultural ideals and values, and an integral part of traditional Chinese social and cultural identity. Despite being vilified for much of the twentieth century, over the past three decades various aspects of Confucianism have been rehabilitated. Diverse interest groups both within and outside the mainland Chinese academy have favored Confucianism over other forms of traditional thought and philosophy, touting it as the principal exemplar of indigenous Chinese thought and values and so best suited to nation- and state-building. Buddhism is excluded on the grounds that it is a foreign import – despite having first been introduced into China two thousand years ago and subsequently having shaped the development of indigenous Chinese traditions of religion, philosophy, art and literature. This exclusive privileging of Confucianism feeds a reductionist assumption that Confucian philosophy is a hermetically sealed tradition that can be understood and adjudicated only by reference to its own "internal" norms and premises. But to regard Confucian philosophy this way is to ignore the vital contribution that Buddhist thought has made to the development of Confucian philosophy. One consequence of this is that the intellectual constitution of the main exemplar of modern Chinese philosophy, so-called New Confucianism, continues to be misrepresented, both in China and beyond.

New Confucianism is a modern neo-conservative philosophical movement, with religious overtones, and the most successful form of philosophical appropriation, reinvention and creative transformation of "Confucianism" in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan since the 1970s. Representative first and second generation New Confucian thinkers – Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883–1967), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) – were clearly cognizant of their engagement with a broad range of Buddhist themes and constructs, which they integrated into conceptual hierarchies designed to privilege Confucian values. Working from the premise that key New Confucian philosophical ideas and constructs are the product of a sustained engagement with Buddhist thought, the broad aim of the research project that led to this present volume was to identify the role that one of the most important texts in East Asian Buddhism, the *Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論 (Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith) (hereafter, *Treatise*), played in that engagement. The findings of that research, as represented in this volume, set out the arguments and evidence needed to explain how the *Treatise* features in the constitution of New Confucian philosophy, as evidenced in the writings of the above four New Confucian philosophers. It does this by pursuing three objectives: (1) demonstrating how and to what ends conceptual models derived from the *Treatise* were adopted and repurposed in those writings; (2) showing which of the philosophical positions defended by the New Confucians were developed and sustained through engagement with the critical challenges advanced by scholars who attacked the *Treatise*; and (3) examining the extent to which twentieth-century New Confucians were aware of their intellectual debt to the *Treatise* and explaining how they reconciled this with their Confucian identity.

The Treatise

Before introducing some of the key doctrinal issues concerning the *Treatise* that became the focus of ongoing discussion and controversy in twentieth-century China, a short introduction to the *Treatise* itself is in order. Appearing in sixth-century China, the *Treatise* purports to be a translation of an Indian text but the weight of modern scholarly opinion is that it is a work of Chinese not Indian provenance.[2] Addressing the problems of why it is so difficult to attain buddhahood and why so few are aware of their inherent buddha-nature, the *Treatise* states that it is aimed at novice Buddhists and was composed in order to explain the importance of faith in the Mahāyāna path and how to develop it. "This text is about the first steps a Mahāyāna Buddhist needs to take, namely an initiation of faith, a conviction that Mahāyāna teachings are correct and effective and therefore should be practiced. Without this faith, there would be no grounds for practice. The *Treatise* outlines a theoretical framework of the psychological mechanisms that enable a deluded person to become enlightened." The *Treatise* provides a concise restatement of the complexities of the ten-stage path of bodhisattva (enlightened being) practice in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which enables deluded beings to free themselves from their false perceptions and suffering. The text's title, *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith*, refers to the awakening of an aspiration to enter this path.

One reason for the popularity of the *Treatise* is its compelling vision of how to realize why we are deluded and then follow a path to actualize our inherent buddhahood. Another reason for its popularity is that it succinctly discusses many of the doctrines of greatest importance to Buddhists in China between the fourth and sixth centuries in a way that reconciles seemingly contradictory ideas in Buddhist texts introduced from India. Specifically, it explores why it is that most beings are enmeshed in delusion, given that the mind is inherently awakened, or originally enlightened (*benjue* 本覺), in the sense of being self-illuminating, like a mirror. The text attempts to guide the novice towards its soteriological goal by means of a number of strategies. One key strategy is via a monism that is deployed to show the pernicious effects of, but also the illusory nature of, ignorance.

One Mind, Two Gateways

As a system of thought that blossomed in China between the fifth and seventh centuries, the Tathāgatagarbha tradition within Mahāyāna Buddhism is particularly associated with a cluster of texts in which the *tathāgatagarbha* (*rulaizang* 如來藏) doctrine is central. *Tathāgatagarbha* means the repository of a buddha. The *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine is the idea that buddha-nature exists within all sentient beings but is concealed due to ignorance. In East Asia, one of the key texts in this tradition is the *Treatise*. The *Treatise* presents the "one mind" (*yixin* 一心) as the ultimate source of reality. The one mind has two modalities or aspects, which the text calls gateways, and these contain all dharmas, all phenomena, conditioned (existence that is subject to determination by the laws of cause and effect) and unconditioned.

> There are two gateways based on the dharma of the one mind. What are they? The first is the gateway of the mind as suchness. The second is the gateway of the mind as arising and ceasing. Each of these two gateways contains all dharmas. Why? Because these two gateways are not separate from one another.
> 依一心法，有二種門。云何為二？一者、心真如門，二者、心生滅門。是二種 門皆各總攝一切法。此義云何？以是二門不相離故。

The gateway of the mind as suchness[6] (*xin zhenru men* 心真如門) is the true mind – unchanging, eternal, and pure. It is identified as the *tathāgatabarbha*, the repository of a buddha, or buddha-nature. The gateway of the mind as arising and ceasing (*xin shengmie men* 心生滅門) is cyclic existence (*saṃsāra*) in which the mind's propensity to awaken struggles against the mental and physical behaviors that arise from the mind's defilement by ignorance. It is identified with the eighth or storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*; *alaiye shi* 阿賴耶識).

Both the mind as suchness and the arising and ceasing mind are ultimately the one mind but, because ignorance obscures realization of the one mind, deluded beings create false perceptions and so become mired in suffering. The arising and ceasing mind then generates misguided conceptual distinctions, which in turn provide new conditions for the ongoing defilement of the mind and for the suffering caused by taking the wrong sorts of actions:

> Because it is based on the dharma of suchness, there is ignorance. Because there are the defiled dharmas of ignorance as causes, they then habituate suchness. Because of this habituation, there is the false mind and, since there is the false mind, it then habituates ignorance. Because [the false mind] does not fully discern the dharma of suchness, it is non-awakened and so conceiving arises, presenting false perceptual fields. Because there are the defiled dharmas of false perceptual fields as conditions, these then habituate the false mind, so that conceiving and attachments generate all kinds of karmic action and one experiences all the sufferings of body and mind.
> 以依真如法故，有於無明。以有無明染法因故即熏習真如；以熏習故則有妄心，以有妄心即熏習無明。不了真如法故，不覺念起現妄境界。以有妄境界染法緣故，即熏習妄心，令其念著造種種業，受於一切身心等苦。

The *Treatise* presents the relationship between the two gateways as one in which the unconditioned (suchness, *tathāgatabarbha*) combines or integrates with (*hehe* 和合) the gateway of the mind of arising and ceasing (the adaption of *tathāgatagarbha* to phenomenal conditions) to constitute the *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness), even as the unconditioned *simultaneously extends beyond* the gateway of the mind of arising and ceasing, just as wetness exists in all waves but simultaneously extends beyond any particular wave:

> The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because it is based on the *tathāgatagarbha*. That is to say, non-arising and non-ceasing combine with arising and ceasing: they are neither the same nor different. This is called the "*ālaya* consciousness" [*ālayavijñāna*; storehouse consciousness].
> 心生滅者，依如來藏故有生滅心。所謂不生不滅與生滅和合，非一非異。名為阿梨耶識。

For the *Treatise*, the main import of the relationship between the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* is that the *tathāgatagarbha* provides the ontological grounding for the *ālayavijñāna* and the *ālayavijñāna* represents the adaptation of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the mind of suchness, to phenomenal conditions. Crucially, *tathāgatagarbha*/suchness – the unconditioned – remains constant, unchanged, undiminished and undefiled by these phenomenal conditions.

Above and beyond this, however, the *Treatise* stands apart from other texts associated with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition by claiming that unconditioned suchness serves as the foundation of the phenomenal world and is able to cause conditioned dharmas (*youwei fa* 有為法) to be generated and also by presenting suchness as somehow being permeated (*xunxi* 熏習) by ignorance, *that the unconditioned is acted upon casually by the conditioned*. The *Treatise* also employs the metaphor of the ocean water and waves to explain how the unconditioned – suchness, *tathāgatagarbha* – can be acted upon casually by the conditioned:

> Because all the characteristics of the mind and consciousnesses are ignorance[11] and, since the characteristic of ignorance is not separate from the nature of awakening, the mind and consciousnesses are indestructible and destructible. This is like the great ocean, where water moves in waves due to the wind. The characteristics of the water and the wind [as waves] are not separate from one another. Since it is not in the nature of water to move [by itself], the characteristic of movement will cease if the wind ceases, without the wetness ever being destroyed.

> 以一切心識之相皆是無明，無明之相，不離覺性，非可壞，非不可壞。如大海水因風波動，水相風相不相捨離，而水非動性，若風止滅動相則滅，濕性不壞故。

Even though the wind stirs up the phenomenal appearance of waves and motion, the wet nature of the ocean is not affected and does not change, whether the wind blows or does not blow. Even though the deluded mind is stirred into erroneous distinction making, in fact, its self-nature – inherent enlightenment, suchness – is constant and unchanging. Only ignorance prevents us from realizing this.

Revival of the **Treatise**

By 1900, over three hundred East Asian commentaries had been written on the *Treatise*. Curiously, however, as John Jorgensen points out in the opening chapter, in China during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), only one commentary was written on the *Treatise* (in 1687) and even that commentary attracted little attention. Indeed, the *Treatise* itself seems to have languished until Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911) devoted significant energies in the 1880s and 1890s to promote the creation of an Aśvaghoṣa (Maming 馬鳴) school that combined the *Treatise* with Yogācāra doctrines and Pure Land practice, in order to revive Buddhism.

As it happens, a fresh perspective on the *Treatise* occurred about the same time in Japan. Prompted by the Meiji regime's persecution of Buddhism between 1868 and 1872, many Japanese monks and laymen participated in creating a new Buddhism (*shin Bukkyō*) that was supposed to be scientific and united, a "protestant" Buddhism. They adopted the *Treatise* as the "fundamental essence" of Buddhism because it was thought acceptable to all Japanese Buddhists, and because it was systematic and succinct. In 1879, at the only university in Japan, Tokyo University, the one-time Sōtō Zen monk, Hara Tanzan 原坦山 (1819–1892), began to use the *Treatise* as the text for a course on Indian Buddhist philosophy.

By the early twentieth century, however, both in China and Japan, the *Treatise* became the focus of sustained controversy. Its critics regarded it as inimical to Buddhism because at best it conflated contradictory doctrines, and at worst introduced non-Buddhist ideas. It was in this context of sustained controversy that the *Treatise* became integral to the development of New Confucian philosophy over much of the twentieth century.

As Jorgensen also points out in the opening chapter of this volume, from the very beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese scholars tended to discuss the *Treatise* in terms of doctrine rather than history and provenance. Thus, despite the fact that in 1922 Yang Wenhui's former student and political activist, Liang Qichao 梁啓超 (1873–1929), had introduced to a Chinese readership earlier Japanese debates on the provenance of the *Treatise*, "the issue of provenance was largely avoided by Chinese intellectuals until the late 1940s and early 1950s." While drawing attention to the important role that Chinese intellectuals, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869–1936) and Liang Qichao, respectively, had played in introducing Japanese scholarship on the provenance debate to a Chinese audience, in his chapter in this volume, Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國 similarly emphasizes the significance of the philosophical debate that ensued from discussions of the *Treatise*, rather that the provenance issue *per se*.

The **Treatise** and Yogācāra

For opponents and critics alike, the *Treatise*'s relationship with Yogācāra continued to be a focus of attention. As noted above, Yang Wenhui had promoted a synthesis of Yogācāra and the *Treatise* as part of his project to build a grand synthesis of Chinese Buddhism, especially Yogācāra, Huayan and Tiantai. In turn, Jorgensen relates, Zhang Taiyan, a former pupil of Yang Wenhui, used "the Yogācāra teachings of the Three Natures (*san xing* 三性; *trisvabhāva*) and passages from the *Treatise*" to argue

that "Buddhism was the religion that had the morality – as evidenced by such practices as the altruistic bodhisattva [being that pursues awakening] vow to save all beings – necessary for a social revolution."

Not all of Yang's students, however, were so sanguine about drawing positive associations between the *Treatise* and Yogācāra doctrine. The most prominent critic was Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943), head of the China Institute of Inner Learning (Zhina Neixue yuan 支那內學院), who was supported by his own students, Lü Cheng 呂澂 (1896–1989) and Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1897–1964). They variously criticized the *Treatise* on that grounds that it violated cardinal Yogācāra principles, that it was not a Mahāyāna text, that its teaching resembled those of the Vibhajyavādins, and that it was akin to an inferior form of non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya. Specific criticisms focused on charges that the *Treatise* violated the laws of causation by positing suchness (*zhenru* 真如)/*tathāgatagarbha* as an ontological reality (*ti* 體), without beginning or end, that gives rise to all phenomena; and that even though it invoked the notion of perfuming (*xunxi* 熏習; habituation; permeation) it lacked the means to effect such perfuming, namely seeds as causes. They concluded that the *Treatise* provided no mechanism for salvation and had led to many abuses in Chinese Buddhism.

In positing suchness/*tathāgatagarbha* as the ontological basis that gives rise to all phenomena, the China Institute of Inner Learning critics maintained the *Treatise* had violated the Yogācāra tenet that a cause can produce a result only of its own kind, which then becomes the cause of another like result. And in maintaining that one dharma (here referring to uniform, undifferentiated suchness) produces many dharmas, the *Treatise* further contravened the principle that the result must be commensurate with the cause. Moreover, in treating suchness as an uncaused cause, this was tantamount to rendering suchness akin to non-Buddhist constructs such as Brahman, *prakṛti* (*shixing* 世性; primal matter), or *ātman* (*wo*).

In invoking the notion of perfuming, the critics charged that not only did the *Treatise* lack the notion of seeds, moreover, for suchness to be able to perfume ignorance or vice versa, requires that both are present simultaneously, yet, if that were the case, it would violate the principle that purity and impurity cannot co-exist. As for the *Treatise*'s claim that suchness can perfume ignorance and that ignorance can perfume suchness, critics appealed to the authority of Xuanzang's 玄奘 (602?–644) *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), a foundational text of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition, which maintains that the only mental activity that is perfumable is the storehouse consciousness and the only mental activities capable of perfuming it are the first seven consciousnesses and their mental associates.

One of the earliest to respond to the China Institute of Inner Learning critics was another of Yang's prominent former students, the cleric Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947). In an effort to realize Yang's grand synthesizing project, Taixu wrote a commentary on the *Treatise* drawing on *Cheng weishi lun*. Taixu's tactic was to respond to the criticisms by also appealing to Yogācāra teachings and concepts, one prominent example being the Four Conditions (*si yuan* 四緣), which are central to Yogācāra accounts of causality – in particular for explaining the causal relationship between seeds, consciousness, and cognitive objects.

As set out in *Cheng weishi lun*, the Four Conditions are: the causal condition (*yinyuan* 因緣; *hetu-pratyaya*); the condition for the causal support of consciousness (*suoyuan yuan* 所緣緣; *ālambana-pratyaya*); the continuous sequence of sameness condition (*deng wujian yuan* 等無間緣 *samanantara-pratyaya*), and the contributory factors as condition (*zeng shang yuan* 增上緣; *adhipati-pratyaya*). The "continuous sequence of sameness condition" refers to the apparent continuity in consciousness of

the previous thought-moment with the following thought-moment. In response to the criticism that even though the *Treatise* deployed the notion of perfuming, it lacked the means to effect such perfuming, Taixu introduced the continuous sequence of sameness condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) in his discussion of the role of the seventh consciousness or mentation (*yi* 意; *manas*) in the *Treatise*, a concept also of central importance in Yogācāra. He argued that it is this uninterrupted succession that provides the mechanism to move from being defiled to being undefiled, once the obstructing *manas* is removed. Elsewhere, he also claimed that Yogācāra accounts for perfuming only in terms of the causal condition (*hetu-pratyaya*), whereas the *Treatise* accounts for perfuming in terms of the other three conditions as well, thus providing a more comprehensive account by elucidating the role of the full set of conditions.

This initial period of intense debate about the *Treatise*, in which Yogācāra figured as the arbiter of doctrinal authority, had eased by about 1926, but as Lin Chen-kuo describes in his chapter in this volume, "this long running debate [subsequently] included the exchanges between Xiong [Shili] and Lü [Cheng] in 1943, and it was revived again in the 1960s and 1970s by Xiong's disciple Mou Zongsan 牟宗三." Philosophical positions defended by New Confucians such as Xiong and Mou, in particular, were developed and sustained by engaging with the critical challenges advanced by the China Institute of Inner Learning partisans, for whom the *Treatise* was as a consistent target of scholarly criticism.

Xiong Shili and the **Treatise**

Xiong Shili began his Yogācāra studies at Ouyang's China Institute of Inner Learning in 1920 and two years later was appointed to teach Yogācāra philosophy in the Philosophy Department of Peking University, where he taught for two years. He subsequently led a peripatetic and frequently interrupted academic career. Over the thirty-year period, from the early 1920s to the early 1950s, he moved from an uncritical belief in Yogācāra philosophy to a position where it served as a foil for his own constructive philosophy. His criticisms of Yogācāra grew progressively more trenchant over this period.

Xiong Shili is the subject of chapters 3, 4, and 5. Taken together, the chapters are broadly chronological. Sang Yu's 桑雨 chapter, "The Role of the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* in the Development of Xiong Shili's *Ti-yong* Metaphysics," focuses on the period between the early 1920s and the mid-1930s. In chapter 4, "Xiong Shili and the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* as Revealed in *Record to Destroy Confusion and Make My Tenets Explicit*," I examine Xiong's 1950 reflection on the achievements of his 1944 *Xin weishi lun* 新唯識論 (New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness) (vernacular edition). The period covered in chapter 5, "Xiong Shili's *Ti-yong* Metaphysics and the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith*'s 'One Mind, Two Gateways' Paradigm," spans the 1930s to the early 1960s, in which the 1950s marks a watershed in Xiong's ontological views.

Sang Yu seeks to show that Xiong's *ti-yong* 體用 (reality and function) metaphysics is isomorphic with key elements of the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" model. Although Xiong had cited the *Treatise* already in 1913, Sang identifies his 1923 work, *Weishixue gailun* 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning) as evidencing a limited, yet significant, appropriation of certain ideas that originated in the *Treatise*. For example, on the one hand, Xiong presented suchness as an unconditioned dharma, yet, on the other hand, he deemed it to be able to act on phenomena, to have function, just as material dharmas have the function of offering resistance (如色即礙用). While clearly deviating from standard Yogācāra views about unconditioned suchness, Xiong's position is consistent with the account in the *Treatise* that unconditioned suchness serves as the foundation of the phenomenal world and is able to cause conditioned dharmas to be generated. This is precisely

the kind of view that the China Institute of Inner Learning camp severely criticized. As John Jorgensen relates, Ouyang's first resolution in his *Weishi jueze tan* 唯識抉擇談 (Talks on the Resolutions of Nothing but Consciousness; 1922) had asserted that reality (*ti*) and function (*yong*) correspond to the unconditioned (suchness and nirvana) and the conditioned (correct cognition and *bodhi*), respectively. Reality neither arises nor ceases; only function arises and ceases. "The trouble with the *Treatise*, according to Ouyang, is that it 'regarded *ti* as being function (*yong*), so that the nature of *ti* is confused [with function], and so the nature of function is likewise lost.'" (是則以體為用，體性既淆，用性亦失。)

Sang Yu finds additional evidence in *Weishixue gailun* of Xiong's appropriation of ideas and models in the *Treatise*, where Xiong characterizes Reality (suchness) as unchanging/constant (*bubian* 不變) and Function (consciousness) as transforming/changing (*bian* 變) – the transformation of consciousness into the phenomenal world. She shows that he posited suchness/*tathāgatagarbha* as the basis for the existence of consciousness from which the phenomenal world is generated, the same thesis that is advanced in the *Treatise*: "The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because it is based on the *tathāgatagarbha*." Moreover, in his 1932 *Xin weishi lun*, Xiong distinguished between Reality as "the true mind" (*zhenxin* 真心) and its Function as "false/deluded consciousness" (*wangshi* 妄識) – the mind that is intermixed with habitual defilements (*xiran* 習染) and grasps cognitive objects. In that same work, Xiong also characterized the mind as simultaneously quiescent (*jing* 靜) and moving (*dong* 動). Sang Yu presents both examples as evidence of a strong isomorphism with the *Treatise*'s one mind, two gateways model: the mind as suchness and the mind as arising and ceasing.

Further, in *Xin weishi lun*, "when Xiong presented Reality as possessing an aspect of activity, he also considered it to have an intimate relationship with the phenomenal world. Indeed, Xiong's reference to the movement of Reality/the mind was with respect to its illusory manifestation, namely, Function/the phenomenal world; and his reference to its quiescence was with respect to its unchanging nature, or Reality itself…. Movement is quiescence, and Function is Reality. It is precisely because phenomena do not have self-nature that they do not differ ontologically from Reality." Sang concludes that Xiong's thesis is consistent with the *Treatise*'s notion that "The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because it is based on the *tathāgatagarbha*. That is to say, non-arising and non-ceasing combine with arising and ceasing: they are neither the same nor different." She explains that although the various phenomena seem to change and move, they actually are unreal, devoid of self-nature. Supporting the illusory phenomenal appearances is the mind as suchness, which neither changes nor moves. "To say that 'non-arising and non-ceasing' and 'arising and ceasing' are neither the same nor different is to say that suchness merges seamlessly with phenomena while remaining unchanged and undefiled."

In chapter 4, I examine Xiong's 1950 work, *Cui huo xian zong ji* 摧惑顯宗記 (Record to Destroy Confusion and Make My Tenets Explicit), which was written as a response to cleric Yinshun's 印順 (1906–2005) critical book-length review of Xiong's 1944 magnum opus *Xin weishi lun* (vernacular edition). *Cui huo xian zong ji* represents a unique retrospective summation of what Xiong himself then regarded as the most important philosophical accomplishment of the *New Treatise*; a work in which he was "finally able to bring to completion that which the Mahāyāna bodhisattvas had left uncompleted." In providing this summation, he also sets out his criticisms of both the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra traditions of Buddhist thought – which, following Buddhist doxographers in the Tang period, he refers to as calls the Emptiness school (*kong zong* 空宗) and the Existence school (*you zong* 有宗). Both schools were, however, also extremely important in Xiong Shili's intellectual development, as Xiong himself acknowledges in the opening pages of his 1958 publication, *Ti yong lun* 體用論 (Treatise on *Ti* and *Yong*): "My thought has certainly benefited from the inspiration I have

received from both the Emptiness and the Existence schools. If I had not started with these two schools, I would not have come to understand how to think for myself, and so what could I have followed in order to awaken and enter the *Book of Transformation* [*Book of Change*]?" (余之 思想確受空有二宗啟發之益。倘不由二宗入手，將不知自用思，何從悟入 《變經》乎？)

As with his former teacher, Ouyang Jingwu, Xiong also discussed the unconditioned and conditioned in terms of *ti* and *yong*, respectively. In addition, Xiong used "the nature" (*xing* 性; short for *faxing* 法性; dharma nature: the true nature of reality; suchness) and characteristics (*xiang* 相; short for *faxiang* 法相; dharma characteristics: the phenomenal marks of dharmas) to articulate this distinction. He directed two main criticisms at the Emptiness school. The first is that it was prone to attachment to the concept of emptiness (*kong* 空). The second, and more fundamental, criticism is that it failed to maintain the "non-duality of intrinsic reality and function" (*ti yong bu er* 體用不二) – the core metaphysical tenet of Xiong's mature philosophy – owing to the powerful Buddhist preference to distinguish the unconditioned strictly from the conditioned. He was also critical of the Emptiness school for failing to accept that Reality (the unconditioned) can flow and actively create. For Xiong, the Emptiness school's refusal to accept that Reality is causal not only implies that some other ontological support must therefore undergird or give rise to the phenomenal world of conditioned dharmas, moreover, in doing so, it also sunders the non-duality of *ti* and *yong*.

In contrast, he finds that the Existence school's doctrine of the Three Natures (*san xing* 三性 ; *trisvabhāva*) provided a valuable corrective to the excesses of the Emptiness school's obsessive focus on emptiness. Xiong maintained that the Three Natures doctrine supports the thesis that although dharmas have no *self*-nature (*zixing* 自性) they do have *true* nature (*shixing* 實性), just as hemp fiber is the true nature of rope, the latter having no self-nature. He argues that this true nature (hemp fiber) is not separated from dependently originated characteristics (the rope), and by *removing attachment* to these characteristics the true nature can be discerned therein. He also referred to this as "seeing the nature in characteristics" (於相而見性). For Xiong, this is his alternative way of making the point that the unconditioned and the conditioned, or *ti* and *yong*, are not separated from one another, and that the conditioned (*yong*) plays the heuristic role of revealing the unconditioned (*ti*).

In the end, however, Xiong concluded that just as with the Emptiness school, the Existence School also denied that the dharma-nature, the unconditioned, can arise, change, flow or be causal. His real complaint is that dharma nature (or *ti*) and dharma characteristics (or *yong*) thus become severed, "and so it cannot be said that *yong* is the manifestation of *ti*." This sundering of *ti* and *yong* is exactly the same complaint that Xiong directed at the Emptiness School.

Having refuted the shortcomings of both the Existence and Emptiness schools, Xiong then praised his own *New Treatise* (1944) as having addressed these shortcomings, thus preserving both *ti* and *yong*, the noumenal and the phenomenal. He describes a key moment in his own path of learning when he achieved "tacit realization of the True Realm" (默會於真際), a realm he characterizes as simultaneously transforming and tranquil: "It has always been empty tranquillity, and yet it has the continuity of unceasing production and reproduction, transformation and retransformation" (本來空寂，而有生生化化不息之繼). In then proceeding to deny that "empty tranquillity" is not an empty void but rather is replete with the four qualities of "constant, blissful, Self, and pure" (常樂我淨), Xiong reveals that his own doctrinal position is squarely aligned with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, where these formulaic four qualities are used to describe suchness, which is also equated with the *tathāgatagarbha*. It also happens that the *Treatise* provides a paradigmatic expression of this formula and its connection with suchness, with the *tathāgatagarbha*. Although Xiong did not reference the *Treatise* in *Cui huo xian zong ji*, elsewhere in that work he did explicitly

align his *New Treatise* with the so-called Truly Constant Mind (*zhenchang xin* 真常心) tradition, a modern epithet for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, stating that the truly constant mind "is not something different from what I call innate wisdom (*xingzhi* 性智) or inherent mind (*benxin* 本心) in the *New Treatise*." "Innate wisdom" is a term Xiong coined in the *New Treatise* (1944) to refer to the awakening that one's inherent mind is nothing other than intrinsic reality. His description of it as an awareness or awakening (*juewu* 覺悟) that has always been self-knowing and self-aware (他元是自明自覺) has unambiguous resonances with the idea of inherent awakening (*benjue* 本覺), a key concept in the *Treatise*.

The chapter also draws attention to the high degree of consistency between Xiong's thesis that "Having entered ultimate truth, there are no characteristics to become attached to (there have never been any phenomenal characteris- tics nor [mental] characteristics of time and space); according with conventional truth, characteristics are not rejected" and the description of "explicit revelation" in the so-called third teaching identified by Huayan and Chan master Zongmi 宗密 (784–841) in his tripartite scheme of doctrinal classification, the Teaching That Explicitly Reveals That the True Mind is the Nature (顯示真心即性教), a teaching that Zongmi associates with a concentration of texts associated with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, including the *Treatise*. The representative doctrine of this third teaching is that the mind of sentient beings is buddha-nature, the *tathāgatagarbha*.

The final part of the chapter argues that Xiong was attracted to the *Treatise* because it countenances the idea that the unconditioned can actively operate within the conditioned, that the non-arising and non-ceasing aspect of the one mind can combine or merge (*hehe* 和合) with the arising and ceasing aspect of the one mind to constitute the *ālayavijñāna*. He proclaimed that the import of *Treatise*'s notion of *hehe* "is deep, broad and boundless" because it vouchsafes the non-duality of the unconditioned and the conditioned, *ti* and *yong*. Moreover, he concluded, it was able to do this precisely because it is *not* an Indian Buddhist text, but a hybrid text that integrates native Chinese and Indian Buddhist thought.

In chapter 5, I set out to show how Xiong drew on Huayan philosophical resources, and later on Tiantai philosophical resources, to articulate changing formulations and refinements of his core metaphysical tenet of the "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*." These resources were grounded in accounts of the relationship between *li* 理 (principle/pattern) and *shi* 事 (phenomena). The first of the chapter's two parts demonstrates that by the mid-1930s Xiong had begun actively to drew on the Huayan doctrine of the non-obstruction of *li* and phenomena (*li shi wu ai* 理事無礙), in particular the idea that *li* pervades all phenomena (*li bian yu shi* 理遍於事) and all phenomena pervade *li* (*shi bian yu li* 事遍於理), to articulate the "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*." This is evident in his increasing reference to "subsuming function into Reality" (*she yong gui ti* 攝用歸體), and "subsuming Reality into function" (*she ti gui yong* 攝體歸用; *rong ti gui yong* 融體歸用). One of Xiong's favorite metaphors to describe these two sets of relations is the ocean and the myriad waves. When the intersubsumption of the parts (function) is seen to reveal the whole (Reality), just as the waves reveals the ocean, then this represents the non-duality of *ti* and *yong* (體用不二) as viewed from the perspective of subsuming function into Reality (攝用歸體); when the whole is seen to manifest as the parts, just as the ocean is manifest as the waves, then this represents the non-duality of *ti* and *yong* as viewed from the perspective of subsuming Reality into function (攝體歸用). Despite this seeming evenhandedness, in Xiong's 1944 edition of the *New Treatise* we see a recurrent bias towards *ti*, in which *yong* is subsumed into *ti* (攝用歸體), reinforced by the persistent claim that phenomena lack self-nature. This bias towards *ti* is also evident in the formula "to reveal *ti* through *yong*" (*ji yong xian ti* 即用顯體), where the goal is to realize *ti* not *yong*. *Ti* has no characteristics that enable it to be directly

revealed and so the characteristics of *yong*/phenomena serve to reveal *ti* indirectly. Because *yong* is nothing more than the expression of *ti* and not something real in and of itself, *yong* must be subsumed within, collapsed into *ti*. This ontological privileging of *ti* over *yong* is consistent with the position of Huayan theorists such as Fazang 法藏 (643–712), who had posited an irreversible structural *dependence* priority of *shi* upon *li*.

In the pre-1950 period, Xiong had maintained that, ontologically, *yong* depends on *ti*, just as an image depends on the brightness of the mirror. That dependence relationship is unilateral. By 1958, Xiong not only insisted on the ontological parity between *ti* and *yong*, but also on their ontological identity. This change represents a clear rejection of the Huayan privileging of *li* over *shi*, of *ti* over *yong*. It is also an unequivocal rejection of the Madhyamaka-inspired notion of "refuting [dharma] characteristics in order to reveal the [dharma] nature" (破相現性). The second part of this chapter argues that Xiong's late 1950s–early 1960s account of the non-duality of *ti* and *yong* thesis can be seen to be a creative appropriation of the Tiantai Three Truths doctrine and represents the final theoretical elaboration of his "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*" thesis. This elaboration was the culmination of rejecting both Yogācāran and Mādhyamikan views on the relationship between dharma nature (the unconditioned) and dharma characteristics (the conditioned), first in favor of Huayan accounts of the relationship between *li* and *shi* and subsequently Tiantai accounts of that relationship, both of which, in turn, were philosophical responses to, and developments of, the *Treatise*'s account of the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned, as encapsulated in its "one mind, two gateways" model. Lin Chen-kuo is no doubt correct to conclude that Xiong's "Confucian identity is constructed through mirrors of language among which Buddhist language plays the most significant role." The main qualification I would make to Lin's assessment is that Xiong's Confucian identity is also grounded in problematics deeply informed by the traditions of Sinitic Buddhist philosophy, and that doctrinal differences both within and between those traditions provided rich conceptual resources he creatively appropriated to serve his own philosophical agenda.

Ma Yifu and the **Treatise**

Xiong Shili's friend and mentor, Ma Yifu, was an extremely eclectic scholar and philosopher, and also a prolific system builder, liberally applying his intertextual hermeneutic strategies to Buddhist and Confucian texts. In his detailed account of Ma Yifu in chapter 6 of this volume, Liu Leheng 劉樂恆 identifies both Yang Wenhui and the *Treatise* as having played the most direct and pivotal role in the formation of Ma's Buddhist thought: "Just as Yang Wenhui thought highly of the *Treatise* for its bridging of the Dharma Nature school and the Dharma Characteristics school, so too Ma Yifu emphasized the *Treatise* for its being able to reconcile the Emptiness school and the Huayan school." Curiously, Ma largely ignored the relationship between the *Treatise* and the Dharma Characteristics school (Yogācāra).

Liu characterizes Ma as a New Confucian who sought to reconcile and synthesize Confucian and Buddhist thought premised on the view that Confucian and Buddhist teachings share a common source, "seeing the nature" (*jian xing* 見性), which in turn amounts to discerning the "virtues of the nature" (*xingde* 性德). In Buddhist terms, Ma characterizes the virtues of the nature using such apophatic descriptions as not being subject to conditioned origination (dependent arising), as "being without that which they depend on" (*wudaixing* 無待性) and being "without falsehood" (*wuwangxing* 無妄性) – yet at the same time they have the quality of "being inherent" (*benjuxing* 本具性) and are "the true characteristic of dharmas" (*zhufa shixiang* 諸法 實相; i.e., suchness). In Confucian terms, the virtues of the nature are identified more specifically as humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety, wisdom, living up to one's word, sageliness, balance, and harmony, which, in turn, can all be subsumed under the overarching single "virtue of the nature," humaneness. This would

seem clearly to have been inspired by Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130–1200) account of the unity of the virtues, in which one cardinal virtue, that of humaneness, is foundational for a group of other cardinal virtues. This is perhaps not altogether surprising, given that Ma identified two Confucian traditions that were able to "see the nature," "return to the nature," and "fully develop the nature": the tradition of humaneness-based learning (*renxue* 仁學) established by Confucius and continued by Mencius; and the tradition of Song-Ming Principle-centered Learning (*lixue* 理學).

Ma saw himself as inheriting both traditions, which he sought to integrate and develop as his own self-styled Theory of the Six Arts (Liuyi lun 六藝論), which Liu Leheng identifies as the hallmark of Ma's New Confucian system of thought. For Ma, the "Theory of the Six Arts" has both an "intrinsic reality" (*ti* 體) aspect and a "function" (*yong* 用) aspect. The former refers to the "virtues of the nature" inherent in the human mind and the latter to the expression of the virtues of the nature. As Liu explains, the Six Arts can be construed both narrowly and broadly. "The narrow sense refers to the *Odes, Documents*, ritual texts, music texts, *Change*, and *Spring and Autumn Annals* as classical texts, whereas the broad sense refers to the methods of moral cultivation, which include all that is perceivable within human life as well as within heaven and earth…. Together, 'the intrinsic reality of the Six Arts' and 'the function of the Six Arts' are known as the 'Way of the Six Arts.'"

In turn, Ma's *ti-yong* structured Theory of the Six Arts replicates the structure of Zhang Zai's 張載 (1020–1077) and Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130–1200) thesis that "the mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions" (*xin tong xing qing* 心統性情). For Zhu Xi, the nature is the intrinsic reality of the mind and the emotions are the mind's function:

> The mind controls the person. As intrinsic reality, the mind is the nature; as function, the mind is the emotions.
> 心主於身，其所以為體者，性也；所以為用者，情也。
> "The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions." It is because of the mind that the nature and emotions are both subsequently perceived. The mind is intrinsic reality. When expressed outwardly this is called [the mind as] function. Mencius said: "The human mind is humaneness." He also talked of "the mind of pity and compassion." He thus applied the term "the mind" to both the nature and to the emotions. "The human mind is humaneness" is referring to the mind as intrinsic reality; "the mind of pity and compassion" is referring to the mind as func- tion. There must be intrinsic reality for subsequently there to be function. From this explanation we can see the meaning of "The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions."
> 「心統性情。」性情皆因心而後見。心是體，發於外謂之用。孟子曰:「仁，人心也。」又曰:「惻隱之心。」性情上都下箇「心」字。「仁人心也」，是說體；「惻隱之心」，是說用。必有體而後有用，可見「心統性情」之義。
> The mind has both an intrinsic reality aspect and a function aspect. Before it is outwardly expressed, this is the intrinsic reality aspect of the mind. Once it has been outwardly expressed then this is the function aspect of the mind. How could the mind possibly have a reference fixed exclusively to one or to the other?
> 心有體用。未發之前是心之體，已發之際乃心之用，如何指定說得！

For Zhu Xi, the mind is both the nature and the emotions; it is both the nature *as* intrinsic reality (體) *and* the emotions as function (用); it simultaneously comprises a *xing er shang* 形而上 (above form) aspect and a *xing er xia* 形而下 (within form) aspect.

In the same vein, as Liu Leheng relates, "The Way of each of the Six Arts is nurtured from the moral nature within the mind. Although this moral nature is concealed and not evident, the Six Arts … are manifest and not concealed. And precisely because the Way of each of the Six Arts is the outflowing and emerging expression of the moral nature of the mind, the moral nature within the mind is

'intrinsic reality' (*benti* 本體) and the Six Arts are the 'great function' that intrinsic reality gives appearance to." In turn, this functioning is expressed as "the emotions."

In order to strengthen and develop his account that the Six Arts can all be controlled by the one mind, Ma further maintained that the "mind unites/ controls the nature and the emotions" thesis and the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" doctrine are interconnected, identifying correspondences between "humaneness qua the mind" (*ren xin* 仁心) or "humaneness qua the nature" (*ren xing* 仁性) and the *Treatise*'s notion of "the mind as suchness" (*xin zhenru* 心真如). As Liu explains, for Ma, both humaneness qua the mind/nature and the mind as suchness are just different terms to describe the "virtue of the nature." "Moreover, what the Confucians refer to as 'the emotions' corresponds with the mind as arising and ceasing (*xin shengmie* 心生滅) in the *Treatise*. Just as the emotions are differentiated as good and bad, so too the mind as arising and ceasing has both an awakening aspect and a non-awakening aspect."

Ma also appropriated and adapted the *Treatise*'s notion of the Three Greats. Early in the *Treatise*, the author introduces two aspects of Mahāyāna: dharma and meaning. Dharma here refers to the mind of sentient beings. The meaning of Mahāyāna is revealed through the mind of sentient beings. The *Treatise* describes this in terms of intrinsic reality (*ti* 體), characteristics (*xiang* 相), and function (*yong* 用). These concepts are presented as the three "Greats" denoted by *mahā-* in the word Mahāyāna, "Great Vehicle" (*da sheng* 大乘). According to the *Treatise*:

> There are three "meanings" [of *mahā-*, "great", in the word Mahāyāna, "Great Vehicle"]. What are they? The first is that Mahāyāna's intrinsic reality is great because the suchness of all dharmas is uniform, neither increasing nor decreasing. The second is that its characteristics are great because the *tathāgatagarbha* is replete with countless merits. The third is that its functions are great because it is the producer of all good causes and effects, both mundane and supramundane. That is why Mahāyāna [the "Great Vehicle"] is that on which all buddhas have always ridden and why all bodhisattvas ride on this Dharma until they arrive at the level of *tathāgatas*.
> 所言義者，則有三種。云何為三？一者、體大，謂一切法真如平等不增減故。 二者、相大，謂如來藏具足無量性功德故。三者、用大，能生一切世間、出世 間善因果故。一切諸佛本所乘故，一切菩薩皆乘此法到如來地故。

The meaning of Mahāyāna is revealed through the mind of sentient beings, and the mind of sentient beings contains all dharmas, as well as the two gateways of the mind as suchness and the mind as arising and ceasing. The mind as suchness reveals the intrinsic reality of Mahāyāna directly and the mind as arising and ceasing reveals it indirectly through its characteristics and functions. These characteristics are associated with the countless merits of the *tathāgatagarbha*, and which are the innate qualities in the mind of all sentient beings – the qualities of buddhas. When suchness adapts to and accords with phenomenal reality, the functioning of the one mind is revealed.

As characterized by Liu, "The intrinsic reality of the Six Arts in its entirety is the unchanging virtue of the nature – this is 'its intrinsic reality is great.' The flow and growth of the characteristics of the virtues of the nature are the characteristic of change – this is 'its characteristics are great.' When the full complement of the characteristics of the virtues of the nature are revealed as the Way of the Six Arts – this is 'its function is great.'"

In drawing these correspondences, Ma was also seeking to bolster the theoretical basis for two of his other intertextual appropriations: (1) "the mind controls/combines the nature and the emotions"; and (2) the Three Changes (*san yi* 三易) in the *Yiwei: Qian zuodu* 易緯: 乾鑿度 (Apocryphon to the *Book of Change*: Opening the Laws of the Hexagram *Qian*): "non-change"

(*buyi* 不易), "change" (*bianyi* 變易) and "simplicity" (*jianyi* 簡易). Thus, on the one hand, Ma correlated "the nature" with "non-change," "the emotions" with "change," and "the mind controls/combines the nature and the emotions" with "simplicity." On the other hand, he also correlated non-change with "its intrinsic reality is great," change with "its characteristics are great," and simplicity with "its function is great."

Liu maintains that from Ma's perspective, a failure to integrate the Three Changes and the Three Greats, would have resulted in the meaning of Confucian teachings generally, and of the Three Changes specifically, being unable to be fully revealed. Moreover, "The other reason Ma Yifu used the integration of the Three Changes and the Three Greats to develop his theory of the Way of the Six Arts was in order to place particular emphasis on the aspect of 'its characteristics are great.' … He wanted to emphasize the characteristics of the virtues of the nature, particularly their qualities of vastness, immeasurability and boundlessness." The final example that Liu identifies of Ma's appropriation of concepts and models in the *Treatise* concerns the *Treatise's* account of habituation (*xunxi* 熏習), which Ma integrated with the Cheng-Zhu Principle-centered Learning's doctrine of "making reverential attention the master" (*zhu jing* 主敬).

Tang Junyi and the **Treatise**

In chapter 7, "Being, Seeing, and Believing: Ontological, Epistemological, and Soteriological Commitments in Tang Junyi's Reading of the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith*," Ady Van den Stock avers that unlike his former teacher, Xiong Shili, and his friend, Mou Zongsan, the influence of the *Treatise* in New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi's writings is not pronounced, and that Tang rarely even referred to the *Treatise* when elaborating his own ideas. Instead, Van den Stock focuses on Tang's interpretation of the *Treatise* as set out in *Yuan dao pian* 原道篇 (Retracing the Concept of Dao) and *Yuan xing pian* 原性篇 (Retracing the Concept of the Nature), both of which are parts of Tang's massive historical study, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun* 中國哲學原論 (On the Origins of Chinese Philosophy) (1966–1975). He further notes that Tang's *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun* contributed substantially to the reworking and final presentation of Tang's own constructive philosophy as set out in his "gargantuan and hitherto often invoked but relatively understudied *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 (Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind)" (1977), a work in which the triad of *ti* 體, *xiang* 相, and *yong* 用 (Three Greats) from the *Treatise* does play a central role in the formal and conceptual structure of that work: the "nine horizons of the mind" (*xinling jiu jing* 心靈 九境). (That work is the subject of Liu Leheng's chapter 8.)

Tang's understanding of the *Treatise* is very much aligned with two topics that were the focus of (renewed) debate, beginning in the early 1920s. The first concerns the relationship between the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*. In his 1923 publication, *Lengqie shujue* 楞伽疏決 (Clarifying Resolutions on the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*), Ouyang had already argued that the *Treatise* was based on a misinterpretation of Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*'s theory of the *tathagatagarbha*: whereas the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* had actually treated the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as the same referent, following Bodhiruci's mistranslation, the *Treatise* treated them as two entities. Ouyang's former student, Lü Cheng, also argued that Bodhiruci had mistranslated a number of key ideas in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, which subsequently influenced the author of the *Treatise*. Similar to Ouyang, Lü insisted that whereas the author of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* treated the *tathāgatagarbha* as synonymous with the *ālayavijñāna* (in which the former amounts to a synonym for the latter), Bodhiruci instead understood relevant passages to differentiate the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna*.

Indeed, already for the author of the *Treatise*, the "one mind, two gateways" model was an attempt to accommodate Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha teachings, in particular the concepts

of *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*. Thus, in the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) periods, commentators and scholars drew attention to what they distinguished as the Northern and Southern branches of the Dilun 地論 school, said to have been active in sixth century northern China. As I have noted elsewhere:

These commentators and doxographers identified the main difference between the two branches to have been whether defiled phenomena arise from suchness (Southern position) or from the *ālayavijñāna* (Northern position). If these accounts are taken as accurate, then the *Dasheng qixin lun* can be seen to be consistent with the Northern branch in presenting the *ālayavijñāna* – identified with the gateway of arising and ceasing – as the basis for defiled phenomena; and it is also consistent with the Southern branch in presenting suchness or *tathāgatagarbha*, which exists within the defiled *ālayavijñāna*, as the basis of everything, no matter defiled or undefiled.

Tang similarly presents the *Treatise* as attempting to reconcile divergent approaches to the status of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the Yogācāra notion of the *ālayavijñāna*. Van den Stock relates how Tang proposed that the *Treatise* treats the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as belonging to two different "levels" (*cengci* 層次). He "treats the *tathāgatagarbha* as 'the mind in the primary sense [i.e., as an "absolute reality"; *paramārtha-satya*]' (第一義之心), on the basis of which the *ālayavijñāna* emerges, an approach Tang identifies as one of the major theoretical innovations of the *Treatise* and a largely reconciliatory intervention in the debates between the Northern and Southern Dilun as well as the Shelun 攝論 adherents." This position again contrasts with that of Lü Cheng, who argued that the *Treatise*'s claim that "The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because of dependence on the *tathāgatagarbha*" is doctrinally incoherent because it presents the unconditioned (what is not subject to the laws of cause and effect) as serving as the basis of the conditioned – and became the basis for a slew of problematic ideas proposed in the *Treatise*.

A second topic of debate where Tang defends a position he attributes to the *Treatise* concerns the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned. As Van den Stock explains, "Tang insists on reading the text as upholding a minimal but important distinction between [unconditioned] suchness, on the one hand, and the conditioned world subject to disintegration and decay, on the other … with Tang instead projecting the duality and polarity between the conditioned and the unconditioned onto the *ālayavijñāna* (as a 'combination' of suchness and ignorance) alone." He argues that the reason Tang was unwilling to follow influential commentators such as Wonhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Fazang 法藏 (643–712) in abandoning the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas came down to soteriological concerns: "Tang insists that without an affirmation of intrinsic awakening as a metaphysical premise – that is to say, one not subject to empirical contingency – buddhahood would be attained only to be lost again. In other words, the potential for enlightenment is something that needs to be 'disclosed' as a transcendental condition of the possibility for awakening before it can begin to be 'developed.'" In soteriological terms, this transcendental condition or metaphysical premise is none other than "intrinsic awakening" (*benjue* 本覺). In contrast to Yogācāra, in which enlightenment relies on the contingency of "perfumation through hearing [the Dharma]," and hence is dependent on external circumstances, for Tang the *Treatise*'s "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself. "Tang claims … 'suchness' not only ceases being 'the principle of emptiness of the myriad dharmas' (萬法之空理), but also becomes a 'fundamental reality with the actual function of giving rise to the myriad dharmas' (能生萬法，而有實作用之實體)."

Tang's position is clearly inconsistent with the account in the *Treatise*, where two senses or characteristics of suchness are distinguished, each with a role to play:

> The first is empty in accordance with what is real. This is because it is ultimately able to reveal what is real. The second is non-empty in accordance with what is real. This is because it has its own intrinsic reality, which is replete with untainted qualities. Suchness is "empty" because it has always been dissociated from all defiled dharmas. That is, it is free from the characteristics that differentiate all dharmas because it has none of the thoughts that the false mind has…. Suchness is "non-empty" because dharmas are intrinsically empty and without falsity, as has already been shown. It is precisely the true mind – constantly unchanging and replete with pure dharmas – and so it is called non-empty.
> 一者、如實空，以能究竟顯實故。二者、如實不空，以有自體，具足無漏性功 德故。所言空者，從本已來一切染法不相應故。謂離一切法差別之相，以無虛 妄心念故。… 所言不空者，已顯法體空無妄故。即是真心常恒不變淨法滿足， 故名不空。

Suchness is truly empty because it is free of false conceptual and verbal discriminations, and it can disclose what is real when defilements caused by ignorance are removed. Emptiness renders delusion unreal and so discloses the reality of "non-emptiness." Overturning delusion enables the practitioner to become aware of what is ultimately real. If it were not for delusion, the practitioner would not awaken to what is real, to the fact that the practitioner is already inherently awoken.

For Tang, however, the key attraction of the model provided by the *Treatise* is that the unconditioned "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself. Tang further characterized the nature of this mind as an active "presentation" (*chengxian* 呈現) or "self-awareness." As Van den Stock explains, for Tang, Buddhism "implicitly commits itself to an axiological conception of 'the nature' (*xing* 性) as something that is not merely 'empty' of all determinations, but also has a normative component, in other words, the existence of a 'nature as value' (*jiazhixing zhi xing* 价值性之性)." This position is, in turn, much closer to that of the *Treatise*:

> [Ordinary people] think that the nature of suchness and nirvana is nothing but emptiness. This is because when they hear the sutra explain that the ultimate reality of mundane dharmas is empty, that even the dharmas of nirvana and suchness are ultimately empty, and that they have always been intrinsically empty and free from all characteristics, they do not know that this [is said] to refute attachments. What is the antidote? It is to make it clear that the dharma body of suchness' own intrinsic reality is not empty, but replete with countless qualities.
> 聞修多羅說世間諸法畢竟體空，乃至涅槃真如之法亦畢竟空，從本已來自空離一切相，以不知為破著故，即謂真如、涅槃之性唯是其空。云何對治？明真如 法身自體不空，具足無量性功德故。

In his concluding section to the chapter, Van den Stock re-iterates that Tang Junyi's conception of the mind's irreducible ontological status as non-empty "would remain more or less constant throughout the whole of his *oeuvre*, right up to his final work, *Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind*, which Tang saw as a 'purely philosophical and theoretical basis' (純哲學理論之基礎) meant retroactively to support most of his previous writings."

That final work is the main subject of Liu Leheng's chapter 8. As with Ady Van den Stock, Liu denies that the *Treatise* had a "determinative influence" on Tang's philosophy or his thinking about Confucianism. He does, however, qualify this, by also maintaining that "Tang put his own philosophy and the *Treatise* into mutual verification and support, resulting in a two-way enrichment between his New Confucian system and his research into the *Treatise* and Buddhist thought generally." At the most general level, this kind of mutual verification is evident in Tang's soteriological agenda. As already noted, Tang was convinced that the "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself; that it is an active "presentation." Liu similarly relates that, for Tang, the *Treatise* was written in response to Yogācāra's inability to explain how attaining buddhahood is possible, given its denial that suchness is a self-manifesting inherent mind, or what Liu variously refers to as the *tathāgatagarbha* pure mind

or *tathāgatagarbha* True Mind: "Tang pointed out that the *Treatise* first established the idea of a *tathāgatagarbha* pure mind because this pure mind is directly, self-consciously experienced by the cultivator in the process of cultivation." And even though the *tathāgatagarbha* pure mind is, in Tang's terms, the ultimate horizon (*jingjie* 境界) of cultivation, it should also be considered the initial point for cultivation, because without it one would never be able to experience the first aspiration for cultivation. Moreover, as Liu notes, in Tang's view: "If I view my present non-awakening in light of my mind that can eventually be fully awakened, then it emerges that my present non-awakening is the same as my eventual awakening. Thus my 'non-awakening' can actually be regarded as a 'non-awakened awakening.'"

Liu also shows how Tang attached particular importance to what he deemed to be the pivotal role that the *Treatise* played in the development of Chinese Buddhist doctrine. In particular, Tang deemed the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" model – according to which the one mind gives rise to both the "gateway of suchness" and the "gateway of arising and ceasing" – as having provided the theoretical inspiration not only for both the Tiantai doctrine of "nature inclusion" (*xingju* 性具) and the Huayan doctrine of "nature origination" (*xing qi* 性起), but, moreover and importantly, for the Huayan doctrine of "according with conditions without changing" (*sui yuan bu bian* 隨緣不變) and the Tiantai doctrine that "the nature [paradoxically] includes both defilement and purity" (*xing ju ran jing* 性具染淨). As Liu explains, these latter two doctrines further developed and reinforced the thesis that "there is no hindrance between the mind's defilement and its purity, or between the defiled arising and ceasing mind and the clear, pure mind of suchness. On the one hand, the superficial arising and ceasing mind and the deeper mind of suchness both exist, yet, on the other hand, their relationship is also one of interpenetrating unity (*xiangguan guiyi* 相貫歸一)." In turn, "from this foundation, Tang proceeded to reflect further on the doctrine of 'one mind, two gateways,' concluding that within the one mind, the relationship between the two gateways is one of mutual interaction and mutual concealing and revealing."

Already in his 1973 publication, *Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun: Yuan dao pian* 中國哲學原論 原道篇 (On the Origins of Chinese Philosophy: Retracing the Concept of *Dao*), Tang had described the relationship between the two gateways as one of mutual concealment, mutual alternation, mutual habituation/perfuming. Liu describes the operations of this dynamic in Tang's reading of the "one mind, two gateways" doctrine as follows:

When the mind as suchness senses that it has become obscured by the defiled arising and ceasing mind, it actually cannot abide this situation and wants self- consciously to manifest itself so as to transcend its obstruction by the arising and ceasing mind. So, in this situation, the mind as suchness can shift from *yin* to *yang*, concealed to revealed, negative to positive, and transform the defiled arising and ceasing mind, causing it to become completely the manifestation of the pure mind as suchness.

In regard to Tang's own theoretical priorities, the significance of the notion of "mutual interaction and mutual concealing and revealing" concerns the main theme of his 1977 publication, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 (Life-Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind): *xin jing gantong* 心境感通 – rendered by Liu as "authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons":

As Tang saw it, authentic feeling is a two-way interaction between the mind and horizons. In other words, given a certain kind of mind, a certain corresponding kind of horizon must emerge, and given a certain kind of horizon, there must emerge a certain corresponding sort of mind. Mind and horizon interact with each other and relate to each other as a pair: there are neither horizonless minds nor mindless horizons…. Thus, the authentic feeling between the mind and horizons is a relationship of co- arising…. If the mind is to interact with a horizon, it must first retire and hide,

allowing the horizon to manifest. Then, when the horizon is manifest, the mind transitions from its negative mode to its positive one and interacts further with the horizon.

Liu translates *gantong* 感通 as "authentic feeling" to convey the sense that this kind of feeling is an expression of the nature of the mind (*xinxing* 心性) and not just something confined to the domain of psychology. "Horizon" (*jing* 境; short for *jingjie* 境界) is also a nuanced concept for Tang Junyi. Tang himself suggested that *jing* should be translated as "horizon" or "world" and not as "object". According to Liu, "Whereas 'object' in Western philosophy often implies that the subject or the mind cannot be connected through authentic feeling, horizon (*jing*) in Chinese philosophy has the sense of being able to reveal that there is a relationship of authentic feeling between mind and object."

In *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* Tang set out a hierarchy of nine horizons – each of which is connected to the mind via authentic feeling. The nine horizons begin with three objective horizons (*keguan jing* 客觀境), then proceed to three subjective horizons (*zhuguan jing* 主觀境), and culminate in three absolute, metaphysical horizons (*juedui de xingershang zhi jing* 絕對的形上之境). The ninth and highest horizon – and a distinctly Confucian horizon – (or in this case, a double horizon) is the "flow of heavenly virtue" (*tiande liuxing* 天德流行) and "fully realizing one's nature and establishing the mandate" (*jinxing liming* 盡性立命). In turn, the three horizons in each tripartite grouping are respectively identified as intrinsic reality (*ti* 體), characteristics (*xiang* 相), or function (*yong* 用) – the Three Greats of the *Treatise*. As Liu explains, for Tang these Three Greats are the manifestation of the process of "authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons": "'intrinsic reality' is the self-nature (*tixing* 體性) of authentic feeling; 'characteristics' are the 'appearance' (*xiangzhuang* 相狀) of authentic feeling; and 'function' is its 'efficacy' (*gongneng* 功能)."

Just as Ma Yifu had repurposed the *Treatise*'s *ti, xiang* and *yong*, as part of his intertextual system building, so too Tang assigned the terms meanings from within his own philosophy. However, the terms also play an important ancillary role in reinforcing another more explicit aspect of the *Treatise*'s connection with Tang's metaphysics, one already introduced above: the notion of "mutual interaction and mutual concealing and revealing." As Liu explains, for Tang, the meaning of "intrinsic reality" and "characteristics" must be demonstrated "through the process of the two successive 'functions' of authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons." The two successive functions are that of concealing and revealing. And although intrinsic reality will not be visible when in a state of contraction and concealment, as it inevitably reverts to a state with the manifest "characteristics" of extension, advancing, and revealing, it becomes visible. As such, Liu concludes, "'intrinsic reality,' 'characteristics,' and 'function' are internal to authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons."

Mou Zongsan and the **Treatise**

In chapter 9, "The Supreme Penultimate: The *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* According to Mou Zongsan," Jason Clower draws on, and treats as compatible, Mou Zongsan's remarks on the *Treatise* in the first volume of *Xinti yu xingti* 心體與性體 (Intrinsic Reality of the Mind and Intrinsic Reality of the Nature; 1968), *Foxing yu bore* 佛性與般若 (Buddha Nature and *Prajñā*; 1977), and *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang* 中國哲學十九講 (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy) (delivered 1978–1979). In his system of doctrinal classification, Mou distinguished two main groups of Chinese Buddhist philosophy: one based on Madhyamaka and the other on Yogācāra. In turn, he sub-divided the Yogācāra group into a Weishi Yogācāra school represented by Xuanzang and a Tathāgatagarbha system he referred to as the "True Mind system" (*zhenxin xitong* 真心系統), of which the *Treatise* is representative. One of the key distinctions is that the Tathāgatagarbha system

employs what Mou refers to as a "transcendental analytic" (*chaoyue de fenxi* 超越的分析). As Clower explains, this refers to "a distinction between the mind of our ordinary experience – mundane, conditioned, determinate, finite, ordinary, unenlightened – and an unconditioned, non-determinate, enlightened '*tathāgatagarbha* pure True Mind' that provides a transcendental basis for our ordinary mind…. The important methodological principle Mou believes to be in play in the *Treatise* is that its doctrinal system must be presented as a 'transcendental analytic,' not the empirical or psychological analysis of the Yogācāra system."

For Mou, Yogācāra and the *Treatise* also differ in their accounts of suchness (*zhenru* 真如). As he writes in *Foxing yu bore*: "In Xuanzang's Yogācāra, suchness is merely the principle of emptiness; it is an object (所、相分) [i.e. lacks any subjectivity]. It can neither perfume nor be perfumed and therefore it can be said only to be 'changeless' and not also to 'follow conditions.'" In contrast, in the *Treatise*, suchness has agency and enables sentient beings to be habituated by it. The *Treatise*'s "*tathāgatagarbha* pure True Mind" or "suchness" particularly appealed to Mou because it evidenced three qualities essential to what Clower characterizes as Mou's "ultimate ground of reality" (UGR) or "ultimate value" (UV): activeness, universalism, and determinacy. Just as Tang Junyi maintained that the "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself, that it is an active "presentation," so too for Mou, "it can take the initiative and act on the subject, both internally and 'externally,' in what the text calls, respectively, 'habituation by the characteristics of the intrinsic reality' of suchness (*ziti xiang xunxi* 自體相熏習) and 'by the functions' (*yong xunxi* 用熏習) of suchness." The True Mind is universal because it is equally available to all; it is also *a priori* and unconditional. In Mou's Kantian parlance, it provides the "transcendental basis" (*chaoyue genju* 超越根據) guaranteeing the necessity of buddhahood for all. As for the third quality, that of determinacy, although True Mind (= suchness, *tathāgatagarbha*) has no boundaries and is beyond determination, there are modes in which it can have finite qualities. As Clower explains, "We could say that Mou was committed to 'save the [determinate] phenomena' and arrive at an *articulated* monism, one which reconciles monism with the 'necessary existence of [distinct] things.'" For Mou, the *Treatise*'s One Mind or True Mind provides the support (*yizhi* 依止) for all dharmas, their "transcendental basis," the *a priori* condition for their possibility. "Mou explains the text's famous passage about combining non-arising and non-ceasing with arising-and-ceasing (不生不滅與生滅和合) in the arising and ceasing aspect of the mind (心生滅), to mean that the mind is both 'transcendent and immanent' and the 'productive cause' (*shengyin* 生因) of pure (*anāsrava*) dharmas and also the 'supporting cause' (*pingyi yin* 憑依因) or 'indirect cause' of defiled (*āsrava*) dharmas, inasmuch as the latter are produced by the storehouse mind, which relies upon the True Mind."

Mou's best-known appropriation from the *Treatise* is his repurposing of the "one mind, two gateways" model for his own "two-tier ontology" (*liangceng cunyoulun* 兩層存有論): an "ontology with grasping" (*zhi de cunyou lun* 執的存有論) and an "ontology without grasping" (*wuzhi de cunyoulun* 無執的存有論), or more straightforwardly, an ontological account of (1) "appearances" or phenomena (*xianxiang* 現象) and (2) "things-in-themselves" (*wu zishen* 物自身). Unlike Kant, who held that humans have no faculty of intellectual intuition (*zhi de zhijue* 智的直覺), that noumena, or "things-in-themselves," can only be postulated and not directly intuited by humans, for Mou, noumenal reality can be directly intuited (or "presented" *chengxian* 呈現). Humans can apprehend both sides of the coin: the noumenal and phenomenal character of things.

In the fourteenth lecture of his *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang*, Mou is both explicit and effusive about the connection between "one mind, two gateways" and his "two-tier ontology":

> One mind opening two gateways … is a very important philosophical framework. This framework makes a tremendous contribution and should not be viewed merely as some account internal to Buddhism. Rather, it should be viewed as a shared model with universal applicability, capable of dealing with a very important philosophical issue…. Therefore, that which is directly presented before moral knowing, the inherent mind, or the intrinsically pristine mind, is the in-itself (在其自己) of every single thing. Once facing the subject of sensibility and understanding, however, the in-itself of every single thing turns into appearances…. Is such a presentation with two faces not the same as Buddhism's "one mind opening two gateways"? Allowing a thing to have the double character of being appearance and thing-in-itself does not violate Kant's arguments. On the contrary, it helps to dissolve the unsatisfactory and inadequate parts of Kant's philosophy. Although "one mind opening two gateways" may be considered only a fantasy from Kant's standpoint, in actual truth, when duly gauged by the principles affirmed in Chinese philosophy, it is, indeed a more advanced philosophical vision than Kant's.
> 一心開二門的架構…是哲學思想上一個很重要的格局。這個格局非常有貢獻，不能只看作是佛教內的一套說法。我們可以把它視為一個公共模型，有普遍的適用性，可以拿它來對治一個很重要的哲學問題。… 因此，對着良知、本心或 自性清淨心直接呈現的，是事事物物之在其自己；而當它一旦面對感性與知性 主體時，則轉成現象。… 這種兩種面向的呈現，不就等於佛教所說的「一心開二門」嗎？這個意思並未違背康德的說法，相反地，卻足以消化康德哲學中的不圓滿與 不足之處。… 雖然依康德的看法，這些都只是「幻想」 (fantacy [sic])， 然從實際的道理來看，就當該照中國哲學所肯定的義理來說，這個哲 學理境的確有進於康德處。

Intellectual intuition is associated with the inherent mind, the pure mind – the correlate of the *Treatise*'s mind as suchness. For Mou, it has the capacity to intuit things-in-themselves directly. The subject of sensibility and understanding (also, variously, the "epistemic mind" [*renshi xin* 認識心], the "finite mind" *[youxian xin* 有限心*]*), is the correlate of the mind as arising and ceasing, the storehouse consciousness, and, like the storehouse consciousness, it gives rise to determinate objects.

As Clower explains, Mou's argument for the "uniqueness of Chinese philosophy" involves maintaining that all the highest practitioners of Chinese philosophy "preach that not only *can* human beings have sagely cognition, or 'intellectual intuition,' but also that we all *do* have it, innately and without exception" and to that end he had to find "a Buddhist point of view from which we can say that *prajñā* is constantly operating, in everyone, and that it can reach out to us from the inside, even in the absence of the right external cues." Although the *Treatise* had gone a long way to satisfying that requirement, for Mou, ultimately it was only the penultimate – albeit necessary – step on the way to a truly perfect (*yuan* 圓) teaching. Drawing on theoretical positions developed in the context of an internal schism in renascent Tiantai Buddhism of the Northern Song period, Mou concluded that the *Treatise* had failed to provide for the necessary existence of determinate things (差別法的必然存在). As described by Clower, "since in the *Treatise*'s account the enlightened mind does not experience variegated things, Mou concludes that it is only conditional, not necessary, that there be things at all, and hence that the True Mind is only 'indeterminately' (*wuding* 無定) absolute: it *excludes* determinacy," including not just material things but also differences among self and non-self and a plurality of moral actors.

What, then, was the constructive position that Mou proposed? For Kant, free will is a practical necessity for the possibility of a categorical imperative, because we cannot act as autonomous moral agents without presupposing the idea of freedom. As such, it is a necessary condition of morality. Yet, whereas for Kant the concept of free will is a postulate, for Mou it is a "presentation": it can be directly intuited by the moral subject. Mou insisted that all humans have the faculty of intellectual

intuition and can have direct intuition of noumenal reality and direct intuition of free will. He characterized the moral subject as having an unlimited capacity for moral knowledge because all humans have a moral mind, one that transcendentally grounds us in the unceasing creative process of the cosmos, an inherently moral process.

Mou further maintained that practical reason (*shijian lixing* 實踐理性) (and hence the moral subject) harbors an inexorable inclination for dialectical development that propels it toward its own "contradiction" (*maodun* 矛盾). Because practical reason requires its antithesis – theoretical reason (*guanjie lixing* 觀解理性) – it artificially or forcefully instigates its own negation. (Practical reason is concerned with the *a priori* grounds for action, whereas theoretical reason enables us to have knowledge of objects given in experience.) It is in this connection that Mou proposed his "self-negation of innate moral consciousness" (*liangzhi ziwo kanxian* 良知自我坎陷) thesis, in which moral consciousness negates its inherent non-discriminating mode in order to allow the discriminating mind to arise and to effect action:

> This emergence is dialectical (in Hegel's sense rather than Kant's). We can describe it this way: (1) outwardly speaking, since people are human yet sagely and also sagely whilst human (or likewise humans yet buddhas and buddhas whilst human), scientific knowledge is necessary in principle and is also possible, for otherwise they would be impaired with respect to their duties as humans. (2) Inwardly speaking, in order to accomplish this task, the clear intuition of knowing-in-itself cannot linger forever as intellectual intuition. It must consciously negate itself and transform itself into "understanding." **This understanding is what confronts things (*wu* 物) and enables things to be constituted as "objects" (*duixiang* 對象) and investigated in their diversity** [JM emphasis]. It must undergo this self-negation in order to realize itself fully, and this is what is meant by dialectical emergence (*bianzheng de kaixian* 辯證的開顯). Its transformation into understanding by going through self-negation is the only way for it to solve all the special problems of humankind, and it is also the only way for its moral aspirations to flow unimpeded.
> 此步開顯是辯證的（黑格爾意義的辯證，非康德意義的辯證）。此步辯證的開顯可如此說明：（1）外部地說，人既是人而聖，聖而人，則科學知識原則上是必要的，而且亦是可能的，否則人義有缺。（2）內部地說，要成就那外部地說的必然，知體明覺不能永停在明覺之感應中，它必須自覺地自我否定（亦曰自 我坎陷），轉而為"知性"；此知性與物為對，始能使物成為"對象"，從而究知其曲折之相。它必須經由這一步自我坎陷，它始能充分實現其自己，此即所謂辯證的開顯。它經由自我坎陷轉為知性，它始能解決那屬於人的一切特殊的問 題，而其道德的心願亦始能暢達無阻。

Despite Mou's explicit reference to Hegel's dialectics, the connection strikes me as tenuous, given that Hegel's notion of sublation or suspension (*Aufheben*) concerns the idea of a ***finite determination*** transitioning to its opposite. Rather, it may well have been Mou's mentor, Xiong Shili, who sowed the inspiration for the "self-negation of innate moral consciousness" thesis with his account of contradiction, contraction and expansion.

Mou further complains that the *Treatise*'s other shortcoming is that "when you explain 'initial awakening' and liberation in terms of the intrinsically untainted mind that is the *tathāgatagarbha* (如來藏自性清淨心) as spontaneously giving rise to the aspiration [for enlightenment] and [capacity for] wisdom, it is hardly self-evident or necessary that it will eventuate in the [*Treatise*'s] type of flight to the trans-mundane." All that the text actually promises is that we must *wait* for our potential for enlightenment to be triggered by the right external circumstances. Just as wood has the capacity to burn, as the *Treatise* says, "If there is no-one who knows this, then people will not have recourse to the means necessary [to ignite the wood] – and it is impossible that the wood will be able to burn by itself." Inherent buddha-nature is the necessary cause of buddhahood yet it is not a

sufficient cause for realizing buddhahood. In order to be sparked, sentient beings need to encounter buddhas, bodhisattvas or good teachers, who will employ skillful means to enable sentient beings to realize their potential.

The **Treatise** and East Asian Philosophy of Subjectivity

In the concluding chapter of this volume, Lin Chen-kuo identifies the *Treatise* as having played a key role in the formation of modern East Asian philosophy of subjectivity. Lin relates that the concept of "subject" or "subjectivity" was introduced from European philosophy into Japan during the Meiji era (1868–1912) and subsequently disseminated within Chinese intellectual circles where it quickly became associated with the notion of "self-awareness" (*zijue* 自覺). The *Treatise* is significant in that it helped to elucidate the internal relationship between subject and self-awareness, which in turn serves as the basis for praxis. The *Treatise* states that "all sentient beings have suchness" and because suchness has the power to habituate "it is capable of inducing sentient beings to weary of [the cycle of] birth and death and take pleasure in seeking nirvana, to believe that they themselves have the dharma of suchness, and to arouse the aspiration to awakening and cultivate practice." (能令衆生厭生死苦、樂求涅槃，自信己身有眞如法，發心修行。) Lin finds this to be consistent with "the idealist notion of a 'subject' imbued with the kind of spontaneity that guarantees the possibility of freedom for the cognitive and practical subject. With regard to the *Treatise*, suchness/truth is both transcendent object and also the immanent basis of subjectivity, realized through the power of the subject."

Lin explains that the key motivation for him in linking the *Treatise* with East Asian philosophy of subjectivity had to do with how the ramifications of debates about the *Treatise* in the early period of the twentieth century in both China and Japan "went beyond the confines of the Buddhist scholastic studies and seeped into mainstream philosophical discourse in modern East Asia, to become a philosophical resource, either implicitly or explicitly, for both New Confucians and the Kyoto School. Viewed this way, the *Treatise* occupied an important place in the intellectual history of East Asia during the early twentieth century."

Indeed, from the late 1870s onwards, Japanese philosophers had begun appropriating the *Treatise* as a vehicle either to introduce Indian and European philosophy or to create a distinctive "Japanese philosophy." For example, as noted earlier, from 1879, the one-time Sōtō Zen monk, Hara Tanzan, used the *Treatise* as the text for a course on Indian Buddhist philosophy at the only university in Japan, Tokyo University. One of his many students, Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944), introduced German philosophy as a means to create a "Japanese philosophy" out of Buddhism, based principally on the *Treatise*.[70]In the next generation, the *Treatise* was an important topic in the correspondence between Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), one of the most innovative philosophers in modern Japan, and his lifelong friend and propagandist of Zen, Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙 (D.T. Suzuki, 1870–1966), with some scholars even arguing that the basis of Nishida's thought lies in the *Treatise*.

Some of Nishida's students, members of the Kyoto School of philosophy, while immersed in German philosophy, openly based their ideas on the *Treatise*. For example, much of *Kegon tetsugaku shoronkō: Bukkyō no konpon nanmon e no tetsugakuteki apurōchi* 華厳哲学小論攷 – – 仏教の根本難問への哲学的アプローチ (A Brief Study of Kegon Philosophy: A Philosophical Approach to Fundamental Problems in Buddhism), published in 1922 by the prolific author Tsuchida Kyōson 土田杏村 (1891–1934), is explicitly based on the *Treatise*. Hisamatsu Shinichi 久松真一 (1889–1980), who promoted a philosophy and aesthetics of Zen for laypersons, wrote a philosophical analysis of the *Treatise* in 1947 (*Kishin no kadai* 起信の課題) based on his university lectures of 1936–1937, interpreting it

using existentialism and "the theology of crisis." Another of Nishida's students, Takizawa Katsumi 滝沢克己 (1909–1984) even used the *Treatise* to create a Christian theology.

Just as criticism of the *Treatise* was principally carried out by scholars associated with the China Institute of Inner Learning, who promoted a return to genuine Buddhism, so too, in Japan, related criticisms were principally carried out by proponents of so-called Critical Buddhism (*hihan Bukkyō* 批判佛教). Thus, the standoff between the views upheld by Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, on the one hand, and by Ouyang and Lü Cheng, on the other, has, in more recent times, resurfaced in the context of controversies surrounding Critical Buddhism. Critical Buddhism is an intellectual movement initiated in mid-1980s Japan by Sōtō scholars Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭 and Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗. Critical Buddhism takes aim at any doctrine that posits an eternal, metaphysical substratum, underlying ground, or locus on which everything else is ontologically grounded, since it is contrary to the Buddha's teachings on impermanence. In particular, Critical Buddhism regards Sinicized forms of Buddhism to be false Buddhism and incompatible with the project of modernity because they are not founded on rational critique.

Lin Chen-kuo points out that "Hakamaya distinguished two kinds of Buddhism, 'Critical Buddhism' and 'Topical Buddhism' (*basho Bukkyō* 場所佛教), and thereby extended the battle line of his criticism right to the doorstep of the Kyoto School." The *Treatise* is seen to be emblematic of so-called "topical Buddhism" or "topical philosophy" – "notions of a universal, ineffable, preconceptual ground or 'topos' from which all things are produced and to which they return at death" – because constructions such as *dharmakāya (fashen* 法身; dharma body) and *tathāgatagarbha* seemingly contradict the doctrine of no-self. These constructions, in turn, are foundational for doctrines such as intrinsic awakening, a doctrine that appears to be inconsistent with the doctrine of conditioned origination. "This forms an intriguing contrast in philosophical disputes concerning the *Treatise*: in China, it was the dispute between the China Institute of Inner Learning and the New Confucians; in Japan, it was between 'Critical Buddhism' and the Kyoto School."

More specifically, how does the philosophy of subjectivity concern Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, the two New Confucians featured in Lin's chapter? In the very opening paragraph of the first chapter in Xiong's 1932 *New Treatise*, "Explanation of the Thesis" (Ming zong 明宗), Xiong provides the following account of why he wrote the *Treatise*:

> Reality (*shiti* 實體) is not an external realm detached from one's own mind, nor is it a cognitive object of knowledge. This is because it is only by seeking within that there is correspondence with true realization. (True realization is the self's recognizing the self, with absolutely nothing concealed.) Correspondence with true realization is called wisdom (智 [**jñāna*]) because it differs from the mundane world, which is established on the basis of discernment [慧 (**prajñā*)].
> 實體非是離自心外在境界，及非知識所行境界，唯是反求實證相應故。(實證即是自己認識自己，絕無一毫蒙蔽。) 是實證相應者，名之爲智，不同世間依慧立故。

The subject of this correspondence with true realization – when the self recognizes the self – is "wisdom" and not "consciousness," underscoring a fundamental departure from what Lin characterizes as the China Institute of Inner Learning's revered doctrine – the theory of the subjectivity of the *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness). Moreover, "for Xiong this subject that is wisdom is none other than intrinsic reality itself (ultimate reality). Put the other way around, intrinsic reality is nothing but inherent mind, and inherent mind and intrinsic reality are non-dual. This line of thought is basically the same as Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 and Wang Yangming's 'mind *is* principle' (*xin ji li* 心即理), and it is also same as the view in the *Treatise* that mind and suchness are one."

Xiong also parted company with the China Institute of Inner Learning partisans on another key issue that involves the *Treatise* and the topic of subjectivity: the question of whether the nature of the mind is inherently quiescent (*xing ji* 性寂) or innately enlightened/awoken (*xing jue* 性覺), which Lin characterizes as representing two theories of subjectivity. This became a topic of contention in a series of exchanges with Buddhist scholar and former classmate Lü Cheng in 1943. At the most general level, this question touched upon the very legitimacy of the philosophical foundations of East Asian Buddhism. More specifically, this point of contention bears directly on a range of issues, including the interpretation of the doctrine, "the nature of the mind is inherently pure" (*xinxing ben jing* 心性本淨) and methods of cultivation.

As Lin explains, Lü maintained that whereas Indian Buddhist theory of the nature of the mind held that "the nature of the mind is inherently pure" and "inherently quiescent and pure, the self-nature is nirvanic" (本來寂淨，自性涅槃), under the influence of the *Treatise*, Buddhism in the Chinese tradition had "misconstrued 'the nature of the mind is inherently pure' to mean that 'the nature of the mind is inherently awakened.'" Consistent with this latter understanding, Xiong upheld the view that the inherently awakened (and hence dynamic) nature of the mind can be personally realized through the "inner realization" of our inherent mind – a doctrine associated in particular with the teachings of the *Treatise*. As Lin notes, in terms of practice, the doctrine that "the nature of the mind is inherently awoken" "seeks to 'directly reveal the nature of the mind'; and 'return to the root and source,' which does not require any change in cognition." Lü Cheng, on the other hand, upheld the Yogācāra view (as represented by Xuanzang and Kuiji) that although "the nature of the mind is inherently pure," realization of that purity requires a "transformation of the basis" of cognition (*renshi* 認識). Lin relates that such a transformation involves an attitude of renewal, whereas "Chinese Buddhism holds that the mind inherently possesses an awakened nature, which leads not only to the possibility of achieving buddhahood without spiritual effort but moreover that this awakened nature functions as a guarantee of the actuality of achieving buddhahood." For Lü, the criteria of Buddhist truth can be found only in logic and epistemological analysis, such as was privileged in Yogācāra. Recondite questions about whether truth (*tathatā*) is innate and realized by inward reflection or whether it is realized as an object of cognition had profound practical implications for methods of religious cultivation and ethical practice. He and his colleagues maintained that the doctrine of intrinsic awakening requires no motivation for personal religious cultivation or for social change and as such is favored by politically conservative ideologies.

Throughout most of the 1920s Xiong had upheld the view that the ontological character of the mind is transformation alone. As Sang Yu shows in her chapter, however, in *Zun wen lu* 尊聞錄 (Record of What Has Been Respectfully Heard), a collection of Xiong's sayings and letters between 1924 and 1928, he had already expressed the view that the mind is simultaneously moving (*dong* 動) and quiescent (*jing* 靜), but did not really begin to emphasize this view until he wrote the *New Treatise*, which was published in 1932. Xiong continued to develop this thesis. In correspondence with Lü Cheng in 1943 he stated:

> I believe that "the nature [of the mind] is awakened" and "the nature [of the mind] is quiescent" are inseparable. When speaking of "the nature [of the mind] is awakened," then quiescence is therein. When speaking of "the nature [of the mind] is quiescent," then awakening is therein. The intrinsic reality of the nature [of the mind] has always been truly quiescent and truly awakened. In other words, it is precisely awakening that is quiescence, and it is precisely quiescence that is awakening.
> 吾以為性覺、性寂，實不可分。言性覺，而寂在其中矣。言性寂，而覺在其中矣。性體原是眞寂眞覺，易言之，卽覺卽寂，卽寂卽覺。

It might be tempting to suggest that Xiong is here proposing a thesis akin to that proposed by early commentator on the *Treatise*, Tanyan 曇延 (516–588), who maintained that even though the *tathāgatagarbha* has since beginningless time followed the continuous arising of delusion (隨妄流轉), "its illuminating nature never changes and that is why it is said to be awoken" (照性不改，故名為覺。). However, the more likely reason for Xiong's insistence that the nature of the mind is both awakened and quiescent is that he wanted to provide a solution to the Buddhist problematic of avoiding the two extremes (*er jian* 二見; *er bian* 二邊) of reification and nihilism, an agenda he pursued well into the 1950s.

Lin Chen-kuo also draws attention to the creative changes that Xiong made to the meaning of certain key terms. A case in point in this same letter is Xiong's statement: "Awakened is humaneness (*ren* 仁), and humaneness is the transformation of life" (覺者，仁也。仁，生化也。). Lin points out that "by using a concept drawn from Confucian metaphysics of creativity to re-interpret the Buddhist concept of 'awakening,' 'inherently awakened' becomes translated into a cosmological and moral philosophical subjectivity that is endowed with creativity." Lin further maintains that Xiong's use of *ren* to re-interpret the Buddhist concept of awakening "later opened the way for Mou Zongsan to take the further step of developing the concept of a free and limitless mind (*ziyou wuxianxin* 自由無限心) into a transcendental subjectivity."

How does the issue of subjectivity relate to Mou Zongsan? Let's begin with "transcendental subjectivity." With respect to the *Treatise*'s two gateways, Lin relates that for Mou, the gateway of "the mind as arising and ceasing" is the one mind's empirical aspect and "the mind as suchness" is its transcendental aspect, and suchness is the transcendental nature of the mind of sentient beings. The mind of sentient beings is inherently imbued with suchness, is of its own nature awakened, and does not need to be sought from without. Because suchness is the transcendental basis of the subject, "to know suchness (dharma-nature *[faxing* 法性*]*) requires only that one 'inwardly returns to awareness through personal realization' (*nijue tizheng* 逆覺體證). It does not require the long and arduous praxis of 'transformation of the basis' (*zhuanyi* 轉依), wherein 'suchness' is 'what is mentally appropriated as a cognitive object.'"

Mou's ontology of non-attachment (or ontology without grasping) is based on the transcendental mind, the correlate of the *Treatise*'s mind as suchness; and his ontology of attachment (or ontology of grasping) is based on the cognitive mind, the correlate of the *Treatise*'s mind as arising and ceasing. This intrinsically pure mind is identified with the moral subject who possesses intellectual intuition, and the cognitive mind is identified with the rational subject. By "inwardly returning to awareness through personal realization" and by "self-negating inherent knowing" Mou presented his two-tier ontology as enabling cognition of the noumenal realm and knowledge of the phenomenal realm. This was the structure of subjectivity as conceived by Mou, a structure that sought to guarantee the existence of the phenomenal realm and the metaphysical realm. Lin describes how the main driver of Mou's philosophical project in works such as *Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue* 智的直覺與中國哲學 (Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy; 1971) and *Xianxiang yu wuzishen* 現象與物自身 (Appearance and Thing-in-itself; 1975) was to bridge Chinese and Western philosophy, and in doing so:

> Figure out how China can become a modern country, and to realize, albeit critically, the demand for modern science and democracy. He was a traditionalist in search of modernization. And in his project of modernization, it was the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" that he employed as a "public model" for understanding Kantian philosophy. We thus see that, by that stage, the *Treatise* was no longer the subject of an internal debate

within Buddhist doctrinal studies but had become the main bridge to interconnect Chinese and Western philosophy.

Despite the key role that the *Treatise* played in constructing Mou's ontology, ultimately it failed to be the Perfect Teaching. As already introduced, Jason Clower explains that this is because Mou concluded that the *Treatise* had failed to provide for the necessary existence of determinate things. Lin Chen-kuo provides a similar explanation, maintaining that for Mou, the *Treatise*'s presentation of suchness (the unconditioned) and phenomenal reality (the conditioned origination of the myriad dharmas) as a *ti-yong* relationship was merely a "Buddhist understanding" of *ti-yong* – a flawed understanding in which phenomena are deemed not to be real, but merely serve to play a role as part of an expedient teaching (*quanshuo* 權說). "Mou wanted to emphasize that it is only by means of the Confucian understanding of *ti-yong* as an actual teaching [*shishuo* 實說] that a foundation can be established for the construction of a moral world and political systems. For Mou, it is only the subjectivity of the Confucian understanding of *ti-yong* that can truly be a subjectivity capable of responding vigorously to modern Western culture."

…

As the above overview shows, overwhelmingly, the main conceptual model that New Confucian philosophers adapted from the *Treatise* and repurposed is the "one mind, two gateways" model. In Xiong Shili's *New Treatise* (1932 edition) this is evident in the model's isomorphism with Xiong's distinction between reality (*ti*) as "the true mind" (*zhenxin* 真心) and its function (*yong*) as "false/deluded consciousness" (*wangshi* 妄識), and also in the one mind's being simultaneously quiescent and moving. Moreover, the final theoretical elaboration of Xiong's "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*" thesis is represented by his eventual rejection of Huayan accounts of the relationship between *li* 理 and *shi* 實 and subsequent embrace of the Tiantai accounts of that relationship. Both Huayan and Tiantai accounts of that relationship were philosophical responses to, and developments of, the *Treatise*'s account of the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned, as encapsulated in its "one mind, two gateways" model.

Ma Yifu explicitly interconnected the "mind unites/controls the nature and the emotions" thesis and the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" model. In turn, he linked both to two other intertextual appropriations: the Three Greats of the *Treatise* and the Three Changes of *Yiwei: Qian zuodu*.

Tang Junyi's account of the relationship between the two gateways as one of mutual concealment, mutual alternation, mutual habituation/perfuming became intimately connected to the main theme of his 1977 publication, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* (Life-Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind): "authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons." Tang also appropriated the Three Greats in his hierarchy of the "nine horizons," so as to group the horizons into three tripartite groupings, deploying them to articulate his key notion of "authentic feeling."

Mou Zongsan's appropriation of the "one mind, two gateways" model provided the inspiration for his own "two-tier ontology." Moreover, for Mou, the one mind not only provides the "transcendental basis" guaranteeing the necessity of buddhahood for all, it also provides the support for all dharmas, the *a priori* condition for their possibility. This was important for Mou because it seemed to guarantee the necessary existence of distinct things.

Which philosophical positions defended by the New Confucians were developed and sustained through engagement with the critical challenges advanced by critics of the *Treatise*? Citing the authority of Indian Abhidharma and especially Yogācāra texts, the criticisms mounted by Ouyang Jingwu and his students, Wang Enyang, Lü Cheng and others, came in three waves: the early-mid 1920s, the early 1940s and the early 1960s. They were highly critical of the doctrines of intrinsic awakening, one mind, and the notion of *tathāgatagarbha* associated with the *Treatise* and

subsequently developed by other schools of East Asian Buddhism. They criticized the *Treatise* for failing to observe the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas, for violating the laws of causation, and for lacking a doctrine that could demonstrate how perfuming/habituation was possible. Seeking to "return to the roots" of Indian Buddhism, this group promoted "genuine" Buddhism over "pseudo" Buddhism, criticizing such doctrines as intrinsic awakening on the grounds that it is founded on the idea that the potentiality for buddhahood exists in all sentient beings and hence this is only faith-based and not true Indian Buddhism.

Just as Ouyang had used the *ti-yong* distinction to discuss unconditioned and conditioned dharmas, so too did his former student, Xiong Shili. In Xiong's case, however, most of his philosophical career was devoted to defending the idea of the "non-duality of reality and function." Xiong's critical engagement with, appropriation of, and radical re-interpretation of Yogācāra was sustained, even as he engaged with Madhyamaka and Huayan doctrines at various phases in that career. Other fundamental departures from Yogācāra include rejecting the *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness) as the locus of subjectivity in favour of constructs such as wisdom (*zhi* 智 [**jñāna*]), innate wisdom (*xing zhi* 性智) and inherent mind (*benxin* 本心). He also disagreed with the China Institute of Inner Learning partisans on the question of whether the nature of the mind is inherently quiescent or innately enlightened/awoken.

In contrast, Ma Yifu largely ignored Yogācāra, drawing theoretical resources and inspiration directly from the *Treatise* and Huayan doctrine.

Tang Junyi responded to criticisms advanced by Ouyang and Lü Cheng that the *Treatise* was based on a misinterpretation of Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* – and so had incorrectly treated the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as two entities – by proposing that the *Treatise* treats the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as belonging to two different "levels," and defending this approach as a major theoretical innovation. Unlike Xiong, in particular, Tang was unwilling to abandon the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas so as to guarantee that the unconditioned "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself, being an active "presentation" or "self-awareness." This is in contrast to Yogācāra, in which true awakening relies on the contingency of "perfumation through hearing the Dharma," and thus is dependent on external circumstances.

Mou Zongsan was similarly critical of Yogācāra's account of suchness on the grounds that it lacked agency, neither able to perfume nor to be perfumed, admiring instead the agency attributed to suchness in the *Treatise*, whereby suchness enables sentient beings to be habituated. Accordingly, he also argued that the doctrinal system of the *Treatise* must be presented as a "transcendental analytic" – the distinction between the mind of our ordinary experience and an unconditioned "*tathāgatagarbha* pure True Mind" – and (in accord with Tang Junyi) not as the empirical or psychological analysis of the Yogācāra system.

To what extent were the New Confucians aware of their intellectual debt to the *Treatise* and how did they reconcile this with their Confucian identity? Xiong proclaimed that the import of the *Treatise*'s notion of *hehe* 和合 (merge, combine) is "deep, broad and boundless" because it preserves the non-duality of the unconditioned and the conditioned, *ti* and *yong*. Moreover, he was also adamant that the phrase "non-arising and non-ceasing combine with arising and ceasing" "is definitely *not* Buddhist in its import." He concluded that the *Treatise* was able to preserve the non-duality of the unconditioned and the conditioned, precisely because it is *not* an Indian Buddhist text, but a hybrid text that integrates native Chinese and Indian Buddhist thought. In contrast, schools of Chinese Buddhism such as Tiantai and Huayan remain captive to the transcendent goals of their Indian origins. This alleged hybridity thus effectively vouchsafed that the text was sufficiently rooted

in the native soil of Chinese wisdom as to be acceptable to Xiong's Confucian sensibilities. Moreover, the fact that in *Cui huo xian zong ji* he explicitly aligned the *New Treatise* with the so-called Truly Constant Mind (*zhenchang xin* 真常心) tradition – a modern epithet for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, and of which the *Treatise* is emblematic – clearly underscores that Xiong did find a way of reconciling the *Treatise* with his Confucian identity, at least in the early 1950s.

The motivation for Ma Yifu's accommodation of elements in the *Treatise* within the system of his overtly Confucian Way of the Six Arts was, as Liu Leheng argues, Ma's conviction that "a failure to integrate the Three Changes and the Three Greats, would have resulted in the meaning of Confucian teachings generally, and of the Three Changes specifically, being unable to be fully revealed." In short, Ma's conscious efforts to integrate Confucian and Buddhist thought were deployed in the service of his own New Confucian philosophy.

Although Ady Van den Stock and Liu Leheng concur that the *Treatise* did not have a determinative influence on Tang Junyi's thought, focusing on Tang's final work, Liu argues that another kind of accommodation took place: "Tang put his own philosophy and the *Treatise* into mutual verification and support, resulting in a two-way enrichment between his New Confucian system and his research into the *Treatise* and Buddhist thought generally." Despite this accommodation, Tang's Confucian priorities remained consistent and privileged.

Mou's Confucian identity is similarly never in doubt. As important as the *Treatise* was in the construction of his two-tier ontology, ultimately Mou judged it to be only the penultimate – albeit necessary – step on the way to a truly perfect teaching. As Lin Chen-kuo concludes, "For Mou, it is only the subjectivity of the Confucian understanding of *ti-yong* that can truly be a subjectivity capable of responding vigorously to modern Western culture."

Working from the premise that the intellectual constitution of the main exemplar of modern Chinese philosophy, New Confucianism, continues to be misrepresented, both in China and beyond, this volume has sought to present a new narrative about the complex intellectual identity of modern New Confucian philosophy and its ties to Buddhist philosophy in twentieth-century China. It has done this by providing the arguments and evidence needed to explain how the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* features in the constitution of New Confucian philosophy, as evidenced in the writings of four representative New Confucian philosophers. These philosophers did not just borrow concepts from the *Treatise*, but, as part of their system building, they repurposed those concepts to develop the most creative ontologies in modern Chinese philosophy, while also deploying those concepts more generally to articulate their distinctive metaphysical systems.

Appendix: Mou Zongsan's "Self-Negation of Inherent Knowing" and Xiong Shili

In correspondence dating from 1934 Xiong Shili had begun to use the term *maodun* 矛盾 (contradiction) to characterize the relationship between *xi* 翕 (contraction) and *benti* 本體 (intrinsic reality; Reality). The ideas Xiong describes in that correspondence, and which are translated below, may have subsequently served to inspire Mou Zongsan's signature doctrine of the "self-negation of inherent knowing" (*liangzhi ziwo kanxian* 良知自我坎陷), which he first used in a journal article published in 1947. There Mou describes how innate knowing, in a process of self-transformation, decides to negate itself so as to discriminate the cognitive mind, which in turn functions to pursue things in order to know and to control them. The article was subsequently included in Mou's book, *Wang Yangming zhi liangzhi jiao* 王陽明致良知教 (Wang Yangming's Doctrine of Extending Inherent Knowing), published in 1954. In his 1934 correspondence, Xiong Shili writes:

> In the past, Zhu Xi also said that transformation ought to have a principle of contraction otherwise it would be empty and devoid of things. (It seems I have seen this in the *Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu*, but I have not checked.) What I have verified, when checked against what Zhu said, suffices to corroborate [that he is correct]. Contraction is the flow of Reality. In other words, it is a kind of functioning that Reality gives expression to; one which is, moreover, inherently contradictory….
> Although Reality is certainly not material, in order for its functioning to be expressed it must have what is referred to as contraction. Contraction is [Reality's] illusorily seeming to become things. This is contraction as function. (Contraction is function.) This gives rise to the suspicion that contraction does not accord with Reality. In other words, contraction is precisely a kind of functioning that is the expression of inherent contradiction within Reality…. The [1932 literary edition of the] *New Treatise* states: "When contracting, it seems as if it is moving such that it will be severed from its root." It also states, "It contracts and so illusorily becomes things. This is how it manifests to resemble a material universe, giving rise to the suspicion that it does not preserve its self-nature." And further, "When [constant transformation] is contracting, it is as though it is about to lose its self-nature and so become transformed into things. This is the meaning of 'retreating.'" All these examples show that the inherent contradiction that is Reality's functioning is because as Reality draws near to becoming transformed by things, it [seems] no longer to preserve its nature.

昔朱子亦嘗謂造化含有一個翕聚的道理， 不然便是空洞無物。（此說似見《語 類》。茲不及檢）吾所參驗，質之彼說，適足印證。夫翕既即是本體之流行， 易言之，即是本體所顯現底一種作用，而且是自爲矛盾的一種作用。… 本體固不是物質性，但其作用顯現，不能不有所謂翕。翕即幻似成物。是則翕之用（翕即是用）。疑與體不相順。易言之，即此翕者，乃本體上顯現自相矛盾之一種作用。…《新論》云:「翕則疑於動而乖其本也」（<轉變>章，42 頁。）又曰「翕 而幻成乎物， 此所以現似物質宇宙，而疑於不守自性也」，79 頁）。又曰:「翕則若將不守自性，而至於物化，此退義也」<附識>語，42 頁）。凡此皆明其作用之 自爲矛盾，即以其將至物化而不守自性故也。 〈〉

Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind by Dan Arnold [Columbia University Press, 9780231145466]

This book looks at first-millennium Indian arguments and contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind and shows that seemingly arcane arguments among first-millennium Indian thinkers can illuminate matters still very much at the heart of contemporary philosophy. It explains how pre-modern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipated modern research on the brain and mind. It confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: the fact that since most Indian Buddhists hold that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death they disagree with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. It also shows that a predominant stream of Indian Buddhist thought, associated with the seventh-century thinker Dharmakīrti, turns out to be vulnerable to arguments that modern philosophers have levelled against physicalism. It explains that these issues center on what modern philosophers have called intentionality—the fact that the mind can be about (or represent or mean) other things. Tracing an account of intentionality through Kant, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell, the book argues that intentionality cannot, in principle, be explained in causal terms. The book shows that despite his concern to refute physicalism, Dharmakīrti's causal explanations of the mental mean that modern

arguments from intentionality cut as much against his project as they do against physicalist philosophies of mind.

Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipate modern research on the brain and mind. Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists held that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death (its continuity is what Buddhists mean by "rebirth"), they would have no truck with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. Nevertheless, a predominant stream of Indian Buddhist thought, associated with the seventh-century thinker Dharmakirti, turns out to be vulnerable to arguments modern philosophers have leveled against physicalism.

By characterizing the philosophical problems commonly faced by Dharmakirti and contemporary philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett, Arnold seeks to advance an understanding of both first-millennium Indian arguments and contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind. The issues center on what modern philosophers have called intentionality—the fact that the mind can be about (or represent or mean) other things. Tracing an account of intentionality through Kant, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell, Arnold argues that intentionality cannot, in principle, be explained in causal terms.

Elaborating some of Dharmakirti's central commitments (chiefly his apoha theory of meaning and his account of self-awareness), Arnold shows that despite his concern to refute physicalism, Dharmakirti's causal explanations of the mental mean that modern arguments from intentionality cut as much against his project as they do against physicalist philosophies of mind. This is evident in the arguments of some of Dharmakirti's contemporaneous Indian critics (proponents of the orthodox Brahmanical Mimasa school as well as fellow Buddhists from the Madhyamaka school of thought), whose critiques exemplify the same logic as modern arguments from intentionality. Elaborating these various strands of thought, Arnold shows that seemingly arcane arguments among first-millennium Indian thinkers can illuminate matters still very much at the heart of contemporary philosophy.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: "Neural Buddhism": Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Dharmakīrti

The *New York Times* columnist David Brooks has ventured, notwithstanding the current popularity of books like Richard Dawkins's *The God Delusion*, that a new wave of cognitive-scientific research on religion may lead not to rampant atheism but to "what you might call neural Buddhism."[1] Brooks's point was that "the real challenge" for theists was likely to come not so much from the avowedly atheistic works of Dawkins and the like as "from scientists whose beliefs overlap a bit with Buddhism." He seems to have meant that cognitive-scientific research supports such

characteristically Buddhist beliefs as that (Brooks says) "the self is not a fixed entity but a dynamic process of relationships," and he worries that such research thus encourages "new movements that emphasize self-transcendence but put little stock in divine law or revelation."

Brooks's column occasioned much reflection on the religious studies blog "The Immanent Frame," where scholars noted (among other things) that the assimilation of Buddhism to science represents a century-old apologetic strategy characteristic of modern Buddhism[2] and that the revolutionary character of cognitive-scientific explanation has perhaps been overstated.[3] Both points are important, but this book will focus on variations on the second one. Here, I want to look at what was arguably the dominant trajectory of Indian Buddhist philosophy—that stemming from Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660 c.e.)—through the lens of central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. I want to suggest that there are indeed important respects in which Dharmakīrti's project is akin to those of contemporary cognitive-scientific philosophers—and that this is so much the worse for Dharmakīrti. My thought is that we can learn much, both about Dharmakīrti and about contemporary philosophy of mind, by appreciating that (and how) some of Dharmakīrti's central positions are vulnerable to arguments that also have been pressed against the kind of physicalist philosophy of mind recently informed by work in the cognitive sciences.

It should be emphasized up front that Dharmakīrti is a particularly difficult thinker; he takes on intrinsically complex and elusive philosophical topics, and his works are, to an even greater extent than is typical of first-millennium Sanskritic philosophers, at once dense and opaquely elliptical, and thus it is unusually difficult to feel confident that one has definitively understood his thoughts on any subject. Dharmakīrti surely admits of various readings, and it would be foolhardy to claim that, by suggesting some respects in which he may be vulnerable to certain arguments, his philosophical project has been exhaustively considered. The present engagement with his thought, however, is animated not only by my sense that we can get some traction on his project by characterizing it as susceptible to certain modern arguments but also by my desire to make the arguments of some of his classical Indian critics seem more interesting than is sometimes appreciated.

In reading Dharmakīrti as I do, then, I am motivated partly by my sense that there are profound philosophical intuitions to be elaborated along lines suggested by some of his Indian critics—and particularly by some proponents of the Brahmanical Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist Madhyamaka schools of thought. I thus hope to reconstruct the arguments of these other Indian philosophers, too, in terms suggested by modern and contemporary philosophical debate. My aims will have been largely fulfilled if we gain some clarity on what may have been at issue among these thinkers—something I hope to achieve in part by showing that the seemingly arcane points at stake for these first-millennium Indian philosophers turn out still to be debated among contemporary philosophers.

I can introduce some of the issues that will come into play with reference to another item from the *New York Times*: a 2005 story concerning a talk by the Dalai Lama at an annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience. Some five hundred brain researchers, it seems, had signed a petition calling for the talk's cancellation, saying it would "highlight a subject with largely unsubstantiated claims," and that it "compromised scientific rigor and objectivity." The *Times* article centered on debates internal to the scientific community—debates, for example, about whether scientific objectivity is compromised by the fact that some scholars engaged in this research are themselves practitioners of Buddhist meditation, and about what kinds of phenomena will admit of properly scientific study. Regarding the latter point, petition signatory Zvani Rossetti is reported to have said that "neuroscience more than other disciplines is the science at the interface between modern philosophy and science."

While Rossetti may be right, it is tendentious to conclude from this that (as he added in questioning the Dalai Lama's talk) "no opportunity should be given to anybody to use neuroscience for

supporting transcendent views of the world." Depending, perhaps, on just what "transcendent views of the world" means, this arguably begs one of the most basic questions in contemporary philosophy of mind—the question whether fundamental issues in philosophy of mind are finally *empirical*, or whether instead they are (and there's a range of options here) metaphysical, transcendental, logical, or conceptual.[5] Impressed by the recently enormous advances in the scientific understanding of the brain (particularly those advances informed by research in computer science and AI), philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett take the questions at issue to be finally empirical and thus take it that the findings of empirical research in the cognitive sciences might answer the basic questions of philosophy of mind, which, we will see, chiefly center for these philosophers on the question of mental causation. What cognitive-scientific research provides, on this view, *just is* an account of mind. Against this, philosophers such as John McDowell take the basic issues in philosophy of mind to be (in a sense we shall consider) transcendental; for McDowell, someone like Dennett offers "what may be an enabling explanation of consciousness, but not a constitutive one. … We lack an account of what [consciousness] is, even if we have an account of what enables it to be present" (1998a, 357). An account of some of the enabling conditions of the mental, in other words, is not to be confused with an account of what the mental *is*—though it's a fair question whether anything *could* count as an instance of the latter.

In light of this divide among contemporary philosophers of mind, it's revealing that Buddhist thought should have come to figure so prominently in cognitive-scientific discourse; David Brooks is far from alone in taking Buddhist thinkers and cognitive-scientifically inclined philosophers as philosophical fellow travelers. This makes sense insofar as Buddhist thinkers are virtually defined as such by their upholding the "without self" (*anātma*) doctrine; surely nothing could be more anti-Cartesian than to urge (as Buddhists do in elaborating this idea) that every moment of experience can be shown to depend upon a host of causal factors, none of which is what we "really" are. Many Buddhist philosophers thus urged a broadly *reductionist* account of persons, according to which we are not entitled to infer that our episodic cognitions and experiences must be the states of an enduring "self"; rather, only the particular and momentary causes themselves are to be judged finally real. Elaborating what he took to be the entailments of this idea, Dharmakīrti influentially said that "whatever has the capacity for causal efficacy is ultimately existent (*paramārthasat*); everything else is just conventionally existent." Surely, a reductionist account that thus privileges causal explanation could be taken to complement a characteristically cognitive-scientific project in philosophy of mind.

Pursuing this thought, Mark Siderits asks (in the subtitle of a recent article): "Is the Eightfold Path a Program?" (2001). That is, can characteristically Buddhist accounts of the person be harmonized particularly with those cognitive-scientific projects that, informed by the availability of the computer model, take thought to be somehow "computational"? Among other things, this amounts to the question whether the basic Buddhist commitment to selflessness might be compatible with *physicalism*.[9] For, as we will see in chapter 2, what computational accounts of thought may most significantly advance is broadly *physicalist* explanations of the mental—explanations, that is, according to which everything about the mental can be finally explained in terms of particular goings-on in the brain. Whether Buddhist thought is compatible with such an account (which Siderits calls "technophysicalism") is a pressing question insofar as contemporary technophysicalist accounts are, Siderits holds, "more difficult to resist" than earlier versions of physicalism (2001, 307). Siderits proposes that the basic Buddhist project *is* finally reconcilable with cognitive-scientific physicalism.

There is surely reason to suppose that Buddhist thought, particularly insofar as it centrally involves causal explanation, might thus be compatible with cognitive-scientific accounts. There remains, however, a significant obstacle to the view that Buddhist thinkers elaborated a position that is uniquely compatible with scientific understanding: while cognitive-scientific accounts of the mind are generally physicalist in character, *Buddhist philosophers are emphatically not physicalists*. Indeed, it is

important to understand that exemplars of the Buddhist philosophical tradition—including, in Dharmakīrti, one of the most influential of all Indian philosophers—elaborated an eminently dualist account of the person. If, moreover, that account finally gives way to any sort of monism (as it arguably does, we will see in chapter 5, when Dharmakīrti lays his Yogācāra cards on the table), it is surely of the idealist sort.

The Buddhist emphasis on the dynamic and causally describable character of subjectivity is not, then, incompatible with the view that among the causes of this are constitutively *mental* existents that cannot be reduced to physical existents. What is denied by Buddhists, in other words, is only that "the mind" denotes (as the definite article perhaps suggests to speakers of English) an enduring substance; to argue, as Buddhists do, that our experience is better explained by an *event*-based ontology than by a *substance*-based one is not by itself to say anything about whether there could be essentially different *kinds* of events. Indian Buddhist philosophers could (and did) coherently maintain both that "persons" consist simply in causally continuous series of events and that the series of mental events, insofar as it continues after the death of the body, has indefinite temporal extension. It is, indeed, just the postmortem continuity of any series of mental events that is called "rebirth."

It is perhaps especially the significance of rebirth for the Buddhist soteriological project that gave philosophers in this tradition a strong stake in refuting any version of physicalism. Indeed, the traditionally transmitted utterances of the Buddha include passages to the effect that physicalism is finally a more pernicious error even than self-grasping (which is saying a lot, since the latter is taken by Buddhists as the primary cause of our suffering). This is, Richard Hayes explains, because "if there is no rebirth, then the very goal of attaining nirvāṇa, understood as the cessation of rebirth, becomes almost perfectly meaningless. Or rather, nirvāṇa comes automatically to every being that dies, regardless of how that being has lived" (1993, 128). Indian Buddhist thinkers thus held that physicalism was tantamount to the extreme of nihilism, or (as Buddhists say) *ucchedavāda*—an extreme not misleadingly translated (to invoke a position in philosophy of mind) as *eliminativism*. This names views according to which everything of moral significance can finally be "eliminated" or explained away in terms of the preferred explanation—and the characteristically Buddhist conviction is that physicalism would be tantamount to such an "elimination" of the morally significant description of events, since on such a view suffering would be eliminated not by Buddhist practice but simply by dying.

Perhaps insofar as physicalism was not a widely entertained option on the Indian philosophical scene, there were few sustained attempts by Buddhist thinkers to refute such a position. There is, though, one revealing attempt to take on the challenge of physicalism; fittingly, this is to be found in the work that most influentially advanced a trajectory of thought that subsequent Indian philosophers took as practically coextensive with the "Buddhist" position in matters philosophical: Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, or (we might translate) "Critical Commentary on Epistemic Criteria." As we will see in chapter 1, Dharmakīrti's magnum opus comprises a lengthy refutation of a physicalist interlocutor who denies the possibility of the Buddha's having cultivated his compassion over innumerable lifetimes; against the objections of this interlocutor, Dharmakīrti argues that mental events cannot be thought to depend on the body.

Insofar as Dharmakīrti's critique of physicalism is judged central to his approach, Siderits may be wrong to claim that the characteristically Buddhist form of dualism is not really integral to the Buddhist project; the significance of rebirth for that project is surely among several considerations that can be thought to commit Buddhists to refuting physicalism. It seems to me that Paul Griffiths is right, in this regard, to stress "just how radical a dualism" was advanced particularly by the Abhidharma and Yogācāra trajectories of Buddhist thought; physicalism "in any form (identity theory, epiphenomenalism and so forth) is not an option" for this tradition of Buddhist thought

(1986, 112). As Richard Hayes more emphatically says, there is "no other philosophical view that is more radically opposed to the tenets of Buddhism than materialism" (1993, 128)—even if Dharmakīrti's refutation is exceptional in explicitly engaging that.

Intentionality, the Status of Universals, and the Problems with Cognitivism

That some Indian Buddhists strenuously rejected physicalism is not, however, the point I am developing in this book. While Dharmakīrti himself pressed the Buddhist tradition's most notable case against physicalism, we can appreciate some central features of his thought by recognizing that his own account of the mental nevertheless turns out to be vulnerable to a cogent line of critique that modern philosophers have leveled against varieties of physicalism. The central premise of this book, then, is that we can learn some important things about the conceptual "deep structure" of what is arguably the dominant trajectory of Indian Buddhist thought—and, as well, about some contemporary cognitive-scientific philosophies of mind—by understanding these significantly divergent traditions of thought as facing some of the same philosophical problems.

In particular, Dharmakīrti shares with cognitive-scientific philosophers of mind a guiding commitment to finally *causal* explanations of the mental, as well as (what arguably follows from this) the view that everything about the mental must be explicable with reference only to things somehow internal to the subject. I follow Vincent Descombes (among others) in characterizing this "solipsistic and causalist position in the philosophy of mind" as *cognitivist* (2001, xvi). Notwithstanding the considerations that (it will be allowed) can be taken to recommend cognitivist accounts in philosophy of mind, we will see that there are significant problems for any such attempt to explain all aspects of the mental in terms of causal relations among local particulars.

These problems, as they commonly arise for Dharmakīrti and for contemporary physicalists, can usefully be framed in terms of the concept of *intentionality*. The various uses of this philosophical term of art—familiar alike to students of continental phenomenology and Anglo-American philosophy of mind—commonly involve the idea of "aboutness"; that is, intentionality picks out the fact that mental events (like *thinking* or *believing*) perhaps uniquely exemplify the fact of being *about* their objects. Mental events, on another way of putting the point, constitutively have *content*; as Franz Brentano puts this in a canonical passage on the subject, "in presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on" (1973, 88). Among the ideas here is that whatever we might reasonably say about the relations of (say) a table to its surrounding environment, we would not say that it is *about* anything; the relation that characterizes a thought's being about its content, many have supposed, is peculiarly distinctive of the mental.

There is (we will see especially in chapter 3) much to be said about the history and the varying uses of this idea, but in one form or another, a main question in the philosophy of mind has thus been (in Lynne Rudder Baker's words) "to understand how one thing (some mental item) *can mean or represent or be about* some other thing (for example, some state of affairs)—to understand how anything can have content" (1987, 9; emphasis added). Here, it's relevant to note that for Baker's "some mental item" we might also substitute *some linguistic item*; surely linguistic items (sentences, stories, claims) are also rightly taken to "mean or represent or be about" states of affairs. In fact, there turns out to be a close relationship between the intentionality of the mental and certain features of language; indeed, linguistic items may represent the one case of something other than mental events that exemplifies intentionality.

While there are many ways one might tell the story of this relationship, this fact surely explains why so much contemporary philosophy of mind looks a lot like philosophy of language—a fact humorously noted by Jerry Fodor, who once characterized his own work as exemplifying "the philosophy of mind (or the philosophy of language, or whatever this stuff is)" (1990, 131). Thus, a

great many contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind often center on considerations in *semantics*—considerations, for example, having to do with such things as the truth conditions and referentiality of propositions. How we are to understand the relation between (as it were) "linguistic" and "mental" intentionality has, in fact, been chief among the points at issue in twentieth-century philosophy of mind. The contemporary debate can be framed by Roderick Chisholm, who said of Wilfrid Sellars's influential 1956 essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that the main question over which they diverged was this: "Can we explicate the intentional character of believing and of other psychological attitudes by reference to certain features of language; or must we explicate the intentional characteristics of language by reference to believing and to other psychological attitudes?" (Chisholm and Sellars 1957, 215).

Sellars held the first of these positions, arguing in his famous 1956 essay that "the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal performances" (1956, 94). Whatever one thinks is the right direction of explanation here (and in chapter 3, I will make a case for Sellars's view), it is perhaps especially the closeness of the relation between linguistic and mental "aboutness" that makes it so difficult to give (what many would take to define a scientific approach to any matter) a thoroughly *causal* account of the mental; for the way that things like sentences relate to what they are about does not (to say the least) readily admit of causal explanation. Insofar, then, as mental events are like linguistic items in this respect, a mental event's "being about" its content arguably involves something constitutively other than causal relations. The extent to which the intentionality of the mental thus resists causal explanation is, then, commonly problematic for Dharmakīrti and contemporary physicalists just insofar as they are alike committed to the view that only things that can enter into *causal* relations are finally real.

The issues here in play might also be put in terms of the category of "belief," which, despite its occurrence in the title of my first book, was not theorized there. In discussions of intentionality, belief represents the paradigm case of what philosophers since Bertrand Russell have called the "propositional attitudes." If mental events are characterized by their having content, propositional attitudes represent the various ways of "being about" any instance of such content; one can, for example, *affirm, doubt, hope*, or *think* that such-and-such is the case. Of the propositional attitudes, *believing* is arguably the most conceptually basic, since taking any other such attitude toward some state of affairs presupposes one's believing something to obtain; "it's impressive," Paul Boghossian notes, "how many concepts of the propositional attitudes depend asymmetrically on the concept of belief" (2003, 43).

Among the questions raised by this way of talking about intentionality is what sort of thing, exactly, the *content* of any belief is; while particular *acts of believing* are specific to individuals, what these are *about* may be common to many such acts. There is thus a case to be made for thinking that beliefs essentially concern things like *claims* or *states of affairs*—the kinds of things, many philosophers have noted, that can be individuated by *that*-clauses. When one says, for example, "she believes *that* it's raining" or "I believe *that Trout Mask Replica* is a great album," the content of the *that*-clause is a complex state of affairs under some description; these clauses embrace entire sets of facts, something of the world as *taken* from some perspective. To think of any instance of awareness (at least of the believing sort) as *contentful*, on such a view—to think of it as *about* anything—is thus to suppose that individuating or understanding the belief requires reference to some kind of abstraction. This is because "states of affairs" are not unique particulars; unlike, say, fleetingly occurrent mental representations, they are the kinds of things that can simultaneously be the object of many people's beliefs.

Buddhists and other Indian philosophers would recognize that what has thus been brought into play by the foregoing introduction of intentionality and propositional attitudes, then, is the question of the ontological status of universals and the relation of these to cognition. Another form of the

question of intentionality, then, is whether it is possible to give a complete account of the mental (more precisely, of mental *content*) in terms of an ontology comprising only unique particulars—or whether, instead, such an account inevitably requires reference to some kind of abstractions or universals, whether those be understood as concepts, propositions, truth conditions, or whatever. Part of what I want to show, then, is the extent to which characteristically Indian philosophical debates about the status particularly of linguistic universals—debates, for example, between basically nominalist thinkers like Dharmakīrti and archrealists like the proponents of Mīmāṃsā—can also be understood to concern eminently contemporary questions about how we should understand our mental lives.

Thus, as we will see in chapter 4, Dharmakīrti (like Jerry Fodor) is centrally concerned somehow to explain linguistic universals with reference only to particulars; this is the point of his famously elusive *apoha* ("exclusion") doctrine. This doctrine elaborates the idea that concepts are more precise or determinate (more *contentful*) just to the extent that they exclude more from their purview; the scope of *cat* is narrower than that of *mammal* just insofar as the former additionally excludes from its range all mammals in the world that are not cats. Typically represented as the signal Buddhist contribution to Indian philosophy of language, this doctrine can also be understood more generally as an account of *the content of beliefs*. According to Dharmakīrti's elaboration of it, this complex doctrine emphasizes that conceptual content can finally be explained just in terms of particular mental representations; particular occurrences of perceiving or sensing, that is, provide the bases for the "exclusions" that finally explain the universals in play whenever we entertain discursive thoughts.

It's important that Dharmakīrti thus be able to explain universals with reference only to particulars since, for him, only particular things—only *this* sensation of a pot, and *this* one, etc.—are finally real; as ultimately unreal, abstractions (like the property *being a pot*) cannot finally explain any belief's having explanatory significance. When we get to Dharmakīrti's arguments for this, we will have seen (in chapter 2) that Jerry Fodor affords us good resources for thinking about what Dharmakīrti is up to in this regard; indeed, Fodor could be talking about Dharmakīrti's *apoha* doctrine when he says of his own representational theory of mind (RTM) that it purports to explain "how there *could* be states that have the semantical and causal properties that propositional attitudes are commonsensically supposed to have. In effect, RTM proposes an account of what the propositional attitudes *are*" (1985, 78).

We will see in chapter 2 that on Fodor's physicalist version of such an account, the particular "mental representations" that explain semantic content can be described in terms of correlated brain events—an idea that the antiphysicalist Dharmakīrti would strongly reject. What commonly characterizes Fodor's and Dharmakīrti's accounts, though, is the essentially cognitivist presuppositions that are arguably most significant for their views. Both accounts are driven by the idea that only causal relations among particulars can be thought finally "real," finally to *explain* anything. These thinkers share, moreover, the idea that the only such particulars that indubitably occur are those that are somehow—Dharmakīrti and Fodor diverge most sharply, of course, with regard to how—internal to a subject. For Fodor, the problem of mental causation thus recommends the adoption of a "methodological solipsism." On this view, anything that is called on to explain the causal efficacy of the mind must be intelligible without reference to the *semantic* properties of mental events—without reference (Fodor says) to "the property of being true, of having referents, or, indeed, the property of being representations *of the environment*" (1980, 283). Instead, the explaining is finally to be done by brain events that can be exhaustively described simply in terms of their intrinsic properties.

We will see in chapter 5 that Dharmakīrti can be understood as similarly grounding his whole account of semantic content (the one elaborated in the form of the *apoha* doctrine) in what is, for Dharmakīrti, arguably the only really indubitable "epistemic criterion" (*pramāṇa*): *svasaṃvitti*, or "self-awareness." It is in the parts of his corpus where he elaborates this doctrine that Dharmakīrti has traditionally been taken most clearly to affirm the characteristically "Yogācāra" doctrine of Buddhist idealism. Whether or not that doctrine can be understood as metaphysical idealism, it is clear that Dharmakīrti's arguments for *svasaṃvitti* represent a case at least for *epistemic* idealism—for the view, that is, that what we are immediately aware of (which, note well, is logically independent of the ontological question of *what there is*) is simply the occurrence and contents of our own mental events. On my reading, the salient point of this epistemological claim is that mental content is autonomously intelligible; this is the idea, in other words, that we can know *how things seem to us* quite apart from any reference to *how things really are*—quite apart (with Fodor) from whether mental representations might have properties like *being true*.

Fodor and Dharmakīrti would, then, commonly have us explain conceptual mental content finally in terms of what irrefragably *seems to a subject* to be the case; anything's seeming so, moreover, is finally to be explained, for both thinkers, in causal terms. Among other things, the kind of cognitivist approach we will thus develop with reference to Fodor and Dharmakīrti can be said to aim at providing a finally *nonintentional* account of intentionality—to aim, that is, at explaining intentionality (at explaining how anything can mean or represent or be about some other thing) in terms of existents that do not themselves intrinsically "mean" anything. Expressing this point, Fodor quips that "if aboutness is real, it must really be something else" (1987, 97). Arguments to this effect represent, in one contemporary idiom, the project of *naturalizing* intentionality.

We will see that there are considerations that recommend such views, which can, it seems to me, be taken to have just the intuitive plausibility that empiricism more generally has. Indeed, the projects of Fodor and Dharmakīrti commonly fall on the side of the broadly empiricist divide in philosophy of mind; on the views of both of these thinkers, the answer to a question such as what it is to *mean* anything takes the form of a psychological account of causally describable processes involving particular states or events. Chief among the problems with such an approach, though, is that it may very well presuppose precisely the kinds of things it aims to explain. This is surely as Dharmakīrti's principally Brahmanical interlocutors argued with respect to his *apoha* doctrine: the very process of exclusion in terms of which Dharmakīrti explains universals is intelligible, his critics argued, only with reference to universals. I will suggest that the conceptual difficulties here can be more generally understood in terms of Dharmakīrti's own attempt to *explain* intentionality as necessarily exemplifying precisely what could be called an *intentional* level of description.

A basically transcendental argument to this effect—one that stems from Kant (and particularly from the *Critique of Practical Reason*) and that is variously carried forward by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell—takes its bearings from the idea that reason itself is the "intentional" phenomenon par excellence. Thus, the discursive realm with regard to which Indian philosophers focus on the problem of universals can also be characterized (as it is by Sellars) as the "logical space of reasons" (1956, 76). This is the level of description at which it makes sense to think of persons in their capacity as responsive to *reasons*—the level, that is, at which we find intelligible somebody's demand that we *justify* any action or decision. The question for those who would "naturalize" intentionality, then, is how to account for the status and content of reasons; more precisely, insofar as reasoning constitutively involves (in John McDowell's phrase) "relations such as one thing's being warranted or correct in the light of another" (1996, xv), anyone who would reduce (or "naturalize") intentionality must, ipso facto, be able to show how such conceptual relations can themselves be explained by (or consist in) finally *causal* relations. The broadly Kantian argument against such a project is that any putative explanation of us in our capacity *as reasoning*—a physicalist's, say, in terms of brain events—

inevitably turns out itself to presuppose or exemplify an intentional level of description; reason itself cannot be "explained" by any such account just insofar as it is only by reasoning that one could try to do so.

This is much as some of Dharmakīrti's principal Indian interlocutors variously argued. When Indian Buddhists and their Brahmanical interlocutors debate the status of linguistic universals, there is an important extent to which they can be taken as advancing arguments in philosophy of mind; indeed, this centuries-long debate between Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas can be characterized as concerning precisely Chisholm's question to Sellars. Thus, Buddhists like Dharmakīrti clearly held that "the intentional characteristics of language" (most generally, its *meaning* anything) are to be explained "by reference to believing and to other psychological attitudes"—more specifically, that what language is about can finally be explained in terms of causally describable mental representations. Against this, Mīmāṃsakas who defended the view that language is eternal can be understood to have held, among other things, that there is something *irreducibly* linguistic about the mental—that language is a condition of the possibility of mind, not a product thereof. Among their most interesting arguments to this effect is one that can be generalized as concerning the ineliminable nature of an intentional level of description.

Similarly, Dharmakīrti's fellow Buddhists the Mādhyamikas, who characteristically urged (in Mark Siderits's apt phrase) that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth," can be understood to have argued that the world must finally be understood as *irreducibly conventional*. The characteristically Mādhyamika deference to "conventional truth" (*saṃvṛtisatya*), I will suggest, can be understood as deference to an *intentional* level of description, and Mādhyamikas can be taken thus to have urged that intentionality is ineliminable in favor of any supposedly privileged level of description. I will, then, be characterizing both Mīmāṃsakas and Mādhyamikas (despite their enormously different overall projects) as having variously advanced something very much like the broadly Kantian line of argument that has been, in my view, most cogently advanced against physicalists. By thus reconstructing some Mīmāṃsaka and Mādhyamika arguments against the likes of Dharmakīrti as having advanced significant insights concerning what Kant called "practical reason," it is to be hoped that we will learn something not only about the various first-millennium Indian philosophers in view, but also about the nature and promise of what some have taken to be a profound argument against physicalism.

Whatever the extent, though, to which arguments such as the foregoing are cogent, it's revealing that they have purchase not only against contemporary physicalists but also against the decidedly antiphysicalist Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti. It is to the extent that he exemplifies a basically cognitivist approach that, even though having pressed the Buddhist tradition's most sustained case against physicalism, Dharmakīrti turns out himself to be vulnerable to what I will elaborate (in chapters 3 and 6) as perhaps the most cogent argument against physicalism. Insofar, that is, as he takes the mental to be causally explicable in terms of particular moments of awareness, Dharmakīrti is vulnerable to arguments meant to show intentionality to be irreducible to and ineliminable in favor of such terms. If, as Sellars has it, the "logical space of reasons" is *sui generis*—if reasoning and believing will not admit of the kind of finally causal explanation that Fodor and Dharmakīrti commonly aim for—then significant commitments of Dharmakīrti's are called into question.

That Dharmakīrti, who was a strong critic of physicalism and probably himself an idealist, should thus be vulnerable to the same arguments that cut against contemporary iterations of physicalism is, I think, revealing of what are the most philosophically significant presuppositions in play. Our consideration of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti in light of contemporary debates about intentionality may, then, not only help us characterize some of the most significant issues in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti; it may also help us appreciate that despite recently enormous advances in the empirical

sciences of cognition, Vincent Descombes is right that "the cognitivist conception of mind has been derived not from cognitive psychology but … from a particular philosophy. To hold that only certain kinds of explanations—e.g., causal explanations in terms of existents with specifiable identity criteria—are finally valid is not simply to follow the manifest deliverances of neutral inquiry; it is to have decided, a priori, for metaphysical commitments that are not themselves the results of such inquiry.

Plan of the Book

We will begin our development of the foregoing thoughts with a consideration, in chapter 1, of Dharmakīrti's critique of physicalism in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. This will be prefaced by a more general survey of some central commitments of Dharmakīrti; in particular, I will sketch the basics of his epistemology, focused in terms of the causally describable character of perception. We will then determine what kind of argument against physicalism is available to Dharmakīrti in light of these commitments. His argument, we will see, is finally to the effect that mental items are ontologically distinct from physical items—and that this is compatible with (indeed, that it relates closely to) Dharmakīrti's characteristically Ābhidharmika notions of causation. I will characterize his argument as basically empiricist in character, in a sense to be elaborated.

In chapter 2, we will begin a two-chapter excursus on some contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality, developed with an eye toward giving us some conceptual tools for the interpretation of Dharmakīrti. This chapter will consider the "computational" models of cognitive-scientific physicalism developed by Daniel Dennett and (especially) Jerry Fodor, particularly insofar as these philosophers aim to account for intentionality. We will see that it is particularly the problem of "mental causation" that can be taken to motivate these projects. While Dennett and Fodor both claim to provide accounts that allow us to think of intentional attitudes (like believing and judging) as somehow real, it turns out to be at the scientific level of description that all of the explanatory work is done; this is as it must be, given their sense (comparable to Dharmakīrti's) that only things capable of involving a certain kind of causal efficacy can finally be thought *real*. It is, for these thinkers, only as alternatively described (in terms, e.g., of brain events) that things like "reasons" can be thought to *do* anything.

Aiming to clarify what is most interestingly problematic about the accounts of Dennett and Fodor, I will, in chapter 3, venture a basically Kantian story of intentionality, motivating an account of why concerns having to do with language should figure so prominently in philosophy of mind—an account of why it is reasonable to hold, with Sellars, that "the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal performances." Kant's appeal to the transcendental unity of apperception figures centrally in his development of what Sellars called the "logical space of reasons"—the conceptual order in terms of which it makes sense to think of persons as responsive to reasons as such. Kant characterized this conceptual order as exercising a faculty of "spontaneity," thus emphasizing the extent to which this level of description constitutively resists causal explanation. Chief among the Kantian arguments to be elaborated following Sellars and McDowell is one to the effect that the intentionality of awareness constitutively involves this conceptual space, and that we must, to that extent, suppose that intentionality cannot be exhaustively explained in causal terms. The argument is completed by pressing the point that the foregoing conclusion cannot be denied insofar as it is only by reasoning that one could do so; the cognitivist project of "naturalizing" intentionality cannot go through, then, just insofar as we can make sense of anyone's being *persuaded* of any view on the matter.

With chapter 4, we resume our engagement with Dharmakīrti, considering, in particular, the *apoha* doctrine. Dharmakīrti's peculiarly causal elaboration of this approach to explaining conceptual mental content—the distinctiveness of which will be brought out by comparing his

version of the doctrine with that first promulgated by his predecessor, Dignāga (c. 480–540 c.e.)—has striking affinities with the "psychosemantic" account developed by Fodor. Thus, what is excluded from coming under any concept is, for Dharmakīrti, everything that does not produce the same kinds of effects—where, significantly, the "effects" in question consist finally in the cognitive "images" or "representations" produced by sensory contact with objects. I argue that this is an account according to which the intentionality of the mental (of what thought is *about*) is to be explained finally in terms of the proximate causes of particular episodes of awareness—and that despite the considerations that may be taken to recommend such a psychologistic approach, this move brings out the truth in Donald Davidson's observation that empiricism is, problematically, finally "the view that the subjective ('experience') is the foundation of objective empirical knowledge" (1988, 46).

We will complete this thought in chapter 5, which will find us confronting the challenge of understanding Dharmakīrti's arguably foundational doctrine of *svasaṃvitti*, or "self-awareness." This is reckoned by Dharmakīrti as a variety of perception, which is most significantly to say that it is constitutively nonconceptual. Among the arguments for the doctrine of *svasaṃvitti* are some meant to show that what we are immediately aware of (which is logically distinct from the ontological question of *what there is*) is only things—sense data, say, or mental representations—somehow intrinsic to awareness. We will also try to make sense of the stronger claim (arguably advanced by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) that *svasaṃvitti* is, in the final analysis, really the only indubitable epistemic criterion (the only real *pramāṇa*)—a view that may amount to a statement of characteristically Yogācāra idealism. It will be clear, in any case, that this doctrine develops the quintessentially cognitivist view that awareness is autonomously intelligible—that, on one way of putting this point, the phenomenological fact of anything's *seeming* blue is logically prior to (and intelligible apart from) our having the idea of anything's *being* blue. An understanding of the foundational role of this idea for Dharmakīrti's project will help us appreciate why Dharmakīrti is committed to explaining mental content as he does in developing the *apoha* doctrine—why Dharmakīrti must, that is, think that contentful thoughts are finally *about* nothing more than subjectively occurrent mental events.

In chapter 6, we will complete the case for thinking that the foregoing project of Dharmakīrti is vulnerable to the same kinds of arguments, first developed in chapter 3, that have been leveled against the physicalist cognitivism of thinkers like Dennett and Fodor. Here, we approach this point by developing arguments from some first-millennium Indian interlocutors of Dharmakīrti and his school. With regard to the *apoha* doctrine, it is surely the Brahmanical school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā that had the strongest stake in refuting Dharmakīrti; Mīmāṃsakas were archrealists about linguistic universals, and the critiques of *apoha* advanced by the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 620–680 c.e.) figured importantly in post-Dharmakīrti revisions of the doctrine. Rather than focus, however, on the arguments explicitly leveled at *apoha*, we will instead consider one of the principal arguments for the characteristically Mīmāṃsaka view that language is eternal—an argument that will be generalized as concerning the ineliminability of an intentional level of description. So, too, some characteristically Mādhyamika arguments concerning the irreducibly "conventional" (*saṃvṛtisat*) nature of existents will be considered through the lens of our issues in philosophy of mind. It will be noted, in this regard, that Mādhyamika arguments to this effect particularly center on questions of *causation*; it is, in other words, the supposedly privileged character of causal explanations that Mādhyamikas particularly have in their sights. It will be suggested that the "conventional truth" (*saṃvṛtisatya*) or "ordinary discourse" (*vyavahāra*) that Mādhyamikas show to be ineliminable in favor of such causal terms can, in keeping with the concerns of this book, be understood as most basically picking out an *intentional* level of description; among the things, then, that are ineliminable from any account of persons on the Mādhyamika view is reference, in one idiom, to their responsiveness to reasons as such.

Throughout the book, my goal is twofold: I want to advance the *interpretive* task of understanding the arguments and commitments of first-millennium Indian philosophers centering on Dharmakīrti, as well as the *philosophical* task of characterizing and advancing some arguments that classical Indian and contemporary philosophers alike would recognize as touching on central issues in (with Fodor) "the philosophy of mind (or the philosophy of language, or whatever this stuff is)." The interpretive, Indological task can be advanced whether or not the arguments here developed against physicalism are finally judged cogent; the exercise is valuable as a way to understand the classical Indian arguments as long as the characterization of the various philosophical interlocutors here invoked helps us to clarify issues of central concern to Dharmakīrti and his Buddhist and Brahmanical interlocutors. It **(p.18)** is my hope, though, that the enlistment of some Indian interlocutors can help in the mounting of a cogent case for a philosophical account of contemporary relevance; perhaps, that is, some first-millennium Indian philosophers can help us understand the nature and limits of some eminently twenty-first-century developments in philosophy of mind. <>

BAHUDHĀ AND THE POST 911 WORLD by Balmiki Prasad Singh [Oxford University Press, 9780195693553]

Today, in the age of terrorism and an unsafe world, there is a fresh need to understand the core meaning of the world religions, to reshape the educational system, and to strengthen the United Nations (UN) in a manner that can help people to build a better future. Drawing upon sources from the ancient roots of Indian culture and his experience as an international civil servant, B.P. Singh presents an essential framework for addressing the core twenty-first century global conflict and rebuilding for the post-September 11 world, while integrating the concept of the bahudhā philosophy. The futility of promoting violence and conflict in the name of religion is obvious to all except a few. Together, people have to recognize that many factors drive public opinion, including education and media, and that a global view is required. Underlining the need to transcend age-old peace mechanisms and reconstruct the language of discourse, this book propounds the concept of bahudhā — an eternal reality or continuum, a dialogue of harmony, and peaceful living. Bahudhā recognizes the distinction between plural societies and pluralism, facilitates exchange of views, and promotes understanding of the collective good. This book argues that the answer to terrorism lies in respecting human rights and appreciating various cultures and value systems. This is crucial for facilitating and enhancing dialogue processes eventually leading to amity and a peaceful world.

The rise of terrorism and fundamentalism in recent times has brought about phenomenal changes in global politics. These unprecedented challenges call for a new, bold, and imaginative statecraft from world leaders. Underlining the need to transcend age-old peace mechanisms and reconstruct our

language of discourse, this book propounds the concept of Bahudhā — an eternal reality or continuum, a dialogue of harmony, and peaceful living. Bahudahā recognizes the distinction between plural societies and pluralism, facilitates exchange of views, and promotes understanding of the collective good.

The book is divided into five parts. The first part discusses the major events witnessed by the world during 1989DS2001 — the fall of the Berlin Wall, transfer of Hong Kong to China, and the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11 — and their implications for various nations, cultures, and

international peace. The next part discusses India's experiences in handling the pluralistic challenge by citing examples from the Vedas and Puranas and analyzing policies followed by Ashoka, Kabir, Guru Nanak, Akbar, and Mahatma Gandhi.

In the subsequent sections, the author underlines the importance of Bahudhā as an instrument of public policy for harmony and also discusses the global imperatives of following such an approach. He highlights the central role of education and religion in the building of a harmonious society and advocates the strengthening of the United Nations to become an effective global conflict-resolution mechanism.

B.P. Singh argues that the answer to terrorism lies in respecting human rights and appreciating various cultures and value systems. This is crucial for facilitating and enhancing dialogue processes eventually elading to amity and a peaceful world.

This interdisciplinary volume will interest scholars, students, and researchers of history, philosophy, politics, and international relations. <> <>

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