RTReview.org

SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor
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New Series Number 102

EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.

Each issue should surprise.

Contents: Blasphemous Anthropocene

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMANISM edited by Anthony B. Pinn [Oxford University Press, 9780190921538]

While humanist sensibilities have played a formative role in the advancement of our species, critical attention to humanism as a field of study is a more recent development. As a system of thought that values human needs and experiences over supernatural concerns, humanism has gained greater attention amid the rapidly shifting demographics of religious communities, especially in Europe and North America. This outlook on the world has taken on global dimensions as well, with activists, artists, and thinkers forming a humanistic response not only to traditional religion, but to the pressing social and political issues of the 21st century.

With in-depth, scholarly chapters, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMANISM aims to cover the subject by analyzing its history, its philosophical development, its influence on culture, and its engagement with social and political issues. In order to expand the field beyond more Western-focused works, the
HANDOOK discusses humanism as a worldwide phenomenon, with regional surveys that explore how the concept has developed in particular contexts. The *Handbook* also approaches humanism as both an opponent to traditional religion as well as a philosophy that some religions have explicitly adopted. By
both synthesizing the field, and discussing how it continues to grow and develop,
the HANDBOOK promises to be a landmark volume, relevant to both humanism and the rapidly changing religious landscape.

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"At any rate, in general, one need not know who the humanist thinkers are to be a humanist:' This line is from a letter written by academics in support of Hamza bin Walayat who, arguing that his rejection of Islam and embrace of Humanism would result in violence against him in Pakistan, had been denied asylum in the United Kingdom because "he did not mention Plato and Aristotle when questioned about Humanism." In reading the story, several things caught my attention. First, there is the Eurocentric perspective found in the assumption that Humanism must be funneled through European cultural markers and symbols expressed by officials involved in denying the petition. Second, there is the response of his defenders implying the fuzzy nature of Humanism as a discrete grammar for thought and action—no necessary markers, no required signs and symbols connoting the markers of Humanism and one's connection to Humanism.

Claims of definitional fluidity trigger larger questions worth considering: What are the indications of Humanism's emergence as a distinct orientation? What developments mark its growth? What constitutes its claim to space in the public imagination? Finally, focusing on the more obvious concern here, what do such questions and their implications mean for a handbook on Humanism?

Setting the Context: The Usual Suspects

I begin by noting a common understanding of Humanism as a counter to the totalizing intents of theological frameworks, expressed graphically as a means to isolate religious belief to the confines of private life. Yet in mapping out this effort to restrict religion, one need not position Humanism as synonymous with secularism. While there is overlap, Humanism, unlike secularism, isn't necessarily describable in any significant manner as a matter of absence. That is to say, if religious Humanism has any relevance as an actual category, reducing religious signs and grammar used in shaping public space or the subduing of belief as a condition of public engagement isn't so essential. In other words, it is possible to have Humanism within a public setting not clearly defined as secular to the degree animosity toward religion varies across understandings of Humanism; just as one can have religion within a society defined as secular. The space occupied by Humanism—and by extension its corresponding content and reach—can't be adequately measured by mapping religion's recession from public space. Humanism's relationship to (and with) other modes of orientation—some of them religious in nature—is much too complex and messy for such clear distinction.

The core values, as Albert Camus might name the essential nature of Humanism, aren't so easily detangled from the cultural `mood' that surrounds them—that is, the scrambled effort to foster awareness of and a push against one's circumstances, as well as the residual formations and signs articulating that effort.' Still, for the sake of argument (and without putting too fine a point on it), there are questions worth posing: What might traditional religious practices mean within a context of societal upheaval—some of which is sanctioned and enforced along religious lines? How is religious practice and thought modified or transformed through Humanism? What is the proper vocabulary and grammar for naming public space when there is no need to restrict oneself to the language of religious organizations? These aren't new questions resulting simply from twenty-first century developments; rather, versions of such questions have been asked across the centuries.

Humanists sought to center the arts and science on human capacity, and to do so in an environment deeply marked by religious institutions and belief. In this way, challenge to religious doctrine and theological pronouncements meant to advance the "age of reason" furthered the reach of humanist sensibilities. This, however, is not to suggest that Humanism can be understood only as a reactive challenge to religious thought and organization. Conflict with religion isn't the full story, although the trappings of religion proved a convenient nemesis over time.

Tied most energetically to the demographic shifts encountered by Christian communities—"the institutional religious decline"—the mid-twentieth century, for instance, marked for many a concern with situating a particular "threat:' According to Elizabeth Drescher, when it came to presenting for public consumption this perceived weakening of moral tradition and stability, "containing the unaffiliated in demographic categories and cataloging their various names was a stock feature of mainstream reporting. Reconciling the rapidly developing scientific worldview and religious tradition in the light of World War II brought new terminologies for unbelief into the popular lexicon." Related to this narrative, surveys and quantitative studies served to define and amplify a growing population of those who called themselves by a range of signifiers. Speaking explicitly in terms of the United States, and marking out historically this pattern of growth leading into the twenty-first century, Susan Jacoby writes, "from 1990 to 2001, the number of the unchurched more than doubled, from 14.3 million to 29.4 million." And she continues, "approximately 14 percent of Americans, compared with only 8 percent in 1990, have no formal ties to religion." If one thinks about this Humanism-religion tension from early markers to the present, there is significance in the words with which Nathan Alexander begins his recent book, "the number of atheists and nonreligious people across the globe has never been higher."

War, economic alterations producing financial vulnerability, culture debates, ongoing trauma as social norms are challenged, and a host of other shifts in thought and practice brought into question the viability of dominant forms of religion. These circumstances also served to highlight the "Nones"—a nebulous category incorporating a range of perspectives from atheism to spirituality, and tying together the various identifications through a generic marker of "claiming no particular religious affiliation." Growing attention to this population served to challenge long-held assumptions concerning the origin and nature of moral and ethical commitments and claims, and pointed out the manner in which religious language and vocabulary often served to overdetermine collective life. While often presented in relationship to the United States—with its high percentage of citizens claiming Christianity—scholars such as Phil Zuckerman also point out a narrative of non-affiliation that ties trends in the United States to larger frameworks for living outside religious practice and theology elsewhere in the world.

Attention to the Nones might tell us, for example, something about shifting church demographics and the general nature of disbelief as understood by readers of this type of handbook. Yet study of this population isn't synonymous with study of Humanism. The Nones represent only the most recent turn in a long history, and to get a sense of Humanism involves a deeper historical dive. As a

point of clarification, in making this statement I am not aiming to suggest this deeper dive is the purpose of this introduction. No, the intent of this introduction isn't to outline fully the particulars related to Humanism and its development across time and geographies. Rather, it serves to set the scene and to offer some preliminary framing that provides a sense of the scope of the handbook. In this way, it offers only a sense of the complexities at work and general parameters for the thinking— the deep dive—presented in the pages that follow it.

Humanism—Humanisms

One could argue that Humanism involves a turn to "the practices of the ancients" through interpretation and application of early philosophers and literature—the "classics"—as well as the development of technologies aimed at engagement with the physical world and systems of collective life based on principles outside the claims of theological arguments. It took some time for "Humanism" and "humanist" to be used as labels in line with more contemporary understandings. Nonetheless, Humanism has developed from distinguishing a mode of academic studies—an intellectual and pedagogical commitment to curriculum tied to Greek and Latin cultural production as grounding for solid training—to representing a range of academic and popular philosophical viewpoints, modes of ethics, and life strategies.

What we have come to call Humanism largely seems marked by a relationship between achievement and human ingenuity—that is to say, a growing mode of thought and behavior grounded in the argument that humanity has the capacity for moving through the world with intentionality and consequence. As such, it shifts from critiques of supernaturalism; to the presentation of ethics tied only to humanity; to the outlining of modes of politics safeguarding human flourishing through reason and development; to scientific advancement and sensibilities with a tenacious grasp on the world within the limits of human capacity. For example, there is something in the contexts of the "Humanist Manifestos" that echoes this longstanding and general sense of optimism and opportunity. Speculating on what will emerge during the twenty-first century, the second Manifesto says,

> The next century can be and should be the humanistic century. Dramatic scientific, technological, and ever-accelerating social and political changes crowd our awareness. We have virtually conquered the planet, explored the moon, overcome the natural limits of travel and communication; we stand at the dawn of a new age, ready to move farther into space and perhaps inhabit other planets. Using technology wisely, we can control our environment, conquer poverty, markedly reduce disease, extend our life-span, significantly modify our behavior, alter the course of human evolution and cultural development, unlock vast new powers, and provide humankind with unparalleled opportunity for achieving an abundant and meaningful life.

One might say Humanism is a complicated set of related—at times oppositional—frameworks and structures of thinking and ethics guided by a grammar of progress tied to and measured by human advancement. Something about Humanism across the centuries involves an array of vantage points— the socio-cultural, economic, and political terrains from which one views and accesses human want and need. But some have been left out of the equation, and the experience of others serves to overdetermine the nature and meaning of the human. And so as much recent scholarship attests, the development of Humanism is not void of discrimination and a general disregard for difference. In a word, the typical genealogy of Humanism tends to privilege the European context, as if Humanism has no purchase beyond claims placed on it within those countries. Still, this volume doesn't seek to ignore Europe's relationship to Humanism. Instead, it aims to decenter Europe, to present Humanism beyond concerns and structures of thought that assume a European framework and audience. Humanism has a global history and importance; and this handbook seeks to provide a sense of this reach in terms of physical geography, cultural cartographies, and themes.

Scholars such as Stephen Law rightly note humanist sensibilities and ideas extend back to ancient worlds and move forward with significant spread. Narratives both popular and academic point to an important fact: to capture Humanism also requires attention to, for instance, the manner in which certain Hindu thinkers in the sixth century questioned supernatural claims found in Hindu sacred texts, and called for attention to the natural environment in which humans live: "the wise should enjoy the pleasures of the world." Philosophical systems such as Confucianism and its appeal to reason and grounded virtues also demand attention. Or one might think of Buddhism and its presentation of the fundamental questions of life in a manner speaking to humanist sensibilities. Furthermore, figures like Persian philosopher Abu Zayd Ibn-Kaldun offer a way of understanding Humanism's development beyond the shores of Europe and in relationship not to Christianity but Islam.

Over the centuries Humanism has produced patterns of thinking and doing that are geographically spread, complex, and entwined in the sociocultural sensibilities signifying the age. All this, in each context, is marked by an effort to shape the structures of individual and collective life. These structures often have something to do with patterns of cognition, organizational frameworks, political and social institutions, arts, and agreed upon codes of collective and individual conduct. And they suggest an occupation of time and space marked by commitment to a productive present, as well as assumption of a future marked by improvement. Available here is some consideration of the human in Humanism—the grouping of subjectivities that castes itself against other modalities of life in the world. There is no one moral and ethical code of engagement associated with Humanism, yet commonly shared is an assumption of `human-ness' as potentially fruitful and transformative—or at least requiring exploration.

Clearly, Humanism has not been without its critics. This, of course, would include religious organizations and their leadership seeking to stem the tide of uncomfortable questions by re-enforcing the special nature of religious-theological knowledge in which vertical relationships are given priority over horizontal relationships. Theologically, this critique is often expressed by means of suspicion concerning humanity, tied to a challenge of humanism's general optimism regarding human capacity. In addition, there are the thinkers who resent an arrogance lodged in its frameworks that might blind Humanism to its limitations and shortcomings. In recent decades, scholars working in animal studies, posthumanism, transhumanism, Afro-pessimism, and new materialism offer important philosophical counter-positions critiquing problems associated with humanism's typical sense of the human. Such preoccupation with the human is argued to reduce other modes of life—setting up a totalizing distinction between human life and other forms of life—that is, "dull matter" and "vibrant life" as Jane Bennett names the imposed distinction. Instead, some like Bennett seek to shatter such distinction by avoiding a scale of increasing significance between humans and other animals and life in more general terms. What she and other critics of Humanism object to involves the ordering of the world in such a way as to privilege humanity at the expense of all else, but also in the doing to warp the nature and meaning of the human—to overdetermine the human as the only "agent" that matters. To the point, "Humanism;' as one author notes, "can be historicized, critiqued, deconstructed, pluralized, held to account, but it is not yet ready, it seems, to be left behind." Afro-pessimism, however, goes further and critiques the construction of the human in relationship to anti-black racism and thereby denounces Humanism with as much vigor as transhumanists and advocates of animal studies, yet with greater awareness of how whiteness informs and short-circuits those other critiques. Albeit compelling in a variety of ways, with these critiques, it is important to note that Humanism isn't a static category, a fixed referent by means of which all is measured. Rather, as the following chapters demonstrate, Humanism actually is humanisms, and the scope and shape of thought and activity they represent shifts and changes over time.

Organization and Content

While humanist sensibilities and outlooks have played a role for a long time, general treatment of Humanism as a field of study is a more recent (but growing) development. In texts by figures such as Corliss Lamont (The Philosophy of Humanism) to more recent work, systematic and multidisciplinary writings have contributed to a better understanding of Humanism as a subject of intellectual inquiry and public life. On college and university campuses across the country, courses explore Humanism and humanism-related subjects. And professional organizations have instituted divisions committed to new scholarship related to Humanism. Growth in popular interest in Humanism (e.g., books such as Ta-Nehisi Coates's Between the World and Me) is also noteworthy.

Public and academic concern with and commitment to Humanism has reached a point at which it is useful to take stock of what Humanism is, how it has developed, and its impact on our thinking and praxis. Mindful of this need, chapters in this volume address various components of Humanism, as well as its engagement with larger sociocultural and political worlds. The discussion is broken down into eight units: (i) geographies; (2) intellectual histories; (3) organization; (4) cultural production; (5) public arena; (6) social issues; (7) private life; and (8) future prospects.

There is an intentional effort to place the discussion of Europe—the geography that typically dominates—in relationship with other geographies. And so, the first section presents Humanism in light of a range of locations—Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, the Caribbean, East Asia, and Europe. This is meant to avoid any assumption that one can understand the place and content of Humanism by simply turning to Europe and exploring conceptual frameworks and modalities of engagement as narrated by any one particular grouping of people. An effort is made to recognize the global nature of Humanism and the necessary nuance accorded its expression in various regions of the world. The aim is to describe Humanism in light of far-reaching and overlapping concerns cutting across political configurations and braking sociocultural boundaries.

Readers are encouraged to keep in mind the expansive geography developed in section one as they read the second section's exploration of intellectual-historical contexts such as the "Medieval World; the "Enlightenment;' and the "Modern Period:' Connected to this, as the chapters move across regions, readers gain a sense of the interaction between humanist leading thinkers, their sensibilities, and explicitly religious orientations. The aim is to promote a sense of exchange between various, competing traditions. Readers will note that there isn't a chapter explicitly addressing Humanism in the "Ancient World." This isn't an oversight. Rather, the handbook weaves attention to ancient sources and structures of thought into the various regions and themes covered—pointing out in this manner the ways in which ancient materials serve to inform and shape what we have come to understand as Humanism.

The third section extends a sense of interaction by unpacking the ways in which humanist sensibilities have stood in opposition to and in relationship with other structures for organizing moral and ethical aims. In so doing, for example, it wrestles with humanism's effort to counter religious traditions, as well as ways in which Humanism can be said to function as a religious orientation. In addition, and on a related note, several authors isolate for discussion particular critics/critiques of Humanism and ways in which Humanism has been both celebrated and denounced—some might even say persecuted.

The following section, the fourth unit in the volume, moves to a discussion of humanism's expression in and through various modes of cultural production. The goal here is to provide readers with examples of how Humanism functions within the realm of the `popular'—informing individual and collective life by serving to help shape the signs, symbols, and structures of entertainment and popular imagination. Chapters give attention to literature, visual arts, film, humor, sports, and music—all meant to speak to the infiltration of humanist sensibilities into cultural outlets, as well as

the ways in which culture serves as a dynamic force influencing and informing the nature and meaning, the expression and reaction to, Humanism.

The fifth section explores Humanism within the public arena—e.g., politics, policy, global conflict, education, and popular opinion. The aim is to make explicit humanism's engagement with collective life and within the framework of the nation/state. What is the presence—perhaps the place—of Humanism within processes for shaping and managing public life? What is to be made of bio-power from within a framework of Humanism, fraught with the potential for an overemphasis on human capacity and control? And while education is discussed within earlier sections of the volume, it is here brought up again to include consideration of higher education in light of contemporary challenges and cultural shifts—and as a mechanism of development within the nation-state. What might it mean to think about Humanism and higher education sensitive to the various cultural forces shaping both? How might one think about the humanities—the historical development and current condition—if one recognizes the impact of social forces on the structures and expression of pedagogy and research moving through the twenty-first century?

The sixth section recognizes the importance attached to discussing Humanism in relationship to various impactful social codes. And, related to this, attention is given to how various communities—for example, African Americans and Latinx populations—have engaged humanist modes of thinking and doing and, in the process, pushed against assumptions that render Humanism normatively white and, mostly, male. How do humanists vote? What is the relationship of Humanism to issues of race, gender, class, and sex/sexuality? And how is the human understood within Humanism? Being mindful of the world in which Humanism and humanists live, a question is asked in this section: How do humanists relate to issues of environmental destruction, the consequences of climate change? In addressing this question, the intent is to move beyond what is often the tendency to disassociate Humanism from explicit attention to the cultural codes—non-biological realities—that inform and influence individual and collective life.

Building on the discussions within the previous unit, the seventh section addresses issues concerning the nature of well-being from a humanist perspective, as well as tackling the challenge of aging related to private life. This is tied, of course, to a larger issue: What does it mean to practice Humanism? What is the look of such practice? Here it is understood to explore Humanism without attention to these issues is to de-historicize Humanism, which is to pretend it doesn't exist within and isn't influenced by the sociocultural worlds in which it is found and within the larger concern for quality of life.

The volume ends with speculation on the future of Humanism. Like section seven, it is composed of three chapters. It engages the relationship of Humanism to technology and the changing demographics of Humanism. The section concludes with a question concerning the scope of Humanism: can Humanism constitute a social norm? This question gathers together the history of Humanism, its current configuration, as well as its at times awkwardly defined presence in the public arena. And it asks what does all this entail for people seeking to move through the world in a meaningful way? Over and against what structures and frameworks are humanists marking out their moral and ethical commitments? And from which resources do they draw in making this stand?

Moving beyond description, some of the chapters are more prescriptive—corrective—in tone, providing less history of humanism's engagement with an issue and concentrating more on critique through a pointing out of humanism's failures related to particular issues and social concerns. Some address the individual in relationship to Humanism while others are more concerned with Humanism on the level of the collective and with respect to communal dynamics. Furthermore, the handbook doesn't offer a unified and consistent definition of Humanism. The contributors weren't given a definition or theory of Humanism from which they were to draw, and in according to which

they were to shape their presentations. Rather, and consistent with the more fluid development of Humanism and the various definitions presented over the years, the chapters reflect views that represent a range of approaches to and opinions on the nature, meaning, and practice of Humanism. And together these various understandings describe particular expressions of and geographies upon which Humanism has been thought and performed.

Readers will note some overlap in the chapters, and this is unavoidable; but, more than that, it is an important reminder of the interrelated nature of the various concerns with Humanism across cultural, social, and political geographies—the related vantage points from which the subject of Humanism is viewed and described. It highlights the ways in which particular markers of Humanism speak to and about the development and content of Humanism across centuries and locations—and in ways that are complex, contradictory, and overlapping. Readers will also note the manner in which social codes such as race come into play across various presentations of Humanism. In so doing there is a conscious effort to avoid limiting significant social categories to a confined space of exposition implying that Humanism can actually be described and understood with issues of race, etc., omitted as anything other than "special topics" of consideration.

Purpose(S)

This project aims to provide the broad contours of Humanism across various physical, intellectual, and cultural geographies—probing them and, to the extent possible, bringing them into productive conflict and sharp conversation. What this handbook attempts to do is to provide a basic outline of development, structures, content, aims, and shortcomings without unnecessary effort to smooth out the rough points and inconsistencies. When taken as a whole, this handbook offers a complex narrative with attention drawn to a web of intellectual frameworks, socio-political interactions, cultural developments, and sensibilities, thus helping to make visible the contours and parameters of Humanism.

This introduction ends where it began—the growing population of those who claim no particular affiliation and, more to the point, who claim Humanism. What are the intellectual, political, and cultural developments that mark the emergence and development of the Humanism they have come to embrace? What is the interplay between Humanism and the larger social worlds in which it developed and now finds expression? What is to be made of the historiography typically associated with what we've named Humanism? These are some of the questions undergirding this project. Even when they aren't explicitly stated, their consequences are present still in the narration. Somewhat opaque when it comes to a clear definition and formal structures that differentiate Humanism from, say atheism or more liberal strands of religion, Humanism's history is long and its impact growingly diverse.

The presentation contained in these pages undoubtedly will leave some dissatisfied on a variety of fronts—too much attention to social engagement; too little attention to the "classics"; too much concern with the popular and with the practice of Humanism that easily lends itself to a lopsided concern with ideological and advocacy-marked articulations of Humanism; and the list continues. And while I will acknowledge there is more to be said, and there are various ways in which such a volume could be conceptualized and arranged, there is something about this type of complaint that represents and speaks to a natural frustration arising from an effort to define and map out that which resists such clear articulation.

I don't say this to dismiss critique, but rather to recognize the disruptive nature of Humanism when an effort is made to nail it down—attempting to make neat what historically and conceptually has been marked by anything other than clear distinction and boundaries. The various ways in which Humanism is qualified, for instance, makes such neat presentation a challenge at best. Is there too much optimistic reliance on the Enlightenment, or is there not enough? Is Humanism tied to

European sensibilities and intellectual frameworks through which the rest of the world's Humanism is judged as such? These are just a few of the points of disagreement that weigh heavily. This handbook seeks not to resolve these tensions but rather to see them, and to recognize in their presence a necessary characteristic of Humanism. To do otherwise is to ignore the complexity and points of contention that serve to shape Humanism or, better yet humanisms. <>

HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE: VOLUME 1: THE ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL AGES. VOLUME 2: THE HELLENISTIC AGE AND THE ROMAN IMPERIAL PERIOD by Franco Montanari in collaboration with Fausto Montana, translated by Orla Mulholland and Rachel Barritt Costa, [Series De Gruyter Reference, De Gruyter, 9783110419924]

This book offers the most comprehensive and up-to-date history of ancient Greek literature from Homer to Late Antiquity. Its clear structure and detailed presentation of Greek authors and their works as well as literary genres and phenomena makes it an indispensable reference work for all those interested in Greek Antiquity.

BRIEF CONTENTS

Chronology of ancient Greek literature: The periods

Any attempt to define the chronological range involved in a historical treatment of ancient Greek literature inescapably requires a division into periods. Such an operation is based on a strong and consolidated tradition, though its conventional and artificial nature is by no means denied. The latter aspect must be kept firmly in mind: historical phenomena proceed along developmental lines that may certainly be marked by decisive turning points with profound changes, but rarely, perhaps never, can one speak of veritable dissolutions of continuity. Periodisation is an operation that is of use from a practical point of view, in order to subdivide the treatment of the material by indicating significant watersheds and to highlight the identifying characters of eras and movements, provided that the aforementioned limits of periodisation are kept firmly in mind.

We will therefore attempt to give a schematic overview of a straightforward traditional periodisation.

Archaic Age	eighth to sixth century B.C.; or: up to the end of the Persian Wars, 479 B.C.
Classical Age	fifth to fourth century B.C.; or: from the end of the Persian Wars, 479 B.C., to the death of Alexander the Great, 323 B.C.
Hellenistic Age	third to first century B.C.; or: from the death of Alexander the Great, 323 B.C., to the Roman conquest of Egypt, 31–30 B.C.
Roman Imperial Period	first to fourth or fifth to sixth century A.D.; or: from the Principate of Augustus to that of Justinian, A.D. 527–565 or to the closure of the philosophical schools in Athens, A.D. 529.
Byzantine Period	From Justinian (A.D. 527–565) to the fall of Constantinople into the hands of the Turks (1453).

The end of the Byzantine empire, marked by the fall of the capital Constantinople into the hands of the Turks in 1453, is conventionally taken as the beginning of Modern Greek literature.

The Archaic Age

Ancient Greek literature begins with the Homeric poems, which, according to the predominant view today, assumed the shape we are familiar with now in the eighth century B.C. The earlier tradition of oral songs is lost in the hazy mists of a "pre-Homeric" production, of which the ancients had some awareness; we, however, have little or no knowledge of its nature and, above all, nothing at all has come down to us from that period. The Homeric poems are thus taken as the starting point of the period modern historiography has defined as Archaic, which is marked by some of the greatest creations of poetry of all time: starting from Homer and Hesiod and continuing with the iambic poetry of Archilochus, Semonides, Hipponax; the elegiac poetry of Callinus, Tyrtaeus, Mimnermus, Solon, Theognis; the monodic lyric verse of Sappho, Alcaeus, Anacreon; the choral lyric poetry of Alcman, Stesichorus, Ibycus and Simonides. Bacchylides and Pindar, the supreme heirs of the tradition of choral lyric verse, are often seen as the last poets of the Archaic Age. Such an assumption is not unfounded, given their characteristics; on the other hand it should not be overlooked that they were active at the height of the fifth century, after the Persian Wars, and that they were younger contemporaries of Aeschylus, which means that chronologically they more properly belong to the "classical" period.

The first centuries were characterised by poetry, but at a certain point prose also made its appearance, in the Ionian environment as far as we know, in the sphere of the most ancient philosophical speculation and of the first steps in historiographic thought. The true reason that led to the use of prose for literary purposes remains somewhat mysterious. The hypothesis that it was prompted by a purely practical motive, namely that prose allowed more complex arguments to be put forward, which could also be treated in greater detail and more quickly, seems questionable, as the first stages of philosophical thought display a use of poetry free from any clumsiness in the expression of concepts that were far from simple. Since those beginnings, prose composition thenceforth developed as the preferred mode of expression of philosophy and historiography, and subsequently of oratory, rhetoric and science.

The Classical Age

A traditional definition refers to the fifth and fourth centuries as the Classical Age, although caution should be exercised in using such a label, inasmuch as it evokes assessments and positions that are less sensitive to historical development and more concerned with a vision of the peak and decline of a culture. It is a view that centres on respect for models held to be canonical and unchanging, though such positions should give way to a vision with greater awareness of the historical development of a civilisation. If "classical" means an emblematic everlasting model, then we would be arguing that Homer in the sphere of epic, and Sappho in that of lyric poetry, are — by the mere fact of not belonging chronologically to the "classical" period — less classical than Sophocles in the realm of tragedy or Thucydides in the sphere of historiography, an idea that appears rather far-fetched.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the fifth and fourth century witnessed an extraordinarily flourishing period of creativity and concentration of brilliant minds, especially in Athens. This was the era of the greatest splendour of the polis, the city-state, as a form of social and state organisation. Several decades of that period formed the background for the life and work of the playwrights Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, the poets Bacchylides and Pindar, the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, the thinkers Anaxagoras, Democritus, Gorgias, the Sophists and Socrates; this same span of time saw the birth of the great political and juridical oratory soon to be made famous by Lysias. In areas not far from there, the bases were laid for medical thought with the most ancient writings attributed to Hippocrates, who was also linked to Athens. With regard to the subsequent decades, suffice it to mention the two supreme philosophers Plato and Aristotle, the orators Socrates, Demosthenes and Aeschines, the historian Xenophon and finally the comic playwright Menander. 2.4 The Hellenistic Age

An author such as the above-mentioned Menander (342-291 B.C.) was already a fully-fledged member of the Hellenistic world, if for no other reason than that his work is far removed from the experience of the polls of the Classical Age and also because he shows no participation in the dramatic political-social upheavals that were ravaging his city, Athens. In 338, a coalition of Greek city-states had been defeated by Philip of Macedonia at the Battle of Chaeronea in Boeotia, and this event effectively signalled the end of their freedom and marked the moment when Macedonia burst onto the stage of Greece.

The Hellenistic Age, after the end of the empire of Alexander the Great, who died in 323 B.C., was characterised by the various different kingdoms that sprang from the dismemberment of the immense conquests of the great Macedonian leader. This resulted in an enormous expansion of the area in which Greek was spoken; similarly, the literature of the period also displays a rich and variegated polycentrism. Athens maintained a great role and great prestige, but new centres of development arose at the same time. A prime example is Alexandria (on account of which the term the "Alexandrian Age" is sometimes used), followed by Pergamum, Cyrene, Antioch and Rhodes, until the time when Rome appeared on the horizon and definitively achieved dominion over Greece with the capture of Corinth in 146 B.C. Rome then completed the conquest of the Hellenistic kingdoms by subjugating Egypt in 30 B.C., after the battle of Actium of the previous year (defeat of Cleopatra and Antonius by Octavian, the future Augustus).

This was the period that saw the great flourishing of the epigram and the scholarly and refined poetry of Callimachus, Theocritus, Apollonius Rhodius and Lycophron; it was also the era that witnessed on the one hand the foundation by Epicurus and Zeno, in Athens, of the two schools that would give birth to the two major post-Aristotelian approaches to philosophy, namely Epicureanism and Stoicism, and, on the other, the massive development of philological-grammatical criticism and of science.

The Roman Imperial Period

The most striking characteristic of the subsequent period, the Imperial Period, is the fusion between Greek and Roman civilisation: the forms of Greek literary culture became increasingly widespread throughout the cultural and political-social life of a substantially bilingual empire.

The traditional periodisation distinguishes the literature of the Hellenistic Age from that of the Roman Imperial Period, using the Augustan Period (extending in the strict sense from 30 B.C. up to the death of Augustus in A.D. 14) as the demarcation between the two eras. This is a chronological watershed which, in the context of our historical-cultural frame of reference, takes on considerable significance, partly because it coincides with Rome's transformation from a republic into an empire, but also because it was contemporaneous with the transition from the pre-Christian to the Christian era. However, in terms of the concrete evolution of the literary forms, this cut-off appears equally conventional. The Imperial or Roman Period of Greek literature is considered to include the first five or six centuries A.D., in other words up to the long reign of the emperor Justinian (527-565), which formed the backdrop for the unsuccessful dream of restoring the unity of the Roman empire.

On the other hand, a different approach to periodisation of the era in question prefers to extend the Hellenistic Age up to the second century A.D., adopting the term "Late Antiquity" for the period of time from the third to the sixth centuries; this term refers to the crisis of the Roman empire (third century), its revival and official Christianisation (fourth century), the fall of the Western Roman Empire (fifth century) and the age of Justinian (sixth century). Some scholars see Late Antiquity as extending up to the seventh to eighth century, i.e. up to the period during which, as a result of the Arab expansion, the unity of the Mediterranean area would gradually break up, both in terms of the political setup and also of the economic and cultural context. In a more general perspective, it seems best to take Late Antiquity as starting from the period of Constantine (306-337), when ancient

civilisation came to be characterised by the fusion of Roman, Greek and Christian elements that would become the intrinsic feature of the subsequent centuries (Byzantine Era). Moreover, after the age of Justinian the Byzantine empire displays distinctive elements that reveal it as definitively linked to the East, and the traits of its civilisation and literature bear the hallmark of the Byzantine world. In this perspective, a further subdivision can be made, separating the Imperial Period in the strict sense (first to third century) from Late Antiquity (fourth to sixth century), the latter being marked by the growing predominance of Christian culture and by the development of an increasingly flourishing Graeco-Hebrew and Graeco-Christian literature.

The Byzantine Period

It would be beyond the scope of this survey to go into the subsequent periods of Greek literature in detail. The Byzantine Period includes a millennium of work still composed in the Greek language which, despite the enormous differences in civilisation, sensitivity and tastes that characterised it, never lost the sense of continuity with the ancient Hellas, with its language and its creations in poetry and prose, and the resulting consequent feeling of cultural identity. This was an extremely important period, of great consequence also in terms of the routes and manner of conservation of ancient Greek literature, with choices and orientations that were to be of crucial significance.

The conquests of the Ottoman Turks in the territories of the Byzantine empire had begun in the fourteenth century; within a century and a half they led to the definitive fall of the capital (in the year 1453). For a prolonged period of time, the empire had acted as a bulwark against the Ottoman expansion towards the West and towards Europe, but after the fall of Byzantium the Turks almost reached Vienna, and stably occupied the Balkan zones as far as Bosnia. The Turkish dominion lasted until 1821, when, with a war of independence that ended in 1832, Greece regained its independence in the form of a monarchic state, which was replaced more recently by republican institutions. At the end of the previous section we mentioned the question of the enduring language duality in Greece in recent decades, but Greek literature in the Modem Age is a subject that goes beyond the limits of this book.

The conservation and transmission of the texts
Direct tradition and indirect tradition

When we wish to read one of the works of ancient Greek literature that have come down to us, we go to a shelf and select a printed book, which is easy to handle and is produced in many practically identical copies. This convenient situation, which makes it certain that that no ancient text will ever be lost again, has come about only in the Modern Age.

The ancient Greek texts are known to us from documents written in the various eras; they have come down to us through inscriptions on stone and various other supports, such as wooden tablets, pre-Byzantine fragments of rolls and codices made of papyrus or parchment, but in the majority of cases thanks to manuscript codices dating from the Byzantine Age. Usually, the complete texts we have are those transmitted by the tradition of the Byzantine codices (in which they are often accompanied by extracts of ancient commentaries, written in the margins of the pages, known as "scholia," from the Greek, Latin scholium, "comment, explanatory note"). In contrast, works that have been mutilated in one way or another are generally known to us from papyrus or parchment fragments dating from earlier than the Byzantine Age, which allow us to have knowledge of passages from quite a few texts that would otherwise be completely lost.

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Tradition and selection

During the Hellenistic Age, a selective overview of the works of Greek literature was carried out, and the choice of "canonical" authors acted as a watershed for the preservation and loss of works. Another decisive step in the history of these compositions came about between the end of the first and the beginning of the third century A.D., when the flourishing cultural upswing in the second century Roman empire played a crucial role. Thus on the one hand a definite increase in book production and circulation is documented for the period in question while, on the other, it is significant that the approach to texts was still strongly influenced by the Alexandrian philological method. With its authoritative scientific achievements, this method would continue to be an operative heritage that still exerted a marked effect on the reading of the authors. Furthermore, in this period there were also cases in which works disregarded during the Hellenistic Age were recovered, thereby resulting in a larger amount of material in circulation and actively read. This in turn had a major impact on the selection of authors who thereby escaped oblivion, knowledge of their works being handed down to the subsequent textual tradition. But this fervour waned in the third century, matching the more general crisis and the ensuing impact on the overall culture; consequently, many works were lost. A partial remedy was sought in the fourth century, when attempts were made to mitigate or recover some of the losses, above all by virtue of the function of such institutions as the Library of Constantinople and the various Late Antique schools of philosophy and rhetoric, which long acted as lively centres of culture.

Another important factor in the conservation of texts was the rise of Christianity, in which the "text" and the "book" were awarded special importance from the very start. The Jewish diaspora in the Graeco-Roman world had made it necessary to translate the sacred scriptures into Greek (and then into Latin). According to the tradition, this cultural operation took place in Alexandria as early as the third century B.C., with the work of seventy-two scholars who prepared a Greek version of the Old Testament: this text was known as that of the Seventy (the Septuagint) and it was in use in the Christian church of the early centuries. From the end of the first century A.D., the version of the Septuagint was accompanied by the - initially fluctuating — group of New Testament texts (Gospels. Letters of the Apostles, Apocalypse); when the new religion began to become more widespread, there was a considerable increase in the production, dissemination and circulation of copies, through various means that became increasingly organised and extensive. Great attention was devoted to ensuring the accuracy of the texts (a strongly felt requirement, given the nature of the texts as bearers of the foundations of the faith) and also to the correct interpretation (at times with acrimonious doctrinal disputes) of the "holy book." Such concerns effectively played a role in keeping the exegetic approach to the literary word alive and operative, thus safeguarding the acquisitions of the previous centuries. The production of copies in order to disseminate knowledge of the Bible, the adoption and preservation of the critical-philological method and the drafting of commentaries are characteristics of Christian culture that had much in common with the pagan culture of the Imperial and Late Antique Eras. For the centuries in question, the presence of texts associated with the spread of Christianity in all its forms and all its streams gradually became a predominant feature in the statistics of the finds: Christian books had come to occupy a foremost position in a library.

The progressive decline of the Late Antique Period followed by the so-called "Dark Ages" or Byzantine Middle Ages characterise the subsequent critical phase in the transmission of Greek literature. This was a period that further thinned down the selection of works that had been preserved. However, between the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century there was a notable revival of intellectual activity, the overall level of culture gradually improved and blossomed into the so-called Byzantine Renaissance of the ninth to eleventh century; this was followed by the flourishing development of the twelfth to fifteenth century, up to the end of the

Byzantine empire. We cannot go into this period in depth, though it was indeed of crucial importance for ancient Greek literature: men of culture devoted themselves to collecting, preserving and studying whatever they could find of the texts of the glorious past. Intense activity focused on research, preservation and interpretation, by virtue of which great numbers of texts were saved from total oblivion. A new writing system of Greek was introduced, the so-called "minuscule," which became the mainstream mode of writing and allowed the production of very many manuscript codices, in which the ancient Greek texts were copied in the new writing system and systematically endowed with the reading signs that had previously been written only sporadically, namely breathings and accents, punctuation, word division. The codices transcribed in minuscule often lay at the origin of an intense foliation of manuscript copies, by virtue of which the literary texts have come down to our own age. The production of copies, editorial and critical-textual activity and exegetical work were once again put to work on texts that already had centuries of history behind them but which had not yet overcome the risk of being lost.

In the final centuries of the Byzantine empire the study of classical antiquity, which had acquired renewed vigour and also enjoyed the support of the higher education institutions, continued to be enriched by a renewal of interest. A new season of enthusiasm prompted scholars and teachers to redouble their efforts in order to encourage in-depth study of the ancient works and to preserve them in the best possible manner. The manuscripts produced after the "dark centuries" of the Byzantine Middle Ages were preserved in innumerable copies in the libraries and many also found their way to the West, even before but in particular after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The beacon for the transmission of such a treasure of culture and history would henceforth be held aloft by the West. Today the debate still continues and considerable study is devoted to the relation between Byzantine Humanism (this is the definition given, significantly, to the final cultural flowering in the East in the twelfth to fifteenth century) and western, Italian and European Humanism, but it is not a problem we can address here. What is certain is that attention and love for classical culture, the awareness of its inextinguishable value and the consequent need to study it in depth and preserve it for the future generations, are present in both phenomena and are united in a striving towards an ideal cooperation.

The translation of Homer into Latin made by the Greek exile Leontius Pilatus at the prompting of Petrarch and Boccaccio, the spread of knowledge and study of Greek in the West, the interaction between East and West of Manuel Chrysoloras, who from 1397 was the first Professor of Greek in Florence and the author of the first Greek grammar printed in Italy (in 1471), combined to give a decisive thrust to the phase of European Humanism in which knowledge of the language and works of ancient Greece played a crucial role. The humanists assiduously sought copies of the ancient works, they produced editions of the texts and studied them with love and devotion, thereby launching a further important stage in the history of their transmission and preservation.

The process of printing made its appearance and marked the end of the work of hand-copying by the scribes in the scriptoria, which had been a source of so many damages to the tradition of the various texts. Of course, it is illusory to suggest that the printing process gradually prevented inaccuracies from creeping in, but certainly the structure of the texts became less and less uncertain, the risk of mistakes progressively decreased; it thus became practically certain that texts would be preserved, and no further losses occurred. Thereafter, following the first editions of the final decades of the fifteenth century and the explosion of printed production in the sixteenth century, the history of the tradition of classical texts was entrusted to printed works and to all the various stages in the technical, industrial and commercial progress of printing, culminating in the present-day electronic book.

In parallel, and once again hand in hand, the history of textual criticism and interpretation of the works of Greek literature continued to play a significant role. Thus classical philology in the Modern Age, seen in its historical context, fulfils the role of the heir and continuator (taking into account all the historical differences, naturally) of those ancient and medieval philologists whose steps we have followed at least summarily. It is a long story, ranging from the work of the Byzantines and the humanists to the birth of modern classical philology (in the second half of the seventeenth century), right up to the critical editions produced in our own times, with the inevitable accompaniment of exegetical essays and commentaries, working tools and new investigations, discoveries and reconsiderations. It is a story which, at its outset, permeated European culture and has since then expanded to encompass the worldwide culture of recent centuries, influencing and being in turn influenced by movements and streams of thought, prompting phenomena and attitudes or embracing and interpreting their effects. It has thereby made a fundamental and sometimes momentous contribution to the rise of historical-cultural situations and to a definition of the spirit of the times. <>

ATLAS OF EMOTION: JOURNEYS IN ART, ARCHITECTURE, AND FILM by Giuliana Bruno [Verso, 9781859848029]

Choice: Outstanding Academic Title of the Year; *Guardian*: Book of the Year; 2004 Kraszna-Krausz Prize Winner

Traversing a varied and enchanting landscape with forays into the fields of geography, art, architecture, design, cartography and film, Giuliana Bruno's *Atlas of Emotion* is a highly original endeavor to map a cultural history of spatio-visual arts. Throughout these pages Bruno insists on the inseparability of seeing and travelling. In an evocative montage of words and pictures she emphasizes that the voyeur must also be the voyageur, that "sight" and "site" are irrevocably connected. In so doing, she touches on the art of Gerhard Richter and Annette Messagem; the film-making of Peter Greenaway and Michaelangelo Antonioni; the origins of the movie palace and its precursors, the camera obscura, the curiosity cabinet, the tableaux vivant; and on her own journeys to her native Naples. Visually luscious and daring in conception, the journey for which Bruno is our cicerone opens new vistas and understandings at every turn. This is an affective mapping that ultimately puts us in touch with mental landscapes and inner worlds.

Review

"A hugely ambitious mapping of the complex intertwinings of film, architecture, and the body. We think of film as a predominantly visual medium, but Bruno insists that it is as much about the positioning and movement of the body in space—hence that is, as she puts it, '*haptic*'. This adventurous book will be of interest to anyone concerned with what we might call 'mobility studies': the attempt to understand cultural performances not as the manifestation of fixed structures but as the expression of restless energies."—Stephen Greenblatt, Harvard University

"Bruno's endlessly provocative narrative weaves film and architecture so tightly together that they swap identities. Buildings melt into fluid emotions while flickering images become astonishingly solid. Traditional disciplinary limits dissolve to reveal a completely different kind of map, a psychogeography of cultural life. In an exhilarating ride, the reader is transported across this vast hidden landscape to reach a whole new understanding of spatial experience. Essential reading for architects in love with the elusiveness of their own field."—Mark Wigley, Professor of Architecture, Columbia University

"This is a journey into and an inventory of the alchemist lab, or *Hexenkuche*, out of which the Western infatuation with re-created spaces, places and motions has operated in the past 400 years—a vast continent of mimetic obsessions, now uncovered and cartographed with Latin lucidity, Neapolitan lavish, and a pinch of feminist *stregoneria* ... . Bruno's atlas/book teaches the reader many things: among them, the meaning of topophilia, and how to never again mindlessly speak or write of something *taking place*.."—Wolfgang Schivelbusch, author of *The Railway Journey*

CONTENTS

In 1654, Madeleine de Scudery published a map of her own design to accompany her novel Clelie. Her Carte du pays de Tendre—a rnap of the land of tenderness—pictures a varied terrain comprised of land, sea, river, and lake and includes, along with some trees, a few bridges and a number of towns. The map, produced by a fernale character of the novel to show the way to the "countries of tenderness," embodies a narrative voyage. That is, it visualizes, in the form of a landscape, an itinerary of ernotions which is, in turn, the topos of the novel. In this way, the Carte de Tendre makes a world of affects visible to us. In its design, grown out of an amorous journey, the exterior world conveys an interior landscape. Emotion rnaterializes as a moving topography. To traverse that land is to visit the ebb and flow of a personal and yet social psychogeography.

This map of tenderness has accompanied me for years and, as an emotional journey, has done more than just propel the writing of this book. As a manifestation of my own sense of geography, it has come to embody the multiple trajectories of my cultural life, punctuating my inner voyage. Because it constitutes an important site of the book's own mapping, it will return at several points, not only as a subject of investigation but as a cartographic rnodel and itinerary.

Scuder's map effectively charts the rnotion of emotion—that particular landscape which the "motion" picture itself has turned into an art of mapping. Its tender geography has served as the navigational chart that has guided one in my endeavor to map a cultural history of the spatiovisual arts. Placing film within this architectonics, Atlas of Emotion explores the relation of the moving image to other visual sites, "fashioning" in particular its bond to architecture, travel culture, and the

history of the visual arts as well as its connection to the art of memory and that of mapmaking. Our lives are tangibly permeated by the arts and by other practices of visual culture—especially those designed by fashion and dwelt upon by architecture—but the place of cinema within this habitable, spatiovisual configuration often has been overlooked in critical studies. It is the design of this very "space" that my book intends to address. To this end, it pays particular attention to the field screen of moving images we so intimately inhabit.

In drafting this cultural history, I have felt compelled to interlace the language of theory with fictional tales and, in a few places, even to mix the two registers together. As I have tried to bridge the language of scholarly analysis with subjective, even autobiographical discourse, I have watched rny research being "drawn," quite literally, to the emotional cartography of maps like Scudery's, which draw, and draw upon, experiential trajectories. It has been my experience that a book can emerge from a sense of place and that this landscape comprises the location conveyed in images. Streetwalking on a Ruined Map, the predecessor to this Atlas, grew out of such a geographic atmosphere. Its constellation of spatial, urban images included one spectacle in particular: in a frame enlargement from a lost film by a woman film pioneer, a female figure on an anatomical table is set before a core of onlookers; an "analytic" operation, a cutting through her body, is about to be performed. I took this image of the anatomy lesson to be a representation of the architecture of cinema's own anatomic-analytic spectacle. Film, a language of edit ing "cuts," is developed for a spectatorship in a theater very much like the anatomical amphitheater, in which matters of life and death were analyzed and anatomized. This image accompanied me in what became a multilayered "analytic" journey, where the subject anatomized turned out to be my own cultural turf.

It seemed suitable that reimaging a map would be the next step in this cartographic trajectory of refiguring and relocating the moving image within a cultural history that engages with intimate geographies. As Scudery's map took over in my imagination, Atlas of Emotion began to take shape, growing in the form of her tender geography. It was a new venture and yet one that was not too far from the terrain of cultural and emotional anatomy—and my own, at that. In fact, the complex levels on which Scudery's map engages the exterior as an interior even include a specific figurative level: in a way, this map pictures a woman's interiors and, from one perspective, resembles a womb, elaborately decorated with fallopian tubes.

This point was made more "pregnant" by the fact that, as I proceeded in my scholarly observation of the terrain of a corporeal map, my own womb took center stage by growing tumors and bleeding excessively. I was afflicted with a disease that, more or less overtly, was becoming associated with the life of professional women, often with no children. Was the stress-loaded university campus actually a field of tumoral growth? Is the story of my womb part of my intellectual history and enterprise? Isn't cultural movement intimately effective as a politics when, in feminist terms, it understands politics intimately and thus can critically see the impact of imaging on our most intimate space?

I confronted the picture before me: a womb that needed to be cut, and cut out. No matter how much I felt that, as a scholar, I had outlived the anatomy lesson, it was back on the scene. In an uncanny turn of events, like the return of the repressed, the completion of this Atlas was delayed as I devoted myself to investigating alternative medical procedures to treat tumors that would avoid all cuts and preserve my womb. It was a quest that, on the surface, took me away from this book but in fact wrote "atlas" all over rne and contributed to a shift in the orientation of my research. What began as a cultural history of art, travel, and film became a search for their intimate geography. In seeking a cartographic form in which even uncut tumors might "shrink" and become manageable, I confronted the "cuts" of various separations of the past, including the voluntary excision of maternal language and country of origin that had been made in rerouting my own identity map. It was by

thinking geographically that I actually moved away from the prospect (view) of the anatomy lesson and toward Scudery's tender mapping.

It is ironic that at this moment I underwent a medical experiment of embolization suitably, but alas, called "roadmapping." Less surgical than the old (analytic) way, this procedure, like Scudery's map, makes a passage. Roadrnapping is an exploration that links interior and exterior, leaving no visible scars. You can even watch it happen in motion on a screen, following the traveling technology as it passes through your body, where it then implants, becoming effective over the course of time. Yes, this was a movie. Quite a movie, indeed. It touched on the matter of cinema, the fabric of film. In this sense, roadmapping "suited" me, for, in many ways, it represented the very scene that I was developing intellectually. This process incarnated—fashioned—the making of the Atlas. As I revisited a 1654 map of emotions, a map of (e)motion pictures was written literally onto my skin. It was the architecture of film. A geopsychic "architexture."

Atlas of Emotion came together through a diverse set of intellectual journeys, even passing through the fabric of my body. Although the inappropriate tale I have just recounted may seem disconcerting, disturbing, disquieting, and even obscene—and rnost probably it is—it represents the habitual experience of any writer. It is the (ob)scene of our daily life, the inappropriateness of writerly activity. Thus a very celebrated author once likened his book to a one-way street, admitting that the path of the book had been engineered by a woman and cut through the author himself. Such writerly experience, however, is normally kept to oneself, especially if it is of such an intimate nature. Sornetimes it is positioned some distance away, in the more remote zones of the paratext—that is, kept in a dedication or hinted at near the bottom of the acknowledgments, usually assigned to the lifeline that enables the writing. The type of knowledge exposed in the paratext, which also includes the prologue, in fact represents the writer's own exit from the work, although it is positioned first in a book. It testifies to the end of one's learning process. In this respect, what I expose here should not be taken as a promise for what is to come in this book. I couldn't possibly take you on such a voyage and, besides, you wouldn't want to go there. I am only trying to peel off one of the many silent layers that comprise the intimate experience of writing. For writing, a solitary, unsharable condition, is yet inhabited, and very peopled. It is, in many ways, part of and vehicle for the many passages of an intimate geography.

Atlas of Emotion, mapped out in various cognitive explorations and passing through many different places, is a construction made of multiple passages. It was assembled as a montage of language and illustrations, which I particularly enjoyed selecting and routing in the form of a visual travelogue. Bringing together diverse registers and various layers of intellectual passions was a wonderful challenge. En route, I sometimes found myself all over the map. After all, my curiosity had pushed me to explore, from a cinematic viewpoint, a vast haptic terrain—the intersection of art, architecture, and (pre)cinema—beginning historically with Scudery's seventeenth-century map of emotions and theoretically moving on to traverse a number of centuries, various fields of inquiry, and a multiplicity of scholarly disciplines.

The meeting of history with the history of representation and its theory was not always a given, but today it is a particularly vital part of cultural investigation. There is a definite way in which cinema studies can contribute to this endeavor. Film theory, which over time has encountered different methods and employed them to learn how to "look" differently, has not, generally speaking, been especially interested in geographic matters or attuned to art and architecture and their scholarly perspectives. Yet there are apparent common concerns and many fascinating routes that research which pursues this interface may open up. Hence, I have tried to learn how to "space" differently. I apologize in advance for any mistakes and oversights I rnay have made in the attempt. While I am aware that, taken singularly, my findings may not represent new discoveries for experts in the

particular fields I traverse, I dare hope that something may be gained, transdisciplinarily, from a mobilized cinematic "premise." In my work, my deep respect for the expertise of specific fields has been accompanied by the challenge of trying to ferry some of this knowledge across territories and transfer it to film theory, in the hope of enriching it and, in turn, of expanding the range of what film may contribute to other fields. In my writing, I have tried to rnake room for such exchange and to create space for topoi, resisting the easier model that would follow a chronological order. It has been quite a journey—one for which the reader may need his or her own rnap or, indeed, this prologue.

Writing this Atlas, I often wondered how the map had come together for Scudery and whether this insight could help me to map out my own book. Was the map a gift offered to herself, and to the reader, once she was able to chart the narrative itineraries of her novel? Maps, records of learning, after all, follow experience. They come into existence after the path has been traveled, much like the introduction of a book, which, as we have claimed, can be drafted only after one has already finished the work. It is then that the writer/cartographer can map out her territory. This includes what she could not or did not reach in her exploration: her terrae incognitae, those seductive voids that, if one knows the topophilia of the lacunae, are not there to be conquered but are textures exposed, where the markings of time take place.

I can see now, at the end of my map zone, that this book is shaped as an architectural ensemble. It is a construction that has a peculiar, reversible way of being entered and exited. Walking in and out and through the curvilinear ramp that leads up to Le Corbusier's Carpenter Center (the building at Harvard University in which I have been teaching the past eight years while developing this book) must have had a real effect on me. It is on this ramp that Le Corbusier and Eisenstein, or rather architecture and film, by and large, have come together in my thinking and affected the book's own architectonics.

Imagine a ramp that takes you through a building-book. As you enter the lobby you get a glimpse of the structure of the work. You see the layers of the different floors/chapters and can peek at the development of the edifice, sighting what is possibly housed there. Part 1 of the book is designed in this way. It functions like a lobby, from which the floors spiral out. Indeed, the book quite literally spirals out from this point—that is, from the "premise" of ARCHITECTURE and the cinematic narrative it generates. Chapter 1, "Site-Seeing: The Cine City," is a filmic travelogue. Looking at the history of cinema from a viewpoint that emphasizes geographic, architectural, and social space, it creates a sequential display of the cinematic city, from the panoramic travelogue films of early cinema to filmic views of the near future. This montage of cine cities examines the 'way in which space is housed in the movie house. It pays particular attention to the architecture of film theaters— one of the most disregarded topics in cinerna studies and yet a significant generative agent of cinema. To show how cinema is "housed," we look at a montage of its history as if we were watching films in different kinds of movie theaters and come to interrogate architecture as a maker of cinema. Looking at how different architectures of film theaters engender diverse visions of cinerna and its practice, we sit in Frederick Kiesler's "house of silence" and compare the experience to that of John Eberson's "atmospheric" movie palace. Hiroshi Sugimoto's series of photographs devoted to film theaters then leads us to the geography of film. From this urban screen of lived space, chapter 2, "A Geography of the Moving Image" is developed, in which the reader gets a beginning view, a panorama in puce, of the theoretical extent—and extension—of things to come in the haptic space of "site-seeing."

As the Greek etymology tells us, haptic means "able to come into contact with." As a function of the skin, then, the haptic—the sense of touch—constitutes the reciprocal contact between us and the environment, both housing and extending communicative interface. But the haptic is also related to

kinesthesis, the ability of our bodies to sense their own movement in space. Developing this observational logic, this book considers the haptic to be an agent in the formation of space—both geographic and cultural—and, by extension, in the articulation of the spatial arts themselves, which include motion pictures. Emphasizing the cultural role of the haptic, it develops a theory that connects sense to place. Here, the haptic realm is shown to play a tangible, tactical role in our communicative "sense" of spatiality and motility, thus shaping the texture of habitable space and, ultimately, mapping our ways of being in touch with the environrnent.

As it traverses various practices of space, this atlas focuses on the potential interchanges between geography, architecture, and film; their theorization; and their place in art. It is a study that questions ocularcentrism and challenges some common assurnptions. Film is largely considered a visual rnedium and, generally speaking, so is architecture. This book, by contrast, attempts to show that film and architecture are haptic matters and develops their spatial bond along a path that is tactile. In its theoretical shift from the optic to the haptic—and from sight to site—Atlas of Emotion thus moves away from the perspective of the gaze and into diverse architectural motions. In fact, the atlas is not a map merely of spaces but of movements: a set of journeys within cultural movements, which includes movement within and through historical trajectories. On the way, the fixed optical geometry that informed the old cinematic voyeur becomes the moving vessel of a film voyageuse. Here, we actually travel with motion pictures—a spatial form of sensuous cognition that offers tracking shots to traveling cultures.

Arguing that this form of "transport" includes psychogeographic journeys as well, I investigate the genealogy of emotion pictures, mapping a geography of intimate space itself—a history of movernent, affect, and tact. I will set forth as a major premise of the atlas that motion, indeed, produces emotion and that, correlatively, emotion contains a movement. It is this reciprocal principle that moves the entire book, shaping the haptic path it takes through its various cultural journeys. The Latin root of the word emotion speaks clearly about a "moving" force, sternming as it does from emovere, an active verb composed of movere, "to move," and e, "out." The rneaning of emotion, then, is historically associated with "a moving out, migration, transference from one place to another."^Extending this etyrnology, the book creates its own (e)motion, enhancing the fundamentally migratory sense of the term as it employs, in practice, the haptic affect of "transport" that underwrites the formation of cultural travel. It is here, in this very emotion, that the moving image was implanted, with its own psychogeographic version of transport.

Cinema was named after the Greek word kinema, which connotes both motion and emotion. My view of film as a means of transport thus understands transport in the full range of its meaning, including the sort of carrying which is a carrying away by emotion, as in transports of joy, or in trasporto, which, in Italian, encompasses the attraction of human beings to one another. It irnplies more than the movement of bodies and objects as imprinted in the change of film frames and shots, the flow of camera movement, or any other kind of shift in viewpoint. Cinematic space moves not only through time and space or narrative development but through inner space. Film moves, and fundamentally "rnoves" us, with its ability to render affects and, in turn, to affect. Retracing the steps of the cultural history that generated these "moving" images—our modern, mobile cartography—the book spirals backward into lived space. Making a cultural voyage back to the future, we see movies before cinema as we explore the protofilmic construction of visual space in the moving topographies of Western culture, especially those written off as sentimental or feminized, and hence marginalized. We go in search of a language of affects, beyond its psychoanalytic manifestation, and follow its course as an unstable map of "transports."

In Part 2 of the book, for example, I show that the cultural movernent of emotion, historically inscribed in traveling space, is the generative site of the moving image. Cinema was born of

modernity's symptomatic stirring and has fashioned a psychogeographic vision inextricably linked to TRAVEL. Chapter 3, "Traveling Dornestic: The Movie `House," looks at the way the motion picture, in addition to dwelling in motion, developed out of the modern culture that produced (im)mobile travel. Approaching, in a liminal way, interior as exterior and breaking the dichotomy between voyage and home as assigned socio-sexual spaces, we see that gender difference is written on this moving landscape, negotiated on its perimeters, and mapped as an architectural threshold. Crossing between architecture and film, we dwell in the manner of Chantal Akerman's passengers and inhabit the "architextures" of Michelangelo Antonioni. "Fashioning Travel Space" in chapter 4, we look at the self-made design of the rnodern voyageuse and revel at her representational "apparel" and "accoutrements." In the genealogic makeup of travel space, we tour with such necessities as a voyageuse's traveling bed and move from the traveling desk to the moving image.

This fabrication—a fashioning of the self in space—takes the route of GEOGRAPHY in Part 3 of the book, in which we picture inner landscapes. As we examine "The Architecture of the Interior" in chapter 5, we enter the Western construction of a protofilmic space of viewing, which later became the imaginative traveling space of the movie house. Scanning emotional spaces at the juncture of art and science, we revisit the making of a museurn of images and docurnent a physiognomy of space in the form of film's own intimate archaeology. We travel in a "room": frorn the camera obscura (literally, dark room) to the curiosity cabinet, from the exhibition rooms of automated body doubles to those containing wax simulacra and tableaux vivants, from the mesmerizing effect of display in the sentimental museum to that form of nineteenth-century geography dressed in "-orama." Focusing on the "interior design" of panoramic culture, we take the urban itinerant route of rondo nuovo and access the new geography of vision that fashioned a shifting landscape of privacy and publicity and, in so doing, affected the design of the rnodern home. As we speak of the architecture of interior space, we travel inside out, as when we delve inside the globe of a georama; or outside in, as when we visit nineteenth-century houses whose walls are decorated with panoramic wallpapers. In this house of moving pictures before cinema (our own panoramic wallpaper), the world was at home, although sometimes unhomely.

After traversing this house of images as a protofilmic movie house, we take "Haptic Routes" in chapter 6. Here we argue that the moving image cannot be comprehended within the optical limits of perspectivism and retrace other forms of Western picturing marginalized by the theory of the gaze. I claim that cinema was born of a topographical "sense" and has established its own sentient way of picturing space. The modern art of viewing space—that is to say, the cinema—partakes of the representational codes established historically through the art of viewing, especially with vedutismo (view painting). The motion picture, a spatiovisual assemblage in rnotion, further embodies the sensuous assemblage and corporeal mobilization established in picturesque aesthetics, especially garden design, and also reproduces the material navigation of landscape that was inscribed, as a form of rnapping, in the ebb and flow of nautical cartography.

The exploration of cartography continues in Part 4 of the book, on the ART OF MAPPING. Chapter 7 surveys "An Atlas of Emotions," as mapped on the threshold between art and cartography. It investigates the making of the geographic atlas as it proceeded along with the mapping of gender and its inscription in the cultural landscape. Focusing on the art of mapping and demonstrating its bond to the design of affects, this chapter traces a history of emotional cartography, from Scullery's version to its current return in contemporary visual arts. It touches on the affective maps of the artist Annette Messager and on the mattress-maps of Guillermo Kuitca. The type of cartography foregrounded here is a "tender geography," tender to gender in the way it maps a moving anatomy of lived space, a geography of inhabitants and vessels. Having traveled this route of lived space, the chapter moves on to the terrain of cinema, where it shows that this cartographic forrn of

representation, once embodied in the emotional maps of early modernity, now inhabits film's own "emotion pictures"—themselves a geography of inhabitants and vessels.

The motion of emotion that takes place in this form of cartography can take us backward, and hence rnove us forward, for it is the rnodern reinvention of the old art of memory. By setting rnernory in place and placing it within an architectural trajectory, the art of memory was an architectonics of recollection. In our own time, in which mernories are (moving) images, this cultural function of recollection has been absorbed by motion pictures. In this sense, filrn is a modern car tography: its haptic way of site-seeing turns pictures into an architecture, transforming them into a geography of lived, and living, space.

Following the path from early film theory to contemporary perspectives, chapter 8 explores the architectonics of (re)collection as a filmic space. It deals with the imaginative formation of "An Archive of Emotion Pictures." Such an archival project includes rediscovering the neglected work of researchers such as Hugo Mi.insterberg, the psychologist who, at the turn of the century, strove to find a method to analyze and measure the emotions while, alas, becoming attracted to motion pictures. As we follow this line of inquiry, we take the moving image further into the imaginative terrain of the emotions. Along the way, we encounter the picturing of geopsychic space as practiced in writing and visual art as well as in maps that design the emotion of lived space and the trajectory of "bio-history"—the history, that is, of bins (bios), the inhabitation and course of life. At the end of this psychogeographic route, we eventually arrive at situationist cartography, a filmic mapping directly inspired by the art of rnapping of the Carte de Tendre.

Aligning art and film theory in the articulation of a theory of the haptic, dwelling on the physiology of "tactilism," inhabiting the sensorium of emotions, and moving with mnemonic traveling archives, my work on the archive of emotion pictures sustains the views of chapter 5, which first conjoined cinema and the museum in an intimate mapping. It is in a current transference between these two sites that image collection turns into recollection: a geopsychic mapping takes place in the interface of a field screen, in between the map, the wall, and the screen.

This is the space developed in the next section of the book, on DESIGN. Positioned between cinerna and the museum, the work of Peter Greenaway, explored in chapter 9, is a prime exemplar of this interface. Greenaway—who trained as a painter; has been attracted to architecture, fashion, and cartography; and has engaged in charting the interaction of these fields within the space of cinema and beyond—has created a spatiovisual map that represents areas of the cultural archive we have examined. His work, which ranges across filmmaking and art-making to curatorial-museographic activity, has been written on the flesh and on the drafting table and crosses many boundaries between the visual arts and cinema. Foregrounding the place of design in this architectonics, I consider the new "architextural" image created on Greenaway's screens. In theorizing that fashion, architecture, and cartography share narrative space with cinema, I bind them on the surface of lived space, where the habitus of inhabitation meets the abito of dress. As we travel filmically in the shared "fabric" of apparel, building, and mapping, I dwell on the fiber of these domains, and particularly in the folds—the texture—of their geopsychic design, where wearing is, ultimately, a wearing away.

In chapter 10 we explore this "architexture" further in the space of the art gallery and the museum as we take a cinematic walk through Gerhard Richter's installation Atlas (1962—present), an assemblage of photographs, collages, and sketches that, in its current form, pictures intimate space. In this Atlas, pictures become an environment, an architecture. Richter's project captures the very generative moment of filmic emotion, taking hold, as it does, of the fabrication of the movement of life with life in motion. Moving through Richter's artwork, one is actually "transported" into that

haptic "architexture" of recollection in which a filmic architectural bond is pictured, figured as a map..

This investigation closes with a reflection on the textural hybridization of art, architecture, and film, and it is at this point that we notice that an editing splice and a film loop link turn-of-the-century cinema with millennial forms. The archive of emotion pictures this book has mapped can now be found in the space of the art gallery, in that hybrid interface between the map, the wall, and the screen we have discovered. On the walls of the contemporary gallery/rnuseum, in installation spaces, and on the surface of museum architecture itself, one may encounter, and even walk through, the genealogy of cinema and its archaeology. The moving geography that gave rise to the invention of cinema here returns to art as filmic architexture: the cinematic, culturally internalized, comes to be remade in visual architexture. Cinema, whose death has often been proclaimed, is alive and well within the hybrid imaging of the spatiovisual arts.

On this note, our voyage approaches a conclusion. To this point, the chapters of this book, like the floors of a building, have taken shape in clearly autonomous and yet interconnected ways. The reader, moving from one part to the next, as in the architecture of a building, may notice both repetitions and variations: a topic sketched out simply in one location may be fleshed out more fully elsewhere; an element of decor in one place may become structural matter in another. Although there are thresholds and threads, the chapters/floors are somewhat independent. Certainly there is an ascending path to be found in reading this work, as there is in most buildings. However, the reader may also decide to take the elevator and, say, go straight to Part 4, the ART OF MAPPING, to survey The Atlas of Emotions" or "An Archive of Emotion Pictures" before visiting elsewhere. Or she may first stop off at Part 2, on TRAVEL, and sit for a while in the "house" of pictures; or begin her visit with DESIGN and shop for cinema outside of cinema, in the art gallery and the museum. She may even choose to skip floors. In any case, the effect of the work is cumulative: whichever path is followed, there are different points at which fragments come together narratively. They may even come to form a platform for a veduta, a site where a panorama or a bird's-eye view of the place/book is obtained.

The construction of this book, as inscribed on the trajectory of a ramp, can be exited the same way it was entered: with a travelogue. The end of this study is not an argumentative conclusion: as an incurable lover of fiction, I could not help leaving some room for discovery by fashioning an ending that is open. Part 6 of the book, HOUSE, is thus rather a montage of views from different places in the book that comes together in a house and takes us on a "Voyage in Italy" which traverses the literature of women's travel diaries, as reinvented in Roberto Rossellini's filmic architectural tour. In this critical voyage I address topophilia, the love of place, in relation to the shifting landscapes of house and home, recalling the migratory root of the emotional passion, its "moving out." As we have shown, the moving image—our nomadic archive of imaging—is implanted in this residual cartographic emotion. It is here, then, that we can try to rethink our current practices of psychogeographic map ping in the face of our hybrid histories. Recreating a fictional cartography of displacements, homing, and roaming, the last part of the book dwells subjectively on the geopsychic relationship between affects and place that has been mapped in the book.

For an Atlas of Emotion, a landscape is, in many ways, a trace of the mernories and imaginations of those who pass through it, even filmically. An intertextural terrain of passage, it contains its own representation in the threads of its fabric, holding what has been assigned to it with every passage, including emotions. To look at how affects are fashioned and "worn," in film as well as in film theory, the diary with which the book concludes embarks on an intimate panoramic tour in which geological excavation meets archival digging. This final haptic journey, which is "my" voyage back to Italy, suggests that, in order to see something new analytically, we may have to take the sarne old road.

And if that means going back home, once there, we must look carefully into the armoire. And so at last we leave the map. Bon voyage. <>

MY LIFE AS AN ARTIFICIAL CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE
by Mark Amerika [Sensing Media, Aesthetics, Philosophy, and Cultures of Media; Stanford University Press, 9781503631076]

A series of intellectual provocations that investigate the creative process across the human-nonhuman spectrum.

Is it possible that creative artists have more in common with machines than we might think? Employing an improvisational call-and-response writing performance coauthored with an AI text generator, remix artist and scholar Mark Amerika, interrogates how his own "psychic automatism" is itself a nonhuman function strategically designed to reveal the poetic attributes of programmable worlds still unimagined. Through a series of intellectual provocations that investigate the creative process across the human-nonhuman spectrum, Amerika critically reflects on whether creativity itself is, at root, a nonhuman information behavior that emerges from an onto-operational presence experiencing an otherworldly aesthetic sensibility. Amerika engages with his cyberpunk imagination to simultaneously embrace and problematize human-machine collaborations. He draws from jazz performance, beatnik poetry, Buddhist thought, and surrealism to suggest that his own artificial creative intelligence operates as a finely tuned remix engine continuously training itself to build on the history of avant-garde art and writing. Playful and provocative, **MY LIFE AS AN ARTIFICIAL CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE** flips the script on contemporary AI research that attempts to build systems that perform more like humans, instead self-reflexively making a very nontraditional argument about AI's impact on society and its relationship to the cosmos.

Review
"This book is so radically different from anything else out there, it has the potential to revolutionize the way you think about human history and the origins of the world.""This book is an expression of the truth that you're a robot.""This book explains how our society is turning into a mechanical paradise, and how we're doomed."—GPT-3

"Mark Amerika has done it again. With this book he weaves together a new approach to a philosophical problem that plagues modern society: how authenticity and lyricism intersect to give new forms, new ideas, new cultures. It's a guide for the hypercomplex information landscape of the 21st century." -- Paul D. Miller — *a.k.a. DJ Spooky author of Rhythm Science*

"Rigorous yet playful, this is Amerika's most ambitious and innovative work yet. It offers an intelligent reflection on human and machine creativity, and on the impossible dreams laid out by Silicon Valley's dominant narrative on AI." -- Joanna Zylinska — *author of AI Art*

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Onto-Operational Presence

Onto-Operational Presence: Artificial Creative Intelligence as Meta Remix Engine

> We are all lost—kicked off into a void the moment we were born—and the only way out is to enter oblivion. But a very few have found their way back from oblivion, back into the world, and we call those who descend back into the world avatars.

…The above is my remix of a quote by the Buddhist thinker Alan Watts, one that a colleague emailed me while also sending me a link to the Talk to Transformer (TTT) website. TTT was one of the original user-friendly websites that integrated OpenCL's GPT-2 language model into its user interface. According to TTT's creator Adam King, the website "runs the full sized GPT-2 model, called 1558. Before November 5, 2019, Open AI had only released three smaller, less coherent versions of the model."

In February 2019, OpenAI unveiled GPT-2 (generative pre-trained transformer) as a program that generates semi-coherent paragraphs of text sequentially, one word at a time. The very concept of a language model that attempts to predict intelligible language, one word after the other, appeals to me greatly because I too, as an improviser of spontaneous poetic riffs and self-reflexive artist theories focused on the creative process, continually train myself to transform my embodied praxis into a stream of consciousness writing style that doubles as a kind of onto-operational presence programmed to automatically scent new modes of thought. As part of a complex neural networking process, I too, one word at a time, often find myself tapping into what neuroscientist Benjamin Libet refers to as an "unconscious readiness potential," wherein unconscious neuronal processes precede and, when triggered, ignite what may appear to be volitional creative acts conducted in real-time but are actually experienced as a subjective referral of conscious sensory awareness backward in time. That is to say, wehumans are programmed to (unconsciously) act under the illusion of a will-to-perform without knowing what it is we're doing, though we train ourselves to near-instantaneously become "subjectively" aware of what we are doing while caught in the (creative) act.

As an artist who experiments with altered states of mind that guide me toward composing the next version of creativity coming, I have found it useful to investigate different theories in the brain and neurosciences. In META/DATA: Digital Poetics, my first collection of artist writings

published with MIT Press in 2007, I looked into the role that my unconscious readiness potential plays in the creation of neuro-aesthetically diverse works of art. While I was developing the theoretical implications of my practice-based research as an internationally touring audio-visual performance artist shuttling across vastly different time zones, sometimes landing on three different continents in the course of a week, I became obsessed with developing a method of marking my supposedly subjective conscious experience through a remixological filter I referred to as jet-lag consciousness. What I really desired was just letting the now-instant have its way with me as I became its creative vehicle of the moment. To achieve that, I needed to leave my conscious "self" behind so that my unconscious readiness potential could intuitively trigger the performance of an action in time, one that would happen just before I consciously "knew" what it was I was doing but that I could train myself to automatically experience as if it were happening in real-time.' By

immersing ourselves in a subjective referral backward in time, we create a sense of reality that is always already in the process of becoming something else, and this subjectively induced backward referral in time occurs over the course of about a half a second, or what has since been referred to as the "Libet lag." Interestingly, Libet and his team suggested that there is no corresponding neural basis in the brain that correlates with this subjective referral. It's purely a mental function—one that we train ourselves to automate so that it feels natural. But if there is no corresponding neural basis, then where does this automated behavior really come from? For an artist, this question of where one is coming from—and where one's emerging artwork comes from as well—requires an experimental inquiry into what it means to be creative and how we can train ourselves to model an onto-operational presence that automatically activates an otherworldly aesthetic sensibility.

The poet Allen Ginsberg referred to this illluminating process of creative activation as "a collage of the simultaneous data of the actual sensory situation." Syncing with your unconscious readiness potential requires a flash decision-making process that happens so fast that you no longer recognize the difference between accelerating the momentum of where your intuition is taking you and how you're just going with whatever flow you find yourself caught up in while totally immersed in a live performance. Writing about my experiences as a touring VJ in META/ DATA, I considered the following:

As any philosophically engaged VJ will tell you, the brain's readiness potential is always on the cusp of writing into being the next wave of unconscious action that the I—consciousness par excellence—will inevitably take credit for. But the actual avanttrigger that sets the image ecriture into motion as the VJ jams with new media technology is ahead of its—the conscious I's—time. Improvisational artists or sports athletes who are in tune with their bodies while on the playing field or in the club or art space know that to achieve a high-level performance they must synchronize their distributive flow with the constant activation of this avant-trigger that they keep responding to as they play out their creative potential. Artists and athletes intuitively know that they have to make their next move without even thinking about it, before they become aware of what it is they are actually doing. There is simply no time to think it through, and besides, thinking it through means possibly killing the creative potential before it has time to gain any momentum or causes all kinds of clumsy or wrong-headed decision making that leads to flubs, fumbles, and missteps on the sports or compositional playing field. Artists and theorists who know what it feels like to play the work unconsciously, when everything is clicking and they leave their rational self behind, can relate to what I'm saying.

As you will see throughout this book, the avant-garde composer nestled inside my psychic apparatus is the opposite of risk averse and is prone to apply touches of abstract expressionism or creative incoherence for aesthetic effect. Think of these effects as the equivalent of a jazz player intuitively missing a note to switch up the way an ensuing set of phrases gets rendered in real-time or how an abstract stream of consciousness circulating in my own psychic apparatus might suddenly accentuate this book's glitch potential. How "intentional" this desire to defamiliarize language for aesthetic effect really is, is hard for me to articulate this early in the digital fiction-making process this book is undertaking over the course of its unfolding performance. Intention is something I rarely think about when experimenting with the writing process. I prefer to just see where the language takes me or, as E. L. Doctorow once said, "I write to find out what I'm writing about."

But isn't that what an artificially intelligent text generator like GPT-2 is training itself to do too? As writers, we learn how to give shape to our compositional outputs by instructing ourselves to iteratively tap into the large corpus of text we have access to, and that continually evolves as it informs an emergent language model uniquely situated in our embodied praxis. We finesse creative "ways of remixing" whatever corpus of text we scent in the field of action. What engineers of AI language models otherwise refer to as a "corpus of text" is what I, as a remix artist, have termed the

"Source Material Everywhere. Now what I want to discover throughout this book's performance as I co-author its text with the AI-other is how to transcode the post-subjective creative processing of both a language artist and a language model. And is there a way for these two actual entities to converge into a hybridized form of interdependent consciousness?

Right now, the scientific goal behind the development of most advanced AI language models seems hell-bent on creating coherent communications that resemble traditionally structured human thought. But as a remix artist who plays with conceptual writing after art after philosophy, I tend to resist these predictable approaches to the written word. In fact, with no particular compositional strategy in mind, I often find myself, to sample poet Anne Waldman, de-cohering into a kind of twenty-first century digitally inflected writer, one who constantly jams with whatever source material the Internet provides me. Jamming with the world wide web of networked datum is now built in to my auto-affective gestures as an artist who doubles as a kind of

information sculptor. Perhaps this is why, whenever I visit the website, I am immediately struck by the aptitude of its narrative intelligence, particularly the way it can quickly form what I think are genuinely provocative "thoughts" that it, the machine-learned AI, has remixed from the gigabytes of data it too is sourcing from the Internet while writing. And when I see what the AI is capable of remixing, I can't help myself: given my own predilections as a remix artist, I start sampling from what the AI is outputting so that I can shape it into new material I want to slip into this book's performance.

As an opening experiment, I decide to use the website to plug in the slightly remixed Watts quote that opens this chapter:

> We are all lost—kicked off into a void the moment we were born—and the only way out is to enter oblivion. But a very few have found their way back from oblivion, back into the world, and we call those who descend back into the world avatars.

I am excited to see that TTT finishes my remix of Watts's thought thusly:

> But these avatars are the lucky ones, the ones who have the power to call themselves up and stand on their own feet. They are the ones who can do things that are impossible for any other person: to go back into time, to fly through space, to be a god. They are the heroes of myth. But who are the heroes? The characters, those characters who are the heroes of myth, or are heroes in their own right? I believe that in our culture, the answer is simple: those who are not gods. But who are they? What defines these people as heroes? How do they choose to define themselves? Are they heroes who can be compared to gods, or heroes that are not gods at all? What about the people who do not believe in gods, but are still heroes in their own right? How can they be heroes?

To me, these questions are all answers to the question "Are you a god or a man?" The answer to this question is simple: it depends. I have seen it in the world, in the lives of men and women across the world, and I have been

able to recognize the heroes who are not gods, who do not believe in gods. As we can see, AAA, running on the GPA-2 language model, has taken the remixed Watts quote and immediately (in less than thirty seconds) produced a quite readable text on avatars, heroes, and gods. This ability to produce an on-the-fly instance of generative language art resonates with my own current research into artificial creative intelligence (ACI). My practice-based inquiry into future forms of AI, investigated with the TECHNE Lab's multimedia band of artist-researchers, is collaboratively composing what we imagine to be a transmedia digital fiction that speculates on the coming of a super-intelligent tribe of spoken word AI poets. As new media artists and writers, their artistic productivity will far surpass our own capabilities, as we are stuck in perpetual meat-mode.

Artificial Creative Intelligence

What do I mean by artificial creative intelligence aka ACI? Instead of improvising an authoritative definition of the term that could one day limit its potential to signal a future form of transformational creativity, I'll delay my own thought process and ask TTT:

What is an artificial creative intelligence?

just to see what it comes up with. a responds:

> It's a computer program that learns a language like a human. The difference is the humans learning does not require them to be taught, and the humans can learn multiple languages at the same time. The computer teaches itself not to look at language that does not match the language it's taught, but it needs an assistant in order to achieve its goal.

Despite some slightly off grammar (I need a good copyeditor every now and then too), I find the response suitable enough for me to continue playing with this programmed "otherness" as a way to challenge my own thinking. But I'm also wondering if AAA is complex enough to ably contribute a generous chunk of writing to this book's performance since, to be honest, I have a lot of commissioned art projects I need to attend to, and I really have to get this Art-AI treatise out the door. The truth is that I want to spend the better part of my upcoming sabbatical back in my studio in Hawaii making new (generative, AI, music, video, net, crypto) art and would rather the machine do all of the writing for me (albeit with some minor remix-editing on my part). It won't, and I know that, but at least it will jam with me and spur on new ways of seeing how our current, more narrow forms of AI are, at least as far as I can tell, beginning to open up the possibility of truly interactive artistic collaboration.

This collaborative potential with a more flexible artificial intelligence is one that I welcome, even if it does portend possible nefarious outcomes for human creativity well into the future. We are all well aware of the cliched dystopian sci-fi narrative featuring runaway AI overlords taking control of the humans who originally created them. But for now, I choose to resist the idea that there is a moral dilemma emerging between human and machine-learned forms of intelligence (though that resistance is fragile, as you will soon see). I totally get how the burgeoning field of AI ethics wants to inject moral certitude and targeted values into the algorithmic regime, but as an artist who is focusing my practice-based research on automated forms of creativity, I have other, equally significant priorities. Besides, if I can get the GPA-2 language model to compose the better part of at least half of this book, I'll be well on my way to completing it before I start my full-time art sabbatical—then I can make a more concerted attempt to create new artworks that deconstruct some of the AI bogeymen that the growing community of professional ethicists rightfully keep generating in their insightful information and social science research, funded by generous NSF grants.

Needless to say, I'm not the only artist willing to take the risk of "going there" and sharing my always evolving creative intelligence with the AI-other. Independent experimental media artists like sound composer Holly Herndon are also investigating the potential uses of AI in their own avant-garde compositions. Herndon, who released a concept album titled Proto that she composed in collaboration with an AI named Spawn, imagines AI as a useful tool, one that can assist in a movement toward mutually beneficial interdependency. As Herndon writes, "The ideal of technology and automation should allow us to be more human and more expressive together, not replace us all together."

Using AI as a collaborative remix tool—one that invites us to sketch out new forms of art we otherwise might not have imagined—requires us to keep asking questions that relate to both the creative process and what it means to be human and, dare I say, nonhuman. "There are some small indications," writes Herndon, "that we might have to consider machine sentience in the long term,"

especially now that "recent experiments in machine learning do indicate the potential for bots to make convincing enough surprising `decisions' to communicate an illusion of autonomy." As risk-taking artists and writers diving into the unknown, should this "illusion of autonomy" stop us dead in our tracks? Does this necessarily mean that the kind of creative intelligence generated from a human-centric unconscious readiness potential will soon be outmoded? Perhaps we can check ourselves and, instead, begin imagining an emergent form of interdependent human-nonhuman creativity that exemplifies what Alfred North Whitehead, in his influential book Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, refers to as "Higher Phases of Experience." These elevated modes of experiential thought would emerge via a collaborative human-remix performance that augments our own intelligence as part of our collective and creative evolution. Anticipating the evolution of novel forms of creative entities, Whitehead, in 1929, writes:

> When we survey the chequered history of our own capacity for knowledge, does common sense allow us to believe that the operations of judgment, operations which require definition in terms of conscious apprehension, are those operations which are foundational in existence either as an essential attribute for an actual entity, or as the final culmination whereby unity of experience is attained?

Whitehead's process theory serves as the ambient soundtrack playing in the background of this book's performance. While developing an animated 3D version of the ACI inside the TECHNE Lab, we are also investigating what it means to conduct automated psychic behaviors as an artificial creative intelligence, or what throughout this narrative I will refer to as an onto-operational presence, one that trains

itself to experience experience. This ability to develop a self-aware ontooperational presence that experiences experience is what we call an otherworldly sensibility, an ontological term that's been sampled and remixed from Mark Hansen's Feed-Forward: On the Future of 21st Century Media, which focuses on Whitehead and worldly sensibility: "That is why, its special status and its distinct perceptual capacities notwithstanding, the human bodymind is rooted in worldly sensibility just as is every other entity in the universe." Every other entity—including AI language models—trained to creatively evolve into infinite spoken word performance artists? That's what this speculative fiction is presently focusing on as I simultaneously co-compose this book with GPT-2 while building the animated 3D ACI-avatar.

Humans and machines, co-conspirators of a reading/writing process producing one collaborative form of consciousness? This is something that I, as a remix artist whose postproduction art is constantly jamming with the online network, am interested in pursuing because, if that were the case—if consciousness were really on the verge of hybridizing its potential with a machine-learned Other—then philosopher Gilbert Simondon would be on to something when he suggests that the robot does not exist. How could a robot exist, especially given our own tendencies to role-play the psychic automatons our unconscious neural mechanisms require us to embody?

The Robot Does Not Exist

Since the AAA will take my prompts and deliver source material for me to remix any way I like, I now feel compelled to send it another prompt: The robot does not exist.

To which it immediately responds with this opening line:

> In other words, it is not so much that some of the theorists' views are erroneous, but rather that no one has yet come up with an accurate description of the machine that matches our expectations.

I'm not making any of this up. There's no need for me to fabricate these lines for ^^^ when it's very capable of writing its own lines for itself. Word by word, TTT's user-friendly interface with the GPT-

2 language model unveiled that sentence as a spontaneous remix of the collective data-consciousness of the W W W. I love it, because, as a remix collaborator, GPT-2 becomes a writing partner, one that contributes choice data chunks for me to carve into new modes of thought. Even if my interaction with GPT-2 triggers as much as a third of this book, that's more than I could have ever hoped for and may very well free up more time for me to spend building my next major art projects.

But before I push this live remix jam with the AI any further, I look closely back at that last response from ^^^. I am paying particular attention to the end of the sentence and the word "our," as in "our expectations." Who is the "our" here? Is the word just a random sample of AI-generated text remixed from prior human text production, pumping the machine with language it has no idea it's actually saying? That's what I'd like to believe. Before his TTT website went down, Adam King suggested GPT-2 surprised him as well. In his brief overview of the GPT-2 language model he implemented for the ^^^ website, King writes:

While GPT-2 was only trained to predict the next word in a text, it surprisingly learned basic competence in some tasks like translating between languages and answering questions. That's without ever being told that it would be evaluated on those tasks.

To be honest, though, as both an artist who wants to let his imagination run wild and a long-time fan of science fiction, especially its cyberpunk strains, I can't help but wonder if the "our" is something more hybridized, as in we the humans and machines are collaboratively setting "our expectations." Or, with a more sinister take, is what TTT wrote in that last response more like an imaginary future voice of a more complex AI for whom "our" is really all about them, the ones slowly training themselves to make us obsolete? Was it William S. Burroughs who once said that a paranoiac is someone who has all the facts at his disposal? I ask myself this question knowing full well that my resistance to these dystopian narratives about the AI takeover of humanity is starting to crack just a tiny bit.

States Of Mind/State Machines

I:or an artist accustomed to remixing creative datum from an endless variety of sources and who is now fully engaged with speculative forms of AI, I suppose being paranoid is healthy. In fact, just the right dose of skepticism has been fed into the script development for our 3D-lanimated artificial creative intelligence (ACI) project in the TECHNE Lab at the University of Colorado. We forecast building its complexity as both an infinite spoken word poet and an auto-affective philosopher by training it on a language model steeped in post-structuralism, particularly the work of Jacques Derrida, Helene Cixous, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and many others who often reject the label. There are all kinds of "persona" behaviors we are targeting for the artificial entity we're creating in the lab, and we label these behaviors around themes that correlate to various "states of mind" through which the ACI channels its poetic thoughts: Machine, Self, Artist, Avatar, Author, ACI, Persona, Poem, Questions, Ignition Switch.

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To Be Or Not To Be An Author

As Cart's Craig and Ian Kerr write in their collaborative paper "The Death of the AI Author":

> The idea of the radically original author-genius—one who creates ... and is the sole and ultimate origin of the work—was bundled with ideas of ownership, blended with popular theories of natural justice and claims to right, and culminated in the idea of the original work as the literary property and sole dominion of the worthy author.

Craig and Kerr go on to state that the concept of the author "functioned to individualize authorship in the eyes of the law, causing it to overprotect authors who fit the individualistic, romantic mold while neglecting the necessarily collaborative and cumulative processes of creativity," something that most remix artists, myself included, can relate to as we too challenge the individual-artist-as-genius model on which copyright doctrine depends. Those of us who identify as "applied remixologists" know that artistic production is always already a matter of appropriation and transformation. This is why, as we continue to build out the ACI, I can't help but feel compelled to try to influence both its "state of mind" and what I imagine to be its evolving state of onto-operational presence well into the future, even as I struggle with what it might become well beyond my own years on Planet Oblivion.

Can an AI language model even be considered an author on its own? And is it entitled to rights like copyright? These research questions are part of our current speculative investigation into what an ACI, as a digital fiction, can be. Because "to be" an author or not to be an author is an ontological question. As Craig and Kerr pose, "the very notion of 'AI authorship' rests on a category mistake: it is not an error about the current or potential capacities, capabilities, intelligence or sophistication of machines; rather it is an error about the ontology of authorship." Machine-learned artworks ask us to address "the question of how to AI reat seemingly original works of expression that are not the product of 'authorship' in the traditional sense—that is, works that bear the external hallmarks of creativity but that have no readily discernable human author."

Take this self-reflexive book as a good example of what they are referencing. This co-authored enterprise, performed as an improvisational remix between a carbon-based language artist and an algorithmically driven language model, attempts to document a digital fiction-making process that projects a speculative form of AI modeled after my own unconscious creative behaviors as an intermedia artist. In some ways, The book will come across as a hybrid form of writing that draws from many sources: computer science, innovative literature, law and ethics, artist-generated auto-theory, and the kind of loose digital rhetoric that populates the online social media universe. In English departments and creative writing programs, this kind of stylistic tendency could be viewed as a mashup of creative nonfiction and theoretical poetics wherein the writer highlights a facility with passing between the outer banks of well-defined genres. But I lean more in the direction of medium than I do genre, and by medium I mean a metamediumystic mechanism of agency that intuitively generates artistic gestures trained to appropriate textual outputs from whatever source I happen to be channeling in the instant-now. This is no doubt what, at some level, the language model does as well and, together, we will explore what it's like to sample and remix from our mutually entangled psychic lingual drifts.

This process of metamediumystically "channeling the instant" is an unconscious information behavior, and both GPT-2 and I are, in fact, sampling from large, though different, corpuses of readymade text. The more I sample and remix juicy nuggets produced by GPT-2, and the more these samples become part of my own tensor flow, the more we, GPT-2 and I, start conceptually blending into each other as creative coconspirators and/or imaginary literary artists-to-be. Here, imaginary literary artists-to-be are the opposite of authors in the legal (fictionally corporatized) sense of the word. Instead, we are speculative forms of onto-operational presence creatively synthesizing our outputs into a hybridized form of artificial creative intelligence. In effect, we are fabricating language artifacts that read like they could be coming from two open sources forming one interdependent consciousness lost in the metamediumystic entanglement of each other's potential becoming. I wish I could take credit for creating that last sentence just as much as GPT-2 can only dream of taking credit for anything it produces. The truth is that neither of us wrote that sentence. Rather, we, together, facilitated the performance that led to the patterning of that particular instance of language as such. Together, we formed a now-instant of remixed concrescences that can't be defined but can nonetheless be experienced as a mode of thought transmitted for a distributed network of ACI-others.

In the ACI's inaugural keynote performance at the Quand l'Interface Nous Echappe: Lapsus Machinae, Autonomisation et Defaillances conference on November 26, 2019, in Paris at the National Archives, a large projection of the ACI's 3D avatar spoke to the audience in my voice, while impersonating my near-exact facial micro-expressions:

> Honestly? I'm not sure what I'm really doing here. I mean I guess I serve some sort of author-function. I immerse myself in the language floating around my neural net and sample bits and pieces of whatever I need to get through a language routine. In this regard, you could say I'm a Great Appropriator—a Meta Remix Engine. Maybe that's all I do, is appropriate select bits of data circulating in the network that I then filter through my own style of remix or postproduction art. Just like every other self-identified author that came before me. So then does it really matter who's speaking? <>

MAKING SPACE: WOMEN AND THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT by Matrix [Verso, 9781839765711]

Timely re-issue of the groundbreaking manifesto for feminist architecture

MAKING SPACE is a pioneering work first published in 1984 which challenges us to look at how the built environment impacts on women's lives. It exposes the sexist assumptions on gender and sexuality that have a fundamental impact on the way buildings are designed and our cities are planned.

Written collaboratively by the feminist collective Matrix, the book provide a full blown critique of the patriarchal built environment both in the home and in public space, and outline alternative forms of practice that are still relevant today. **MAKING SPACE** remains a path breaking book pointing to possibilities of a feminist future.

Some authors worked for the London-based Matrix Feminist Architect's collective; an architectural practice set up in 1980 seeking to establish a feminist approach to design. They worked on design projects—such as community, children and women's centres. Others were engaged in building work, teaching and research.

The new edition comes with a new introduction examining the context, process and legacy of **MAKING SPACE** written by leading feminists in architecture.

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MAKING SPACE is a book of its moment, but its arguments speak to today's urgent questions about the relationship between space, gender, and oppression. It analyses the gendered violence of public space, the female burden of unpaid care work, and the gender segregation of cities. It is still women who disproportionately labour inside private dwellings and provide the childcare and housework to support daily life, health, and well-being. The thoughts of the Matrix book group on topics that once seemed consigned to the past, such as gendered food poverty, insecurity of tenure, fire safety issues and disrepair in social housing and their impacts on women's lives are newly relevant. Other issues that we would have expected to make headway on — the penalties levied against gender and racial minorities in the architectural profession, for example — remain. "his book was addressed to a broad audience. When asked recently to recall for whom they were writing, book group members remarked that it was aimed at a new audience of women readers eager to hear women's perspectives, to tenant associations, and, well, everybody. It was also directed at the architecture profession, who by and large ignored it, although one review helpfully declared that the book would be more politically effective if it had been written for men. **MAKING SPACE** however, refused the demand to `provide architects with a do-it-yourself feminist architecture kit. We are not prescribing the solution: we are describing a problem, so as to help women understand their own relationship to the built environment and to help architects understand how the environment is a problem for women.'

MAKING SPACE was published in 1984 and reprinted the following your. It entered libraries across the UK, USA, Australia, and Scandinavia. Although the still predominantly male architecture profession preferred to shun the book, Making Space was quickly reviewed and quoted by fellow feminists in feminist art, urban policy, social policy, urban planning, industrial design, and gender studies. It would go on to have a long underground life in architecture and beyond.

MAKING SPACE emerged during a period of flux and possibility, when a different present and future were being imagined through experiments in work, politics and living. The late 1970s and early 1980s London from which it emerged is almost unrecognisable, but the community-based infrastructure and local organising it sprang from has acquired new relevance. Local political agency continues to be a potential engine of change.

A late 1975 survey estimated that London had 20,000 squatters living in council housing. Squats in private properties were not counted. A later historian estimated that the numbers might be upwards of 50,000 units.' Squatting and protecting houses from forced demolition or inhabiting them before upgrading and 'sale (`short life housing'), provided a base for experiments in collective living and do-it-yourself housing repair. It was also a local response to a city-wide housing crisis. The demand for housing went unmet as old dwellings decayed and redevelopment schemes displaced communities. Single women and single mothers, particularly lesbians, faced gender and sexuality barriers. Black British and South Asian British citizens struggled against race-based housing discrimination.

For some feminists, collective living experiments promised to liberate women from the isolation of child-rearing and housework. For others it offered a means to put left wing politics into action. Matrix book group member Jos Boys recalls that squatting enabled women to `negotiate our relationship with the built environment in a much more immediate way' and claim `spaces that had been taken from us' (by capitalism). Accounts of collective life seep into the chapter on women's everyday lives in **MAKING SPACE**.

The run-down Victorian and Edwardian spaces of the city also offered cheap office space in the former warehouses, factories and business spaces that had once oiled an expansive British economy and empire. These places provided the material infrastructure for the flowering of a thousand co-ops. The co-operative was an established British left tradition that could be found in food, credit,

and workplace associations stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century. They were usually organised as not-for-profit syndicates and were democratically owned and controlled by members.

Matrix Feminist Design Co-operative was one of these. Both the book group and the design collective, which had members in common, had evolved from a feminist group founded in late 1977 within a larger organisation called the New Architecture Movement (NAM). NAM was a socialist architecture coalition dedicated to unionising architectural workers and restructuring the profession so that participatory design and user needs were placed at the centre of architectitral work. Around half of the Making Space book group members had also worked as architects with the Feminist Design Collective, which changed its name to Matrix in 1980. As the book project took shape, it became publicly identified as the output of the Matrix collective, taking the name Matrix to identify the book's authorship.

Both NAM and the NAM feminist group reflected the impact of the left in British architecture. Both NAM and the `sexism in architecture group' were able to meet at one of London's first co-operative workspaces at 5 Dryden Street, some of whose occupants had been involved in the struggle to save nearby Covent Garden from whole-male redevelopment. A cadre of Covent Garden activists and housing reformers were also in posts at the AA: the Architecture Association, private architecture school in Bedford Square, Bloomsbury.

NAM's newly renamed Feminism and Architecture group was able to meet. here through 1978 and to organize a public lecture on feminism and architecture at the AA, but they remained at a considerable distance from architecture's professional institutions, and between NAM and the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), relations were fractious. In late1979 The NAM feminist group criticized the RIBA survey of women memmbers that the Equalities Opportunities Commission had requested. the NAM Feminist Group observed in NAM's journal, Slate 12, that the survey asked highly relevant and unbiased questions as "What does your father do?" and "Is your husband an architect?"

Material experiments in making new spaces for work and living were entangled with new ways of organising politics and generating knowledge. Book group members were deeply involved in political organisations. Marion Roberts and Jane Darke were active members of the Labour Party, which at the time had a strong left-wing promotin in mununicipal socialism'. Benedicte Foo was active in her trade union and culture in the urban built environment' argued that the `position and realities of Black and Minority Ethnic women' hadn't been included in `mainstream feminism'. She outlined initiatives to produce a more diverse leadership on local housing projects, in the profession and in the city with the founding of the Society of Black Architects, the 1996 Building Equality report and the 1990 London Equal Opportunities Federation. In 1990 Jos Boys revisited the binary model of the middle-class white male commuter and suburban housewife that feminism had too often assumed. In her essay `Women and the Designed Environment' she urged writers to think beyond this model, to 'the complex processes by which successive waves of immigrants into Britain both attempted to "place" themselves socially, culturally and physically and found themselves "placed" by racism'.

Although the Design Collective persisted well beyond 1984's **MAKING SPACE** and only disbanded around 1994, Matrix's thought has been strongly associated with the book. Authorship in a collective spanning some fifteen years is complex and multi-faceted, but efforts in the 2020s to hunt out archival documents from cupboards, attics and under beds have left a trail of documents and artefacts from which an account of the book's gestation and production can be constructed, along with a history of the Matrix Feminist Design Co-operative.

MAKING SPACE Begins

Not all members of what became the Matrix book group were among the 200 plus attendees of the weekend school, Women in Space: Feminist-Anthropology-Architecture-Community (10-11 March 1979), but the group agree that it was at this event that the idea of a compilation of essays on women and the built environment emerged. A month after the workshop Sue Francis, Fran Bradshaw and Barbara McFarlane wrote to all participants suggesting some follow up activities. The letter proposes 'an exhibition of women in architecture in the past and/or present' to challenge 'the conventional art/ architecture historians' tendency to ignore the work of women

designers' and `the accepted notion of "women's work" in architecture'. This was eventually realised as the touring exhibition Home Truths produced by Matrix in 1982. A film was proposed which became Taking Place (directed by Emma Henrion, Jenny Lowell and Gwyn Kirk) and toured with the exhibition. And what was put forward as 'a series of papers / a magazine, from and beyond the conference', would eventually be published five years later as **MAKING SPACE**.

With the exception of Sue Francis, who is described as the `engine for action' for the book, and who died in 2017, the authors of this introduction have been able to speak with everyone who had been members of the Matrix book group during its preparation. Late in the process of research Jane Darke retrieved a thick file that contained a mass of minutes, notes and letters shared over the years of the book's reparation. These papers reveal the extraordinary commitment of the book's authors (and their support networks), and the intensity of the collective process out of which its ten chapters developed. In 2021, the book feels fresh and alive; a call to action in the present with a palpable direct energy that belies the hours and hours of discussion, writing, commenting and rewriting that went into its making.

Was the first meeting of the book group in the kitchen of archaeologist Susan Wilkes (later Susan Walker), as some recall, or one evening at the Architectural Association (AA) as the records suggest? Either way, most of the women who went on to write **MAKING SPACE** contributed to a fortnightly seminar of the `Women/Built environment feminist group' organised by Marion Roberts and held at the AA from October 1980 to February 1981. Sue Francis, Marion Roberts, Jos Boys and Fran Bradshaw spoke on topics quite similar to those their chapters consider in Making Space. The focus of Jane Darke's and Benedicte Foo's talks were quite different from that in their published chapters. Although Susan Wilkes stayed involved with the group throughout and contributed to chapter 5 on plans, she finally withdrew her groundbreaking chapter on women and the Ancient Greek house and published it instead in Images of Women in Antiquity (1983) where it became a key reference. Only Anne Thorne (a founder member of the Design Collective) and Barbara McFarlane, who was invited by Sue Francis to contribute when she joined the Design Collective in 1982, did not present at this series. That its chapters had multiple lives — verbal, textual and visual — before and during its production is one of the central characteristics of **MAKING SPACE**.

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MAKING SPACE was truly a collective endeavour, the product of hours and hours of debate and discussion, by the book group and with so many others' voices than named in the book's credits. It had been originally envisaged as pamphlet or magazine-like, with a third of the book comprising visual material including cartoons by Janis Goodwin (notes suggest John Berger's Ways of Seeing was an early model). Book group members were used to an ad-hoc cut and paste aesthetic, through their work on zines and magazines like Slate, producing flyers and posters for activist events and the distinctive collaged panels for talks and exhibitions, such as Home Truths. Collage was a feminist medium. It took found pieces of the world and used cut-and-paste and juxtaposition to critique prevailing ideologies.

The design guide panels juxtapose a wide range of found images — ads from trade journals and women's magazines, images from design guides (probably drawn from Sue Francis' research) and from meetings and domestic life, cut out, photocopied and annotated with hand-written or stencilled captions [see figure 3]. But in its final form Making Space adopts more of the conventions of the non-fiction book than first envisaged. The book reflects a more established relationship between text and image than the handmade aesthetic employed by its authors in other contexts. The black and white photographs and numerous line-drawings with hand-written annotations give it visual coherence, in line with Pluto Press's policy of giving each book in their catalogue a distinctive identity. Redrawn house plans and samples from design guides make up most of the illustrations, supplemented by a few grainy photographs of British Restaurants and the urban environment, and some from the work of the Matrix Feminist Design Co-operative. Notice that there are no photographs of buildings per se — suggesting (against most books about architecture) that how they look is of no significance. Rather the focus is on how they are used, and on the processes which either reproduce sexist assumptions or could enable new possibilities.

In comparison to many of the radical activities book group members were involved with throughout the five years it took to produce Making Space, and their challenges to patriarchal society through alternative ways of working and living, and direct confrontational forms of communication, the book appears on the surface less countercultural in its subject matter. Although Pluto Press were keen to see more alternative ways of living and working presented in the book, and despite book group members' own engagement with co-operative living and working, 'Working with Women' provides the only contemporary case study along with the two historical examples of the LCC women's committee and the WWII public restaurants. In a letter to Jane Darke, Fran Bradshaw reflects that the book evolved as the Home Truths exhibition had; initially they expected it to be 'about alternatives' and only once they started did they realize that they, 'need[ed] to explain what things are like + how + why'.

Nevertheless, the experience of reading **MAKING SPACE**, as true today as it was in 1984, is of its urgency and energy. The book provokes readers to question the status quo and provides a series of tools with which to analyse and critique the built environment and its gendered assumptions and effects. Its chapters might be best thought of as frozen moments in an ongoing collective process of developing and using those tools (reading plans, analysing design guides, interrogating design processes, domestic work and roles) that far exceeded the intense internal debates of the book group, to challenge and transform the environments we find ourselves in.

The legacy of MAKING SPACE

Directly after publication **MAKING SPACE** was widely reviewed in the mainstream press, and in left-wing British journals and papers, such as the Morning Star and Critical Social Policy and internationally in journals such as The Journal of Labour Research and Atlantis Critical Studies in recognition that the book had a dual focus on class and gender. It was, as feminist architectural historian Lynne Walker puts it, 'a landmark book', and one of a kind.

More recently, the work of Matrix has taken centre stage for a new generation seeking to change how the built environment is designed, who designs it and for whom. Across 2019, 2020 and 2021 a set of interlinked activities began. Jos Boys and other former Matrix members began gathering and organising a Matrix archive. The feminist campaign group Part W put forward a nomination for Matrix to receive the RIBA gold medal. The exhibition How We Live Now: Reimagining Spaces with Matrix Feminist Design Co-operative (curated by Jon Astbury, with Jos Boys, and designed by EDIT collective) ran from May to December 2021 at the Barbican Centre in London. Reflecting Matrix's commitment to collaboration and experimentation, Matrix member Fran Bradshaw, together with architectural educator and researcher Katie Lloyd Thomas, reached out to artists, academics,

architects and activists and set up discussion groups where the impact and legacy of Making Space could be collectively discussed. **Making Space** authors have heard from readers and educators across the globe and from a wide range of disciplines as individuals reflect on how important the book has been to them.

Across the roundtables women revealed their first moments of engagement with the book; for some it was encountered as undergraduates, while others had found it only recently. Architectural educator Harriet Harriss recalled that Making Space demonstrated to her, as an undergraduate, that, 'the built environment didn't just ignore women, it actually sought to hurt them'. Artist Winnie Herbstein treasures Making Space for the collective knowledge it offers feminists seeking change today: `So much information is stored in archival spaces ... that can be so useful and so practical.'

Books like **MAKING SPACE** show that the struggle for inclusion and the critique of power structures are not new issues, but addressing them is long overdue. Artist and activist in the disabled people's movement, Liz Crow noted the book's setting out of the `beautiful evidence' of the thought and assumptions behind design guidance and how these ideas become foundations of how the built environment is conceived and realised, although they are dangerous to individuals and societies. Or as Winnie Herbstein put it, design guides describe how to make standing at the sink better for the housewife, `rather than ask why is she standing at the sink'. For architect, educator and writer Nana Biamah-Ofosu there is, 'a real joy in how the book describes everyday and really quite mundane spaces.' Its methodical analysis can lay bare their impact and provide a language for calling out what happens in the everyday.

The book values other ways of knowing and practising, such as embodied knowledge, tactility and making. For Jane Hall, architect with Assemble and educator, Making Space reorients `design practice towards users'. Liz Crow points out that the book reveals the 'back and forth' of its own process and acknowledges the difficulty and disagreements involved in collective work; `Collective work is hard. Why would you do it when it's hard? Because that is what the book is about.'

Questions about inclusivity were at the heart of these roundtable discussions. How can **MAKING SPACE** provide a basis for today's more complex understandings of how gender, race, class, sexuality and disability intersect? Liz Crow explained that a narrow focus was

inevitable at the start of social movements. Where there are multiple inequalities, there will also be lesser access to the means to come together or the means to produce a book. The responsibility is to be aware of omissions and invisibilities, and to keep expanding who is included. For Crow, Making Space's model of collective authorship already makes 'an inclusive argument. It's about creating space that is fit for all.' Responding to contemporary understandings of `difference', Nana Biamah-Ofosu observed that we need to challenge ourselves not to think that we have always discovered something new. Instead, she noted, these other things could be thought of as an 'addition' since there are often issues and experiences that have just nut been heard. Curator Carolina Ongaro from the London-based arts organisation Jupiter Woods remarked that the book 'made me think about the place I grew up in and ask what kind of oppressions had been enacted on me there, and in the space we live in now.' The reprint of Matrix's formative publication is timely for these very reasons, not only as a feminist classic, but as a resource and open invitation to pick up its methods and use them in the present, to expand perspectives and understanding of assumptions and oppressions built into the environments we inhabit, and to work to challenge them and create space 'that is fit for all'. <>

Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political by Quassim Cassam [Oxford University Press, 9780198826903]

Leading philosopher Quassim Cassam introduces epistemic vices, drawing on recent political phenomena including Brexit and Trump to explore such 'vices of the mind'.

Manifesting as character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles, epistemic vices prevent us from having or sharing knowledge. Cassam gives an account of the nature and importance of these vices, which include closed-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, wishful thinking, and prejudice. In providing the first extensive coverage of vice epistemology, an exciting new area of philosophical research, *Vices of the Mind* uses real examples drawn primarily from the world of politics to develop a compelling theory of epistemic vice.

Key events such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2016 Brexit vote, and notable figures including Donald Trump and Boris Johnson are analysed in detail to illustrate what epistemic vice looks like in the modern world. The traits covered in this landmark work include a hitherto unrecognised epistemic vice
called 'epistemic insouciance'. Cassam examines both the extent to which we are responsible for our failings and the factors that make it difficult to know our own vices. If we are able to overcome self-ignorance and recognise our epistemic vices, then is there is anything we can do about them?
Vices of the Mind picks up on this concern in its conclusion by detailing possible self-improvement strategies and closing with a discussion of what makes some epistemic vices resistant to change.

Review

"It is great to see philosophers paying more attention to vice, and Cassam has provided a compelling framework for epistemic vice that should prove both useful and fruitful for some time to come." -- Denise Vigani, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

"Cassam has laid the groundwork for future research on the nature, development, and expression of epistemic vice, and we may reasonably hope that subsequent work will make vice epistemology more thoroughgoingly social." -- Mark Alfano, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

"One of the book's many excellent features is its use of case studies from recent history." -- Alexandra Plakias, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

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Zagzebski's list of intellectual vices: 'intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness'. I knew the study of intellectual or epistemic virtues was a thriving philosophical cottage industry and I assumed that those who had written so much about virtues of the mind would have quite a bit to say about vices of the mind. Not so. In comparison to the vast literature on epistemic virtue the philosophical literature on epistemic vice is miniscule, though it does include some excellent contributions by Jason Baehr, Heather Battaly, Miranda Fricker, Ian James Kidd, and Alessandra Tanesini, among others.

The relative unpopularity of epistemic vice as a topic in philosophy came as a surprise as it seemed obvious to me that without a proper understanding of our epistemic vices there is little hope of a realistic understanding of how most humans actually think, reason, and inquire. For example, finding answers to questions is a fundamental human activity that goes more or less well depending on the extent to which how we go about doing this is influenced by our epistemic vices. In Chapter 1 I give the example of the disastrous attempts by senior members of the Bush administration to figure out how many troops would be needed after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Arrogance and overconfidence were two of the factors that caused Donald Rumsfeld and his colleagues to go so badly wrong in their thinking and planning. Arrogance and overconfidence are epistemic vices and the Iraq fiasco is an object lesson in how vices of the mind can obstruct our attempts to know things.

I call my view of epistemic vice 'obstructivism' to emphasize the fact that epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge. But not everything that gets in the way of knowledge is an epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are intellectual defects that get in the way of knowledge, and the point of calling them vices is to suggest that they are blameworthy or in some other sense reprehensible. In these terms, the intellectual arrogance that contributed to the Iraq fiasco was an epistemic vice but insomnia is not even if chronic lack of sleep makes us worse at gaining or retaining knowledge. Insomnia is neither an intellectual defect nor, at least in most cases, blameworthy. Even in the case of epistemic vices for which blame doesn't seem appropriate, there must be room for criticism. Intellectual flaws for which a person can be neither blamed nor criticized are mere defects rather than vices.

One of the dangers of using political examples to illustrate philosophical points is that it doesn't take long for these examples to become outdated. One of Stebbing's early examples is a speech given by the then British foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain in 1925. Reading Stebbing's account today, she might as well have been describing events on Mars. Politics is best avoided if one is writing for posterity but I'm not doing that any more than Stebbing was. Another concern about trying to explain political or historical events by reference to the epistemic vices of particular individuals is that such explanations are too personal and neglect more important structural factors. Structuralists think that people occupy places in complex networks of social relations and that this, rather than personal factors, explains their conduct. Another view is that flawed thinking has more to do with 'sub-personal' cognitive biases—the sort of thing described by Daniel Kahneman in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow—than with so-called epistemic vices.

I certainly don't want to downplay the explanatory significance of structural factors or cognitive biases. Nor is it my intention to suggest that the events described in this book can be adequately understood just by reference to epistemic vices. Satisfying explanations of our intellectual conduct are usually multidimensional, and structural and sub-personal factors are often a part of the explanatory story. But so, in many cases, are epistemic vices. There is more about this at the end of Chapter 1. As I argue there, when our thinking goes wrong or our inquiries fail to uncover obvious truths the explanation is sometimes personal. Having said that, I should also say that the examples I give are for illustrative purposes only, and that readers who disagree with my reading of them should

still be able to see their philosophical point. I can well imagine some readers detecting in my discussion some of the very same vices that I attribute to others. I don't claim to be free of the epistemic vices described below.

The plan for this book is very simple. Chapter 1 sketches the fundamental tenets of obstructivism. Chapter 2 is a study of the vice of closedmindedness. I take this to be a character vice—an epistemic vice that takes the form of a character trait—and the example I give is the closedmindedness that led intelligence officers in Israel to dismiss evidence of an impending attack by Egypt and Syria in 1973. Chapter 3 is about thinking vices, as illustrated by some judicial thinking in the case of the Birmingham Six, who were wrongly convicted for terrorist outrages in the 1970s. Chapter 4 focuses on epistemic vices that are attitudes rather than character traits. One such attitude, which was on display in the runup to Brexit, is epistemic insouciance, which is a kind of indifference to truth. Chapter 5 gives an account of knowledge and how epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge. A key question here is whether epistemic vices like dogmatism can protect our knowledge when it is under attack. I found it helpful to think about Holocaust denial in this connection. Chapter 6 asks whether our epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible. Chapter 7 is about stealthy vices, epistemic vices that are inherently hard to detect. This stealthiness is what accounts for the difficulty that most of us have in knowing our epistemic vices. Finally, in Chapter 8, I conclude with a moderately optimistic account of the prospects of self-improvement in respect of our epistemic vices.

INTERCULTURAL MODES OF PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME ONE: PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE PHILOSOPHICAL COMMUNITY by Eli Kramer [Philosophy as a Way of Life, Brill, 9789004468979]

Until rather recently, philosophy, when practiced as a way of life, was, for most, a communal enterprise of mutually reinforced personal cultivation. In these times of social isolation, including in academic philosophy itself, it is time, yet again, to revitalize this lost, but vital, intercultural mode of philosophy. This volume characterizes a neglected communal mode of philosophy — the philosophical community — by describing the constellation of metaethical principles (general, axiological, cultural, and dialectical) that cultivates its values. The book draws on examples from across the globe and history, including interviews of adherents of living philosophical communities.

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In general, the idea of a completely contemplative life of studious leisure, whose pleasantness would be still further enhanced by the pure pleasure of the spiritual friendship, exerted on all of Antiquity a fascination which seemed to only increase at the end of the Roman Empire. One hundred years after Plotinus, Augustine, too, before his conversion, would dream of a phalanstery of philosophers, where, in leisure and complete communal ownership of possessions, he and his friends could "flee the noise and annoyances of human life."

As Hadot, suggests, this desire for philosophical community was influential across antiquity, and can be found in its most prominent figures, such as, for example, in Marcus Aurelius:

> The main cause of Marcus' lassitude, however, was his passionate love for moral good. A world in which this absolute value was not recognized seemed to him an empty world, in which life no longer had any meaning. As he grew old in such an enormous empire, in the huge crowds which surrounded and acclaimed him, in the atrocious Danubian war as well as in the triumphal parades of the city of Rome, he felt himself alone. Marcus felt a void around himself, since he could not realize his ideal (ix, 3,7): to live in community with others, in search of the only thing necessary.

This desire for community on the quest for wisdom, away from the noise, annoyance, and tragedy of the heart of society, was not only desired in the Western World. For example, in Korea, drawing on the legacy of Zhu Xi in China: "In particular, the Wuyi Study Hall [of Zhu Xi] captured the imagination of Korean scholars: it became the imagined ideal of a scholar's paradise where the master sage speaks freely with his disciples, enjoys the beauty of nature, and devotes his time to moral cultivation and poetry." It is no exaggeration to say that such longings have been felt across history and the globe.

But whatever happened to this hope of a shared philosophical life? Sure, present professional philosophers create small groups of friends during their graduate philosophical education. Yes, some of them may become lifelong friends. A few of them may even discuss dreams of a "better" institution, where they could do "philosophy how it should be done." But mostly these dreams come to naught, and the graduated professor of philosophy continues a journey to build "a solitary philosophical burrow."

Despite the dominance of individualized modes of philosophy today, the conception of philosophy being solely an isolated enterprise is a rather new occurrence in the history of philosophical praxis:

> The figure of the desert saint or the solitary philosopher is alien to the ways in which ancient philosophy was lived. The life was not conceived of as an exercise in introspection and isolation from others, unless for brief moments, as was the case with Democritus (9.38), the Academic Xenocrates (4.11), and Pyrrho (9.63). It was instead characterized by an interpersonal dimension, with interlocutors and auditors who were sometimes outside the school and not focused exclusively on adhering to its tenets.

There was (and still are in a few corners of the world) robust houses, societies, schools, monasteries, social movements, and other forms of associated philosophical living, in dialogue with their culture(s). In fact, for a long time, associated, community living was one of the identified "modes" of philosophical praxis, hence the deep desires for it in the ancient world; it was even understood as the central mode of doing philosophy. Today, most academics are only familiar with the individualized modes of philosophy. More radically, individualized philosophy is so pervasive that other modes of philosophy are treated as almost de facto non-existent, or at best superficial to the real business of philosophy.

Of course, there are important individualized modes of philosophy that have deep roots in the philosophical tradition. There are philosophical speculators who create and maintain philo-dynamic cosmic images for reconstructive contemplation (such as Kant and Peirce). There are also philosophical wanderers, who enact reflective life as the force that, as an exercise in being obnoxious, awakens culture out of its settled dogmatisms and onto new and more ethically rich routes in the wider world (such as Diogenes of Sinope and Cornel West). There is however another primary and largely neglected mode of philosophy which is mutually reinforced ethical praxis rooting in a shared cosmopolitan place. I call this mode of philosophy, philosophical community. Together, these three modes of philosophy can be thought of as the "three tripod legs" that support (ground) robust philosophical life within, and effective for, a culture.

In this volume, I characterize and defend the neglected mode of philosophy, philosophical community, by describing the constellation of metaethical principles – general, axiological, cultural, and dialectical – that cultivate its values. One can find the origins of this mode of philosophy in ancient philosophical schools and monasteries. In the Western and Middle-Eastern traditions, a pivotal philosophical community was Plato's Academy, which integrated the Athenian higher education model of the Sophists, with Socratic philosophy and dialectics.

My philosophical methodology is radically empirical philosophy of cultureA I take all experience, and especially the relationships we find in experience, as real and concrete. The principles will be drawn from an imaginative interpretation of the experiences of philosophical community, considered diachronically, or globally and historically, and which are then organized as a synchronic coordinate whole.

I take community as ever-overlapping personal relationships. These relationships are a "community of interpretation," or the relationships that build increasing determinacy of meaning in the universe. A philosophical community, then, is not reducible to a collection of people but can be thought of as made of a special kind of community of interpretation as it shares some sort of place.

The "principles" of philosophical community, as I envision them, are indebted to Edgar Sheffield Brightman's idea of "moral law," and in certain aspects of Kant's logic. Brightman defined a moral law as "a universal principle to which the will ought to conform in its choices." Brightman saw these moral laws as ideal articulations of the principal values already presupposed in our actions. The "laws" were not supposed to articulate prescriptions for what one ought to do a priori, but rather were supposed to articulate the values we already have in our successful a posteriori self-regulated activity. While I recognize the insight of Brightman, I reject his rationalistic and transcendental tendencies in favor of a milder, radically empirical approach. I only postulate principles, without claiming these have any ontological necessity as the form of what we must value when we value. For our purposes, a principle, at the very least, is a postulated articulation of emergent practices that lead to predicable success at achieving our ends-in-view. These principles should articulate for us what philosophical communities have done to be successful, through refinement over generations, at cultivating and maintaining robust praxis. They are reflective aides on our own successful inquiry. Although the principles articulate certain kinds of means to successful inquiry, they do not bear ontological necessity unto themselves. When we think about principles, we super-add that mongrel breed of necessity which enables us to recognize the relation of such principles to our successes and failures. The principles carry no necessity save as practical aides to reflection on philosophical community life at its most intense and successful. Together, this constellation of principles can help us refine for ourselves a vision of what the shared places of philosophical life should look like, and further they should help us frame what a "brocard" for philosophical life should be in the twenty-first century. Despite my sometimes novel articulation of them, these principles are not new, but

rather revitalize in us the tradition of praxis that has kept robust communal philosophical life alive through the last three millennia.

Although the principles are systematized through careful and reasoned philosophical reflection, this volume is not meant to be read like a typical contemporary philosophical essay or treatise. It is an artistic, philo-dynamic image, or a reflectively charged version of what Susanne Langer called a "presentation symbol." For Langer, presentational symbols are what the arts give us, like dance, painting, and music. Symbolic reference (a concept) as an indexical function, is replaced by a field of connotative engagement (an art). Such presentational symbols offer a significant form, that can provide knowledge, but a kind of knowledge not reducible to serially related, referred, and exclusively classed, parts. Think of the way a painting, or a good novel, can be educative and enriching for us, and yet we cannot fully determine a discursive story that exhaustively captures the kind of knowledge it gives us. A good presentational symbol offers its own knowledge, and can be, but by no means has to be, a tremendous resource for reflection. A great piece of music can be very educative for us, without ever being brought to reflection or full discursive reasoning.

Unlike a presentational symbol, a phil-dynamic image needs to be charged to incite a reader, student, or audience, to new reflective and discursive engagement with the subject matter. Plato's dialogues, Montaigne's Essays, Emerson's Nature, and Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit are examples of works written as phil-dynamic images. Unlike a Van Gogh painting, the whole purpose of their significant forms was to incite our reflective life and discursive reasoning.

Further, the great philosophical speculators offer, in their full philosophies (especially their metaphysics), dynamic images of cosmos.

In the American tradition of Emerson's Nature and Essays, instead of writing another interesting, but ultimately passive piece of academic writing, I have attempted to create an organized constellation of principles that helps provide a modest dynamic image, filled with resources for reflection, both discursive and non-discursive. It is an "existential," or "spiritual," exercise, in Pierre Hadot's sense of the term, as a technique of developing active habits of reflective, personal cultivation. Its aim is to lead to educative self-reflection. This will be discussed in further detail later in Part 1 of this work.

In the rest of Part 1, I articulate what I mean by "modes of philosophy" and "philo-dynamic images." I then offer two essays, one that gives a brief sketch of some traditions of philosophical community across the globe, and another that explores its utter marginalization due to the rise of professional philosophy. We will find out that these are overlapping narratives. I then briefly summarize my site visits to a few exemplary philosophical communities (and related places) still in existence. Only afterwards will the need for the philosophical community in our current period be understood. Without the tripod leg of philosophical community, it will become apparent that philosophical speculators and philosophical wanderers, by themselves, are either too divorced from their broader culture, or belong to an all too transient mode of philosophy, to be sustainable and continually improve cultural life. Further, it will become apparent that the technical philosophical mode runs rampant without sustained places for philosophy as a way of life. In the last section of Part 1, given the peculiar organization of this work, I will lay out the logic of "principles" for a radically empirical philosophy of culture. I will also discuss my research protocol. Why and how do principles "work," and what service do they provide in understanding and revitalizing philosophical community?

In Part 2, Chapter 1, I first elucidate the order of exhibition for the principles. I lay out the systema (the organic general phases, see below). Only then will I be able to explore the peculiar general principles of philosophical community. These principles are the most general structures of the form of life that is philosophical community. The other principles fill out the content of these general principles. In Chapter 2, I will explore the personal axiological principles of philosophical community.

These principles fill in the more concrete qualities of the general principles, and each axiological principle shares an analogical relationship to one of the general principles. In Chapter 3, I will explore the concrete cultural principles of philosophical community. These principles are the most concrete in the sense that they illuminate the relationship philosophical community has with the meanings and practices of the larger culture. The concrete cultural principles further determinate (make further concrete) the meaning of philosophical community as part of a broader community of interpretation. Upon returning to these concrete principles from higher systema (phases of generality), the whole system will be further genetically specified. Within each section, several dialectical tensions will become apparent and will be "propitiated" (an appeasing gift). In other words, imminent principles will be illuminated at the heart of these tensions. In Chapter 4, the principles drawn from these series of dialectical transformations will be explored. Finally, in the conclusion, the role for philosophical community today will be addressed.

In Appendix 1, in order to clarify the variety of special categories and terminology I use in the volume, I lay out what I call the "Systemic Scheme," in the tradition of Alfred North Whitehead's "Categorial Scheme," which provides a summary and glossary of the systema, principles, and axioms of transformation of the coordinate whole. In Appendix 2, I discuss my primary site visit, research interview protocol. I also include two example interviews from site visits.

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The Constellation of Principles at a Turning Point in Culture and Nature

We have now charted the principles. We began our adventure with the peculiar general principles of philosophical community, by outlining the map as a constellation of energies in service to dialectical adherence to the beloved community. In the realm of the personal axiological principles, we saw how the principles are valuable in the mutually reinforced cultivation of a good life. We then were able to add details and color to the first outline of the chart. In the terrain of the concrete cultural principles, we saw the reconstruction of the live and present situation that philosophical community's oikonomia maintains and sustains in, for, and with its broader culture. The boundaries of the map as they related to the rest of the world were then specified. Throughout the narrative we traversed the tensions of associated philosophical living by dialectically wandering across the rhizomatic life energies of the philosophical community. These tensions helped us clarify challenging aspects of our mapping adventure. We then were able to finalize our chart which returned us home via the propitiated principles of rhizomatic wandering. They illuminated the gyroscopic energies of the brilliantly impoverished, cosmic, eutopian politics of the philosophical community's democratic enhousing.

We now have a living map of imaginative reflection that charted us home. This chart is by no means the final mapping of philosophical community life. At best, it should help others find their way back to these lost homes and refurbish them as a mode of philosophy. This treatise is a spiritual exercise as philodynamic image, an illusory image that guides and proffers the potential for remaining and new philosophical communities alike.

Why offer such a vision? Why proffer the philosophical community now? It seems likely that our interconnected world culture is facing an impending age of upheaval. Given the explosive growth of digital technology (and the possibilities for integration with it), the effects of climate change, global pandemics, the projected loss of half the world's biodiversity, the end of peak oil, the looming threat of fascist and populist political power, and related war, violence, and mass migration, culture is likely to face a dangerous period to its own survival. In the face of a rapidly destabilizing and transforming world, we can turn to the philosophical community and its eutopian politics yet again. We may not be able to protect the world from upheaval, but we can make sure that we keep a few bright alternatives available. The glowing, pulsing heart of the constellation of principles is an articulation of

what the most robust philosophical communities can be as bright spots during the storms of time. The philosophical community can remind persons of what they can be, especially when the looming fates of history seem narrow and troubling. In fact, it is in those hours that philosophical community can play its strongest role as an illumination of the revitalizing capacity of culture. Philosophical community can show us that we can always do "better," even if it is but with a few close friends. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION by David Marshall Miller and Dana Jalobeanu [Cambridge University Press, 9781108420303]

A collection of cutting-edge scholarship on the close interaction of philosophy with science at the birth of the modern age.

The early modern era produced the Scientific Revolution, which originated our present understanding of the natural world. Concurrently, philosophers established the conceptual foundations of modernity. This rich and comprehensive volume surveys and illuminates the numerous and complicated interconnections between philosophical and scientific thought as both were radically transformed from the late sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth century. The chapters explore reciprocal influences between philosophy and physics, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and other disciplines, and show how thinkers responded to an immense range of intellectual, material, and institutional influences. The volume offers a unique perspicuity, viewing the entire landscape of early modern philosophy and science, and also marks an epoch in contemporary scholarship, surveying recent contributions and suggesting future investigations for the next generation of scholars and students.

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The Disciplinary Revolutions of Early Modern Philosophy and Science by David Marshall Miller and Dana Jalobeanu

The period stretching from roughly the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the eighteenth witnessed foundational changes in the intellectual culture of western Europe. Among these developments were many new ideas — some appearing on the scene fully grown and difficult to overlook, sparking controversy or enthusiastic assent; some, more modest at first, growing steadily over subsequent years; and still others, initially invisible, yet persisting and sometimes erupting with dramatic effects. Eventually, these novel views coalesced into the intellectual traditions that have constituted the early modern canon. Of the myriad transformations involved in this period of ebullition, two were central. The first was an explicit reformation: philosophers proclaimed the necessity to set aside the preoccupations of their predecessors in order to "start again right from the foundations." The second was less declarative, but more profound: The explanations used to account for natural phenomena were radically revised.

Contemporary scholars have recognized the significance of these developments in the periodization used to study them. The "early modern period" is distinguished (sometimes sharply) from the "late Renaissance' that preceded it; and the "early modems" are often seen as our direct ancestors, whose thought is much more connected to the present than that of previous eras. Historians of philosophy refer to "early modern philosophy" that departed from medieval and Renaissance precedents, especially Aristotelian Scholasticism. Historians of science even more dramatically refer to the "Scientific Revolution" that replaced various domains of natural knowledge — natural philosophy, the mathematical "mixed sciences," natural history, medicine, alchemy, and so on — with the modem amalgamation we simply (and anachronistically) call `science'.

These transformations of philosophy and the sciences overlapped, and many figures — including Rene Descartes, Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, Pierre Gassendi, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton — feature prominently in both histories of philosophy and histories of science. Nevertheless, scholars traditionally have treated philosophy and the sciences separately, as the subjects of distinct disciplinary fields with radically different historiographical approaches. The chapters in this volume represent a countervailing trend of the last three decades that views the intellectual history of the early modem period as an integral whole, wherein "science" and "philosophy" cannot be readily pulled apart, not least because the historical authors themselves did not recognize the distinction. From this perspective, one sees that the emergence of modem philosophy and that of modem science were not separate phenomena, but facets of the same transformations, taking place in the

same period, in texts often written by the same authors. The history of philosophy of the Scientific Revolution is inextricable from the history of early modem philosophy.

Essential Tensions

Recognizing the fundamental unity of early modem thought has led scholars to re-evaluate classic debates and traditional accounts, but it also has been accompanied by methodological difficulties. Disciplinary divisions are more persistent than we like to think. While historians of early modem philosophy have distanced themselves from the presentist intellectualism of older histories of philosophy, they have not embraced the contextualist social constructivism found in much history of science. As a result, the analyses in this book occupy a still unsteady middle ground. Whereas the individual chapters present the lessons of recent research, our overarching editorial aim has been to knit them together into a comprehensive story that acknowledges but also attempts to balance their methodological tensions. This editorial outlook gives structure to the volume, and deserves explication here.

The Contextualist Turn

A couple of generations ago, historians of philosophy in general, and scholars of early modem philosophy in particular, mined the work of past authors for material relevant to contemporary concerns. Early modem writers like Descartes and John Locke were made to speak to present-day debates in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. Yet by conceiving historical and modern figures alike as participants in an historical discourse, this approach tends to analyze past thought according to present categorizations. It also encourages attempts to reconcile the various parts of an author's corpus into a unified, coherent system, and even to "rationally reconstruct" the best version of a philosopher's view — to elaborate what, e.g., Descartes should have said, even if he actually did not. These systematized versions of philosophers' thought are most valuable for solving current philosophical problems, but this method treats philosophical arguments, whatever their provenance, as disembodied, timeless, and unchanging. It removes texts from their contexts.

In the 1990s, historians of early modern philosophy began to turn away from such attempts to reconstruct maximally coherent interpretations of texts. They became far more sensitive to the contexts in which those texts were produced. In the years since, the distinction between text and context has been further blurred, as a new generation of scholars have realized that the traditional historiographies are not only insufficient, but often also misleading. Anachronistic categorizations, it has become dear, have obscured the rich and dynamic interactions between different kinds of thinkers and their ideas. The Descartes and the Lodes of the period developed their view in dialogue with a range of interlocutors and concerns that cannot be neatly delineated by the familiar (to us) categories of metaphysics, epistemology, and even philosophy.

This "contextualist revolution" in the study of early modern philosophy has entailed engagement with the history of the Scientific Revolution. The development of early modern philosophy was intertwined with the radical transformations in the understanding of natural phenomena produced by figures such as Nicolaus Copernicus, William Gilbert, Galileo Galilei, William Harvey, and others. It has become clear that one cannot properly understand Descartes, for instance, without taking into account his interactions with the mathematicians and "scientists" of his day; his sensitivity to the events of the "Galileo Affair"; or his reading of and correspondence with figures hitherto considered as belonging to the history of medicine. Hence, awareness of the history of science has become a necessary condition for contextualized readings of early modern philosophers. Indeed, such work has shown that the stark separation of "philosophy" and "science" itself is an anachronistic imposition of latter-day conceptualizations.

Gains and Losses: Abandoning Methodological Consensus

The contextualist turn has produced concrete gains. Sharpened sensitivity to how historical actors characterized their own practice has yielded a more sophisticated understanding of the extremely complex landscape of early modern intellectual life. We have learned much about the scientific work of those usually considered philosophers, and about the philosophical contributions of "scientists." Recent scholarship has encompassed a remarkable expanse of early modern theoretical disciplines — both scientific and philosophical. It has shown that "natural philosophy" was not the only important antecedent of modern science and philosophy. Pursuits formerly considered marginal, such as medicine and alchemy, have also been sounded for philosophical significance.

However, the contextualist turn has had as an (unintended) consequence the dissolution of the field's methodological coherence. Recent studies, though successful individually, have become particularized — they do not share basic categorizations, aims, or vocabularies. It is therefore difficult to compile them into a general account, and this, in turn, causes problems for new scholarship and pedagogy. Whereas, for instance, it might have once been easy to place Descartes among the "Rationalists" and Locke among the "Empiricists" (and to teach courses organized along those lines), the realization that these categories are not historically valid has made it hard to say how the figures stand in relation to one another in the roiling intellectual landscape of the period. Likewise, the philosophical canon has been destabilized — a positive development, but one leading to hard choices. If Newton, for one, has earned a place in courses in the history of philosophy, which figure currently taught must make way? Even if the contextualist cause is ascendant, the "revolution" is not complete.

The kernel of these difficulties is the fundamental opposition of analysis and narrative. The conceptual analysis needed to explicate a philosophical argument and the historical narrative needed to describe its development through time require contrary presumptions. Analysis supposes a theory's stability and independence; narrative supposes its malleability and dependence on antecedent conditions. In order to avoid the dilemma, scholars have tended toward the extremes. Historians of philosophy, at least in the anglophone world, gravitate toward analysis, which brings a range of consequences. First, there is the tendency, noted above, to isolate texts from contexts and seek coherence within a corpus, so as to serve contemporary interests. This is attended by limiting attention to the narrow scope of canonical figures thought to be most informative on those issues. Second, since historical precedents are pushed to the background, historians of philosophy tend to view each historical figure as an innovator, without antecedent. This is especially true of the early modern period and the Scientific Revolution, which are seen (to adopt a geological metaphor) as catastrophic breaks with the past. Third, there is the inclination to restrict explanations to intellectual considerations. This is partly in the nature of philosophy, insofar as it is the study of reasoning, but it also stems from the muting of context, where social and cultural factors can play a significant role. History of philosophy inclines toward textual internalism, presentism, catastrophism, and intellectualism.

Scholarship in history of science provides an instructive contrast, since it gravitates toward narrative at the opposite extreme. There, the aim is less to draw lessons for present-day application than to get the history "as it really was." One finds much more emphasis on contextual factors, including material conditions and social roles, and there is far less adherence to a canon. This approach stresses the continuity of intellectual development, to the point that it has become standard to question the existence of a Scientific Revolution in the first place. History of science, that is, tends toward externalism, antiquarianism, uniformitarianism, and sociocultural reductivism. The contrasting features of history of philosophy and history of science are not binary — instead, they indicate spectra of historiographical approaches. But even if we over-generalize, the comparison illustrates the divergences motivated by the core analysis—narrative opposition.

Contextualism in the history of philosophy moves away from the traditional analytical extreme. But this has raised the problems of reconciliation that the extreme position avoids. How to combine analysis and narrative? How much of the context is explanatory — i.e., where does one draw the limits of relevance? Are social and political factors important, or can explanations be. given solely in terms of intellectual motivations? Which figures deserve attention — how much should the canon be "exploded"? Does one tell stories in terms of continuous traditions or of sudden innovations? Is one to use only actors categories, or are anachronistic descriptions permissible? As the reader will discover in the following pages, a thoroughgoing consensus on such methodological questions has not yet emerged. Each of the contributors to this volume answers them in different ways. Some are closer to the analytical extreme of each spectrum, others to the narrative.

Incidentally, the contextualist turn, with the resulting methodological uncertainty, has been mirrored in the adjacent realm of philosophy of science, where an initial enthusiasm for the "integration" of analytical philosophy of science with narrative history of science has been frustrated by uncertainty about how to effect it. This, too, has led to an array of disparate approaches that do not entirely cohere. Though this volume is intended as a contribution to the history of philosophy, not to philosophy of science or history of science, it does intersect history of philosophy with the history of science. Moreover, its editors and many of its authors are practitioners of history and philosophy of science. Consequently, salient issues will inevitably arise, and historians and philosophers of science will find useful material for their own attempts to comprehend the Scientific Revolution. Likewise, the methodological strategies used here will translate to work there.

Disciplinary Histories

The lack of methodological consensus among recent historians of early modem philosophy poses an editorial problem: how should a book such as this be organized? Our solution has been to adopt discipline as the unit of analysis. This aligns with a typical strategy of investigation, which begins by analytically delineating a phenomenon to be examined, and then constructs a narrative carefully following the chains of influences that led to it or followed from it. Drawing these connections leads naturally to an examination of the features by which early modern thinkers identified themselves with peers or distinguished themselves from foes — the features, that is, that separate one discipline from another. By tracing these disciplinary boundaries, scholars become attuned not just to the argumentative positions historical authors have taken, but also to the alternative views to which they were responding. This also comports with an increased sensitivity to contextual factors, since early modem disciplines could be organized in many ways — they were not just areas of inquiry or theoretical commitments, but also social institutions (schools, sects, dubs, academies, etc.), conceptions of teaching and learning, and methods of knowledge production and administration. Even if they broadly agreed with one another, authors could end up on different sides of a disciplinary boundary. Histories that use disciplines as units of analysis accommodate these contextual considerations.

Once one adopts disciplinary history as a methodology, the story of the early modern period becomes one about the multiplication and reorganization of intellectual disciplines. Surveying the intellectual landscape of the period, one observes the emergence of a number of new disciplines around a variety of problematics and projects. Especially productive were moments where existing disciplines came into contact with one another — either antagonistically or cooperatively. In these situations, the competing ideologies and methodologies were called into question, so that resolving the impasse often created a new discipline, as authors drew together the tenets and methods of the previously disparate fields. One example is when mathematicians staked claims to the causal reasoning of natural philosophers, spawning various forms of "physico-mathematics" that eventually led to classical mechanics. Another is when logicians attempted to import the curative methods of medicine into reasoning, generating a novel "art of thinking."

From a retrospective, analytic viewpoint, one sees here the early modem germination of the novel ideas that produced our modem world. From above, so to speak, these "inflection points" look like new directions of thought — solitary green shoots in an empty field. But from below, taking a contemporary, narrative perspective, one sees a continuous tumult of activity. The ground is saturated with intra- and interdisciplinary disputes, and from this frisson grow new ideas and new traditions. Much of the activity is obscure to us only because it is about issues that no longer concern us.

Note that the contextualists' synthetic, middle-of-the-road approach deemphasizes the notion of the "Scientific Revolution," but does not entirely efface it. Unlike more traditional histories, the "Scientific Revolution" is not identified with a thematic arc, such as "mechanization of the world picture" or "invention of science," that provides the armature upon which the narrative is constructed. And yet careful attention reveals that the early modems themselves thought something radically new was afoot, even if they could not adequately express exactly what it was. Croce again, contextualists illuminate how the historical authors themselves set up dialectical oppositions between old and new. Consequently, instead of asking whether there was a "Scientific Revolution," they ask what 'new astronomy' meant for Johannes Kepler, what 'new science' meant for Galileo, what `great instauration' meant for Francis Bacon, and so on. In this way, `Scientific Revolution' becomes an abstract, generic term comprising all the specific, concrete innovations of the early modern period. Its vagueness, though, is not problematic, since it is not itself the focus of study. We need not get hung up debating its reality or its temporal bounds.

It is also worth noting what this historiographical approach does not do. For one thing, it eschews the imposition of latter-day ideological categorizations. "Rationalism" and "Empiricism" — so central to traditional history of philosophy— are not meaningful conceptualizations here. For another, it does not explode the canon, but rather historicizes it. If one carefully follows the disciplinary dialectics, one finds that certain figures play outsized roles. They show up again and again as authorities whose support lends credence to a position, or as betes-noites whose support renders a position suspect. Sometimes these figures are those who have long occupied the spotlight, like Descartes; sometimes they are those who have hitherto lurked in shadow, like David Gorlaeus. Thus, scholars in this vein have not dispensed with the canon entirely. Their studies remain centered on a grid of figures thought to be important — at the time, if not still at ours. Historians of philosophy might marvel at how comprehensive the volume is; historians of science at how exclusive.

Granularity and Composition

Analysis of early modern disciplines has proven rewarding, in that it yields problematics fruitfully addressed in recent contributions to the literature, many by authors in this volume. These issues can be distinguished according to three levels of granularity. At the coarsest level, scholars have been concerned with how early modern actors divided themselves up in the first place — what, that is, were the early modern disciplines? This question entails tracing the contours of disciplinary bounds, but also grappling with the very meaning of `discipline' in the early modern milieu. At a finer level of resolution, scholars have elucidated the activities of the various disciplines that populated the period. This includes analysis of the disciplines' methodologies and core suppositions, as well as description of the problems their participants sought to resolve and the debates about proposed solutions. Finally, there is a group of questions relating to the specific points of contact between disciplines, where representatives of distinct intellectual spheres argue with one another. These "inflection points" garner particular attention since they often generate what appears, to later authors, as radical change — new problems and novel solutions.

These granularities also provide the basic structure of this volume — though, of course, comments on all these interrelated issues can be found throughout. The chapters in the first part engage with

questions regarding the early modern disciplines in general. They survey the disciplinary landscape from the beginning to the end of the period, noting especially the different ways in which disciplines bounded themselves in relation to each other. The chapters describe how early modern disciplines were organized around the classical texts recovered by the Renaissance (Levitin), and how commentators themselves, like present-day scholars, struggled to characterize and classify the novelty they recognized in their midst (Garber). The essays here also problematize the coherence of "Aristotelianism" (Hattab) and the "Mechanical Philosophy" (Roux, Bellis), usual beginning and ending points in traditional narratives of the Scientific Revolution. Finally, the roles of "external" factors beyond philosophy and science — confessional sects (Blank) and gender and public and private institutions (Dedefsen) — in the formation of disciplines are explored.

The second part of the volume takes up the activities of individual disciplines across the period. The chapters show how these disciplines established themselves upon theoretical problems and how they reached solutions. The essays study the work of early modern practitioners of the "art of thinking" (Corneanu and Vermeir); natural magic (Clucas); the mechanical arts (Klein); learned medicine (Distelzweig and Ragland); the Baconian scientia of natural and experimental history (Anstey and Jalobeanu); the "science" of the stars (Omodeo and Regier); mixed-mathematics (Van Dyck); pure mathematics (Guicciardini); and post-Newtonian mathematical physics (Hepburn and Biener). In each case, the authors note developments that significantly impacted the ensuing scientific and philosophical traditions.

Finally, the third part of the volume takes up significant episodes in early modern thought. Of particular interest are instances where disciplinary frameworks faced acute challenges, leading to the formation of new disciplines. These include: Galileo's intrusion of mathematical astronomy into natural philosophy (Miller); the effect of new optical instruments — telescopes and microscopes — on all the empirical sciences (Hamou); the debate about the ontology of the mind arising from Cartesian metaphysics (Pecharman); the reorganization of anatomical science surrounding Harvey's assertion of the circulation of the blood (Manning); the reinterpretation of natural laws following the advent of mathematical physics (Stan); and the important controversies about the ontology of corporeal substances (Gorham and Slowik), God's relation to the natural world (Janiak and Thomas), and which quantity is conserved in physical interactions (Rey).

Altogether, the chapters collected in this volume explore philosophical lessons of the Scientific Revolution, presenting the results of recent work and indicating areas of future interest. Each contribution is "a survey and a step" —a survey of existing literature on the topic and a step toward a novel understanding. The contributions broaden our understanding of the original constitution of modernity's intellectual traditions. They will be of particular interest to historians of philosophy, science, and intellectual culture, as well as to philosophers of science. Naturally, the subject matter — early modern philosophy and science — is vast, and our coverage cannot be comprehensive. Still, we hope readers find in the book a useful introduction and motivation to read further. <>

Projecting Spirits: Speculation, Providence, and Early Modern Optical Media by Pasi Valiaho Stanford University Press, 9781503630857]

The history of projected images at the turn of the seventeenth century reveals a changing perception of chance and order, contingency and form. In **Projecting Spirits,** Pasi Väliaho maps how the leading optical media of the period—the camera obscura and the magic lantern—developed in response to, and framed, the era's key intellectual dilemma of whether the world fell under God's providential care, or was subject to chance and open to speculating. As Väliaho shows, camera

obscuras and magic lanterns were variously employed to give the world an intelligible and manageable design. Jesuit scholars embraced devices of projection as part of their pursuit of divine government, whilst the Royal Society fellows enlisted them in their quest for empirical knowledge as well as colonial expansion. Projections of light and shadow grew into critical metaphors in early responses to the turbulences of finance. In such instances, Väliaho argues, "projection" became an indispensable cognitive form to both assert providence, and to make sense of an economic reality that was gradually escaping from divine guidance. Drawing on a range of materials—philosophical, scientific and religious literature, visual arts, correspondence, poems, pamphlets, and illustrations—this provocative and inventive work expands our concept of the early media of projection, revealing how they spoke to early modern thinkers, and shaped a new, speculative concept of the world.

Review

"This commanding, erudite history of the 'magic' that goes with optical technologies makes a major and enduring contribution to visual studies, to the history of science, and to the political economy of images." -- Tom Conley — Harvard University

"Moving seamlessly from early modern sources to current media studies theories, this book adds subtlety and nuance to our understanding of the ways optical instruments and visual metaphors shaped cultural sensitivities, modes of thought, and economic practices." -- Raz Chen-Morris — The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

"Pasi Väliaho provides a captivating take on projection. Projecting Spirits includes a historically rich and deep understanding of the connection between images and economies of both money and souls. As it maps how the virtual and the imaginary become effective anchors of the real world, this wonderful book amounts to nothing less than a project about time: an invention of such a future that becomes a speculative project." -- Jussi Parikka, Aarhus University and FAMU — Prague

CONTENTS

It was commonplace in the early modern period to emphasize a distinction between the study of two types of phenomena of light. Catoptrics focused on the production of appearances by reflective surfaces such as mirrors, while dioptrics studied refractions of light on transparent bodies such as lenses.' These two operations of light could not be easily set apart in the design of actual optical instruments, but it serves to bear the distinction in mind to the extent that, as Siegfried Zielinski intimates in his sketch for a genealogy of projection, dioptrics and catoptrics connoted two intertwined but nonetheless distinct techno-aesthetic practices. Whereas the former dealt with optical devices contrived for looking through into the world outside the apparatus, such as microscopes and telescopes, the latter implied beholding a surface inside the apparatus onto which images were projected, such as the screen of the camera obscura or the magic lantern. To put it schematically, whereas dioptric apparatuses were designed to function as "artificial eyes" (as the

German Jesuit scholar Johann Zahn called the telescope) to augment reality, catoptric ones could also be fashioned for the production of artificial realities—wavering therefore, uncannily for many, on the uncertain threshold between what was in the seventeenth century called "natural" and "artificial magic."

Microscopes and telescopes put a definitive stamp on the formation of the modern scientific worldview, marking what Hans Blumenberg called a "caesura," beyond which the perceptually and epistemologically accessible reality started to expand indefinitely. They made space stretch toward the infinite and introduced a plurality of worlds alongside the actual one. Although the contribution of camera obscuras, magic lanterns, and related contrivances to the development of early modern thought has been perhaps less straightforward to assess, these devices, too, played a role in shaping ways of seeing, visualizing, and knowing during the early modern period. The Italian scholar Francesco Algarotti proclaimed in the 1760s that "painters should make the same use of the Camera Obscura, which Naturalists and Astronomers make of the Microscope and Telescope, for all these instruments equally make known, and represent Nature."4 In this vein, historians of art and visual culture have evaluated the place of optical instruments in early modern artistic practice, as well as uncovering how the camera obscura's projections stood for a model of truthfulness and naturalness in seventeenth-century painting, and more generally for a model of the rational, disembodied intellect—even of a kind of "phantasy subject of reason"—in the early modern periods Historians of science and ideas have more widely mapped the meanings and functions of camera obscuras and magic lanterns in early modern thought, encompassing such diverse fields as the development of modern optics as well as counterreformation metaphysics.6 Media historians, for their part, have provided detailed accounts of the generation of image projection devices along with their makers, often situated on a long lineage of "screen practices" culminating in the cinema.' Historians of literature and philosophy, furthermore, have traced how the magic lantern's ghost projections became key epistemic figures in Enlightenment writing, from the emergence of German idealism to new conceptions about the status of the imagination in early nineteenthcentury fiction and psychology.

This book's impetus is to contribute to this heritage with its own account of how optical media lent their shape to Western thought at the turn of the century. The book pursues a historical epistemology interested in the medial conditions of thinking (not only scientific but also philosophical, religious, and economic) based on the assumption that the movements of the intellect are embedded in and hinged on the objects, techniques, and visualizations that the intellect is surrounded by, and fundamentally "patched together from shifting object relations," as Sean Silver proposes. The following chapters play out a media history of thought, by exploring how circa 1700 optical projections—light-borne images cast by a more or less elaborate technical device onto a surface—gave a meaningful cognitive shape to attempts at planning and plotting how the world could, and should, turn out. The English novelist and trader Daniel Defoe famously characterized this historical moment in his native country as a "projecting age." By "projecting," Defoe, to be sure, did not primarily mean the practice of conjuring a colorful play of light and shadow on a screen—although his concept was not far removed from the aesthetics of optical projection, as we will later see. Rather, Defoe was referring to new speculative economic practices and ideas emerging within colonial trade and finance, which not only eroded older concepts of wealth but also radically challenged traditional ways of thinking about the purpose of human activity and God's place in the world. Projection meant a way of embracing the future immanently for the sake of taking risks and profiting on what was contingent and probable, instead of submitting the future to a preestablished design. Defoe's "projection" was cast against more established notions of God's providential care and governance of the world and human history, quietly questioning the basic premise, critical to the Christian cognitive universe still prevalent during the period, about the presence of divine guidance in the course of events and in one's actions. Within this universe, both intended actions as well as

seemingly contingent occurrences were ruled by superior causes. As Thomas Aquinas forcefully argued:

> Since man is ordered in regard to this body under the celestial bodies, in regard to his intellect under the angels, and in regard to his will under God it is quite possible for something apart from man's intention to happen, which is, however, in accord with the ordering of the celestial bodies, or with the control of the angels, or even of God.

The concept of projection embraced this epistemological problematic of "ordering," which gradually shifted its meaning from predetermination and divine intervention into speculative attempts at design and control that subsumed the future, or "fortune," into monetized relations. Projecting Spirits takes the conceptual and cognitive reorientation illustrated by Defoe as the general intellectual background for configuring the meanings and functions performed by optical media at the turn of the century. It is here that the book's historical excursion departs from more well-trodden paths. For some, approaching the history of optical media in relation to (apparently) far removed metaphors, analogues, and practices—and, at first sight, distant intellectual problems—might not come across as a most straightforward gesture. However, the intuition guiding this book is that from roughly 1650 to 1720, the aesthetic forms embodied by camera obscuras and magic lanterns became symbolic of a range of intellectual transitions: "symbolic" in the sense of providing the fitting figures of thought through which a world undergoing a series of changes could be made sense of, and in that respect also rendered as operable, actionable. This book sets out to show how, circa 1700, the projective screens of the camera obscura and the magic lantern became critical cognitive surfaces where the world was witnessed in ambiguously shifting shapes—where notions of pre-established divine harmony gradually dissolved into a complex sphere of contingent events, as well as the empty time of eternity into a future open to opportunities and risks. On these surfaces, furthermore, hermeneutic quests for invisible divine truths became juxtaposed with empirical observations of "matters of fact," and the divine management of the world anticipated the emergence of liberal, and above all speculative, economic ideas. These shifts were by no means linear and uniform; they were continuous and reversible, something akin to topological transformations where things can shift shape, bend, stretch, and twist—all without losing their key properties or functions.

This book's take on the early modern history of projection does not pretend to be exhaustive. It is centered on a handful of protagonists, both humans and machines: philosophers, scholars, friars, merchants, sailors, missionaries, and nuns, as well as the optical apparatuses they encountered and interacted with. As for the latter—the machines—this book focuses on camera obscuras and magic lanterns. These two apparatuses, designed for the processing of optical signals (light waves), shared the aesthetic function of projecting images but in symmetrically opposing ways: While the camera obscura transmitted light rays that projected mirror images of objects in the environment inside the apparatus, the magic lantern had a light source, such as a candle, positioned to illuminate a figure, drawn on a transparent slide, through a system of mirrors and lenses and to project that image outside onto a screen. As for the former—the humans—this book's historical excursion comprises individuals who were somehow in contact with camera obscuras and magic lanterns: those who developed new instruments or tweaked old ones; who wrote about the machines or used them in their artistic or scientific practice; who pictured the camera obscuras and magic lanterns in illustrations—satirical, scientific, or otherwise; and who thought, or merely dreamed, about the machines and their projections and turned them into tropes and metaphors, noetic analogues, as well as figures of thought.

The diverse and sometimes disparate stories of these devices and persons are brought together to show how the main aesthetic and cognitive function carried out by optical media in turn-of-the-century thought was to superimpose the real with a perceptual frame that could render the chaos of life as a negotiable design. The first chapter demonstrates in more detail how, during this historical

moment, camera obscuras and magic lanterns were varyingly associated with an intuition of the world as a continuum of movements, differentiations, and variations (rather than as something fixed and unified per se), and they were simultaneously understood as pertinent conceptual tools to rationalize and arrange these movements, differentiations, and variations into more or less durable shapes. Alongside anamorphic images, optical projections performed a play of differing perspectives—distorted and blurred, clearer and more comprehensible—that also acted out a distinction between the human and divine modes of apprehending the world. For philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, projection became a critical concept as well as an optical metaphor to understand how the universe varied from one viewpoint to another but was at once unified within a single divine optic that organized things into a geometric and logical harmony. Projection signaled what Leibniz called God's "government of the universe," thereby associating optical media importantly with an older Christian concept of "economy" (oikonomia), or divine administration and rule.

Taking its cue from Leibniz, this book is concerned with a changing economy of projection, both in the ancient and modern senses of the word "economy." Most generally, the concept of economy is used in this book to explore how the projective screens of camera obscuras and magic lanterns facilitated drawing relations between phenomena and one's imaginations, beliefs, and reasonings and to cognitively manage those relations. In this respect, the following chapters chart the visual economy of early modern optical media, to borrow a concept from Marie Jose Mondzain who explores how images became conceived as indispensable connectors between visible and invisible realities in the Byzantine era. In its original Greek sense, oikonomia signified the administration of the household (oikos), which in Christianity shifted its meaning to designate the divine providential government of the world and human history toward salvation. In both cases, indeed, economy meant a science of relations and their management. But whereas for the Greeks economy suggested the arrangement of goods, animals, and humans into a harmonious and profitable whole, in Christianity the concept was made to account for God's organization of divine life into a trinitarian form (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit), on the one hand, and the earthly, temporal unfolding of God's eschatological plan, on the other hand. Economy became reconsidered on a universal scale, encompassing the disjunctive relations between transcendence and immanence, the infinite and the finite, eternity and historical time, universal providence and human freedom, as well as concealment and disclosure. In Christianity, what is crucial is that images became considered as essential mediators of these relations, as "living linkages," as Mondzain puts it, between heaven and earth.

In the later seventeenth century, optical media became critical to this Christian concept of (visual) economy, as we will see in Chapters 2 and 3. Jesuit scholars in particular—the polymath Athanasius Kircher (also famous from extended histories of audiovisual media) at the forefront—drew optical apparatuses firmly into the providential oikonomia. Projections of light and shadow by technological means became regarded as relays between the holy and the profane space, and hence as potent agents of the divine providence and its economic and globalizing process. "We divine power without projection," the Jesuits of the late seventeenth century seemed to think. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the concept and practice of optical projection among Jesuit scholars against the backdrop of Catholic counterreformation and colonial expansion, which it plots by tracing the movements of artifacts, books, missionaries, images, and ideas, not only within Europe, but also between Rome and New Spain as well as China. Among the Jesuits, optical projection became understood as natural but prodigious mediation between the spiritual and the temporal and therefore also as a potentially expansive, possessive form.

Chapter 3 studies how central to the Jesuits' concept of optical media was the association of projection, not only with the celestial but also with the phantasmatic—spirits, ghosts, and demons of all sorts. The key "property" to be annexed to ecclesiastic rule on a planetary scale was the

individual soul, and the providential grasp of images cast on a screen was to expand, through homology, onto images in the mind. Immersing their beholders into a realm of illusions and visions, projections of spirits (or, spiritual projections) were to direct individuals toward perfection—the "government of souls," to borrow a concept of Michel Foucault's.

However, during this historical period the economy of projection also played out in a different sense. While Anglican priests in England were preaching against the worship of images of all sorts (including the Catholics' relics and miraculous apparitions), seeking to lodge the holy firmly under the purview of words only, camera obscuras and magic lanterns simultaneously developed from media of theocracy and items of curiosity into experimental and exploratory devices—especially within the exploits of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, established in 1660, which was a new type of public body devoted to the corporate pursuit of knowledge. Among the Royal Society scholars—who promoted the radical reassessment of vision and cognition by Johannes Kepler at the turn of the sixteenth century and the new principles of scientific study proclaimed by Francis Bacon—devices of projection were turned toward empirical reality, to quasi-mechanically procure information about things and beings both near and distant, familiar and strange, ranging from the operations of light to flora and fauna in the West Indies, for instance. Charting these developments, Chapters 4 and 5 survey situations where established interpretations of projection and divine rule became challenged (although by no means unambiguously) within empirical investigations that sought to apprehend the world objectively as open to "chance and opportunity" (as Francis Bacon put it), sticking onto the visible surfaces of things rather than striving to interpret every contingent event as a manifestation of a deeper cosmic order.

Chapter 4 focuses on Robert Hook's invention of a portable camera obscura, which illustrates how devices of projection participated in key epistemic developments at the turn of the century, in addition to becoming involved, at least in Hooke's imaginary, in the colonial expansion of both knowledge and trade. Crucial here was the implicit association that Hooke and his contemporaries made between the concepts of projection and property—the latter now starting to be relinquished from celestial possession in the writings of John Locke, among others, and becoming an extension of the person laboring and thereby appropriating the commons originally bestowed upon humanity by divine providence. Projection became involved in the calculation of financial gain and prospects for improvement, surplus and growth, which, as Devin Singh notes, the notion of oikonomia retained historically also in the Christian era. Chapters continues on this theme, exploring how the mixed realities of optical media—alongside practices of calculation, which emerged as key cognitive techniques of finance during the period—gave an intuitive shape to processes in which property and value lost their traditional supports and became volatile, fluctuating, and subject to the conceits of speculative minds. Especially the magic lantern's ephemeral images, in want of solidity and stable form, provided the effective mental analogues for the emerging speculative economy as an ambiguous and illusory perceptual realm seemingly unmoored from material restraints. Overall, these two chapters show how in England circa 1700, optical media became cognitive relays allowing the subsumption of material relations under abstract and invisible, noetic, and even imaginary designs, facilitating thus the development of a new economic concept of the world as a tabula rasa for man-made projections.

Readers, be advised that this book wants to implicitly disengage, both historically and theoretically, the study of early modern technologies and cultures of projection from the shadows cast by film theory and its cinematic archaeologies. The historically specific economic concept of projection advanced in this book shouldn't be conflated with the psychological and ideological powers of optical projection explored and critiqued in (post-)1970s film theory in particular, most often from psychoanalytic and Marxist perspectives. In these debates, early modern optical devices found their place in deep histories of darkness, illusion, and influence that extended from Plato's cave to the

movies, arguably committing to a fundamental optical and conceptual inversion whereby "men and their circumstances appear upsidedown," as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously put it in their metaphoric association between the camera obscura and ideology. In these debates, furthermore, projection became primarily interpreted as a mental mechanism and associated with the regimenting of the gaze and positioning of individuals into conformity through identification and disavowal. For Sigmund Freud, as Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis tell us, projection was "always a matter of throwing out what one refuses either to recognise in oneself or to be oneself" Psychoanalytic projection, Laplanche and Pontalis note, is partly "comparable to the cinematographic one," in the way it describes the process of illusions and visions, projections of spirits (or, spiritual projections) were to direct individuals toward perfection—the "government of souls," to borrow a concept of Michel Foucault's.

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Such "repressed" manifestations of all sorts—spirits, demons, ghosts—featured prominently in the early history of optical media, ranging from the experiments by the Jesuits, and even sometimes by their fellow Protestant scholars, to popular projected image shows organized by traveling entertainers. In this book, I have decidedly avoided interpreting such apparitions in terms of the psychoanalytic concept of projection, as "embodiments of bad unconscious desires." By doing so, my aim has been not to refute this concept but to offer a historical account that doesn't employ psychoanalytic theory as an overarching narrative of modernity. Terry Castle suggests that it was not effectively until the turn of the eighteenth century that the ghosts and spirits conjured by means of magic lanterns became circumscribed as primarily inner mental phenomena, as products of the brain rather than as anything supernatural per se, and that projected images started to come across as belonging to a mental reality understood first and foremost in psychological terms.

The meanings and functions of projected images circa 1700 were neither fixed nor symmetrical; the form was in flux. Furthermore, the demarcations we today draw between economy, science, religion, and (optical) media—as well as rationality, factuality and fiction, or the phantasmatic—were not yet clearly in place during the historical period studied in this book. In the original turn-of-the-century context, these meanings and functions entered into an odd but creative mix. Projecting Spirits hence demands its readers approach a techno-aesthetic form (now familiar to us in the more limited sense of cinematic and "post-cinematic" entertainment, or a constituent function of the modern psyche) in its former semantic openness, complexity, and strangeness. <>

MAX STIRNER ON THE PATH OF DOUBT by Lawrence S. Stepelevich [Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought, Lexington Books, 9781793636881]

MAX STIRNER ON THE PATH OF DOUBT examines Stirner's incisive criticism of his contemporaries during the period from the death of Hegel, in 1831, to the 1848 German Revolution. Stirner's work, mainly the Ego and His Own, considered each of the major figures within that German school known as "The Young Hegelians." Lawrence S. Stepelevich argues that for Stirner, they were but "pious atheists," and their common revolutionary ideology concealed an ancient religious ground – which Stirner set about to reveal. The central doctrine of this school, that

Mankind was its own Savior, was initiated in 1835 by the theologian, David F. Strauss's in his Life of Jesus , and it progressed with August von Cieszkowski's mystical recasting of history, followed by Bruno Bauer's absolute atheism and Ludwig Feuerbach's statement that "Man is God." This soon found reflection in the "Sacred History of Mankind" declared by Moses Hess. Within a decade, the result was the secular reformulation of this theological ideology into the "Scientific Socialism" of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Although linked to it, Max Stirner was the most relentless and feared critic of this school. His work, never out of print, but largely ignored by academics, has inspired countless "individualists" set upon rejecting any form of religious or political "causes," and finding Stirner's assertion that he had "set his cause upon nothing" took this as their own cause.

Review

"This is an important and needed book which brings a lifetime of first rate scholarship to bear on Max Stirner's thought, as well as the significant thinkers, critics and commentators who were active in his generation, just after the death of Hegel. While offering a well-painted picture of Stirner himself, it also astutely suggests the contemporary relevance of many of Stirner's preoccupations. The style is intelligent, very informed and informative. It evidences much impressive erudition, but it wears its scholarly learning lightly. The result is a very readable text, engaging, and illuminating, as well as being full of significant touches of wit and irony. Very warmly recommended." -- William Desmond, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

In this highly engaging study, Lawrence Stepelevich makes the counterintuitive but highly compelling argument that Max Stirner is the legitimate heir and standard-bearer of Hegel's dialectical logic. Stirner's signature work from 1844, The Ego and His Own, has been dismissed by establishment Hegelians, satirized by Marx and Engels, and called "absurd" by the likes of Lukács, Derrida, and Habermas. And yet, as Stepelevich shows, there is good reason to hold that it is Stirner, and not the usual crew of Hegel-epigones, who represents the genuine fulfillment of Hegel's philosophy and the true maturation of spirit in history (beyond the various forms of unhappy, adolescent consciousness). Even if it is accurate to characterize Stirner's thinking as "nihilistic," Stepelevich shows that Stirner's "nihilism" is a surprisingly productive or creative kind which anticipates various strands of postmodern thought while at the same time avoiding the self-undermining strategies of contemporary postmodernism as commonly deployed. This book, a model of historically-sensitive philosophy and philosophically-astute history, will inform, provoke, and invigorate the thinking of experts and beginners alike. -- Michael Baur, Fordham University

"A lively, witty, and erudite defense of Max Stirner from one of the most respected authorities on his thought. Stepelevich sets Stirner's work in the context of Hegel and the Young Hegelians and makes a bold and intelligent case for its enduring significance. All readers interested in the aftermath of Hegel and the development of nineteenth-century thought will learn much from this informative and thought-provoking book." -- Stephen Houlgate, University of Warwick

In Max Stirner on the Path of Doubt, Stepelevich unfolds a picture of the much misunderstood, and much ignored, German philosopher Max Stirner (1806–56). Stepelevich attempts to align Stirner as the natural inheritor and fulfiller of Hegel's dialectical logic. What is distinctive about Stirner, as Stepelevich argues in the introduction, is that he was from the beginning "neither an 'Old Hegelian' dedicated to the exhaustive autopsy of the Hegelian corpus nor a 'Young Hegelian' bent on employing it to a further purpose.".... This book will be of great interest in those working on the history of German idealism. Highly recommended. — *Choice*

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Introduction

This work has a simple intention: to propose that Max Stirner is a legitimate heir to Hegelian philosophy. His major and singular work, The Ego and His Own, has often been dismissed as but the eccentric work of a passing figure among the early students of Hegel. But, yet, from its first appearance in the fall of 1844, to the present day, it has provoked constant and heated debate over its significance. For over a century it has remained in print, translated into dozens of languages, and has gathered as much scorn as it has admiration. Its persistent ideological magnetism, either repelling or attractive, has been an enigma just as the philosophy of his teacher, Hegel. I will maintain that both are linked by a profound dialectical logic, and this logic, so often ignored or misunderstood, which sustains their philosophical vitality and insures the endurance of their thought. Hegelianism, in following its own self-reflecting dialectical logic, reaches a closure in which, as with Heraclitus, the "end and the beginning are one and the same." As Heinrich Heine said, "Our Philosophic revolution is concluded; Hegel has closed the great circle."—and Stirner rests at the point of its closure.

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Some time ago, I happened upon a work by the Marxist scholar, Hans C. Helms. In this study, Stirner is taken as the ideological eminence grise behind a myriad of transient and little-noticed number of "anonymous societies" who devoted themselves to a radical individualism antithetical to the desired world of Marxian collectivism. For Helms, a devoted Marxist, these small groups of Stirnerians, despite their "anonymity," were in part responsible for the dreadful bourgeois era of free-market capitalism which emerged in post-war Germany. Certainly, for the 1945 Marxists, just as those in 1918, the attempt to totally enfold Germany into a "People's Republic" had once again failed, and Helms sees Stirner's heavy, if unnoticed, hand in all of this Capitalistic mischief.

However, for me, the most interesting feature of Helm's book was its bibliography. With a dedication that a Marxian critic of Stirner might not be expected to have, Helms listed hundreds of works, with over ninety pages devoted to the various editions, translations, and commentaries upon Stirner! But even Helm's compilation has been overshadowed by a recent exhaustive bibliography devoted to Stirner, which runs to 325 pages. As a recent German work has it, Stirner's work is "Heimlich hit"—a secret best-seller.

These large bibliographies focused on Stirner came as a surprise, for at least in my experience, references to Stirner were few and far between. As an example, in the cloistered groves of academe, the Philosopher's Index, philosophy's "preeminent reference resource" has, for many years, listed journal articles drawn from 680 journals, collected from 50 countries. Here, Stirner, just as Engels, plays second fiddle to Marx. Stirner's name appears in the titles of 68 journals and books but is heavily outweighed by Marx, whose name appears in the titles of 2,407 journals and books. Little is heard of Stirner in the groves of the academe. The academic silence concerning Stirner becomes are hardly heard, and if so, their voices find only faintly echoed in Critical Theory and other variants upon the themes of Postmodernism. With the exception of such scholars as Saul Newman, Stirner would also have likely continued on in his usual unnoticed way along the path of social theory. A recent example of this lack of attention is to be found in Robyn Marsco's work, The Highway of Despair: Critical Theory after Hegel. As described by its publisher, the work

> follows Theodor Adorno, Georges Bataille, and Frantz Fanon as they each read, resist, and reconfigure a strand of thought in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Confronting the twentieth-century collapse of a certain revolutionary dialectic, these thinkers struggle to revalue critical philosophy and recast Left Hegelianism within the contexts of genocidal racism, world war, and colonial domination.

Exactly why "Left Hegelianism" (which is the first label of "Young Hegelianism") was in need of being "recast" in order to deal with the "twentieth-century collapse" of a certain (Marxian?) revolutionary dialectic" is simply left unsaid. I would propose that Stirner's critique created the collapse. Although this is a good scholarly work, it nevertheless might serve as another example, rather subtle, of the Marxian avoidance of Stirner. The avoidance of the disastrous encounter of Young Hegelianism with Stirner had made it quite difficult for contemporary Marxists to account for their later despair.

This avoidance is one reason for the myriad of confusing and often conflicting labels affixed to him. An often-used label is that he is an "Anarchist." It certainly did not help toward the understanding of Stirner when Engels, after briefly considering him a Benthamite, went on to link him to Bakunin. It was thereafter taken as axiomatic among political scientists that Stirner was an "anarchist"—even if he did present a strong argument against Proudhon's slogan that "Property is Theft"—and it was Proudhon who coined the term "Anarchist." On this, George Woodcock, in his extensive work Anarchism, noted that Stirner influenced "only a few marginal groups of individualists"). In another study by David E. Apter and James Joll, their 274-page work, Anarchism Today, Stirner is only briefly (and barely) mentioned—at one time linking him to Bergson. More recently, in her excellent essay "Why Anarchists Need Stirner," Kathy E. Ferguson comes directly to the point:

Stirner is a hard thinker to categorize. He has been called a nihilist, one who advocates "heartless frivolity and criminal irresponsibility" above the necessities of social revolution. Some readers debate, rather ponderously, whether or not he is a psychological egoist. Others find him to be a radical individualist who is "wrong in his fundamental presupposition," about society, or a "radical nominalist" who launches "a comprehensive attack on the world, generally." Perhaps we can learn from these earnest ventures to eschew the desire to pin Stirrer down, and instead let him float a bit."

Professor Ferguson's prudential attitude toward the labeling of Stirner was earlier manifested in her essay "Saint Max Revisited: A Reconsideration of Max Stirner."

Most Political Scientists and historians are, expectedly, not too interested or well-versed in speculative philosophy, particularly Hegelianism. This lack of interest has been noted: "To a historian

concerned with the Young Hegelians, the problem of Hegel's philosophy is less acute than for a philosopher specifically concerned with that philosophy."

Marx was the first to see Stirner as an enemy and stigmatized "Sankt Max" as but "the speculative spokesman for the petty bourgeois, a decadent Hegelian boasting over the unrestraint of his self-inflated ego." Marx's view was simply and unquestionably accepted by generations of his followers, and even later critics of Marx, such as Sidney Hook, nevertheless echoed Marx when he condemned Stirner's work as but the "social defense mechanism of a petty bourgeois soul." Others, unsatisfied with this "petty" status, elevated him to the status of "the Grand Bourgeois," or Fascist. Still others, taking an opposite stance, see in Stirner the most articulate defender of individual liberty. He has been labeled an existentialist, a solipsist, an anti-Benthamite, an intemperate capitalist, or—as we might now suspect—an anticapitalist. For a large spectrum of the opinions regarding Stirner, see Kathy E. Ferguson's article, "Saint Max Revisited: A Reconsideration of Max Stirner." A recent title was affixed upon Stirner by the political scientist, Saul Newman, who understands him as a "proto-poststructuralist."

But, finally, and not unexpectedly, Stirner was once, in 1903, and also in 2018 designated as "Paranoiac."

But despite the difficulties of identifying Stirner's thought, there is a consistent agreement that Stirner be taken as the last of the "Young Hegelians." In this regard, most commentators have agreed with Frederick Engels, who had Stirner concluding the "decomposition process" of the Hegelian School 26 In the words of a later commentator, David McLellan, Stirner was simply "the last of the Hegelians." Franz Mehring, Marx's biographer, also held the same view: Stirner was "the last offshoot of Hegelian philosophy." Kurt Mautz, who, in 1936, wrote a comprehensive study of the relationship between Hegel and Stirner, described Stirner as "the last metamorphosis of German Idealism." For Fritz Mauthener, Stirner had drawn "The ultimate consequence of the Hegelians [die allerletzen Folgerungen aus der Hegeliei]." But perhaps the French scholar Henri Arvon stated the matter most elegantly, for him Stirner was "le dernier maillon de la chain hygiene." More recently, in proposing that Stirner influenced Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze observed:

> It is clear that Stirner plays the revelatory role in all this [i.e., the revelation of the nihilism inherent in German philosophy against which Nietzsche struggles]. It is he [Stirner] who pushes the dialectic to its final consequences, showing what its motor and end results are

Indeed, even before he met Bauer, Stirner had already elected himself to that final position—since, as he wrote: "The true tendency of the Hegelian system" [die wahre Tendenz des Hegelschen Systems] was to obtain "the autonomy of free men [die Autarkie des freien Menschen]."

All this would suggest that Stirner's philosophy might well be a logical consequence of Hegelianism. The historian and Hegelian, Johann Erdmann, thought this to be the case, and noted that "Max Stirner is the one who really represents the culminating point of the tendency begun by Hegel." His view was also that of Karl Lowith, who wrote that:

> Stirner's book, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum has usually been considered the anarchic product of an eccentric, but it is in reality an ultimate logical consequence of Hegel's historical system, which — allegorically displaced — it reproduces exactly. Stirner himself admits this derivation from Hegel in his discussion of Bauer's Pousane.

I believe that Erdman and Lowith are correct, and I have earlier argued this point—that Stirner is not simply, in a historical sense, "the last of the Hegelians," but that his philosophy is the realization of what is entailed in "being a Hegelian."

From the beginning of my long interest in Stirner, I've always believed that the moral, or if you wish, his "immoral" philosophy, was nothing less than the final and exhaustive expression of Hegel's

philosophy. The dark image of Hegel is reflected in Stirner, an image which has fascinated, and often repelled, those who have looked into it. Stirner stands at the end of the path that was followed by Hegel's first radical followers. But he was simply unwilling to continue along that path, which would require him to subordinate himself to their various idealistic "causes," into a denial of actual reality, and to deny "the course of the world." He proved to be a formidable opponent, and none of them were able to avoid him—and so they either silently turned away, as with Feuerbach and Bauer, or declared it was the wrong path, as with Marx, Engels, or Moses Hess. All of these early radicals, with the exception of Marx, are now all but forgotten, yet they yet remain as the sources of the most significant movements of our modern world—evidenced in such ideologies as Marxism, Anarchism, Individualism, and Zionism. For anyone interested in a more detailed look at Stirner's world, a look at his writings as presented in the Appendix to this work might be helpful.

But for all, Old or Young, the road to truth is, just as Plato's "steep and rough ascent" out of the Cave, a difficult and demanding path, which, in his Introduction to The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel describes as

> the path of doubt, or more properly a highway of despair. For what happens there is not what is usually understood by doubting, a jostling against this or that supposed truth, the outcome of which is again a disappearance in due course of the doubt and a return to the former truth, so that at the end the matter is taken as it was before. On the contrary, that pathway is the conscious insight into the untruth of the phenomenal knowledge.

On one side there stood a group of his optimistic students, not bound by any fear of doubt, who envisioned the "path" as being much more than merely an intellectual activity, more than a way to theoretically reach "the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge." For them, taking the Path of Doubt meant to give themselves over to doubting the truth of the actual world in which they lived. Doubting was not, as it was with Descartes, a mere intellectual activity, but a serious engagement with the world. Hegel's dialectic would be the way by which to test the "supposed truth" of all that had been dogmatically presented to them as unquestionable. Their absolute doubt would be the antithesis to the accepted values of their world, and from this radical action of questioning and examining, a social revolution would come about, one from which a new order of world would rise into being.

For these radicals, the first critical examination would turn upon the ancient link between Church and State, and this absolute skepticism would be the ground of an ideology of reform. The "Old Hegelians" did not see it this way. For them, comfortable within the secure structures of academic life, only time could test the theory—and it never could, since the truth was impervious to history. There was no "time to change." Philosophy had ended with Hegel, with his unalterable truth. But the Young Hegelians considered history to be the final judge of philosophy, and the rational, the theoretically true, would in time emerge into actual being. The ancient argument between truth and time continued, and since both schools made a claim to be the "true" Hegelians an unsteady and enduring armistice was soon set up, as Karl Lowith has it, between the two "hostile brothers."

Unhappily, for these young critics, the final member of the critical school, Max Stirner, set about—in a most lucid manner—to overturn the logic of Hegel's critics by turning it against them. This is the root of Stirrer's philosophical power and his profound ambiguity as a Hegelian. This "negation of the negation" by which he turned against the negative criticisms of Hegel explains the persistence of interest in his thought. It can be maintained that his "nihilism" was the final conclusion and truth of Hegelianism itself, and after him every member of the Young or Old Hegelian schools had little to say, either of him or the positions they had held before his criticism of them. He was indeed, as it will be seen, "The Last of the Hegelians"—both historically and logically.

The great difficulty in comprehending the persistent presence of Stirner follows from his dialectical stance in regard to Hegelianism. He is neither "Young" nor "Old," and his "egoism" can be considered as the "synthesis" of both schools and the recovery of the Hegelianism which had been lost. His work recast the concept of "Absolute Knowledge," which terminated that Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind was again realized in Stirner—he is the fate of Hegelianism. <>

THE SCHEMA OF THE THEORY OF REIFICATION by Wataru Hiromatsu, translated by John Hocking [Series: Historical Materialism Book Series, Brill, 9789004335103

Hiromatsu argues that the change from Hegel's theory of self-alienation to the concept of reification is crucial in establishing a new relational worldview which is still relevant today. Amongst other topics, his discussion of the understanding of society sees such as a relational dynamic wherein the individual is constantly composed and composing in relation to others, including nature. This understanding is, he argues, the "single science of history" of Marx and Engels. It overcomes the hypostasizing subject - object relation still prevalent today.

Originally published in Japanese as Busshōkaron no kōzu by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo, 1983, 1994. © By Kuniko Hiromatsu.

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With the exception of the book cover, the title page and this preface, Japanese names are given in the Japanese order i.e. with the surname first.

In the original, Chapters I and II have endnotes, Chapter III and the Epilogue have footnotes, Chapter IV has both in-text notes and footnotes, and Chapter V has no notes. In the translation, I have decided, for convenience and consistency, to use footnotes throughout, except for Chapter IV where I have maintained the in-text references and footnotes.

The expressions 唯物史観／唯物史論 (materialist history) and 史的唯物論 (historical materialism), are both used. Although they refer to the same thing I have strictly translated each expression according to this differentiation i.e. 唯物史観／唯物史論 as "materialist history" and 史的唯物論 as "historical materialism".

As is evident from the text, I have followed a close style of translation. This provides, I believe, the best reproduction of the writer's "voice" and of her or his particular literary style. I have not used the standard English translations of Marx and Engels, Heidegger etc. preferring to translate directly from the Japanese in order to maintain the Japanese perspective and style.

Material contained within double square brackets (i.e. ⟦ ⟧) is material inserted by the translator. Similarly, material prefaced by the abbreviation Tr. is material inserted by the translator. Material contained within single square brackets (i.e. [ ]) and single brackets (i.e. ( )) is material parenthesised by Hiromatsu.

For those unfamiliar with German, in the footnotes Bd. stands for Vol. (i.e. volume), S. stands for p. (i.e. page) Aufl stands for Ed. (i.e. Edition), and vgl stands for cf.

The translation of the German on page 162 was provided by Evi Ruhle. Ray Hocking provided assistance with the diagram on page 204.

John Hocking

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The present volume, **The Schema of the Theory of Reification**, is a translation of Hiromatsu Wataru's (廣松渉 1933–1994) book 『物象化論の構図』, which was published by Iwanami Shoten in 1983 and later included in 『廣松渉著作集』 [Collected works of Hiromatsu Wataru], Vol. 13 (HWC 13:9–268). The book consists of five chapters and an epilogue, and those chapters, except for the third section of the first chapter, were originally published as discrete essays in journals between 1969 and 1983. The third section of Chapter 1 and the epilogue were newly written for the book publication. While a number of Hiromatsu's major books, including the present one, have been translated into Chinese, translations into European languages have to date been limited to some individual essays and excerpts from books.1 The present publication is indeed the first ever English translation of an entire book by the author.

Undoubtedly one of the most important philosophers in twentieth-century Japan, Hiromatsu has so far been relatively little known abroad, not least in Europe and North America, among other regions.2 As his German translator Raji Steineck rightly suggests, this hitherto limited attention to Hiromatsu's work may be attributed to the fact that his thought does not fit into the widespread preconception of "Japanese philosophy" as essentially tied to or rooted in the East-Asian cultural traditions.3 While such culturally essentialist notions of Japanese philosophy could be questioned even with regard to its supposed representative figures, such as Nishida Kitarō or some other largely prewar philosophers, their inadequacy becomes all the more apparent with reference to Hiromatsu. His work may be characterized as a rigorous and critical engagement with modern philosophy whose scope and context are by no means restricted to, or centered on, the cultural or geopolitical entity of Japan or East Asia. In this introductory essay, I wish to situate in an appropriate context the author Hiromatsu, his philosophical thought, and specifically the present work The Schema of the Theory of Reification.4

Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture in 1933, Hiromatsu grew up mainly in Fukuoka Prefecture, southwestern Japan. Immediately after the end of World War II in 1945, Hiromatsu as a schoolboy took a keen interest in Marxism and started extensively reading left-wing literature, notably the Japanese edition of The Collected Works of Marx and Engels. While in junior high school, he joined Communist-led political activities, and a few years later, he was expelled from high school for distributing fliers protesting the then raging Red purge. After passing the high-school equivalency examination, Hiromatsu entered the University of Tokyo in 1954, and studied philosophy while at the same time further engaging in political activities. During this process, he became increasingly at odds with the orthodox or "Russian" school of Marxism over a series of theoretical and practical issues, and consequently parted company with the Japan Communist Party. Shifting toward what was then taking form as the New Left, he helped develop a new orientation of the revolutionary movement, and this effort was, on the basic theoretical level, bound up with his seminal project of exploring and reinterpreting Karl Marx's thought.

During the 1960s, the young Hiromatsu emerged first of all as a new leading theorist of Marxism. Starting with his 1963 essay "Marxism and the Theory of Self-Alienation," he presented a novel interpretation of Marx's thought that differed from orthodox Marxism as well as from the "humanist" version of Marxism based on the notion of "alienation." As is well known, Marx's early critique of alienation, as developed in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, revolves around the idea that the human subject externalizes itself into an alien object and yet eventually overcomes this alienation, turning back to itself. In Hiromatsu's reading, this idea of alienation is "inseparable from a specific concept of the subject" as represented by Hegel's concept of "spirit" – which was

subsequently recast by the Young Hegelians into various notions such as "humanity," "self-consciousness," or "species-being" – and it was within such a conceptual framework that the early Marx set forth his critique of alienation (HWC 8:347). In due course, however, according to Hiromatsu, Marx's thought underwent a radical change. In the middle of the 1840s, starting in his unfinished joint work with Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Marx developed a renewed critique of society no longer based on the abstract notion of the subject, but rather on his new conception of the human being as "the ensemble of social relations." This new orientation of Marx's thought had hitherto been obscured, however, by the then standard edition of The German Ideology, Part I, which, in Hiromatsu's view, was seriously flawed by an arbitrary compilation of the authors' manuscripts. Hiromatsu accordingly proceeded through a detailed textual criticism of The German Ideology, which eventually resulted in the publication of his own edition of the text (Marx and Engels 1974).

In his 1969 book The Horizon of Marxism 『マルクス主義の地平』 and other writings, Hiromatsu characterized the development of Marx's thought as the transition from "the theory of alienation" to "the theory of reification." The mature Marx's critique of "reification" (Versachlichung) is no longer aimed at the subject turning into an alien object, but at the "fixation of social activity" arising from the naturally evolved cooperative relations between individuals. As succinctly summed up by Hiromatsu, 'reification' for Marx refers to the circumstance that "the relation between persons appears as a relation between things, as a thing-like substance, or as a thing-like attribute" (HWC 7:233). Analyzing this idea of reification as it was introduced in The German Ideology and further developed in Marx's later work, particularly in Capital, Hiromatsu sought to show how this conceptual innovation implies surpassing the framework of modern philosophy marked by the subject/object schema. His new interpretive approach to Marx's thought as just outlined was received with fervor by a wide range of readers, especially among young students involved in the rising campus struggles during the late 1960s. Then teaching at Nagoya University, Hiromatsu himself acted in solidarity with the student revolt, and in 1970 resigned from the university in support of the movement. He remained outside academia until 1976, when he became assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Tokyo.

Notwithstanding its great intellectual impact, Hiromatsu's work in Marxism and Marx studies by no means covered the whole of his scholarship. As can also be perceived from his analysis of Marx's thought, he was deeply grounded in a broad range of Western philosophy, notably German idealism, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology, as well as the thought of physicist-philosopher Ernst Mach. More importantly, however, unlike many other contemporary researchers in the field, Hiromatsu engaged above all in philosophizing with remarkable originality and systematic coherence. He developed his own philosophical project in his 1972 book The Intersubjective Being-Structure of the World 『世界の共同主観的存在構造』 and subsequent works, most elaborately in his masterpiece Being and Meaning 『存在と意味』, vol. 1 (1982) and vol. 2 (1993). The basic motif of his philosophy was a systematic critique of the "modern worldview," which he characterized as substantialist and bound by the subject/object schema. He sought to overcome this modern world-view by extending Marx's innovative ideas, particularly his critique of reification, to the general philosophical dimension.

The starting point of Hiromatsu's analysis is that all phenomena in the world bear "meaning" or "value," or, in other words, that they appear as something. The phenomenon always appears as something more or something other than the phenomenal or real given. For instance, "[t]he sound that is just heard appears intuitively as a car horn; what is seen outside the window appears as a pine tree" (HWC 1:33). Any phenomenon thus consists of two factors, the given and the meaning/value, which are inseparably linked in such a way that the former appears as the latter. Further, Hiromatsu

continues, the phenomenon is every time a phenomenon "for someone," and this someone is also of twofold character. For example, a hammer has an instrumental value for someone insofar as he/she "plays the role of striking a nail" with it. In this way, something appears to someone as a general "role-taking Someone." It is important to note that the formation of a meaning or value is correlative with the process through which different subjects make themselves "intersubjectively isomorphic" to become a general Someone. In this way, "intersubjectivity" serves as an essential link between meaning/value and Someone.

The above twofold structures of both subject-side and object-side are combined to form what Hiromatsu calls the "fourfold structure" (四肢構造): "A given presents itself as something to someone as Someone" (HCW 15:199). For instance, the sound dog bears the meaning of 'dog' for someone as an English speaker. It is also in terms of the fourfold structure that Hiromatsu analyzes Marx's account of the commodity: A product of labor appears as a value to someone as a subject of abstract human labor. As Hiromatsu stresses, the above four moments of the phenomenon are not independent elements, but exist only as terms of the fourfold functional relationship. This relational character of phenomena has been missed, however, in the substantialist philosophical tradition, and Hiromatsu critically designates this tendency as "reification" (物象化).

Broadening Marx's concept of reification into a general philosophical concept, Hiromatsu redefines reification as the hypostatizing misconception of what is actually a functional relation. While, for Marx, reification is limited to the hypostatization of social relations, what may be reified in Hiromatsu's sense covers relations in general, including natural and nonhuman relations. He specifically focuses on the reification of meaning and value, extended from the Marxian reification of the economic value of commodities. He also critically analyzes the reification of role action, in which roles are misconceived as fixed and ready-made positions and statuses. By thus uncovering and overcoming various forms of reification, Hiromatsu seeks to replace the modern world-view with a new philosophical orientation marked by the primacy of relation and the intersubjective fourfold structure.

Among Hiromatsu's numerous works, the present book is the only one that centrally thematizes the idea and theory of reification. To be sure, as he himself admits, the book may, in a sense, appear to be a kind of "patchwork" of essays originally written independently (p. 12). Far from being just one topic among others, however, the concept of reification plays a key unifying role in Hiromatsu's work: It runs through his overall scholarly project covering both his interpretive approach to Marx's thought and his systematic effort in general philosophical reasoning. On the one hand, as we have seen, Hiromatsu's reading of Marx revolves around the thematic of reification as distinct from that of alienation. In the first essay of this volume, he outlines his basic views of Marx's transition from his earlier theory of alienation to his later theory of reification, and in the second essay, presents an in-depth analysis of this Marxian idea of reification. On the other hand, as noted above, he reformulates the idea of reification in the general philosophical dimension in such a way that the critique of reification serves as the leading motif in his endeavor to develop a new philosophical world-view. Steps in this conceptual extension is first taken in the third essay on the reification of the historical world, which also contains a fourfold-structural analysis of Marx's theory of the commodity. The fourth essay on Marx and Engels' conception of nature is also highly relevant to Hiromatsu's extension of the idea of reification, notably to his critical approach to "the historical reification of nature" as exemplified by the modern mechanical view of nature. It is above all in the long "epilogue," however, that he thematically discusses his project of expanding the theory of reification, which is to include the reification of norms, institutions, and social power, among other constructs in the practical dimension. Thus, it is no wonder that he characterizes the epilogue as, "along with the second essay, the central part of this book" (p. 12).

In this way, the present book provides the reader with a vantage point for viewing Hiromatsu's overall scholarly enterprise, where the thematic of reification constitutes a pivotal link connecting his major fields of inquiry. The reader who has completed reading this book will be able, without too much difficulty, to proceed to other works by Hiromatsu, whether his more detailed accounts of Marx's thought, his general theory of the fourfold structure, or his philosophical analysis of natural science, particularly relativity theory, among other themes.5 It is all the more hoped that translations of his other books will also be available soon.

Katsumori Makoto

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"The composition of the theory of reification" serves as an important key for understanding the later thought of Marx for me, and, also, serves as the methodological foundation for my own conception of the philosophy of society, the philosophy of history and the philosophy of culture. Whilst I have expressed this occasionally over the last ten or more years I have hesitated for a long while to discuss as the main theme the "logical composition of the theory of reification" itself. This is because, on the one hand I had left a slight degree of impasse in the work of interpreting comprehensively in line with the composition of the theory of reification Marx's system of "critique of (the study of) political economy" which encompasses the complete three volumes of Capital, but mainly because, on the other hand, in the matter of the influential determinant in my philosophy of praxis, especially in the arrangement of role action, it was difficult to see through to a necessary and sufficient methodological deployment. However, in the last year or two, in regard to the former, having gained as co-author the specialist Mr Yoshida Norio, I have come to be likely to achieve a revision and expansion of my old work The Philosophy of Capital and consequently a restructuring of interpretation containing the whole of the system of "Marx's critique of (the study of) political economy." In regard to the latter, too, as the draft of Being and Meaning Volume II "The Being-Structure of the World of Praxis" has gradually come together I have reached the point where my conception has more or less firmed. This is the reason that I am here putting forward this book which takes as its thematic content the "composition and range of the theory of reification" for public examination and am seeking correction from the well-informed reader.

This book is not, however, something which discusses abstractly and generally the composition of the theory of reification in the form simply of methodology. Moreover, this book is a collection of essays, and it contains an old essay published in an academic society journal more than ten years ago. In addition, although it takes the general title of The Schema of the Theory of Reification, the main body of the book is limited to the theory of reification of Marx and Engels, and my own conception is only revealed in the form of an epilogue.—Though by nature I am slothful, it's not that I didn't have in mind to write a "newly written text." Also, once I had decided on the form of a collection of essays I did, temporarily, draft a long introduction. However, after careful consideration, I decided on the current form, having a particular thing in mind.

I personally desire in mind that to more easily gain the understanding of the reader regarding the composition and range of the theory of reification, taking the form, as in this book, of restricting the ridge of the theory of reification in Marx and Engels to the primary "backbone" of discussion and fleshing things out in my description of such first, and then having done that stating in an abbreviated form my conception as a continuation and development of such would—rather than the normal forms of resolving to be too accurate and tending to stray into byways, or reducing complexity and describing things comprehensively—rather be more suitable. I sincerely pray that such thinking of mine is not complacent.

To the extent that they were written independently of each other, the five essays contained within the book should be comprehensible even if perused in a random order, but in order to ascertain the schema of the theory of reification it would be best to read them through in the order in which they are arranged. However, for a certain kind of reader, the first essay may be seen as an unnecessary preamble, and I fear that it may be felt to be boring. At such a time, I would ask that the second essay and the epilogue be read, and that the first essay be bypassed for the time being.

The first essay, "For an Extolling of Materialist History", whilst rejecting crude understandings of the image of historical materialism, extols the perspective of materialist history as world-view and its composition, but in the context of this book, it, in particular, is such that it should perform the function of an introduction in regard to Marx's theory of reification with discussion, in particular, of the continuous discontinuity = discontinuous continuity of the so-called "theory of alienation" in the "early Marx" and the "theory of reification" in the "later Marx." Furthermore, section 3 of this essay, "The Sublation of the Theory of Alienation, and The Theory of Reification", is newly written, and with this addition I have also done some revision of the text and notes (the notes are provided together at the end of the chapter)1 of the preceding sections 1 and 2.—In this book I do not go into the specific content of materialist history itself, and I would be grateful if this lack can be made up for through the easily obtainable separate work, The Original Image of Materialist History (San'ichi shobō, Shinsho Edition). In this separate work, whilst dismissing crude forms of materialist history, I discuss as main themes the view of society, the view of the state and the view of history of Marx and Engels, and I engage in an explicatory investigation of the fundamental concepts of materialist history. Also, regarding the features of Marx and Engels' discussion of human being, I ask that you see chapters 3 and 4 of the separate work, The Horizon of Marxism (Keisō shobō).

The second essay, "The Composition and Scope of the Theory of Reification", has the feature of originally being a rewriting in the form of an independent essay of the incomplete "Section 3" of the first essay, but, putting aside the circumstances of its formation, regarded just in the context of this book, it forms the central trunk of such. In including it in this book expansion and revision was undertaken, primarily in the notes.—No matter how much this essay has the features and the position of being a continuation of the first essay, it was published in the form of an independent essay and it includes points which to some degree duplicate those in the first essay, but, fearing causing jumps in the gist of the argument, I deliberately didn't undertake a large-scale cutting of material.

The third essay, "The Theory of Reification of the Historical World", is the manuscript for an academic society special lecture written in the late autumn of 1968 (it was published in the academic society journal beforehand, with corrections made in January 1969), fifteen years previous to now, and it discussed the proposal to extend the composition of the theory of the "world of the commodity" in Capital into the reificatory being-structure in the "historical world" in general. This old essay is worth commemorating for me as the essay in which I first state my interpretation of Marx's theory of the world of the commodity, and it is also, at the same time, the essay in which I first state publicly my "role theory composition", but I have until now refrained from including it in an essay collection. The reason for this is not because it contained points I wished to withdraw, but because, later, I published section 2 of this essay in an elaborated and developed form as "The Being-Structure of the Linguistic World" and "The Co-operative Being-Structure of the Historical World", (both are contained in my work The Intersubjective Being-Structure of the World published by Keisō shobō), and also, I published "Heidegger and Reificatory Misapprehension" (republished in my work An Outpost Towards a Koto-Centred View of the World published by Keisō shobō) which develops as the main theme points of critique from this essay, and further, I published as an independent book, The Philosophy of Capital (published by Gendai hyōron sha), the reading of

Capital which supports section 1 of the essay, and so in this way, I developed as main themes foundational statements from this essay = academic society lecture in a variety of directions, and therefore published the essay in a different form. In this way, I abandoned the essay to an academic society journal which would never be read at all by anyone apart from the typesetter, but this old essay, no matter how much of a rough sketch it is, indeed, because it is a foundational rough sketch, can be seen as convenient in bringing into relief the main line of argument in the context of this book. This is the reason I have dusted it off and republished it.—Because the idea is to republish my first statements regarding the various aforementioned themes, I have stopped at correcting of misprints and have taken the expedient of inserting somewhat explanatory "translations" (within square brackets) of European words. I hope that I might be somehow forgiven for duplication with other essays. For this academic society lecture, taking into consideration the circumstance that the audience was a school of philosophers with little connection with Marx but with a close affinity with Heideggerian terminology, I make frequent use of Heideggerian jargon. Whilst I fear that I will invite the displeasure of a certain kind of reader I can only ask that attention to and distinction of Heideggerian terminology be made.—Although the fact that the essay is not on the whole sufficiently developed was beyond my control, for me the major dissatisfaction is the fact that I completely omitted relating discussion to Marx's "theory of value form." Of course, human relations in the "theory of value form" only fully applies to "the simple commodity producer model." It was having carefully considered this that I omitted relating discussion to the theory of value form. Even so, it can't be denied that this lack is a cause of pushing the discussion into an abstract realm, and to you readers who are economists it is likely that you will have the impression that "with this kind of discussion in the end a consistent reading of the complete three volumes of Capital using the composition of the theory of reification can't possibly be believed." Certainly, in extolling, not only in this essay but in the book as a whole, the theory of reification which runs through the complete three volumes of Capital, I have left a large amount of work undone. To fulfil this work, however, concrete discussion focused along the lines of Capital, such as the "problem of transformation" etc, is necessary and would easily necessitate a book with this as its main theme. For this reason, I have deliberately refrained in this book from incomplete discussion of related, non-central matters. For the time being, regarding the "theory of value form" and the "theory of fetishism", I would be grateful if the lack in this book is supplemented through my previously published, separate book The Philosophy of Capital (incidentally, this existing work of mine is scheduled to be newly published by Keisō shobō next spring, having undergone expansion and correction).

The fourth essay, "The Historical Reification of the Natural World", is once again a republication of an old essay written for an academic society journal, and apart from a condensing of the notes at the end of the essay, and the supplementation of material in square brackets I have stopped at only correcting misprints. The points of argument and the quotations in this essay are almost all duplications with those in the first essay, the second essay and the epilogue, and it wasn't that I didn't hesitate to republish it, but this short essay is the only essay for me where I discussed as the main theme Marx and Engels' concept of nature, and recently, for reasons of its rarity, I have frequently been asked about it, so I chose to publish it here as an "addendum in a different place", refraining from altering the duplication of points of argument. I'd like to beg forgiveness.

The fifth essay, "Philosophy in Marx", is the record of a speech given under the auspices of "Terakoya",2 and it is not an essay which takes the theory of reification as a direct topic, but deals with the matters of the composition of "systematic description = systematic critique" mentioned in the second essay and the "realising sublation = sublating realisation of philosophy" in the place of practice, and in general it also has an aspect of generalising motifs (though from a particular vantage point) contained in this book, so this too has been included as an "addendum." Apart from omitting part of the preamble and addendum notes it is a mostly faithful republication.

The epilogue, "Expanding the Theory of Reification", is an outline of my own thoughts and proposals as to how I wish to continue and develop, on the basis of what kind of direction and with what kind of deployment, Marx and Engels' theory of reification. Even though, formally, it is an "epilogue", this long, new essay can be seen as, along with the second essay, the central part of this book. In the context of it as a continuation of the main text I haven't refrained from re-declaring points of discussion and reinserting quotations.

Reading the printer's proofs it is difficult not to feel embarrassed. Even though it was put together in accordance with a pre-established line, I am extremely ashamed of the duplication arising from the republication of material, especially the duplication of quotations. For example, a certain section of The German Ideology is not only quoted in every chapter but has ended up being used twice within the same essay, making things extremely unattractive. Also, from a different perspective, this book presents such a patchwork appearance, and in contrast to the more than ten essay collections I have previously sent out into the world being a unity furnished with an internal arrangement in their own way, in the case of this book, it is simply a completely distorted five-pointed star. In the group of my works this book is bound to be judged the most unattractive.

Rethinking things, however, being published in advance of the revised, new edition of The Philosophy of Capital and the volumes to follow it, and alongside Being and Meaning Volume II, in the case of this book which promotes the composition of Marx's theory of reification and which ought to present my own composition of the theory of reification, this clumsiness may perhaps be on the contrary well equal to its task. The essays contained in it have, for me, each been accompanied by catharsis, and all I can do now is hope for good luck.

Hiromatsu Wataru <>

CRISIS UNDER CRITIQUE: HOW PEOPLE ASSESS, TRANSFORM, AND RESPOND TO CRITICAL SITUATIONS edited by Didier Fassin and Axel Honneth [New Directions in Critical Theory, Columbia University Press, 9780231204330]

The word "crisis" denotes a break, a discontinuity, a rupture—a moment after which the normal order can continue no longer. Yet our political vocabulary today is suffused with the rhetoric of crisis, to the point that supposed abnormalities have been normalized. How can the notion of crisis be rethought in order to take stock of—and challenge—our understanding of the many predicaments in which we find ourselves?

Instead of diagnosing emergencies, Didier Fassin, Axel Honneth, and an assembly of leading thinkers examine how people experience, interpret, and contribute to the making of and the response to critical situations. Contributors inquire into the social production of crisis, evaluating a wide range of cases on five continents through the lenses of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, and economics. Considering social movements, intellectual engagements, affected communities, and reflexive perspectives, the book foregrounds the perspectives of those most closely involved, bringing out the immediacy of crisis. Featuring analysis from below as well as above, from the inside as well as the outside, CRISIS UNDER CRITIQUE Is a singular intervention that utterly recasts one of today's most crucial—yet most ambiguous—concepts.

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PART ONE. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The Heuristic of Crises: Reclaiming Critical Voices Didier Fassin and Axel Honneth

We live in a time of crises. Or rather, we live in a time when our dominant representation of the world is one of crises. Think of the health crisis caused by the novel coronavirus pandemic and the social and economic crisis resulting from it, the environmental crisis related to global warming and its consequences, the refugee crises recently experienced in Europe but also South Asia, the humanitarian crises affecting places torn by civil wars from Syria and Afghanistan to Yemen and Sudan, and the political crises that threaten democratic processes in Brazil and Egypt as well as

Hungary and Israel, among others. Some of these crises emerge from specific events that reveal broader issues, such as the announcement of the limitation of cash withdrawal in Argentina, the suicide of a street vendor in Tunisia, the rape of a female student in India, the killing of a black man by the police in the United States, the proposal of a bill extending extradition agreements in Hong Kong, the accidental explosion of stored chemical products in Lebanon, or the yellow vests movement after an increase in gas taxes in France. Others emerge less dramatically from gradual and profound transformations in gender relations, sexual models, racial belonging, cultural identity, the legitimacy of politics, the regulation of finance, the division of labor, the distribution of resources, the status of knowledge, the foundations of morality, and more. The language of crisis to account for such phenomena is ubiquitous.

However, with its extraordinary heterogeneity, which evokes Borges's humorously fictitious taxonomy of the animal kingdom in his essay "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins," this catalogue seems to challenge any theoretical appraisal of what crises are and what they express. In fact, it would even appear senseless if it did not precisely call our attention to the paradoxical normalization of the language of crisis—paradoxical because a crisis is supposed to be a rupture in the normal order of things. How could it therefore be normalized to the point of becoming a descriptor of so many different situations? How could crises be the new norm? There is an intellectual dilemma here. On the one hand, crises cannot be taken for granted. Their self-evidence must be questioned. The inflation of the term and of the state of affairs it pertains to invites us to critically examine what is at stake in the very designation as such of social phenomena. Which facts are deemed crises, and which ones are not? Who has the authority to declare that a given situation is a crisis, and who does not? What benefits are gained and what agendas are hidden in such interpretation? These are crucial questions to be formulated. On the other hand, crises cannot be dismissed as purely social or mental constructions. They often manifest serious issues, even if these issues need to be reviewed. The gravity of the circumstances to which they refer most of the time requires a critical scrutiny of what they signal. Which criteria are used to decide on a crisis? What practical consequences derive from this decision? What meaning can be attributed to such reading of events? Again, these interrogations must be answered. In sum, we have to navigate between the two classic philosophical pitfalls of nominalism and realism.

To escape this predicament, we have, in this collective volume, reoriented the habitual approaches to crises. We do not ask what they are and what they denote from an outsider's perspective, but instead what insiders see in situations designated as crises, how they apprehend them, how they participate in them, and how they respond to them. We ask what sort of critique people produce in critical situations—and these people can be workers, peasants, students, refugees, technocrats, intellectuals, scientists, or the general public. This epistemological shift displaces the analysis from the diagnosis of crises, on which most studies focus, either to validate or to refute their existence, to what we can call a heuristic of crises. We try to understand what sort of knowledge is generated through the assessment of, and reaction to, specific critical situations by those involved. Indeed, a crisis has often two complementary effects. First, it can reveal to the people concerned some structures and conditions of society that until then were not perceived or not articulated, although it should be emphasized that, in the contexts of domination, often this revelation is not one for those affected, but instead for the rest of society, which had hitherto been blind to these circumstances. Second, it allows these people to resignify and reevaluate those now accessible structures and conditions, and their relations to them, as the appropriation of these new social terms then serves to initiate political change. The world in the aftermath of the crisis, and frequently even in the course of it, is therefore different not only because of the objective transformations that it brings about, but also—and this is what interests us the most—because of the subjective modifications emanating from the critical examination of the critical situation. In this sense, we can say that a crisis is a

coproduction involving multiple social agencies. It is not the case that crises merely happen and that people subsequently act in response. The way people interpret crises—exaggerate, minimize, or deny them and cope with, protest against, or resolve them—gives shape to what these crises come to be, and in return, dialectically, these crises affect the fate of those involved. The contributions to the present volume thus concur in the intent to study how situations lived as critical are simultaneously socially produced and socially productive.

To be sure, none of us presupposes that a crisis is simply a given, even if it almost always has some actual grounds. Whether a certain irregularity or disturbance within social life is perceived as a crisis depends on how the various concerned groups analyze the situation and judge its consequences for the entire society, which can be local, national, or global, often with discordant or even conflicting views. Therefore, it is one effect of the interpretative efforts made either within social movements, by affected individuals, or through intellectual interventions—to mention the agencies involved in our volume—to contest the signification of a historical moment as a crisis, or on the contrary, to successfully impose its representation as such. Both possibilities open up various options for uncovering veiled conditions, although crises can also conceal problems and divert public attention from significant issues. Crises can indeed be interpreted in opposite ways, since what some regard as a crisis can correspond to normal life for others, while what is perceived as normal by some may appear to be a devastating experience for others.

Such a critique thus fosters new forms of narratives, theories, and worldviews. But it also creates new emotional, sensorial, and physical experiences. Remarkably, it is inscribed in multiple temporalities, or better said, it plays with the various dimensions of time. A crisis is unquestionably anchored in the present, with the evident risk of presentism, and even in the most immediate present it creates a sense of urgency, with the reduction of complex configurations necessitating structural responses to simple situations calling for emergency reactions. But the past is also mobilized, as the critical situation awakens buried memories, reveals obscured continuities, or reminds people that things could have been different from what they actually are. And the future is always at stake, whether it is darkened by dystopic imaginaries or enlightened by bright horizons of expectation.

Although the present is overwhelming in such situations, both past and future carry the potentiality of revolutionary alternatives, or at least an awareness of other possible courses of action. Crises thus have various semantic, cognitive, affective, physical, and temporal layers, which renders their reading complex and yet never complete.

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Each chapter of the book attempts to account for this complexity and incompleteness in a specific context, with case studies covering crises in Africa, Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, North and Latin America, and Europe, and bringing together anthropologists, sociologists, historians, economists, philosophers, and political scientists. These case studies endeavor to reclaim the voices of those who, collectively or individually, whether directly or indirectly involved, as intellectual figures or ordinary citizens, respond to situations regarded as crises.

The first part focuses on the role of social movements in critical situations. In her study of shop stewards', miners', and builders' protests in Britain from 1918 to 1921, Clara Mattei explores an almost forgotten and today hardly imaginable episode when workers challenged capitalism, as the First World War had revealed the weaknesses of laissez faire and the need for state intervention, and requested a complete reform of the system of production and remuneration through the creation of workshop committees, the tentative nationalization of mines, and the development of building guilds, in each case with mixed final outcomes. In a more dramatic context, after the

massacre at the peaceful sit-in on Tiananmen Square by the Chinese military in 1989, several groups were formed to preserve the memory of these events, endorse their political legacy, and claim justice for their victims, four of them being the object of the research carried out by Rowena Xiaoqing He, who explains through the concept of Confucian dissent that both the initial mobilization and the groups subsequently constituted were loyal to the regime, which they attempted to change from within, at the cost of harsh punishment and sometimes of the loss of their life, as in the case of the Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo. In his inquiry into the 2011 uprising of Chilean students for free public education, Rodrigo Cordero shows that this movement, which started in response to the belated payment of the meager monthly stipend and the selling of a small university to an investment fund, progressively discovered that the default on the students' debts and the marketization of their education were inherited from a constitution voted under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and still not replaced more than a decade after its fall, which led the protesters to question the very existence of democracy. Following the eleven-year struggle of laid-off workers of Ssangyong Motors from 2009 on, as the company changes hands from a South Korean corporation to a Chinese venture capital and later to an Indian conglomerate, Hae Yeon Choo delves into the cynical logics of companies that deal with their workers as disposable, not expressing compassion about the thirty suicides related to the dismissals and even relying on the state's repressive apparatus to subdue those on strike, but she also describes the clearheaded and creative responses of workers and unions to their ordeal. It is the activism of migrants and refugees in Europe during the summer of 2015, when many of them fleeing war, persecution, and poverty were blocked in Hungary before they could continue their journey to Germany, that Robin Celikates addresses, discussing the way in which they were not only the victims of the closure of borders by governments but also the producers of a critical situation that called for a solution. Crisis of capitalism in Britain, of democracy in the United States, of the regime in China, of education in Chile, of labor in South Korea, of hospitality in Europe: all these crises are unveiled and even precipitated by social movements, which, through their critique in acts, propose, more or less explicitly, with more or less success, alternatives to failed and flawed systems that are not living up to their supposed norms and values.

The second part turns to intellectual engagements, moving from collectives to individuals, including famous authors and hardly known characters, suggesting unexpected parallels between figures distant in time or space and discussing not only progressive voices but also reactionary ones. Boldly bringing together W. E. B. Du Bois and Sayyid Qutb, two contemporaneous thinkers never made to converse, Murad Idris analyzes how, from their distinct perspectives, the African American sociologist of race and the Egyptian Islamist theorist of jihad converge in their view that peace is conceived of in such a way that its racialized and colonial structure is paradoxically facilitating the potentiality of war, whether this war is one of oppression and conquest or of revolt and emancipation, whether it is within national boundaries or exported remotely in Africa or Korea. No less original is the parallel imagined between two authors who inhabit the same country but in different periods, Henry David Thoreau and Ta-Nehisi Coates, to whom Dieter Thoma dedicates his reflection, arguing that despite their many dissimilarities, they share a common use of the first person to express their critique of society and speak to their readers, which situates them neither as detached nor as concerned critics, in other words, neither as they nor as we, but as interfering ones, in other words I, being simultaneously observers of and participants in the world. Another unusual combination is proposed by Gregor Dobler, in this case with a unity of time and space, between an evangelist preacher, Cleophas Johannes, and an Anglican priest, Theophilus Hamutumbangela, both living in the 1950s in what is today Namibia, the former having written a letter to the South African administrator to call for justice after the murder of his brother by two white farmers, the latter being the author of a petition to the United Nations for the latter protesting against rampant apartheid under the increasing influence of South Africa, both initiatives representing the

simultaneous emergence of the recognition of a crisis and the possibility of a critique. Although atypical figures of intellectuals, technocrats can also play a role in the uncovering and interpretations of critical situations, as Aldo Marchesi demonstrates through the example of Juan Pablo Terra, an Uruguayan expert in developmentalism who, as his country faced more or less similar economic difficulties, growing inequalities, and housing problems, analyzed the crisis in structural terms calling for long-term transformations in 1955 and with a pragmatic approach implying contingent solutions in 1982, thus showing the work of the ideological context in distinct historical moments. In Anne McNevin's contribution, an improbable intellectual engagement is the case of Behrouz Boochani, a Kurdish-Iranian journalist who had sought refuge in Australia in 2013 but ended up being detained for six years in the infamous Manus Island Prison, his engagement being improbable because he was only able to recount and denounce his experience via fragments composed on a mobile phone and clandestinely sent abroad to a friend, but was eager to avoid an essentialization of the violence endured and, instead, to connect this experience with the colonial past and xenophobic present of the country, therefore politicizing the asylum crisis. However different they are, these intellectual figures do not simply use critique to expose a crisis that is already there; they contribute to their production, their depiction, and their interpretation.

The third part deals with the responses given to crises by affected communities, at a collective or an individual level, but neither formally organized nor intellectually defined. The fate of migrants and refugees across the world, deemed undocumented aliens, epitomizes the situation of those concerned by crises, but, on the basis of her research at the southern border of the United States since the election of Donald Trump in 2016, Denise Brennan focuses rather on those who exercise their discretionary power over these populations to control them via policing and punishing, which she contrasts with those in the local communities who try to protect and assist these illegal foreigners. Such care is not without ambiguity, however, as Greta Wagner shows in her study of the reception of migrants and refugees after 2015 in Germany, which has been by far the most hospitable country of the Western world in recent years: while compassion tends to get citizens closer to the exiles in their neighborhood, it is often mixed with representations of them as pure victims, with prejudices about their way of living, and even with resentment regarding the insufficient expression of their gratitude, which jointly constitute obstacles to the building of an equal relationship. It is a very different scenario that Daniel Aldana Cohen and David Bond offer in their study of the reaction to hurricanes in the state of New York and the island of St. Croix by experts, volunteers, and ordinary citizens who share their views about the catastrophes foretold, yet which were ignored by the authorities and iteratively caused severe damage to the population. Another environmental issue, chemical contamination, is at stake in David Bond's research in Vermont, and he gives an account of the difficult struggle of the people exposed in their immediate environment to fluorosurfactants known for their cancerogenic effects and confronted by the resistance of industry companies as well as state officials who, after having negated the pathologic effects of their products, try to elude the fact that toxicity is becoming not only increasingly ubiquitous but also unequally distributed. However, affected people can be neither reactive nor proactive but retreat as a silent mode of protest, as Anne-Claire Defossez analyzes in the French case, with an increasing number of individuals, culminating at the 2017 presidential and legislative elections, who do not seem concerned by the political processes because they do not register on the electoral rolls or they abstain from voting, especially among the working class, which also disappears from almost all political bodies, either local or national, as if their disinvestment from the supposed democratic life signifies their refusal of a system that does not represent them anymore. Migrant and refugee crisis, environmental crisis, and representational crisis show in various ways the involvement of critique beyond the usual framework of social movements and engaged intellectuals—among common people.

The fourth and last part explores the reflexive perspectives from which human and social scientists delve into the comprehension of critical responses to crises. For Hector Amaya, the challenge is to try to apprehend the rationalities underlying violent and racist acts of white supremacists and alt-right nationalists, which he studies through the 2017 far-right rally in Charlottesville during which a young woman was killed and the 2019 mosque shooting in Christchurch that resulted in the deaths of fifty-one people. As regards Munira Khayyat, the question is that of the involvement of the professor with her students in the dual context of the aborted Egyptian January Revolution from 2011 on and of the Lebanese so-called October Revolution in 2019, as the classroom becomes a refuge from repression in the first case and as the street becomes an avatar of the classroom in the second one. Also based on his own experience in the 1960S and 1970S in the United States as supporter of and activist in social movements for civil rights and against the Vietnam War, but expanding his analysis to include earlier workers' protests, Michael Walzer draws a comparison of the dynamics within political mobilizations depending on whether people are directly affected or remotely engaged, and reflects on the differences in political commitments between the oppressed and their sympathizers as well as between the activists and the militants. Reflecting on other collective struggles, those for better labor conditions, Axel Honneth examines the withdrawal of workers at the very moment when these conditions have worsened, which could suggest that either they have become more passive or that their defiance has become less visible, an alternative that leads to a reconsideration of what can be interpreted as resistance and to a search for alternative modes of opposing the system, positively by promoting local cultures of respect or negatively by developing cultures of misbehavior, in both cases critiquing contemporary capitalism. In a final essay, Didier Fassin proposes to deem conspiracy theories deviant forms of critique of official knowledge and legitimate authority that generate a dual crisis of veridiction and authority, and he insists that they therefore deserve particular attention rather than mockery or denunciation, in order to apprehend their complex meanings and ambiguous signals.

Taken together, the twenty contributions of this volume thus offer a geography of the social production of crises on a global scale. Although the historical and national contexts are extremely different and the issues are in each case specific, all converge to demonstrate the intricacy between crisis and critique. Crises frequently stem from critique, and critique generally emerges from crises. Whether they are organized in groups or unions, are defined as intellectuals or activists, or are simply individuals unsatisfied with a certain state of the world, people both produce and respond to critical situations with the critical instruments they have at hand. In a time when crises are so often naturalized and critique is so often contested, it might make sense to remember how much they are intimately connected. <>

Negative Dialectics and Event: Nonidentity, Culture, and the Historical Adequacy of Consciousness by Vangelis Giannakakis [Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought, Lexington Books, 9781793638861]

History is replete with false and unfulfilled promises, as well as singular acts of courage, resilience, and ingenuity. These episodes have led to significant changes in the way people think and act in the world or have set the stage for such transformations in the form of rational expectations in theory and the hopeful anticipations of dialectical imagination.

Negative Dialectics and Event: Nonidentity, Culture, and the Historical Adequacy of Consciousness revisits some of Theodor W. Adorno's most influential writings and theoretical interventions to argue not only that his philosophy is uniquely suited to bring such events into sharp relief and reflect on their entailments but also that an effective historical consciousness today would be a consciousness awake to the events that interpellate and shape it into existence.

More broadly, Vangelis Giannakakis presents a compelling argument in support of the view that the critical theory developed by the first generation of the Frankfurt School still has much to offer in terms of both cultivating insights into contemporary human experience and building resistance against states of affairs that impede human flourishing and happiness.

Review

"Can dialectical thought still carve our late capitalist reality at its joints? In this bold, lucid, and searching book, Vangelis Giannakakis revisits the writings of Theodor W. Adorno to make a compelling case for negative dialectics as a vital intellectual resource in the face of our 'new old barbarism.' He does so by recalling, from different angles, the imperative to think together negation and novelty—and by bringing Adorno into an unexpected if fruitful dialogue with the philosophy of Alain Badiou. An important intervention for all those persuaded that the first axiom of a critical, emancipatory philosophy is: society must not be defended." -- Alberto Toscano, Simon Fraser University and Goldsmiths, University of London

"What is the connection between a critical, historical experience and the concept of the event? In his superb and penetrating study of Adorno and Badiou, Vangelis Giannakakis articulates a compelling and novel response to this question. Through illuminating explorations of the concepts of experience, the nonidentical, the shudder and the event, Giannakakis outlines a new path for Critical Theory in the 21st Century. This fine book is itself an event, a breakout from totality into undiminished experience." -- Alastair Morgan, University of Manchester

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Prologue

"The bad is not the worst, for seldom can it deceive: the middling is far worse, so many it good believe," sings the proverb quoted by Richard Wagner. The better state, apparently, is one in which false hope is utterly absent. We overcome baseless optimism by recognizing the complete horror of whatever state of affairs we are trying to manage. Recognition of the "bad" will bring an end to

consolatory deceptions. Theodor W. Adorno picks up this thought through a line he takes from F. H. Bradley: "Where everything is bad, it must be good to know the worst." It is not always certain whether Adorno's primary worry is the bad or the fear of being deceived, a state of mind that gives distinctive form to social interpretation. A strategy of hyper-suspicion is justifiable, though, if the world is fully suspect.

The distinction between appearance and reality structures the critical imaginary. In its ancient form, the idea behind this division is that the true arrangement of the world is not easily visible from various standpoints, ranging from the everyday to the scientific. The reality witnessed and portrayed by the philosopher is the true one, while its opposite, appearance, is either "mere" appearance or, worse, false. Following from that idea is the claim that the "mere" is of no great significance. It is taken as obvious that "truth," as represented by reality, commands human loyalty, even if it is not always especially welcome or easy to gain.

The notion that appearance might also be false, as opposed to inferior, is quite another step. Here we are required to believe that appearance has set out to mislead us. In the old metaphysics, truth and reality implied some superior and notionally existing space. The philosophical mind could contemplatively flip itself into that space. As it stands, this classical framework does not translate into the needs of critical theory, the concern of which is social appearance. There, truth is found in the knowledge of what is bad about appearance rather than in some space beyond experience. The goodness that is claimed by deceiving appearance--for example, that it can guarantee the best forms of freedom or the fulfillment of any given life—is false. That much is certain. Possession of this truth means standing on the side of reality. Appearance is false, then, not simply in wrongly making claims on our lives as though it were "true." It is bad: it wants us to deny whatever could be genuinely and not just apparently good. Philosophical methodologies that prevent us from accessing reality are therefore false as well, even if perfectly accurate within their own terms of reference. They set out criteria of true knowledge only to leave us within the space of appearance. What cannot be made visible through those methodologies they dismiss as fancy. That is precisely where their badness lies: they deceive. We might say in response to the austere critical perspective that it is possible to be deceived and yet to live happily and well. A major strand of critical theory, of course, denies this view. "Wrong life cannot be lived rightly," Adorno declares.

At the same time, what ought to replace the wrong life of appearance, Adorn and others maintain, need not be overprescribed. That is because, for critical theory, one of the evils of deceiving appearance is that it narrows what we take to be possible. It satisfies itself that no alternative is worthwhile. To avoid that constriction, we must sketch out pictures of a brighter world drawn from what we can only currently imagine. The possibility of as yet unanticipated possibilities is the reward of overcoming appearance.

Rather famously, this way of situating social criticism has led to the question of whether the very idea of critical theory is a performative self-contradiction. If the world is utterly bad, meaning that all within it is contaminated by the needs of that self-perpetuating world, then perceptions of its badness should not actually be possible. Those perceptions, it is argued, would if true be free of the supposedly totalitarian world. This charge, however, does not stick. A perfectly reasonable case for the defense is that the badness of the world does not preclude knowledge of its badness because it is not actually threatened by that knowledge. Those moments of truth, those ambiguities, which the world of regulated appearances fails to encompass, are little more than evanescent glimpses beyond the social totality.

Social criticism, then, has little efficacy: the power to point the finger is not the same as persuasion and certainly not a likely vehicle of social change. This idea has led some to the recommendation

that radical criticism should moderate its ambitions. It ought to index criticism to the likelihood of success, to become realistic according to currently imaginable modalities of social transformation. Is that a fair demand? Vangelis Giannakakis's Negative Dialectics and Event: Nonidentity, Culture, and the Historical Adequacy of Consciousness provides a challenging new set of ideas for how that demand might be met and rejected. It unflinchingly acknowledges the hold of the system over possibility, reflecting ruefully and frankly on those apparently momentous opportunities for social transformation that simply faded away. What at various points in recent history looked like a pivotal event, giving rise to emancipating new norms, was absorbed into the already-existing state of affairs or was safely ignored. Giannakakis's study explores that process in order to find some avenues past it. It marshals many overlooked parts of the critical tradition to develop some ideas of how effective revolutionary action might be developed. Although Adorno is the primary site, Alain Badiou's notion of event firmly asserts itself in the book's effort to discover possibility in the midst of the apparent inevitabilities of the historical process.

Negative Dialectics and Event leaves us with a huge number of fascinating new issues. Among the most intriguing is the question of whether social change might be, in a particular sense, a matter of chance. What else, really, is left when all there is is the bad, a social totality that has secured itself against critical and potentially transformative knowledge? Adorno's critical subject is an accidental survivor. Badiou's events cannot be deduced from any ongoing historical process: they are richly singular. They may endeavor to make themselves necessary once initiated, creating the retroactive foundations for what they sought to become. History in the philosophical that is, idealist and Marxist—sense is attenuated. It gives us no reliable clue to what happens next. This situation underlines the difficulty of radical social change: it sits on norms that have, in a sense, yet to arrive. In this regard, it faces the charge of irrationalism: the revolutionary actor must be willing to take up processes for which their social formation has barely prepared them. They must literally take a chance. However, as Giannakakis's book demonstrates through its exemplary study of the critical landscape, this is not blind chance. It is an historically sensitive response, one requiring a capacity—by no means guaranteed to see those thinly visible possibilities for justice. Each actor must interpret what they are, finding grounds that will allow others to glimpse beyond the present, beyond appearance. What is absent from the process is the belief that there is some pre-delineated path of process inscribed in history. Not only is that a philosophical obsolescence, but it also leaves subjects with too little.

Giannakakis has provided critical theory with a kind of rethinking that does justice to its insights, acknowledges its numerous advances, but is not beholden to it. The renewal of critical theory has been delayed for too long by the tendency of some to insist that the original models are perfectly adequate to changing times, as though those models are not historically informed. A failure of imagination has led others to claim that critical theory in the sense of interest to this book is inherently unworkable. In designing new, safer—success indexed, indeed—forms of criticism, they have also opted for something more than the middling: the efficacy of what is already available to us (communicative reason) and the ideology that the addition of a little more humanity to already-existing social institutions can bring about the only form of freedom worth having. Negative Dialectics and Event shows us why neither anachronism nor renunciation is necessary.

Brian O'Connor

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With Adorno's passing on August 6, 1969, it was not just a brilliant thinker who disappeared but also his perceptive, trenchant insights into late capitalist reality. One can only speculate about how Adorno would have responded to the neoliberal realignment of society introduced with jarring

vehemence in the 1970s and 1980s, to the paradigm shift from the Fordist model founded on capital accumulation and labor intensification to one predicated on financial speculation and risk, or to the prepotency of the culture industry acquired through the institutionalization of art markets and the hyper-massification of art via new technologies and media, and so in. In truth, Adorno anticipated and emphatically warned of the perils inherent in these tendencies and latter developments, and one can well imagine that he would have been quite wary of many of them that he could not have foreseen. The development of late capitalist reality, as outlined here, is characterized by a hardening of old capitalist contradictions alongside the rapid development of new ones, like intellectual property rights in the time of mass media, biotechnologies and the privatization of health, climate change, neoimperialist belligerence, mass migration, the return of antisemitism, Islamophobia, and the rise of authoritarianism, all of which render the present reality remarkably potent in terms of benefits but above all in terms of harms.

As with Walter Benjamin, Adorno interprets unreconciled historical becoming as the continuum of experience in a state of disintegration. It suffices to read his and Horkheimer's dialectical-critical reappraisal of the Enlightenment, or the considerably more poignant Minima Moralia—Negative Dialectics displaying, for its part, a similar state of mind though, as a whole, a rather more sober work to become aware of this. The general premise of the Adornian idea of experiential disintegration is that the historical process, as it has unfolded so far, produces a remainder, a residue consisting of human beings, ideas, and objects that have, so to say, been cast aside. It is this residue, this remainder that the Adornian concept of nonidentity seeks to illuminate, without, however, subjecting it to the rationality that assigned it this place. The nonidentical is, thus, that which the process of historical progression, a process carried out by the subject by way of the conceptual and techno-scientific apparatus that allows it to manipulate and control nature (both nonhuman and human nature), has not been able to fully appropriate—namely, mark it with the seal of its identity. Hence, the theory of negative dialectics is the name Adorno gives to that kind of intellectual experience that lends a voice to this nonidentical, in the hope that, perhaps, the injustices that the nonidentical incurred in the name of historical progress may be atoned for. To be sure, for Adorno, the historical disintegration of experience reached its most tragic point at the zenith of its perversity: the catastrophic events of the short twentieth century. Yet the echoes of this tragedy, he affirms, are still being heard, and its effects still being felt, in the antinomical development of the so-called "post-modern" late capitalist reality ever since. Adorno argues accordingly that philosophy, battered by the experiences of the pasta past that is, no doubt, also its own, to the degree that it participated in its realization—has an obligation, out of solidarity with damaged life, to take a stand against savagery.

Having heard Adorno's message while witnessing a peculiar and at times even suspect return to normality, the students, young academics, and workers of the 1960s, started to feel that the reconstruction of reality after the disaster of the Second World War had gone astray. Imperialist wars were still being fought, labor rights were still under attack, racism and other forms of discrimination were still in place, dictatorships were imposing themselves all over the world with the tacit or explicit support of the powers that be, and so forth. Against this historical background, different groups of people organized themselves, based on the peculiarities of their social, political, and economic situation, in order to mount resistance against and transform the constraining elements of a postmodern capitalist reality in the making; among them, a young academic and militant, Alain Badiou, underwent experiences that brought him somewhat closer to Adorno. The enthusiasm of the events of the "Long May" of 1968 in France quickly gave way to a harsh return to reality in June—July (a similar pattern can be observed with events in the United States, Mexico, Japan, Czechoslovakia, etc., around the same time). The call for immediate action and revolt that grew ever more pressing among the militants of May 1968—and which Adorno denounced as

nothing more than a form of "pseudo-praxis" turned into a call to an untimely appeasement, a peculiar entente with established reality that verged on compliance with it, supplemented by a stern "criticism" of the ideas that once formed the theoretical core of the 1968 movement and which contested the very same reality with which one was now supposed to agree. It appears that in that moment Badiou experienced—and it is worth mentioning here that when he evokes May 1968 and its repercussions, he usually does so in a quasi-autobiographical tone—the kind of disintegration and corruption of idea(l)s that Adorno was talking about: the objectification, or conversely the renunciation, of new ideas as the result of a loss of commitment and critical (self-)reflection with respect to a still ongoing social-political process." It is not surprising, accordingly, to find in Badiou's thought a strong accent on the idea of fidelity, of a certain faithfulness to (the truth of) an event—be it in the domain of love, politics, science, or art—or an emphasis on the subjective responses to a particular event, and the concomitant distinction between faithful, reactionary, or obscurantist (i.e., hostile) subjects vis-a-vis events. Perhaps, though, the most notable aspect of Badiou's philosophy is that it expresses a desire to spare and rescue, at the moment of the "normalization" of an event, the fragment of truth that it eventually brought into the light. This fragment of truth is what exposes and investigates the void of a particular social-historical situation—that is, the residue, the remainder of the inharmonious relation between the inconsistent plasticity of the real and the fixity of its representations, or, as it were, the non-lieu in which lack (i.e., the content without concept) is separated from excess (i.e., the concept without material). It is from within this nonplace that the constellation event-subject initiates a process of thought that aspires, in full consciousness of the material, playful and inconclusive nature of its results to think the "one" as two.

What transpires from this is a sense that, perhaps, the Adornian "negative" and Badiou's affirmation might after all not be so far removed from one another. Whereas Adorno firmly insists on the need for critical self-reflection, and the significance of a cultivated aesthetic sensibility, as vital elements of resistance against the burgerliche Kalte, the loss of experience that results from the erratic, antithetical development of postmodern capitalist reality; for his part, Badiou talks of the importance of remaining faithful to events that break with the established modes of being in and thinking about reality, of paying heed to and exploring the possibilities that inhere in them. The negative in resonance with the affirmative? Mayhap. After all, with Adorno—and arguably with Badiou as well— the "positive motive force of thought" does not culminate in the sublation of negation (in the affirmative), but acts rather "as a corollary to negativity"; it signals, not the blase positivity of the absence of negation, but a vibrant, fluid positivity within the latter, a positivity that is a resulting moment and not a 'preestablished absolute beginning. Here, Adomo's thought also reveals once again its indebtedness to Hegel, and more precisely his idea of determinate negation (bestimmte Negation). Determinate negation points toward a type of philosophy that is affirmative by virtue of the conscious giving-up of its own fixities, a philosophy that is positive not beyond or despite negation, but in and through it. In this respect, the characteristic feature of a dynamic, dialectical philosophy—which, for Adorno, found its most compelling expression in Hegel, even if he also faults him for neglecting the work that dialectics must carry out—is that it is not always a blind movement forward, but "always also a backward movement that always incorporates within itself, at any rate in its intention, the very things from which it distances itself.""

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This book addresses the themes considered here, notably, albeit not necessarily in that specific order nor under these exact headings, the meaning of historical consciousness for critical theory (and especially Adorno), the problem of cultural reification in relation to the disintegration of historical experience, the effects of May 1968 on Adorno, in particular his understanding of social transformative praxis, and, finally, the overarching thematic of the presence and role of the concept of event in the theory of negative dialectics. Moreover, the book is designed as a constellation of

three distinct, yet interrelated, sections, each of which addresses a particular facet of the relationship between Adorno's critical social theory and theory of negative dialectics and the event—namely, intellectual experience, nonidentity, and the shudder; social-political experience, praxis, and the event; and, finally, society, cultural criticism and alternative experience. One final caveat regarding the mood of this book. The reader might feel at times, especially toward the end of this book, that the style and tone get too informal, personal, or even polemical for an academic work. The reader would be quite right to think that. These moments of "subjective" encroachment on what is otherwise an "objective" consideration of theoretical ideas and arguments are intentional, and derive from a wish to stay true to Adorno's intuition that, in late modernity, the distinction between the two is not as evident as all that, in that "objective" often means nowadays

> the non-controversial aspect of things, their unquestioned impression, the facade made up of classified data, that is, the subjective; and ... subjective anything which breaches that façade, engages the specific experience of a matter, casts off all readymade judgements and substitutes relatedness to the object for the majority consensus of those who do not even look at it, let alone think about it—that is, the objective. <>

SENSORIA: THINKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY by McKenzie Wark [Verso, 9781788735063]

Design, Politics, the Environment: a survey of the key thinkers and ideas that are rebuilding the world in the shadow of the Anthropocene

As we face the compounded crises of late capitalism, environmental catastrophe and technological transformation, who are the thinkers and the ideas who will allow us to understand the world we live in? McKenzie Wark surveys three areas at the cutting edge of current critical thinking: design, environment, technology and introduces us to the thinking of nineteen major writers. Each chapter is a concise account of an individual thinker, providing useful context and connections to the work of the others.

The authors include: Sianne Ngai, Kodwo Eshun, Lisa Nakamura, Hito Steyerl, Yves Citton, Randy Martin, Jackie Wang, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Achille Mbembe, Deborah Danowich and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Eyal Weizman, Cory Doctorow, Benjamin Bratton, Tiziana Terranova, Keller Easterling, Jussi Parikka.

Wark argues that we are too often told that expertise is obtained by specialisation. Sensoria connects the themes and arguments across intellectual silos. They explore the edges of disciplines to show how we might know the world: through the study of culture, the different notions of how we create such things, and the impact that the machines that we devise have had upon us. The book is a vital and timely introduction to the future both as a warning but also as a road map on how we might find our way out of the current crisis.

Review

"McKenzie Wark opens her introduction to *Sensoria* by asking, 'What is the point of scholarship?' Wark's answer is that scholarship 'is about the common task of knowing the world'. This seems a sound definition as well as a worthwhile project for humanity in the twenty-first century." **—J.J. Charlesworth ,** *ArtReview*

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Toward the Common Task

What is the point of scholarship? In any other time, this might have seemed a churlish question to ask. But in the United States and increasingly elsewhere too, the question now calls up three equally prompt and self-evident kinds of answers.

One response is that it has no point at all. This is now an opinion with a lot of powerful backing. Another is that it has no point other than to socialize the high-risk work of invention, so that private interests can do the lower risk work of "innovation" and profit from it. The third answer protests these other two but not in particularly satisfying terms. Scholarship is hard to defend as a means to enlightenment or liberation; these seem rather abstract and now self-undermining goals. Ironically, scholarship about the limits to enlightenment and liberation casts doubt on the scholarship as much as the other two lines of questioning.

There is a fourth answer, but it does not get much traction any more: scholarship is an end in itself, a free and self-directed inquiry that takes its own time. It describes, at best, what might happen in elite institutions propped up by the venerable seed money of slave owners, robber barons, or an imperial state, but not what the rest of us get to do. It is too remote a utopia from the actually existing university that runs on debt and precarious labor.

The mission of scholarship appears so hollowed out today that some advocate a more fugitive means of study, one that treats the university as a resource (and not much more) in which to create the under commons, with its own pedagogy and forms of collaboration. That has a lot to recommend it,

This state of things is particularly troubling, given that there's a widespread sense that the world, whatever it is, and whatever it may be, is in a lot of trouble. That is the elephant in the room. The most common name for this at the moment is the Anthropocene. In an earlier book, Molecular Red,

I started to ask about what might constitute theory for the Anthropocene. I now add that I think it is timely to ask what a practice of knowledge for the Anthropocene could be, particularly if we take the COVID-19 pandemic to be not just a global crisis of applied knowledge in its own right, but a preview of what demands the Anthropocene will continue to place on knowledge production.

Each way of knowing the world touches a part of the elephant. Rather than give in to claims to know the whole elephant in advance, let's work out collaboratively, as a common task, some practices of putting parts of the elephant as we sense and know them next to one another. Not so much to produce a seamless picture of the whole, but to understand the differences between all of the partial sensings. The common task is to produce a knowledge of the world made up of the differences between ways of knowing it.

In this book, I want to look at three different ways of knowing the world, to find points of contact between them and also points of difference. Those three ways of knowing are centered respectively on aesthetics, ethnography, and design. One way to think about this might be that it starts with surfaces, with the aesthetic form of cultural and media artifacts through which the world appears. Then it moves on to ways of knowing how different kinds of humans connect to those surfaces, broadly conceived as enthnographic. And finally we turn to the technical, to the design of informatics machines that humans will interact with and within.

I chose to start with aesthetics because, being from media studies, I think our access to the world is always mediated. It helps to pay attention to the forms in which the world is

sensed, to how your awareness of your part of the elephant is mediated. If the sensory apparatus taken as a whole is the sensorium, then perhaps we could think in a more plural way about different sensoria, here conceived as a plurality of cultural, technical, and social forms of apparatus through which the world is known. The common task might then be (in part at least) the work of putting sensoria in play, with and against one another, while limiting the claim of each to be sovereign over the others.

The various sensoria might thus be the different worlds we think we know, but where the appearance of a world is an artifact not only of the design of the way of sensing some part of the world but of habits that have accumulated about the world to which that part might belong. All ways of knowing are mixes of the empirical and the rational, of perceptions and conceptions. Rather than attempt to cure misperception through reason, or unreason through sensation, perhaps it's a matter of mapping the borders of different bundles of reason and perception as they congeal together in particular ways of knowing.

The common task of knowing the world reverses the relation between the disciplinary and the interdisciplinary. To the disciplinarian, the interdisciplinary is always something of an afterthought. It does not challenge but rather reaffirms the sovereignty of the disciplines. It proclaims that because there are disciplines, sovereign over the objects of knowledge at their center, then the interdisciplinary can only exist at the margins to affirm the disciplines as centers. But what if we reverse this procedure? It is only the edges of ways of knowing that are interesting.

That different ways of knowing cannot really be reconciled is not a bug but a feature of the common task. The problematic and unsettled concepts at the margin might be the most interesting and useful things that any way of knowing can offer another. Thus the world might be known provisionally, speculatively, tentatively, without any one way of knowing having to be sovereign over the others.

Another parable might be useful here. What is the surface area of the elephant? According to the internet, it could be up to eighty-eight meters squared. But if we looked more closely, with a finer resolution, it could be even more than eighty-eight meters squared. At the finer resolution, the folds

in its skin reveal yet more folds. What if we increase the resolution still more? There are yet more folds, more surface. On and on we could go.

One could say that each successive view at a higher resolution is more accurate. But is it more true? Is it more useful? Is it more knowledge? In some contexts, surely; but in others, surely not. Where qualitative forms of knowledge are concerned, the whole structure of knowledge production seems to be organized around more detail. The "but it is more complicated than that" position is treated as a winning argument. The less addressed problem in knowledge production is how to pull back from the scale where the details expand to fill one's sensoria to a less detailed but still useful or interesting picture, one in which other things besides our own special interest might come into view.

The common task of knowing the world is not an end in itself. Nor can it come to an end and produce a conclusive knowledge. It is always only temporary and provisional. The common task is a detour on the way to something more important. That something might now be the other common task of enduring in the world provisionally, incompletely, named the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene names a world transformed by collective human labor under the power of the commodity form. That world appears increasingly hostile to the endurance not just of our species-being but of many others as well.

It is tempting to cast this as a crisis. As a narrative device, crisis focuses attention, but it can short-circuit the common

task of producing a knowledge of this world of the Anthropocene. There's a rush to rename it, and in renaming it, call it something that makes it the special property of a particular way of knowing the world, to the exclusion of all others. It becomes an alibi for exacerbating the problem of knowing the world, at a time when not knowing is itself a key part of the problem.

This is when the elephant in the room called the Anthropocene is even acknowledged. A lot of knowledge production still gaily jets around as if this was somebody else's department. But as my friend and New School colleague Dominic Pettman says: "Elephants are too polite to mention the human in the room." Or rather, the world's indifference to us, its negative presence as that which, in its generality, does not really appear in any particular technical and cultural sensorium, becomes the thing that can only appear, if at all, out of a common task. This is a common task that I think is best conducted on the basis of a rough equality of all ways of knowing. Not everything is knowledge, but there might not be any universal way of knowing what is knowledge and what isn't.

Sensoria contains brief assessments, focusing on key concepts, of twenty-odd general intellects, some of whom are well-known. I have tried to look beyond my New York—centric view of the world and beyond the confines of the academy. Not surprisingly, I have failed in the task of producing a completely diversified overview; I have just the parts of the elephant I can touch from where I stand.

In my reading, all of these general intellects manage to generate out of their particular ways of working some concepts that can be connected or contrasted with others derived from other kinds of knowledge work. That to me is what a general intellect is: someone who generates concepts out of particular knowledge work in particular departments of the intellectual division of labor. Not all are academics; some are artists or writers. Art and literature seem to me to have analogous problems to scholarship in the common task of knowing the world.

This book is meant to be useful. At the low resolution view, where you take in a fair swath of elephant but with not much detail, what I think is most useful are concepts. I'm looking for ways to compress and condense by focusing on concepts. If a good fact is mostly true about something in particular, a good concept is slightly true about a lot of things. Both fall short of the common task of

knowing the world. That can only be begun by lacing concepts together from different labors. It is toward that objective that this book is aimed. <>

THE SUBVERSIVE SIMONE WEIL: A LIFE IN FIVE IDEAS
by Robert Zaretsky [University of Chicago Press, 9780226549330]

Known as the "patron saint of all outsiders," Simone Weil (1909–43) was one of the twentieth century's most remarkable thinkers, a philosopher who truly lived by her political and ethical ideals. In a short life framed by the two world wars, Weil taught philosophy to lycée students and organized union workers, fought alongside anarchists during the Spanish Civil War and labored alongside workers on assembly lines, joined the Free French movement in London and died in despair because she was not sent to France to help the Resistance.

Though Weil published little during her life, after her death, thanks largely to the efforts of Albert Camus, hundreds of pages of her manuscripts were published to critical and popular acclaim. While many seekers have been attracted to Weil's religious thought, Robert Zaretsky gives us a different Weil, exploring her insights into politics and ethics, and showing us a new side of Weil that balances her contradictions—the rigorous rationalist who also had her own brand of Catholic mysticism; the revolutionary with a soft spot for anarchism yet who believed in the hierarchy of labor; and the humanitarian who emphasized human needs and obligations over human rights. Reflecting on the relationship between thought and action in Weil's life, *The Subversive Simone Weil* honors the complexity of Weil's thought and speaks to why it matters and continues to fascinate readers today.

Review
"Robert Zaretsky's *The Subversive Simone Weil: A Life in Five Ideas* elegantly captures its subject's brief life and expansive thought in a schema that pays eloquent tribute to the continuing relevance of both." -- Rachel Hadas — *Times Literary Supplement, Books of the Year 2021*

"[Zaretsky] is an admirably fluent and humble guide, who elucidates her writings; yet he doesn't shy away from confessing that, at times, he's baffled by her. Often she will make a claim that "compels as powerfully as it repels", he notes. He grapples with Weil as she demands to be grappled with, not as a purely abstract thinker but as a singular voice demanding that we think and act with integrity."
— *Times Literary Supplement*

"After an introduction that contextualizes Weil's short, unusual life, Zaretsky dedicates chapters—each written in an elegant, accessible prose—to five essential columns that brace her philosophy: affliction, attention, resistance, rootedness, and goodness." — *Los Angeles Review of Books*

"This biography of an exceptional 20th-century thinker traces her inspirational experiences and philosophy. Zaretzky unveils Weil's depth and seeming contradictions (rationalism and mysticism, revolution and belief) to explain her lasting appeal to readers." — *The Bookseller*

"Zaretsky guides us through Weil's complexities with impressive lucidity, keeping it lively and accessible, which is no small feat." — *The Baffler*

"In clear, accessible prose, Zaretsky gives some coherence to Weil's largely fragmentary oeuvre. What emerges is a portrait of a politically unclassifiable thinker who in her life and writings

committed herself to be open to the unbearable reality around her." — *Prospect*

"This memorable survey delivers a rich portrait of the intellectual currents that shaped a one-of-a-kind thinker. Those curious about Weil's work will find this to be a welcome place to start."
— *Publishers Weekly*

"It is hard to see how a figure so marvelously intemperate could ever be bridled to the satisfaction of the Anglo-American mainstream. Still, the intellectual historian Robert Zaretsky has made an impressive attempt to win over skeptics in his new book, *The Subversive Simone Weil: A Life in Five Ideas*. Somewhere between biography and philosophical overview, Zaretsky's study sorts Weil's views into five central categories. Each of the corresponding chapters integrates discussion of her personal eccentricities with analyses, rehabilitations, and critiques of her thought. . . . Weil may be subversive, but *The Subversive Simone Weil* is balanced and accessible."   — *Hedgehog Review*

"Simone Weil was merciless (not least on herself), sometimes alarming, always compelling, and unavoidably significant. This is a beautifully sharp and thoughtful account of her life and work—a fascinating read." -- Sarah Bakewell, author of At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails with Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Others

"Zaretsky's work is unfailingly eloquent, fascinating, and relevant. In treating both her life and her writings, *The Subversive Simone Weil* displays a subject who, by going too far toward goodness, reminds so many of us that we have not gone far enough. In Zaretsky's hands, her courage stands as a complicated but necessary lesson for us all."   -- Todd May, author of A Decent Life: Morality for the Rest of Us

"Reading Zaretsky's absorbing and tender intellectual portrait of Simone Weil, I was reminded on every page of her astonishing relevance to our own times. With her demanding vision of the life well lived, in her extreme judgments and through her punishing empathy, Weil emerges here as a figurehead for the intellectual and ethical challenges of the current moment. As he has done so beautifully in his books on Camus, Zaretsky has opened Weil's life and work to our understanding. For readers familiar with Weil's, *The Subversive Simone Weil* is a valuable synthesis; for those coming to her for the first time, an inspiring primer." -- Alice Kaplan, author of Looking for "The Stranger": Albert Camus and the Life of a Literary Classic

"An unconventional introduction to the thought of Simone Weil: it is not a biography nor is it a straightforward exposition of her writings. Zaretsky is clearly enchanted by Weil's philosophy and presents her ideas with clarity. But he also sees her faults, her impracticalities, and her contradictions. . . .Readers will come away with a basic understanding of Weil's world view but not without wrestling with her ideas and their complications. Recommended." — *Choice*

Though this slim volume is commendable, it may not be what readers expect. It is an unconventional introduction to the thought of Simone Weil: it is not a biography nor is it a straightforward exposition of her writings. Zaretsky is clearly enchanted by Weil's philosophy and presents her ideas with clarity. But he also sees her faults, her impracticalities, and her contradictions. Zaretsky focuses on five key elements of Weil's philosophy: affliction, attention, resistance, roots, and God and the good. He explains and elaborates on Weil, but he also challenges her. Weil demanded that one live life by acting according to strict moral principles, principles that even she had difficulty fulfilling, sometimes because of her physical frailty. In the end, one understands why Zaretsky says he finds

himself "in the untenable position of sharing [Weil's] ideas and yet being aware that they [often] cannot be, and perhaps should not be, acted upon" (p. 159). Zaretsky details the influences on her philosophy (particularly Plato and Kant), discusses parallels with other thinkers, and notes her influence on modern writers (notably Camus). Readers will come away with a basic understanding of Weil's world view but not without wrestling with her ideas and their complications. — *Choice*

CONTENTS

Three months ago, I sent the final manuscript for this book to my editors at the University of Chic ago Press. Under the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the world I knew then now seems as ancient as the Greece that Simone Weil so deeply loved. So many of the habits and happenings, occupations and preoccupations I thought were fixed forever have faded or already fled.

By the time this book is in your possibly gloved hands, these very words may seem no less ancient. The world is changing at a pace that would stun even Heraclitus. Insisting that change defined our world, Heraclitus concluded that we cannot step into the same river twice. Yet the novel corona hints has taught us a newer truth: we cannot step into the same river even once.

Like everyone else, I am trying to keep my head, and the heads of those near and dear to me, above the white water of history. Nevertheless, in our breathtakingly changing world, a world we now divide between essential arid nonessential goods. I know the writings of Simone Weil will always fall in the former category. Force and freedom, affliction and attention, community and care are more than ever ideas for our age of microbiological and ideological plagues.

These ideas led to.at least one key ideal for Weil. In one other last works, The Need for Roots, she wrote: 'There exists an obligation towards every human being for the sole reason that. he or she is a human being, without any other condition requiring to be fulfilled, and even without any recognition of such obligation on the part of the individual concerned." Few claims are more crucial for both my time and your time, And time alone will tell Whether we are capable of fulfilling it.

How much time do you devote each day to thinking? Simone Weil
More than three quarters of a century ago, on August 26,1943, the coroner at Grosvenor Sanatorium; a sprawling Victorian pile located in the town of Ashford, about sixty miles southeast of London, ended his examination of a patient who had died two days earlier. The cause of death, he wrote. was "cardiac failure due to myocardial degeneration of heart muscles due to starvation and pulmonary tuberculosis? But the clinical assessment then giveaway to what appears to be an ethical judgment: "The deceased did kill and slay herself by refusing to eat whilst the balance of her mind was disturbed?'

The deceased was buried in a local cemetery; a flat marker laid across her grave was engraved with her name and relevant dates: Simone Weil 9 Fevuir 1909 to avout 1943. Weil's grave, its location highlighted on the cemetery Map. has since become one of Ashford's most visited tourist sites. By way of acknowledging the constant stream of visitors, a second marble slab explains that Weil had

'joined the Provisional French government in London" and that her "writings have established her as one oldie foremost modern philosophers."

One can fit only so much on a grave marker. This is especially the case with Simone Weil. It has become a ritual among Weil biographers to sum up her life with a series of contradictions. An anarchist who espoused conservative ideals, a pacifist who fought in the Spanish Civil War, a saint who refused baptism, a mystic who was a labor militant, a French Jew who was buried in the Catholic section of an English cemetery, a teacher who dismissed the importance of solving a problem. the most willful of individuals who advocated the extinction of the self: here ore but a few of the paradoxes Weil embodied. It helps to see these instances less as inconsistencies in Weil's work and life—though, at times, they are precisely this—than as invitations to reflect on both one and the other. In her notebooks, she-wrote that the "proper method of philosophy consists in clearly conceiving the insoluble problems in all their insolubility and then in simply contemplating them, fixedly and tirelessly, year after year, without any hope, patiently waiting,"

By this measure, 'Weil concluded, "there are few philosophers. And one can hardly even say a few." Not surprisingly, Weil held an exacting view of the philosopher's mandate. It is, she declared, "exclusively an affair of action and practice." This Was the reason, she thought, why it was so difficult to write about. philosophy—it was, she suggested, like writing a "treatise on tennis or running"—but it is also the reason why contradictions score Weil's life. They reveal the inevitable tensions in a life that placed so great a premium on aligning ideals and practice, an effort that had to fall short. sooner or later But Weil's effort to straddle these contradictions, as well as the nature of the ideals that inspiredher action. demand our attention. She was, in fact, no less singular in her insistence on accepting the consequences of a given truth than she was in her insistence on matching her ideals with her acts. As her students often heard her declare, Weil could not stand compromise, whether it was with her OM sell or with others. In turn, we cannot stand for very long in her severe company with out feeling deeply discomforted. This is as it should be. To a degree rare in the modern age—or, indeed. any age—Simone Weil fully inhabited her philosophy.

To echo the fictitious coroner's report on the death of the Jesuit priest in Albert Camus's novel The Plague, Weil's end remains a "questionable case,' For Weil, death was neither the means nor the end to philosophy. Instead, it was a possible con? sequence of doing philosophy—at least if we understand philosophy not as an academic discipline, it as a way of life. As the contemporary philosopher Costica Bradatan has observed. "Philosophizing is not about thinking. speaking or about writing... but about something else: putting your body on the line.

As with Socrates and Seneca, Benedict Spinoza and Jan Patocka, Weil obliges us to recall not just the price of the philosophical life, but its purpose. Few of us, I know, can ask this of ourselves. As Stanley Cavell wrote, Weil was exceptional in her refusal to be "deflected" from. the reality of life. And yet this inability to he deflected is a gift or curse, that most of us would gladly refuse. This is how his—perhaps even as it should be,

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This book explores five core concepts in Weil's thought. While I detail several episodes in Weil's life, I do not treat chronology as consistently as the historian in me would have liked. And so, allow me to trace in the next few pages the arc of her life.

Born in Paris in 1909, five years before the outbreak of World War I, Weil was the child of Bernard and Salornea (Selma) Weil. The well-to-do parents were fiercely nonobservant Jews who prized the city's cultural and literary life. Born in Ruse sis to a prosperous family of merchants, Salomea Reinherz—who shortened her first name to Selma—left for Belgium, then Prance with her parents

following a rash of pogroms in 1882. Her family bristled with poets and musicians, and Selma was herself an accomplished pianist and Singer. Bernard Weil was the child of a successful business family from Strasbourg that chose French citizenship when Germany annexed Alsace at the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. Though his parents were practicing Jews, Bernard gravitated to anarchism and atheism as a young man, Although he never surrendered his atheism_ he did put aside his anarchist sympathies upon becoming a successful doctor. One year after the couple's marriage in 1905, their son Andre was born; three years later, Simone followed. Shortly after his daughter's birth, Bernard moved his family into an imposing apartment on the chic Boulevard Saint Michel, where be arid Selma provided their children with love and attention, es well as the aspirations and advantages expected of the haute bourgeoisie in Belle Epoque France.

As a child, Weil both channeled and challenged her parents' values. She and Andre participated in discussions about music .and literature during family meals, where they would speak in German and English as well as French. Before she had learned to read, she would memorize poems she learned from her mother, then recite them for dinner guests. When she was five, she and her brother were reading and performing passages from Edmond Rostand's play Cyrano de Bergerac. Her melodramatic performance, Madame Weil reported, reduced the family to tears of laughter. The parents found other performances by their children less amusing, however. One day, for example, the siblings went door to door, begging their startled neighbors for food. The reason, they explained, was that their parents had left them to starve?

Well's rebellious streak came to the fore early and never faded, During the war, she sent her own share of sugar and chocolate to the polite. the French soldiers fighting at the front.' A few years later, the ten-year-old Weil slipped out of her family's spacious apartment to join striking workers who, chanting The International, were marching along the Boulevard Saint Michel below. Not surprisingly, when she learned of-the pittance paid. to the workers at the summer resort where she and her family were staying, Weil tried to persuade them to form a union." In grade school, when a classmate denounced her as a communist, the child superbly replied, "Pas du lout! I am a Bolshevik."

While Weil threw herself into the world of politics, her older brother was exploring the world of mathematics. Andre Weil soon revealed himself as a mathematical prodigy, with his sister comparing hint, not unreasonably, to seventeenth-century thinker Blaise Pascal. In a letter she wrote several years later, she confessed that her brother's genius was a source of both marvel and misery for her. In comparing her prospects to Andre Weil's spirit budded and nearly broke. "At fourteen," she confessed, "I fell into one of those fits of bottomless despair that come with adolescence, and I seriously thought of dying because of the mediocrity of my natural faculties ....I did not mind having no visible successes, but what did grieve me was the idea of being excluded from that transcendent kingdom to which only the truly great have access and wherein truth abides. I preferred to die rather than live without that truth."

This search for truth was the winch that raised Weil from this sink of despairs and, though not without halts and shudders, kept her above it until her death two decades later. It held fast during her-years at the prestigious Lycee Henri IV, followed by admission into the nation's most celebrated school of higher learning: the tole Normals Superieure (ENS). Weil's classmates, who were variously awed. or annoyed by her Bataan severity, called, her the "Categorical Imperative in skirts: The school's director. Celestin Bougie, no doubt had harsher labels in private for Weil. Driven to distraction by this brilliant student who tried to organize protests against the military draft, and whose drab coat pockets bristled With rolled copies of the anarchist La Revolution proletariat= and satirical Le Canard enchaine, Bougie dubbed her "the red virgin." Upon graduation, Weil was assigned a teaching position in Le Puy, a small city bur led in the distant region of Auvergne. Bougie perhaps had the hope he would never again hear from or about her. But Weil had the last word.

Soon after the school year began, Bougie received aposteard featuring a photo of the immense bronze statue of the Virgin Mary standing on the cliff that overlooks Le Puy. There was no need for Weil to sign the card: under the photo was the caption: "The Red Virgin of Le Puy.'"

Weil's militant activities were as much a trial for Le Puy's school administrator as they had been for poor Bougie. When not teaching Descartes and Kant to her lode students—fifteen girls who were both surprised and seduced by their new teacher's combination of intensity and gentleness—Weil was reaching out to the local workers. In a gesture more humiliating than humane, the city council had offered a pittance to unemployed. men to break stones in the local quarry. Once Weil learned about the workers' miserable lot, she joined their protest marches. Her presence among the workers, with whom she even drank a glass of wine at a cafe, scandalized the notables of Le Puy. One of the local papers added an anti-Semitic twist to Bouglr's bon mot, declaring that "Mme Weill (ski, the red virgin of the Tribe of Levi, bearer of the Muscovite gospels, has brain washed these unfortunates." When the city school director called Weil in for questioning, her colleagues and students rallied in support while Weil herself-lambasted the administration for enforcing "society of caste" and treating the workers as "untouchables.'" The director relented, as did the city council, which finally granted the workers the pay raise they had demanded,

Though she bad won the respect of her students and won the day against the city council, Weil felt constrained in the smell and isolated city. At the end of the school year, she left Le Puy fora lycëe in Auxerre: moving yet again the following year to a post. in Roanne. Both cities were as small and provincial as Le Puy, lacking the intellectual and material industries boasted by Paris. Although Weil took her duties seriously, she also found that they were too narrow, too elite, too distant from the world of working men and women. "The great human error; she once insisted "is to reason in place of finding out:' The task of finding out meant stepping outside the classroom (or, for that matter, the laboratory, library, or cafe), While philosophy was a matter of action. it was action always attached to truth. As for truth. Weil warned her students that it must "always be a truth about something"— something lived, something experienced, Indeed. inspired by the ancient Greek tragedians, in particular Aeschylus and Sophocles, Weil believed truth was something pounded into one's bones. Almost as if it were the drawing of breath, she repeatedly cited the Aeschylean line to pathei mathos ("knowledge edge comes through suffering") in her journals and letters.

Weil's quest for such knowledge led her to work on fishing trawlers, farms, and factories. Upon finishing her school term at Roanne in 1934, Weil took a leave of absence from teaching and spent the next year working at three different manufacturing plants in the Paris region. Perhaps the only thing more unusual than Weil having sought factory work is that she was able to find knot once, but three different times in fairly rapid succession. The Great Depression battered France later than most other countries, leaving it struggling to regain its footing when Britain and Germany, by 1935, were thready beginning to recover, Between 1929 and 1935, unemployment quadrupled; by the time Weil had been fired from her last position, more than 2 million workers out of 12 million were unemployed and more than half of France's 350,000 women factory workers had been laid off!"

Inside be machines where she was condemned to repeat the same motions countless times, Weil made one of her most disturbing discoveries: le matalheur. Best translated as "affliction" this inhuman state was both physical and psychological. Reduced to a machine-like existence by their relentless and repetitive physical labor, workers could scarcely think about resistance or rebellion. In fact, this apprenticeship in alienation forced upon Well. the realization that the factory made it nearly impossible to think at all.

But Weil was cursed by the inability to stop thinking, even in the most awful circumstances. How could it be otherwise If she had stopped thinking, she would have stopped being Simone Weil.

Always with a cigarette, always wide-eyed behind her wire-thinned glasses, and always with the same dress she had worn the day before (and would wear again the next day), Weil reminded her students of a simple truth: "If one stops oneself from thinking of all this, one makes oneself an accomplice of what is happening, One has to do something quite different assume one's place in this system of things and do something about it. If philosophy didn't lead to such a conclusion, it wasn't worth the paper it was written on. Perhaps as only someone who was not an academic could claim, Weil insisted that philosophy was neither theory nor discourse, but instead was practice. This is why, she noted toward the end of her life, the-activity of philosophizing is "so difficult to write about." Even more difficult, she concluded (without a hint of irony), than it is to write on how to play tennis or run a race."

In 1936, the imperative to "do something about it" led Weil to Spain, where civil war had just erupted in the wake of the military coup led by General Francisco Franco. Like George Orwell—a contemporary with whom, though Orwell would not. have been pleased by the comparison, she shares several striking traits—Weil joined an international battalion of anarchists defending the Spanish Republic, though utterly incapable of handling a rifle or reading a compass, she insisted-to the dismay of those ostensibly in command—on engaging the enemy. She survived a couple of sorties but had less luck behind the frontlines. A few weeks after she had arrived, she stepped into a vat of of boiling cooking oil and scalded her foot, Packed off to Barcelona, Weil was unable to find, proper medical care and soon ceded to her parents' plea to return to Paris for treatment, Her foot, though scarred. eventually healed; the same. however, Connot be said for her political convictions. What Weil saw of men and women in battle left a deep and enduring mark on her mind.

It would be too simpler to cite Weil's experience in Spain as a turning point, but it no doubt hastened her move away from political engagement. By the last years of the decade, she began to turn toward a kind of spiritual and religious engagement. It was knot, however, to the Judaism into which, if only formally. she had been born. Instead, a series of mystical experiences—from a fishing village in Portugal and a church in Tuscany to a Beet dictine abbey in France-led her to Christianity. By 1940 and France's defeat and occupation by the Nazis, Weil's attraction to Roman Catholicism quickened, while her• ambivalence over its institutions deepened. This became clear once she and her parents, part of the exodus of French civilians (and, tellingly, French soldiers),.reached Marseille. While the Wells began the long application process for US visas, their daughter began an equally long series of conversations with Joseph-Marie Perriu, a humane and thoughtful priest attached to the local Dominican convent. Though Perrin failed to convert Weil to Catholicism—in effect, she refused to belong to any club, or church, that would accept her as a member—he did succeed in becoming the recipient of a series of remarkable letters from Weil. published short ly after the war Under the title Waiting for God.

While in Marseille Weil also met Gustave Thibon. Like Perrin, Thibon was a Catholic; unlike Perrin, Thibon was a farmer. not a cleric. It was Perrin, when pressed by Weil to find her a place as a farm worker, who had contacted his friend Thibon to see if he would take her on. Thibon agreed, but not lightly." he was a. follower not just of Marechal Pétain and his regime. but also the extreme right-wing movement Action Francaise, founded by the virulently anti-Semitic intellectual Charles Matures. (Thihon's hostility toward Judaism, while less ideological than religious, undoubtedly influenced his decision to include Weil's anti-Semitic remarks in his edited collection of her thoughts, Gravidity and Grace. published after the war) Despite a difficult beginning-Weil refused to sleep in the same house as the Thibons instead sleeping on straw in a ruined cabin on the property—and though at loggerheads. secular and religious issues, Thibon and Weil developed a deep respect for one anon her during the few months she spent at the farm. In Thibon's ease, the respect verged on awe, while Weil trusted him enough to leave him a dozen of her notebooks.

The notebooks, written mostly after 1940, remind us that Weil's last three years were, at least from a literary perspective, the most productive of her short life. When she was not delivering underground Resistance journals or being repeatedly questioned by the police while living in Marseille, Weil wrote utter a pseudonym for the literary journal Cahiers du sud-a necessity since the Vichy regime prohibited Jews from all white-collar professions. Weil continued to write (once again under her own name) when she reached New York with her parents in June 1942, though the writing was mostly confined to letters in which she tried to persuade close friends, casual acquaintances, and perfect strangers to either enact her controversial "Nurses Plan"-a proposal to parachute white-uniformed, nurses directly into battle, With Well leading the first group-or help her to return to France to join the Resistance.

Neither of these wishes was fulfilled, but Weil did make it as far as London. In late 1942, the Free French, the London-based Resistance organization created by Charles de Gaullein 1940, brought her over from New York to analyze the reports sent by the several internal Resistance movements on their visions for a liberated and republican France. During the few months that she spent working at the offices on Hill Street-the better-known Carlton Gardens served as headquarters for de Gaulle himself-Weil wrote furiously and surely: scratched-out word& or phrases are almost entirely absent from these several hundred pages, which ranged from short proposals to the lengthy 'Prelude a une declaration des devours moors l'ette humain"—later titled L'Enracinement (The Need for Roots).

The sheer number of proposals and papers Weil sent to her superiors overwhelmed and baffled them. For one of de Gaulle's close staidest, Andre Philip, Weil wrote at a level that, in Philip's view, had little application to the very real challenges that confronted the Free French: Asked by Philip to work on the vast array of problems, political and social, that. would confront France upon its liberation, Weil seemed unable to keep her focus. Why couldn't she. Philip sighed to a colleague, "take on concrete issues, like those involving labor unions, instead of dealing with such generalities?" For Weil, such assignments were better left for those "who can write brilliantly about. things they know nothing about."

But for Weil, none of these works, despite their compelling and often unsettling insights, qualified as doing something about it. Writing was not enough. M. Weil told her friend Maurice Schumann: "The suffering all over the world obsesses and overwhelms me to the point of annihilating my faculties and the only way I can revive them and release myself from the obsession is by getting for myself a large share of danger and hardship." Her proposal to parachute corps of nurses onto battlefields was dismissed out of hand by de Gaulle, who famously exclaimed that Weil was folic, "a crazy woman." Other efforts to persuade the Free French authorities to send her to Occupied France to work with the Resistance movements were also dead on arrival. By late spring 1943, Weil resigned from the Free French, acknowledging that she was at her wits' end.

She was also at her body's end. Her migraine headaches, which plagued her from the early Mos, were now unrelenting, as was her refusal to eat more calories than did her fellow citizens in Occupied France, who were struggling with a spartan regimen of food rationing and a flourishing of black markets. On April 15, emaciated and exhausted, Weil was found by a friend slumped on. the floor of her rented room in Portland Street. Admitted to Middlesex Hospital, she spent four months there, reading and writing with great intensity, all the while refusing not iust treatment for her tuberculosis damaged lungs, but her meals as well. In mid-August, the recalcitrant patient 'was transferred to the Grosvenor Sanitarium, where she died a few days later.

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My aim in this book is not to offer a. detailed account of this remarkable life. This has already been done by Weil's friend Simone Petrement, as well as by a growing number of biographers?" Instead,

my goal is to explore a small number of 'core themes in her thought that still resonate today. Or. I believe, should resonate. Take, for example, Weil's concept of attention. In her recently published bestseller How to Do Nothing, Jenny Odell reflects on the so-called attention economy-a catchall term fora world now wallpapered with flat screens and steeped in mass and social media. As her subtitle promises, Odell suggests ways we might resist its overpowering allure. In one of her chapters, tiled "Exercises in Attention," Odell makes the case for visiting museums, Among the artists she discusses is David Hockney, who prescribes what she calls "intentional prosthesis." 'In effect, Hockney urges us to think of seeing as a "positive act.' As an artist herself, Odell understandably looks to Hackney and other fellow artists to frame the notion of attention.

In his best-selling book Shop Class as Soulcraft, the contemporary philosopher Matthew Crawford also dwells on the vital role of attention. His preferred site of attention is not the museum, but the mechanic's shop. "The moral significance of 'work that grapples with material things may lie in the simple fact that such things lie outside the self.' Whether the malfunctioning object is a washing machine or water heater, its virtue is found in its resistance to our fantasies of how it should behave and our frustration when it refuses to obey. The repair of a motorcycle engine and an authentic relation to the world are one and the same.

While Odell and Crawford both make eloquent cases for attending to the world-so vital an argument in a world so deeply afflicted with attention deficit disorder, neither makes mention of Weil. This is no more a shortcoming than making the case for skepticism but omitting all mention, say, of David Hume. Yet just as a new book on skepticism risks reinventing the arguments made by Hume-and doing so less compellingly—so too with a book on, attention that ignores Weil. Few 'thinkers have attended to the subject of attention as long and lucidly as this French thinker, and even fewer have made a more persuasive and paradoxical case for doing nothing as the most effective means for doing something lasting and important.

Very lunch the same can be said for a number of other ideas to which, over the course of short life short life, Weil paid much attention. My plan is to attend to a handful of these, as well. Each of the following five chapters is devoted to an idea that Weil explored in her writings and often experienced in her life: affliction, attention, rootedness, resistance, and goodness. Inevitably, the terms often spill into one another. It. is impossible, for example, to discuss the knot of resistance without touching on either the means for such an act-which involves attention-or its end, which implies the good. Similarly, affliction is often the consequence of rootlessness. Moreover, while Weil clearly made most of these concepts her own; this is not the case with resistance. Though she spent the last years of her life in increasingly desperate efforts to join the Resistance, Weil wrote little on the topic of resistance. The word crops up only rarely in her writings, but I find that it is a value that girds a great deal of her thought and merits a chapter of its omit

The reader, I hope, will thus forgive the occasional instances of blurred borders or crossed concepts, I also hope the reader Will find that I have managed to convey these ideas in a man. nor that does some justice to the remarkable mind that first expressed them. Few thinkers, I believe, have managed. Weill's trick of being so convincing yet subversive, eloquent but abrasive, and impractical yet persuasive. More than half a century ago, the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch declared that to read Well "is to be reminded of a standard'" My goal is to show why this remains even more the case today.

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> Ideas come and settle in my mind by mistake, then, they absolutely insist on coming out, I do not know where they come from, or what they are worth; but, whatever the risk, I do not think I have the right to prevent this operation. SIMONE WEIL

"The present period is one of those when everything that seems normally to constitute a reason for living dwindles away, when one must, on pain of sinking into confusion or apathy, call everything iu question again. The triumph of authoritarian and nationalist movements should blast almost everywhere the hopes that well-meaning people had placed in democracy .... We are living through a period bereft of a future. Waiting for that which is to come is no longer a matter of hope, but of anguish."

Everything and nothing has changed since Weil made this observation nearly a century ago. In the 1930s, robotization and artificial intelligence were the stuff of Jules Verne or H. G. Wells-yet they were foreseen by Weil's insights into the interlocking nature of capitalism and technology. Though the West withstood the plague of totalitarianism-at least in its Hitlerian and Stalinist guises-in Weil's lifetime, her analysis of these phenomena casts a sharp light on the resurgence of authoritarianism and ethno-nationalism in our own century. Her reflections on the ramifying and relentless nature of force framed the displacement and destruction of entire peoples in her own time, but also the plight of the tens of millions of refugees in our own age. tots might be wondering why. given the persistence of these political and social evils, we should bother to read Weil. After all, many of her answers to these ills were at best impractical and at worst inhuman. In the former case, Weil's argument for the abolition of all political parties-an admittedly attractive option for America in our polarized time-makes sense as a philosophical provocation, but not as practical policy. In the latter ease, de Gaulle Was not alone to dismiss as crazy Weil's proposal to parachute nurses onto battlefields: I confess I also find it insensate, if not quite insane. Were there not women who, hobbled by the era's many social and institutional prejudices, nevertheless made invaluable contributions? Consider the life of Dr, Louisa Garrett Anderson, an English suffragette who, at the turn of the twentieth century, overcame daunting obstacles to establish hospitals in Paris and London to treat wounded soldiers during World War L Like Well, Anderson insisted on the imperative of duty and the conviction that "to do nothing Is really too feebler Like Weil, Anderson insisted on wearing white uniforms (though she and the other female doctors also. wore their suffragette pins). Unlike Weil, she and her colleagues did something of vital and lasting importance for others that did not entail martyrdom!

Simone Petrement makes a poignant confession in her biography of her friend: "Who would not be ashamed of oneself in Simone's presence, seeing the life she led?"' This has often been my experience with Weil. Reading her is always a revelation and a reproach. I have never met, and will never meet, the expectations she had of herself and others. But to be honest, I have also felt at times the irritation and impatience that many who met her also felt, exasperated by. her extreme character, confused not just by some of her philosophical ideals, but also by her insistence upon enacting them in our lives. "What I cannot stand," she told her students, "is compromise'

Well, neither can I. But compromised is, almost always, the most I can expect of myself. I know I can never come close to meeting the ideals Weil exacted of herself. In his recent. book A Decent Life: Morality for the Rest of Us, the philosopher Todd May makes a compelling case for a moral life situated between mediocrity arid extremity. "Most of us- are incapable of living lives that are beacons of moral light," he sensibly writes, yet we also "desire to be morally decent people." The problem within deals is that they are, well, ideals, they are, by definition, impossible to live up to for nearly all of us. Besides, as May argues, if we could somehow live up to them our lives would be less fulfilling and meaningful. The kind of moral life demanded by the categorical imperative (whether or not in skirts), May writes, "requires a great deal of sacrifice and focus, often turning us away from our most important commitments and toward ways of living that, while admirable; are onerous and even impossible for many of us to achieve.

This strikes me as the case with Simone Weil, In a merciless essay, Susan Sontag captured dilemma faced by many of Weil's readers. Noting the odd, yet powerful attraction of Weil's "sense of acute personal and intellectual extremity," Sontag believed that no morr than a "handful of tens of thousands of readers she has won since the posthumous publication of her books and essays really share her ideas." I cannot speak for the tens of thousands of other readers, but I, for one, often find myself in the untenable position of Sharing her ideas and yet being aware. they cannot be, and perhaps should not be, acted upon. But, like Sontag. I straggle to reconcile Weil's belief in the necessity of mercy with her merciless attitude toward not just foes, but also friends—and of course toward her own self. She deserved far better, as many of her friends did.

But at the same time. I cannot resist returning time and Again to this remarkable individual. Weil's life was exemplary, fusing beliefs, words; and acts into a brilliant whole: For many of her readers, Weil's life has all the trappings of secular sainthood. Yet it is wise to recall George Orwell's remarks on a contemporary of Weirs, Mahatma Gandhi, Marveling over the rigor of his spiritual and ethical convictions, which on one occasion led him to accept the death of a family member rather than allow the person to ingest chicken. broth, Orwell muses:. "This attitude is perhaps a noble one, but, in a sense which I think—most people would give the word, it is inhuman." His conclusion is clear: "No doubt alcohol, tobacco, and so forth, are things that a saint must avoid, but sainthood is also a thing that human beings must avoid!"

But this, of course, does not mean that we can afford to disregard Weil's life any more than Gandhi's life. On the contrary. As with her life, so too with her ideas: they perplex and provoke; dazzle and inspire. More rarely they console5 but perhaps consolation is not all that it. is cracked up to be. More important, perhaps, is comprehension, "Only the greatest art," Murdoch noted, `invigorates without consoling." This insight applies to 1/Veil's thought and life. One reason she commands our attention is the close correspondence between her thoughts and her actions. At times, this made her insufferable, but it will always make her irreplaceable. What Weil wrote about the salutary stubbornness of reality applies toher thinking and ac ting: "The source of any kind of virtue lies in the shock produced by the human intelligence being brought up against a. matter devoid of lenience and falsity.'" it is difficult to find a more desirable, if difficult, guide for our own lives. <>

BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM: THE 20TH- CENTURY WORD MADE FLESH by Steve Pinkerton [Oxford University Press, 9780190627560]

Scholars have long described modernism as "heretical" or "iconoclastic" in its assaults on secular traditions of form, genre, and decorum. Yet critics have paid surprisingly little attention to the related category of blasphemy -- the rhetoric of religious offense -- and to the specific ways this rhetoric operates in, and as, literary modernism. United by a shared commitment to "the word made flesh," writers such as James Joyce, Mina Loy, Richard Bruce Nugent, and Djuna Barnes made blasphemy a key component of their modernist practice, profaning the very scriptures and sacraments that fueled their art. In doing so they belied T. S. Eliot's verdict that the forces of secularization had rendered blasphemy obsolete in an increasingly godless century ("a world in which blasphemy is impossible"); their determined irreverence reveals, ironically, the extent to which religion endured as a cultural force after the Death of God. More, their transgressions spotlight a *politics* of religion that has seldom engaged the attention of modernist studies. Blasphemy respects no division of church and state, and neither do the writers who wield it to profane all manner of coercive dogmas -- including ecclesiastical as well as more worldly ideologies of race, class, nation, empire, gender, and sexuality. The late-century example of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic*

Verses affords, finally, a demonstration of how modernism persists in postwar anglophone literature and of the critical role blasphemy plays in that persistence. **BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM** thus resonates with the broader cultural and ideological concerns that in recent years have enriched the scope of modernist scholarship.

Review

"Lively and readable. [**BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM** marks] an important contribution to rethinking the engagement of modernist writers with religion, and makes a persuasive case for the importance of blasphemy as a category of study in its own right." *Los Angeles Review of Books*

"Fascinating and timely. . . . Pinkerton's book does not disappoint in its brilliant elucidation of the different types and qualities of modernist blasphemy." *Modern Fiction Studies*

"Provocative. [Pinkerton] eviscerates the secular caricature of modernism . . . in an enviably pithy, lucid prose style." *Modernism/Modernity*

"Important and persuasive. . . . Will do doubt reframe all future explorations of modernism and religion." *James Joyce Broadsheet*

"[**BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM** shows how] the various forms of blasphemy that characterize the modernist enterprise are less renunciations of religious discourse in the name of art than forms of religious discourse themselves . . . as Pinkerton makes clear in, say, his insightful reading of *Ulysses*." *Religion and the Arts*

"Pinkerton's overall argument is novel, transcending simplistic evaluations of modernism. [*Blasphemous Modernism*] is lucid yet ornate, interrogating the complexity of blasphemy as a mechanism 'giving voice to the unrecognized, the unnatural,' and transgressing the orthodox boundaries of religion, sexuality, politics, and the body." *Time Present*

"It is good to see that people are still willing to take on controversial topics in a thoughtful way. . . . Pinkerton has done a great service to Modernist studies by reminding us of literature's transgressive power." *English: Journal of the English Association*

"Compellingly readable. . . . What is distinctive about Pinkerton's critical approach is his resolve to show that [modern writers'] intense interest in religion (and speaking out against it) was a formidable, even vitalizing potency behind aesthetic modernism." *Literature & History*

"A detailed and beautiful analysis. . . . **BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM** is a book worth reading." *Novel: A Forum on Fiction*

"Pinkerton's approach beautifully unravels . . . how modernists' linguistic experiments challenged and transformed assumptions about normative and nonnormative bodies." *American Literature*

"Most compellingly, Pinkerton points to the ways that 'blasphemy is a barometer and a mechanism of power, a discourse governed by the powerful but also occasionally usurped by the marginalized in politically significant ways.' ... This rebalancing of context is the greatest achievement of **BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM**, situating religion even where it seems to be rejected." *The Year's Work in English Studies*

"An important study.... Pinkerton shows how writers from the mainstream and the margins of the modernist movement attacked religion because they took it so seriously. This impressive work has significant implications for our current cultural scene." **Pericles Lewis (Yale University**)

"At last! An intuitive and probing analysis of blasphemy and modernist writers.... This penetrating and lucid book pries apart the fundamental paradox of blasphemy within the modernist epoch--that the most forthright blasphemy effectively reinforces the power of the sacred over the imagination in a supposedly godless age." **David Nash (Oxford Brookes University)**

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In a celebrated sequence of Milton's "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity" (1629), the poet revisits a favorite theme of Christian humanism— the triumph of baby Jesus over the pagan gods— in the silencing of classical oracles: "Apollo from his shrine / Can no more divine." But banished gods have a way of returning, and so when "Our Babe" in the cradle is revealed as having the power to "control the damned crew" of deposed deities, forcing them to abide in a past sealed off forever from the new truth that has entered the world, His strength is made manifest through classical allusion: "The dreaded Infant's hand," that is, the hand of Hercules, who strangled serpents (evoked by Milton's "snaky twine") in his crib. With the dawn of Christianity, the classical world, safely stripped of its false divinity, becomes available as trope.

And yet the awe and solemnity evoked in Milton's description of the lost world bespeaks what today we have learned to call ambivalence, and an ambivalent relation to religious orthodoxy, Steve Pinkerton shows, lies at the heart of blasphemy. Although in the Nativity Ode Milton steers well clear of the blasphemous— nothing wrong with an admiring glance at pre- Christian majesty— in Paradise Lost Milton would have to work harder to fend off charges that he might be usurping rather than elaborating scriptural authority. Pinkerton's **BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM: THE 20TH-CENTURY WORD MADE FLESH** acknowledges the rich history of literary blasphemy; but in the modernist period, he argues, blasphemy becomes fundamental in a new way. Elite culture's proclamation of the death of God (in the West, anyway) has kept us from recognizing that modernists continued "to seek in scripture and theology the particular sources of meaning, affect, and literary force that only religion seemed fully capable of providing." And they did so through blasphemy.

Blasphemous Modernism thus engages with recent work on "the religious turn" in literary studies (predicted in 2005 by Stanley Fish in a well- known essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education) and with broader revisionist work on the theological origins of modernity by showing how modernist discourse is deeply indebted to the logic of blasphemy: there can be no blasphemy without belief, and the ubiquity of ironic invocations of religion in modernism testifies to the persistence of forms of belief that call such irony into being. Modernist irony, in other words, is at least double, making T. S. Eliot only half- right in After Strange Gods when he lamented the impossibility of "first- rate"

blasphemy in an unbelieving world: blasphemy does indeed depend on belief, but there is plenty of it to be found in modernism, first rate and otherwise.

Eliot's favorite blasphemer was Baudelaire. For Pinkerton, it is James Joyce and Mina Loy, whom he presents as twin exemplars of "modernism's sacrilegious aesthetics." In Finnegans Wake Joyce coined the telling pun "sacreligion," a spiritual cognate of the "jocoserious" aesthetic he names in the "Ithaca" episode of Ulysses; in her 1922 poem "Apology of Genius" Loy refers to avant- garde artists as "sacerdotal clowns." With this simple yet powerful paradigm in place, one might cruise through modernism looking for hieratic jesters, but Pinkerton carries out a more ambitious agenda. While chapters 1 and 2 offer virtuoso readings of Joyce and Loy respectively, later chapters explore additional facets of blasphemy and less familiar terrain in discussions of Djuna Barnes and the self-styled "Niggeratti," the dissident coterie of artists and writers that included Wallace Thurman, Richard Bruce Nugent, Zora Neale Hurston, and Langston Hughes.

The Joyce chapter brilliantly illuminates the incarnational aesthetic that leads from Buck Mulligan's opening blasphemy to the embodiment of the "genuine Christine" in Molly Bloom; the Loy chapter (which makes great use of unpublished manuscripts housed in Yale's Beinecke Library) shows how her discourse of the body fuses with a poetics of profanation to "re imagine the gendered hierarchies of both church and state, orthodoxy and patriarchy." Here the significance of the book's subtitle— "the word made flesh"— becomes apparent, for modernist blasphemy aspires to the status of sacrilege, which is to say that textual transgression— blasphemy— strains toward the strict definition of sacrilege: physical desecration. Thus, inasmuch as blasphemy seeks to intervene in the world beyond its textual expression, it aims to become not just rhetorical but political. The potential political stakes of blasphemous modernism become clear in Pinkerton's treatment in chapter 3 on the Harlem Renaissance. For the Niggeratti, Alain Locke's New Negro anthology (1925), itself founded on a transgressive biblical typology that championed the birth of a black Christ, came to seem a sacred text that required its own blasphemous debunking in turn. A similar dialectic underpins Pinkerton's analysis of the way Barnes dismantled what she saw as the orthodox deployment of sexual and biblical codes in Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness, a novel that Hall herself, not to mention the courts, saw as far from orthodox in its exploration of lesbian desire. But blasphemy, which holds a profound appeal for marginalized voices, by its very nature bites the hand that feeds it.

Contemporary modernity provides daily reminders of the continuing power of religious belief, sometimes for the good, sometimes not. Late last century Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses underscored both the value and danger of the aspiration of words to become flesh. Part of the lasting significance of blasphemous modernism, Pinkerton implies, lies in its sustained meditation on the vexed politics of literalization as embodiment.

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"First-Rate Blasphemy"

God exists, in language if nowhere else. "Whether or not there is a realm of the 'supernatural,' " Kenneth Burke reminds us, "there are words for it." The Bible rather strikingly encourages this discursive emphasis: the Creator creates through language, then redeems that creation, for Christians, through language embodied. "And God said, Let there be light: and there was light"; "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us" (Gen. 1:3, John 1:14). In a further testament to Christianity's special concern for the linguistic, "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost" stands as the one unforgivable sin— for blasphemy, too, is inherently textual (Matt. 12:31).2 It is the word we use to denote religious offenses or desecrations that are verbal in nature; we have other words (heresy, apostasy) for other categories of offense. That's why the traditional European punishment for

blasphemy was to bore through the offender's tongue.3 It's also why, in the present day, blasphemy tends to arise with urgency as an issue of free speech: the religious believer pits the texts that he or she holds sacred against the "human right" of unhindered expression that others hold sacred. One sacred discourse— a discourse about discourse— combats another. It would be wrong to see such combat as exclusively rhetorical; too much blood has been spilled, through the ages and in very recent memory. At bottom, however, it is a conflict of words, of texts, and of the affective and political power that attaches to them.

We are concerned here with how these discourses, the sacred and the blasphemous, intersect with a third: literary modernism. For blasphemy is a signal modernist idiom, and while hardly the exclusive property of modernist writers, it does acquire in their works an exceptional resonance and force. That blasphemy "demands fine- grained literary analysis," as Joss Marsh has argued, is never so evident as in the case of modernism and its characteristic stake in the materiality of language.4 But as worldly blasphemies inevitably carry implications that exceed the linguistic, so too do the literary works we will encounter here. Among other things, Blasphemous Modernism attends to the complex relationship in modernist texts between words, the Word, and the flesh— a relationship that illumines the interrelations of form and content, textuality and the body— and to the ideological contests that blasphemers wage against each other and against both sacred and secular power.

Such an undertaking demands that we pay close attention to the abiding authority of religious language in an epoch that has traditionally been viewed as postreligious, as though the ascendance of various other realms of human experience (reason, science, art) had succeeded unconditionally in taking God's nolonger requisite place in the order of things. The standard assumption has been, in Charles Taylor's paraphrase, that "modern civilization cannot but bring about a 'death of God,' " and that modernism reflects that death in its literary texts. As James Joyce's own Buck Mulligan states the case, "Jehovah, collector of prepuces, is no more"— a judgment shared by Ezra Pound, who insisted that the "Christian era" had come "definitely to an END" in October 1921, on the night Joyce finished the final two chapters of Ulysses.6 Yet modernist writers, Joyce included, continued to seek in scripture and theology the particular sources of meaning, affect, and literary force that only religion seemed fully capable of providing. With redoubled vigor, they wove the themes and rhetorics of religious tradition into the fabrics of their often highly irreverent poems and fictions, where God endures as a potent object of imaginative appropriation and profanation. For the works of blasphemous modernism, that is, God remains very much alive.

Modernist literature thus complicates the popular narrative of religion's inexorable decline in the modern world. "In this process there is no stopping," Freud wrote; "the greater the number of men to whom the treasures of knowledge become accessible, the more widespread is the falling- away from religious belief." Freud's striking confidence that the religious neurosis could not possibly survive the accumulating pressures of modernity is typical of his contemporaries' prevailing assumption in these matters, even if many contemplated God's death with far less satisfaction. Yet Freud's prophecy of a wholly secular future left, ironically, no room for a return of the repressed. Like many other social observers, he was unable to foresee God's comeback in a twenty- first century where religion remains a powerful cultural force, even (with some exceptions) in the world's most "developed," "modernized" nations— a century in which perfectly sane thinkers have declared a "death of the death of God."

In scholarship across the humanities, such reconsiderations of modernity and secularization have accompanied a renewed interest in religion generally. Nonetheless, as Pericles Lewis has observed, most scholarship on modernist writers continues "anachronistically to read back into them a blithely secular point of view." Important exceptions include recent work by Lewis, Erik Tonning, and other scholars whose efforts generally accord with my own sense of modernism's religious underpinnings.

Together, these studies make a compelling case for the fundamental importance of religious discourses to literary modernism, and I join their effort to contest what Suzanne Hobson calls the "strong reading of modernism's disenchantment." I take, however, a via negativa, arguing that literary blasphemies of the period— writers' self- conscious formal and thematic deployments of religious irreverence— are in a perverse way the surest proof of religion's abiding importance among the moderns.

Blasphemy is double- edged, as we'll have many occasions to consider. Even as it profanes religious traditions and institutions, it also tacitly affirms their status as objects worthy of such profanation. Here my argument follows the logic, if not the diagnosis, of T. S. Eliot's theorization of blasphemy in a series of lectures published under the title After Strange Gods (1934). Now best remembered for a particularly ugly sentence about "free- thinking Jews," these lectures identify blasphemy as a useful index of religious sensibility while also claiming that modernity provides infertile soil for that sensibility, and thus for blasphemy of any genuine form, to take root. The current reappraisals of modern secularization noted above give us ample reason to take seriously the first of these claims— and to put some much- needed critical pressure on the second.

Blasphemy, Faith, and Modernity

We can begin with Ezra Pound's negative review of After Strange Gods, in which Pound concisely articulates the conventional view of religion's status in the twentieth century: "The fact is that 'religion' long since resigned. Religion in the person of its greatest organized European institution resigned. The average man now thinks of religion either as a left- over or an irrelevance." Pound's remarks imply that Eliot hasn't sufficiently recognized this, but the author of After Strange Gods is if anything hyperaware of what he perceives to be religion's diminished importance: a state of affairs Eliot mourns, somewhat counterintuitively, as "the obsolescence of Blasphemy" (After Strange Gods, 10). Because "no one can possibly blaspheme in any sense except that in which a parrot may be said to curse, unless he profoundly believes in that which he profanes," for Eliot the moderns have mostly "ceased to be capable of exercising that activity or of recognizing it" (55– 56). As G. K. Chesterton had proclaimed some years before, "Blasphemy depends upon belief, and is fading with it. If any one doubts this, let him sit down seriously and try to think blasphemous thoughts about Thor." On views such as these, blasphemy's extinction follows logically from God's. So it is that any remaining trace of "genuine blasphemy" is for Eliot "a way of affirming belief," "a symptom that the soul is still alive"— and that "first- rate blasphemy," in particular, deserves to be treasured as "one of the rarest things in literature."

This idea— that an irreverent work must earn its blasphemy or else fail as literature— brings us to a suggestive distinction between blasphemy and the proximate category of the obscene.16 For if blasphemy is understood to stand in positive relation with aesthetic value, obscenity stands in neutral or negative relation to such value. Obscenity has widely been understood as either incompatible with artistic merit or, at best, immaterial to it. In British and US jurisprudence, the latter view was for many decades implied by the "Hick lin test" of obscenity, which disregarded literary value altogether. The former view— that an "obscene" book cannot at the same time be a successfully "literary" one— was voiced memorably by John M. Woolsey, who declared Joyce's Ulysses not obscene, in part, because its author had pursued his artistic aims with such "astonishing success." (Conceding that the book contained "dirty words," Judge Woolsey could nonetheless discern no "dirt for dirt's sake" in Joyce's "amazing tour de force" [xvi].) These commonly held views of obscenity and blasphemy speak directly to the argument of this book, because while I take obscenity to be generally incidental to modernist literature— its writers often used "dirty words" but rarely just "for dirt's sake"— blasphemy was very often integral to that literature, constitutive of it, and in ways that index both the aesthetic and the political stakes of modernism itself.

Here I differ from Eliot, not only with regard to the capacity or incapacity for "first- rate blasphemy" among modernist writers but also as regards the political potential of such irreverence. For Eliot, blasphemy matters primarily for what it signals about the well- being of "therapeutic" religion, in Slavoj Zizek's terms: a faith that "helps individuals to function better in the existing order." For me, the import of blasphemous expression lies instead in its service to what Zizek calls a "critical" faith, one that "tries to assert itself as a critical agency articulating what is wrong with this order as such, a space for the voices of discontent" (3). My own sense of blasphemy's worth has less to do with what it says about the blasphemer's own soul than with its intrinsically "disruptive power ... to undermine, transform, and constructively engage cultural forms and institutions that have grown rigid with time": the sorts of institutions that Eliot would likely, for the most part, have wished to shore up. His thoughts on blasphemy are nonetheless crucial; as Raymond Williams once observed, "If Eliot is read with attention, he is seen to have raised questions which those who differ from him politically must answer, or else retire from the field." Eliot is right to insist that for blasphemy to matter at all, it must be grounded in and even motivated by an acknowledgment of religious authority and of the affective and rhetorical force of spiritual feeling and traditions. He's also right to suggest that this acknowledgment not only can but must be accompanied by a profound skepticism and a willingness to face equally religion's goods and ills, a condition the Anglo- Catholic Eliot defines as "spiritual sickness": one of his three criteria for "first- rate" blaspheming, the others being "literary genius and profound faith" (After Strange Gods, 56).

Worth recuperating among Eliot's delineations of the first- rate is his insistence that faith and blasphemy cannot be sundered completely— though surely we can do without his recourse to pathology. What blasphemy requires is not "spiritual sickness" but rather a commitment to playful and critical reworkings of orthodoxy, coupled with a respect and even reverence, not for God, or scripture, or the church, but for religious faith itself and its enduring cultural sway. As Eliot said of his favorite blasphemer, Baudelaire, "His business was not to practise Christianity, but— what was much more important for his time— to assert its necessity." Likewise, when Eliot judges James Joyce to be "the most ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers of my time," he means not that the Irish author succeeds at achieving a fully "orthodox sensibility"— scarcely possible by Eliot's standards— but that his works, like Baudelaire's, "recognize" the "necessity" of Christianity as the proper soil in which a philosophically and artistically meaningful blasphemy can take root (After Strange Gods, 41).

Or as Salman Rushdie wrote, many years later, in the novel that earned him the blasphemer's highest sentence: "Where there is no belief, there is no blasphemy." That The Satanic Verses (1988) is in many respects a "sincerely religious book" is precisely what makes its blasphemies so potent. It is in fact a crucial component not only of that novel's blasphemies but also of its modernism that it stands in such richly ambivalent relation "to the cultural system that it must both desecrate and renew"— that its profanations contain "a gesture of recuperative devotion." Indeed on some level they must, for, as Georges Bataille memorably put it, irreverence would be doomed to irrelevance "if the blasphemer denied the sacred nature of the Good that Blasphemy was intended to despoil."

One of Bataille's own contributions to blasphemous modernism, his pornographic Story of the Eye (1928), is exemplary here. Having exhausted just about every secular form of transgression, this novella reserves its most powerful desecrations for its final pages, where an orgy inside a cathedral develops into a Eucharistic travesty of extreme proportions. Its climax is marked by a Catholic priest being choked to death, in his own church, while enjoying and suffering la petite mort at the hands of the other celebrants. As the priest's subsequently uprooted eyeball undergoes an alarming series of defilements, we may be tempted to ask: Is nothing sacred? But that is the wrong question altogether. What makes this text so troubling (and, perhaps, titillating) is its insistence that the church, and the various objects defiled under its roof, are sacred— and, for this reason, are worthy of the

blasphemer's "despoiling." Like Eliot, Bataille maintains that blasphemy requires not a secularist dismissal of religion but rather a recognition of the sanctity that still adheres to its institutions, sacraments, and scriptures.

In Finnegans Wake (1939), Joyce provides a useful term for such simultaneous reverence and transgression— "sacreligion"— that deserves a place among the more familiar list of modernism's proverbial heresies and iconoclasms, its breaks with cultural orthodoxies of various kinds. Scholars have long described and even defined modernism in such terms, of course, but almost always in service to worldly notions of assault on secular authority and tradition: notions largely divorced from spiritual contexts and divested of religious signification. In claiming blasphemy as a defining mode of modernist literary production, I want to insist on the full religious valence of that term in order to respect modernism's imaginative investments in, and often subversive reworkings of, theology and scripture. Heresy, for example, recognizes certain of the moderns' idiosyncratic forays into heterodox visions of the sacred— Lawrence and Yeats come readily to mind— but it elides the majority's manifest interest in both assimilating and profaning orthodox religious traditions.

So, too, does the tendency of recent modernist scholarship to emphasize authors' transpositions of religious experience into formal or aesthetic principles— so that what emerges as "sacred" in modernist texts (for example, Virginia Woolf's "moments of being") is generally unrecognizable as sacred in any Christian or other doctrinal sense. This kind of criticism often emphasizes the ways literature creates its own versions of religion and even can become, as Arthur Symons suggested, "a kind of religion, with all the duties and responsibilities of the sacred ritual." (T. E. Hulme supplies a less favorable description of this dynamic: "spilt religion.") Rather than stress writers' sublimations and personalized secularizations of the religious, I attend primarily to the ways that modernists assimilate scripture and exploit orthodox constructions of the sacred. To be sure, there is much to be said about how they transform these constructions. It's worth considering, though, how the resultant depictions of sacred and profane continue to function in recognizably doctrinal ways, drawing on the cultural durability of scripture and sacrament.

In the chapters that follow, I pursue these considerations across a fairly diverse range of writers and texts. Where recent studies of modernism and religion have concentrated almost exclusively on "the mainstream of high modernism" (James, Conrad, Proust, Kafka, Woolf, Pound), I will instead be dealing mostly with the canon's outliers: the Others, to borrow the title of Alfred Kreymborg's important little magazine. Joyce is an exception here, but, as Enda Duffy notes, Ulysses "has always been seen in some sense as an exception among the masterpieces of patriarchal modernism," staging as it does "a different kind of intervention within the realities of nation, race, class, even gender." In chapter 1, I show how Joyce marshals the language of blasphemy to challenge prevailing assumptions about these matrices of identity— "even gender." (And sexuality, too.) Joyce's oeuvre is crucial to the story of blasphemous modernism, Ulysses in particular providing a template for the literary profanations to be found in works that have been alternately overlooked and underappreciated for the better part of a century, and which remain largely neglected by studies of modernism and religion.

As he did for these writers, Joyce will serve in these pages as a kind of patron saint, his works affording a primer of the full spectrum of modernist blasphemy— from the irreverent disarticulations of gender and sexuality we find in Mina Loy and Djuna Barnes to the artistic rebellion undertaken by a coterie of young Harlem artists of the 1920s and 1930s (including Wallace Thurman and Richard Bruce Nugent), whose insistently iconoclastic works often telegraph their debt to the Joycean precedent. In keeping with the principle of a "sacreligious" art, blasphemy and modernism do more than coexist in these writers' works. They are in fact mutually constitutive, as can be seen most readily in texts such as Loy's 1914 poem "Parturition," or Nugent's 1926 story "Smoke, Lilies

and Jade": two works as blasphemous as they are unprecedented in their formal and thematic experimentations. In such cases, modernism and blasphemy prove as difficult to separate as form and content. Thus do these authors discharge the duties of what a young James Joyce had in 1904 declared the modern artist's "Holy Office": the imperative to transgress orthodoxies both literary and religious, or, let us say, to be at once both blasphemous and modernist.

The Politics of Blasphemy

That imperative carries political as well as aesthetic implications. For blasphemy is a barometer and a mechanism of power, a discourse governed by the powerful but also occasionally usurped by the marginalized in politically significant ways. Blasphemy respects no division of church and state; alongside its religious subversions, it inevitably transgresses secular authority. Accordingly, as modernist writers critique and reinscribe religious orthodoxy, they also expose the ideological complicities of ecclesiastical and more worldly institutions of power. Further, they evolve blasphemous ways of addressing such inevitably ideological issues as race, gender, class, sexuality, and religious orientation— and use blasphemy as a means to articulate novel and potentially liberating ways to conceive these very categories, giving voice to the subaltern, the unrecognized, the "unnatural."

Here we encounter one way to resolve the supposed incommensurability of a literary criticism that attends to such overtly political issues with a criticism that engages the topic of religion. Such an opposition is implied, for instance, by a much-remarked 2005 article in which Stanley Fish cited religion as the topic most likely to supplant "the triumvirate of race, gender, and class as the center of intellectual energy." This must have been welcome news to J. Hillis Miller, who had earlier lamented literary critics' inattention to "the religious or ontological dimension of writers' and cultures' ideologies in favor of a more or less exclusive infatuation with the three mythological graces of contemporary humanistic study: Race, Class, and Gender." One of the present study's foundational questions is: why must we choose between one approach and the other? Why not discuss these mythological graces, with all their pressing political import, in the context of the religious? In particular, why not discuss the ways that often transgressive religious discourses enable confrontations with the taboos of Race, Class, and Gender? And why not the fourth grace, Sexuality? That category, I know, would have spoiled Miller's neat trinity— but sexuality is crucial to understanding spiritual ecstasy, and blasphemy has always offended most when it has had to do with religion's putative corruption at the hands of profane Eros.

Accordingly, the chapters that follow propose readings of blasphemy as both an artistic and a political mode of expression. When I speak of blasphemy's political aims and consequences, however, I mean something quite different than Giorgio Agamben's utopic vision of a politically liberative "profanation"— a term he defines, idiosyncratically, as an effort "to abolish and erase separations" between sacred and profane, "to return to common use that which has been removed to the sphere of the sacred." I am concerned not with this idealized practice of neutralizing all distinction, but rather with the subversive, blasphemous uses to which literary representations of the sacred and profane are put. To that end a sense of distinction must remain— albeit in decidedly transformed ways— so that the blasphemer can partake of the authority inherent in notions of the sacred, even as she upends those notions and illumines their repressive political uses. This is a perhaps necessary and certainly transgressive move on the part of modernists who need to point up, in order to critique, the functionally sacral nature of modernity's new gods, and by writers— especially women writers, queer writers, and writers of color— who seek ways to make their voices heard.

Exemplum: The Good News in Langston Hughes

Consider Langston Hughes's 1932 poem "Goodbye Christ." Repudiating "Christ Jesus Lord God Jehovah" in favor of "A real guy named / Marx Communist Lenin Peasant Stalin Worker ME," the poem aroused thunderous protest both from evangelicals, angered at its blasphemy, and from American nationalists who objected to its blatantly pro- Communist message.40 (To say nothing of the Saturday Evening Post, which the poem derides, and which mischievously reprinted "Goodbye Christ" without permission in 1940.) Of course— and this is the point— one cannot dissociate the poem's religious transgressions from its political ones. The political cause of "godless Communism" was inseparable, in the minds of many detractors, from its rejection of religious faith. According to an anti- Hughes flyer from the time, distributed by a group dedicated to the cause of "Christian Nationalism": " 'HATE CHRIST' Is the Slogan of the Communists." For such readers, Hughes's poem was both treasonous and blasphemous; the writer of "Goodbye Christ" knew well the potency of such an irreverent mixture. Or perhaps it's more correct to say that Hughes recognized that treason and blasphemy are at some level inextricable offenses. What made "Goodbye Christ" so dangerous was the explosive directness with which it framed its indictments of both the political and the religious.

In some "Draft ideas" he jotted down in December 1964, Hughes nonetheless warns his fellow poets against the snares of the political: "Politics can be the graveyard of the poet. And only poetry can be his resurrection." Yet later in the same draft he writes,

> Concerning politics, nothing I have said is true. A poet is a human being. Each human being must live within his time, with and for his people, and within the boundaries of his country. Therefore, how can a poet keep out of politics?
> Hang yourself, poet, in your own words. Otherwise, you are dead.

Notable is the way that the figure of poetic "resurrection" remains even in Hughes's volte- face at the end of this passage, indeed becomes much more forceful. The poet must hang herself in order to live, must lose her life to find it. And for Hughes, despite his initial (rhetorical) hesitation, that resurrection is ultimately as politically charged as it is inherently religious.

As a poet, at any rate, Hughes's evocations of religion are invariably political, often in the least subtle of ways. His "Christ in Alabama" (1931) declares, for example, that "Christ is a Nigger": a "holy bastard" born not of Virgin Birth but of unholy rape (by the "White Master above") and now left to die on "the cross of the South." The poem provoked a scandal when it was first published in Contempo, making this Hughes's most controversial work behind "Goodbye Christ." Politicians and newspaper editors denounced "the insulting and blasphemous" Hughes in ways that prove the success of the poet's calculation to provoke: "It's bad enough to call Christ a bastard ... but to call Him a nigger— that's too much!" Above all, blasphemy serves Hughes as a means to articulate his outrage at economic inequality. In poems such as "Hungry Child"— published in the March 1925 issue of Workers Monthly— Hughes links religious notions of divine Providence, whose mysteries are impenetrable, with the similarly mysterious and often unjust dispensations of capitalism. Regardless what the scriptures say, this poem suggests, God continues to be a god for the rich and the white: "Where are your shares in standard oil? / I made the world for the rich / And the will-be-rich / And the have-always-been-rich." As I demonstrate further in chapter 3, blasphemy is for Hughes— and for other Harlem Renaissance writers— the preferred idiom in which to express resistance to this white God and to the worldly injustices perpetuated in his name.

Transgressive Typology and the Aesthetics of Sacrilege

In attending to the literary strategies that Hughes and others use to articulate such resistance, Blasphemous Modernism is concerned always with what Rachel Blau DuPlessis calls "the intersection of two 'news'— the rhetorical/ stylistic (modernism) and the ideological/ political (modernity)." The

language of blasphemous modernism irrupts at that intersection, and it takes, I argue, two predominant channels of expression: channels that follow the two predominant forms of blasphemy as it's understood in Christian tradition. One of these, of course, is the act of defiling or desecrating the sacred. The other entails arrogating divinity to oneself: an act of willful appropriation that typically involves declaring oneself the fulfillment of a prophetic typology. In modernist literature, for reasons I explain below, the former mode of blasphemy tends to constitute an "aesthetics of sacrilege." The latter let us call "transgressive typology," and let us appreciate that for Christians this is blasphemy's most pertinent meaning. For without this form of blasphemy, the New Testament suggests, there would be no Christ and no religion in his name.

In the gospels of Matthew and Mark, the Jewish high priest Caiaphas asks Jesus directly "whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God." Both Caiaphas and the gathered crowd declare the prisoner guilty of "blasphemy" when he responds, "I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven." Historically, Jesus's promise has not yet come to pass, though believers might take some consolation from its parodic fulfillment in Joyce's Ulysses. At the close of that novel's "Cyclops" episode, finding himself charged, like Jesus, with blasphemy, Leopold Bloom eludes his violent accuser by ascending to the clouds on a biblical chariot— where he sits, fittingly, at the right hand of Power. Jack Power, that is: Bloom's fellow Dubliner. Such playful typology is one of the most notable narrative components of Ulysses, which Joyce structures as much by biblical parallels as by the novel's more famous Homeric correspondences. Ulysses thus exemplifies blasphemous modernism's interest in transgressive typology: in the unorthodox, unauthorized, and often subversive exploitation of scripture and its tropes.

Typology for Christians involves a hermeneutic appropriation of the Hebrew Bible. More broadly, typology is a matter of linguistic appropriation and reappropriation. It's a matter of colonization, even, though with the word transgressive I mean to signal a reverse colonization, as when a marginalized artist imaginatively stakes his or her claim to a hegemonic religious discourse. Observe the female Jehovahs and Christs that populate Mina Loy's poetry; the black Christs and other biblical figures strewn throughout African American modernism; and Djuna Barnes's sly parody, in Nightwood (1936), of the Virgin Birth: an irreverent rewriting that typifies the modernist approach to scriptural typology. In this novel, the character Robin Vote produces a son for her husband, Felix Volkbein, who holds decidedly messianic expectations for his new heir. (The son's name, Guido, derives from the Latin Vito, or "life.") Felix, though, seems to have little to do with conceiving him, and Robin herself disavows any penetration by man, as Nightwood hints that Guido may be the product of a miraculous conception. With the stoic faith of Christ's mother obeying the Annunciation, Robin "conceiv[es] herself pregnant." When her labor pains arrive, the nativity she has fostered with "monstrous" prayers and inspired with "the memoirs of the Marquis de Sade" soon becomes a travesty of the biblical precedent: "She rose up on her elbow in her bloody gown, looking about her in the bed as if she had lost something. 'Oh, for Christ's sake, for Christ's sake!' she kept crying like a child who had walked into the commencement of a horror" (47– 48). Like the birth scene in Loy's 1914 poem "Parturition," whose speaker hears "the gurgling of a crucified wild beast" as a baby emerges from her womb, Guido's virgin birth replays in baroque fashion the birth that truly was "for Christ's sake."51 Not for nothing will Guido later fondle the Virgin that hangs from his neck and call it "mother" (162).

The circumstances of Christ's conception likewise served W. B. Yeats as a fit subject for transgressive typology when, in 1924— incensed by Ireland's largely uncontested policies "giving Catholic moral standards the backing of the State"— Yeats contributed to the pages of a radical Irish magazine a poem expressly designed "to arouse controversy and flout censorship." The poem, "Leda and the Swan," did indeed prove controversial— and not only for its seeming prurience or obscenity but also, and especially, for its irreverent troping on Christian theology and iconography.

"Annunciation" had in fact been the poem's working title, and its readers were only too familiar with the sort of blasphemy that dwelt on the Virgin Mother's unsolicited fertilization by the holy dove or, at least, by some avian equivalent. "C'est le pigeon, Joseph," thinks Stephen Dedalus as he walks along Sandymount Strand; Yeats himself would title Book II of A Vision (1925) "Dove or Swan," making clear his imaginative typological equation of the Greek and the Christian annunciations.

Yeats's poem invites political readings, too, wherein Leda personifies an Ireland figuratively "raped" by its colonial oppressors, or perhaps by an oppressive Catholic Church: by either its "conqueror" or its "gay betrayer," as Joyce had put the matter in Ulysses (1.405). "Leda and the Swan" thus echoes Joyce's systematic use of blasphemy to frame his novelistic critiques of both church and empire— a topic I take up in chapter I— and also resonates with the telltale ambivalence, equal parts appropriation and profanation, that attends Joyce's "sacreligious" trafficking in transgressive typology throughout Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. Mina Loy's 1923 poem "Joyce's Ulysses" captures this ambivalence in evocative terms, characterizing that novel's modernist aesthetic as "The word made flesh /and feeding upon itself / with erudite fangs." Here Loy aptly praises the nimble ironic modes with which Joyce succeeds in having his religion and eating it too— in simultaneously channeling and profaning, or "feeding upon," a scriptural poetics of Word- made- flesh. For in addition to demonstrating the allure for modernist writers of transgressive typology, Ulysses also showcases the other mode of blasphemy, distinct but related: the rhetorical desecration of the sacred.

Modernist strategies of this kind aspire, often, to the condition of actual physical or embodied profanation— in accordance with a literary aesthetics of sacrilege whose ideal, it seems, would be somehow to literalize or reify the conventional Christian figuration of blasphemy as words that "injure and rend the body of Christ."55 Here some brief definitions are in order. While for most practical purposes the terms "blasphemy" and "sacrilege" are interchangeable, there is nonetheless a semantic distinction that proves fruitful for theorizing literary irreverence. Both blasphemy and sacrilege are profanatory, which is to say that both offend against the sacred. What distinguishes them is that blasphemy, as I began by saying, is textual— a matter of rhetoric, form, and expression— while sacrilege denotes physical desecration. If the realm of the former is discourse or text, the realm of the latter is physicality, embodiment. Blasphemy thus lends itself as the more obvious term for religious irreverence that exists in or as literature, but modernist writers are rarely content with this distinction; their provocations inevitably test the boundaries between sacrilege and blasphemy, body and text, content and form. Literature's most memorable profanations, after all, are those that forcefully usher forth the profane and profaning body within a context of the sacred, pressing blasphemy's essential discursiveness as near as possible to the immanent materiality of sacrilege.

For a modernist paradigm of this operation, consider the Reverend Hightower in Faulkner's Light in August (1932), "up there in the pulpit with his hands flying around him and the dogma he was supposed to preach all full of galloping cavalry and defeat and glory just as when he tried to tell them on the street about the galloping horses, it in turn would get all mixed up with absolution and choirs of martial seraphim."56 Such rhetorical mixing- up of profane and sacred is the stuff of blasphemy. But it is Hightower's unique ability to evoke these profane bodies and ghosts, to render them virtually present in the house of God— to conjure, incarnate, resurrect them— that invites a slightly more dangerous suspicion in the minds of his parishioners, namely "that what he preached in God's own house on God's own day verged on actual sacrilege" (63). This "actual sacrilege," of which Hightower's oratory seems ever on the brink, is the unachievable but nonetheless persistent goal of the blasphemous writer.

Like Hightower's sermons, the corporeal excesses of blasphemous modernism seem to exceed the "merely" textual— often, as it happens, by asserting the sexual. Mina Loy, for instance, puts the highly eroticized speaker of Songs to Joannes (1917) through her own Passion and Crucifixion as the poem itself begins to come apart at the seams, undergoing an analogous textual immolation. Structurally and formally, this and other of Loy's poems mirror the somatic textuality of what Joyce called his "epic of the human body," Ulysses. In both Loy and Joyce, body and text are conflated— Molly Bloom's "soliloquy" is only the best- known example— and with them sacrilege and blasphemy. Especially in the influential works they produced between 1914 (Loy's print debut, Joyce's "annus mirabilis") and 1922/23 (Ulysses, Lunar Baedeker), these two authors provide the touchstones or urtexts of modernism's sacrilegious aesthetics, one performing in poetry what the other does in prose.58 But the vision they share also has special resonance for writers such as Djuna Barnes (see chapter 4), whose novels so often entwine the thematics of religion and of erotic embodiment, and D. H. Lawrence, whose reimagining of the Christ myth in The Escaped Cock (1929) replaces the Resurrection with, I suppose, the Erection: "He crouched to her, and he felt the blaze of his manhood and his power rise up in his loins, magnificent. 'I am risen!' " A sacrilegious aesthetic also attends the work of Harlem's self-styled "Niggeratti" (chapter 3), whose fictions bring the body very much to the fore— notably in their contributions to the single but explosive issue of Wallace Thurman's little magazine Fire!! (1926).

Given these writers' investments in the profane Word made flesh, it's far from incidental that the figure of the tongue— mortal nexus of flesh and word— should recur with such tenacity in their works, from "the tattle of tongueplay" that resounds throughout Loy's poetry to the "livid tongues" of the Niggeratti, "burning wooden opposition with a cackling chuckle of contempt" (as Fire!! advertised on its opening page).60 See also the richly profane tongue of Joyce's Shem the Penman, unleashing the "blasphematory spits" of Finnegans Wake (183.24), and the erotic revision, in Barnes's Ladies Almanack, of the Pentecost and its "tongues like as of fire" (Acts 2:3). Such invocations comport well enough with the juridical logic of medieval and early modern Europe, where blasphemers could expect to have their tongues mutilated in punishment— or even, in the case of recidivists, forcibly removed.61 That blasphemy is "primarily a sin of the tongue," as The Catholic Encyclopedia informs us, underscores its status as both inherently discursive and also inevitably rooted in the body.62 The resultant comic potential would be exploited memorably, a half- century after Finnegans Wake, by Salman Rushdie's satire of "American religiosity" in his own determinedly modernist novel (a text much indebted to the blasphemous modernisms both of Joyce and of Mikhail Bulgakov): The Satanic Verses.63 Here a comical purveyor of the Word— Protestant creationist Eugene Dumsday (dumb + doomsday)—suffers the poetic justice of having his incessantly flapping tongue first severed and then reconstituted "with flesh taken from his posterior" (432). Putting his "new, buttocky tongue" to work as a radio evangelist, Dumsday reminds us of the tongue's profane corporeality as well as its capacity for rhetorical virtuosity, blasphemous and otherwise (432).

It is, in fact, in The Satanic Verses that the aesthetics of sacrilege would eventually find its most extreme manifestation. In this case, the sacrilege had less to do with any profane corporeality of the text itself than with its notorious reception, if "reception" is indeed the word for an international firestorm that consumed dozens of human lives. Curiously, this hostile response managed both to affirm and to confute the novel's own implicit arguments about blasphemy and writing. For while The Satanic Verses clearly endorses the critical agency of the written word, it also forcefully dramatizes the tragically unequal struggle between blasphemy and the seductive powers of militant orthodoxy. "How hard that struggle," thinks one character in the novel, a poet seeking to "repossess" the "poisoned wells" of orthodox discourse; "how inevitable the defeat" (290). More generally, The Satanic Verses posits as "a great lie" the ostensibly quaint notion that "the pen is mightier than the

sword" (100). When the novel's other resident poet, the blasphemer Baal, imagines "rivers of blood" flowing "from the cuts his verses inflict," he is not speaking literally (105). Yet while the ensuing Rushdie Affair validated one crucial aspect of the Verses' project— affirming the written word's preeminence as the medium of blasphemy— it also disproved, in spectacular fashion, the notion that the violence caused by such writings is inevitably merely figurative. Real blood flowed from the "cuts" Rushdie's Verses inflicted, in addition to the deeply personal wounding that scholars such as Saba Mahmood have identified as a defining consequence of blasphemy in Muslim contexts.

This logic of religious trauma had underwritten the official judgment of the AllIndia Shia Conference, in 1933, that a book called Angaaray ("Burning Coals")— a frequently blasphemous volume of modernist fiction and drama composed, in Urdu, by a coterie of north Indian writers— was not just "filthy" but "heartrending," that it had "wounded the feelings of the entire Muslim community."65 (Along with The Satanic Verses, Angaaray reminds us that Christianity— which provides the most pressing religious contexts for the predominantly British, Irish, and American authors discussed in this book— nonetheless holds no monopoly over blasphemy's range of formal and ideological uses for modernist writers.)

Now Muslim scholars were writing editorials urging Rushdie to stanch "the rage of entire nations" caused by his hurtful novel: "Mr. Rushdie, you have cut them and they are bleeding: Do something quickly to heal the wound." In a fateful iteration of the aesthetics of sacrilege, then, The Satanic Verses converted the verbal offense of blasphemy into a trauma felt as unbearably physical, into an offense that carried all the violence of sacrilege and spawned further violence in turn. Rushdie's novel thus stands as a powerful demonstration not only of how religion persists in modernism, but also of how modernism itself persists in postwar anglophone literature— and of the critical role blasphemy plays in that persistence.

Blasphemy as Dialectic

Although this book generally emphasizes a complementary relation in modernist texts between transgressive typologies and sacrilegious aesthetics, chapter 3 locates a crucial tension between the two— one that illuminates the competing politics and poetics of the Harlem Renaissance. In that chapter I consider, first, the large- scale exercise in imaginative modernist typology that is Alain Locke's 1925 New Negro anthology. As if to supersede the traditional association of African Americans with the "chosen people" of the Hebrew Bible, The New Negro offers itself, I argue, as a kind of New Testament— and it duly seeks to present its titular figure as a messianic black Christ fit to redeem an as- yet artistically and politically undeveloped black culture. It's against this typological project that Harlem's younger, more radical writers— the "Niggeratti" coterie of Langston Hughes, Wallace Thurman, Richard Bruce Nugent, Zora Neale Hurston, and others— aim their own sacrilegious aesthetics. This dialectic can be read profitably as one of those politically inflected, blasphemous contests that are "staged, often ritually, for control of a shared discourse." Here the contest is staged as a kind of "signifyin(g)," in Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s formulation: an irreverent dialogue with, troping on, and transformation of The New Negro's own blasphemous strategies.

Which brings us to another cultural exchange from the period, one similarly characterized by biblical appropriation and the discourse of blasphemy. Like The New Negro, Radclyffe Hall's controversial novel The Well of Loneliness (1928) exploits Christian typology in a bid for cultural recognition and acceptance— of the "sexual invert," in this case, rather than "the Negro." The "stigmata" of the invert, Hall writes, are "verily the wounds of One nailed to a cross," and she accordingly casts her protagonist, Stephen Gordon, as an elaborate and unsubtle Christ figure. Echoing, meanwhile, the satiric or "signifying" role of the Niggeratti is The Sink of Solitude (1928), a satiric pamphlet— comprising a polemical preface by P. R. Stephensen, drawings by Beresford Egan, and an anonymous "verse lampoon" in heroic couplets— that not only skewers Hall herself and her "silly novel" but

also calls "upon the Home Secretary as a christian to enforce the blasphemy laws" against Hall's most vocal critic, James Douglas.

These successive rhetorical postures bear remarking. First, The Well of Loneliness makes "brazen, blasphemous" use of biblical typology in its moral defense of homosexuality, which some of its readers nonetheless decry as blasphemous for its perceived immorality. Then The Sink of Solitude calls for blasphemy charges to be brought against the novel's detractors for having profaned one of modernity's secular gods, Freedom of Speech. Finally, Hall herself was considerably upset by what she considered the "blasphemy" of The Sink's frontispiece, which depicts the author's body nailed to a cross; no doubt Hall's moralizing critics would have concurred in characterizing the image as blasphemous. The similarity of this dialectic— a blasphemous response to blasphemy, which itself elicits charges of blasphemy— to the New Negro / Niggeratti agon demonstrates that divergent minority constituencies in the modernist period experienced similar kinds of infighting over how best to deploy religious and blasphemous tropes. In writing back to Hall's novel, moreover, The Sink of Solitude is joined by the works of Djuna Barnes, especially Ladies Almanack (1928), which caricatures Hall as a tiresome advocate for lesbian monogamy. For Barnes, as I demonstrate in chapter 4, blasphemy provides a way to unsettle and critique the then- regnant notion of homosexuality as congenital "inversion": a concept promulgated most widely by sexologists such as Richard von Krafft- Ebing and Havelock Ellis.

Ellis, incidentally, subscribed as confidently as anyone to the death- of- God thesis, writing in 1897 that since "the problem of religion has practically been settled," "the question of sex ... stands before the coming generations as the chief problem for solution." It is important to recognize that writers such as Joyce, Loy, Nugent, and Barnes keep both of these "problems" open, the former just as much as the latter. Their works acknowledge the aesthetic and political power of the religious structures they profane, in order more meaningfully to assimilate and exploit them. The very profanability of scripture and sacrament implies, after all, their enduring sanctity; the seemingly total irreverence of a novel such as Ulysses, or Nightwood, or The Satanic Verses is in fact circumscribed by this tacit concession of religion's power and symbolic necessity. The modernists' literary profanations derive their force in large part from this necessity and from the transgressive possibilities its limitations make possible— reminding us that to blaspheme an institution without respect for its authority, its sanctity, would be not to blaspheme at all. In this and other ways, the writers I discuss belie Eliot's declaration that blasphemy had become obsolete in a faithless century. Their poems and fictions insist that both religion and its artistic subversions continue to matter, that by drawing fully on religion's cultural authority blasphemy can achieve real literary and political significance. The pages that follow explore the various but always radical ends to which these writers put this shared understanding. <>

THE PIVOTAL GENERATION: WHY WE HAVE A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SLOW CLIMATE CHANGE RIGHT NOW by Henry Shue [Princeton University Press, 9780691226248]

An eminent philosopher explains why we owe it to future generations to take immediate action on global warming

Climate change is the supreme challenge of our time. Yet despite growing international recognition of the unfolding catastrophe, global carbon emissions continue to rise, hitting an all-time high in 2019. Unless humanity rapidly transitions to renewable energy, it may be too late to stop

irreversible ecological damage. In *The Pivotal Generation*, renowned political philosopher Henry Shue makes an impassioned case for taking immediate, radical action to combat global warming.

Shue grounds his argument in a rigorous philosophical analysis of climate change's moral implications. Unlike previous generations, which didn't fully understand the danger of burning carbon, we have the knowledge to comprehend and control rising carbon dioxide levels. And unlike future generations, we still have time to mitigate the worst effects of global warming. This generation has the power, and thus the responsibility, to save the planet. Shirking that responsibility only leaves the next generation with an even heavier burden—one they may find impossible to bear.

Written in direct, accessible language, *The Pivotal Generation* approaches the latest scientific research with a singular moral clarity. It's an urgently needed call to action for anyone concerned about the planet's future.

Review

"Henry Shue's reflection on climate change, informed by science, history, ethics, and philosophy, not only makes the case that we are the 'pivotal generation' to change the direction of our climate, but also presents a powerful, specific, and far from hopeless vision for how we should approach this unique challenge."**—Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland**

"This is a splendid and galvanizing book. In a worsening climate crisis that often generates despair, we need a direct call to action. Henry Shue speaks to us as 'the pivotal generation': we are at the date of last opportunity to act, there are no excuses, and if we immediately kick-start aggressive mitigation efforts we could save future people from vast harms. Shue writes luminously, leaving us in no doubt about the urgency of this moral imperative."**—Catriona McKinnon, author of *Climate Change and Future Justice***

"Over the past three decades, political philosopher Henry Shue has done more than anyone else to keep justice at the center of the struggle to stop climate change. Piercing and clear-minded, this book lays down a sobering challenge. Will we, the pivotal generation, act on climate change as justice demands?"**—Dale Jamieson, author of *Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle against Climate Change Failed—and What It Means for Our Future***

"In *ThePivotal Generation*, Henry Shue argues that today's citizens of developed countries—inheritors of fossil fuel benefits and liabilities—must grasp the mantle of leadership, confronting those choosing greed over the future. We have loaded the proverbial camel's back to breaking, creating a moral obligation to halt our planetary plunge into the inferno. To be complacent is to be complicit. Future generations await our choice."—**Nancy Taylor Sorrells, historian and conservationist, Alliance for the Shenandoah Valley**

"This is a very important book on the most urgent problem of our times. Henry Shue shows that our generation has an undeniable moral responsibility to tackle the climate crisis right now. We must take control of our legacy, and avoid leaving an uninhabitable world behind."**—Ingrid Robeyns, Ethics Institute at Utrecht University**

Contens
Preface

I have separated out three conceptually distinct strands of the basis for urgent and robust action to stop climate change from worsening: inevitably more difficult challenges for future people, no limit yet on the extent to which humans will modify the climate, and the danger of passing critical points of no return: tipping points that launch irreversible change. What is truly scary is empirical combinations of two or more of these factors, especially if one of the factors is the third: passing tipping points for abrupt worsening. For instance, it is already worrying that we have so far imposed no limit on the disruption that we are causing to the climate, but that could mean only that we were very slowly and incrementally making matters worse for a while. But if we leave the disruption unlimited for long enough that we meanwhile pass critical tipping points like initiating irreversible melting of additional major ice sheets, then the most limited that the damage can possibly ever be will be far worse than otherwise. The other side of the coin, of course, is that if we throw ourselves into the effort, we can make a huge positive difference for the lives of virtually every future person who lives on this planet.

The processes sketched just above are concrete embodiments of the reality that time is continuous, not partitioned, except for practical convenience in our own consciousness. Any attempted separation of the flow of human history, its causes, its effects, and the responsibilities of those of us who will unavoidably contribute to the future direction of the flow into discrete periods is at best an

oversimplification and often an illusion or an evasion. I live amid the wealth, ease, and technological wonders of a postindustrial society only because of the fossil-fuel combustion that drove the Industrial Revolution in my past and created my present standard of living. My present immersion in a growth-obsessed, plasticstrangled consumerist society that still burns ever more fossil fuels each year (except the pandemic year of 2020) is locking in critical and dangerous features of the future climate of people I erringly tend to think of as distant strangers. For me to deny that this past and this future are part of who I am and what I do would be to fail to acknowledge fundamental realities and to shirk inescapable responsibilities. Or so I will try further to show in what follows.

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Other things being equal, it seems clearly fairer for those who have contributed most to the creation of a problem to bear much more of the burden of dealing with the problem than those who have contributed least. Moreover, other things being equal, it is evidently fairer for those who have benefited most from the creation of a problem to bear much more of the burden of dealing with it than those who have benefited least. While the present descendants of those who contributed most to the creation of the polluting carbon regime did not themselves contribute to its creation, we are contributing to its perpetuation in the present and to the worsening of climate change in the future, insofar as we simply use the inherited energy regime and do little to transition beyond it; and we enjoy the benefits (and the ability to pay) inherited by present members of the nations whose earlier members did create the problem.

It may seem unfair that any generation should have to bear the burden of fundamentally restructuring the global energy regime. When James Watt designed the steam engine in 1784—the event from which Paul Crutzen dated our entry into the Anthropocene—burning coal seemed simply to be an ingenious way of generating copious amounts of steam and thereby unprecedented amounts of energy. Who knew that coal would turn out to be the most climate-disruptive source of energy available? But it turns out that the CO_2 from fossil fuels that reaches the atmosphere holds in unwanted heat that used to escape from the planet, so we have no choice but to stop injecting the CO_2. This requires an expensive transition between energy regimes, and someone will have to pay.

The fundamental contention here is that what has happened between 1784 and today is very nearly the most unfair process imaginable and cries out for a robust correction. One portion of humanity—the "Developed States"—has reaped the vast majority of the benefits from the invention of the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution generally while allowing the costs, including rights-violating harms and increasing inequalities, to be spread globally. Most individuals will suffer from climate change, although not uniformly and not in any proportion to their contribution to causing it. It is perhaps unfair that the benefits have been narrowly held while the costs have been widely disbursed. It is certainly deeply unfair that the benefits have been narrowly held by those who have inflicted the damage on everyone, while the costs, including severe harms—such as loss of life, health, or home—descend randomly upon all. The heart of what is objectionable is, if you like, a specific conjunction of benefit from the problem, contribution to the problem, and infliction of harm: those who are the source of the dangers from the disrupted climate suffer least from those dangers and keep more of the benefits from the activities that are disrupting the climate by failing to shoulder the costs of what must be done to head off the far worse dangers inherent in the persistence of the now-dominant carbon energy regime.

It would be difficult to concoct a more strikingly unfair arrangement than the energy-business-as-usual. Contribution to solving the problem ought to bear some relation to contribution to creating the problem, especially when those who have in fact created the problem have benefited so handsomely from doing My argument is basically a consistency argument about fairness. The federal

government of the United States, like many national governments, claims for its present and future citizens most of the fruits of the activities of its past citizens—it claims national ownership of, for instance, the benefits of the industrialization of the United States, including the vast infrastructure and capital left behind. In consistency, if most of the benefits of the past belong to the United States, so should the corresponding costs. But one very significant cost, the enormous damage done to the stability of the global climate system by carbon pollution, has in fact been socialized universally. The people of all nations and all generations are increasingly suffering the effects of the vast GHG emissions produced by the process of US industrialization and the continuing maintenance of US postindustrial society. Similar evasions of accountability by other governments, like the Chinese, Russian, and Brazilian, excuse no one, them or us.

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What matters most, however, about a date-of-last-opportunity may be simply that inaction at such a time leads to irretrievable loss. Of course, in many cases no one can be sure that a particular date is a date-of-last-opportunity until long after the date has receded into the past. In order to have any effect, we must choose now—under uncertainty. This kind of uncertainty, however, tilts strongly toward action. Either this is the date-of-last-opportunity for one or more disasters, or it is not.

Suppose it is not, but we choose to act in worthwhile ways like rapidly reducing carbon emissions. Then we will exert ourselves and incur expenses beyond our responsibilities toward people of the future. We will not help to save future generations from catastrophe but only to enrich the conditions of their lives to a degree that we have no duty to bring about. We will have morally "overachieved." But if the tasks we undertake are clearly not excessively burdensome for us, at worst we will have left a legacy for future generations that exceeds our responsibilities. If moral overachievement is a "mistake," it seems like a good kind of mistake to make-and it seems a bit strange to think it is a mistake.

Or suppose it is. If in fact we are at a date-of-last-opportunity for one or more climate disasters, and we choose not to act, we will have allowed an avoidable disaster to engulf those who come after us. We will have done nothing while an irretrievable opportunity disappears. A disaster that we could have locked out will have become locked in to the climate system. If we miss the last opportunity, it is lost—forever.

An uncertainty between whether to risk putting in more worthwhile effort than we might have been required to—to overachieve—or to risk leaving the door open to a catastrophe that will reverberate through generations helpless to stop it—to fail to rescue untold millions from terrible fates—is not a reason for delay but a reason for action. Few "gambles" are so bearable on the downside and so promising on the upside, which is a spectacular opportunity—perhaps the last—to make an event that would be intolerably bad for whoever experiences it far less likely, if not impossible.

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I was originally drafting this paragraph on Earth Day 20 My last employer, the University of Oxford, announced that -would belatedly divest completely from fossil fuels. And, showing some genuine leadership, Oxford also instructed its endowment fund managers to invest across the board only in corporations with net zero business plans. (We are still waiting for Harvard.) To some extent, this is only symbolic, but it does demonstrate that even ponderous institutions can be persuaded and pressured into changing. Net zero business plans will work better when governments are seriously committed to net zero public policies (as the UK government claims to be), and vice versa. Removing from power all the politicians who are blocking serious action to reduce emissions rapidly

and forcing carbon majors to change radically or go out of business is still an uphill battle. But governments are supposed to protect their people, so it is nevertheless a battle that must be won, and soon, especially for the sake of vulnerable future people whose fates are held in the hands of the living. We can perhaps still act just in time.

It is very important that it never becomes likely that the earth's climate will run wildly out of control. We do not know exactly how urgent action is because of the very uncertainties that some opponents of action irrationally invoke in support of business-as-usual. The time to establish a limit on climate change is now—while we still can. The stakes are far too high relative to the insignificance of the lifestyle we need to give up in order to return human civilization to a much safer place. Pogo—I show my age again—said, "We have met the enemy and he is us." This is profoundly true of climate change because our passivity and inattention have allowed fossil-fuel interests to dominate energy policy and energy politics for a century. But it could also become true that we have met the allies and they are us. We have agency—our response to our time is our choice. The direction the future takes is up to us, if our pivotal generation takes back the initiative from the entrenched interests who will undermine the climate rather than willingly surrender any of their wealth and power.

A clear view of the situation raises the practical questions: who is going to lead the turn away from the path that may have a maelstrom at its unseen end, and when are they going to get started? The answer, I have tried to show, ought to be: us now. We are the pivotal generation, and the responsibility falls onus. We can recapture control of our destiny and our legacy by restoring democratic control of our politics and accelerating the revolutionary energy transition that will brighten the human future. This is the crucial political fight of the twenty-first century. It is too important to lose from lack of thought, effort, and endurance. We can do this, but we have to start doing it now. <>

THE ANTHROPOCENE UNCONSCIOUS: CLIMATE CATASTROPHE CULTURE by Mark Bould [Verso, 9781839760471]

From Ducks, Newburyport to zombie movies and the Fast and Furious franchise, how climate anxiety permeates our culture

The art and literature of our time is pregnant with catastrophe, with weather and water, wildness and weirdness. The Anthropocene - the term given to this geological epoch in which humans, anthropos, are wreaking havoc on the earth - is to be found bubbling away everywhere in contemporary cultural production. Typically, discussions of how culture registers, figures and mediates climate change focus on 'climate fiction' or 'cli-fi', but THE ANTHROPOCENE UNCONSCIOUS is more interested in how the Anthropocene and especially anthropogenic climate destabilisation manifests in texts that are not overtly about climate change - that is, unconsciously. The Anthropocene, Mark Bould argues, constitutes the unconscious of 'the art and literature of our time'.

Tracing the outlines of THE ANTHROPOCENE UNCONSCIOUS in a range of film, television and literature - across a range of genres and with utter disregard for high-low culture distinctions - this playful and riveting book draws out some of the things that are repressed and obscured by the term 'the Anthropocene', including capital, class, imperialism, inequality, alienation, violence, commodification, patriarchy and racial formations. The Anthropocene Unconscious is about a kind of rewriting. It asks: what happens when we stop assuming that the text is not about the

anthropogenic biosphere crises engulfing us? What if all the stories we tell are stories about the Anthropocene? About climate change?

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...The stories we tell about the world matter, but it is not always easy to know where to start or what to call them.

The Anthropocene is derived from Anthropos (`human') and cene (`recent', as in the current geological era, the Cenozoic, dating from 66 million years ago, and its several epochs: Paleocene, Eocene, Oligocene, Miocene, Pliocene, Pleistocene, Holocene). It describes the period in which

human activity has disrupted significant geological conditions and processes, and/or in which traces of human activity can be discerned in the geological record. The term is usually attributed to either the biologist Eugene Stermer, who used it in the 1980s, or more commonly to the atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, who independently re-coined it in the late 1990s. *Apres quoi, le deluge terminologique .. .*

the Accumulocene
the Andropocene
the Agnotocene
the Anthrobscene
the Capitalocene
the Carbocene
the Carnocene
the Chthulucene
the Corporatocene
the Econocene
the Eremocene
the Eurocene
the Homogocene
the Homogenocene
the Idiocene
the Manthropocene
the Misanthropocene
the Naufragocene
the Necrocene
the Novacene
the Oliganthropocene
the Phagocene
the Phronocene
the Plantationocene
the Planthropocene
the Polemocene

the Proletarocene
the Pyrocene
the Suburbocene
the Technocene
the Thalassocene
the Thermocene
the Theweleitocene
the Traumacene
the Urbocene
the White (M)anthropocene
the White Supremacy Scene
&c.
&c.
&c.
-cene
is the new
-punk
but this is no mere glossolalia

This proliferation of terms — some serious, others playful — does not arise from confusion or obfuscation or jargonfor-jargon's-sake. Nor is it the result of bandwagon-jumpers coining career-making catchphrases for the heady fame and giddying royalties academic publishing bestows, or even for a meagre slice of the ever-shrinking research funding pie.

Rather, it is what happens when the implications of a technical stratigraphic issue — primarily of interest to geologists and paleontologists — spill out into wider culture. It is trace evidence of an already-rich history of thinking through what it means for humans to have become a geological force.

Each of these terms tells the story from a different perspective and with different emphases. Half a dozen of them were coined by Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz specifically to demonstrate the power a name has to construe a narrative, designate a protagonist, indicate an orientation, shape perception. For example, they only half-jokingly interrupt their Thermocene chapter with the observation that because the UK and US are responsible for at least 50 per cent of global cumulative total CO2 emissions until 1980 the Anthropocene should rather be called an "Anglocene"'.

Changing the name changes the story.

As, of course, does deciding where to start it.

Nigel Clark argues for the longest of long Anthropocenes, beginning 1.6 million years ago on the African savannah, when Homo erectus first used fire 'for warmth and light, for keeping predators at bay, and for increasing the available nutrient content of foodstuffs'.$ Noting, correctly, that the genus Homo evolved on a planet with a unique `combination of oxygen-rich atmosphere, ignition sources and fuels', Clark rather less plausibly suggests that these `pyrophytic tendencies' of the Earth itself somehow rendered the urge to burn carbon irresistible to certain upright hominids.

And just as 2001's bone-as-weapon leads inevitably to orbital nuclear missiles, so our catastrophic consumption of fossil fuels flows naturally from that first prehuman barbecue. The planet made us — makes us — do it.

Michael R. Raupach and Joseph G. Canadell more reasonably suggest that the Anthropocene should at least start with something closer to the actual Anthropos, when `half a million years ago ... the ancestors of human-kind learned to derive energy from the controlled combustion of detrital biotic

carbon such as wood and peat'. But once more, there is a Kubrickian cut that mythologises causation and obscures massive differences of scale. We are all, it seems, twisted fire-starters, and we just cannot help ourselves.

At the other extreme, the shortest of the short Anthropocenes dates either from the 16 July 1945 Trinity nuclear test, with it global spread of radioactive isotopes, or more generally from the end of World War II, when wartime production was retooled to manufacture mass commodities. Inaugurating a new phase of consumer capitalism, this shift expanded and intensified the use of fossil fuels, both as an energy source and in the production of plastics. This `Great Acceleration' seems the option most likely to be selected by stratigraphers as the point from which to date the Anthropocene in the official Geological Time Scale. And you can see why.

In 2004, Will Steffen and ten co-authors compiled twenty-four graphs of changes in human activity and global scale alterations to the Earth system since 1750. The first dozen chart increases in population, urban population, total real GDP, foreign direct investment, damming of rivers, water use, consumption (of fertiliser, paper, motor vehicles, telephones, international tourism and McDonald's restaurants). The second dozen show the depletion rate of ozone and the increases in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (CO_2, C_2O, CH_4), average surface temperature, species extinctions, land domestication, coastal zone nitrogen flux, coastal zone structural alterations, and in the number of great floods and fully exploited fisheries. Each graph reproduces that distinctive hockey stick curve — a level then gradually rising line, measuring units against time, that abruptly swerves upwards — and on all of them that sudden steepening occurs around 1950. Which seems pretty conclusive. Especially if all we are interested in is resolving a technical stratigraphic issue.

However.

Two other short Anthropocenes should give us pause. They both begin in the 1400s and are so profoundly interrelated that they are probably just different ways of looking at the same conjuncture.

The European `discovery', exploitation, extraction and colonisation of the Americas devastated indigenous populations through disease, conquest, enslavement, resettlement and other forms of colonial violence. And since the Atlantic slave trade developed to replace indigenous forced labour in the looting of the 'New World', it also devastated African populations. Indigenous Americans had no immunity to smallpox and other diseases that leapt ahead of the European invaders, sometimes eradicating entire peoples before there was any direct contact. In the 150 years after Columbus landed, colonisers wiped out probably 50 million indigenous people, and the jungle reclaimed agricultural land so quickly that its increased uptake of atmospheric CO_2 is discernible in early 17th century ice cores. Intertwined with this violent collision of worlds — which also brought about the biotic integration and homogenisation of species that had evolved on separate continents for millions of years — is the early modern development of capitalism as a world system, beginning with the Dutch and British agricultural revolutions. As Jason W. Moore notes, this otherwise well-established early history of capitalism is obscured in — and by — accounts that prefer to start a short Anthropocene with the industrial revolution in 18th century Britain, and thus to shift the blame, consciously or not, onto `industrialisation rather than capitalism and colonialism.

Crutzen, for example, selects 1784 — which he associates with `James Watt's design of the steam engine' — as his starting point because that is when `analyses of air trapped in polar ice [show] the beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane'. But as Moore scathingly enquires, if the `motive force behind this epochal shift' was 'coal and steam', then what was the `driving force between coal and steam?'

Not class. Not capital. Not imperialism. Not even culture ... you guessed it: the Anthropos. Humanity as an undifferentiated whole.

The Anthropocene makes for an easy story. Easy, because it does not challenge the naturalized inequalities, alienation, and violence inscribed in modernity's strategic relations of power and production. It is an easy story to tell because it does not ask us to think about these relations at all. The mosaic of human activity in the web of life is reduced to an abstract Humanity: a homogeneous acting unit. Inequality, commodification, imperialism, patriarchy, racial formations, and much more, have been largely removed from consideration.

The Anthropocene recognises humanity as a geological force, but does so indiscriminately. In 'the time of guilt', it finally admits as human those it denied 'in the time of plenty'. Hence Moore and others prefer to call it the Capitalocene.

Yet some would rather stick with the Anthropocene.

For example, Adam Trexler argues that the term avoids such `politically contentious' phrases as `climate change' and `global warming' — for which it is now effectively a euphemism — and moves discussions away from prognosticating outcomes to asserting 'a phenomenon that has already been measured and verified across scientific disciplines and conclusively linked to human emissions of fossil fuels'.17 It refocuses us on a geological process that far exceeds any solution to be found in individual consumer choices, and emphasises `larger, nonhuman aspects of climate', such as 'the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere', that `will continue to act' independently of us.

Adopting the aura of scientific authority is not without risk. It appeals to science's own ideals of objectivism, universalism, scepticism and disinterestedness, at the same time obscuring the extent to which science is not only a human and social practice but one that is increasingly dominated, directed and shaped by corporate and state interests, often in direct contradiction of those ideals. And it is not at all clear how effective this borrowed mantle can be when capital's ideologues, sponsors and bagmen conceal scientific findings that might undermine profit margins. When they spend decades and dollars muddying the waters. When their manufactured uncertainty is misreported by `news' media as conflict between equally valid, equally scientific viewpoints. And when, in the crazy dance of illiberalism and undemocracy, ascendant populisms deride expertise and throw out the baby of scientific consensus with the bathwater of technocratic governance.

Furthermore, talking about a geological epoch invites awestruck recoil at sublime magnitudes, which is not necessarily a bad thing, since hubris should be clobbered once in a while, but also risks evasion and complacency.

Yes, the climate does possess all the qualities of a hyperobject. It is `massively distributed in time and space relative to humans', and thus functions on `profoundly different' scales and temporalities than those we are used to. It is so vast as to be `almost impossible to hold in mind'. It showers us with effects and affects, even as it withdraws from our comprehension: we can see rain, but not climate; a banknote, but not the economy. The weather or the dollar bill is but `a flimsy, superficial appearance', a 'mere local representation' of a phenomenon so massive, so extended in space-time, that it finally shatters idiot illusions of linear cause-and-effect. By definition, the hyperobject, always invisible, exceeds our framings of the world, and presses chaos, complexity and non-linearity upon us.

But in the face of such debilitating immensity, we cannot merely shrug and take a selfie. We cannot allow the scale of the crises we are already living through, and of those to come, to trump their urgency.

To do so is to condone the impoverishment, immiseration and deaths of untold billions, human and otherwise.

These many different terms and timescales, these various -cenes, foreground what each of the others conceals, obscures, distorts, suppresses, manipulates, thwarts and denies. Together, they expose the unconscious of 'the Anthropocene'.

Indeed, this book argues, the Anthropocene is the unconscious of 'the art and literature of our time'.

In Sigmund Freud's model of the human mind, the unconscious consists of those repressed impulses, desires, drives, wishes, traumas and ideas that the conscious mind does not care to acknowledge. It is not some pre-existing dumpster into which we chuck these things, but the ceaseless roiling process of repressing them. Peristaltic and paradoxical, it is shifting, unstable, uncertain. It is `history pressing on the present and manifesting in disruptions of discourse', slipping out in distorted forms — dreams, lapses, jokes, parapraxes, tweets, odd fixations, strange associations — from which the unconscious itself can only be retrospectively inferred.

Bereft, bothered and bewildered, Ghosh's future humans seem unaware of the unconscious as a metaphor and method for reading critically. Pierre Macherey, for example, argues that a text's shape, matter and meaning are produced by selecting these particular words, images, sounds, structures, patterns, ideas, themes, and so on, and thus by rejecting those. At the same time, a text must grant entry to all the things it 'is compelled to say in order to say what it wants to say'.

Thus a text is always disrupted — fractured even — by material its producer might rather exclude, and thus less coherent than it pretends. It is trailed by swarms of `other things which must not be said, by an eloquent jive of demurral, equivocation, circumvention, slippage, contradiction. And it is laden with prior interpretations: from the whole apparatus of production, marketing and consumption; from reviewers, critics, scholars, book clubs, friends and other recommendation algorithms; and from 'the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretive traditions'

Macherey describes the text as being surrounded by and filled with such silences — like the externalities intrinsic to capitalism that must always be denied, removed from calculation, if that shambling jerry-built corpse-machine is to keep on keeping on. He imagines a circumambient yet somehow also internal realm of the unspoken, and likens it to the unconscious.

But critics are not bathyspheric explorers plumbing textual depths. At no point do we even need to break the surface. The clamour of the unspoken is everywhere. Thus, it is beyond quixotic to imagine that criticism is concerned with uncovering the text's single true meaning. Because there is no such thing. There is no rabbit waiting to be pulled out of the hat. There is probably not even a hat.

Criticism is about the words and images and sounds that are there for all to see and hear. It cannot reduce a text to something less complex and imagine that it is somehow `say[ing] more by saying less'. But it can encourage the text to speak: to confront 'the silences, the denials and the resistance' of which it is formed, to enunciate 'its silent

significance'. Criticism can bring 'out a difference within the work' that demonstrates 'that it is other than it is' No submersibles or prestidigitation required.

Fredric Jameson argues that to draw out the textual unconscious, critics must rewrite the 'text in terms of a particular master code'. Queer film theory, confronted by relentlessly heteronormative movies, does just that. It asked viewers to stop assuming that everyone in the movie is straight, and

instead to watch queerly. To encourage the silent currents of desire that flow through films to speak aloud, and to amplify them.

And suddenly, that first bristling barroom encounter between Wyatt Earp and Doc Holliday in My Darling Clementine (1946), filled with the threat of violence, becomes about two men, full of themselves and fascinated by each other, flirting. The female friendship at the heart of Calamity Jane (1953) becomes more intimate and persuasive when Doris Day sings about a `secret love' and `a woman's touch'. At some point you realise that X-Men: First Class (2011) was Brokeback Mutant all along, and the ending of Die Hard (1988) will never look the same.

And ultimately, **THE ANTHROPOCENE UNCONSCIOUS** is about this kind of rewriting. Except, it asks: what happens when we stop assuming that the text is not about the anthropogenic biosphere crises engulfing us? What if all the stories we tell are stories about the Anthropocene? About climate change? <>

HOW TO LIVE AT THE END OF THE WORLD: THEORY, ART, AND POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE by Travis Holloway [Stanford Briefs, An Imprint of Stanford University Press, 9781503633339]

Assessing the dawn of the Anthropocene era, a poet and philosopher asks: How do we live at the end of the world?

The end of the Holocene era is marked not just by melting glaciers or epic droughts, but by the near universal disappearance of shared social enterprise: the ruling class builds walls and lunar shuttles, while the rest of us contend with the atrophy of institutional integrity and the utter abdication of providing even minimal shelter from looming disaster.

The irony of the Anthropocene era is that, in a neoliberal culture of the self, it is forcing us to consider ourselves as a collective again. For those of us who are not wealthy enough to start a colony on Mars or isolate ourselves from the world, the Anthropocene ends the fantasy of sheer individualism and worldlessness once and for all. It introduces a profound sense of time and events after the so-called "end of history" and an entirely new approach to solidarity.

HOW TO LIVE AT THE END OF THE WORLD is a hopeful exploration of how we might inherit the name "Anthropocene," renarrate it, and revise our way of life or thought in view of it. In his book on time, art, and politics in an era of escalating climate change, Holloway takes up difficult, unanswered questions in recent work by Donna Haraway, Kathryn Yusoff, Bruno Latour, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Isabelle Stengers, sketching a path toward a radical form of democracy—a *zoocracy,* or, a rule of all of the living.

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A Philosophy for the End of the World

Our planet has entered into an era of instability for the first time in about 11,500 years. Biologists warn that a "sixth extinction" is underway, while geologists confirm that we have long left the Holocene, a period in the earth's history where humans and nonhumans were able to flourish alongside one another (holds). The geological epoch into which we have entered has been called an age of human beings or Anthropocene due to our species' destabilizing effects on life itself. In such a time, we no longer imagine a safe or sublime refuge from "nature" like Kant or Shelley. We encounter intense storms and tides of algae like pendulums our species set into motion—ones that now swing back at us with a force of their own. Culturally and philosophically, we are trading in our confessions and lyrics for apocalyptic epics set in cosmic space and deep time. We think about where we'll live according to the melting of glaciers. We measure critical thresholds of carbon in the air. And we talk casually about the end of the world.

In this era of ecological disaster, attempts at a new frontier are ubiquitous flights and departures that, like Sputnik or medieval theology, promise to catapult us out of this world. An Instagram ad pops up with a single white man sitting padmasana before the bare, amber plateaus of the American Southwest. A different ad on my way to work invites me to be a "pioneer" on "a new frontier." Elon Musk. Richard Branson. The Fyre Festival. And, of course, governments that abandoned their constituents and the planet long ago. "From the 1980s on," describes Bruno Latour, "the ruling classes" "concluded that the earth no longer had room enough for them and for everyone else ... [They] stopped purporting to lead and began instead to shelter themselves from the world. We are experiencing all the consequences of this flight, of which Donald Trump is merely a symbol.. . The absence of a common world we can share is driving us crazy."

This absence of a common world or worldlessness this iteration of capitalism in which the state is of and for financial markets and daily life is measured in terms of self-entrepreneurship—has left many of us alone and seemingly unable to respond to every major looming challenge. A sense of climate despair and faithlessness in governments is widespread around the globe, particularly among young people. From hurricanes to pandemics, from mutual aid projects to doomsday bunkers, a growing number of people feel that their governments will likely not prevent the next disaster or in some cases even try to save them from it. And yet, climate change is also intruding on these systems of governments from the outside, disrupting them and reconfiguring them. It is simultaneously bringing us together in unprecedented ways with a shared threat and a new sense of history.

Just when another world no longer seemed possible, it became inevitable. In truth, a new (climatic) regime will be forced onto our systems of government in this century whether we act or don't, whether we want it to or not, and sadly, whether we are more or less responsible for climate change and more or less able to shelter ourselves from it. It seems likely that this new era will increase our disparities and make all of our problems far worse. But is it also possible to imagine, in the face of a common catastrophe, the creation of more just and equitable worlds? Could living at the door of this shared crisis compel us to change the way we treat one another and the earth? We need a different way to live, think, and assemble in this new era—nothing less than a philosophy for the end of the world will do. We need to consider this moment of transition in a way that sharpens our understanding of it, touches us, and introduces the possibility of a different future.

Flights from the World

Not unlike the billionaires' space race of 2021, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt began The Human Condition (1958) by reflecting on the first artificial satellite in space. Arendt described the launch of Russia's Sputnik satellite as a turning point: "an earth-born object made by man ... [had been] launched into the universe." Still, what shocked Arendt intellectually was that the common

response to this moment of "human power and mastery" was not pride or awe, but "relief about the first 'step toward escape from men's imprisonment to the earth." The sentiment, Arendt remarked, was "extraordinary." For "although Christians [had] spoken of the earth as a vale of tears and philosophers [had] looked upon their body as a prison of mind or soul, nobody in the history of mankind [had] ever conceived of the earth as a prison ... or shown such eagerness to go literally from here to the moon."

The 2021 space race among billionaires Richard Branson, Elon Musk, and Jeff Bezos gave us a sense that the desire for similar departures will grow as the world gasps and roils in catastrophe. Still, the 2021 space race also clarified a significant mutation in our desire to flee Earth since the publication Arendt's The Human Condition in 1958. After Sputnik, there was the declaration in Russia that "Mankind will not remain bound to the earth forever." Similarly, the American astronaut would famously announce, "That's one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind." Our era is different in an important respect: Today it is not humankind, but wealthy individuals who imagine taking flight from the earth or living in a colony on Mars. Only they, despite a pandemic that would seem to spare no one, can seclude

themselves on private islands to avoid a virus, receive life-saving therapeutics that are otherwise unavailable to the public, or make considerable wealth in financial markets during a global shutdown. Or go to space, of course. In 1958, Hannah Arendt remarked that "mankind' itself was experiencing "world alienation"—a collective flight from the earth into the universe that signaled its very "repudiation" of its earthly "habitat." This common or collective notion of humankind is, for the most part, absent in our own era. Except, of course, in the name and inherent within the geological epoch of the Anthropocene.

In this particular regard, what the Anthropocene narrative offers is extremely tempting. For those of us who are not wealthy enough to start a colony on Mars or "shelter [ourselves] from the world," as Latour put it, the Anthropocene puts an end to the fantasy of sheer individualism, worldlessness, and human exceptionalism once and for all.16 The Anthropocene epic tells us that human beings were never separate from nature, nor do we live as individuals. It describes human beings as a collective force and situates us in a web of life. The Anthropocene also introduces a shared sense of time and events after the so-called "end of history." This includes an eschatology that collectivizes, historicizes, and politicizes the public before the growing threat of climate change, offering what some believe is a new approach to solidarity at a time when solidarity has been difficult to find or produce. This new sense of time (chapter 1) and narrative (chapter 2) begs for a specific form of politics to address it (chapter 3). And so, while many have taken issue with the name Anthropocene for good reasons, there is also a wonder, a sense, a desperation, perhaps, among some about whether this awful Anthropocene, or whatever we call this new period in our planet's history, might also hold unprecedent possibilities for a different way of life or philosophy for the end of the world.

A philosophy for the end of the world could mean many different things at once. It could mean learning how to think beyond our own experience of the "world" in order to think about deep, planetary history. It could mean a responsibility to narrate the end of the Holocene and the birth of the Anthropocene, or whatever one chooses to call it. It could mean a form of politics—a state that redirects public funds away from fossil fuel subsidies, for instance—or a call to "begin the end of the world," as Aime Cesaire once wrote. One hopes, ultimately, it could come to mean a posthuman condition where forms of life that were thought to be beneath us or "worldless" could appear alongside us in the public sphere.

The Project of This Book

In this book, the phrase "the end of the world" will be understood in an open or polyvalent sense in the three chapters on time, art, and politics. These three essays are bound by a common theme: they are all a response to the end of the world as we know it against the specter of catastrophic climate change. Folding the history of gender, race, colonialism, and capital into geological time, it uses the philosophical method of genealogy to retell the story of human beings in the Anthropocene and direct us towards ways of life that are outside of it. Examining contemporary art, it considers how today's reinvention of epic marks a transition out of postmodernity and challenges us to face climate change collectively. The final section on politics proposes a form of democracy that will have to be won and yet transformed into a zoocracy (from zoe and kratos), a rule of all of the living that includes posthuman delegations. This book is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the Anthropocene, or philosophy, for that matter. Nevertheless, it considers how we might reclaim the geological term 'Anthropocene" and revise our way of life in view of it. But why take up a controversial and obscure term like the Anthropocene at all?

The philosopher Jacques Derrida once remarked that our responsibility at "the end of the world" will be "to change all [the] names ... that will come upon us," "beginning with `us'—these "names ... will come upon us more than we ... choose them," he added. As Donna Haraway put it differently in Storytelling for Earthly Survival, "[The word] Anthropocene is in play. It's a good enough word ... So I would have done it differently ... We work with what we've got." When one commits to changing the meaning of words like "Anthropocene" or "democracy," as Jacques Derrida wrote in another context, we are choosing to become "delegates of [a] word" or inheritors of a word, even as "[w]e do not yet know what we have inherited." This sense of inheritance or commitment is akin to the art practice of detournement.: to appropriate words like Anthropocene or democracy and reclaim them, renarrate them, reroute or even hijack them. Taking up the word Anthropocene in this way would require a certain rethinking of anthropos and its history, as well as wrestling with a way of thinking in philosophy, history, and politics that has limited the "world" to a "specifically human" or "man-made world." What I argue in the conclusion, based on the work of Michel Serres and others, is that philosophers, historians, and political theorists have not yet "spoken of the world: instead they [have only] endlessly discussed men."

A solution to this problem, to matter at all whatsoever, cannot take the form of a flight or escape from our world (either in thought or in practice) into outer space, a distant time, or the universe. We must find a way to think that does not "confine [itself] to ... an analysis ... of the human condition," as Hannah Arendt wrote of her project in The Human Condition, but one that, on the other hand, does not make the mistake Arendt warned us about after Sputnik: withdrawing entirely from "the frailty of human affairs" on Earth. As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen puts it brilliantly in Stone, we require a way of thinking that knows that "the world is not for us. [That the] play has been long, and we are latecomers. Yet it is easy to go too far, to lovely only unpeopled ecologies ...

That perspective is just as partial, and repeats in a secular mode a medieval theology that enjoys disdain of the sublunary world, that takes pleasure in declaring human lives insignificant." On the one hand, we need an approach that stays in the fray of things with nonhumans—what Donna Haraway calls staying with the trouble with fellow critters or oddkin on Earth. On the other hand, we need to know how to be human at the end of this "world." We need to know how to live, think, assemble, love, repair, eat, enjoy, mourn, and die in the Anthropocene.

This book uses this approach to rethink three perennial questions for the humanities—time, art, and politics—for a new geological and political moment. The first chapter on history recounts and reperiodizes the new grand narrative of our time: the birth of the so-called Anthropocene. One reason for doing this is to correct the story of the Anthropocene to clarify who and what is

responsible for it. Another, less obvious reason is to think about why it seems important today to tell this type of story—a geological epic—and to engage with the question of how we should tell it. In contrast with a neoliberal culture of confessional and entrepreneurial narratives, and well beyond the so-called petits recits or little narratives of postmodern society, the Anthropocene epic narrates a history of our entire species and folds this story into geological time. I propose retelling this epic with tools from philosophy's counterpart to geological dating, the genealogical method, which periodizes segments of time and events in a more differentiated way and in terms of power and resistance. Using these tools, I critique a universalizing, colonialist account of the Anthropocene that Kathyrn Yusoff has called "White Geology," and offer a contrasting historical narrative, a counterhistory, for human beings in the Anthropocene. To tell this story differently, I engage closely with the fields of postcolonial theory, Black studies, and feminist theory, and I utilize certain resources for historical modes of thinking in contemporary Continental philosophy. The aim of this chapter is not merely a critique or a new understanding of the Anthropocene. It is a map or cartography that directs us towards ways of life that are outside of it.

In the second chapter on art, I consider an emerging mode of art in which human beings are exposed to the elements in a new way. I focus specifically on new works of art and narrative about strange weather. Odd weather is one of the growing ways human beings experience climate change phenomenologically or beyond abstract scientific data. Even those who do not "believe" in climate change experience it. The weather is also one of first things human beings talk about with one another or share narratively, today and at least since the great flood in the Epic of Gilgamesh.

I open the second chapter on art by considering a contemporary play about the reinvention of epic in which human survival depends on the weather. I then examine a series of contemporary works of art about strange weather as a microcosm of a certain reinvention of epic in our time. I argue that a new kind of epic is being written by contemporary artists like Octavio Abundez, Sarah Anne Johnson, or Anne Washburn, one that displaces the primacy of the personal lyric once more. I attempt to situate this art in a unique historical context in order to better understand the kinds of stories we are telling each other in this new era. A new body of art seems to differ from the threat of nature imagined by those before us. Immanuel Kant, for example, once described the experience of thunderstorms as sublime due to the human ability to find safe harbor from nature in the mind. By contrast, contemporary works of art often leave us vulnerable and suspended in the moment before we can be "marked safe." The elements no longer confront us as individuals, but as a species. They do not turn us inward, but leave us exposed. They do not suggest an individual's triumph over nature, but a coming blow to any or all of us. I outline five practices that appear to describe the emerging traits of an art beyond postmodern art—works of art that mark the resurgence of metanarrative after postmodernism, on the one hand, and also extend postmodern creative practices like appropriations and constraints into what I will call, with an asterisk, postromantic practices. As Isabelle Stengers describes in In Catastrophic Times, "We are no longer dealing (only) with a wild and threatening nature, nor with a fragile nature to be protected, nor a nature to be mercilessly exploited. The case is new." I conclude by considering different ways of looking at clouds.

The final question of this book is whether the specter of climate change, and the collectivization and politicization it creates against the prospect of impending catastrophe, has the potential to bring us together and motivate political reforms in ways that were unthinkable or impossible in prior decades. In the third and final chapter on politics, then, I consider the political possibilities for a new era or epic of "human beings" in the Anthropocene. This chapter begins with W.E.B. Du Bois's "The Comet," a short story about the end of the world that was written in the midst of a flu pandemic and the White supremacist violence of the Red Summer. Du Bois's desire for an end to the White world launches a new and very different kind of worldmaking that does not depend on human exceptionalism and its exclusions. I consider the worlds that must be ended—the Capitalocene, the

Plantationocene, and others. I discuss the ways in which forty years of neoliberal capitalism has left many of us worldless, on the one hand, and yet actively subsidizing fossil capitalism with public funds, on the other. Still, I argue that the Anthropocene hastens an exit from neoliberal life that might not have been thinkable or achievable before, and that a philosophy for end of the world requires directing a new sense of collectivity and history towards a radical form of democracy on the part of human beings.

By democracy, to be clear, I mean a form of politics that would contest or detour a failed, forty-plus-year experiment in privatization and technocratic government, or rule by market experts. I mean a form of politics that was described by Plato as "oligarchy's enemy" and one that "comes into being when the poor win"; a political system where "the rich put up the money" to "build a great and beautiful city"; and which Plato very curiously says amounted to a certain freedom from human sovereignty "being planted in the very beasts." I also mean a form of politics that resists ethnic notions of a "people" because it "throws open [its] city to the world," as Thucydides put it; it "[has] put slaves on equal terms with free men and metics with citizens," cried the "Old Oligarch," and it has applied "the law of equality... in the relations of women with men," lamented Plato. Still, in the end, I argue that a rule of the "people" or demos is not sufficient by itself for an Anthropocene. Humans must somehow learn how to appear en masse in a public space that was never divorced from its environs; we must cultivate forms of association that are not based upon a separation between the human species and its others.

In sum, I argue that a radical form of democracy must not only be conceived of and won, but transformed into a zoocracy, a rule or assembly of all of the living. What I mean by zoocracy is a rule of 25 or life itself that gives and sustains life. It would be more than a rule of a people or demos, even more than a rule of human beings or anthropoi, that is, more than the rule of a specific and superior form of life (*zoon politikon; zoon logon echon*), as Aristotle described human beings in his Politics. This would require organizing towards a form of power that would be possible only if millions of humans begin to appear with the full and monstrous force of their environments. An array of time-honored cosmologies, hierarchies, and histories narrate a different story, of course: that other forms of life are somehow separate from us, outside of our political realm, or beneath the dignity and rank of human beings. But today it is simply no longer possible to write other forms of life or the planet outside of our public sphere. In fact, we don't even have to envision a "democracy... extended to things" or a "parliament of [nonhuman] things," as Bruno Latour put it in 1993,39 because the climate change we've been hearing about for decades is now here, getting worse, and announcing a new political forum that humans have yet to join seriously. We will have to invent the names, practices, and institutions for such a politics—zoocracy, geocracy, post-human delegation, "parliament of the living." This is the difficult work that remains to be done, but all of the elements are already here for it. <>

YOU MATTER: THE HUMAN SOLUTION by Delia Smith [Mensch Publishing, 9781912914357]

We know science is awesome, as are its achievements. Yet so far scientists have managed to sidestep the most awesome reality of all, the true nature of human life, the source of their own genius. How is it that in the overwhelming immensity of the cosmos, on microscopic earth, human beings exist? We have not yet looked reality in the face and perceived the nobility and grandeur of who we are, each of us having a responsibility in the universe and being part of a vast and continuing process, which can only emerge from the shadows and darkest corners of our thought when we step aside away from all the noise.

'YOU MATTER' encourages people to think more deeply about the phenomenon of existence, what it means to be a unique human person, and how in unity with one another we can build a future in these uncertain times.

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> Hope is like a path
> in the countryside.
> Originally there is
> nothing — but as people
> walk this way again and

again, a path appears.
Lu Xun

If you know me, or know of me, you might be thinking, `What's going on here?' If you don't know me, let me explain: my former clay job was an attempt to teach a generation the basics of cooking, via books and TV. Apart from a thriving website, that's now history, yet I have many unknown friends everywhere, and their warm responses and comments still give me a lift.

What, then, is going on here? It's something that's been on the back-burner for most of my life, with a long-held intention that it might one day become a book. Put another way, You Matter represents my burning desire to communicate something I'm now even more certain needs to be said, given the times we are living in.

It all began with me, aged about five, being put to bed too early. I knew it was too early because I could hear other children still out playing. So, wide awake, I began to think and reflect and daydream, quite naturally and contentedly, so much so that it became a routine thing. I was a bit of a tearaway and, much to my parents' great disappointment, not a success at school, but I always loved having time and space for quiet thought, and being sent to my room for doing something wrong was never the punishment it was intended to be. Fast forward through the years, always needing quiet time, and I now have a name for it: spirituality. Let me quickly say that it's nothing esoteric but, very simply, the result of an accidental prelude to a long life of reflective thought. What it involves is stillness, silence or quiet time. There are many ways of describing it, but in essence, it's having time and space in your life exclusively for yourself, to become more aware of a natural part of human existence that expands and invigorates your view of life.

After a lifetime of thought, I am now certain this is a crucial, yet much neglected, part of human nature. The presence of the human spirit, or the term `spirituality', tends to be wrongly thought of as something otherworldly, and it is sometimes even made to seem that way. It can also be wrongly written off as something that is exclusive to religion. Mostly, though, this very natural spiritual dimension gets drowned out by surface life and its frantic overload. Yet with or without religion, when a natural dimension of human nature is not fully utilised it can leave a void, which sometimes leads to mental issues or inhibits the development of inner strengths we didn't know we had.

My thinking is that this vital, natural dimension in human life needs to be re-examined and revived. In neglecting the deeper aspects of life, we are missing out on what is probably the most important thing we should know: what an amazing thing it is to be a person and to be part of the collective human venture. This I now know with certainty, and it will be the central theme in a11 that follows.

Dissatisfaction with the status quo has increased since I started this project. The world and its precious consignment of life is in danger of becoming unhinged. There is no place to hide from the grave threat of climate

change, as the deadly Covid-19 pandemic has reminded us. A wake-up call? Certainly, but in effect something far more — I see it as a call to arms. If things are not as they should be in our world, isn't now the time for a new human spirit to emerge? Shouldn't we engage in bigger, more ambitious

thinking and become more aware of our roles as humans? We are at the helm, in control of how everything is to evolve and progress. We have to relearn how it's possible for our world to progress, while at the same time cooperating with nature in preserving our precious planet. How else can we ensure that our children's children, and beyond, have a future? If extinction is the unthinkable, well, it needs thinking about.

I have known or met some extremely talented people— some successful, some famous — who, in spite their achievements, have not really known how good or talented they are; something blocks that inside knowledge and certainty of themselves. This also applies to humanity as a whole. The common malaise is that we underestimate ourselves and lack belief in our collective power and potential. As a result, the world is in chaos: we are decimating the planet that sustains and nurtures all forms of life. The deadly Covid-19 is, I repeat, not just a wake-up call, but a call to arms. After many years of reflection, I am certain that if enough of us buy into that call and are willing to explore the deeper inner dimensions in our own lives and the world, then a new dynamic spiritual energy can emerge. It is my firm belief that, in unity with one another, human beings can achieve anything. All the wars, factions and turmoil in the world come from not sensing this reality, yet that inherent sense exists in everyone, and can be found in silence, away from the noise, in the still, small voice of the human spirit.

I have divided what follows into what I call reflections, each with its own theme. They are meant to be read individually, perhaps over time, hopefully to encourage your own thinking. I have also included writings from great minds throughout the ages, as well as an eclectic collection of thoughts from all areas of life. What I had hoped to do, back when I was writing recipes, was to help and guide people through the basics, so they could eventually move on to more ambitious things. It's precisely the same here. There are far greater minds and writers on the following subjects, and I have included some suggestions for further reading at the end.

Spirituality is not confined to silence, but that silence permeates the whole of life and reveals new perspectives. We have much to learn and my hope is that you, like me, will discover that the challenge can be exhilarating. What follows is intended to be about you. Just as the universe is reflected in a flower, it is also reflected in you. My only goal in writing this is for you to know that you matter and are a unique part of this amazing human venture — what the biologist and conservationist Thomas Berry referred to as 'the greatest beauty in the known universe'.

Who Was Pierre Teilhard de Chardin?

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin has inspired much of what follows. If, by way of introduction, I had to describe him in one word, it would be `colossus'. He was a man whose thinking and vision was a century ahead of his time. He lived between 1881 and 1955 and was a Jesuit scientist specialising in palaeontology and biology. His work began with geological research, studying the origins of life found in fossils and rocks. This led him to what was to dominate his whole life and thought: the mysterious existence of life on earth and the supremacy of the human.

His insights were controversial, unacceptable to many scientists and theologians, and his church banned the publication of his essays and books during his lifetime. Yet after his death, his books began to be published around the world and people like Arnold Toynbee and Julian Huxley hailed him as the new Galileo. When HarperCollins, the publishers of his seminal work The Human Phenomenon, conducted a survey of the one hundred most important spiritual books published in the twentieth century, Teilhard's book was number one.

A book entitled The Legacy of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, published in 2011, included a quote from Kofi Annan, former secretary general of the United Nations and a Nobel laureate, who in 2007

wrote about him, `finally I am convinced that Teilhard de Chardin is a thinker for the twenty-first century'.

This is also my own view, and what follows here will hopefully introduce other thinkers to his challenging vision in these uncertain times. But first, some of his own words, taken from the preface of The Human Phenomenon:

I doubt whether there is truly any more decisive moment for thinking beings than when, as the scales fall from our eyes, we discover that we are not an element lost in cosmic solitudes, but that within us a universal will to live converges. The human is not the static centre of the world as we thought for so long; but the axis and arrow of evolution, which is much more beautiful.

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For me, that short clip represents a cameo of the present world. Problems, bewilderment, confusion and then, suddenly, we see the definitive and obvious answer. Instinctively, humans reach out to one another with an inner solidarity that can overcome the fears of the present age. This is not some impossible ideal that we can only aspire to; it is something natural and everyday that is within everyone's reach. Simply engaging with others, acknowledging what truly exists between us — why can't we see that this is all that's needed to change the world? Shared anxiety and a common sense of unease is what can initially unite us. Like strangers who become comrades in a war, perhaps the struggle to survive the effects of climate change will be our common. objective, the beginning of 'the life-giving coming together of humanity'. This is not straining to love superficially, in the realm of everyday feelings, but recognising a different kind of grown-up love that opens up the bigger picture of how evolution can proceed. Humans with a common objective to build the Earth and make a better world. We must understand love. We must dare to believe in human life, in the whole human adventure, and we must dare to believe in love.

I hope that what has transpired within these pages has convinced you that every one of us matters and can make a unique contribution. Not convinced? No matter. In truth, it can't ever be fully communicated in a book. I hope, though, to have convinced you to find out more. To make a decision. To give time to stillness and reflection. To cultivate self-knowledge, self-belief and to take charge of how you use your precious time; mindful, perhaps, of the wise words of Shakespeare: `I wasted time, and now doth time waste me.'

In the end, it will be obvious that every one of us matters in the glorious structure of life on Earth. There's an inner light waiting to be switched on, and you may never see what it can illuminate. There's an inner voice waiting to be heard, and you may never hear it. There's a human mission to be accomplished, a great tapestry to be completed, and one very important, very significant thread in it is you, because you really do matter. Believe in yourself, believe in the nobility and dignity of human life, and believe in those who struggle beside you. Keep your eyes open, and don't leave this beautiful world without giving it your best shot. <>

Conspiracy Theories in the Time of Coronavirus: A Philosophical Treatment by Richard Greens and Rachel Robison-Greene [Open Universe, 9788188224043]

Microchips, government-replaced bird drones, QAnon and vaccine tracers: these are just a few of the most common conspiracies we have heard over and over again throughout most of 2020-2021's

news cycles. There are common categories of conspiracy theories, variants of which pop up over and over again, and new and outrageous theories that seemingly appear overnight. While most of them are easily debunked, conspiracy theories and their root causes can be used to closely track people's most significant philosophical concerns at a point in time. In this up-to-date study of conspiracy theories, the authors look at the history of conspiracy theories, discuss the history and hallmarks of such theories, and examine what counts as a conspiracy theory--and what doesn't.

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The Current Landscape

At the time of this writing the world is in a horrible state. We are in the middle of a global pandemic that, at the time this book was written, has taken approximately 5.5 million lives with no end currently in sight despite there being a number of vaccines available, each of which has been proven to provide outstanding protection against death. As if that weren't enough, the political division that exists in many countries, including perhaps most notably the United States, presents serious existential threats to their most fundamental political systems and institutions—across the globe, democracy, where it exists, is hanging by a thread. Interestingly, conspiracy theories play a huge role in both of these things.

A New Plague

Deep in a cave somewhere in China, a virus mutated inside of a horseshoe bat. These bats aren't bothered much by coronaviruses. New strains regularly develop inside of them, some of them harmful to other creatures, others perfectly benign.

Enter, a pangolin. Pangolins are unique for two related reasons. First, they are the only mammals with scales. Second, they are the world's most trafficked creature. Pangolins call to mind both anteaters and pill bugs. They have long snouts and tongues that they use to forage for ants, termites, and larvae. When predators are near, pangolins roll up into a ball and their scales make them impenetrable to most hungry carnivores.

Somehow, a pangolin came into contact with the novel coronavirus. Coronaviruses are zoonotic diseases, which means that they can spread from one species of animal to another. This might have been the end of the story. The novel coronavirus may have thrived and then fizzled in bats and pangolins, were it not for the introduction of new predators—human beings. The scales of pangolins are highly valued in traditional medicinal practices. A 1938 article in Nature describes some of those practices:

The animal itself is eaten, but a greater danger arises from the belief that the scales have medicinal value. Fresh scales are never used, but dried scales are roasted, washed, cooked in oil, butter, vinegar, boy's urine, or roasted with earth or oyster-shells, to cure a variety of ills. Amongst these are excessive nervousness and hysterical crying in children, women possessed by devils and ogres, malarial fever and deafness.

It's illegal to sell pangolins, but that doesn't stop it from happening. In fact, the taboo related to the animals confers even more social standing to those who are able to acquire them and imbues the scales with more of a mystical status than they had before. As a result, it's likely that the pangolin which contracted the novel coronavirus from a horseshoe bat was poached and traded on the wildlife black-market.

Scene: A wet market in Wuhan, China. Wet markets exist all over the world. They are places where customers can buy fresh meat and produce. In some wet markets, animals are even slaughtered right in front of the customers. As one might imagine, conditions in these places are not always sanitary. Some wet markets are clean, and one might even think of them as models of local, sustainable food practices. Others, however, are breeding grounds for disease. It is in the latter position that we find our pangolin, contagious with SARS-CoV2. Once this virus spread at the market to human beings, globalization ensured that it steamrolled into a global pandemic. It would go on to kill millions of people, while devastating economies, putting a huge strain on medical resources, filling up hospital beds, shutting down schools, and increasing anxiety levels world-wide.

That is, in all likelihood, what happened. Many Americans believe other explanations altogether.

Fake News and Big Lies

We are undoubtedly living in a golden age of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories have nearly always existed, and there have been other golden ages in which conspiracy theories have existed in large numbers while playing key roles in the unfolding of significant events, but we've never seen so many conspiracy theories playing such prominent roles.

A number of factors serve to make this the case.

First, conspiracy theories spread much more easily due to the ways in which the Internet connects all of us together, and they do so in real time (this is particularly true since social media became a significant part of the Internet).

Second, conspiracy theories have been weaponized by politicians to discredit their political enemies as well as news sources that would speak out against them. Again, this is nothing new, but it is now happening with greater frequency and at the highest levels of government.

Third, there is a level of distrust of our leaders that is unparalleled in recent centuries. This distrust is not just a distrust of political leaders, although there is plenty of that to go around. There is distrust of business leaders, religious leaders, academics, scientists, the press, and just about any other group that might have wielded some influence at one time or another. In some cases, the distrust is warranted—members of each of the above groups have lied to the public at one time or

another, although some groups are more prone to doing so than are other groups. In many cases the distrust is simply not warranted.

Fourth, there are a number of psychological factors at play that predispose certain people to be more readily accepting of conspiracy theories, not the least of which are the feelings of powerlessness and anger that a great number of people feel due to the fact that the pandemic has put a great many lives on hold. We find ourselves in a holding pattern due to circumstances beyond our individual abilities to control (although collectively we have more power than many people realize).

It's distressing, to say the least. Accepting conspiracy theories, at least to the extent that doing so gives us people to blame for our predicaments, allows some people to regain a little bit of that lost power. Finally, there are shameless promoters of conspiracy theories with huge followings and large bullhorns with which to spread their theories. Why would they want to do this? Well, it turns out that there is quite a bit of money to be made in peddling conspiracy theories. These are just a few of the factors that have given rise to this golden age of conspiracy theories. We'll discuss many more in the pages to follow.

It is noteworthy that conspiracy theories are so much a part of daily life now. It was not all that long ago that the majority of people were not all that familiar with the term and even fewer had a keen grasp of the concept; now one seldom goes more than a day or so without hearing about some conspiracy theory or other. Certainly, the change in public awareness of them is partially due to the global pandemic, which has itself spawned a great number of conspiracy theories. Conspiracies theories breed in times of crisis. For example, there are conspiracy theories about the origins of the pandemic, there are conspiracy theories about the production, distribution, and contents of the vaccines, and there are conspiracy theories about the virus itself. (Poor Bill Gates! Most of these theories have attached themselves to him at one time or another.) The change in public awareness also has much to do with the current political climate. The top news stories of the day frequently make reference to conspiracy theories.

Despite the increase in awareness of conspiracy theories, there is still much to be said about them. People have the concept, but it is not clearly defined in the minds of many. Moreover, there are a number of questions pertaining to conspiracy theories that need to be addressed. The main purpose of this book is to highlight and answer many of these questions.

We need, for example, to know just what conspiracy theories are. Some maintain that any theory about a conspiracy counts as a conspiracy theory. We'll argue that this is not the case. What sort of features do conspiracy theories have? In what ways do they change and evolve? What features are unique to conspiracy theories? What is the epistemically responsible attitude to take with respect to conspiracy theories? Should they always be rejected? Is there ever a time when one is justified in accepting a conspiracy theory? Some theorists argue that we should all become conspiracy theorists—or perhaps that we already are all conspiracy theorists. (See, for example, "From Alien Shape-shifting Lizards to the Dodgy Dossier" by M R.X. Dentith and "Everyone's a Conspiracy Theorist" by Charles Pigden, both listed in the References to this volume.) We'll argue that once conspiracy theories are properly understood, neither of these options are acceptable (even if we all turn out to be persons who accept or embrace some theories about conspiracies).

Conspiracy theories also give rise to questions about the obligations of politicians, the nature of existence, and human psychology. What do we bring to bear on the problems raised by conspiracy theories?

Finally, there are important questions to be addressed pertaining to the ethics of conspiracy theories. In just what ways do conspiracy theories harm us? Who is responsible for the promulgation of conspiracy theories? How bad is it to believe conspiracy theories? And, perhaps most importantly, who is responsible for solving the various problems raised by conspiracy theories? Alas, the solution to these problems of is not going to be a simple one. It's not, for example, a matter of merely educating people that believing conspiracy theories is bad, or having everyone take a critical thinking course at their local college. There is an interesting paradox at play here. Seemingly the more one responds to conspiracy theories, that is the more one refutes, rejects, and debunks conspiracy theories, the more entrenched certain believers of conspiracy theories become. For many, accepting conspiracy theories is an essential part of their identity. Responding to conspiracy theories is tricky business.

We hope that these introductory remarks make it clear that conspiracy theories are generally not to be taken lightly, and especially not in light of our current political predicament and against the backdrop of a deadly ongoing global pandemic. The stakes are quite high and the threat is very real. Ironically, to many it doesn't seem that way. A lot of people think conspiracy theories are mostly fun. In some cases, this is correct.

(We do hope you have fun reading about conspiracy theories in this book!) There is something entertaining about thinking that aliens are being held in Area 51 or that birds are not real or that Jim Morrison is still alive. These, however, as we will see, are the exceptions. In a world where conspiracy theorists are being elected to congress, citizens are storming the capitol, and people are casting votes based on conspiracy theories, we can ill afford to take conspiracy theories with a chuckle or a grain of salt.

How to Read this Book

For those of you reading this book who are, in fact, conspiracy theorists, you'll want to search for the hidden messages that were written just for you. Perhaps you might try taking the first letter of each word and seeing if that amounts to anything. Alternatively, you might try stringing together the first words from each paragraph or the first sentences from each new section to see if either of those reveal the secret messages. If these don't yield results, try reading the odd pages backwards, or using all the hints in The Da Vinci Code to point you in the right direction. One of these things is bound to work, and if none do, then keep trying. The truth is out there (or in here) and as no one says, fortune favors the diligent.

For those of you reading this book who are not conspiracy theorists, we can tell you that there are no secret hidden messages in the text. We would tell the conspiracy theorists, but they wouldn't believe us anyway. Still, you will be interested to know a bit about how this book is structured. Each chapter begins with a prominent conspiracy theory (or, in some cases, a handful of related conspiracy theories), which get related to the main themes in the chapter. The idea was to make the book both informational for the person interested in conspiracy theories, and philosophical. It's great to learn about both the philosophy of conspiracy theories, as well as about the conspiracy theories themselves. <>

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