

RTReview.org

SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books



Robert Tenor, editor
11-15-2022

New Series Number 104

EDITORIAL

[Scriptable](#) is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for “the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies” derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought. Each issue should surprise.



Contents



.....	0
THE GREAT DIVIDE AND THE SALVATION PARADOX by David P. Griffith [Pickwick Publications, 9781666731736].....	9
Review.....	10
Concludings.....	17
THE GOSPEL OF THOMAS: INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY by Simon James Gathercole [Series: Texts and Editions for New Testament Study, Brill, 9789004190412].....	20
The Religious Outlook of Thomas.....	22
Theological Framework.....	22
The Father.....	22
The Kingdom.....	22
Creation and the Fall.....	23
The World.....	24
The Body.....	24
The History of Israel.....	25
Jesus and Revelation.....	25
(Self-)Knowledge.....	25
Salvation.....	26
The Practice of Discipleship in Thomas.....	26
Self-Union.....	27
Gender Union.....	28
Christological Union.....	28
Concrete Requirements.....	29

The Problem of “Asceticism” in Thomas	29
Social Ethos and Practices	30
Thomas’s Views of Its Rivals	31
Non-Christian Judaism	31
The Wider Christian Movement	32
Cautionary Remarks	32
Conclusion	32
LET IN THE LIGHT: LEARNING TO READ ST. AUGUSTINE’S CONFESSIONS WITH ATTENTION TO THE LATIN TEXT by James Boyd White [Columbia University Press, 9780231205009]	
Review	34
AUGUSTINE’S CONFESSIONS: PHILOSOPHY IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY edited by William E. Mann [Oxford University Press, 9780199577552]	
Review	40
AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: VOLUME I: CONCEPTS, PERSPECTIVES, AND THE EMERGENCE OF AUGUSTINIAN IDENTITY by Eric Leland Saak [Series: Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, Brill, 9789004405738]	
A COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL MIRACLE COLLECTIONS edited by Sari Katajala- Peltomaa, Jenni Kuuliala and Iona McCleery [Reading Medieval Sources, Brill, 9789004465404]	
Miracle Collections in Their Contexts by Sari Katajala- Peltomaa, Jenni Kuuliala and Iona McCleery	49
Structure of the Volume	52
ELISABETH LESEUR: SELECTED WRITINGS by Janet K. Ruffing [Classics of Western Spirituality, Paulist Press, 9780809105748]	
Elisabeth Leseur (1866-1914)	55
The Leseurs	56
Elisabeth Leseur’s Spirituality	58
Marriage and Family	58
Pattern of Devotional Life and Ascetical Practices	59
Primary Influences on Elisabeth Leseur’s Spirituality	59
Popular Religion	60
Lay Exemplars	61
Spiritual Writers	62
From Preface by Wendy Wright	65
WRITINGS ON BODY AND SOUL BY AELRED OF RIEVAULX , edited and translated by Bruce L. Venarde [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, Harvard University Press, 9780674261181]	
Excerpt: Aelred’s Reputation	68
The Contents of this Volume	68

A Pastoral Prayer.....	69
Spiritual Friendship.....	69
Á Certain Marvelous Miracle.....	70
Teachings for Recluses.....	70
Translating Aelred.....	71
COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS'S TREATISE ON HAPPINESS AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE by J. Budziszewski (Summa theologiae. Prima secundae Quaestio I-5.) [Cambridge University Press, 9781108477994].....	
Review.....	72
The Reason for this Commentary.....	81
God and God's Image.....	84
So What Is Our Ultimate Purpose? What Is Happiness?.....	84
TEACHING FOR SPIRITUAL FORMATION: A PATRISTIC APPROACH TO CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN A CONVULSED AGE by Kyle R. Hughes, Foreword by David I. Smith [Cascade Books, 9781725281233].....	
Seeking Conversations with Strangers.....	87
Christian Education in a Convulsed Age.....	88
Two Key Presuppositions.....	89
The Purpose of Christian Education.....	90
The Relevance of the Church Fathers.....	92
An Invitation to the Journey.....	94
THE MATERIAL LOGIC OF JOHN OF ST. THOMAS: BASIC TREATISES by John Poinsett, translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst, with a Preface by Jacques Maritain [The University of Chicago Press, 9780226758497].....	
TRACTATUS DE SIGNIS: THE SEMIOTIC OF JOHN POINSETT Interpretive Arrangement by John N. Deely in Consultation with Ralph Austin Powell from the 1930 Reiser edition (emended second impression) of the <i>Ars Logica</i> , itself comprising the first two parts of the five part <i>Cursus Philosophicus</i> of 1631-1635, by the same author. First Published at Alcala de Henares (Complutum), Iberia 1632. In Bilingual Format Corrected Second Edition [St. Augustine's Press, 9781587318771].....	
Since 1985, and a Little Before.....	106
SAD LOVE: ROMANCE AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING by Carrie Jenkins [Polity, 9781509539581].....	
Review.....	110
THE FUTURE OF DECLINE: ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE AT ITS LIMITS by Jed Esty [Stanford Briefs, Stanford University Press, 9781503633315].....	
Lost Greatness as a Way of Life.....	115
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD 4 VOLUME HARDBACK SET edited by Mark Philip Bradley, Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, Carla Gardina Pestana, Kristin Hoganson, Jay Sexton, Brooke L. Blower, Andrew Preston, David Engerman, and Max Paul Friedman [Series The	

Cambridge History of America and the World, Cambridge University Press, 4 volume pack ISBN: 9781108419208]	120
EDITORS: Eliga Gould, University of New HampshirePaul Mapp, College of William and Mary, Virginia, Carla Gardina Pestana, University of California, Los Angeles, Kristin Hoganson, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Jay Sexton, University of Missouri, Columbia, Brooke L. Blower, Boston University, Andrew Preston, University of Cambridge, David Engerman, Brandeis University, Massachusetts, Max Paul Friedman, American University, Washington DC, Melani McAlister, George Washington University, Washington DC.	
General Introduction: What is America and the World? by Mark Philip Bradley.....	120
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 1: 1500–1820	
edited by Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, Carla Gardina Pestana [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419222]	124
Selections from: What Does America and the World "Mean" before 1825? by Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, and Carla Gardina Pestana	125
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 2: 1820-1900	
edited by Kristin Hoganson, Jay Sexton [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419239]	127
Selections from the Introduction by Jay Sexton And Kristin Hoganson	129
Building and Resisting US Empire	130
Imperial Structures.....	131
Americans and the World.....	131
America in the World.....	133
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 3: 1900–1945	
edited by Brooke L. Blower, Andrew Preston [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419260]	134
American Power in the Modern Era.....	138
Competing Perspectives	138
The perils of Interdependence.....	139
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 4: 1945 TO THE PRESENT	
edited by David C. Engerman, Max Paul Friedman, Melani McAlister [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419277]	140
Ordering a World of States.....	144
Challenging a World of States.....	144
New World Disorder?.....	146
RETHINKING UTOPIA: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES edited by Ebru Deniz Ozan	
[Political Theory for Today, Lexington Books, 9781666906950]	147
Rethinking Utopia.....	147
THE METAPHYSICS OF CULTURE: DEFINITIVE ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY by Rod Cameron	
[Academica Press, 9781680537604]	150
HANNAH ARENDT AND THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT edited by Daniel Brennan, Marguerite La Caze [Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought, Lexington Books, 9781666900859] 153	

FREEDOM, RESENTMENT, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS by Pamela Hieronymi [Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 9780691194035].....	164
Review	164
THE EXPERIENTIAL ONTOLOGY OF HANNAH ARENDT by Kimberly Maslin [Lexington Books, 9781793612441]	166
CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN THE TIME OF CORONAVIRUS: A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT by Rachel Robison-Greene and Richard Greene [Open Universe, 9781637700068]	173
Review	173
The Current Landscape	175
A New Plague	175
Fake News and Big Lies	176
How to Read this Book	177
PLATO'S CRATYLUS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM PRAGENSE edited by Vladimír Mikeš [Proceedings of the Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, Series: Brill's Plato Studies Series, 9789004473010]	178
Making Sense of the Cratylus by Vladimír Mikeš.....	179
Chapter 1 The Opening of Plato's Cratylus A Prelude to a Socratic Reading of the Dialogue by Steffen Lund Jørgensen.....	180
Chapter 2 Why the Cratylus Matters, or: Plato's Cratylus and the Philosophy of Language by Francesco Ademollo	181
Chapter 3 Intentionality and Referentiality in Plato's Cratylus by Francesco Aronadio.....	181
Chapter 4 What Remains of Socrates' Naturalist Theory Once Conventionalism Is Accepted by Vladimír Mikeš.....	181
Chapter 5 Forms and Names: On Cratylus 389a5–390a10 by Anna Pavani.....	181
Chapter 6 Platons Theologie der Götternamen by Jakub Jinek.....	182
Chapter 7 Commerce, Theft and Deception: The Etymology of Hermes in Plato's Cratylus by Olof Pettersson.....	182
Chapter 8 Gorgias and the Cratylus Author: Mariapaola Bergomi.....	182
Chapter 9 Quelques Différences entre le Cratyle et le Sophiste by Frédérique Ildefonse.....	182
Chapter 10 A Theory of Language between the Cratylus, the Theaetetus and the Sophist by Filip Karfik.....	183
PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AS THEORY, METHOD, AND WAY OF LIFE: CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS edited by Przemysław Bursztyka, Eli Kramer, Marcin Rychter, and Randall Auxier [Series: Philosophy as a Way of Life, Brill, 9789004515789]	183
The Origins of Philosophy of Culture	185
Philosophy of Culture's Role in Humane Flourishing	188
The Structure of the Collection	191
Conclusion: An Invitation	192

PROJECTING SPIRITS: SPECULATION, PROVIDENCE, AND EARLY MODERN OPTICAL MEDIA by Pasi Väliäho [Stanford University Press, 9781503630857].....	192
Review	193
THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MAGIC by Jordi Cami, Luis M. Martinez, Translated by Eduardo Aparicio [Princeton University Press, 9780691208442].....	201
Review	201
Where We Go in This Book	204
The Grammar of Magic	205
Your Journey with Us.....	205
Scientific Research and Magic	206
The Science of Magic	206
Is There a Scientific History Related to Magic?	207
How Could Magic Contribute to Neuroscience?.....	209
PEACEFUL APPROACHES FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD edited by Sanjay Lal [Series: Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy of Peace, Brill, 9789004507210]	211
DOMESTIC CAPTIVITY AND THE BRITISH SUBJECT, 1660–1750 by Catherine Ingrassia [University of Virginia Press, 9780813948096]	216
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY: BLACK SOCIETY IN JAMAICA, 1655-1838 , 2 nd edition by Orlando Patterson [Polity, 9781509550982].....	217
THINKING LIKE AN ICEBERG by Olivier Remaud, translated by Stephen Muecke [Polity Press, 9781509551460]	218
The Issue	218
Thinking Like an Iceberg	218
IMMATERIAL: RULES IN CONTEMPORARY ART by Sherri Irvin [Oxford University Press, 9780199688210]	221
Pranking Painting.....	222
Disclaimers	227
Philosophy of "contemporary" art.....	227
Philosophy of contemporary "art"	228
"Philosophy" of contemporary art.....	228
"Immaterial"??	228
AS DEEP AS IT GETS: MOVIES AND METAPHYSICS by Randall E. Auxier [Open Universe, 9781637700082]	229
From the Alamo Draft House to the Livingroom Couch (Or There and Back Again)	230
The Slow Death of My Imagination (and Yours).....	231
A Little History (Very Little)	232
Remember the Alamo	232
Down but Not Out in Hollywood	233

The Disaster	234
Movies and Metaphysics: Better Together	235
ASCETICISM, ESCHATOLOGY, OPPOSITION TO PHILOSOPHY: THE ARABIC TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF SALMON BEN YEROHAM ON QOHELET (ECCLESIASTES) by James T. Robinson [Études sur le Judaïsme Médiéval, Karaite Texts and Studies, Brill, 9789004191341]	
	236
Review	236
Qohelet In Karaism.....	237
CREATION: THE STORY OF BEGINNINGS by Jonathan Grossman, translated by Sara Daniel [The Noam Series, The Michael Scharf Publication Trust of Yeshiva University Press, Maggid Books, 9781592645039]	
	240
Reality and Symbolism.....	243
Is Genesis I-II an Independent Unit?	247
Repentance Preceded the World's Creation	248
Genesis and the Ancient Near East	248
Characterization: God and Human	250
BECOMING ELIJAH: PROPHET OF TRANSFORMATION by Daniel C. Matt [Jewish Livesm, Yale University Press, 9780300242706]	
	253
Review	253
THE CHARACTER OF DAVID IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM WARRIOR, POET, PROPHET AND KING edited by [Themes in Biblical Narrative, BRILL, 9789004465961]	
	257
The Variety of Davids in Monotheistic Traditions: An Introduction by Marzena Zawadowska....	259
Structure.....	261
The Images of David in Medieval Jewish, Muslim and Christian Sources.....	262
The Psalter of David in Monotheistic Traditions.....	264
David and His Women: The Cross-Religious Reception Exegesis of the Bathsheba Narrative	265
Reinventing David in Early Modern and Modern Religious Thought and Literature.....	267
MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND ITS LITERARY FORMS edited by Aaron W. Hughes and James T. Robinson [New Jewish Philosophy and Thought, Indiana University Press, 9780253042514]	
	269
Review	269
UNVEILING THE HIDDEN—ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: DIVINATORY PRACTICES AMONG JEWS BETWEEN QUMRAN AND THE MODERN PERIOD edited by Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum [Series: Prognostication in History, Brill, 9789004445062]	
	273
The Inevitable Presence of Divination in Culture	274
Criteria and Limitations of the Approaches in This Book.....	276
Arrangement of the Chapters and Overview of Their Contents.....	282

EMMANUEL LEVINAS'S TALMUDIC TURN: PHILOSOPHY AND JEWISH THOUGHT by Ethan Kleinberg [Cultural Memory in the Present, Stanford University Press, 9781503629448].....	285
Review	285
Constitutive Dissymmetry	285
WHY AM I A JEW? SPINOZA REVISITED by Michael Baum [Resource Publications, 9781666730999]	288
Review	289
A HISTORY OF MODERN JEWISH RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY: VOLUME III: THE CRISIS OF HUMANISM: A HISTORICAL CROSSROADS by Eliezer Schweid, translated by Leonard Levin, annotated by Leonard Levin, Christoph Hopp, Yuval Lieblch [Series: Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Brill, 9789004375383]	291
Historical and Methodological Introduction.....	292
Defense of Humanism through a Return to the Sources of Judaism in Germany.....	298
The Debate in Eastern Europe on Judaism as a Secular Culture.....	301
HUMANITY DIVIDED: MARTIN BUBER AND THE CHALLENGES OF BEING CHOSEN by Manuel Duarte de Oliveira [Series Studia Judaica, De Gruyter, 9783110740745]	303
THE LIFELINE: SALOMON GRUMBACH AND THE QUEST FOR SAFETY by Meredith L. Scott [Brill's Series in Jewish Studies, Brill, 9789004514393]	311
Foundations.....	315
AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY by Rafael Medoff [The Jewish Publication Society, 9780827615182]	316
FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY by Gisela Striker [Oxford University Press, 9780198868385]	324
THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, 2 VOLUME SLIPCASE: DELUXE EDITION, ENGLISH AND ANCIENT GREEK EDITION by Franco Montanari, Editors of the English Edition: Madeleine Goh & Chad Schroeder under the auspices of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C.: Advisory Editors: Gregory Nagy & Leonard Muellner [Brill, 9789004298118]	325
Features:	326
Review	326
***See Insert	Error! Bookmark not defined.

THE GREAT DIVIDE AND THE SALVATION PARADOX by David P. Griffith [Pickwick Publications, 9781666731736]

The church in its first centuries split on whether Christ saved everyone or a few, Universalism versus Exclusivism. In the sixth century, the church settled the issue seemingly and held that Universalism was heresy. This book reviews this history as well as what provoked it—Scripture, on its face, gives two contradictory accounts of salvation's extent: everyone is ultimately saved and

everyone is not. In contrast to both Exclusivism and Universalism, the book takes Scripture's two accounts of salvation's extent as true—that is, as a paradox. This is the approach the church has taken with other scriptural paradoxes. Saying one God is three, or one Son is both God and man, appeared to be contradictory too, but, to embrace Scripture entirely, these were seen as paradoxical. The Trinity modeled how one can be three, and the hypostatic union modeled how one can be two. For the paradox of salvation's extent, the answer lies in the individual's divisibility in the afterlife, one can be two. That is, in ultimate salvation, each individual can be both saved and unsaved.

Review

"This subtle, learned, and intriguing analysis not only invites us to ponder anew some of the ultimate mysteries of the Christian revelation, but to see how the concept of paradox can encompass a wide range of apparently contradictory scriptural truths in order to underscore God's gracious salvation in Christ. Those who follow David Griffith's reasoning in this highly accomplished study will be enlightened and enriched." --D. Densil Morgan, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, emeritus

"Griffith's innovative take on the Christian paradox of exclusive or universal salvation is to find the paradox applied to every individual. A person's eternal life and character are divisible and thus subject to both divine acceptance and judgment. This is a fascinating exercise in constructive theology and in defining a person in relationship to the eternal God." --J. Andrew Dearman, Fuller Theological Seminary

"'Who then can be saved?' The question reverberates through Christian history from New Testament times. Taking Scripture seriously and employing a whole host of ancient as well as modern sources, David Griffith offers a fresh and original approach to the Bible's apparent advocacy of both a universal and an exclusive salvation. Erudite, stimulating, and lucid, the discussion is both constructive and provocative. Careful reading will yield insights into theological anthropology as well as Christian soteriology." --Robert Pope, Westminster College, Cambridge

"This is a novel book with a fascinating argument. As Griffith indicates, the stalemate in Christianity between universal and limited salvation seems to be an intractable issue without resolution. However, Griffith has provided an original way forward that deserves recognition and careful consideration. A timely piece and a tour de force." --Michael Burdett, University of Nottingham

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

Introduction

I Prolegomena

1. The Issue Is Ultimate Salvation

2. Salvation's Extent Matters

3. The Salvation Paradox Infringes Commonplace Logic

4. "Individual" Is the Lesser Embarrassment

5. Models Suit Paradoxes

6. Scripture Is the Signal Data

7. Understanding Requires Whatever It Takes

2 Decease, Decrease, Increase

1. Everyone Dies, Followed by More

2. The Godly Are Separated from the Perishing

3. The Godly Are Completed

3 Scripture's Salvation Paradox

1. Everyone Is Ultimately Saved
2. Only Some Are Ultimately Saved
3. Contradictions Reveal Fallacies
- 4 The Responses
 1. Universalism Began Strong and Resurges
 2. Exclusivism Is Orthodox
 3. Potentialism Hedges
- 5 Unconvincing Treatments
 1. Tradition Lacks Consensus
 2. Each Response Is Problematic
 3. The Responses Undervalue Paradox
- 6 Divisibility's Coherence
 1. The Individual Takes Personal Identity and Character
 2. Most Any Metaphysic Works
 3. Anthropology Historically and Currently Reflects the Essential I
 4. We Each Live through an Indivisible Personal Identity
 5. We Each Live as a Multilateral Personal Character
 6. The Personal Character Is Divided
 7. Scripture Reflects Personal Identity Centering Divided Character
 8. Each Individual Is Oriented Both Towards and Away from God
 9. Life Forms Personal Character, Which Forms Life
 10. Evil Exists
 11. Dividing an Individual in the Afterlife Is Realizable
 12. A Divided Individual Can Be Modeled
- 7 Preserving the Paradox
 1. After This Life, Godly Is Divided from Ungodly
 2. Individual Afterlife Divisibility Allows the Salvation Paradox
 3. The Divisible Individual Transitions into the Afterlife
- 8 Christianity's Divisible Individual
 1. Scriptural Hints of Afterlife Divisibility Are Ignored
 2. Theologians Approach Paradoxism
- 9 Systemic Truth
 1. Paradoxism Conserves Anthropology
 2. The Good News Remains God's for Us
 3. Paradoxism Handles Binary Problems
 4. Proportional Justice Survives
 5. Paradoxism Values Grace
 6. Afterlife Decision-Making Is Unneeded
 7. The Community Is Eternal

Concludings

Bibliography

God turned to speak to me
 (Don't anybody laugh);
 God found I wasn't there—
 At least not over half. —Frost, "Ten Mills"

The extent of salvation is a Christian aporia because Christians have not entirely agreed on whether Christ saves all of us or saves only some of us, but they all agree on the obvious: Not even Christ can truly do both. Their disagreement is based on what Christians find in Scripture, which sets out both accounts of salvation's extent and also justifies the notion, if a justification were needed, that

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430



contradicting accounts cannot be entirely true. As a result, the scriptural traditions have had to dissolve creatively what Scripture says and choose which account to embrace and which to refrain from embracing. A common shorthand for the competing positions that Christians (and others) have arrived at on salvation's extent is exclusivism and universalism. Exclusivism is the belief that not everyone is saved and has been orthodox longer than dyothelitism and since before Muhammad, but exclusivism A reconstrue all the scriptural texts that say everyone is saved so that Scripture can be interpreted in such a way that it never really says that. Universalism, the dissenting position, is the belief that everyone is ultimately saved and is a persistent heresy, but, so as to prefer wherever Scripture expresses universalism, it must negate the repeated scriptural depictions to the contrary. And, so, that is the problem: Scripture offers a paradox that says both everyone will be saved and not everyone will be, and all sides have reformulated those accounts into a contradiction so that Scripture, once the exegeting is done, can say only one account or the other.

This is not how the church typically handles scriptural paradoxes. Rather than adopting the tempting nuances that heresies have offered to simplify the scriptural answers, the church has usually offered greater wit. It has accepted such enigmas as God being both one and three and as Christ being both truly divine and truly human, but, unfortunately, by the sixth century, the church had exhausted itself on such paradoxes before understanding salvation's extent and, after recuperating, was beyond fighting over additional ones. As a result, the church settled for the simplicity of contradiction and choose exclusivism, and the second-place finisher, universalism, was only simpler. No part of the church has ever acknowledged that somehow all of Scripture is actually true in saying that both everyone will be saved and not everyone will be. This book purports to do that—accept both contraries on salvation's extent—without unlearning the principle of noncontradiction, and, to do that, the thesis must model the individual as divisible. With this divisibility, each person can be both saved and not saved, it is argued, which would then leave Scripture's salvation paradox as it aspires to be, true. Admittedly, dividing the individual, who is practically, normally, and etymologically indivisible, is a high price to pay to preserve the paradox, but it is no higher than that paid in order to understand the other scriptural paradoxes. Being both saved and unsaved is not much different from being both one and three or being both human and divine. Each scriptural paradox has been worth the cost of rethinking the irrefutable.

The divisibility of the individual as proposed here is not the conventional one associated with biological death, where the vanishing cadaver leaves an afterlife remainder, typically labeled the soul. What constitutes the personal remainder that may persist after biological death, which is presumably spiritual and definitely not zoological, is left to those dealing with that topic. The thesis in this book divides, rather, whatever the particulars of that remainder turn out to be. Though what is substantively the remainder is not declared, what functionally continues after death is declared and that out of necessity. If we are to live after biological life, what continues must include that which has lived that life, which is usually called our character. Without the continuation of the personal character, those who are saved in eternal life would be none of us, just other people altogether. This personal character, given how we each live, has roughly two paramount outlooks, directions, alignments, mindsets, or, as broadly termed here, orientations. Our dueling as-lived orientations are roughly that of being godly and of being selfish, whether relating to God favorably or, from pride or cowardice, sinning. The two orientations cohabit in each of us. This is absolutely incontrovertible for one person and, given the good authority from many others, is confidently presumed of nearly everyone else. To this widely shared observation that the personal character is conflicted in this life, the thesis proposed here adds the novelty that it is divisible afterwards. This unconventional idea takes nine chapters to explain.

Chapter I clarifies several preparatory issues required for understanding the salvation paradox, including the meaning of the central issue—ultimate salvation. Ultimate (or final) salvation specifies a

quality of this life but also a quality of the life beyond it. That is, salvation is eschatological, “the fulfilment of all time,” Karl Barth’s phrase. Salvation, while it applies to every moment, is critical in the ultimate because it is as of then that everyone is or is not saved and is the context in which the answers of universalism and exclusivism diverge. The first chapter also justifies devoting precious attention to the issue of salvation’s extent despite the contemporary sheepishness about preserving paradoxes, including the meaning of death and the objectivity of truth. The dispute about salvation’s extent is often deemed too contentious for polite society or too speculative for practical company, but its extent must be understood because questions demand answers. If questions are not answered intelligently, we have only answers of the other variety. The fundamental hurdle for understanding salvation’s extent is that its paradox consists of two scriptural propositions pointing in opposite directions. Happily, scriptural propositions in paradox do not generally intimidate Christians, who believe ideas like dying to live. The paradox of salvation’s extent suffers in particular because it pertains to individuals, and this can be associated with “individualism,” which Christians can find problematic. Yet too, this association is unavoidable because, as Thomas Aquinas reminds us, individuals cannot be reduced to universals. This is especially true in salvation. We can, Søren Kierkegaard noted, be treated like a herd on other subjects such as inoculations, but not on subjects like salvation. Finally, this chapter identifies the authority for addressing salvation’s extent, which means tackling such issues as the relationship of tradition to Scripture.

Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework of ultimate salvation in which its paradox rests. While salvation’s extent is paradoxical, its bewildering content has, to the limit of the information available to us, mostly been settled among the Christian faithful: We live with death, then die, and experience the binaries of eternal life for the godly or of perdition for the ungodly. These parameters triangulate the salvation paradox, which is delivered by Jesus, who is a sign of contradiction and who produces our division (Luke 2:34; 12:51), which bisects us (Matt 10:34–35). Though universalists and exclusivists agree that salvation relates to this life and that at least some of us experience eternal life, they disagree whether any of us suffer its negation. This is of course not the only salvation dispute, but the others are left undisturbed because, no matter how they are resolved, the salvation paradox abides in them. For example, whether salvation extends to faith-alone or to faith-plus-works leaves the Christian consensus that godliness, broadly understood, relates to salvation’s extent.

Chapter 3 lays out the two scriptural accounts of salvation’s extent, and they are, if not paradoxical, undeniably contradictory. The universalism account is well represented in Scripture. There is “one God and Father of all who is over all, through all, and in all”⁹ (Eph 4:6), with each “all” being a substantive of ^{^^^}, the most natural way that the NT has to refer to everyone. Because Christ “wills all men saved” and “gave himself ransom exchange for all” (1 Tim 2:4, 6), “God’s grace, saving to all men, has appeared” (Titus 2:11), the aorist indicative verb actualizing universal salvation. Paul explains: The salvation of the God-man must be as thorough as the thoroughly infectious sin of the first-man and thereby reach “all men” (Rom 5:12–21). So, God saves “all men, most especially [^{^^^^^^}] those believing” (1 Tim 4:10), which emphasizes that none fewer than everyone is saved. Scripture is, however, equally expressive on exclusivism. The evil are “gathered and burned in” the consummation’s “fiery furnace” (Matt 13:24–50). Christ will “separate men from each other” and the cursed will suffer “eternal castigation,” a “torment” in “fire” (25:31–46; Luke 16:19–31). Those not abiding in Christ are “like the branch cast away to wither” (John 15:6). While “many” traverse “the way leading to the destruction,” only “a few” traverse “the way leading to the life” (Matt 7:13–14). In the end, God’s wrath inundates the cosmos, which is likened to Sodom’s brimstone and Noah’s cataclysm (Luke 17:26–30/Matt 24:37–39), “an example of suffering eternal fire’s punishment” (Jude 7). Given these seemingly contradictory accounts, both cannot be true, at least not without more comment. So, both exclusivists and universalists must, in adhering to their respective positions, unwind the paradox by downgrading its opponent’s scriptural basis to something that is only facially true, not authentically true. Exclusivists take all people as all believers so that, wherever Scripture

says all people are saved, only all believers are, and universalists take God's wrath as a passing phase so that, wherever Scripture speaks of the damned, no one truly is. This chapter, in contrast, takes the accounts as written without anticipating the logic collision towards which they are evidently bound.

Chapter 4 presents the church's responses to the paradox of salvation's extent. The contesting responses have throughout history been roughly two, and, not coincidentally, they follow the two accounts found in Scripture. The two positions were competitive among Christians until the sixth century, which was when exclusivism abruptly prevailed and universalism was anathematized. Because Christians have since grown accustomed to the orthodoxy of that resolution, the chapter must give an extended survey of Christian universalists to counterbalance exclusivism's obvious dominance, and confirmation of that dominance comes primarily from Christianity's creeds, which chapter 4 also presents. In reviewing the universalism and exclusivism in the church, the chapter strives for evenhandedness while juggling thoroughness and brevity. The overview finds that 1) universalism gained strength in the second century and lasted until the sixth century, convincing luminaries like Origen of Alexandria, Athanasius the Great, Hilary of Poitiers, Gregory of Nyssa, John Cassian, and Maximus the Confessor, and has more recently flourished as a minority, whose notables have included Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Tillich, William Barclay, Jürgen Moltmann, and David Bentley Hart, and 2) exclusivism has more or less predominated since the beginning and has been led by such greats as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil of Caesarea, Augustine, Chrysostom, Jerome, Gregory the Great, John Damascene, Thomas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and the authors of every extant Christian confession for over one thousand years and nearly every church order since the *Didache*. No one has yet taken any but these two positions, though a twentieth-century exclusivist subset, with worthies like Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar, has claimed that universalism is potentially, though not actually, true (here designated "potentialism").

Chapter 5 explains why these positions have failed to maintain a consensus, much less extinguish its competition. Each response, in treating its preferred scriptural account as sincerely true, treats its opposite account as only superficially true, all to make Scripture intelligible, though some potentialists say Scripture is unintelligible on this subject. Exclusivists, who are grounded in how obviously Scripture says eternal life is not for everyone, suffer a sort of semantic anomia whenever they encounter scriptural words like all in connection with salvation. Universalists, on the other hand, have the same sort of motivated perception when it comes to scriptural words like hell, wrath, perishing, remnant, or any unqualified imperative. As for potentialists, they mostly say that everyone is saved potentially, which optimistic exclusivists espousing unlimited atonement have been saying all along. The chapter does not referee the theological conflict so much as find that no side convinces when rejecting its opposition. Said differently, much like heresies had tried with the paradoxes of the Trinity and of Christ's natures, each position has deflated Scripture's paradox to one account, while treating the other account as a misdirect, which inevitably gives each position a nagging sense of imbalance. On the positive side, the persistence of each position in the church confirms what a fair read of Scripture clearly yields—both positions on salvation's extent are obviously present.

Chapter 6, the longest, sets the table for the proposal to preserve the salvation paradox as Scripture has presented it, and that argument depends on the individual's divisibility. The chapter reviews the thought history and current perspectives on what we think we know about who we are in this life and about what of this life that perdures into the next. Addressed but found wanting are the views that say the self is a fiction or an organic robot. Instead, the subject is as Richard Wollheim aptly described it after appropriating Kierkegaard—it is one who leads a life. And this self is all too reasonably assumed to be indivisible. The body partly explains this assumption, but the body can divide even in this life (e.g., amputation) and always does, at least eventually and then thoroughly, in death. The natural body's most pertinent limitation is that an afterlife lacks one. The individual after

death is, if anything, either discarnate or preternatural. This supposed belittlement of the terrestrial physique sounds antiquated and must therefore be addressed repeatedly. Irrespective of the natural body or any other ontological inventory, an individual is incurably a personal character, which consists of memories, beliefs, and preferences from leading a life, and is inherently centered on a personal identity's first-person awareness of that life. Accordingly, an afterlife, to be the self from this life, must include the personal character and, to be experienced, must include the personal identity. And certainly in this life, the personal character is manifestly semi-divided for the healthy (e.g., internal dialogue) and can be pathologically divided for the unhealthy (e.g., dissociative identity disorder). Scripture likewise describes the personal character's orientations as divided in this life: Two ways are choosable, and we each choose both. We are not two beings, but two modes of being. As Paul observed, the self is metaphorically two selves by literally living two ways (Rom 7:19–21). So, our character develops as we each live, and, because it is conflicted in this life, the character's divisibility afterwards is almost plausible.

Chapter 7, to finalize the argument, takes what the prior chapters have established. First, according to Scripture, everyone is ultimately saved and not everyone is. Second, according to those whose thoughts find traction in reality, contradictions entail falsehood. So, according to everyone interpreting Scripture, either everyone is ultimately saved or not everyone is. Third, according to those who have candidly explored the individual, each one of them is conceptually, though not actually, divisible in what orients them. These verities, this chapter argues, lead to the ineluctable but unprecedented conclusion: The individual suffers divisibility in the next life. Rather than godly individuals being separated from ungodly ones as tradition sees the separation then, the godly can be separated from the ungodly as to each individual. Accordingly, a single individual can have both eternal life and perdition. In other words, because Scripture says that everyone is saved and that not everyone is saved and because the principle of noncontradiction is adamant, something must give, and that something is the weak link. The individual splits. The individual's divisibility differs critically from its purging, which is traditional. Purging is what removes ungodliness from the individual, and, as a consequence, purging does not address the salvation paradox—it damns no one. Dividing an individual, in contrast, results in one who is saved and one who is not. Thus, the thesis, in striving for the orthodoxy of honoring what Scripture says in its entirety, is thereby unorthodox in the sense of beyond belief. Like Christianity generally, the thesis foolishly chooses both sides of Scripture's paradox and scandalously arrives at the incredible. As a result, Scripture's accounts of salvation's extent are not as they have been taken—poorly worded—but are utterly true.

Chapter 8 is defensive. While the thesis is built on the salvation paradox that Scripture presents, this chapter sets out how Scripture hints at the answer that the thesis offers. The scriptural exegesis is mostly original and, hence, probationary, but it exploits the greater literalness that the thesis of afterlife individual divisibility allows. For instance, when Jesus says self-amputation is better than perdition entirely, might he have meant something like that, such as perdition partly (Mark 9:43–49//Matt 18:8–9; 5:29–30)? Jesus adds that he will bring about personal division (^^^^^^^^^^^^), which tradition has understood as dividing persons into two groups, one consisting of the unbelieving, but Jesus adds that his division involves one person being divided into two (^^^^^^^^^^^^), with one part (^^^^) for the unbelieving (Luke 12:46, 51). The NT also frequently uses ^^^, which combines if (^^) with the generally untranslatable contingency of ^^, and this combination could express a condition in both kind (from if) and degree (from ^^), which English expresses with to the extent. So understood, Scripture is explaining that salvation is “to the extent,” not merely “if,” godly. Further, certain grammar oddities in Scripture, conventionally taken as unproductive, are reexamined and found suggestive. To illustrate, the NT uses comparative adjectives for those who are saved and those who are damned, thus expressing degrees of salvation and damnation, though traditionally understood as not really meaning that. The NT also uses neuter nouns (e.g., ^^^ and ^^^^), not personal nouns, to describe what, not who, is saved and damned. In one instance, Jesus says he

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

wants fellowship with what (^) the Father has given him (John 17:24). Correct grammar here demands who (^^^), which a few early copyists “corrected” John to, but the best manuscripts kept what, which just forced exegetes to interpret it as who anyway. Individual division, however, justifies the canonical wording, which is that personal qualities, not persons altogether, are saved. So, dividing a person, which may have at first seemed deranged, is, upon reflection, earnestly so (2 Cor 5:13). The chapter ends with an examination of several theologians, such as universalists like Sergei Bulgakov, potentialists like Balthasar, and exclusivists like Wolfhart Pannenberg, who, without dividing the individual to account for the salvation paradox, resort to descriptions of purging that are similar to division as a way to account for how persons have eternal life despite their endemic ungodliness.

Chapter 9 reviews whether the individual divisibility that is being proposed disturbs any Christian doctrines other than that of salvation’s extent, and, conveniently, the thesis requires no further innovations. Dividing the individual after this life changes only those doctrines it intends to, which is actually none. And that includes anthropology because the proposal does nothing to anthropology as it relates to this life, which is naturally the primary focus in both Scripture and tradition, and, as for the afterlife, which is traditionally conceived as involving the individual’s purgation and transformation, the proposal merely discerns divisibility among all that metamorphosis. Related to every chapter, but especially this last, are the numerous doctrines that the proposed model leaves undisturbed. For example, not developed here is soteriology, whether its nature or means, or the resurrection, whether Christ’s or generally, because addressing such issues is unnecessary for the salvation paradox. More generally, the thesis sidesteps any issue not directly implicated in the paradox of salvation’s extent, even when the issue is in the same doctrinal domain, such as what constitutes, comprises, or accounts for being human, the extent to which eschatology is realized or not-yet, whether there is an intermediate state, whether perdition is torment or annihilation, or how the final judgment is administered. One paradox per book is enough.

As this introduction manifests, the approach will be conceptual. That is, while pertinent scholarship will be extensively relied on for premises and context, the book is not a critical evaluation of what any particular theologian thinks or what any comparison or combination of certain theologians produces. While some theologians will rightfully contribute more here than others, none has negotiated the salvation paradox as a paradox. On that issue, the position, if the theologian has taken one, has always been either that everyone will be saved, that not everyone will be, or, a purported compromise, that everyone will be saved potentially. In reaching these positions, each side must retreat to its favored ghetto, which is fortified by the obvious Scripture for its preferred expression and is protected by the well-rehearsed exegetics for pounding the other side, but, to nonpartisans, this theological shadowboxing has been unconvincing because Scripture clearly takes both sides, at least until the exegetes do their magic. Therefore, focusing on any theologian or any handful would miss the point, and, so, numerous authorities from a wide variety of backgrounds are counted upon instead. As a further result of what the thesis strives to accomplish, it cannot circumscribe its focus by isolating on any specific set of theologians. The thesis instead relies on the singularity of the salvation paradox for that focus. This means citing broadly the expressed insights of various theologians (and others) without trying to determine with confidence what they thought comprehensively. For us the auditors, the truth comes from the artwork, not the artist, and the truth from the artwork is found without exegeting the rest of the corpus.

And the citations will be unapologetically generous, but they are not presented to make the reasoning more persuasive, though they might help those needing a nudge. Rather, the authorities serve as arbiters of the reasoning so as to ensure that the proposal reaches for the outlandish only in its titular conclusion. The reasoning therefore surveys broadly, distilling the scholarship and treating its convergence, but is always motivated by the cultural embarrassment in how the salvation

paradox has everywhere been reduced to a mere contradiction. Even if individual divisibility is the wrong approach, this project is called for, certainly beforehand and definitely after. The Gregorys anticipated the sentiment of both the project and the approach. “I do not wish the Word to save only half of me,” even if this means I must be “at once conjoined and separated.”

Concludings

The thought of the life beyond the grave distracts me to anguish, to terror . . . And now I am so bold as to ask you. Oh, God! What will you think of me now? —Dostoevsky, **THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV**

Chapters 1 and 2 framed the predicament that chapter 3 presented, which is that Scripture by imparting both exclusivist and universalist accounts is in paradox on salvation's extent. Chapter 4 documented how the church has responded to this predicament, which, according to every position that has so far been taken on the subject, is that Scripture is in contradiction and, as a result, one account on salvation's extent must be hollowed out so that the preferred account may be hallowed. After centuries of mostly ineffectual debate about which account to prefer, the church has decided conclusively but precipitously on exclusivism, which includes potentialism, but many Christians, particularly after Origen and of late, have favored universalism. Chapter 5 found that each competing position is incomplete primarily because each side, so as to brevet one scriptural account to doctrine, must cashier the other scriptural account to misconception, and, not only must each side do violence to what Scripture says to achieve pellucidity, each position is in the ultimate noetically unbalanced: universalism seems Pollyanna, exclusivism seems savage, and potentialism seems disingenuous.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs led to chapter 6's disquisition that the individual is divisible, which, as chapter 7 explained, allows Scripture's portrayal of salvation's extent to be paradoxical—that is, seemingly contradictory but actually true. As a consequence of everyone being ultimately divisible, both are true: everyone is saved, and not everyone is. Chapters 8 and 9 offered additional reasons for this strange understanding. The stances that have been argued with conviction throughout the book's second half have been offered mostly to suggest the viability of preserving Scripture's salvation paradox through individual division. Those so inclined are invited to jettison any number of the stances taken, such as those which concern who we are, the scriptural exegesis, or the doctrinal influences, and this should not undermine the primary stance of the thesis, which, at the end here, can be singled out from the obiter dicta.

The thesis originated with what cannot be fairly disputed: Scripture says that everyone will be saved and also that not everyone will be. If the text of Scripture did not itself make both accounts clear enough, the church's many first-rate proponents have confirmed each account on salvation's extent. Denying either account is effectively unavailable until one of them is exegeted with extreme prejudice—the favored account, whichever one that happens to be, is used to justify reinterpreting the other so that just the favorite survives. The only alternative has been to claim that actual contradictions are true, but this view does not survive contact with reality except perhaps under dictatorial doublethink. In contrast, the impetus of the thesis has been that Scripture's portrayal of salvation's extent should be as it appears, paradoxical.

The gist of the thesis has been to show how this scriptural paradox need not be treated as an actual contradiction, which means to say something false, and the insight proposed has been that of the divisible individual. Though individual has been around for nearly as long as cogitation, Descartes famously highlighted its indivisibility. Those disputing Cartesian anthropology have largely challenged

its dualism or its stringency, but the eligible anthropological alternatives, whether before or after Descartes, still model the living individual as generally indivisible thanks to this life's naturally unitary corporeality and the first-person's inherently unitary perspective. The thesis, regardless of whatever dependence our thinking has on Descartes, also uses this understanding of the individual for two reasons. First, the in-itself individual has clearly been the most common understanding since antiquity and remains so until today, and, given our unitary perspective, it is also the most reasonable.

This is why Descartes' position, even if wrong at the physical or metaphysical level, has been so credible at the practical level. Second, the in-itself individual, which emphasizes the integrity of the entity, actually imposes the most stress on paradoxism's divisibility. So, those of us with less Cartesianesque views can, if persuaded by them, consider their alternatives for individual (or self or human) and should have an easier time with the paradox. Regardless of how indivisible we are each understood to be, the salvation paradox had best remain as it is scripturally presented—a paradox. Even if our understanding of the individual changes, the issue will remain whether dividing an individual, to whatever extent it might be Cartesian, risks less than enfeebling one scriptural account. If the dividing of the individual as modeled here does not display the salvation paradox, some other model should.

Long before the thesis, Scripture's adherents have struggled with its paradoxes. In those struggles, the church has typically imbibed Scripture entirely, marginalizing as heresy only the sublations, even when dressed up as sublimations, and, to avoid subjecting Scripture to such reductions, the church modeled new theological insights. An interminable exception, however, has been the paradox of salvation's extent. Instead of accepting, as Scripture asserts, that both everyone is ultimately saved and not everyone is, Christians have accepted only the account deemed best. The exclusivist position, which has been dominant, is based on Scripture unmistakably describing two actual, populated ultimate destinies, one of which is perdition. The universalist position, which competed early on and resurges today, is based on Scripture clearly declaring that God, who is through and in everyone, reconciles and saves everyone, dragging everyone to himself, even the ungodly. Given the inescapable principle of noncontradiction, whether reasoned out or intuitively lived, the church felt obliged, despite the evident presence of both scriptural accounts, to pick one. This unraveling of the contradiction, once it was taken as a contradiction, required no insight, just a cleanup of the other scriptural account.

The church in its first several centuries tentatively split on which contradicting account to clean up. In deciding more vital issues, each involving seemingly contradictory scriptural accounts, the church had resisted the alluring simplicity of contradiction and preserved the paradoxes that Scripture presented, but it had not decided on how best to understand the paradox of salvation's extent by the time the church had begun to see paradox as a threat. By then, a "coating of dust" had fallen, Bornkamm described, "on the holy writings like a pall." So, the sixth-century church, lacking the appetite for more incongruities, opted for exclusivism, though universalism subsequently persisted as a heresy and has, as Christianity's bona fides have waned, now regained popularity. Both sides in the debate, despite reaching opposite conclusions on salvation's extent, have agreed on one fundamental, which is that the salvation paradox is a contradiction in need of reform.

In contrast, paradoxism takes salvation's extent as what Scripture says it is, which means taking the salvation-extent accounts not as untruthful or as unartful but as paradoxical. If both scriptural accounts are taken as true, the accounts cannot contradict, and it is this that invites the individual's divisibility. It can be admitted at the end that this, despite being unexpected, is as should be expected. Absolute truth claims, such as those that Scripture makes about eternal life, are bound to be particularistic and universalistic because such claims are exceptional without exception. Paradoxism, to the extent elegant, is, however, no anodyne for the salvation paradox because to

preserve the paradox the model exposes the individual as divisible into two, not merely purged into clarity.

The healthy among us naturally question how this can be, an individual that is divisible. The model, in answer, relies on how little we know about the individual. Much of what we suspect to be the case does not contribute in our context, and, so, unspecified here are whatever the substances are, if any, that continue from this life to the next. Nonetheless, the Christian consensus delivers, and the model employs, two unavoidable axioms that are relevant. First, as corpses prove relentlessly, our bodies suffer an erasure when life ends that is, at least eventually, as thorough as unused words wiped into dust from the chalkboard. Second, beyond the corporeal dust left behind, there are at least two other personal aspects that perdure from this life to the next if there is to be an afterlife: Our personal identity continues because any afterlife to be ours must be experienced by us, and our personal character continues because any afterlife to be ours must be us. While the personal identity is our first-person awareness and is thereby unitary, the personal character is what our led life renders and is thereby chronically conflicted between what is basically godly and ungodly. From this, paradoxism's understanding of the salvation paradox follows: The individual is ultimately saved to the extent godly and doomed to the extent ungodly, dividing (if necessary) the two orientations of the personal character, and our personal identity experiences the personal character with which it identifies.

As a result, because no one is nothing ultimately, everyone in God's mercy is remade ultimately while also remaining oneself, reunifying God with the singular, but anyone opposing God's mercy deserts the self. In the paradox of salvation's extent, as with most other Christian paradoxes, what coincides is identity and difference, the singular and the plural. Divisibility, therefore, contrary to expectation, unifies because everything in this life matters for the next, notwithstanding that the next life, by general agreement, radically differs. The next is not merely this life plus extras, just as the eternal is not dying plus overtime. Rather, Christ unifies this life with the next, and, while everything now will matter to the next, not everything now will be in the next.

This began as an effort to understand what Scripture means when it says that everyone is saved and that not everyone is saved. Paradoxism accepts both as true, but this is reckless, even perilous, because it domesticates neither salvation proposition. Preserving Scripture's salvation paradox means that what ultimately matters is how we face every moment, not any particular moment or two, and the choice we face is the lifelong one between the sinfully earthy and the earthly Divine. "The man under grace is engaged unconditionally in a conflict," Barth saw, "a war of life and death, a war in which there can be no armistice—and no peace." "Upon the threshold of my existence there appears . . . the new man in Christ Jesus, . . . endowed with attributes which are not mine . . . This new man is . . . no other, second person with whom I may be compared; he claims to be me myself, my existential, unobservable ego," but this internal dissension means only "that an abyss is disclosed between myself and—myself." The question heard in the abyss is, With whom do I identify? Hamann answered rightly, "Unbelief in the most essential, historical sense of the word is thus the only sin against the spirit of the true religion, whose heart is in heaven and whose heaven is in the heart." "As a result, there is no mediating concept left . . . except to believe with all their heart, with all their soul, with all their mind: For God so loved the world—This faith is the victory that overcomes the world."

"God is love," which is not our love for him, but his for us, namely his love revealed in us (1 John 4:8–10, 16). This in Wordsworth's words is "the sustaining thought." "[T]he glory of God," Irenaeus noted, "is a living man; and the life of man consists in beholding God." Cabasilas advanced the idea, "It is those in whom this noble passion is nourished who truly live, just as all things are dead for those in whom it is absent." No one escapes this passion entirely; just as no mere mortal nourishes

it thoroughly. The “dangerous condition of being human,” McConville reminds us, involves “the perpetual tension between flourishing and degradation.” “In redemption, as in creation,” Käsemann knew, “everything is differentiated” because “God does not want stereotypes.” Yet too, “Nothing differentiates” (Rom 3:22). We are therefore encouraged not to differentiate people as either godly or ungodly, but to recognize that we each are both. God’s love certainly does not differentiate among us, but every great love, even his, knows absolute differentiation at its most lived, which is the yearning difference between the lover and the beloved.

When all is done, I want to be “counted worthy of God’s reign” (2 Thess 1:5). I do not know if I can try more—I certainly can—or how much that counts—I question that—but I will try more, because “nothing entering man from outside can defile,” only “what comes out of man” (Mark 7:18, 20//Matt 15:17–18). “I do not wish the Word to save only half of me,” Gregory of Nazianzus foresaw. I alone am guilty, Kierkegaard judged, which brings the joy that the fault lies in me alone and that my task alone remains. Therefore, even when assured of salvation, I doubt the extent to which I abide in it. “God will call to account the pursuit” (Eccl 3:15). Though the good news is God’s grace to humanity, I live the paradox of a loving but an alienating response. I am, therefore, sure and unsure of salvation. I hear distinctly Yes and No, but the voices sound different. It is as if I am divided. Sure, God loves me entirely, but if only I entirely returned the favor. Kierkegaard again writes for me: “now, for the first time, I understand and can see the whole of it—but then of course I cannot say ‘I.’” “What is this mystery in me?” the original Climacus asked. “Speak to me, my yoke-fellow, my nature! I cannot ask anyone else about you,” he insisted. “How can I escape the danger of my own nature? I have made a promise to Christ that I will fight you, yet how can I defeat your tyranny?” I—no, we—should fight this fight, not because we want to live eternally, but because we want to be there when we do. <>

THE GOSPEL OF THOMAS: INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY by Simon James Gathercole [Series: Texts and Editions for New Testament Study, Brill, 9789004190412]

In this new commentary on the controversial Gospel of Thomas, Simon Gathercole provides the most extensive analysis yet published of both the work as a whole and of the individual sayings contained in it. This commentary offers a fresh analysis of Thomas not from the perspective of form criticism and source criticism but seeks to elucidate the meaning of the work and its constituent elements in its second-century context. With its lucid discussion of the various controversial aspects of Thomas, and treatment of the various different scholarly views, this is a foundational work of reference for scholars not just of apocryphal Gospels, but also for New Testament scholars, Classicists and Patrologists.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Preface

Abbreviations

Introduction

1 Manuscripts

2 A Comparison of the Greek and Coptic Texts
Appended Note: Thomas as a ‘Rolling Corpus’?

3 Named Testimonia to Thomas

4 Early References to the Contents of Thomas

- 5 The Original Language of Thomas
- 6 The Provenance of Thomas
- 7 The Date of Thomas (with Authorship)
- 8 The Structure of Thomas
- 9 The Genre of Thomas
- 10 The Religious Outlook of Thomas
- Appended Note: Is Thomas “Gnostic”?
- 11 Thomas, the New Testament and the Historical Jesus
- 12 The Plan of the Commentary

Commentary

Prologue, Logia 1–114, Subscriptio

Appended Notes:

The Relation between GTh 12 and 13 (after GTh 72)

Moki.xoc in the Gospel of Thomas (after GTh 76)

The Five Trees in Paradise (after GTh 79)

A Scribal Error in Q? (after GTh 36)

Bibliography

Index locorum

Author Index

Subject Index

Excerpt: The greatest commentary never written was undoubtedly that of Prof. Morris Zapp of Euphoric State University. In his own words:

I began a commentary on the works of Jane Austen, the aim of which was to be utterly exhaustive, to examine the novels from every conceivable angle—historical, biographical, rhetorical, mythical, structural, Freudian, Jungian, Marxist, existentialist, Christian, allegorical, ethical, phenomenological, archetypal, you name it. So that when each commentary was written, there would be nothing further to say about the novel in question.

Of course, I never finished it.

Rather than imitating the promethean project started by Prof. Zapp, any commentator must be subject to a strict self-denying ordinance, and focus only on particular aspects of the text. This is no less true with such a short book as the Gospel of Thomas. DeConick’s commentary, for example, seeks to identify where the various sections of Thomas accrued in the compositional history of the work.² Nordsieck aims primarily to identify the extent to which particular sayings go back to the historical Jesus. One approach which Valantasis adopts is a kind of post-structuralist reading of the text, emphasizing the playfulness and indeterminacy of Thomas.

The intention of the present commentary is different. The aim here is principally to understand the meaning of the sayings of Thomas in its second-century historical context. That is, it elucidates the religious outlook of Thomas in the setting in which it was composed. This may sound like a standard approach of a commentary, but, as can be seen from the remarks above, commentators have not always focused on the actual meaning of the text. As Gagné has recently put it: ‘What has lacked in Thomasine research is inquiry into the meaning of the collection of sayings as a whole, and this for a plausible historical implied reader. This commentary is not concerned with the tradition-history of the work, asking, for example, whether a saying in Thomas is more primitive than its parallel in the Synoptics. (I have addressed a number of the issues about the compositional situation of Thomas in a recent monograph.) It treats the final form of the text, an approach which is in part defended in the Introduction, which aims to argue for Thomas as a tolerably unified work which can legitimately be interpreted as such. The reasonable degree of similarity between the Greek and Coptic texts is shown (Introduction, §2), and the reasonably coherent religious outlook of the work is set out (§10) in order to defend an approach based upon Thomas’s relative consistency. Speculative theories about the prehistory of Thomas are also subjected to scrutiny (see Appended Note following §2).

A few house-keeping matters are in order. The division of the text into 114 sayings has for a long time been well established, and I have also followed the subdivisions of sayings adopted by the Berliner Arbeitskreis für koptischgnostische Schriften. In the translation, I have used gender-inclusive language where practicable, though in order to avoid cumbersome renderings, occasional masculine pronouns ('he', 'him', 'his') have been necessary.

The Religious Outlook of Thomas

A central problem for scholarship on Thomas has been to identify its theology or religious outlook. This question has elicited a number of answers, in part because of Thomas's enigmatic content, its form and its brevity. As Schröter has remarked, Thomas has been taken variously to be a document of Gnosticism, or of Jewish-Christian encratism, or of wisdom theology, or as an expression of social radicalism. Others have summarised Thomas as focused upon 'unitive mysticism', or as a Valentinian product, or as 'an "orthodox" text from early Syrian Christianity'. Scholars have often attempted to align Thomas with a particular school of thought, and have aimed to fill in the gaps with the help of literature from that school. The difficulty, however, is that Thomas does not fit neatly (or even approximately) into any previously known hairesis. It is therefore important, at least in the first instance, to look at Thomas as far as possible on its own terms, even if there are limits to this, as Uro rightly notes. The aim here is to identify, if not a tidy theology, then at least Thomas's central concerns as well as its more ambiguously articulated themes. The rough sketch here is of course dependent upon various points of interpretation argued for in the commentary below.

Theological Framework

Thomas's theology is fundamentally a soteriology: 'Whoever finds the interpretation of these sayings will not taste death' (GTh 1). It is not primarily about common wisdom, as alleged both by some members of the Jesus Seminar, as well as by one of their staunchest critics. For Thomas, the souls of the elect had their origins in the realm of light, the kingdom of the Father (GTh 49–50). Thomas provides instruction in how to return to that kingdom of the Father.

The Father

The Father is in one respect a prominent figure in Thomas, being mentioned 21 times. On the other hand, it is striking that he is hardly a character at all; he is not identified as an agent in any significant way, in contrast to Jesus. The most that can probably be said is that he is characterised by 'motion and rest' like the elect (GTh 50), as well as having an 'image of light' in GTh 83. He evidently has a 'will' (99), and of course a Son (GTh 61; 64; 99), but especially a kingdom (GTh 57; 76; 96–99; 113).

The Kingdom

Although the Synoptics talk of the kingdom as 'prepared' (Mk 10.40; Matt. 25.34; cf. Mk 10.40; Matt. 20.23), Thomas goes further, envisaging the kingdom as a pre-existent, paradisaic realm of light. It is certainly not a geographical location in the cosmos. It is closely associated with 'light' (49–50). The kingdom is inside the elect, and outside of them (3); they came from it and will return there (49). It can also be found (27.1; 49), known (46), and most of all, entered (22 tris; 99; 114; cf. 39; 64; 75); or one can be 'far from' it (82). When the disciples talk of the kingdom 'coming' (GTh 113), Jesus retorts that it is spread out everywhere (113): other traditional, futuristic language is avoided. There is some sort of future expectation ('days are coming' in GTh 79), but this is not related specifically to the kingdom, and even the rolling up of the heavens and the earth do not have any effect upon the elect (GTh 11; 111). The categories of 'now' and 'not yet' do not apply in Thomas, because the kingdom is an ever-present, primordial paradise (18–19). The kingdom does not belong to the rich and powerful, but to the poor (54) and child-like (22; 46). It is a place of primeval unity (22), and ought to be visible, though it is obscured by people's blindness (113).

Creation and the Fall

Understanding the creation of the world in Thomas presents certain difficulties. We should not expect a systematic account, and indeed we only have short and elusive fragments. On some occasions, the creator figure is referred to in feminine terms: Adam came from a 'great power and great wealth' (GTh 85), and it is some sort of 'true mother' who gave Jesus life (101). These (along with 'the Mother' in GTh 105) might be suggestive of the Spirit (cf. 44) as involved in creation, in two instances where it is clearly positive. It is tantalising, however, that GTh 101 has a lacuna at a key point. In addition to GTh 77 (on which see below), the only other place where one might see a creator is in GTh 89, but that saying is also enigmatic.

Whatever the truth about creation, the tragic reality of the present is the result of a fall. This is expressed in two main ways, which can be summarised as a 'falling apart' and a 'falling downward'. With respect to the former, Jesus states that, 'When you were one, you became two' (11), and this theme of division is picked up in a number of places. Jesus on the other hand 'comes from the undivided' (GTh 61.3), and is emphatically not 'a divider' (72). A conception of the fall as a separation appears in, among other places, the Valentinian myth, according to which the enthymesis of Sophia was removed from the pleroma and became Achamoth, an inferior form of Sophia (Irenaeus, *All* 1.4.1), or as in another version, in which the Word is divided in two (Tri. Trac. 77, 11–36). We will see that in Thomas the recovery of primordial unity is a key task in the discipleship of the elect.

As far as the 'downward' fall is concerned, the spirit descends into physical human bodies, as Jesus states: 'I am amazed at how this great wealth [sc. spirit] has made its home in this poverty [i.e. the body, the flesh]' (29). This is clearly related in some unspecified way to the fall of Adam, and his death (85). So there is a conception of a heavenly fall with mundane implications for human beings. None of this is connected explicitly with sin, however, a topic which plays a very small role in the Gospel of Thomas. The cause of this fall is unclear.

A number of options existed in Thomas's intellectual environment for why souls descended into bodies, many of which arise out of interpretations of the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedrus*.¹⁶ Alcinoüs lists four options: 'either following their turn in a numbered sequence, or by the will of the gods, or through intemperance, or through love of the body; body and soul, after all, have a certain affinity for one another, like fire and asphalt'. Iamblichus's *De Anima* 23 discusses various accounts of 'the activities which induce the soul to descend', listing the following: a kind of desire for independence (Plotinus); 'flight from God' (Empedocles), and 'the rest which consists in change' (Heraclitus), 'derangement and deviation' (the Gnostics), and 'the erring judgment of a free will' (Albinus). Iamblichus returns later to a very similar theme, where some Platonists are described as taking the view that there are multiple modes of descent (*De Anima* 26); in *De Anima* 27 Heraclitus's view is repeated (souls must be in motion because it is an effort for them to stay still), and two opinions of Taurus or his followers are described, the completion of the number of souls in the universe, and the demonstration of the divine life (cf. Alcinoüs's first two options?). Other explanations include the soul's intention to administer the material realm (Plutarch's stranger; Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.8.4–5). Philo's enigmatic explanation is that the soul was 'not able to overcome a satiety with divine blessings'. The other distinction made is that between willing and unwilling descent (Iamblichus, *De Anima* 27).

Some of these are incompatible with Thomas. It is hard to imagine that for Thomas, the soul-spirit, being 'great wealth', could have had evil propensities or incompetence before its descent (the view attributed to Albinus or the Gnostics). Additionally, Alcinoüs's last option, where there is an attraction between soul and body because of their mutual affinity (the view which he probably holds himself), probably does not do justice to the way in which Thomas portrays their rather more hostile relationship (see commentary on GTh 87 and 112 below). The problem of characterising Thomas's own view is complicated further by imagery which defies systematisation: in GTh 57, the

evil is sown among the good, whereas in 21.2–3 and 29, the good has taken up residence in what is alien. Two points which have not yet been brought into the discussion perhaps deserve mention. Firstly, the ‘all coming forth’ from Jesus in GTh 77 perhaps is suggestive of a fall of the light or pneumatic element, and not necessarily a positive act of creation. Secondly, the view attributed by Iamblichus to Heraclitus that ‘souls travel both the road up and the road down and that for them to remain in place is toil but to change is rest’ may have something in common with Thomas: ‘motion and rest’ are the ‘sign of the Father’ in the elect in GTh 50, and, as we have seen, GTh 77 talks of the all both ‘coming forth’ from Jesus (cf. the ‘road down’) and ‘extending to’ him (cf. the ‘road up’). Such connections must remain speculative, however.

The World

Uncertainty about the character of the fall is one reason for a degree of ambiguity in Thomas about the world, for which the Coptic uses the Greek loan word. On the one hand, Thomas seems very negative about the world: it is described as a corpse (GTh 56), its implied ‘death’ putting it at the very negative extreme of Thomas’s moral spectrum. Some have seen this negativity as arising from a demiurge who is responsible for creation, for example in the reference to God/ god in the ‘Render unto Caesar’ pericope (GTh 100). On the other hand, Zöckler draws attention to the fact that according to GTh 24 the world can be enlightened, and for Marjanen the world is the arena where salvation is possible for people, with the same creator making both the inside and the outside of the metaphorical cup (GTh 89).

As one proceeds through Thomas, it is the negative elements which come to the fore. One sees the ridiculousness of the kingdom being part of this world—in the air or the sea (GTh 3). Jesus has cast fire on the world in GTh 10, and GTh 16 repeats this idea, adding ‘sword and war’. GTh 21 may imply that the world belongs to other powers. The world is probably the implied object of ‘passing by’ in GTh 42. As noted, it is a corpse (56), and should be renounced (110). There is an overwhelmingly negative impression here. If the world is to be illuminated, it is only because it is dark in the first place. It may be that the positive illumination is confined to the world qua people: when Jesus stands in the midst of the world in GTh 28, there [^]ocMoc is glossed in anthropological terms—as ‘them’—namely, the blind, empty and drunk who nevertheless have the capacity to repent.

It is interesting that, in contrast to the world, ‘the all’ came forth from Jesus and is identified with Jesus, and ‘the earth’ is the realm over which the kingdom is spread out (GTh 113). This may point to different realms, as has already been suggested (see further the commentary below). One can compare here the contrast between the world and ‘the all’ (as well as the Pleroma) in the Treatise on the Resurrection (46,34–39).

There is also a degree of ambiguity in the treatments of particular ‘worldly’ themes. Some are sharply rejected: the accumulation of wealth is frowned upon and commerce shunned (see e.g. GTh 63–65), as are the finely clothed but ignorant rulers of GTh 78. On the other hand, other items are treated merely as matters of indifference, such as clothes (36: ‘do not be concerned ...’) and diet (14: ‘eat whatever is set before you’): this almost certainly means there is no prohibition of eating meat. The same is true of money per se in GTh 95.2, where giving to those who cannot give it back signals at the same time altruism and indifference to one’s own possession of money; similarly, one can without hesitation give Caesar back what belongs to him (100) because it holds no appeal to the true disciple.

The Body

Mirroring Thomas’s view of the world is the perspective on the body. There is certainly a stark contrast between the soul or spirit on the one side and the body or flesh on the other. (The terms spirit and soul do not seem clearly distinguished, nor do body and flesh.) As we saw in the discussion

of the fall, Jesus expresses his amazement that such great wealth, viz. the spirit, has come to occupy a position of poverty, i.e. in the flesh (GTh 29.3). Thomas suggests that this cohabitation is an ill, however, as there is a woe pronounced upon the mutual dependence upon the flesh and soul in GTh 112. Less antithetically, there is a contrast between the external, physical image on the one hand, and the pre-existent, spiritual image on the other (84), but not an opposition. It is just possible that the body is neutral in Thomas's mind. On the other hand, two factors might point in the direction of a more negative perspective. For one, the existence of the spirit in the body seems to correlate with the sense of alienation which is explained as being "two"—divided, rather than a whole unity. Another factor is that for some readers, the view of the world would have rubbed off on their view of the physical body: it is difficult to keep these too far apart. It is an outstanding question in the Platonism of the period whether the body is the negative 'fetter' that it is in the *Phaedo*, or in fact something less detrimental to the soul. Valentinians maintained that in the body and other created institutions, 'the likeness of the divine is rather eclipsed than wholly obscured', as Edwards has put it, in contrast to the sharper negativity of the Gnostics. Thomas does not seem to have taken a clear stance on this question, while tending in a negative direction.

The History of Israel

Moving to the more mundane sphere of history, there are only brief allusions in Thomas to Israel, which is perhaps seen as one of history's unfortunate parentheses. As we have seen above, circumcision and 'the Jews' are characterised as straightforwardly negative (GTh 43 and 53; see above §7.3, and commentary ad locc. below); the Pharisees (and Scribes) aim to prevent people from discovering the truth in GTh 39 and 102; Israel may well be the illegitimate vine which will be uprooted (GTh 40); the temple will be irrevocably destroyed (GTh 71). More positive is John the Baptist, but as in Matthew 11 and Luke 7 he is primarily the pinnacle of the old age, and inferior to anyone participating in Jesus' kingdom (GTh 46).

Jesus and Revelation

It is probable that Thomas portrays Jesus as incarnate: he is fundamentally 'light' (GTh 77), but also entered the world as 'flesh' (GTh 28). Although there is a sense in which the true disciple can be identified with Jesus (GTh 108) and the disciple Thomas should not even call Jesus 'master' (GTh 13), nevertheless in various ways Jesus retains a transcendence.³⁴ He is, for example, the agent of election (GTh 23) and judgment (GTh 10; 16); the elect are his disciples (55), and are under his 'lordship' (90); all are to give him his due (GTh 100), and supremely, he is the light above all and the all in GTh 77. His relation to the supreme divine being is as son (99), and he also appears to receive life in some sense from another, feminine, spiritual being (105).

Central to the christology of Thomas, however, is his identity as revealer. In GTh 17 this is highlighted: 'I will give you what eye has not seen, and what ear has not heard, and what hand has not touched, nor has it ascended to the heart of man.' The theme is picked up in GTh 38, highlighting Jesus (and by implication the Gospel of Thomas) as the unique source of revelation. The format of the whole Gospel ('Jesus says ...', 'Jesus says ...', 'Jesus says ...') draws attention to just this point. The opening lines of the Gospel set out the significance of this revelation entrusted to Thomas, this revelation which must be rightly understood and which is the means to escaping death (Prologue + GTh 1).

(Self-)Knowledge

After a saying which expands upon the eschatological reward of escaping death (2), we have another statement which probably glosses the comprehension of Jesus' revelation: GTh 3, with its reference to knowing oneself. Knowledge is a central theme in the work. There are twenty-five instances of the word *coo* in Thomas, twenty of which are of theological significance, with five more casual instances.³⁶ There is also the Greek loan-word in GTh 39.1, and six instances of Coptic *e* [^] *e*

(probably five theological in intent). This is an extraordinary density of 'knowing' vocabulary, given that Thomas is such a short work. There is also a strong focus on the words of Jesus as the source of this knowledge (Prologue; GTh 38 etc.). The references specifically to 'self-knowledge' should not be understood as concerned with a kind of psychological introspection, 'self-knowledge' in the sense of knowing one's own personality, knowing one's abilities and identity in relation to and comparison with others. Rather, it is about knowing what you are in the grand theological scheme of things—knowing about yourself. It is probably something close to what is summarised in the words of the Valentinian Theodotus, who defines knowledge (^^^^^^) by way of the following questions:

Who were we and what have we become? Where were we and where are we now cast? To where are we hastening and from what have we been delivered? What is birth? What is rebirth?

(For further parallels and discussion, see the commentary below on GTh 3.4.) The answers to all these questions are thematised in Thomas: 'Who were we and what have we become?' We were spirits pure and simple but are now divided between spirit and body. 'Where were we and where are we now cast?' We were in the primordial light, but have now been thrown into a corpse-like world. 'To where are we hastening and from what have we been delivered?' We have been delivered already from ignorance, and are now heading for—or better, returning to—the perfected salvation which is already substantially possessed.

Salvation

This knowledge about oneself that Jesus reveals according to the Gospel of Thomas, then, is the necessary condition for salvation. This state of salvation is depicted in various ways as, for example, vision of the Father, ascendancy over the cosmos, being in a united state (on which more below) and perhaps predominantly, 'rest'. DeConick rightly emphasises the motif of visionary experience in places such as GTh 59,39 and there is a good deal of visual language elsewhere in Thomas (e.g. GTh 5; 15; 27.2; 37; 38; 84), even if it is not the central idea in Thomas. There is still a strong emphasis on text and textual interpretation as precondition for salvation, and other soteriological motifs are also prominent. Ascendancy over the cosmos is a key goal for true disciples, expressed in terms of their reigning (GTh 2), and conversely of the obedience or service which elements of the world will render (19.2; 48; 106): additionally, 'the world is not worthy' of such disciples (56; 80; 111). 'Rest' is also another important result (51; 60; 90), signalling freedom from the temptations of the world and—ultimately—freedom from the labour of discipleship. It may be dangerous to assign primacy to any particular image, but there is certainly widespread reference in Thomas to the cultivation or creation of a unitary personhood or nature in the enacted discipleship of the elect, and this theme merits more extended treatment.

The Practice of Discipleship in Thomas

We have above characterised the fall as a kind of disintegration, which is more precisely a splitting of reality into binary opposites. There are various instances of this. The audience itself is 'two' (11), but GTh 22 especially focuses on the inside/ outside, above/ below, male/ female divisions. Existentially, loyalties are divided (47) and the disciples 'like the Jews' operate with inconsistent distinctions (43, 89). The 'house' can be divided (48; cf. 106). The distinction between the internal 'image' and the external 'likeness' (84) recalls the inside/ outside dichotomy, as does the false distinction between the inside and the outside of the cup (89). The need for Mary and women in general to be assimilated to maleness (114) reflects (though not exactly) the male/ female division in 22. There are three aspects to the resolution of these divisions, which might be called 'self-union', 'gender union' and 'christological union', and all these require actualisation by the disciple. As Frend has noted, salvation is not conceived as instantaneous, but rather results from 'advance towards spiritual perfection through the practice of ascetic virtues and repentance'.⁴⁰ Although one might quibble with some of Frend's terminology, the thought is a valid one. There are quite distinctive images

which express this side of Thomas's theology. We will examine these individually before exploring their potential coherence.

Self-Union

GTh 70 is the one place in Thomas where the standard verb 'to save' is employed. The saving element in this saying is described in the language of that which 'you bring forth from yourselves'. This probably refers to the true image, or spirit, hidden within. It is this real image which needs to come to the fore, and to take precedence over the external visible image presented in the body. A similar idea is perhaps found in the Gospel of Judas: 'Let whoever is [strong] among you men bring forth the perfect man and stand in the presence of my face' (Gos. Jud. 35,2–6); compare also Gos. Mary 18,15–17. Relatedly, the Treatise on the Resurrection comments that it is not our dead, external limbs which will be resurrected, but the true living members (Treat. Res. 47,38–48,3). 'Light' is another image used in Thomas to describe the saving, internal element (GTh 24).

GTh 22 similarly talks of 'when you fashion eyes in the place of an eye, and a hand in place of a hand, and a foot in place of a foot, and an image in place of an image' as preconditions for entering the kingdom. Here, the construction of a new person is in some sense envisaged, although one might more properly label this a reunification and return to a primordial state. The conclusion—'an image in place of an image'—may well be a summary. The new, or true, person within needs to supersede the external physical person. The two 'images' correspond to those in GTh 84, the external 'likeness' as opposed to 'your images which came into being before you, and which neither die nor become manifest'. The latter needs to swallow up the former. If GTh 70 spoke of bringing forth and externalising the true image within, GTh 22 speaks slightly differently of replacing the external with the internal. The emphasis here is on the new/ primordial identity, and the 'intentional reformation of the self' and creating an 'alternative symbolic universe'.

Somewhat different is the metaphor of 'becoming a child' (GTh 46; cf. 4, 21, 22, 37, 50), although this too connotes a primordial identity. In addition to the connotations of asexuality and innocence, there is the element of childlike nakedness without shame (37) evoking the Garden of Eden. This connection is also made by Philo:

"And the two were naked, both Adam and his wife, and they were not ashamed; but the serpent was the most subtle of all the beasts which were on the earth, which the Lord God had made" (Gen. 2.25; 3.1). The mind, which is clothed neither with vice nor with virtue, but really stripped of both, is naked, like the soul of an infant child ... (Leg. 2.53)

Thomas probably similarly sees the child-like state as that possessed by the elect disciple who has reverted to primordial innocence. This is often, probably correctly, seen as a reversion to a primordial state construed as an Adamic identity; a specifically Adamic state is not always strongly emphasised in Thomas, however. The 'child' imagery is linked to, and perhaps explicated by, two related motifs, those of the unifying of the divided self, and of stripping naked.

Jesus in GTh 22 commends suckling babies as models of discipleship, and then immediately talks in terms of 'when you make the two one', especially the inside/ outside, above/ below, and male/ female. Hence Jesus exhorts the disciples to participate in the resolution of the 'inside/ outside' dichotomy (cf. also 48 and 106). There is some tension between unification and replacement (for example of 'outside' and 'inside'), but they have a similar field of reference.

The motif of 'stripping off one's clothes', noted in the parable in GTh 21, comes to prominence in GTh 37 as necessary for vision of Jesus. Whether this is achievable in the present or is eschatological is unclear. The precise contours of this expression are not especially relevant here: what is clear is that we have a removal of the external, which connects with (indeed, constitutes the negative element of) the replacement of the external with the internal in GTh 22.

We have here, then, various construals of the internal and external: (i) bringing forth what is internal, (ii) replacing the external with the internal, (iii) unifying external and internal, and (iv) removal of the external. It would be rather churlish to decry any inconsistencies that may be present here. For Thomas, (i) and (ii) are derived from the Gospel's image theology, and (iii) and (iv) are closely related to the 'child' motif. Across those two themes of the image and the child, we have noted that (iv) can be seen as a component of (ii), and—in particular—GTh 22 fuses both themes, with the child as the symbol of the unified image. Additionally, they are all related to the primordial state in which the eternal image within recovers its superiority over outward physical likeness (although (iii) is surprising here). It is interesting that Philo (in a passage already alluded to) can also combine these in the same primeval setting of Genesis 1–2:

Observe that it is not the woman who cleaves to the man, but on the contrary, the man to the woman, that is, the mind to sensation. For when the better, namely, the mind, is united to the worse, namely, sensation, it is then dissolved into the worse, that is the nature of the flesh, and into sensation, the cause of the passions. But when the worse, namely sensation, follows the better, the mind, then it will no longer be flesh, but both will be mind (Leg. 2.50) Here, the mind is fused with the flesh (cf. iii), but then when the mind becomes the prominent element (cf. i) and the flesh follows the mind, then the flesh will also become mind (cf. ii and iv). There is a degree of coherence in Thomas's account here without it being systematic.

Gender Union

This leads us in to the theme of 'gender union': just as male/ female division is an aspect of the plight in Thomas, so the construction of an androgynous state is part of the solution. As Klijn puts it, humanity was originally one but became two by becoming male and female; the person needs to return to that unitary, single state. Klijn draws attention to Philo as again illuminating this theme. (There are also Syrian and Talmudic parallels, but these come from a later time.) Philo saw God as monad in contrast to the dyadic human (Deus 82–84), and in contrast to divisible matter (Spec. 3.180). In fact, however, humanity was originally not dyadic when existing as the uncontaminated image of God (Opif. 134). This is associated by Philo with man/ woman, where man is 'mind' and woman 'sensation', as in the passage just quoted above (Leg. 2.50). A postmortem existence in which the duality is resolved into its original unity awaits humanity. Thomas is also similar in this respect to the Gospel of Philip, where the separation of 'Adam' and 'Eve' is imagined as a fall in need of reversal:

If the female had not separated from the male, the female and the male would not have died. The separation of male and female was the beginning of death. Christ came to heal the separation that was from the beginning and reunite the two, in order to give life to those who died through separation and unite them. (Gos. Phil. 70,9–17)

A passage following shortly after this elaborates, and although it becomes fragmentary, it may suggest that the unification of Adam's soul and spirit are analogous to the salvation of the addressees of Philip (70,23–28). The Gospel of the Egyptians also makes the unification of male and female a condition of salvation much as does the Gospel of Philip.

The unity in Thomas may not be best construed as entirely genderless, but might be best described as 'male androgyny' (see commentary below on GTh 114). The way in which the male/ female distinction is treated in Thomas, however, does not necessarily enable us to identify the gender dynamics in the Thomas movement.

Christological Union

Finally, the resolution of cosmic division results in incorporation (perhaps even absorption) of the person into Jesus himself (hence, 'christological union'). As GTh 108 has it: 'Whoever drinks from my mouth will become like me. I myself will become him ...' (108.1–2). The degree of assimilation

here is strong, reflecting more than a Pauline imagery of being in Christ, and closer to the kind of 'unitive mysticism'⁵¹ or ^^^^^^^ ^^^ in the strong sense in the Gospel of Eve or the Gospel of Philip (see commentary on GTh 108 below). The precise nature of this union in Thomas eludes us, however.

Concrete Requirements

More concretely, what is required is radical self-denial. This is expressed in the traditional terms of taking up the cross (55), but also through the language of 'fasting to the world' and observing 'sabbath' (27), and renouncing power (81) and the world (110). Obligations to parents (101) and to anything else must be subordinated to the requirement of Jesus.

More positively, there are a number of motifs which highlight the devotion to the matters advocated in Thomas, summarised in GTh 99 as doing the will of the Father, and elsewhere as seeking rest (60) or seeking the imperishable treasure (76). The importance of seeking is reinforced by the fact that throughout Thomas finding is a soteriological good (GTh 1; 2; 8; 27; 38; 49; 56; 58; 77?; 80; 90; 92; 94; 97?; 107; 109.3; 110; 111). In addition to this language, salvation can also be said to depend on particular attributes which are to be developed. Singlemindedness, especially about true knowledge over against its alternatives, is prominent in the parables (GTh 8; 76; 107), as well as in the aphorisms (e.g. GTh 32–34). Also notable is the demand of exacting labour (GTh 2; 58; 107.3, 109.3)—related to the seeking motif. Discipleship is also characterised by readiness, a theme employed most consistently in contexts of conflict imagery: being armed in anticipation of robbery (GTh 21.4?; 103) and being able to effect a killing (98). Where this theme of readiness comes particularly into prominence, however, is in the preparation of acquiring knowledge necessary for heavenly ascent (GTh 50).

The knowledge of one's place in relation to the kingdom and the cosmos is highly relevant to this postmortem scenario envisaged in GTh 50. In the personal eschatology set out in Thomas, the soul is asked a series of questions about her identity, origin and characteristics. Hence, mastery of what Thomas says about these themes is essential labour for the true disciple. As noted above in §10.1, Thomas's theology is fundamentally soteriological.

The Problem of "Asceticism" in Thomas

Some scholars have emphasised very strongly that for Thomas the goal of discipleship is apatheia and that permanent celibacy is a *sine qua non* for the elect. Frend wrote of 'complete sexual abnegation', and Turner of Thomas's 'fastidious abhorrence of sex'. Richardson remarked that Thomas is 'crystal clear' on the point; Lincoln stated not only that a requirement of chastity was 'certain', but added: 'it is not unthinkable that even so extreme a measure as self-castration may have been practiced by the senior members of the Thomas-community'. More recently, for DeConick, abstinence is the necessary preparation for openness to visionary experience, which she argues is also crucial to Thomas. Certainly there are places which might well be amenable to such an interpretation, as for example in the references to 'single ones', and perhaps a veiled condemnation of marriage in GTh 87.

At the other extreme, Davies has stated that there is no such thing: 'Thomas never mentions either marriage or sexual continence.' Indeed, with its indifference to these themes, Thomas 'contradicts encratism'. There is also something to be said for this understanding, given that early Christians and others in Thomas's cultural environment were perfectly capable of talking clearly about celibacy if they wanted to: Paul's commendation (though not requirement) of celibacy is clear (1 Cor. 7.7), but the same is not true of Thomas. On the other hand, is Thomas ever 'crystal clear', and given the nature of the work, should we expect such clarity?

More moderately, Uro notes that the talk of blessing on those who no longer give birth is relegated to the future: 'Days are coming when you will say, "Blessed are the womb which has not conceived and the breasts which have not given milk"' (79.3). Uro also warns against the danger of interpreting the 'single ones' as celibates against the background of rather later, fourth-century Syrian parallels. Nevertheless, the factors favouring singleness should not be dismissed lightly either, even if there seems to be no clear prohibition of marriage.

If Uro is on the right track in rejecting a clear requirement for celibacy in Thomas, it is probably also true to say that for those disciples who have ears to hear, celibacy is the (strongly) commended life. A brief survey of Thomas is illuminating in this respect. GTh 7 may include, among other things, a condemnation of lust. The supreme being is 'not born of woman' (GTh 15). The addition of 'and they will stand as solitary' to the saying about division in the family (16) implies separation from the family. Child imagery, with its potential connotations of asexual innocence, is very concentrated (4, 21, 22, 37, 46), with the relativisation of the male-female distinction in one of those sayings (22), and some degree of contrast with 'those born of woman' in another (46). Certainly there is a redefinition of family in the Synoptic Gospels, but it is notable that Thomas has taken over much of this material in, again, a concentrated way (GTh 16 = Matt. 10.34–35/ Lk. 12.51–53; GTh 55 = Lk. 14.26; GTh 79 = Lk. 11.27+23.29; GTh 99 = Mk 3.31–35&parr.; GTh 101 = GTh 55 = Lk. 14.26): material spread across Matthew, Mark and Luke is included in the very much shorter Thomas. (Thomas is less than one-quarter the length of Matthew and Luke, slightly over one-quarter the length of John, and slightly over one-third the length of Mark.) Salome, perhaps known from the Gospel of the Egyptians as a celibate, is highlighted as a disciple in GTh 61. A marriage is an excuse for avoiding (allegorically) discipleship in the parable about the 'places of my Father' in GTh 64. Only the solitary, ironically, will enter the true bridal chamber (GTh 75). In contrast to the fertile, it is the barren who are blessed in GTh 79. Perhaps the most negative statement about sex is that in which a body dependent on another body is denounced as 'wretched' (87): at risk of hair-splitting, however, 'wretched', or 'pitiable', might not be so negative as e.g. the 'cursed' state in GTh 7.2. In contrast to the biological family of Jesus, the obedient are his true family (99), and the physical parents of disciples are to be 'hated' (101). Thomas disciples are instead characterised as those who know their true Father and Mother. In the treasure parable, the biological son is ignorant, but the one who works achieves success (109). Women must become male in order to enter the kingdom (114).

'Asceticism' and 'enocratism' have probably become words too ill-defined to be useful in Thomas scholarship at present. What should probably be said, however, is that in contrast to the extreme positions of both Richardson and Davies, commendation (but not requirement) of celibacy is present in a concentrated way. Accompanying this is a stance of indifference to and disregard for biological relations, as the statements above have already implied. As Uro rightly notes, there is a 'disregard for family ties'.

Social Ethos and Practices

Less important in Thomas, but not irrelevant, are the various social attitudes and practices enjoined. These are not extensive: Patterson rightly talks not so much of a 'community' as a 'loosely structured movement', which is 'not very highly organized'. Hence there is not a large set of community regulations. There are no references to baptisms or eucharists, or observance of a literal sabbath, though some have seen these.⁶⁴ There is, however, an emphasis on speaking the truth and doing as you would be done by, but even these are expressed in negative terms (GTh 6). More positive statements come in the commands to love and guard a brother (25), to give generously (95), and in the reference to social fasting (69.2).

Some have strongly emphasised the missionary outlook of the Thomas movement as reflected in the document, most notably Patterson, who sees in the work an itinerant radicalism—in Theissen's

term, 'Wanderradikalismus'. (This is not to imply that Thomas is itself an evangelistic tract.) At the other end, Popkes objects that some characteristics of 'Wanderradikalismus', such as its Jewish-Christian character, are absent from Thomas, and that there are only marginal hints of mission. This seems like an over-reaction. Others such as Schröter, have struck a successful balance between over-emphasising and undervaluing mission in Thomas. There does appear to be a kind of missionary programme presupposed in the incorporation of the traditional synoptic sayings about eating whatever is set before you when you go into different places (GTh 14), and asking for labourers to be sent out into the great harvest (GTh 73). Thomas combines an exclusivity of loyalties with an openness to accepting new converts on its own terms (cf. GTh 4). In the end, however, it is difficult to be certain from Thomas the extent to which the movement was a wandering mobile movement and the extent to which it was more static.

Another difficult element to assess is prayer. In one place prayer is—remarkably—expressly condemned, alongside fasting and almsgiving (GTh 14). On the other hand, Thomas can also rather mysteriously say: 'But when the bridegroom leaves the bridal chamber, then let them fast and pray' (104). This might only be a problem, however, if GTh 104 refers—as does its Synoptic parallel—to Jesus' death or ascension. In fact, the departure of the bridegroom from the bridal chamber probably has a rather different meaning, since it would be very odd for the bridal chamber—a soteriological image in Thomas (75)—to refer to the world. A suitable parallel to this critical stance toward prayer appears in the Gospel of Philip (a work which particularly thematises the bridal chamber), which has a close association with Thomas in the fathers and in Nag Hammadi Codex II: 'The winter is the world, the summer the other aeon. Let us sow in the world so that we may reap in the summer. Therefore it is right for us not to pray in the winter' (Gos. Phil. 52,26–29). A further similarity between Thomas and Philip, then, is that they both connect the prohibition of prayer with a particular epoch of time. Even if Thomas forbids prayer, however, or reinterprets it dramatically, there is still a residual prayer in 73: 'Ask the Lord, therefore, to send out labourers to the harvest.'

Thomas's Views of Its Rivals

Thomas's theological positions are expressed not only in positive but also in negative terms, i.e. over against other groups, references to which are always oppositional. One might compare here the position of Justin who states that there are some Christ-believers who wish to observe the law who despite their weak-mindedness will be saved (Dial. 47), or the various systems which posit an 'in-between' group, such as the psychics between the hylics and the pneumatics. On the other hand, closer to Thomas in this respect is the similarly uncompromising stance of the Gospel of Judas, although the opposition in Thomas is not given a cosmological and demonic explanation (though n.b. GTh 40).

The two main targets of criticism are non-Christian Judaism, and the wider Christian movement which does not follow Thomas. There is a possible criticism in GTh 67 of Gnostic and/or related groups who lay claim to knowledge (for Thomas, falsely so-called): 'Whoever knows all, but is deficient in one thing, is deficient completely.' The statement is too vague to allow certainty on the point. Similarly, there may be criticism of Roman persecution in the reference to 'those who drag' in GTh 3, but again there is not sufficient clarity to be sure.

Non-Christian Judaism

Some have argued that Thomas is fundamentally 'Jewish Christian', usually (at least in part) on the basis of the reference to James in GTh 12. This is a mistake, however: the reference to James does not necessitate seeing Thomas in Jewish-Christian terms. (The category 'Jewish-Christian' is in any case a highly problematic one.) As we have seen, Thomas is unreservedly critical of Jews (GTh 43), the Pharisees (GTh 39; 102) and central aspects of Jewish theology and practice (GTh 14; 52–53; 71, though in some cases as Christian elements). Jesus and the disciples are not depicted as Jews or as

belonging to Judaism. As Löhr has put it: “Jesus der Jude” ist im EvThom nicht mehr erkennbar.’ Thomas is in GTh 14 totally negative towards prayer, alms and fasting, which are not just useless but harmful; this attitude is neither explained nor justified, but is simply in conflict with Thomas’s own ethical outlook. The same is true of the attitudes to circumcision, sabbath and temple, where Thomas’s views bear comparison with Justin, Barnabas and the Epistle of Ptolemy to Flora (and indeed with the views of pagans). The position according to which Thomas is sharply critical of Jewish practices now attracts very wide support. The references to Jewish themes may indicate ‘contact’ and ‘encounter’ with Judaism or Jewish Christianity, but certainly do not align Thomas with Jewish Christianity.⁷⁶ In fact, however, the comment about the ‘twenty-four prophets’ in GTh 52 betrays a confused ignorance of the Jewish subdivisions of Scripture: there are twenty-four books but not twenty-four prophetic authors (Moses, for example, was assumed to have written five, whereas the twelve minor prophets only counted as one).

The Wider Christian Movement

Thomas is equally critical of non-Thomasine Christianity, which may of course include not only the ‘magna ecclesia’ of the likes of Ignatius and Polycarp, but also Valentinian and other movements. This critical stance is evident from the negative valuation of Matthew and Peter in GTh 13, and via the criticisms of disciples both in general (e.g. GTh 18) and as representatives of particular theological views of biblical authority and resurrection (GTh 51–52).

The negativity here causes difficulties for the view taken by Stead and Pagels that Thomas was intended as supplementary teaching for elite members who also sat happily within communities such as the wider apostolic church, and who also enjoyed one or more of the canonical Gospels. It is a difficulty for this view that the work presents itself as a document the acceptance of which is necessary for salvation (as in GTh 1)—thereby excluding non-Thomasine Christians. Similarly, several of the distinctive elements in Thomas are presented not as recommended ideal practices for reaching a higher spiritual status, but as soteriological conditions. For example, in GTh 22.4–6, the conditions of making the two one, the outside like the inside and the above like the below, etc., are identified in 22.7 as necessary for entry into the kingdom. Similarly, in GTh 27, fasting to the world and ‘sabbatising’ are conditions for finding the kingdom and seeing the Father. GTh 13 also implies a separatist stance. Finally, Thomas’s prohibitions of fasting, prayer and almsgiving (GTh 6; 14), as well as its views on resurrection and scripture (GTh 51–52) and other matters, strongly suggest divergence from other movements which countenanced such practices rather than affiliation with such movements.

Cautionary Remarks

There is a need here for careful mirror-reading. Some exegeses of sayings in Thomas have adopted too simplistic an approach, such as supposing that ‘the questions that the disciples pose are invariably the questions that the community has raised and seeks to resolve’, and that in GTh 24.1 ‘the disciples’ question represents the voice of the community’. Similarly, Trevijano Etcheverría gives voice to what is often assumed in Thomas scholarship, namely that the motif of the incomprehension of the disciples represents the ignorance of non-Gnostic Christianity and Judaism. But some questions of the disciples (including 24.1) are rather more abstract (cf. also 91). There is, then, a serious danger involved in mirror reading: as Uro has warned, the facts on the ground cannot simply be read off the surface of Thomas.

Conclusion

A number of clear points emerge here. Thomas takes an uncompromising stance towards its rivals. One could add to (a) non-Christian Judaism and (b) the wider Christian movement, (c) the additional target of figures of authority in the wider empire—‘your kings and your nobles’ (GTh 78; cf. 81),

though these are not assigned any particular religious views. Many of Thomas's central theological themes, especially elements of the Gospel's soteriology are sufficiently evident.

On the other hand, some aspects of Thomas's theological ethical and stance are more ambiguous, and there are certain points on which Thomas is simply silent. Perhaps such ambiguities in Thomas were originally illusory and there was a clear corpus of other works read alongside Thomas shaping its interpretation, with mystagogues who guaranteed the authoritative understanding, and a set of practices lived out in the Thomas movement and simply assumed in the Gospel. Or it could be that Thomas was intended all along to serve as an impulse for all kinds of different interpretative results, though this is unlikely. We also may have to reckon with the fact that some of the tensions left by the author or editor may be the result of Thomas not having been written or edited by a towering theological intellect and literary craftsman. Overall, however, there is a good deal of consistency, and so perhaps E.P. Sanders' verdict on Paul is not so far off the truth for Thomas—that it may not be completely systematic, but it is reasonably coherent. That is, the thought reflected in Thomas is not necessarily animated by a philosophical impulse towards logical doctrinal tidiness, but one can nevertheless make sense of Thomas's religious outlook. As Marjanen has concluded: 'it is nevertheless an exaggeration to claim that the choice and interpretation of the material employed in the Gospel is guided by no consistent theological and ideological line of thought. On the contrary, in its chief theological emphases the Gospel of Thomas provides a fairly coherent picture.'⁸⁷ Because of this, one can attempt an exegesis in the commentary below which does not need to see in Thomas a haphazard series of sayings which may go off in all sorts of different directions.

The survey above has also aimed to highlight those works with which Thomas can helpfully be compared (and more detailed evidence for this will be found in the commentary below). Two important criteria are closeness in time and partial overlap of theological approach. The difficulty with a number of Syrian parallels is that they are not really contemporaneous with Thomas, but generally come from around two centuries later. Conversely, Gnostic literature begins at roughly the same time as the composition of Thomas, but as Turner quipped, 'aeons and syzygies are conspicuous by their absence' from Thomas. As already noted, Thomas cannot be assigned to any particular group. There are some early Christian works which are both contemporaneous with Thomas, and in which quite similar moves are made (although their differences also need to be borne in mind). The Gospel of Philip shares a number of themes in common, and probably quotes Thomas. The Dialogue of the Saviour is also close in many respects. The Epistle of Ptolemy to Flora and Justin Martyr also share some similar interpretative strategies, as does the Treatise on the Resurrection. On some key themes, Philo offers important parallels. The Epistle of Barnabas is usually dated either to the end of the first century or to the second quarter of the second century, and its treatments of Jewish institutions such as sabbath, circumcision and temple bear comparison with Thomas. These works will be seen to be especially useful, alongside others, in the course of the commentary below. <>

LET IN THE LIGHT: LEARNING TO READ ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS WITH ATTENTION TO THE LATIN TEXT by James Boyd White [Columbia University Press, 9780231205009]

St. Augustine's *Confessions* is heralded as a classic of Western culture. Yet when James Boyd White first tried to read it in translation, it seemed utterly dull. Its ideas struck him as platitudinous and its prose felt drab. It was only when he started to read the text in Latin that he began to see the originality and depth of Augustine's work.

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

In **LET IN THE LIGHT**, White invites readers to join him in a close and engaged encounter with the *Confessions* in which they will come to share his experience of the book's power and profundity by reading at least some of it in Augustine's own language. He offers an accessible guide to reading the text in Latin, line by line—even for those who have never studied the language.

Equally attuned to the resonances of individual words and the deeper currents of Augustine's culture, **LET IN THE LIGHT** considers how the form and nuances of the Latin text allow greater insight into the work and its author. White shows how to read Augustine's prose with care and imagination, rewarding sustained attention and broader reflection.

LET IN THE LIGHT brings new life to a classic work, guiding readers to experience the immediacy, urgency, and vitality of Augustine's *Confessions*.

Review

I've spent fifty years translating Sanskrit texts, but only now has this book taught me how to read a text in a foreign language and how to read (and write) a translation. It is also a brilliant book about Latin, Augustine, God, and the meaning of life. -- Wendy Doniger, author of *The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth*

Such careful, loving reading as we find in James Boyd White's book is as rare as it is precious. This is a book to be read slowly, allowing Augustine's Latin to resonate—to be felt even when little understood. For words are living things, and we here come to know that Augustine's *Confessions* is a work that is alive in words with all their human complexity— but above all with love. -- David Jasper, author of *Heaven in Ordinary: Religion and Poetry in a Secular Age*

Let in the Light offers a better way to read a work of literature of enormous and enduring importance. White argues that our easy familiarity with the English language and the inevitable distance and distortions associated with any translation create a barrier between Augustine and his readers. He is a lively, clear, and engaging writer, and the book is extremely sophisticated about literary criticism but wears its sophistication lightly. -- M. Cathleen Kaveny, author of *Ethics at the Edges of Law: Christian Moralists and American Legal Thought*

CONTENTS

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

AN OUTLINE OF AUGUSTINE'S LIFE UP TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONFESSIONS

PART I

1 The Shape of the Confessions

2 The First Three Sentences (Book 1)

3 Movement from One Mode of Thought and Expression to Another (Book 1)

4 Remembering Early Childhood and Language Breaking Down (Book 1)

PART II

5 Adolescence, Sex, and the Stolen Pears (Book 2)

6 Love, Philosophy, and Monnica's Dream (Book 3)

7 Friendship and Struggles with Manicheism (Book 4)

8 From the Manichees to Ambrose (Book 5)

9 Certainty and Uncertainty (Book 6)

10 Imagining God and the Origin of Evil (Book 7)

11 The Conversion in the Garden (Book 8)

12 What It Meant (Book 9)

PART III

13 Memory, Sin, and Redemption (Book 10)

14 Time (Book 11)

15 Reading Genesis: The Creation Story (Book 12)

16 "Knock and It Shall Be Opened unto You" (Book 13)

Coda

NOTES

I can best explain what kind of book you have in your hand if I tell you first how it was that I became engaged with the *Confessions* of Augustine. It is a simple story. I had heard over and over again that this was one of the most important and valuable books in the Western tradition: the first full expression of human inwardness, the deepest actualization of the human self as we have come to know it since, full of depth and mystery. It was fascinating, enlightening, and a true shaper of our culture.

I started to read the *Confessions*, many times in many translations, but I found it impossible. I felt that I was drowning in an ill-shapen mass of pious platitudes taken from second-rate nineteenth-century theologians, who seemed to speak as if their language was not problematic in any way, but simply said what needed to be said clearly and with the authority of the ages. I could not grasp either the outline or the details of the story. I could not imagine building on what I read.

In these English versions, Augustine seemed to use theological terms in what lawyers call a conclusory way, that is, as though they did not need further elaboration or definition. His psychology likewise seemed elementary and unsophisticated, again as though his words explained themselves. As for the narrative, that seemed pointlessly complex and substantively trivial. What, for example, is this big deal about stealing pears? It was an adolescent prank, not a serious sin. And why was the story more generally so hard to follow? Why does he so often fail to tell us where he is and who he is with? And so on. If you have tried to read the *Confessions*, maybe you have had such a response yourself.

None of this helped me discover what his religious experience was, or how the language he used might be connected with the events of ordinary life, in his era or our own. The whole experience was deeply unsatisfactory. I know other people have had different responses to the translated Augustine, but this was mine, and I saw no way to change it.

Then—now many years ago—I read the first page of the *Confessions* in Latin. I was, in the modern idiom, blown away. All the impressions I had of this text were exploded. It was full of life and immediacy and urgency. In the Latin text Augustine seemed to use his terms of theology and psychology, indeed all of his languages, with a constant sense of what they could and could not do, of what they left out or distorted. His sense of God was not reducible to theological cliché, but was deep, vital, and original. I felt that I was directly hearing his actual voice, not listening to a voice muffled and distorted by being forced to speak English.

In recent years my retirement has made it possible for me to read the whole work through in Latin, and for me it has become one of the most important books of all.

The present book is meant as a reading of the *Confessions* that recognizes it as a Latin text, as it was written by Augustine

himself. I want to help you see how it is that this book can take

on meaning of a different and deeper kind when it is read in its original language—and read closely. Thus in early chapters

I shall try to explain in detail how Augustine is at work in the Latin in a small number of sentences, so even if you know no

Latin at all you may get a sense of the way it works here and to what end Augustine directs it. As we proceed, we will do less of that, but I will always try to give you, in English, a sense of the Latin text at hand.

If you do not have any Latin, I want to help you learn just a tiny bit, enough to enable you to get some feel for what this text is actually like as it was written. My hope is that the experience of being exposed to the mind of Augustine speaking the language in which he lived and thought will bring you to want to learn at least a little more.

Working with the Latin as well as the English will, I hope, be a rewarding process, but it will necessarily and properly be a very slow one. It is an extreme form of close reading, which is in my view all to the good. The result is that in Part I of this book I will treat in detail only the first book of the Confessions. In Part II and Part III I will give less comprehensive attention to the other books.

The question I ask throughout is: What is it like to read the Confessions of St. Augustine? In addressing this question, why is it important to read the Confessions, at least in part, in Latin? Why exactly can it not be fully and properly translated?

I will speak to these questions repeatedly throughout the book. But I can say now that one important reason for reading at least some of it in Latin is that Augustine's mind is present in the original text in a way it cannot be in a translation, even a very good one. Of course there are good translations of books from one language to another, and we should be thankful for them. But there are always what the Spanish scholar Ortega y Gasset called "exuberances and deficiencies" of meaning, that is, ways in which the translation both fails to express what is said and done in the original and adds meanings that are not there.

This is true not only of translations across languages but translations within a language. Think of a poem, for example, and how much its life and meaning are particular to its form. If you want to engage with the mind of Shakespeare, you will insist upon reading his own words, not a version found in student aids like Cliffs Notes. Or, if like me you are a lawyer, think how hard it is to explain what is meant by terms like "jurisdiction" or "equity" or "common law" to those who do not have a legal training. To understand these words you need to learn the language. That is in fact what happens, or ought to happen, in law school.

If we hope to engage in a full way with the movements of Augustine's mind and imagination, then, it is important to read him at least in part in Latin. Another way to put it is to say that his voice can fully be heard only in that language, and as I will try to show, his voice is crucial to the meaning of the whole. Or, putting it another way, in the Latin he is present, in mind and soul, in a way he cannot be present in English.

Another reason to read the Latin is that the Latin language that Augustine learned as a child and worked with as an adult was a carrier of his culture, a culture in which he was caught up when he was young—as we are all caught up in the cultures in which we are raised—and of which, when he was older, he came to be in some ways critical, in others accepting, in still others transforming. To put it slightly differently, a central part of the drama of the Confessions lies in his struggles with his culture and the language that embodied it. In this sense the Latin language he knew is one of his most

important subjects. We can have access to what he does with this language, and why, only as we come to share it.

In addition, as I hope to show, Augustine not only uses the Latin he has inherited; he remakes it in important ways as he

uses it. In doing so he is teaching us how to remake our own languages, our own ways of imagining and talking. All this requires us to pay attention to what he has done in the Latin.

This point is all the stronger, for me at least, when I recognize how little of what Augustine says can be reduced to a set of propositions. Sometimes scholars seem to see him as promulgating a philosophic or theological system. But in my experience this is just what he is not doing, at least in the *Confessions*. The life and meaning of what he does lies rather in the way he confronts and uses his language and the expectations it generates; in the way he establishes and builds relations with his two audiences, his reader and his God; and in the way he stimulates perception, feeling, thought, and imagination in us. This book is not reducible to a narrative, nor is it propositional in character. Rather, I think it can best be understood as offering us as we read it a set of experiences, in our minds and our inner beings. It is in these experiences that its meaning lies.

A third benefit of reading some of it in Latin is that its very foreignness and difficulty forces us to slow down as readers—to admit uncertainty, to look for meanings that are not obvious on the surface, and to regard our initial understandings as incomplete, all in a good way.

Think of what it is like to skim through a newspaper column or detective story in English. It can go so easily that it is hardly happening at all. In a way it would not necessarily be a huge advantage to us as readers of the *Confessions* if we were as fluent in Latin as we are in English, for then we might just skim through it. This book should not be read in such a way, nor should it be swallowed whole. Rather, like Shakespeare's plays or the poetry of Donne or Eliot, it requires sustained attention and thought, an active and imaginative engagement, if we are to read it well. One of the advantages of the Latin is that it makes skimming impossible, at least for us. We are forced to slow down, and

that is a good thing.

Also, in reading the *Confessions* we are reading a book that has an original form. It is a new genre, and to read it well we need to see how that genre is given shape and meaning as the book is written. This requires us to look with special care at what Augustine says, and how he says it. To do this we need to pay attention to its language and how he uses it.

Despite all I have said, I know that good translations obviously have their own importance and value. In what follows I myself translate almost every Latin passage into English. If I have done my job well, there and in the commentary, I think

that even if you were to read only these translations, skipping the Latin entirely, you would acquire a real, though incomplete, sense of who Augustine is and a deeper connection with him and his life.

As for the Latin, I hope that even if you cannot read it, the presence of this language is a constant reminder that you are not reading the real thing. I hope you will be aware that the English you do read in the translations, including my own, has something unexpressed behind it, something you can

see and in a sense touch, or let touch you. I hope that the Latin in this book can in this way have real value even for someone who reads little

or none of it.

The first chapter of this book is a kind of summary of the whole of the Confessions, offered not as a scientific statement of some kind but simply as one reader's effort to sum the work up. My hope is that this will help you start to tune yourself to the actual

text when we turn to it. The next chapter will focus on the opening sentences, which are reproduced in Latin with notes and comments. Subsequent chapters will build on these two. From time to time throughout the book I will ask you to think about the way a particular Latin sentence actually works, giving you what help I can.

It is important to understand that while we shall work with passages taken from each of its books, we shall in total read only a rather small portion of the Confessions. My choice of passages is of course not beyond criticism, but it is perhaps comforting to think that our selection of passages will leave lots of the Confessions for you to turn to when our work together is over.

I should add, loudly and clearly, that I am not a professional Latinist, nor an Augustinian scholar, but just one mind engaging as well as I can with what Augustine has written. This is not a work of scholarship in the usual sense, but an exploration of the experience this wonderful book offers its readers. You might perhaps think of me as a friend with whom you happen to be reading this text closely, asking questions, making suggestions, and in general carrying on a conversation, without making any claims to perfection.

In this connection I imagine you, the reader, as someone who wants to come to terms with the experience of reading this text, even to the extent of learning to use at least a little Latin, and who is willing to give the conversation that it wants to establish with you a try. I think that if you ever studied Latin, in high school say, you should be able to follow a good bit of the Latin you will be presented with. If you have no exposure to Latin, you may want to look also at the resources in the note appended to this paragraph, or even better, to ask a Latinate friend to help you. Everything I do here is meant as an invitation or introduction, a first step in coming to terms with this remarkable work.

Finally, I might add that in having these hopes for the use of Latin I am moved by my own experience, not of Latin this time, but of Dante's Italian. With a couple of friends, one of whom knew Italian well, I read through the *Commedia*, one canto every week for three years. I used a text with Italian on one side, English on the other. I was never able simply to read the Italian, but I could often reconstruct much of its meaning with the help of the translation, then read it in Italian. This gave me an experience of reading Dante in Italian, which changed my whole sense of what he was doing and how.

What happens in such a case is that the language is brought to life as a language, even though not fully understood, and this connects the reader with the mind of the writer in a new way. In the case of Augustine you will find that what is written in Latin, when it is understood even a little, will have a kind of firmness or solidity, as well as a life, that a translation cannot have. These are the words he wrote; there is nothing behind them but his mind. With a translation, by contrast, there is always something behind the language you read, something hidden, uncertain, obscure.

As you will see, I am present throughout the book as an interlocutor with you, the reader, continually making comments

and asking questions. I hope you will look at these critically. I do mean what I say, but I do not propound it with any external authority. As you read, ask what you think of my comments and questions, and the way, or ways, of thinking they express. How would you do it differently?

On another note. It has been suggested to me that you may already, and understandably, have an unappealing image of

Augustine as an authoritarian, rigid, misogynistic, self-certain figure constantly engaged in doctrinal battles that have no real

meaning today. While I cannot speak of all of his writings, I hope that you will discover that the Augustine at work in the *Confessions* is not like this at all. As you will see, his central term is *caritas*, another word for "love."

If you do need a quick antidote to the image I have presented above, I suggest you read his Sermon 9.7 Here he treats the sin of adultery, which men in his culture felt privileged to commit, while women were meant to be completely faithful. The women, who are present with their husbands in the congregation, are understandably afraid to speak to them about this difficult subject. Augustine speaks for them, in the presence of their husbands, giving them a voice they otherwise would not have had and claiming for them in no uncertain terms a fundamental equality in the face of a culture that denies it. While doing this he explicitly creates a sense of the Scriptures not as demanding grim obedience to a set of severe commands but as offering a life of song and joy.

There is one more aspect of this work I want to mention now, namely, its connection to the world in which I write—a world in which we face a serious pandemic, the possible loss of our democracy, and the consequences of global warming. In this world it is not possible to rely unthinkingly on existing institutions or traditions or established practices and attitudes. We do not know where we are going but we know it is not into a version of our own past. In 2019 I published a book, *Keep Law Alive*, which was about contemporary threats to our way of doing law, indeed to law itself, in which I tried to show how we might keep alive this crucial element of our culture. I had to consider as well how we might respond if we lost the law as we know and admire it; my response was to turn to Augustine who lived in a worse world than our own—one in which the Roman Empire was collapsing and invaders were taking its place—yet in my view found a way to maintain his psychic and intellectual integrity, his integrity as a person. The chapter in which I tried to explain this reappears with little change in this book as its first chapter. The rest of this book could be read as an elaboration of what I saw to be so remarkable in Augustine's *Confessions* and what it might mean for us, living as we do in a culture that is collapsing, perhaps to be reborn, perhaps not. <>

AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS: PHILOSOPHY IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY edited by William E. Mann [Oxford University Press, 9780199577552]

Augustine's *Confessions* is a masterpiece of world literature. Written by Augustine in his forties, at the height of his philosophical and rhetorical skills, the *Confessions* is at once autobiographical, philosophical, theological, and psychological. The aim of the eight essays commissioned for the present volume is to provide an examination and discussion of some of the philosophical issues

raised by Augustine. What constitutes the happy or blessed life and what is required to achieve it? The essays question the role that philosophical perplexity plays in the search for truth, and the mental discipline that is required for conducting the search; in addition to asking how Augustine depicts the acquisition of truth as a vision of God. Furthermore, they discuss the problems that arise in the attempt to understand minds, both our own and others, and ask about the interplay between what reason tells us is right and what we will to do. What are the impediments to an individual's moral progress, and how far are these impediments created by the temptations to indulge in such fictions as dramas and dreams? What is the nature of eternity, and how does eternity differ from time? How should scripture be interpreted, especially the account of creation of the material world in Genesis?

Readers with a basic knowledge of Augustine may perceive him to be simply a powerful definer and defender of religious orthodoxy, a figure who ranks behind only Jesus and Paul in the development of a distinctively Christian world-view. For such readers the intellectual honesty and psychological candour of the *Confessions* should come as a pleasant surprise.

Review

"...overall they present a useful companion to a deeper reading of this most fascinating book... Recommended. Upper-level undergraduates and above; general readers." --Choice

"This is an unusually philosophical - thus very welcome - book about the *Confessions*...overall Mann has edited a spicy mixed bag, with a few lows and some exhilarating highs." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

"...analytic philosophers might find this volume helpful...If this volume leads philosophers to a greater understanding of Augustine, and perhaps to further reading of Augustine himself and the wealth of scholarship dedicated to him, it will be a successful work indeed." -- The Review of Metaphysics

"Many would insist that whatever speculation Augustine engaged in, it was solely as a theologian. Yet each of the authors in this superb volume approaches Augustine in the context of the philosophy of the late Roman world, especially Neoplatonic philosophy. Their success in showing how the themes of

the *Confessions* resonate with the language of philosophers of the time - Plotinus chief among them - and wrestle with many of the same issues vindicates Mann's claim. Anyone interested in understanding the *Confessions* will have to confront these eight essays and ponder their philosophical analysis of Augustine's thought." -- Journal of the History of Philosophy

Contributors

Abbreviations

Introduction, William E. Mann

1. Augustine's Anti-Platonic Ascents, Peter King
2. Practical Rationality and the Wills of *Confessions* VIII, Tomas Ekenberg
3. Happiness in Augustine's *Confessions*, Nicholas Wolterstorff
4. The Desire for God and the Aporetic Method in Augustine's *Confessions*, Stephen Menn
5. The Life of the Mind in Dramas and Dreams, William E. Mann
6. Thinking Eternally, Paul Helm
7. The Privacy of the Mind and the Fully Approvable Reading of Scripture: Augustine on Genesis 1:1, Blake D. Dutton
8. Intelligible Matter and the Genesis of Intellect: The Metamorphosis of a Plotinian Theme

in *Confessions* XII-XIII, *Christian Tornau*
Index

A strong case can be made for the claim that with the exception of Jesus and Paul, Augustine has exerted the most influence on the development of Christian thought. His writings became authoritative in medieval, Reformation, and post-Reformation thinking. Contemporary writers and translators continue to regard his thought as valuable. Surely the most well-known of his works is the *Confessions*. The *Confessions* belongs to everyone. No single academic discipline can claim exclusive rights to it or its author. Classics students can sample the Latin language of a rhetorical master. Theologians will find positions inaugurated in it that reverberate throughout Christianity in subsequent centuries. Historians can trace the influence of earlier thinkers on Augustine's thought as he reports on his intellectual odyssey. In turn, they can find his influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians, including Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Descartes. Psychologists will find accounts of language learning and conflict of will still worth examining. Students of literature can savor a work that seems to defy genres: is it a 300-page prayer, an autobiography, a theological treatise, all of the above, or something else entirely?

The aim of the essays presented here is to provide a sample of the wares of Augustine the philosopher. For that purpose the *Confessions* is a well-stocked bazaar. In it one will find such topics as what constitutes the happy or blessed life and what is required to achieve it; the role of philosophical perplexity in Augustine's search for truth; the mental discipline required for conducting that search; the "ascent" to a vision of God; problems arising in the attempt to understand minds, both our own and others'; the interplay between practical reason and the will; impediments to moral progress, including the temptations of fiction and fantasy; time and eternity; and the interpretation of scripture, especially the account of creation in Genesis.

Readers who know only a bit about Augustine's intellectual biography may think of him simply as an inflexible, powerful definer and defender of religious orthodoxy. It may come as a surprise to them to see in the *Confessions* expressions of fascinated perplexity and open-mindedness. In some cases he believes he has found a resolution, for example, in dealing with the quandary of how there can be evil in a world created by God. In other cases, it appears that he does not. He seems to despair of finding an explanation for his youthful theft of his neighbor's pears, a trivial but nonetheless senseless crime. In Book 11 he famously worries about the nature of time: he claims to know full well what time is until he is asked to explain it. The essays presented here attempt to respect that sense of philosophical wonderment and investigation.

Peter King's "Augustine's Anti-Platonist Ascents" documents the ways in which Augustine's account of the ascent to God in Book 7 differs from Plato's account of the ascent of the soul to the Form of the Good in the *Symposium*. Plato conscripts erotic love (Eros) to provide motivation for the soul to engage in the process of ascent. King argues that Augustine, following Ambrose's lead, regards erotic urges as the chief impediment to the ascent to the divine. King notes that God, unlike Plato's Form of the Good or Plotinus's One, can offer assistance to Augustine, but can also freely refrain from offering assistance.

"Practical Rationality and the Wills of *Confessions* 8" by Tomas Ekenberg explores the book of the *Confessions* that describes the mental struggle that culminates in Augustine's conversion to Christianity. Ekenberg argues that Book 8 does not present a coherent account of the will as something distinct from emotion and reason. Augustine sometimes attributes his hesitation to his desires overpowering what reason acknowledges; at other times he describes his reason as self-deceived; at still other times he suggests that even when all his cognitive and conative resources were in harmony they were inadequate to effect his conversion. In support of his argument

Ekenberg notes the theoretical influences on Augustine coming from Manicheanism, Platonism, and Stoicism.

In “Happiness in Augustine’s Confessions” Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that whereas the great bulk of the ancient eudaimonists understood eudaimonia as the good or estimable life, with most of them holding that the estimable life is the well-lived life, Augustine understood beatitudo differently, namely, as the joyful life. In describing the role of happiness and unhappiness in his life, Augustine divides his life sharply into his life before his conversion and his life after his conversion. It is easy to get the impression, upon finishing Book 9 of the Confessions, that Augustine’s conversion meant the end of his misery. From Book 10 we learn that it meant nothing of the sort. Misery remains. Its source now is different. Augustine is now unhappy over the fact that his self has not been reformed as he wants it to be. He yields to the temptations to desire and enjoy sensory pleasure for its own sake, to desire and enjoy praise, to indulge his curiosity. As to why Augustine thinks it is intrinsically wrong to engage in these activities, the answer is that all of them are independent of his love of God and distractions from activities expressive of that love. Wolterstorff closes by arguing that, as Augustine sees it, happiness in this present life is impossible.

One of the quandaries about the composition of the Confessions is the placement of Book 10 between what has hitherto been autobiography and what is henceforward commentary on the book of Genesis. In “The Desire for God and the Aporetic Method in Augustine’s Confessions” Stephen Menn addresses this quandary by pointing out that much of the Confessions is written in the form of aporiai or seemingly paradoxical philosophical puzzles. Menn focuses on one such puzzle, a version of which appears at the beginning of Book 1—how one can search for, or pray to, or make predications concerning God prior to knowing God. Menn discusses the puzzle in connection with Meno’s Paradox, but argues that Augustine does not accept Plato’s solution, namely the doctrine of Recollection. Menn argues that Augustine offers his solution to this puzzle in Book 10 and suggests how the two major parts of that book, on memory and temptation, fit in with the solution. If, as Menn argues, God is truth and humans take pleasure in the truth, then in pursuing the truth humans can experience God without yet knowing God. In the second half of Book 10 Augustine describes the ways in which humans can fail in the pursuit by deluding themselves. The aporiai serve to induce confessions of ignorance.

William E. Mann’s “The Life of the Mind in Dramas and Dreams” focuses attention on two seemingly disparate phenomena, Augustine’s attitude towards the theatre recorded in Book 2 of the Confessions, and his worry about persistent erotic dreams in Book 10. Book 2 contains the first recorded presentation of the so-called paradox of fiction, which for Augustine has three strands. People flock to take in staged spectacles that evoke feelings of fear, anger, and grief, even though they otherwise seek to avoid such feelings. Yet these emotions do not move the audiences to action. Moreover, the emotions are aroused even in cases in which the audiences know that the protagonists never existed. Dreams are like dramas in that they can exhibit the same paradoxical features. Augustine’s remarks on the role of imagination imply that just as plays have playwrights, dreams have “dreamwrights”—the dreamers themselves. Augustine would like to disavow responsibility for his dreams, but Mann argues that he never fully succeeds.

Paul Helm’s “Thinking Eternally” examines Augustine’s discussion of time in Book 11 of the Confessions by laying emphasis on what it is to think eternally. Helm stresses the importance for Augustine (in his quest for a way of thinking about the immutable God of the Christian church) of replacing an Aristotelian theory of categories with a “grammar” inspired by his coming to understand the Neoplatonists (as reported in Book 7). Invoking the distinction between A-theories and B-theories of time, Helm argues that Augustine in effect opts for a modified B-series for God’s relation to time, citing four lines of evidence: that Augustine uses the language of temporal realism;

that God's knowledge of time transcends time; that a B-series accounts for the nature of God's knowledge of time; that the language of the A-series, that is, the language of past, present, and future viewpoints, is inexact. Helm suggests that Augustine's use of A-series language enables us creatures to appreciate the fleetingness of time.

"The Privacy of the Mind and the Fully Approvable Reading of Scripture," by Blake D. Dutton, concentrates on Book 12 of the Confessions. Dutton argues that Augustine defends an interpretation of Genesis 1:1 with which many fellow Christians would disagree. Central to Augustine's defense is a thesis to the effect that different interpretations of the same text can be true even when not all of them capture the author's intentions. In service of that thesis Dutton attributes to Augustine a Doctrine of the Privacy of the Mind, according to which each mind is cognitively accessible to itself but cognitively inaccessible to every other mind. The doctrine implies that any author's intentions are unknowable. Thus doubt is cast on correctness as a basis for judging an interpretation of Scripture. Dutton suggests on Augustine's behalf that a fully approvable reading of a text is a reading in which the reader takes the text's propositions to be true and advantageous. Dutton concludes by pointing out Augustine's "astonishing" Plenitude of Meaning Thesis: for any sentence in Scripture, if a reader takes it to express some proposition that is true, then the author intended it to express that proposition.

In "Intelligible Matter and the Genesis of Intellect" Christian Tornau investigates the way in which Augustine appropriates the Neoplatonic notion of intelligible matter in his exegesis of the first verses of Genesis in Books 12 and 13 of the Confessions. Augustine regards matter as changeable and a source of potentiality, which in his theology distinguishes creation from its changeless creator. Some immaterial substances, however, are also susceptible to change; Augustine has in mind the created angelic intellects, who have it in their power to rebel. Contrary to Plotinus Augustine comes to regard intelligible matter as a source of potentiality in creation, a potentiality, moreover, that is ethical and primarily negative—it is the pseudo-freedom to sin.

The Confessions consists of thirteen books, each of which is traditionally divided into chapters and sections. The sections are more fine-grained than the chapters, making the chapter numbers redundant for purposes of reference. So, for example, in this volume reference to Book 7, chapter 10, section 16 will be given as 7.16. <>

AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: VOLUME I: CONCEPTS, PERSPECTIVES, AND THE EMERGENCE OF AUGUSTINIAN IDENTITY by Eric Leland Saak [Series: Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, Brill, 9789004405738]

The culmination of thirty years of research, Eric Leland Saak's **AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES** offers a comprehensive, new interpretation of late medieval Augustinianism. The first of a two-volume work, the present book sets the stage and analyzes the conceptual and methodological structures requisite for interpreting the reception of Augustine in the later Middle Ages historically, together with explicating the first two of the four "pillars" of Augustinian theology: the Augustinian Hermits' political theology; the teaching in the Order's

schools; the Order's university theology; and its moral theology. Holistically fused with the Order's religious identity, these distinct yet interconnected components of Augustinian theology, rather than a narrow, theologically defined anti-Pelagianism, provided the context for the emergence of the Reformation.

- Contents
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Influence and Impact
- Part I Augustinian Traditions
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The Reception of Augustine
- Chapter 2 The Religio Augustini
- Part 2 Augustinian Political Theology
- Introduction
- Chapter 3 Giles of Rome
- Chapter 4 James of Viterbo
- Chapter 5 Augustinus of Ancona
- Part 3 Augustinian Theology in the Studia
- Introduction
- Chapter 6 Henry of Friemar
- Chapter 7 Hermann of Schildesche
- Chapter 8 Jordan of Quedlinburg
- Intermission
- Bibliography
- Index of Modern Authors
- Index of Names, Places and Subjects

In 1956, Damasus Trapp published a 129-page article in the journal *Augustiniana*.¹ That volume was a special issue celebrating the 700th Anniversary of the bull *Licet Ecclesiae* of Pope Alexander IV, establishing the *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*. It remains perhaps of unparalleled importance for our understanding of the late medieval Augustinian tradition, and Trapp's article is one of the primary reasons why it is so. Reading Trapp's article for me was transformative. I still remember sitting deep in the stacks of Doheny Library at the University of Southern California reading it for the first time and having the feeling that somehow this was extremely important, while at the same time realizing that I did not understand a single word. The title of Trapp's article was "Augustinian Theology in the Fourteenth Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Booklore." That article was designed as a sketch of a forthcoming work of Trapp's, which regrettably never appeared.² This present book takes Trapp's article as its intertext. While I still cannot claim that I understand every word in that article, it is one to which I constantly return, with the same degree of awe, even if with more understanding.

As the intertext for this present work, the subtitle "Notes" applies here as well. The study below should be read as simply "Notes on the Augustinian Theology of the Later Middle Ages." It makes no claim to be comprehensive, and by intent hopes to serve as a point of departure, much as Trapp's article did for me; I have been studying the late medieval Augustinian tradition ever since.

Yet even if not comprehensive with the very conscious awareness of the extent to which that is so—since far more work would need to be done on still unknown and only partially known late medieval Augustinians before we could even begin to be able to claim a comprehensive understanding—it is more than a sketch in that it seeks to make a clear argument with sufficient

evidence to make it stick. That overarching argument can be summarized in the following four theses:

1. 1. Historically seen, Augustinian theology in the later Middle Ages cannot be reduced to late medieval anti-Pelagianism;
2. 2. Historically seen, Augustinian theology in the later Middle Ages was the theology of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine (oesa);
3. 3. Historically seen, Augustinian theology in the later Middle Ages cannot be reduced or limited to the theological production of the Augustinian Hermits' university magistri;
4. 4. Historically seen, Augustinian theology in the later Middle Ages was a major catalytic factor in the emergence of the Reformation and Early Modern Europe.

These theses, implicitly and explicitly, have lain behind the majority of my published work, so consequently one could legitimately question why yet another book on the theme is needed. There are, I would claim, two primary reasons. First, acknowledging the work that has been done, and that has been done since my *High Way to Heaven* in 2002, the late medieval Augustinians and their impact on their world have still not entered general representations of the religion and theology of the later Middle Ages. As a case in point, Kevin Madigan's *Medieval Christianity. A New History*, which appeared in 2015, treats Augustine in passing but does not even mention the Augustinian Hermits, even when treating the religio-political conflicts of the early fourteenth century.⁴ Other popular works and textbooks ignore the Augustinians as well, while giving at least some importance to the Franciscans and Dominicans.⁵ While scholarly works only "trickle down" to popular works and textbooks very slowly, until the Augustinians and their importance for our understanding of the religious, cultural, intellectual, and political history of the later Middle Ages is recognized, it is essential to continue to emphasize that importance, to underscore it and to elaborate on it, in scholarly works.⁶ Second, while my published books and articles have built towards an over-arching representation of the reception, influence, and impact of Augustine from the late thirteenth to the early sixteenth century, emphasizing the centrality thereto of the Augustinian Hermits, they have not in and of themselves presented my vision and interpretation of late medieval Augustinianism and its relationship to the origins of Early Modern Europe in its entirety. That is presented here for the first time.

I should note, however, that that vision and interpretation is presented in this present work only in part. Originally, I had conceived of presenting my overall vision and interpretation in a single volume that would have been based on previously published articles and would have carried the account up through the Council of Trent. That soon become increasingly distasteful and I found myself doing increasingly more new research, so that what had started conceptually as a volume of collected articles of sorts grew into a new independent work, since, if for no other reason, I realized that indeed to present my vision and interpretation of late medieval Augustinianism a volume of collected articles, even reworked and expanded, did not actually suffice. It did not do what I had wanted to do. As the conception evolved and grew, it also grew in size so that were I to write a single work it would have ended up being longer, perhaps even substantially so, than my *High Way to Heaven* (of over 800 pages).⁷ Thus I decided to break it into two works. I may, if time and longevity allow, at some point in the future return to writing the "second" volume with the title, *The Confessionalization of Augustine. Augustinianism in the Reformation*, which would re-examine the thesis of Eduard Stakemeier that the late medieval Augustinian tradition culminated not in Luther and the Reformation, but in Jerome Seripando and the Council of Trent. Time will only tell, and there are a number of projects I need to complete first beforehand. Yet here I do present my vision of Augustinianism in the later Middle Ages as a whole. This endeavor too, though, grew over time with the consequence that I needed to do it in two volumes, yet two volumes that form a unified whole, even with the first volume appearing first, to be followed shortly by the second. This two-volume work then seeks to establish what late medieval Augustinianism actually was. As such, it

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

stands on its own, as well as providing the requisite point of departure for a re-interpretation of the role and influence of Augustinianism in the Reformation.

This last phrase, however, may appear to be a mis-statement, or a lapse of memory, as a major theme of my work has been the argument that there was no such thing, as such, as “late medieval Augustinianism,” or at least that if we use the term, we should do so historically, whereby only the religious identity of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine (oesa) can legitimately claim to be described, in a historical rather than in a theological understanding, as late medieval Augustinianism.⁸ I still hold to that position, for it was, and still is, asserted as a means to bring the scholarly debate back to a historical basis rather than one explicitly or implicitly focused on the confessional, theological positions of the ones doing the interpreting. There is good reason to refer to the later Middle Ages as such as an “age of Augustine” or an “age of Augustinianism,” or the “Augustinian later Middle Ages,” yet doing so obscures as much as it might illumine historical contours and developments as did Heiko Oberman’s reference to the “Franciscan Middle Ages.”⁹ “Augustinian traditions” could be a useful term since it would acknowledge the ambiguity and the multiplicity of Augustine’s reception, influence, and impact without attempting to concretize it into any one particular reception, influence, or impact. Keeping that broader, more general perspective in mind, here “late medieval Augustinianism” is understood as referring to the historical phenomena of living as an Augustinian. Thus the qualification “Historically seen” in each of the four theses stated above. In this context we can identify more specific phenomena of how Augustine and his works affected the historical developments of the later Middle Ages. It is far more than an issue of “mere semantics”; it is an issue of historical understanding, and how we describe that understanding, which is, by necessity, always a creation of the historian. We are prisoners to language and the words we use to describe what we observe often shape and create that which we observe. With that recognition as a given, here I attempt to present my interpretation, my understanding, of that specific, determined influence of Augustine and his heritage as it was embodied in the late medieval oesa. This particular reception and appropriation of Augustine was the only historically legitimate referent for the ahistorical term “late medieval Augustinianism.” It was, however, this specific reception, influence, and impact of Augustine that served as a catalyst, at least in part, for the Reformation and emergence of early modern Europe. That, in any case, is the argument in what follows below.

There is, though, a third reason why this book is legitimate, at least in my own mind. In his classic study, *Amor Dei*, John Burnaby wrote in his preface:

The years in which this book has been written have been a time in which pride, hatred, and violence have seemed the rulers of this world, and the meditation of an ancient ideal has been too easily oppressed by a sense of futility. St. Augustine stands for the faith that an advancing knowledge and an increasing love of the Eternal God is the only foundation upon which frail men can build the love of one another and learn to live together in peace ... It may be that at long last a broken world will come back to the love of that Beauty which is old, but ever new.

If only it were true. Burnaby wrote these lines in 1938. The better part of a century later, we still live in a world in which pride, hatred and violence seem to be the rulers of the world. My country is being torn apart by hate and violence. In the current political crisis, the current soul searching in trying to figure out who we are as a country, in the current dilemma of individuals balancing the competing instincts of fighting or fleeing, in the conflict of despair and hope, what relevance at all can a study of late medieval Augustinianism have? We are still living in a broken world, and Augustine’s teaching of Love remains the only remedy for the pride, hatred, and violence that continues to infect and comprise the saeculum, regardless of the moralistic and religious rhetoric used for self-justification. In so many ways, not only the late medieval Augustinians, but also Augustine himself has

been forgotten, and rendered mute, and that is, perhaps, precisely why this current volume is needed, to remind of a time when Augustine's doctrines of love fueled the social action of an entire religious institution. It pales in comparison with the need to address gun violence, white supremacy, nationalism, terrorism, corruption, the attack on truth, and global warming, by no means an exhaustive list. And yet as so many in El Paso asserted after the gun violence and white supremacy that exerted its hate on their community in the summer of 2019, love is the means to heal their community, their city, and our country, a position that has been and remains foundational for President Biden, even after the storming of the Capitol on 6 January 2021. Burnaby's words ring eerily true eighty years later, and not completely without reason when we have the courage to recognize the parallel perils. Thus, for what it is worth, as little as it might be, the work that follows is dedicated to the love that Augustine advocated, even if the theme of love itself is not often present explicitly in the pages that follow. It is why I study the late medieval Augustinian tradition, and why I feel it is so essential, and relevant, to our world today, lest we forget the world that led Burnaby to write his lines quoted above.

I don't know what will happen with my country as I write these lines, and I am rather skeptical of realizing the extent and depth of healing that is needed. Yet there is always hope, even if vague and dim. Being an Augustinian myself, at least in a certain way, I accept as a given that God's plan and our hopes do not always coincide, if they ever really do (Isaiah 55:8-9). For both history and theology, the comprehensive interpretation of Augustine's reception, influence, and impact in the later Middle Ages, if it is to be forthcoming at all, will be the work of others. Here I offer only some notes on one part of that reception, influence, and impact, that I hope will serve as points of departure for others, representing as they do the culmination of my work since that first day long ago when I discovered Trapp's article in *Augustiniana* 1956 and was transported into a state of awe. The awe remains, even if the understanding has grown, and as the understanding has grown, the awe has likewise just increased. As historians and as theologians we so often portray ourselves as masters of the past. We should recapture the awe and the wonder, not so much as dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants, though that we are, but as dwarfs gazing upon the giants of the past in amazement and wonder at the world to which we no longer have access, which we can never visit and never, really, understand, try as we may. If wonder and awe are not what is clearly present in the chapters that follow, the reader should know they are there, underneath, underneath the conventions of our scholarly hubris that are intended to reveal not the scholarly erudition of the historian, but the awe and wonder at the minds, hearts, and lives of those long since dead and gone, whose only voice is that which we can give them, faint and faulty though it may be. May we listen well, we in our grossly impoverished intellectual world, who can only offer up what we can as a means of mourning our loss as we pay tribute to what we cannot hope to recover. If I can serve as a spokesperson for the mute, dead Augustinians, whose voices we still would be well advised to strive to listen to and to hear, I will have met my hopes and goals for my own work. Thus too this book.

The study that follows is a new creation of what is signified explicitly by the term "Augustinian Theology" in the chronological period referenced descriptively by the term "the Later Middle Ages." Creation it is, and consciously so, but creation is not fiction. The historian is grounded in the existence of her sources, sources that signify, somehow, the muted voices of the past to which the historian has the daunting responsibility of making heard once again. Historical fiction has its place, and if and/or when it is done well, it can enrich our historical understanding. But historical fiction is not history. Just as the historian is a slave to language, so is the historian a slave to the extant sources. Thus in the chapters that follow, I strive to describe, analyze, interpret, and understand the sources of the late medieval Augustinians, or at least some of them, and to present my understanding and interpretation thereof to come to a new understanding and representation of the Augustinian theology of the later Middle Ages, creating thereby a new understanding of late medieval Augustinianism, even as a slave to language and to the sources. I can only hope that fundamentally as

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

simply some “notes” on the Augustinian theology of the later Middle Ages, it may serve itself as a catalyst and inspiration for new and further work on the extant sources, many of which have still never been read, even if only by some future undergraduate, deep in the stacks of her undergraduate library. <>

A COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL MIRACLE COLLECTIONS edited by Sari Katajala- Peltomaa, Jenni Kuuliala and Iona McCleery [Reading Medieval Sources, Brill, 9789004465404]

Miracle accounts provide a window into the views and conceptions of the laity, the uneducated, women, and even children, whose voices are mostly missing from other types of sources. They are not, however, simple to use. This volume offers a methodological insight into the medieval world of the miraculous. Consisting of 15 cutting-edge articles by leading scholars in the field, it provides versatile approaches to the origins, methods, and recording techniques of various types of miracle narratives. It offers fascinating case studies from across Europe, which show how miracle accounts can be used as a source for various topics such as lived religion, healing, protection, and family and gender.

Contributors are Nicole Archambeau, Leigh Ann Craig, Ildikó Csepregi, Jussi Hanska, Emilia Jamroziak, Sari Katajala-Peltomaa, Jenni Kuuliala, Iona McCleery, Jyrki Nissi, Roberto Paciocco, Donald S. Prudlo, Marika Räsänen, Jonas Van Mulder, and Louise Elizabeth Wilson.

Contents

Acknowledgements

Contributors

Introduction: Miracle Collections in Their Contexts by Sari Katajala- Peltomaa, Jenni Kuuliala and Iona McCleery

1 Writing Miracle Collections by Louise Elizabeth Wilson

2 Miracles in Monastic Culture by Emilia Jamroziak

3 The Canonization of Saints in the Middle Ages: Procedure, Documentation, Meanings by Roberto Paciocco

4 Practical Matters: Canonization Records in the Making by Sari Katajala- Peltomaa and Jenni Kuuliala

5 Heretics, Hemorrhages, and Herrings: Miracles and the Canonizations of Dominican Saints by Donald S. Prudlo

6 Miracula and Exempla – A Complicated Relationship by Jussi Hanska

7 Rituals and Spaces of Devotion in Cistercian Everyday Religion by Marika Räsänen

8 Pilgrimage as a Feature of Miracles by Leigh Ann Craig

9 Physical Disability and Bodily Difference by Jenni Kuuliala

10 Madness, Demonic Possession, and Methods of Categorization by Sari Katajala- Peltomaa

11 Death in a Birth Chamber: Birth Attendants as Expert Witnesses in the Canonization Process of Bernardino of Siena by Jyrki Nissi

12 Escaping Justice?: The Politics of Liberation Miracles in Late Medieval Portugal by Iona McCleery

13 Protection Miracles as Evidence for the Shifting Political Landscape of Fourteenth-Century Provence by Nicole Archambeau

14 The Mobilization of Thought: A Narratological Approach to Representations of Dream and Vision in Late Medieval Miracle Collections in the Low Countries by Jonas Van Mulder

15 Miracle Types and Narratives: The Case of Saint Margaret of Hungary by Ildikó Csepregi
 Selected Bibliography
 Index

Miracle Collections in Their Contexts by Sari Katajala-Peltomaa, Jenni Kuuliala and Iona McCleery

Why do miracles matter? Are they not just a reflection of the imaginary side of Christianity, an emblem of the backwardness of the Middle Ages? It has not been that long a time since these kinds of disclaimers were openly proclaimed, and administrative documents were considered to be most reliable sources in historical research. Obviously, for decades now, it has been clear that miracle narrations, whether recorded in a register at a shrine, in a collection, or in a judicial hearing, are invaluable sources when it comes to questions about daily life, family relations, lay devotion, or healing practices. This list of prolific themes and approaches could be, and indeed has been, continued, since miracles capture a wide variety of crucial elements of medieval society and culture. They were linked to church administration, economic life, patriotic pride and politics, communal coherence and hierarchies, gender and identity, as well as to experiences of illness, health, and healing. In sum, they encapsulate the whole spectrum of life and connect macro and micro levels of society and culture with each other. They matter a lot when it comes to our understanding of the Middle Ages.

Miracle narrations were also one of the most popular and widespread – if not the most widespread – literary genres during the Middle Ages, and were also a crucial part of the oral communication within societies as a common discussion topic and “dinner table” subject. Furthermore, they are often vivid narrations full of colorful details. Considering all this, it is small wonder that miracle narrations in their various forms are increasingly used by medievalists. They are no longer neglected – quite the contrary, but this proposes another problem. The nature of the sources, that is, how the written narration came into being, what is written and why, is occasionally not afforded enough attention. Miracle narrations do shed light on all the themes mentioned above – as well as hitherto unstudied ones – but not at face value. A profound methodological awareness is due in order to fully deploy the potential of the material. This is the aim of the volume at hand: to offer practical tools for the methodological understanding of miracle narrations. We analyze the background rationale of this material as well as deconstruct the structure of the collections and rhetorical elements within the narrations. Our focus is both on miracle collections and canonization processes, and we aim to offer a comparative perspective, to scrutinize links, similarities, and differences within these sets of sources. In addition to the evolution of the genre and contextualizing the collections, the chapters of the volume at hand offer a synthesis of some recent themes within this field and suggest new directions. Before introducing the themes and structure of the volume at hand, a review of the earlier scholarship is due.

There are many types of miracles, some of which, such as healing miracles, liberation miracles, and visions, receive special attention in this volume. There have been numerous studies of miracles over the decades, ranging in approach and theme from theological discussions and folkloric treatments, through to more recent histories of daily life and social practices. Although there have been historiographical reviews previously, and there are several important essay collections on miracles and their contexts, they perhaps focus more on the early Middle Ages, on the period 1000–1200, or on a single country. There is a great deal of scholarship on twelfth-century miracles, in particular, especially for England. As for other geographical areas, French and Italian miracle collections have also been extensively analyzed. Similarly, Scandinavian miracle collections and canonization processes have been analyzed for the study of the region.

In the scholarship, there has been relatively little methodological or critical analysis of miracle genres and miracle- recording practices, and what there is tends to focus on an earlier period than that covered by this volume. There are also limited comparisons across different regions of Europe; where these exist they tend to be focused on canonization processes rather than shrine collections.⁶ Shrine collections and canonization processes are usually studied separately, often for fairly narrow or discrete time periods with little opportunity to look at wider patterns. There are few late medieval studies of shrine collections. Even the miracles of the Virgin Mary, a truly universal transnational phenomenon, and usually studied as such, have not received the comparative attention they deserve for the Late Middle Ages. When it comes to late medieval saints, it is often their mysticism, devotional practices and asceticism or their political influence which has attracted interest. Legal and theological aspects of the cults and canonization process have also been extensively studied. Both of these are established fields of study, but do not particularly focus on miracles.

Following from the biblical example of Christ and his apostles, healing has always been the archetypal miracle, favored in all kinds of miracle collections. Resulting from this, where miracles are the focus of attention, it is usually healing that has received most scrutiny. Studies of childbirth, madness and possession, blindness, and resuscitation have been prominent in recent years. Sustained studies of broken bones, hernias, cancers, fevers, plague, and occupational injuries are very rare even though there are many examples of these conditions recorded in processes and collections across Europe and individual cases have attracted the interest of medical historians. For example, Luke Demaitre and Joseph Ziegler both study the cure of a woman with breast cancer attributed to Pierre of Luxembourg in 1387, and Nancy Siraisi describes how parents took their child with a hernia to the tomb of Chiara of Montefalco in 1308 rather than resorting to surgery. The problem of belief in these cures is often completely side- stepped by researchers, even those who study doubt and skepticism. Belief in healing has, to a certain extent, been avoided as a research topic in recent years. Either scholars have to consider that the injury or lesion was really there and healed miraculously; or that the miraculé was too ignorant to recognize that it was not a serious condition (unlikely in these very obvious cases); or that it just healed “naturally”; or that it was a textual construct that did not “really” happen (but then why describe the conditions if they had no bearing on experience?). Although we have come a long way from the reductionism of the 1970– 80s that tried to explain holy intercessors and miracle cures using modern rationalizations, there are still some fundamental issues that need to be addressed in the field of miracle studies for the late Middle Ages.

In some respects, the key difficulty for scholars coming into this field is that there are so many archival sources for late medieval politics and society that the specificity of what can be achieved through the study of miracles becomes lost. For example, it has been noted recently by a number of social historians that the great mortality that resulted from plague in the late Middle Ages (currently it is estimated that on average 50% of the population of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa died in the late 1340s) did not lead to nearly the amount of archived commentary that we would expect, used as we are to outpourings of grief in modern letters and diaries. Scholars instead point to changing patterns in late medieval art and literature or archaeological disruptions, but the archive is often annoyingly silent. Relatively few historians have tried to fill this silence by reading late medieval miracles for evidence of emotional and practical concerns connected to caring for the sick. The pioneer in this area is Nicole Archambeau in her close study of traumatic experience as expressed in the late fourteenth- century miracles of Delphine of Puimichel. We should consider that more late medieval miracle narratives could be studied in this light as a glimpse of the anxieties of their age, although it may not be as transparent as was previously assumed.

One of the major issues that this field of research faces is that there are relatively few monographs, but a profusion of essay collections and articles, some of which are isolated or quite difficult to

access. Perhaps as a result, there is, as Robert Bartlett put it in a book review, “the continued dominance of the classic studies of thirty- five years ago (Sigal, Vauchez, Brown, Finucane, Schmitt)”. This critique does not denigrate the sterling work of those scholars, some of whom are still active, and most of whom Bartlett also uses at length in his own very influential research. However, it is a reminder that it is time for scholarship to move on to new methods and insights, especially for the late Middle Ages, while still recognizing pioneering earlier scholarship. It will be clear from the pages of this volume that all of these scholars remain fundamental for the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, especially Sigal, Finucane and Vauchez. However, it is also clear that as far as reading miracles today is concerned, two other names are now repeated much more regularly and deserve special recognition for their influence on a younger generation of researchers: Michael Goodich and Gábor Klaniczay.

Michael Goodich’s research focused on the study of miracles: their narrative form and what they say about medieval society. He pioneered the use of miracles for social history, unusually using both canonization processes and shrine collections across a broad sweep of time and space. Goodich very much first advocated the idea that miracles could be used as evidence for daily life, social status, emotions, violence, childcare and gender studies, without ever losing sight of the need to pay close attention to the manuscript contexts of the original record. Gábor Klaniczay was originally known as a specialist on royal saints, part of his far broader interest in supernatural power. His major monograph on dynastic saints was ground- breaking in its attention to gender and the distinctive monarchies of central Europe. Klaniczay then turned his attention from dynastic politics to canonization processes, especially the miracles they recorded. His many studies and translations seek to make miracles from a much broader range of cults much more accessible.

As noted earlier, the study of miracle collections, and especially canonization processes are both lively historical fields. This means that new themes are emerging. While the first studies focused largely on quantitative analysis, especially on the classification of various conditions cured, qualitative close reading has been a core approach for some time now. The study of miracle narrations has also taken a turn to more theoretical approaches following the lead of scholars studying *vitae*, who are largely literary scholars. Their theory oriented gender approach and queer reading of sources, for example, has also inspired scholars focusing on miracles. Similarly, the theoretical framework of social and cultural models of disability have been used and discussed in the study of hagiographical sources. Correspondingly, other theories borrowed from the social sciences have been utilized in the study of daily life and family relations. Miracle narrations offer excellent potential for the study of childhood socialization, for example.

In addition to a more profound theoretical frame utilized in the analysis, a more pronounced focus on methodology has recently become relevant within studies of miracle narrations. For example, deconstruction of elements of hagiographic genre and analysis of different topoi, like the oral and literate elements in the depositions, as well as analysis of various versions of the same case at different levels of the process (local shrine, canonization process, curial evaluation, papal bull, sermons on a feast day) are scrutinized. Recently, the rhetorical elements in depositions have been deconstructed.

Miracle narrations as a source material are not easily exhausted and they have demonstrated their ability to conform to new approaches within historical studies. A recent “turn” that affects academia widely, not only historians or medievalists, is the return of religion in its various forms. Theology or church institutions are no longer deemed as the most essential elements. Focus has shifted to religion’s intermingling with society and culture, which can be defined as “lived religion”, meaning a focus on devotional practices, such as rituals, symbols and gestures, and their connection to the community and culture. Even if the laity’s devotional practices have long been a core element in the

study of miracle collections and canonization processes, the “lived religion” approach contests the hierarchy between the “learned” and the “popular” within religion, as well as the existence of a strict polarity between individual and collective religious participation, and enables scholars to take seriously the experience of religion. Recently, topics like disbelief or demonic presence in daily life have also been addressed by analyzing miracle narrations. The non-typical miracles that do not fit into the accustomed pattern, revealing fractures in the genre and in recording practices, are also attracting increasing attention. The chapters of this volume contribute to the aforementioned themes and aim to open new possibilities for scrutiny. As methodological questions are a core rationale for the volume at hand, both the very concrete methods of recording as well as specific thematic analytical concepts emerge.

Structure of the Volume

The chapters included in this volume have been divided into two parts. The first of them concerns the evolution and contexts of miracle collections and canonization processes. In this section, the authors analyze and discuss the practical and juridical backgrounds and principles for recording miracles at shrines, in monastic settings, as a part of canonization processes, as well as how they could be used and re-used later on. These aspects are of crucial importance for any analysis of miracle narratives, as they provide the background for source-critical aspects that the researcher needs to take into consideration in order to be able to examine and dissect the sources fruitfully.

Louise Elizabeth Wilson’s chapter, “Writing Miracle Collections”, starts the first part of the book. In her chapter, Wilson examines the producing of collections of miracles in twelfth- and thirteenth-century England, Scotland, and France. She discusses the importance and variance in the reports of the oral report given by the beneficiaries as well as the methods and principles of the hagiographers. Wilson demonstrates the importance of knowing the individual situation of each collection in analyzing them, as the writers utilized different methods and rhetorical techniques depending on their purposes and the cults’ situations, as well as on the cultural, societal, and theological changes over time.

Emilia Jamroziak’s chapter, “Miracles in Monastic Culture”, examines the importance of miracles for late medieval monastic culture, focusing particularly on the Benedictine and Cistercian orders. Despite their significance for any monastic community and its memories, a systematic analysis of miracles and monastic culture is still lacking. Monastic communities were often the guardians of shrines, in communication with their local communities, but miracles also played a role in remembering the vagaries of monastic life. In her chapter, Jamroziak also demonstrates the different purposes and audiences of miracle-recording in monastic settings, as well as the topoi they produced.

With the chapter “The Canonization of Saints in the Middle Ages: Procedure, Documentation, Meanings”, written by Roberto Paciocco, the volume moves to the discussion about the practicalities and principles of canonization processes. Paciocco provides a thorough overview of the legal/theological developments which led to the establishment of the process in the thirteenth century, and demonstrates the growing needs and increased volume in the production of the required documents. The chapter covers the whole period of medieval canonizations, ending with the developments of the fifteenth century, and shows how the developing and changing legal requirements influenced the types of documents preserved for a modern scholar.

In their chapter “Practical Matters: Canonization Records in the Making”, Sari Katajala-Peltomaa and Jenni Kuuliala continue the discussion on the requirements and preferences of those conducting canonization inquests, this time focusing on the recording of miracle testimonies. They show how the same legal and theological principles could be put into practice in very fluctuating and differing ways, depending on the situation of individual processes and the preferences of those conducting

them. Their article demonstrates that comparisons between different processes and the knowledge about their characteristics is vital for any fruitful analysis of these sources.

Donald S. Prudlo also elaborates on the significance of miracles in canonization processes and the cults of the Friars Preachers in his chapter “Heretics, Hemorrhages, and Herrings: Miracles and the Canonizations of Dominican Saints”. With miracle collections and papal bulls as a source, Prudlo shows how the Dominicans as well as the popes emphasized different aspects of the lives of their three major saints, St Dominic himself, St Peter of Verona, and St Thomas Aquinas, to formulate and strengthen the order. The choice of miracles played an important role here, and may point to the many different purposes and reasons for their selection in various types of hagiographic sources.

The final chapter of the first part of the book, “Miracula and exempla – a Complicated Relationship” by Jussi Hanska, proceeds to examine later usages of miracle narratives. Exempla were used in later medieval preaching to prove a point or teach a valuable lesson, and often miracle narratives were their core material. Hanska shows how the writers of exempla collections and preachers’ manuals re-used and re-modelled existing miracle narratives to fit their genre, and also how preaching itself shaped the laity’s views about the miraculous. Miracle narratives and exempla thus offer an interesting opportunity for research on the transferring of religious influences.

The second part of the book turns the focus to the ways miracle narratives can be and have been used in the study of lay piety, lived religion, communal religious practices, and the social history of medicine. The case-studies presented here provide examples of the potential of this material, highlighting source-critical aspects which need to be taken into consideration, as well as offering windows onto new possible research topics.

In the first chapter in this part, “Rituals and Spaces of Devotion in Cistercian Everyday Religion”, Marika Räsänen analyses the ways the cult of St Thomas Aquinas was born, developed, and practised in the daily lives of his devotees. By dissecting Thomas’s canonization process in particular, her focus is on the rituals and practices that tied the cult to the local communities and made it touchable for them, discussing also how the practicalities of this particular process intermingle with and enable a historical analysis. Furthermore, Räsänen shows how the dossiers can be used to study the interaction between the monastery and the surrounding villages in the sphere of lived religion.

Also focusing on the religious practices of the laity and their interaction with the sacred, in her chapter “Pilgrimage as a Feature of Miracles” Leigh Ann Craig examines the concept and practice of pilgrimage. A crucial element in the veneration and invocation of saints, pilgrimage however received different levels of emphasis in miracle narrations. Craig discusses the usage of miracle reports included in miracle collections as well as canonization processes as sources for pilgrimage, analyzing the interplay of travel, the transfer of ideas, and lived religion.

Thaumaturgic cures have always formed the largest group of recorded miracles. In her chapter “Physical Disability and Bodily Difference” Jenni Kuuliala discusses the uses of miracles, especially those examined in canonization inquests, as a source for medieval disability history. As a rare source type recording the laity’s views about illness, impairment, and health, these texts provide an exceptional window onto medieval communities’ ideas about bodily deviance. The article examines the ways physical disability was reconstructed in canonization inquests and what that states about the everyday life of the disabled.

The topic of miraculous healing continues in Sari Katajala-Peltomaa’s chapter “Madness, Demonic Possession and Methods of Categorization”, where she shows that the categorization of different mental conditions was always a result of communal negotiations. Instead of proposing one simple line between demonic possession and mental illnesses, she shows how such categorizations varied from one context, that is one set of source material – a miracle collection or a canonization process

– to the next. Demonic possession was an affliction but also a social phenomenon arising from, and therefore also revealing, the needs of the community.

The study of communal roles and social realities is also in focus in Jyrki Nissi's chapter "Death in a Birth Chamber. Birth Attendants as Expert Witnesses in the Canonization Process of Bernardino of Siena". Nissi examines childbirth based on testimonies about miracles, where a newborn infant was resurrected from death, analyzing how a community functioned and what the birth attendants' strategies for survival were. The chapter demonstrates how the requirements of a canonization inquest produced statements and information that are of great value for a modern scholar studying everyday events.

Not all miracles were healings, however, as Iona McCleery discusses in her chapter "Escaping Justice? The Politics of Liberation Miracles in Late Medieval Portugal". This chapter first of all identifies "non- healing" miracles such as shipwrecks and escapes from prison, and some of the methodological difficulties of studying them. Then the chapter focuses on liberation from prison or execution in the context of the late medieval Portuguese cult of the saints. Such miracles are guides to and critiques of behavior, as well as performances of power. They shed light on a less well understood system of criminal justice.

Continuing with the theme of "non-healing" miracles, in her chapter "Protection Miracles as Evidence for the Shifting Political Landscape of Fourteenth- Century Provence", Nicole Archambeau examines in more detail types of protection in miracle narratives in miracle collections and canonization processes. Saints were asked to help in various vagaries of everyday life, protecting the petitioners from different types of danger. Archambeau shows that miracle testimonies can be used for the study of social and political ties, and how the veneration of saints intermingled with political events and tensions of a given area. In addition to larger- scale quantitative analyses, the focus again on a strictly defined geographical area also produces illuminating results.

Jonas Van Mulder's chapter titled "The Mobilization of Thought. A Narratological Approach to Representations of Dream and Vision in Late Medieval Miracle Collections in the Low Countries" analyses miracles that report dreams and visions as narratological constructions. He examines the ways these narratives could be used in instructing the cultic community, and how they simultaneously transfer information about the laity's access to the divine through visions. With a certain miracle type in his focus, Van Mulder demonstrates the ways those recording miracles remodelled a religious experience to fit an established cultural script.

The narratological methods of miracles are also in focus in the last chapter of this volume "Miracle Types and Narratives: The Case of Saint Margaret of Hungary". Using various typologies in the different miracle collections of St Margaret, Ildikò Csepregi discusses the ways a lived event receives a form as a miracle story, and is then recounted to a shrine keeper or at a canonization inquest, and how the established pattern of a miracle narrative functioned in this process. At the same time, she shows how the particular nature of Margaret's canonization process, compared with many other inquest documents of the time, influences the narrative tone and therefore also the researcher's possibilities and challenges. <>

ELISABETH LESEUR: SELECTED WRITINGS by Janet K. Ruffing [Classics of Western Spirituality, Paulist Press, 9780809105748]

This volume, the first in the highly praised Classics of Western Spirituality series to venture into the 20th century, introduces the writings of Elisabeth Leseur (1800-1914), a French laywoman who left a

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

precious record of a remarkable inner spiritual journey that was all but hidden from those who knew her. Leseur confronted the twin challenges of serious illness and her husband's agnosticism, which pained her, but didn't prevent her from being happily married. Inspired by a spirituality of the communion of saints, Leseur approached these issues by becoming a loving presence in her familial and social circles. She participated in all of the major theological developments that led to Vatican II, as well, but she has been a missing figure in the history of spirituality until now. This volume introduces the writings of Elisabeth Leseur to an English-speaking audience. It is the first and only edition of Leseur's works that brings together in one volume insights from her entire corpus. The works included are: Journal and Daily Thoughts, Writings on Christian Vocation, Letters to Unbelievers (Selected), Letters on Suffering (Selected).

CONTENTS

Foreword
Preface
Introduction
Elisabeth Leseur (1866-1914)
Elisabeth Leseur's Spirituality
Primary Influences on Elisabeth Leseur's Spirituality
Church and Society
The Women's Movement
The Communion of Saints
Personal Vocation
Suffering
Friendship Within the Communion of Saints
The Writings
Note on the Translation
The Texts
Journal and Daily Thoughts
The Journal: Part 1 (1899-1906)
Notebook of Resolutions (1906-1912)
The Journal: Part 2 (1911-1914)
Daily Thoughts (1899-1906)
My Spiritual Testament
Writings on Christian Vocation
Letters to Unbelievers
Letters on Suffering
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index

Elisabeth Leseur (1866-1914)

Born into the privileged Arrighi family during the last half of the nineteenth century and dying on the eve of World War I, Elisabeth Leseur creatively and originally responded to the spirit of her own times in the way she understood and practiced her faith as a lay Christian. Elisabeth Leseur deserves to be better known as an important lay figure in the history of Christian Spirituality.' The specific challenges she confronted were many. First, her marriage at the age of twenty-three to Félix Leseur profoundly threatened her faith, and she struggled to regain that faith and develop it into a robust committed dedication to God. She found herself married to an unbeliever in an age of unbelief in France, and she adopted an apostolic strategy of unconditional loving presence. Despite this difference of religious belief, the Leseurs show evidence of deeply loving each other throughout their marriage.

Second, her approach to spirituality from the beginning of her adult conversion was always thoroughly lay in character. She developed a rule of life that maintained a set of priorities related to her responsibilities within her marriage and family. The couple remained childless, which seemed to bother Elisabeth more than Felix. Elisabeth responded to this lack by maintaining deep involvement with their extended families, including giving special attention to her niece and nephews, as well as by developing her own intellectual gifts through a disciplined program of study. Her studies included languages, literature, philosophy, and Christianity.

Third, she experienced many forms of suffering in her life. She endured many illnesses, beginning with an intestinal abscess that developed toward the end of their honeymoon and that never completely healed. That illness was followed by a carriage accident (1895) in which she was struck on her side by the horse's hoofs. From 1908 on she had recurrent problems with her liver, forcing her to spend a great deal of time resting during each episode. In 1911 she developed breast cancer, from which she died in 1914. She learned how to turn this physical suffering as well as her spiritual isolation into a form of prayer and participation in redemption, making a pact with God offering her sufferings for the conversion of her husband. In addition to her physical and spiritual sufferings, Elisabeth constantly confronted deaths and life-threatening illnesses within her family. Her father died just after her honeymoon, when she was too ill to attend his funeral. Her youngest sister, Marie, died as a child from typhoid fever, and her younger, adult sister Juliette died from tuberculosis in 1905. Her nephew, Roger, died in childhood as well. Her belief in the communion of saints helped give meaning to these experiences of suffering and loss.

Fourth, she had an expansive view of the world from extensive travel and reading. The Leseurs counted among their friends, musicians, artists, writers, philosophers, politicians, doctors, and lawyers—believers and unbelievers alike. She recognized a special call to minister to the needs of this segment of society.

Fifth, she participated in the developing lay movements of her time, deeply affected by the social teachings of Leo XIII and the evangelizing efforts of the embryonic Catholic Action movement. She also embraced the budding developments in Catholic theology and spirituality—the beginnings of historical criticism and better understandings of the scriptures, the early liturgical movement as promoted by Dom Gueranger, and the return to the importance of the Eucharist as fostered by Pius X. She was deeply engaged in trying to harmonize faith and reason, faith and the new democracy, faith and culture. In many ways she was dearly an exceptional prototype of a happily married lay woman, educated in her faith, immersed in society, and carrying out in a secular context the specific forms of the lay apostolate that Vatican II would envision half a century later.

The Leseurs

Introduced by family friends, Elisabeth and Felix were immediately attracted to one another. It was certainly love at first sight. They both loved music, culture, literature, opera, and travel. Felix was just finishing his medical degree and expected to serve in the colonies. Elisabeth assumed that they came from similar family backgrounds—their fathers were both lawyers and both families were Catholic. Elisabeth believed that "Felix was everything she desired in a husband." He had been educated by the Oratorians, and Pere Bordes, an Oratorian and one of Felix's teachers, presided at their wedding. On the eve of their wedding Elisabeth discovered that Felix was no longer a practicing Catholic and had become a complete agnostic.

He promised to respect and support her practice of the faith, even accompany her to Mass at times, but after a short period Felix discovered he was anything but neutral and increasingly tried to influence her toward unbelief. He became a journalist and worked for two of the most anticlerical journals in France. In 1892 he replaced his good friend, Maurice Ordinaire, as director of the *Republique Française*, founded by Leon Gambetta, when Ordinaire was offered a cabinet post by the

undersecretary of state for the colonies. Ordinaire was first a deputy and senator of Doubs, then vice-president of the Senate and a close friend of Felix. The Ordinaires lived near Jougne, where the Leseurs eventually purchased a summer home in 1902. A year after joining the Republique Franaise, Felix moved to Siecle in order to write editorials on colonial questions. He hoped thereby to launch his colonial career. When his friend, Theophile Delcasse (1852-1923) became minister of the colonies, he offered Felix a posting that would have taken the Leseurs to Africa in 1894. Fearful about Elisabeth's delicate health, her family intervened and in 1894 invited Felix to become part of their prestigious insurance company, thus ending Felix's ambitions for Foreign Service.

This brief description of Felix's friends and activities gives some indications of the social and political circles in which the Leseurs entertained, worked, and socialized. Felix was immersed in the anticlerical, rationalist thought of his day and wanted Elisabeth to join him. He had a library that included Protestant writers, rationalists, and modernists. Elisabeth's habits of recollection and her practice of the faith began to weaken in the whirl of travel, social life, entertaining, and Felix's constant activity. He describes himself as returning after their evening meal to the office or to public or cultural functions and coming home in the early morning hours. Elisabeth began to study Latin, which Felix could not criticize because it was not only the language of the church but of the classics as well. Sometime in 1898, when Elisabeth mentioned she had nothing to read, Felix suggested she read Ernest Renan's (1823-92) *Origines du Christianisme*. Instead, she chose Renan's *La vie de Jesus* from his library.

This book marked the turning point in her spiritual crisis. Elisabeth was not at all persuaded by Renan's account and quickly dissected his argument. In order to justify her critique she turned to the Gospels and was deeply affected spiritually by reading them daily. She engaged in a program of reading, study, and prayer, and she began writing in her journal one year later, after the Leseurs returned from their trips to Spain and Germany. Eventually, she assembled a library of two hundred volumes of philosophy, morality, spiritual writing, apologetics, and religious biography. Although Elisabeth certainly participated in all of the popular forms of religion characteristic of nineteenth-century French Catholicism, her strong mind and the intellectual environment of their social circle compelled her to find answers to her pressing religious and social questions through reading.

In 1903 the Leseurs accepted an invitation from friends to join them on a pilgrimage to Rome. There, at the tomb of St. Peter, Elisabeth describes a religious experience that marked the beginning of a "new life" for her, confirming her in her renewed commitment to Christian life. Finding herself isolated in her religious practice and deep faith, Elisabeth confides her resolutions, rule of life, significant insights into herself, and her vocation in a private journal, *Journal et pensees pour chaque jour*. She had no one to talk to about her unfolding spiritual life until she met Pere Joseph Hebert, OP, in 1903, when a co-worker of Felix asked her to be his sponsor for baptism. Subsequently, Elisabeth sought spiritual direction from Hebert in the context of the sacrament of penance twice monthly when the Leseurs were in Paris (September to May) and when Elisabeth was well enough to leave her home.

Elisabeth, recognizing that faith is God's gift, prayed constantly for the conversion of her husband. She suffered deeply from the inability to share a life of faith, so meaningful and important to her, with her husband, with whom she shared everything else. The pact she made with God offering her suffering for his conversion convinced her that Felix would not only eventually return to Catholic practice but would also become a priest. Gradually, Felix became more respectful of his wife's religious practices and witnessed the consolation she experienced in prayer at Lourdes and when she received communion at home during her final illness. Felix also met some other religious people, Elisabeth's epistolary soul-friend, Soeur G[^]by, and several priests whom Elisabeth assisted in fund-raising events and in pastoral ministry. His attitudes toward religion softened, but he had not

returned to the faith before his wife's death. Elisabeth's sister Amelie urged her to preserve her journal instead of destroying it, as she had already instructed her sister to do. At that point Elisabeth decided to agree with her sister and thought the journal might help Felix understand her better after her death and be of some comfort to him through that spiritual understanding. Indeed, the bereft and grieving Felix returned to the Catholic Church in 1915 through reading Elisabeth's journal and feeling her presence guiding him from beyond the grave. Four years later he entered the Dominican community, becoming a priest, making Elisabeth's apostolate of prayer and suffering known and promoting her cause for canonization throughout his priestly life.

Elisabeth's spiritual evolution seemed to unfold in four distinct phases. From her marriage until 1897, Felix appeared to weaken her religious observance and seriously undermine her faith. In the first phase of her adult development from 1897 to 1898, Elisabeth underwent a spiritual crisis and recommitment to Christian faith. In the second phase, from 1898 to 1899, Elisabeth returned to her faith, strengthened by the crisis she had resolved interiorly. From 1899 to 1903, her third phase, Elisabeth progressed spiritually through her own solitary prayer, study, meditation, and writing. In the fourth phase, from 1903 to 1914, Elisabeth continued to grow spiritually through exchanges first with Pere Aebert and subsequently with Soeur Goby.

Elisabeth Leseur's Spirituality

Marriage and Family

Elisabeth carefully integrated her family life and her spirituality. Tutored in devout humanism with Francis de Sales as her guide, she fully accepted his teaching that a life of devotion is fully compatible with marriage." Since her conversion occurred nine years into her marriage, she assumed that this call to a deeper, more intimate relationship with God was to be lived as Felix wife. Despite their inability as a couple to share faith as they shared everything else, every reference to her husband suggests a loving and mutually respectful relationship. She felt Felix loved her deeply and supported her by his presence, companionship, and expressions of affection. For instance, she wrote: "Some joyful days because of a present from Felix, and more because of the words that accompanied it—words so full of love that made me very happy. I do not deserve to be so loved, but I rejoice fully in it.» She felt Felix's love and support during her sister's death and her niece's first communion six weeks later," and they enjoyed one another's company when they traveled together, visited Mends, and summered in the countryside with Elisabeth's extended family. Despite their childlessness, Elisabeth consistently described a healthy and mutually loving marital relationship. In her letters she remarked frequently about how busy her husband was with no trace of resentment on her part. From his side, Felix was devoted to her and remained constant in his love and affection for her through her multiple illnesses. The devastation he describes when she died was evidence of the depth of his love and his emotional reliance on her.

She both took for granted the gender expectations of her role—managing the household, including the supervision of the servants, planning the necessary round of dinner parties, and responding to the charitable needs of the poor—and questioned restrictions on this role. (Her views on women will be explored separately.) She involved herself with her extended family—her mother, her sisters and their children. The children stayed for long periods of time at the Leseur's country home near the Swiss border, where they all spent quality time together. Elisabeth took an active role in encouraging the faith life of her niece and nephews by preparing them for first communion and writing spiritual treatises for both of them on this occasion. The children loved their Aunt Elizabeth and wrote postcards and notes to her as young adults; they seemed anxious to share their lives with her. They were impressed by her hour of daily meditation when they were with her in Jougne, noting that they were not to disturb her during that time. Elisabeth's correspondence to family members and friends discloses a regular round of meal-sharing and visits with family and friends.

These were simply the givens of the upper-class family life that Elisabeth embraced as part of her spiritual journey. This involvement with family as well as concerns related to both society and church characterize lay spirituality.

Pattern of Devotional Life and Ascetical Practices

Elisabeth devised a flexible rule of life that organized her devotional and ascetical practices." These she outlined in the second part of her journal, titled "Notebook of Resolutions," which spanned the years 1906-12. Despite the specific structure, she modified it by the two principles of flexibility and charity. She did not want her devotional life to interfere with either the comfort or needs of those she loved. She strictly followed her program when she was home alone and did not need to consider the rest of the household, and she was entirely flexible where others were concerned.

She maintained a daily pattern of morning and evening prayer including meditation. She went to confession and communion every two weeks. She would have liked to communicate more often if she could have done so "without inconveniencing or displeasing anyone." She made a one-day spiritual retreat monthly. This meant as much solitude as possible, more time in meditation, an examination of conscience, reflection on her life, and preparation for death. Annually, she tried to make a few days of retreat. Her letters indicate that by 1911, she felt fortunate to go to Mass and communicate three times a week.

She also organized her outer life as part of her spiritual program. She considered family and social responsibilities first—Felix lovingly headed the list. She carefully monitored what she said to him about spiritual matters, and by 1906 she had resolved to say as little as possible. Since she was relatively healthy, she adopted work she felt she could do, was actively involved with the poor, and sought to treat her servants as warmly as possible without crossing the boundary of familiarity. Finally, she developed an asceticism based on silence, self-giving, and austerity. Love determined all. What was the loving way to be, the loving thing to say, the loving thing not to do or say?

She defined each of these virtues in her own situation. Silence meant not imposing her illness, pain, or even graces on others. She actively sought to conceal her suffering and to avoid a natural tendency toward self-absorption when ill. She spoke about her interior experience only if she thought she could help another who sought spiritual guidance or emotional support from her. By self-giving she meant a radiant and active charity—real love expressed in every relationship and activity in her life. Finally, personal austerity meant that she avoided anything harmful to herself physically. "I need to preserve and try to improve my health, since it can be an instrument in the service of God and of neighbor. But in this illness...the precautions I must take, the discomforts it brings and the deprivations it imposes... there is sufficient opportunity for self-denial." Any other choice related to personal austerity had to have a positive effect on someone else. For instance, she continually tried to be gracious, lively, and good company in social situations while at the same time concealing the pain caused by religious hostility on many of these occasions. Her ascetical choices were carefully ordered to charity. If they did not serve love or increase her intimacy with God, she did not do them.

Primary Influences on Elisabeth Leseur's Spirituality

There are complex and multiple influences on the spirituality of any single Christian. First, there is the melange that constitutes the historical period in which a person lives. For Elisabeth, this included the popular forms of French Catholicism that constituted the context in which she experienced sacramental life in the church and available resources for developing her own interior life. Second, there are the public examples of other notable Christians either immediately preceding a person's life or contemporary with a person's life. Third, there are spiritual writers both historical and contemporary who reflect, challenge, or nourish someone like Elisabeth, who had almost unlimited

access to books and time to read them. Fourth, there are the particular circumstances that constitute the "givens" of a person's life to which each person creatively responds in the artful fashioning of a unique way of living.

Popular Religion

Several analyses of nineteenth-century spirituality agree on some of the main trends in popular Catholic piety in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1854 the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was formally defined and promulgated. In France this official impetus for Marian devotion was preceded by Catherine Laboure's vision of Mary in 1830 with the prayer invoking "Mary conceived without sin" and the striking of the Miraculous Medal, depicting the woman of the Apocalypse. It was followed in 1858 by the appearance to Bernadette Soubirous at Lourdes, where Mary identified herself as the Immaculate Conception. Thomas Kselman describes a rather circular relationship in the way the church used these apparitions and the healings that accompanied them as affirming, almost proving, the dogmatic definition. By approving these apparitions and orchestrating the healing cults that grew up around them, the church supported the prophetic hope for healing and for a restoration of the religious faith in France.⁹ In addition, as these pilgrimage sites developed, the devotions practiced included confession, Eucharist, the Rosary, or other popular devotions specific to the site.

Kselman aptly characterizes popular nineteenth-century French piety with its amazing array of devotions as manifesting three themes: the sentimentalization of Catholic piety; the guilt of the modern age and the need for redemption; and the virtues of poverty, simplicity; and humility. The sentimentalization of piety tended to increase the affective intimacy between the devotee and the object of devotion. This was part of a more general and sophisticated trend toward a religion of love rather than fear that was still quite strong in preaching and in the religious culture in general. This trend could also represent the emphasis on the irrational and affective over reason in the face of nineteenth-century rationalism. Metaphors of family life were especially important. And in the nineteenth century the family was becoming a new locus of affective intimacy and friendship. The autobiography of Therese of Lisieux is a stunning example of this theme as well as the one that follows.

The guilt of the modern age and its need for redemption underlay a dramatic increase in devotions throughout the nineteenth century that focused on the sins of the modern world and the role of prayer and suffering to make reparation for these offenses. There were at least three sources for this renewed emphasis. First, the French clergy consistently attempted to frighten their congregations into moral behavior through preaching and confessional practices that relied on fear of eternal punishment for moral transgressions, usually related to sexuality and blasphemy. Second, the social and political unrest in France, which destroyed the monarchy and finally developed into a republic, gradually separated church and state from one another. Thus, it became socially possible to express publicly one's agnosticism or atheism. Anxiety about the salvation of these skeptics and unbelievers required that those who continued to believe make up for this loss of religion in a formerly Catholic culture through prayer and reparation. Third, life-threatening illness and other forms of suffering remained a fact of human life. There is a psychic need that supports an appeal to the crucified Christ (or Mary, who suffers with him) that others might live. Kselman suggests that the shift specific to nineteenth-century France was from concern about individual salvation to concern about the salvation of others. One could earn salvation or conversion for another through prayer and suffering. This, of course, included the ever present and growing devotion to the Sacred Heart, which developed its modern form through the visions of Saint Margaret Mary Alacoque at Paray-le-Monial from 1673 to 1675 and which reached its peak in the national vow in 1873 that initiated the building of the Basilica of Sacre-Coeur on Montmartre. Sacre-Coeur was completed only on the eve of World War I. Of particular note in relationship to Elisabeth Leseur, Leo XIII consecrated the

entire human race to the Sacred Heart in 1899, one year after Elisabeth's resolution of her own spiritual crisis."

Finally, an emphasis on the virtues of poverty, simplicity, and humility was an antidote to the growing wealth, a higher standard of living for some, and the hubris of secular proposals for public life that threatened religious values. Virtually all of the visionaries of the nineteenth century were poor and rural. Their pastoral poverty contrasted with the growing urban wealth among some. In these visionaries the church began to celebrate the moral superiority of the poor. Their simplicity contrasted with rationalism and their illiteracy with the education of scholars. Humility ensured that neither visions nor prophecy would lead to pride. Their humility was linked to obedience and ensured humble submission to church authority.

In addition to these trends in popular Catholic religiosity, church elites in the nineteenth century began to influence devotional life through a renewed emphasis on liturgy; frequent reception of the Eucharist; a retrieval of the importance of scripture and the beginnings of historical criticism; and the more compassionate moral theology of Alphonsus Liguori, which gradually replaced the previous rigorist practices in the sacrament of penance. These were all strong influences on Elisabeth. She read Alphonsus in Italian? Msgr. Louis Gaston de Segur's promotion of frequent reception of communion was very widely known in Paris. Fenelon's Letter on Frequent Communion was republished by Dupanloup in 1855, selling 100,000 copies, and Pius X encouraged daily communion for religious orders and in 1915 allowed any Catholic in the state of grace to receive communion. As mentioned above, Elisabeth had a deep appreciation for the liturgical seasons, a theology of Eucharist, and meditated on the New Testament. She read the works of Dom Prosper Guéranger (1805-75), abbot of Solesmes, an authority on liturgy. She would have attended Eucharist with a hand missal? Elisabeth also regularly read Dominican Marie Joseph Lagrange's (1855-1938) *Revue Biblique* and comments on how much she appreciates it. There is less emphasis in Elisabeth's writings on popular devotions than on a combination of interior recollection, meditation, and a sacramental practice that conflates the Real Presence of Jesus in the Eucharist with the Sacred Heart. She possessed a solid theological and philosophical understanding of Christianity. It is true that Elisabeth went to Lourdes in 1912, accompanied by Felix, primarily in gratitude for her nephew Mauñcek's recovery from a serious injury to his hand, but for herself as well. She went to the Chapel of the Visitation at Paray-le-Monial while her husband had legal business there. Her friend Soeur Goby prayed for her there at another time and also at the shrine of the Cure of Ars, Saint John Vianney (1786-1859). She also had a single volume of meditations for "souls devoted to the Sacred Heart," which she used and distributed. This strata of popular devotions appears to be the taken-for-granted background rather than the primary focus of Elisabeth's spirituality.

Lay Exemplars

Although Elisabeth's ecclesial milieu could scarcely be characterized as an age of the laity, she was aware of a number of prominent lay Catholics in France who had made unique contributions to the life of the church. Most notable among them were Frédéric Ozanam and Pauline Jaricot. Ozanam (1813-53), descended from a Jewish family, was a lawyer, author, and professor at the Sorbonne. He responded to the challenge of social radicals to Catholics who had ignored the plight of the poor by founding the Society of St Vincent de Paul in 1833, a lay organization that "personally served the poor, the sick and the unemployed without distinction of race and creed"; the Society was organized at the parish and diocesan level.; Ozanam participated from the beginning in the development of a social Catholicism in France that looked beyond private charity to public reforms intended to address the situation of the impoverished masses. ^ specialist in Dante and Francis of Assisi, he joined his intellectual life with practical social action. Pauline Jaricot (1799-1862) was no less innovative, although her status as a single lay woman caused her great suffering. She founded the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, which began as an association for the missions in 1820.

Another group of laymen joined forces with her to solicit financial aid for the missions. Pauline made a private vow of perpetual virginity at the age of seventeen. She also founded the Union of Prayer in Reparation to the Sacred Heart, an organization for working girls. In 1826 she established Loretta House, a home for the same group.

Elisabeth also names Joseph de Maistre, Charles Montalembert, George Goyau, and other scholars, writers, diplomats, politicians, and philosophers who represented admirable efforts of lay Catholics to live their faith in the public arena as they came to terms with the shifting relationships of church and state in postrevolutionary France.

Spiritual Writers

Elisabeth mentions the spiritual writers she appreciated and who seemed to help her the most in the course of her letters and journal entries. Her husband also annotated her library, indicating which volumes she constantly read and reread, underlined, and which she talked about or distributed. Elisabeth lent her books to friends and acquaintances she thought would benefit from them. She simply replaced them if they were not returned. She considered this enlightenment of others through sharing resources one form of her intellectual apostolate.

Elisabeth writes about reading the lives of Bridget of Sweden, Teresa of Avila, and Catherine of Siena. She claimed Teresa and Catherine as patron saints. Felix notes that she liked the Dialogue of Catherine of Siena very much. In addition to these mystics who encourage interiority, contemplative prayer, suffering, apostolic activity, and strength in women, there are strong Salesian influences on Elisabeth. Few other women would have possessed fifteen volumes of the works of Saint Francis de Sales. Contemporary writers whom she mentions include Msgr. Charles Gay (1815-92), Pere Auguste Gratry, and the English Oratorian Frederick William Faber.

Elisabeth Leseur appears to have been a woman on a search, like so many lay women today. She was intellectual, deeply affectionate, and spiritual. From a loving and close-knit family, she sought love and affection in her marriage and maintained affectionate bonds with both families throughout her life. She extended this love and affection to her social circle of friends and acquaintances. She longed for the kind of friendship Francis de Sales describes in the Introduction to the Devout Life as almost a necessity for Christians who live their lives in a secular environment. This spiritual friendship she found only late in her life when she met Soeur Goby. She had to find a way to God that included both head and heart, affective nourishment and intimacy, as well as a defensible, thoughtful history and philosophy she could draw on to justify her religious practice to herself and to unbelievers. She had to find a way to relate the spiritual dimension of human persons to reason. She wanted to find a way to discover the spiritual core of unbelievers who were genuinely good people but who had no faith. She had to do this as an upper-class, married woman in Paris.

Elisabeth echoes several major themes of Francis de Sales and Jane Frances DeChantal. She is convinced God is a loving God and that human happiness consists in experiencing that love in prayer and in embodying that love in life and action. Her childhood journal already shows the beginnings of this affective intimacy with God. According to historian and biographer Genevieve Duhamel, more than twenty pages of this journal speak of death and heaven. She burst out with this exclamation to her parents: "That the good God will welcome you one day in his beautiful heaven, you are worthy of that. This is the wish of a little girl who loves you tenderly." And again, she reports being surprised in the midst of her meditation by a servant who cared for her. "My meditation today was on heaven; Oh, I had been transported in reading about that; I had stood up straight, crying, 'My God! Heaven!' Mamie came in at that moment and asked me if I was performing a play. I said to her no, but I thought that she wasn't sure. Oh! Heaven! Heaven! The house of the good God; and I would like to be there; what happiness it must be to see God!" As an eleven-year-old, she reveals something of her ecstatic nature but also a Salesian sensibility of the goodness of a loving God and

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

the realization that death is not to be feared because it means being with God. Her understanding of the Eucharist is similar in that she experiences God in her heart. As an adult, Elisabeth found in Francis de Sales a way to pursue this intimacy with God as a married woman. His focus on the cultivation of the virtues includes *douceur*, humility, simplicity, and poverty. Wendy Wright gives a number of meanings for *douceur*, a word almost impossible to translate into English:

"Sweetness," "gentleness," "graciousness," "meekness," and "suavity." None of these translations do it full justice. *Douceur* is a quality of person that corresponds to the light burden offered by the Matthean Jesus to those otherwise heavy-laden. It connotes an almost maternal quality of serving that is swathed in tender concern. Salesian *douceur* also suggests a sense of being grace-filled, graceful in the broadest use of the term. This gracefulness extends from external demeanor—polite manners and convivial disposition—to the very quality of a person's heart the way in which a person is interiorly ordered and disposed. Here one is reminded of the tradition of the *l'honnête homme* popular in the seventeenth century which stressed the harmony, beauty, and grace of the whole person and which De Sales saw as reflecting the beauty and harmony of God.

This reflection of God dwelling in her, embodied in the gracefulness of her attentive, empathetic presence, became Elisabeth's apostolic strategy. She also aspires to simplicity of life and detachment from wealth, on which De Sales gives advice in "The Poverty of Spirit to Be Observed in the Midst of Riches" and "How to Practice Genuine Poverty although Really Rich." Elisabeth discreetly responded to the needs of those she knew with generosity and consistency. She gradually persuaded Felix to stop giving her expensive gifts by explaining that monetary gifts she could use for the poor would give her more pleasure. At the same time she deliberately dressed as attractively as possible to further her apostolic goals—attracting others to her joyful, radiant interior secret as well as honoring Felix's social standing, which required her to dress appropriately for numerous social events.

From Salesian spirituality she adopts De Sales' approach to austerity or mortification. One was to acquire the virtues through hidden mortification—using the circumstances of daily life to cultivate humility, patience, gentleness, and so on. Elisabeth exhibits this moderation of self-denial in the service of developing personal qualities that contributed to a peaceful and loving environment for those around her. She never aspires to the heroic or masochistic practices of self-inflicted physical pain or excessive fasting. Quite the opposite, her physical vulnerabilities to illness provide all the material she needs. Taking care of her health without making a project of it is her form of asceticism. Her asceticism is largely internal, monitoring her internal responses and resisting the depression and lethargy that are normal accompaniments of serious illness. This kind of hidden practice of virtue and prudent asceticism is also echoed in the writings of Teresa of Avila. Self-denial is ordered to love, as it is for De Sales. Finally, the gentle bishop of Geneva used his *douceur*, his gentleness, and his loving approach to the people in his region to win them back to the faith and to develop peaceful relationships with Protestants in this Calvinist stronghold. De Sales understood that hearts are won through love and gentleness, not through violence or hatred. Elisabeth found here the strategy she was looking for in her social life with intolerant and often bigoted atheists and agnostics. She learned in this environment not to debate but simply to be a radiant, God-filled presence.

As a lay woman, Elisabeth found able spiritual guidance in Francis de Sales. She also found much to support her in contemporary spiritual writers. French spirituality in the nineteenth century had a strongly moralistic tone that only gradually changed when the influence of Alphonsus Liguori began to soak into French consciousness and several other writers began to emphasize the centrality of love in the Christian life. Elisabeth's preparation for first communion consisted in a nearly two-year program supervised by her mother and her tutors. She was given a copybook and encouraged to write in it. The entries reveal the voice of a bright, lively girl who felt very loved within her family. This journal is more like a typical diary except for her struggles with her faults, as she sees them,

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

accounts of positive experiences with confession, and a day-by-day account of her first-communion retreat. The retreat focused on death, judgment, and the loving reception of the sacrament. Elisabeth was clearly interested in being good and choosing the path to heaven. She was required to write little essays after attending religious education in her parish church taught by Abbe Seguin, her parish priest. In addition to meditating on this instruction, she was also supposed to monitor her behavior and dispositions through examination of conscience and to improve herself. Her mother's role was to accompany her to instructions and then to supervise her ongoing reflection.

When she begins her adult journal in 1898, she follows a similar procedure, except there are far fewer entries about daily life. She uses this personal journal to monitor her responses, to formulate a way of life, to record resolutions, and to remember the more significant insights and religious experiences that unfold. At this point in her life she has no one with whom to share her interior life. The journal becomes a way of recording, reflecting, remembering, and mirroring the important movements along the way, especially as she works out what this new life will mean for her and how it will affect her. It is not a record of mystical experiences or of visions. About these she is mostly silent. When she does note experiences of God's presence or of consolations, they typically accompany sacramental practice—the focus is eucharistic. It is Jesus present in her then. After 1911, when she cannot go out to Mass, she mentally prays in her room while imagining she is present in her friend Soeur Goby's chapel when her community is at prayer. She has a strong sense of Eucharist and holy communion—as sacrament, for making intentions, and as spiritual communion when ill. Part of the appeal of Elisabeth's spirituality is precisely its lack of emphasis on extraordinary mystical experiences. At the same time she exerted an extraordinary influence toward good on those around her.

Elisabeth writes of the influence of Msgr. Charles Gay. His *De la vie et des vertus chretiennes* consideerees dams l'etat religieux was given in conferences to nuns, but he thought it might also be useful to priests and to devout laity. Based on seventeenth-century spirituality, it was strongly Christocentric, drawing on Saint Paul's teaching that each Christian participates in the body of Christ and on the Johannine theme of the vine and the branches. He wrote in his preface:

What I have tried to do above everything else is to make Christ present in every parr of this work;...the whole book should be simply and solely Jesus Christ. The person of Jesus should never be separated from His teaching. If that teaching is life, it is because it comes from Him who is the life: the blessed words that He speaks, the commands that He lays down, the counsels He suggests, the attractions He displays, the advances He makes, the helps He provides and the pledges He gives—all these are simply bringing life to His beloved human creatures, that life which is real, close, fulfilled, endless union with Him who is true life....The sum of our perfection and of our holiness—is our living union with Jesus.

Gay differed from Pierre de Berulle, the great seventeenth-century spiritual writer, by giving more importance to the human starting point for holiness. One needed to understand human nature and build on it. He proposes a harmony between the natural and the supernatural. Faith uplifts and perfects reason, it does not extinguish it. Christian life is nothing more than Christ living in us the life of the Trinity. Gay is less interested in the "states" and "dispositions" of Christ than in the Thomistic doctrine that grace builds on nature. Virtuous life is made possible by this indwelling of God. Gay's emphasis on human development and on the role of fostering virtues useful in relational human life is one of the influences on Elisabeth's program of meditating on a specific virtue each month as part of her retreat practice.

Two other nineteenth-century Oratorians were favorites of Elisabeth: Auguste Gratry (1805-72) and Frederick William Faber (1814-63). Gratry appealed to head as well as heart, while Faber was known for his emotionalism. Gratry taught moral theology at the Sorbonne, subsequently being elected to the Academie Francaise. He contributed to a renaissance in Christian philosophy with works that

were both apologetic and polemic. He is criticized for placing excessive weight on emotion in the discovery of truth. In reflecting on the knowledge of God, he appealed to "a sense of the infinite" that is superior to intellect. Elisabeth considered him a kindred spirit. She clearly assimilated his sense of the supernatural and his assumptions about prayer. He wrote in *Les sources*, for instance: "Those who pray help everyone. They help their brothers and sisters often by the salutary and powerful magnetism of a soul who believes, who knows, and who wills. They are able to do all things as Saint Paul says through their prayers, supplications, and their graced actions for all."

Frederick Faber, known for his effusiveness and emotional tone, clearly promoted a vision of a loving and merciful God. He was a prolific writer and a popular, successful preacher, drawing from the Italian and French schools of spirituality. He was an insightful spiritual director and had a reputation for shining a light into the dark places of human nature. Faber was also accused of being so lenient that he was "sending people to heaven on a featherbed." Pierre Pourrat, an expert on the history of spirituality, characterized him as "ultramontane" in the true sense. He was deeply respectful of the pope and promoted an attitude of duty and love toward the papacy. Despite his expansive and florid style, Faber drew on many sources and presented his teaching in an original way. He placed a great deal of emphasis on "the soul's individuality," the psychosomatic unity of the individual, "the necessity of spiritual reading," and "friendliness to all men, especially to those not of the faith." This last theme would have held particular appeal to Elisabeth as she sought to respond to the many unbelievers around her. She also appreciated his book on redemption, *Le Precier Sang or le prix de notre saint*, which she read sometime after her surgery for breast cancer.

From Preface by Wendy Wright

Not long ago a retired priest contacted me about a book he hoped to complete during the last active phase of his life. It would be a book about Christian saints for the journey, and he wanted to be inclusive, so, of the twenty portraits he planned to paint, he hoped to fashion ten of exemplary women. The problem, and this is why he had written to me, was that all the names he could come up with were women in vowed religious life. Could I recommend to him any well-documented stories of women enrolled in the ranks of the canonized who were lay people? Of course, I could not offer him a long list, and of the few examples I could come up with, other than some early martyrs, the spirituality of the women—Catherine of Genoa for example—was very much cast in the ascetic mold shaped by monastic life. Or a life was so singular—I think of the sickly Kateri Tekakwitha, the Lily of the Mohawks, who clung to her chosen faith despite being persecuted by members of her tribe—that it really belongs to one time and place. There is little documentation about women whose Christian Catholic faith was deeply realized precisely as lay persons.

Part of the problem in coming up with officially canonized female lay saints, of course, lies with the process by which the Roman Catholic Church recognizes those persons felt to be heroic practitioners of the Christian life. But the issue is deeper than this specifically ecclesial one. When one looks beyond the ranks of those who are formally recognized as worthy of liturgical veneration to the many other Christian holy persons whose names and stories are enthusiastically admired today, one finds that, while some are lay women, they are generally admired because of the dramatic narrative arc of their spiritual journey. Contemporary heroine Dorothy Day embraced radical poverty and offered uncompromising hospitality to the homeless and hungry on the streets of America's cities, and Maryknoll lay missionary Jean Donovan made the ultimate sacrifice of her own life for the people of El Salvador. Their witness compels admiration, even imitation, but their lives don't really mirror most of ours.

This focus on the unusual and the exceptional as characteristic of the heralded Christian life extends to the academic world as well. The last thirty years or so, with the Paulist Press Classics of Western

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

Spirituality series leading the way, have been rich ones in the scholarly world for the discovery and recovery of the width, depth, and breadth of Christian spiritual traditions. Yet so many of the narratives and texts held up to us are of the unusual variety. As fascinating as are kataphatic visionaries, pursuers of the apophatic depths of the Godhead, hi-locators, martyrs, hermits, undaunted foundresses, and spiritual performance artists, and as important as they are for our understanding of the trajectory of the tradition, their stories rarely offer us a vision of the Christian life that finds us just where we are—in our little lives with our mundane responsibilities, so-so relationships, our probably pretty pedestrian joys and pains. Rarely do they take our breath away by a glimpse of the sheer simplicity and elegance of an ordinary life made transparent by being lived in faith.

And then there is Elisabeth Leseur.

"The Christian life is great and beautiful and full of joy," she wrote. When you begin to read the personal journal entries, letters, and writings on vocation and suffering that Elisabeth penned, you begin yourself to entertain just such a radical thought. Her story is both very ordinary and extraordinary, and it is that in a hidden, unpretentious way.

How can I describe Elisabeth Leseur in a manner that conveys some real sense of the presence captured by Janet Ruffing's lovely translation of her writings? She is very French. Her profound formation in the spirit of French-speaking Francis de Sales is evident. She studied and internalized the *Introduction to the Devout Life* that he wrote for lay women two centuries before she lived. She gave herself completely to God's animating life exactly as a wife, an aunt, a friend, a woman who struggled with illness, and as an avid student of the gospel and of contemporary thought. The Savoyard bishop's insistence that each "state in life" has its own spiritual practices and tonality shaped by the duties of that life is something she knew well. One can also hear the echo of Francis's injunction to "be what you are and be that well" as Elisabeth discovered the trajectory of her own spiritual pilgrimage: in her tenderness for her nonbelieving husband, in her silent evangelization of others through the practice of being a loving presence, in her probing correspondence with her spiritual friend Soeur Goby, in the integrity of her intelligent pursuit of her recovered Catholic faith, in the long diminishment that resulted from her breast cancer. There is as well in Elisabeth Leseur something reminiscent of two French Carmelite women whose lifespans overlapped hers. There is in her spirituality something akin to Therese of Lisieux's utterly simple, clear grasp of the mysteries of faith, something of Therese's little way," and something reminiscent too of Edith Stein's inquiring mind, which applied itself with such penetration to matters of faith.

To read Elisabeth Leseur is to encounter the spiritual possibilities of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Roman Catholicism, an era often overlooked by scholars of Christian spirituality as an age dominated by pietistic devotionism and reactionary theology. Elisabeth Leseur did find redemptive meaning in the illness that finally claimed her life, but one cannot roll one's contemporary eyes at a distasteful "victim spirituality" or snigger at the thought that she was just mindlessly "offering it up." Rather, the depth at which Elisabeth explored the resources of the Catholic spiritual tradition of her day, both before and after her last illness, are revelatory both of her own deeply examined faith and of the inherent depth of that same tradition. Evident in her writing is the creative dynamism stirring the church of her day: the beginnings of historical criticism and liturgical renewal, the emerging Catholic social-teaching tradition and vital movements encouraging lay involvement, the artistic and philosophical explorations that would emerge in the French Catholic Revival. She also provides a stunning example of a convicted believer whose breadth of spirit and trust in the divine compassion at the root of all creation allowed her to live graciously and gratefully in a society and a marriage often hostile to or dismissive of faith.

Elisabeth Leseur's presence also seems to expand outward beyond the confines of her era and geographical location. Perhaps that is why she so rightly belongs in the Classics of Western

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

Spirituality series. Her thought as recorded in these writings is spacious and expansive, at once balanced and penetrating. Very little of it seems constrained by narrow or petty concerns. She was capable of a lyricism that is profoundly contemplative, sensitive to both the interior and exterior dynamics of a fully lived faith. Thus she could write expressively:

Let us love. Let our lives be a perpetual song of love for God first of all, and for all human beings who suffer, love and mourn. Let deep joy live in us. Let us be like the lark, enemy of the night, who always announces the dawn and awakens in each creature the love of light and life. Let us awaken others to the spiritual life.

Strangely, when I try to evoke her to entice readers to discover her for themselves, I find myself conjuring up a man of the next generation, Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish secretary-general of the United Nations, whose personal spiritual notebook, *Markings*, was not made known until after his death. Elisabeth was not a public figure or an internationally known diplomat, but she, like Hammarskjöld, left a precious record of a remarkable inner spiritual journey that was all but hidden from contemporaries. Profoundly personal, the inner journeys these two undertook were not, however, privatized. They undergirded lives of intense service to others. They flowered in a spirituality at once social and intimate, sophisticated and utterly transparent. <>

WRITINGS ON BODY AND SOUL BY AELRED OF RIEVAULX, edited and translated by Bruce L. Venarde [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, Harvard University Press, 9780674261181]

Aelred (1110–1167), abbot of Rievaulx Abbey in Yorkshire, has always been a controversial figure. He was beloved by his monks and widely admired, but also sharply criticized for his frankness about his own sinfulness and what some considered his favoritism and excessive leniency.

WRITINGS ON BODY AND SOUL includes a selection of the prolific abbot's theological, historical, and devotional works. Each contains autobiographical elements, showing Aelred at turns confident and fearful, tormented and serene. In *A Pastoral Prayer*, he asserts his unworthiness and pleads for divine aid in leading his monks wisely and compassionately. *Spiritual Friendship* adapts Cicero's dialogue on friendship for Christian purposes. *A Certain Marvelous Miracle* offers a riveting account of a pregnant teenage nun, the bloody vengeance wreaked on her seducer, and the miracle of her release from her fetters. Finally, *Teachings for Recluses*, addressed to Aelred's sister, is a guide for women pursuing solitary religious perfection.

Freshly revised editions of the Latin texts appear here alongside new English translations.

CONTENTS

Introduction

- Aelred's Life
- Aelred's Writings
- Aelred's Reputation
- The Contents of This Book
- A Pastoral Prayer*
- Spiritual Friendship*
- A Certain Marvelous Miracle*
- Teachings for Recluses*
- Translating Aelred
- Acknowledgments

Notes

A Pastoral Prayer
Spiritual Friendship
A Certain Marvelous Miracle
Teachings for Recluses
 Note on the Texts
 Notes to the Texts
 Notes to the Translations
 Bibliography
 Index

Excerpt: Aelred's Reputation

The charming and witty figure, wise man, kind mentor, guru, biblical scholar, and brilliant writer memorialized by Jocelyn of Furness, or the sinful, anxious abbot Aelred portrayed himself to be, was a controversial figure in his lifetime. He remains so today, the object of extensive and sometimes contentious scholarship. Walter Daniel was sometimes defensive in the *Life of Aelred*, completed shortly after its subject's death. Of Aelred's election as abbot of Rievaulx, Walter writes that "there are some who think that he rose to rule this house by willful ambition" and noted that critics accused him of being "a glutton, a drunk, and a friend of publicans who gives up his body to baths and ointments." Walter also notes the abbot's patience with those weak in body and character; he welcomed to Rievaulx men no other monastery would accept. In a subsequent letter aimed at critics of his encomium, Walter explains that by saying the young Aelred lived as a monk in the court of King David, he was referring to his humility, noting almost casually and without elaboration that "Aelred occasionally deflowered his chastity." In his own times, then, Aelred had enemies who regarded him as an ambitious, lax, self-indulgent sensualist.

In his writings, Aelred offered ample material for critics. His recollections of his youth in *A Pastoral Prayer* and *Teachings for Recluses* include what sound like more than occasional sexual sins. The close bonds described in *Spiritual Friendship* have led some modern scholars to claim that Aelred was gay or that, at very least, he had a circle of intimates in the monastery who incurred resentment from those who were not members of it. Although *Spiritual Friendship* fails to mention the friendship between Scipio and Laelius that was the cornerstone of Cicero's treatise, it cites as models the mythological figures of Orestes and Pylades and, repeatedly, the biblical David and Jonathan, two friendships whose homoerotic overtones are unmistakable. The precise nature of Aelred's sexual interests and history are impossible to determine, but it is easy to imagine his gentle treatment of errant monks and his close friendships arousing malicious gossip.

The monks of Rievaulx revered Aelred, whose accomplishments and reputation could easily have incited jealousy while provoking criticism that he paid too little attention to his responsibilities as a spiritual leader. Again, Aelred himself invited criticism, often voicing his regret that practical affairs demanded so much of his time. He frequently preached away from Rievaulx, and although information about his public life is incomplete, he clearly knew some of the most powerful people of his day. Rievaulx under his guidance became populous, wealthy, and highly regarded. Aelred managed to be many things to many people, and as is usual in such cases, he inspired detractors as well as admirers.

The Contents of this Volume

Many of Aelred's writings have autobiographical elements, including all those presented here. *Spiritual Friendship*, *A Certain Marvelous Miracle*, and *Teachings for Recluses* were completed in the last years of Aelred's life. *A Pastoral Prayer*, too, has usually been dated to this late period, but it could well be a much earlier work, written on the occasion of his election as abbot of Revery in

1143 or as abbot of Rievaulx in 1147. It is an excellent introduction to Aelred as a person, an abbot, and a thinker, so it appears first.

A Pastoral Prayer

"O good shepherd Jesus," begins Aelred's plea for divine aid in his position as abbot, shepherd of his monastic flock. In straightforward yet passionate language, Aelred asserts his unworthiness for his office and wonders why God has imposed it on him. He proceeds to ask God's help to lead wisely, compassionately, and with attention to the needs of each individual under his care. Aelred then prays for his monks. He hopes he may rule and teach them well and that God will guide them and provide for the spiritual and temporal needs of "your household, your own people." The abbot concludes by commending his flock to God, in the hopes that its members will carry out their vocations joyfully, thereby attaining eternal life. Throughout, Aelred's worry about his unworthiness is balanced by hope and trust as he expresses gratitude for God's many favors. A Pastoral Prayer is packed with biblical citations and allusions and draws inspiration from writings on the similar themes by Abbot John of Fécamp (d. 1070), Archbishop Anselm of Canterbury (1033/4-1109), and Aelred's fellow Cistercian abbot William of Saint Thierry (ca. 1080-1148), behind all of which stands Augustine in his Confessions. It is nonetheless highly personal, its presentation elegant and powerful.

Spiritual Friendship

As Aelred explains in a prologue, when young he found comfort and guidance in Cicero's eloquent book on friendship, which he wants to rework on the authority of scripture and other holy writings. It has three books, which he summarizes as covering the definition of friendship, then its rewards, and finally its cultivation and preservation. Each book is framed as a dialogue. The first is between Aelred and Ivo, a young monk of the monastery of Warden, a daughter house of Rievaulx that Aelred is visiting. Books 2 and 3 are set at Rievaulx, some years later, and recount a conversation between Aelred and two of his monks, Gratian and Walter. Part of the pleasure of Spiritual Friendship derives from the character sketches that emerge from the conversations. ^^ is a starry-eyed youngster, timid yet prone to intellectual impetuosity. Gratian is loving, eager, and generous, even to Walter, whose irascibility and self-righteousness show that he is based on none other than Walter Daniel, whose writings also disclose those traits. Presiding over it all is Aelred, modest, patient, learned, and ever so slightly long-winded.

The treatise covers more subjects than Aelred's précis suggests. It includes questions of the origins of friendship; different kinds of friendship, both good and bad; the sort of people among whom friendship exists; who makes the best friend; the stages of friendship and reasons and procedures for dissolving it; the characteristics, pleasures, and duties of friendship; its limits; and its spiritual aspects. In an extended final section, Aelred recalls two of the most important friendships of his life.

Spiritual Friendship was completed sometime between 1164 and Aelred's death in early 1167. As he promises at the beginning, Aelred draws extensively on earlier writings. The foundation is Cicero's On Friendship, frequently quoted and alluded to throughout. The second and third books of Spiritual Friendship are rich in positive and negative examples of friendship drawn from scripture, especially the historical books of the Hebrew Bible. Aelred frequently quotes or cites Ambrose of Milan's On Duties and Augustine's Confessions, as well as other pagan and Christian authors. But Aelred does more than pile up quotations, references, and examples. Instead, he creates a work of synthesis on the power of any friendship that has its origins and purpose in Christ.

Aelred's most popular work in the Middle Ages, Spiritual Friendship was copied in whole or in part in many manuscripts in England and on the Continent. At least one of the shorter versions was long attributed to Augustine. Around 1200, the scholar and diplomat Peter of Blois wrote an immensely successful treatise entitled Christian Friendship, heavily dependent on Spiritual Friendship and the

Mirror of Charity. *Spiritual Friendship* was first translated into a vernacular language, French, in the thirteenth century. Interest in *Spiritual Friendship* waned in the later Middle Ages but was revived in the twentieth century. In recent decades the text has been translated into Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, and Spanish.

À Certain Marvelous Miracle

This brief narrative, closer to Aelred's historical writings than to the other three texts in this book, recounts events that took place around 1160 and were recorded two or three years later. It is a shocking story of sex and violence. A four-year-old orphan girl was sent to Watton, an East Yorkshire monastery of the Gilbertine Order that housed both men and women, canons and nuns, as well as lay brothers and sisters. As a teenager, she begins a torrid affair with a lay brother of the community. She becomes pregnant, her fellow nuns bind her with chains and imprison her, and her fleeing lover is captured through trickery and handed over to the nuns of the community. The nuns take their revenge on him in a gruesome fashion, and he vanishes from the narrative. When it is clear that the teenage nun is about to give birth in her cell, she has two visions, during the second of which she sees two beautiful women in white carrying away what appears to be an infant. The next morning, she is no longer pregnant and soon her fetters begin to come loose. Aelred, invited to Watton to investigate and consult, concludes that God was behind this second miracle and the matter should be left to God. The account ends as Aelred, back at Rievaulx, hears that the last of her bonds has fallen away.

Readers have been hard pressed to interpret the narrative, which fails to tell us things like who the girl's parents were, what happened to her and her lover subsequently, or even her name. It is likely that Aelred wanted to keep her identity, and that of her family, private. However, two things stand out. First, as his title and prologue make clear, Aelred saw this as a miracle story, not a tawdry tale but a manifestation of God's power and grace. Second, Aelred's treatment of the protagonist is gentle, even compassionate. He makes it clear that the nun, however great a sinner, was temperamentally unsuited to monastic life. He notes that although her seducer had only sex on his mind, she thought of love, and Aelred shows her stoically accepting her brutal treatment, saying she deserved worse. When Aelred visits after some of her fetters have unaccountably fallen off, the nuns suggest she be chained up again. He forbids it as presumptuous and faithless.

Teachings for Recluses

Aelred's guide for women leading a solitary religious life also dates to the abbot's last years. Recluses, also known as anchoresses, were enclosed in their ordinarily doorless cells in a formal religious ceremony. *Teachings for Recluses* is addressed to the abbot's sister, who has had long experience as a recluse, and she is urged to share its contents with young women aspiring to this way of life. At the end, Aelred notes that the text is divided into three parts: one about the outer self, one about the inner self, and finally a guide to meditation designed to increase devotion to God. After a brief account of the origins of this way of life, complete with a satirical portrait of women who carry it out in an unholy fashion, Aelred begins in earnest to describe how the recluse should organize her life in matters like food, drink, clothing, contact with others, silence, and daily routine. He moves on to consideration of the merits of solitude and virginity, the practice of chastity, the cultivation of humility and simplicity, how to serve fellow humans while avoiding them, and how to love God. This last subject opens the third section, a three-part guide to meditation on Christ's past, present, and future. The past here is the life of Christ. Aelred outlines a mental pilgrimage in which the recluse becomes an emotion-filled participant-observer at events from the Annunciation to Christ's crucifixion and resurrection. Meditation on the present is to include reflection on the blessings of this life; here Aelred contrasts his sister's lifelong purity to his own youthful sins. The meditation on the future concerns what comes after the death of the body, and

Aelred places his sister at the seat of Christ's judgment to observe the fate of the wicked and the good. The meditation, and the treatise, ends with a description of the joys of eternal blessedness.

Although the recluse was to be solitary, she was hardly alone; in fact, many English recluses lived in cells built on the outside of a church wall. Aelred prescribes two servants to perform domestic duties and an elderly and reputable local priest to serve as spiritual advisor or confessor. Anyone wanting to speak with the recluse can do so only with a third party present and with her priest's permission. Still, that leaves three people with whom the recluse has regular interactions, and although other visitors are in general discouraged, Aelred expects her to receive some, including bishops and monastic officials. This is in keeping with the setting of this solitary life; many recluses, both male and female, lived not isolated in the countryside but in or near villages and towns.

Teachings for Recluses is a highly inventive work, combining several elements into a harmonious whole. Some of the first section reads like a monastic rule, and the remarks on the inner life and youthful transgressions are in keeping with both traditional and more novel themes in Christian spirituality. At the same time, the description of the failings of some recluses is excellent satire. The prescription for a "threefold meditation" contains nothing new in itself; calls to contemplate the life of Christ, one's own life and behavior, and life after death are found in the works of other twelfth-century writers, including Bernard of Clairvaux. But the length and the passionate tone of the meditations are noteworthy. *Ancrene Wisse*, a Middle English guide for female solitaires written in the early thirteenth century, drew heavily on *Teachings for Recluses*, and the imaginative participation in the life of Christ Aelred recommends was much in vogue in the late medieval and early modern eras.

Translating Aelred

Translating Aelred's Latin into faithful yet idiomatic English is a demanding task. I have sometimes divided long periodic sentences into two or even three parts to enhance clarity and readability, changed passive voice to active, and reduced the frequency of both asyndeton (absence of conjunctions) and polysyndeton (multiple successive conjunctions). The main difficulty, however, is with individual words, and the reader should be aware of some choices I have made, especially where nuance or consistency proves impossible.

Aelred often uses, more or less interchangeably, words that denote sweetness, pleasure, charm, enjoyment, and delight: the nouns *suavitas*, *dulcedo*, and *iocunditas* and the adjectives *suavis*, *dulcis*, and *iocundus*. In the absence of any clear pattern, I have used several English words to translate each set of nouns and adjectives, preferring "sweetness" or "sweet" for *suavitas/suavis* and *dulcedo/dulcis*. The demands of idiomatic English, however, do not permit complete consistency, for example when Aelred refers to something as both *suavis* and *dulcis*. In a similar vein, Aelred draws on Latin's rich vocabulary for nouns and verbs to express tenderness or devotion: *amor* and *amare*, *dilectio* and *diligere*, and *caritas*. *Amor* and *amare* usually have positive connotations and refer to the feelings of God or humankind, but they can also be associated with carnality and wickedness, which context makes clear. *Dilectio* and *diligere*, which also signify traits or capacities of God and people alike, are unambiguously positive. In the texts translated here, Aelred uses *caritas* to refer almost exclusively to feelings of humans toward one another. For the most part, I have translated all these words simply as "love." *Caritas* is sometimes "loving-kindness," but to render it so in all instances would be clumsy in English.

Most vexing of all is *affectus*, a word rarely used in classical Latin that features prominently in Aelred's writings. In his first major work, *The Mirror of Charity*, Aelred writes that *affectus* is "a certain spontaneous and sweet inclination of the very spirit toward someone" (*est igitur affectus spontanea quadam ac dulcis ipsius animi ad aliquem inclinatio*). That definition is less helpful than modern scholars and translators would like, especially since Aelred locates *affectus* variously in the

mens (mind), anima, (soul), animus or spiritus (spirit), and cor (heart). In any case, it is unlike the capacity of reason, which can be accounted for and is not spontaneous. Here again consistency proves impossible, in part because Aelred was not consistent in his usage of the term. I have translated affectus variously as "affect," "affection," "attachment," "emotion," and "feeling," according to context and the demands of English idiom. Caveat lector. Biblical translations are my own, although I have consulted the Douay-Rheims Vulgate. <>

COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS'S TREATISE ON HAPPINESS AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE by J. Budziszewski (Summa theologiae. Prima secundae Quaestio I-5.) [Cambridge University Press, 9781108477994]

This monumental, line-by-line commentary makes Thomas Aquinas's classic Treatise on Happiness and Ultimate Purpose accessible to all readers. Budziszewski illuminates arguments that even specialists find challenging: What is happiness? Is it something that we have, feel, or do? Does it lie in such things as wealth, power, fame, having friends, or knowing God? Can it actually be attained? This book's luminous prose makes Aquinas's treatise transparent, bringing to light profound underlying issues concerning knowledge, meaning, human psychology, and even the nature of reality.

Review

'Budziszewski's Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Happiness and Ultimate Purpose provides an in-depth, detailed, accessible, and comprehensive commentary on the Summa theologiae's questions on happiness. This commentary is a gem. It can be read with profit by philosophers, theologians, and intellectual historians, as well as by their students. If you are interested in Aquinas, want insight about happiness, or both, this book is for you.' Christopher Kaczor, author of *The Gospel of Happiness* and *Thomas Aquinas on the Cardinal Virtues*

'Excellent. Students, general readers, and professionals alike are sure to find this commentary on Aquinas tremendously useful given its clarity, erudition, attention to contemporary moral and philosophical concerns, and plain enjoyableness.' Edward Feser, Pasadena City College

'Professor Budziszewski is among the rare scholars who combine depth and erudition with a real flair for writing. No matter how dry or formidable one imagines Thomas Aquinas to be, his words come alive through the pen of Budziszewski. One sees with new eyes how amazingly pertinent Aquinas's questions are, how intriguing the puzzles with which he wrestles, and how sensible the answers at which he arrives regarding the meaning of life. This book will be a godsend for classroom study.' Matthew Levering, James N. and Mary D. Perry Jr, Chair of Theology, Mundelein Seminary

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

For this Table of Contents, I have taken the topics of the Articles from St. Thomas's prologues; these differ slightly from those shown in the texts of the Articles themselves. For clarity, I have also paraphrased the traditional titles of the Questions, several of which are a little bit misleading. "Man's Last End" has become "Man's Ultimate Purpose"; "In What It Consists" has become "In What Does Happiness Lie? Failed Candidates"; "What It Is" has become "Where Then Does Happiness Really Lie, And What Is It in Itself?"; "What Is Required for It" has become "What Complete Happiness Requires"; and "How It May Be Obtained" has become "How Complete Happiness Is Finally Attained."

The general structure of the Treatise, then, is as follows:

I Man's Ultimate Purpose (Question I)

II Happiness Itself

A. Where Does Complete Happiness Lie? Failed Candidates (Question 2)

B. What Then Is Complete Happiness in Itself, and In What Does It Really Lie? (Question 3)

C. Its Attainment

1. What Complete Happiness Requires (Question 4)

2. How Complete Happiness Is Finally Attained (Question 5)

And its detailed structure is shown below, with the themes of additional discussions indicated in italics.

Anti Studium

Epigraph

Commentator's Introduction

General Prologue of St. Thomas Aquinas to the Treatise on Happiness and Ultimate Purpose

Man is not a pawn of a blind fate but a being who knows what he is doing. As we see later, supreme happiness is not attainable by man's natural powers alone. Yet in another sense, whether he attains utter happiness depends on his free choices.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: God and God's Image

MAN'S ULTIMATE PURPOSE (QUESTION I)

Prologue to Question I

The term "happiness," which is unavoidable in this book, gives but a pale and pallid sense of what St. Thomas is talking about. Expressions such as "blessedness" and "supreme happiness" convey fair impressions of its meaning; the expression "flourishing" would be even better, if only we could keep in mind that the sort of flourishing we are thinking about is neither that of a plant, like a cabbage or artichoke, nor that of an animal, like a cat or a turtle, but that of an embodied rational being who has dominion over his own actions.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: So Many Questions

Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? (Article 1)

In either of two ways, one might deny that it is characteristically human to act for an end or aim. The more moderate is to suggest that man does not always act for an end. The more radical is to suggest that man never acts for an end, but only seems to. St. Thomas responds.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: A Practical Joke by the Universe?

Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end? (Article 2) Is man's characteristic of acting for some aim due specifically to his rational nature — is it because of his rationality that he acts in this way? Could it be that in some sense, creatures that lack reason will also act for an end? The tradition has held that they do — that all things in nature are directed to ends, even the lower creatures that do not know what they are doing. St. Thomas seeks to find out whether this is true.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Divine Providence

Whether human acts are specified by their end? (Article 3)

Do human acts "receive their species" from their ends — are their ends what make them the species, or kinds, of acts that they are? If so, then these ends are the proper basis for defining and classifying them — something we need to know for what comes later.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Moral Judgment

Whether there is one last end of human life? (Article 4)

At present St. Thomas is asking only whether ultimate meaning or purpose is in some way at stake in each human life — whether in this sense human life is meaningful. Later on he asks whether each person has but a single ultimate purpose, whether each person always acts with it in view, and whether each person pursues the same one.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: So Many Infinities

Whether one man can have several last ends? (Article 5)

Can a single man have more than one ultimate purpose at once — more than one independent final aim in all his acts?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Don't Tell ME About Happiness!

Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end? (Article 6) Could it be that even though every person does love something to the furthest limit, he pursues not all things but only certain things for its sake?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Under the Aspect of Good

Whether all men have the same last end? (Article 7)

In the previous Article, St. Thomas made it clear that different men might pursue different ends, not as ultimate but as though they were ultimate. Now he considers whether such differences arise from a mistake: Whether, despite disagreements about what the ultimate purpose is, in some sense all people are aimed at the same one — even if they err about it.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Qualified Judges

Discussion: Qualified Judges — Trying Again

Whether other creatures concur in that last end? (Article 8)

Wouldn't all created things have the same ultimate aim? One might at first say "Yes," just because they were all made by the same God. On the other hand, one might at first say "N^," on grounds that creatures without intellects have no aims. But as we saw previously, things do not have to know their purposes in order to have purposes; their purposes are built into their natures. Yet shouldn't it make some difference that certain things have intellects and others do not? What is the solution?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Teleology in Contemporary Science

Discussion: Not Only the Image but the Likeness of God

WHERE DOES COMPLETE HAPPINESS LIE? FAILED CANDIDATES (QUESTION 2)

Question 2 Prologue

In Question 1, we found that acting for a purpose is a property of man; that although subrational things also act for purposes, man does so under his own agency and direction; and that the purpose of an act makes it the kind of act that it is. Furthermore, we found that each human being pursues some aim as an ultimate purpose, not for something else but for its own sake; that he pursues just one purpose as ultimate; and that he directs everything to it. Finally, we found that all human beings have the same ultimate purpose, the fulfillment of which only rational beings are capable. But although we have given names to this ultimate

purpose, such as supreme or consummate happiness, complete or perfect flourishing, and beatitude, we don't yet know much about it.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Just a Copycat?

Whether man's happiness consists in wealth? (Article 1)

Wealth is the first candidate for happiness to be considered, probably because so many nominate it. It is easy to see why people would fix their hopes on material possessions, for the desire for riches is allied with other strong motives.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Love of Money, Then and Now

Whether man's happiness consists in honors? (Article 2)

Here we are thinking of the particular distinctions that we confer upon persons whom we consider deserving. Offices, for example, are honors; so are prizes, awards, and other authoritative recognition; so is being raised to a higher rank.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Craving for Honor among Professionals

Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory? (Article 3)

To have fame is to be clearly known and praised by others. Many envy so-called celebrities. The psychological bases of the belief in their happiness do not concern us here. We are concerned only with whether it is true.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Reason and Revelation

Whether man's happiness consists in power? (Article 4)

The kind of power discussed in the present Article is not the power to build a house, to prove a theorem, to be aroused to anger, or to write a book, but the power to rule or direct others. Curiously, although people in our society readily admit to the desire to be "administrators," join "management," learn "leadership," or enter "public service," they rarely admit to a desire to rule or attain power.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Can Happiness Do Harm?

Discussion: Evil As Privation of Good

Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good? (Article 5) Although St. Thomas frames his arguments in such a way as to apply to all bodily goods, he has the Objectors focus on the bodily good of health, and with good reason. Only a few people think supreme happiness lies in swiftness. Perhaps a somewhat larger number think it lies in beauty. But a great many think it lies in health.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Materialism, Soft and Hard

Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure? (Article 6)

St. Thomas is far from dismissive of common opinion, especially concerning people's own experience — something of which they have, so to speak, inside knowledge. He is also quite aware of the popularity of the view that happiness is pleasure. In his view, however, the

relation between happiness and pleasure is not the sort of question that can be settled by an opinion poll.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Hedonism, High and Low

Discussion: From Pleasure to "Positive Emotions"

Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness? (Article 7)

The actual enjoyment of external and of bodily goods takes place in the soul. However, there are also goods intrinsic to the soul, such as virtue.

Could supreme happiness or beatitude lie in one of those?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Can We Love Anything More than Ourselves?

Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness? (Article 8) So far we have been considering not only particular goods, such as wealth, but also entire categories of goods, such as goods of the body. Since these categories seem to exhaust all possible created human goods, it would seem that no other candidates for happiness are left. Nevertheless, someone might say happiness must lie in some good of the created order, just because there is nothing else he can desire. So in this culminating query St. Thomas considers all created goods at once.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Wanting to Be Supermen

WHAT THEN IS COMPLETE HAPPINESS IN ITSELF, AND IN WHAT DOES IT REALLY LIE?

Question 3 Prologue

Question 2 finally concluded that supreme happiness does not lie in any created good at all. But what is it?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Should I Take This Seriously?

Whether happiness is something uncreated? (Article 1)

To ask whether our beatitude or supreme happiness is "something uncreated" amounts to asking whether our beatitude is something concerning the Creator Himself. Surprisingly, although in one sense the answer is "Yes," in another sense it is "No."

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Does God Lack Something?

Whether happiness is an operation? (Article 2)

The suggestion that happiness is some kind of activity may seem formidably abstract until we have considered just what kind of activity it may be — and for this, we must read through the rest of Question 3. Here it may suffice to remember Aristotle's remark that both ordinary

and educated people identify happiness with the activity of living well and doing well.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Pie in the Sky By and By?

Discussion: Is Aristotle Wrong about Nature Making Nothing in Vain?

Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellectual part only? (Article 3)

The sensitive powers include not just the abilities to see, hear, smell,

taste, and touch, but all those capacities by which animals surpass plants. So to ask whether happiness is an activity of the sensitive powers is to ask whether it is an activity of those capacities, connected with the body, which we rational animals share with subrational animals, rather than of the intellectual powers that are ours alone.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Are We United with God through Our Feelings or Our Minds?

Discussion: Why Does the Intellect Depend on Phantasms?

Discussion: Seeing the Glory of God

Discussion: The Unity — and Dislocation — of Human Nature

Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will? (Article 4)

The intellectual powers include not only understanding, but also willing. So if happiness really does pertain to our intellectual rather than sensitive powers, is it a matter of understanding, or of willing?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Is Happiness Peace?

Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect (Article 5)

Granted that happiness is an activity of the intellect rather than the will, is it an activity of the knowing intellect or of the guiding and doing intellect — of the power of mind to understand, or the power of mind to direct conduct?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Knowledge as Power, or as Understanding?

Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? (Article 6)

The "speculative" or theoretical sciences include all that has been called philosophy, all that has been called science, and much that has been called scholarship, from ancient times to the present. The question, then, is whether supreme happiness lies in pursuing these studies — in doing what "scientists" or scholars do. Are they the truly happy ones?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Light That Illuminates the Mind

Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels? (Article 7)

If any exist, immaterial created beings would certainly be higher in the order of being than we are. Some have believed that they also enlighten the human intellect. Some have believed that under God, they in certain ways govern us. Some have even believed that they created us — an opinion St. Thomas rejects. However, any of these things would make them nobler objects of the intellect than either ourselves or the things that are beneath us. Then might happiness lie in reflecting upon them?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Angels of the Materialists

Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence? (Article 8)

Finally we reach the pivotal question, the one to which the spoilers have been pointing: Are we really united with God by knowing Him, and is this really our happiness? The argument moves swiftly, because so much of it has already been anticipated.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Mourning and Weeping in This Valley of Tears

WHAT COMPLETE HAPPINESS REQUIRES (QUESTION 4)

Question 4 Prologue

In Question 1, we established that man does have an ultimate purpose, and this is happiness. In Question 2, we found that it does not lie in any created thing, and in Question 3, we found that it lies in union with the Creator. Here in Question 4, we consider the conditions it requires — "If you do not have Q, you cannot possess that union."

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: What Is at Stake?

Whether pleasure, or delight, is required for happiness?

(Article 1)

Delight can mean either rational delight or bodily pleasure. To ask whether delight is required for supreme happiness is to ask whether any so-called happiness that did not include the element of delight could be completely happy. This is not the same as asking whether happiness lies in delight; that query has already been answered in the negative.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Is a Requirement the Same As a Necessity?

Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight? (Article 2)

We saw in the previous Article that in one sense happiness requires the vision of God, and in another sense it requires the delight of this vision. Even though they are inseparable, it makes sense to ask which is more fundamental — and so we do.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Delightetarians

Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness? (Article 3) Previously St. Thomas argued that we need not comprehend God to be happy, and that, being finite, we cannot do so anyway. Yet the tradition seems, at least, to say that in some sense, happiness does require comprehending Him. What then is the truth of the matter? Plainly it needs to be unraveled.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Number of the Intellectual Powers

Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness? (Article 4) All three Objectors accept what has been shown previously: Happiness is the mind's possession and enjoyment of truth as such, which lies in the vision of God. However, two of them argue that even a person with a crooked will can attain such knowledge. The third argues that even if a straight and upright will is necessary for the attainment of it, it ceases to be necessary once the knowledge is in hand. St. Thomas responds.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: God Pills and Other Gimmicks

Discussion: Divinity without Deity

Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness? (Article 5)

St. Thomas believes that the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated not only from faith but also from reason. What does come uniquely from faith is the doctrine of the general resurrection: That after a period of time, the separated souls of the dead will be reunited with their bodies. Consequently, the question of whether souls can be happy while separated from their bodies should be of interest to everyone. Although Christian tradition holds that separated souls can be happy, it is not at first obvious how they could be, because the human person is a union of body and soul. This Article is one of the longest in the Treatise on Happiness and Ultimate Purpose, perhaps because over the course of his life St. Thomas changed his mind about one of the issues involved in the question.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Overflow

Discussion: Mortal and Immortal Souls

Discussion: How Can Separated Souls Understand Anything? Discussion: Do All Dogs Go to Heaven?

Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness? (Article 6) St. Thomas argued in the previous Article that the reunion of the redeemed soul with its body does not increase its happiness in intensity, but it does increase it in extent, because now the body participates in the soul's happiness by "a kind of overflow." If supreme happiness does require the body, then it is reasonable to ask whether it also requires that the body be in perfect condition. Above all, this would mean that the body is perfectly obedient to the soul, no longer subject to the humiliations that result from the Fall.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Redemption of the Body

Discussion: The "Spiritual Body"

Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness? (Article 7) It might seem to follow as a matter of course that if the body is required for supreme happiness, then so are the external goods that the body needs. However, several other things complicate the question. We must distinguish between the essence of happiness and the means to it; between what is needed and what is fitting; between complete and incomplete happiness; and between the conditions of our bodies in the next life and in this one.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Contemplative and Active Lives

Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary for happiness? (Article 8) Certain people are offended by St. Thomas's teaching that the consummate happiness of the redeemed souls in the life to come does not need the fellowship of friends. But if they are complete in God, how could it? This does not mean that they have no love for their friends; it means that their love for them is greater still, because, as a flawless reflection of God's own love, it too is perfectly gratuitous. Now, perhaps for the first time, they do not love to be loved in return; they

only love.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: ^ Refuse to Be Happy Unless Doris Is There, Too

HOW COMPLETE HAPPINESS IS FINALLY ATTAINED (QUESTION 5)

Question 5 Prologue

In one sense, we have already considered the attainment of happiness, for in Question 4 we investigated the requirements that must be fulfilled in order to have it. This turned out to be

a more complex question than might have been expected, because there is more than one sense in which a thing can be required for happiness. However, the requirements of happiness are not the only things we need to know about the possibility of its achievement and loss. We turn to these other things now.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Leftovers?

Whether man can attain happiness? (Article 1)

A few people hold that life is so full of suffering that it is "better never to have been." A far greater number hold that supreme happiness is unattainable, so the wise person takes what he can get and "settles." In the present Article, St. Thomas challenges these views. To be sure, if consummate happiness really were unreachable, then giving up the quest might be the only reasonable course of action. Surprisingly, though, many refuse even to consider the possibility of its attainment.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: If Happiness Can Be Attained, What's Wrong with Me?

Whether one man can be happier than another? (Article 2)

If we are speaking of the incomplete happiness of this life, then it is obvious that one can have more or less of it than another. But that is not the question, for we are speaking of the complete and consummate happiness that leaves nothing to be desired. Is it possible for someone to have more or less of that? Can there be degrees of what cannot be improved?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Happiness and Love

Whether one can be happy in this life? (Article 3)

It is a curious thing: If one asks whether supreme happiness is possible, some people insist that it is not; yet if one asks whether supreme happiness is possible in the present life, some of the same people insist that it is. The only thing these two answers have in common is a resolution to deny that supreme happiness is possible in the next life: "Here, or nowhere!"

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Has Not Man a Hard Service upon Earth?

Whether happiness once had can be lost? (Article 4)

The responded or "I answer that" in this Article is the longest in the Treatise on Happiness and Ultimate Purpose. No doubt this is mostly because the problem itself is complex, but perhaps St. Thomas also wants to make sure that we get the point. If we could reach our final destination, but not stay there, what hope would there be in human life?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Partakers of the Divine Nature

Discussion: But Didn't the Fallen Angels Lose Their Happiness?

Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?

(Article 5)

Can we acquire supreme happiness by our natural abilities alone? The problem is more subtle than it appears. Perhaps the answer is "Yes", perhaps "^^" on grounds that we need supernatural help. But if "^^," then in what sense can happiness be considered our nature's fulfillment?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: If Perfect and Imperfect Happiness Are Different Things, Then Why Are They Both Called Happiness?

Discussion: If We Cannot Give Perfect Happiness to Ourselves,

Can We at Least Assuage Our Own Sadness?

Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature? (Article 6)

In the previous Article, St. Thomas showed that no human being can achieve supreme happiness by his own natural powers. However, during the course of the argument he maintained that man can achieve supreme happiness by the power of God. Someone might ask: Is God our only resort? Even if our own powers do not suffice, can we attain supreme happiness by any power superior to ours, but short of His?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: How Could Anyone Know Anything about Angels, Anyway?

Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God? (Article 7)

The query is not whether we can do anything by our own power to make ourselves supremely happy, for we have already seen that we cannot. Nor are we asking whether we can do anything by our own power to deserve supreme happiness, as though we had a claim upon God as an equal. Only one point is at issue: Does God require us to conduct ourselves in a certain way to receive happiness at the Divine hands?

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: The Paradox of Merit

Whether every man desires happiness? (Article 8)

Does everyone really desire supreme happiness? Think of a person who says, "I want something, but I don't know what I want." In one sense he knows what this "something" is: It is what he wants. In another sense he does not know what it is: He does not know what specific thing will satisfy his desire. Since by now St. Thomas has shown exactly where supreme happiness does lie, he is finally in a position to investigate who really wants it — and in what sense.

Text and Paraphrase

Commentary

Discussion: Wanting to Suffer

Discussion: Beatitude and the Beatitudes

Afterword: So What Is Our Ultimate Purpose? What Is Happiness?

Index

The Reason for this Commentary

What is happiness? For that matter, what isn't it? Can it be attained, and if so, how? Surely these count among the permanent questions of human life. Yet active interest in pursuing them waxes and wanes over the years, and, in our day, such interest has exploded. What universities call Happiness Studies has become what marketers call a growth field.

The most probable explanation for this current vogue is that despite all our modern advantages, we are not happy — or not very happy — or not as happy as we think we should be. This is not just a personal impression. Recently the share of American adults aged 18-35 who say they are "very happy" in life — never very high — dropped to 25%, the lowest percentage ever recorded in the history of the General Social Survey. Perhaps the time has come again to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest what is probably the greatest book on happiness ever written, Thomas Aquinas's *Treatise on Happiness and Ultimate Purpose*, which is part of his massive *Summa Theologiae*.

Encountering the *Treatise* for the first time is less like reading a new book than exploring a new universe. If we do take up the Angelic Doctor's book, we may be forced to readjust our thinking. Years ago, when I had shed yet another skin of unconsidered modern assumptions and prejudices, I

realized that I would have to go on molting for a good while longer. I am still molting. I wish all my readers a good molting, too.

Most books about happiness approach it from a statistical point of view. They assume that happiness is whatever people think it is. In this age of Self, most people would agree. But the claim is ambiguous, for it may mean any of the three following things.

1. It may mean that human happiness is what it is, independent of our opinions, but that, being humans ourselves, we have inside knowledge of it. Therefore, our opinions have merit.
2. It may mean that human happiness is what it is, independent of our opinions, but even though our opinions about what it is may be wildly wrong, they are no worse than any other guide.
3. It may mean that since human happiness is our happiness, our opinions make it what it is. It is what people think it is just because their thinking it makes it true.

The problem with the first view is that even though we all have inside knowledge, experience is not self-interpreting, and we all draw different conclusions. The second view is arbitrary, for if our opinions are no worse than any other guide, they are no better, and the guides disagree. With the third view, the difficulty is that many people who pursue what they call happiness are bitterly unhappy even by their own lights. They thought that whatever they called happiness would make them happy, and it didn't. Apparently, the notion that the will alone has independent value, that it confers value on the things that it chooses just by choosing them, is false. In the end, we are just lofty enough to admit that we are not lofty enough to pursue ourselves as ends.

St. Thomas takes no account of the second and third views, which are of modern coinage. They are too silly to have been current in his own time. As to the first view, he agrees that we have inside knowledge, and he begins with common opinion. But in view of the confusions of common opinion, he does not end with it. Instead, he uses common opinion to cross-examine common opinion; he connects the dots of our scattered and fragmentary insights, showing that some of what people say about happiness reveals flaws in their very claims about what it is. It isn't that he doesn't think people know anything about themselves. However, he will not allow psychology to take its stand on shifting sand. With philosophical help, he forces it onto firmer

ground.

Here is another thing that takes some getting used to: St. Thomas always wants to know what others before him have thought. Today we are taught so thoroughly to doubt authority that in our vanity, we sometimes behave as though no one worth considering had ever thought about a subject before we did. As a result we are always breathlessly rediscovering banalities, on the order of "Science discovers the benefits of hugging" and "Researchers find that youth are not fully mature." Now St. Thomas is certainly aware that authorities may be mistaken: As he quips in one place, "the proof from authority is the weakest according to Boethius." But he would consider it foolish and vainglorious to leap to the opposite conclusion that the authorities of the past have nothing to say to us except when they confirm our prejudices.

It is amazing how devious St. Thomas allows his hypothetical objectors to be in their use of authorities. Sometimes he even allows them to quote selectively, distorting the meanings of the texts they are using. But why shouldn't he? Many real-life objections are devious. This was true in his time, and it is true in ours. We do not have the luxury of engaging only with good-faith objections and not with devious ones. We must take them as they come, responding to the former, dissipating the smokescreens of the latter. He had to do this. So do we.

Perhaps the biggest shock to our skeptical and secular assumptions is that St. Thomas makes use not only of philosophy, but of theology. However, this does not work the way one might expect. The popular notion of the Middle Ages is that it was a time of unthinking acceptance of dogma. This is far from the truth, for the air was filled with the ring and clash of ideas. The Scholastic thinkers were trained to think of subtle objections to everything — so only those things stood that could not be knocked down. This is not the method of Descartes, who refused to be confident of anything that could be doubted, for anything can be doubted. For the Scholastic thinkers, the question was not whether a proposition can be doubted, but whether it can plausibly defend itself. Even so, this is a rather terrifying intellectual method, because one must inure oneself to standing on precipices. The risk is that one might be shaken in one's grasp of the truth. The gain is that one might attain deeper insight into that truth that cannot be shaken.

As one might guess from this fact, St. Thomas breaks sharply with fideists, who reject reason in favor of faith. In every inquiry, he takes reason just as far as it can go — often much further than rationalists do — before seeking additional help. But he also breaks sharply with rationalists, who reject faith in favor of reason. In his view, although faith without reason is nonsense, true faith makes reason not less reasonable, but more. Not only does it provide reason with additional data, but it ceaselessly pushes it to ask more penetrating questions.

Utter and consummate happiness provides a very good example. As we will see, St. Thomas thinks that reason alone can show that there must be such a thing; yet had it not been for Revelation, the mind might never have pushed itself hard enough to discover the fact. Even so, there are some things about consummate happiness that reason does not have the power to find out without additional help. Revelation provides such help. "Although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest," he says, "yet the argument from authority based on Divine Revelation is the strongest."

Among other things, this means that by his methods, St. Thomas explores not only the patchy, inadequate, and discontinuous happiness that is attainable in this life, but the complete, unstained, and continuous happiness that is attainable in the next. Some will put the book down for this reason alone. Aren't we beyond all those fairy tales now? To them, the hope of heaven is to be taken no more seriously than the Big Rock Candy Mountains of the Harry McClintock folk song:

*In the Big Rock Candy Mountains
You never change your socks
And the little streams of alcohol
Come trickling down the rocks
The brakemen have to tip their hats
And the railroad bulls are blind
There's a lake of stew
And of whiskey, too
You can paddle all around `em
In a big canoe
In the Big Rock Candy Mountains*

But what if there existed not just wish-fulfilling motives, but actual reason to believe in the possibility of union with God? Faith does not mean believing with no reason, and St. Thomas will settle for nothing less than reason. But he thinks there is reason.

The kernel of this reason — although there is much more — is that nothing in the natural order is pointless. Therefore, if we yearn for a satisfaction that nothing in the natural order can provide, then there must be something more than the natural order. Although Divine revelation agrees, this is essentially a philosophical argument. If we are skeptical, the burden of proof lies on us to show

where the fallacy lies. If we refuse to do so, then we are betrayers, not followers, of reason. And it is curious, isn't it, that the more contemporary man professes disinterest in the possibility of man's destiny with God, the more he pursues the vision of man becoming God on earth?

God and God's Image

We are not God. We are not the same as God, we are not a part of Him, and we are not a "splinter" of Him. Nor will we ever be. He does not depend on anything else, because He is what everything else depends on. He cannot be explained by anything else, because He is what everything else must be explained by. There is no one like Him. He is utterly above us. He is what He is, and there was never a time when He was not.

And yet the same faith that insists upon these things also insists that God made us "in His image, after His likeness" He who is infinite, illimitable, incomparable, and dependent on nothing else has made man a finite and limited portrait of Himself, on whom man depends. What could this mean?

Some over the centuries have held the meaning of being made in God's image is that as God is mind, God has endowed man with mind. Others have held its meaning to be that as God is love, God has made man capable of love. St. Thomas's formulation both includes the former insight and implies the latter. However, it penetrates more deeply.

For in the first place, God has not made us pure thinkers disengaged from action: As His own thoughts formed the world, so He has made man's own imitative thoughts effective in the world. Within the proper limits of created being, we can do those things that arise from our deliberate will. And in the second place, just because we are doers, it is possible for us to be lovers. For love is something chosen, but how can I choose if I am but a billiard ball knocked about by the forces of the universe? Love rejoices in the good of the beloved, but how can I carry out even the act of rejoicing if I have no power of action? Love itself is an act of a deliberate will; a person is not capable of love, unless first he is capable.

So What Is Our Ultimate Purpose? What Is Happiness?

People may have many different purposes, merely in the sense that they direct themselves to different things: to be rich beyond the dreams of avarice, to be a pop music star, to get married, to win the Nobel Prize, to have a steady supply of heroin. But this cannot be the end of the story, because some of these subjective purposes are inappropriate to our nature, to what we are as human beings.

To what then does our nature direct us? For beings of the human kind, what counts as fulfillment, what counts as flourishing, what counts as living well? We have a name for it: Happiness. But what is happiness?

My students often argue that a person's happiness is whatever he says it is, just because he says it. But that merely takes us back to step one. People who get what they call happiness — who become captains of industry, connoisseurs of pleasure, famous scholars, or successful pimps — are often desperately unhappy, even by their own lights. "I thought this was what I wanted, but something is still lacking."

This fact must not be misunderstood. If we go down the list of things in which people commonly say that happiness lies — for example, wealth, honors, fame, power, health, beauty, and pleasure — we find that none of them fully satisfy. But although the view that these things equal happiness is an

illusion, it is not wholly wrong. Even if there is such a thing as an excess of wealth, surely we need some material goods to live well. Because we are social beings, we cannot be said to flourish if everyone holds us in contempt. The sheer enjoyment of lording it over others is a vice, but we do need the power to direct our lives well. Health is not the soul's happiness, but the soul is united to the body, and health might be called the body's happiness. If it is good to enjoy the beauty of the night sky, then it is hard to see why it is not good to enjoy the beauty of a lovely face; although many disadvantages come with having a face that can launch a thousand ships, beauty is good in itself. And as to pleasure — no, it is not itself the good, but certainly it is repose in some good.

So if people think that these things equal happiness, they are at least correct that they are true goods. Not in excess, but the right way, and in due measure, they are worth having. But they are not enough. Having a sufficiency of one of them is not enough. Having a sufficiency of all of them is not enough. Having the things we need, and also having the moral and intellectual virtue that directs us in their proper use and enjoyment, is better — in fact, this is the incomplete happiness of the present life. But although it can truly be called happiness in the sense that it is worth having in itself, not just for the sake of something else, nevertheless there is something else that is lacking.

One might suppose that the problem is that the list of candidates is not complete. Very well, add love to the list. Add meaningful work. Add commitment to a worthy cause. Add every imaginable good that lies within the created order. It will still not be enough. Unless we are great liars and self-deceivers, inevitably we will find ourselves asking, "Is this all there is?"

Now consider. If it is true that nothing in our nature is in vain, then there must be something that can satisfy our deepest longings. Otherwise the longings themselves would be in vain, there would be no reason to have them. But if nothing in the created order can satisfy our deepest longings — and, as we have seen, nothing can — then that which satisfies them must lie beyond the created order. And that is what we call God.

At this point some religious people smile in satisfaction, but others frown in dismay. As a matter of faith, they may believe that their happiness lies in God. They may pray. They may worship. They may live lives of obedience to His known will. In love, they may abandon themselves to His goodwill. And yet this is not enough either. For they find that they too are not yet fulfilled. Then is something wrong?

According to Thomas Aquinas, nothing is wrong. This is normal. The reason the pursuit of the Highest Good is not enough is that it is only the pursuit; it is not yet the attainment. Even though nothing in this life is better than the flashes and glimpses of Himself that God sometimes affords us, yet they are only flashes and glimpses. They are not yet the face-to-face experience of Him. They are foretastes of supreme happiness, but they are not supreme happiness. How can we make sense of this?

Let us begin again, this time from a different starting point. We might reasonably suppose that the fulfillment of our nature lies in the fulfillment of our natural powers. Indeed, it would seem that our highest fulfillment lies in the highest activity of our highest powers. Our highest powers are our intellectual powers. Their highest activity would be to know the best truth, the First Truth, the Source from which all other truth takes its truthfulness. So our ultimate consummation — our most complete fulfillment, that which is not only good in itself but which leaves nothing further to be desired — is knowing that. And again, that is what we call God.

Ay, and there's the rub. Our natural intellectual powers are adapted to our senses. True, we know about not only what we see and touch, but also what we can extrapolate from what we see and touch. Thus, even though we cannot see and touch God, we can know about God. We can know that He exists, that He is the Creator, that He is the uncreated Good that is the source of all

created good — we can know many such things about Him. But to know about Him is not to know Him — knowing Him by inference is not the same as knowing Him in His own Being. To know God in that way exceeds our natural intellectual powers.

Yet that knowledge is just what we long for, and the more we understand this longing, the stronger it becomes. As we saw above, this deepest longing cannot be in vain, for our longings are all for something. If, then, our natural intellectual powers are insufficient to behold God face to face, there must be means beyond nature by which our natural intellectual powers can be uplifted. And for the third time, this is what we call God. The power is His.

To be sure, our natural intellectual powers can go somewhat further, even apart from being uplifted. Just as they can show why it is reasonable to believe that they can be supernaturally uplifted, they can work out many other things about this uplifting, for example, some of the things about what happens to the body in the meantime. But just as to have knowledge about God is not the same as to see God, so to have knowledge about seeing God is not the same as seeing God.

The mind, by its own powers, can work out that it cannot be uplifted without grace, and it can work out, by its own powers, that it is reasonable to believe in the possibility of that grace. But it cannot, by its own powers, attain that grace. That is, in fact, why grace is called by that name. It is a gift of God, made available to man by the sacrifice of the Redeemer of the World, and the means by which it is provided are made known to us only through faith. These means must therefore also be reasonable things in which to believe.

This happiness — the happiness offered to the faithful in the next life — is not just a second layer on the cake of the happiness of this life, for it utterly transforms the significance of this life. It makes it possible for enjoyment of the goods of this life — so fragmentary, so incomplete, so inadequate in themselves — to share, really share, even though only by anticipation, in the Supreme Good of the next life.

For in this case, by His help, we are not just pursuing this good or that good — we are pursuing it for the sake of the Good Himself, in Person. <>

TEACHING FOR SPIRITUAL FORMATION: A PATRISTIC APPROACH TO CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN A CONVULSED AGE by Kyle R. Hughes, Foreword by David I. Smith [Cascade Books, 9781725281233]

In **TEACHING FOR SPIRITUAL FORMATION**, church historian and experienced Christian educator Kyle R. Hughes advances a fresh vision of Christian teaching and learning by drawing upon the riches of the Christian tradition, synthesizing the wisdom of the early church fathers with contemporary efforts to cultivate a distinctively Christian approach to education. Of interest to a wide range of Christian educators, this book examines how the writings of five significant church fathers can illuminate our understanding of the vocation of teachers, the nature of students, the purpose of curriculum, decisions about pedagogy, and how spiritual formation works. Besides reimagining these aspects of Christian education, Hughes also offers habits and practices that can help bring this vision of Christian teaching and learning to life, challenging Christian educators to sharpen their approach to the integration of faith and learning in practical and accessible ways.

CONTENTS

Foreword by David I. Smith: Seeking Conversations with Strangers

Acknowledgments

Timeline of Key Events and Texts

1 Introduction

Christian Education in a Convulsed Age

2 Who Are We as Teachers?

Gregory the Great and Contemplative Spirituality

3 Who Are Our Students?

John Chrysostom and Embodied Learning

4 What Are We Teaching?

Basil of Caesarea and Training in Virtue

5 How Are We Teaching?

Benedict of Nursia and Formative Practices

6 How Do We Plan for Growth?

Cyril of Jerusalem and Catechesis by Design

7 Conclusion

A Teacher's Rule of Life

Appendix 1: Worksheet for Developing Your Teacher's Rule of Life

Appendix 2: Worksheet for Institutional Planning for Spiritual Formation

Appendix 3: Vision Statement for Spiritual Formation

Appendix 4: Foundational Principles for Spiritual Formation Appendix 5: Sampling of Biblical References for Spiritual Formation

Bibliography

Ancient Document Index

Index of Names and Subjects

Seeking Conversations with Strangers

Christians who work in education live amid a variety of tensions, real and imagined. One tension seems particularly pertinent to the book that you have just commenced reading. (If, that is, you started at the very beginning. Which, as the book is suggesting, is a very good place to start.)

As members of the Christian church, Christians find themselves belonging to a communion of saints that stretches not only across the world, spanning cultural, ethnic, and political boundaries, but also across time. As compelling as the concerns of the present moment might be, it still matters for the Christian church what Augustine thought about sin, what Luther said about Romans, how Wesley understood sanctification, how the church fathers practiced prayer. Christians do not do theology (at least theology that has much merit) as if folks discovered God last week and the first good thinkers arrived a day or two later. Christians are part of a long conversation unfolding across time amid the communion of saints. More recent is not automatically better. As those who affirm the authority of Scriptures written many centuries ago, Christians have a pretty basic reason for affirming that vital wisdom and compelling direction can come from ancient sources.

As members of the education profession, Christians find themselves in a current thought-world in which decisions are supposed to be data-driven and data comes from the social sciences. Keeping up with the latest findings, methods, and devices is part of professional competence. Ongoing research publications tell us, for instance, that we should teach to particular learning styles or multiple intelligences, and then a decade or two later fresh research publications unveil the lack of solid evidence that these are actually valid; teachers are encouraged to adjust accordingly. After all, there is a great deal at stake in children's education. Why rely on strategies that are grounded mainly in habit and guesswork if fresh findings might show us that something else works better? In this realm, it does not seem as if ancient sources have much to offer. The tendency to read those ancient sources as if they were only talking about narrowly theological matters adds to the challenge. The

church fathers might be a good source of prayer fodder, but what could they possibly say about teaching and learning?

Despite appearances, the contrast between these two worlds is not as stark as it may seem. Research can valuably inform our teaching, but it rarely, if ever, can tell us exactly what to do. Empirical research itself depends on ideas and values that come from beyond its scope. Measuring does not get us very far if we have started with bad questions or poorly formed assumptions about what needs measuring or what might count as evidence. Even the best data is of only partial value if it misses the heart of what we are trying to do. Perhaps most importantly, the claim that we are educating children implies a claim that we are somehow making things better, helping them to become better than they would have been without our intervention. “Better” is a value judgment that requires a conception of the good and enough wisdom to see how it might play out in learning. Claiming that a strategy “works better” only makes sense if it is backed up by an idea of what kind of good we are trying to achieve: better for what, and why? Talking well about education includes ideas like assessment, outcomes, and cognitive development but at least as urgently needs ideas like justice, beauty, formation, and hope.

At this point Christians ought to become wary: if, as Scripture warns, the human heart is deceitful, then idolizing either the latest ideas or the ones of a generation ago or any other arbitrary point in the past becomes problematic. Truth is not tied to a particular decade. People did not start being sinners or making self-serving assumptions a few years back (or stop last Christmas). Neither the present nor the past offers us a golden ticket to a perfect classroom or a pristine grasp on things. There is room for repentance in our best ideas.

Yet here the voices of those from a different time and place can be peculiarly helpful. Scripture instructs us to avoid conforming to the pattern of this world, a tricky instruction indeed given that the pattern of our current world has shaped our perceptions, our judgments, our sense of what is possible and viable and valuable. A voice from outside our particular fish bowl (perhaps, say, one from the early years of the Christian church) has potential to help us. Not because what it says will be automatically right, for other times and places have had their own failings and idolatries. But because there is a chance that it is asking questions we might have missed, probing at problems that we have ignored, making connections that slip beneath our own radar. Perhaps its strengths and weaknesses don’t mesh with ours, and that might help us to see. In communion with others, precisely others who are not ourselves, we might make headway in learning how to repent, how to seek truth, how to teach and learn in ways that love our students as ourselves.

I think that this is an important part of the service that Kyle Hughes offers in this book. He invites us to spend time in the company of the church fathers, people who, after all, thought and wrote well enough about being Christian that they are still in print and still discussed almost two millennia later. He invites us to read them not just for prayer tips but to get a sense of how they might have imagined the task of learning, the wisdom of teaching, what it means to grow and help others to grow. And he asks us not to replace some current surefire recipe with some hoary old one (solve all your teaching problems with this one second-century trick!) but to tackle the more patient task of seeking wisdom to inform our work. If we are to sustain wisdom in teaching, we need more conversations like this, thoughtful conversations with the best of those who have taught before. A visit with the church fathers is not a bad place to start.

Christian Education in a Convulsed Age

Christian schooling presents both profound challenges and incredible opportunities for those seeking to provide students with an education that contributes to their formation into disciples of Jesus

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

Christ. While many teachers, professors, and administrators have discerned a call to this vocation precisely because of their desire to see young people grow into Christ's likeness, they may at times struggle to discern how best to carry out this work in an authentic and transformational way. We live in a convulsed age—as I write this, the United States is contending with far-reaching upheavals resulting from a global pandemic, economic downturn, and the legacy of racial inequality, and all of this in a broader time of intensifying political polarization, rapid technological and demographic change, and increasing environmental crisis. This is the world into which we are sending our students, young people who may already be experiencing the effects of these upheavals and uncertainties in their own lives, or perhaps are simply dealing with the more mundane (and yet, for them, no less real and significant) matters of meeting parental expectations, fitting in with peers, and facing learning difficulties. Likewise, many Christian educators are also experiencing convulsions in their work, adapting to new forms of virtual learning, staring down budget cuts, and wondering if their efforts are actually making any difference at all. As a teacher myself, I know that I often feel like I am just treading water. It can feel difficult enough to get through the required course content and grade yet another stack of essays; broader conversations about “the integration of faith and learning” can seem as distant and useless as the bottom of the sea.

And yet, the calling for Christian educators remains. Christ tells us that he came that we might have life—true, abundant, complete life—here and now, even in our present circumstances (John 10:10). It is this quality of life that we long for our students to taste and to see, as we have, that the Lord is good (Ps 34:8). It is a life in which we are reminded that we will have our portion of hardship and suffering, and yet it is in precisely those things that we will find true joy and communion with Christ (1 Pet 4:12–13). It is, moreover, a life in which we can become like trees planted by streams of water, yielding the fruit of love of God and love of neighbor for the healing of the world (Ps 1:3; Rev 22:2). This, then, is the life to which we endeavor to invite our students, even as we are very much in the process of figuring this out for ourselves. If anything, the present trials and tribulations of our world should only heighten the urgency with which we seek, for ourselves and for our students, the life that Christ brings. But how?

In light of the complexities and challenges of our present time and place, the early church fathers—those key figures of the first Christian centuries whose lives and writings guide the church's doctrine and practice to this day—would at first glance appear to be unlikely conversation partners for educators interested in making deeper connections between their Christian faith and the work of teaching and learning. It is my contention, however, that it is precisely in a time such as ours that the voices of our great forefathers need to be invited to the table. We need the church fathers to speak afresh that wisdom that has endured through the centuries and proven itself time and again to be a source of inspiration and edification for Christians through the ages. This book, then, is an attempt to advance a fresh vision of Christian teaching and learning by drawing upon the riches of the Christian tradition, synthesizing the wisdom of the church fathers with contemporary efforts to cultivate a distinctively Christian approach to education.

Two Key Presuppositions

Before beginning our engagement with the church fathers and what they can teach us about Christian education, a few words are in order to explain how I have arrived at my understanding of the purpose of Christian education and the relevance of the church fathers. While some readers may no doubt be eager to move on to begin engaging with the first of the church fathers we will examine in this book (and are welcome to do so), further attention to these two points will help make sense of the approach that undergirds the following chapters.

The Purpose of Christian Education

First, I hold that the goal of Christian education is not simply to produce graduates who know things about English, history, math, science, or even theology but rather to form graduates who become certain kinds of people—disciples of Jesus Christ. To validate this claim, we must briefly consider what we mean by “education” in the first place. In James K. A. Smith’s influential definition, “An education . . . is a constellation of practices, rituals, and routines that inculcates a particular vision of the good life by inscribing or infusing that vision into the heart (the gut) by means of material, embodied practices.” For Christian educators, then, this means that “the primary goal of Christian education is the formation of a peculiar people—a people who desire the kingdom of God and thus undertake their vocations as an expression of that desire.” In other words, the ultimate end (that is, the *telos*) of Christian education is to help shape students’ understanding of “the good life” as one that is centered on Christ and his kingdom, such that they are challenged to reorient more and more of their lives in light of the gospel. Rather than reducing students to what Smith provocatively calls “brains on a stick,” empty containers into which the expert teacher pours her knowledge, this approach to education proceeds from a truly Christian anthropology that sees students, like all people, as embodied beings, who by means of their habits, relationships, and the Holy Spirit are formed into people who come to desire the things of God above the things of this world.

We will return to this point below, but for now it will suffice to say that Smith helps us to see that the work of Christian education is in fact the work of discipleship, here carried out not in the sanctuary or on the mission field but in the classroom. By emphasizing the role of formational practices in building disciples, Smith points us to the realization that Christian education must include not just the selection of curriculum (the *what*) or the relationships being formed (the *who*) but even the process of teaching and learning itself (the *how*). This approach calls for the integration of faith and learning across all levels of the educational endeavor: in the curriculum and pedagogy, in the minds and lives of the teachers and students, and in the policies and ethos of the institution itself. It involves, therefore, both an expansion of the imagination for rethinking some of these central aspects of the teaching task and a commitment to engaging in the formative practices and habits that will enable a Christian vision of the good life to take root in the deepest parts of a person’s being.

Across his various works, but most clearly and recently in his book *On Christian Teaching*, David I. Smith has sought to unpack some elements of what such a distinctively Christian approach to education might include. What Smith correctly recognized was that most conversations about Christian teaching and learning were ignoring such formative classroom matters as the use of time and space, patterns of reflection and interaction, and types of homework and assessment. As he insists, “An account of Christian education that focuses only on the truth of what is taught, and fails to address the meanings molded through how it is taught and learned is at best incomplete.” While conceding that “Christian faith cannot simply tell us how to teach or provide unique, copyrighted, Christian teaching moves,” Smith still claims that “Christian faith can play a generative role in shaping pedagogy.” To unleash this process, he commends a model that involves examining how various aspects of the teaching and learning process might be viewed and practiced differently in light of the values and virtues of the kingdom of God. A key initial element of Smith’s proposal is the work of expanding the imagination, casting a new vision of teaching and learning. As Smith eloquently puts it: “Attending to faith’s role within our pedagogical world involves being able to imagine afresh, to see anew, and for this we need not so much to think harder as to engage in the practices that nurture Christian imagination. We need to invest in becoming people capable of imagining in Christian ways, of seeing our classrooms through the lenses of grace, justice, beauty, delight, virtue, faith, hope, and love.” It is very much within this perspective on what it means to integrate faith and learning that I offer this book as a complement to Smith’s provocative work.

The difficulty of this challenge should not be understated; there are, I believe, three major roadblocks to engaging with this task. The first is institutional. As others have recognized, the “prevailing view” in many Christian schools “assumes that Christian education more or less happens when Christians teach in Christian schools.” Indeed, it is easier for Christian educators to adopt the presuppositions, ideals, and values of the prevailing instrumentalist model of secular education, to add on a weekly chapel time and make some occasional efforts to connect Scripture to class content, than to do the work of moving in the direction of providing an education that would result in “the transformation of the school’s educational goals, curriculum, pedagogy, student evaluation, and organizational structure.” What if this approach would make our school less appealing to colleges, graduate schools, or prospective employers? What if no one enrolled? There is a legitimate concern here for practical and economic realities that is understandable enough, and yet to the extent that we fail to embark upon this difficult work, our ability to provide a truly Christian education, and thereby participate in the work of forming Christian disciples and setting forth an authentic, countercultural Christian witness, suffers. While some institutional factors may lie outside of the control of many teachers, it is nevertheless the case that real organizational change is possible from the efforts of even small groups of teachers committed to advancing the cause of faith-learning integration in their classrooms.

The second roadblock is societal. As is widely recognized, America is now very much a post-Christian society, where Christianity no longer holds a religiously privileged position in the public square. Indeed, the broader landscape of modern American spirituality appears to be tilting decisively away from orthodox expressions of Christianity. As the philosopher Charles Taylor has demonstrated, we have entered a “secular age” in which we have moved “from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others.” Drawing on Taylor’s work, Carl Trueman has identified a major cultural shift with profound repercussions for our society as the “prioritization of the individual’s inner psychology—we might even say ‘feelings’ or ‘intuitions’—for our sense of who we are and what the purpose of our lives is.” In such a context, the Christian appeal to the Bible and the traditional teachings of the church as in some sense authoritative is increasingly seen as problematic, if not outright dangerous. Still, there are signs of hope. As Gerald Sittser explains, while the decline of Christianity in the United States “has left the church concerned, confused, and sobered,” it has also made the church more “curious and teachable, which is one reason why Christians are looking for new resources, movements, and models that might help us, as Christians living in the West, respond faithfully and winsomely to this new state of affairs.” As we will see below, it is my contention that the “new” approaches we need most are not so much those that are of recent origin but rather those that are being rediscovered after having been forgotten for a lengthy period of time and are now ready to speak afresh into our present circumstances.

The third roadblock is theological. The “triumph of the therapeutic” is seen not just in culture at large but even within much of the Christian church. In their famous study of the religious beliefs of American teenagers, Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton identified “moralistic therapeutic deism” as the prevailing “religion” of many such young Americans. This belief system posits the existence of a deity who, from a safe distance from our affairs, just wants people to live good, moral lives so that they can be happy and fulfilled. For Smith and Denton, this was not so much a conscious theological development as it was a reflection of a broader American social context of “therapeutic individualism” emphasizing subjective personal experience and self-fulfillment. In any event, while this kind of thinking is certainly not characteristic of all American teenagers today, nor is it limited to younger generations exclusively, moralistic therapeutic deism is nevertheless the form of “Christianity” that informs much of our present teaching context. The challenge, then, is to help our students—and, indeed, ourselves—enter into a more meaningful and more orthodox understanding of what it means to be a Christian, one in which we are striving to

submit the entirety of our lives to Christ as his disciples, such that we “interpret and live all of life within the Biblical drama of creation, fall, redemption, and restoration.” Rather than moralistic therapeutic deism, we are called to a faith characterized by what the German theologian and martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer described as a “single-minded obedience” in which we follow Jesus on the road of self-denial and suffering, which is “the badge of true discipleship” and the means by which we share in Christ’s own life. This, then, is what we mean by discipleship: the daily work of training our affections away from the things of this world such that, by the power of the Holy Spirit, we are transformed into Christ’s likeness in every aspect of our lives. As we put off the old, we put on the new (Eph 4:22–24), learning to find and embrace the presence of God in every aspect of our daily living.

We will unpack in more detail the exact nature of this understanding of the Christian life and how to go about walking alongside of our students on this journey in the chapters that follow. For now, though, it will suffice to note that this book proceeds from the belief that the goal of Christian education is nothing less than the formation of disciples of Jesus Christ, an aim which requires a thoughtful and comprehensive approach to the integration of faith and learning that impacts every aspect of the educational endeavor. Thankfully, given the enormous challenge of this task, we have a powerful and yet underappreciated resource to help us in developing such an approach: the church fathers.

The Relevance of the Church Fathers

The second main assumption of this book is that the close study of the teachings of the church fathers can provide a new lens for thinking about Christian teaching and learning. Considering the above section, we might rightly ask what it would look like to go about actually nurturing a Christian imagination that has the potential to transform the way we see Christian teaching and learning. We might wonder, too, what habits we could engage in, as individuals or with other teachers or even with our students, that would deepen the role of faith in our classrooms. There are, of course, the basic disciplines of the Christian life: reading the Bible, prayer, and corporate worship. We can exchange ideas with our colleagues and attend conferences. But most Christian educators are not trained biblical scholars or theologians, instinctively able to bridge the pages of the New Testament or the liturgy of the church’s worship to the work of the science classroom or the computer lab. Likewise, many churches have dropped the ball on faith formation for their own people, complicating our efforts to reach our students when we feel so inadequate in our own spiritual lives. For these reasons, we need expert guides who can help show us the way. David Smith himself recognizes this need: “The cultivation of a Christian imagination, one rooted in both Scriptures and a communion of saints that stretches beyond the bounds of our own social and historical context, can help us to see our tasks and contexts anew. Throughout Christian history, there have been thinkers who have allowed their vision of pedagogy to be framed and shaped by the imagery of Scripture and the practices of the church, and they can help us to imagine differently.” Indeed, getting outside of our own time and place can, like a semester abroad, shake loose some of our certainties about the way things must be. In this way, the history of the church, and the lives of those saints who have gone before us, can indeed provide opportunities for expanding our imaginations.

Are the early church fathers, though, really adequate guides for this particular journey? Within some evangelical Protestant circles of Christian education, there is often a bias towards an understanding of church history that sees the Protestant Reformation as the retrieval of “true New Testament Christianity,” as if everything between the New Testament and the Reformation had been a giant mistake. Often there is simply an ignorance of church history altogether. There are, however, many hopeful signs that the evangelical church is increasingly recognizing, as the great Protestant reformers themselves had acknowledged, the significance of the great tradition for the present and future of the Christian faith. This is seen, for instance, in an increased interest among evangelical

scholars in the early church, as there is a growing awareness that the spirituality and theology of the early church can provide a solid grounding for the faith in the evershifting sands of the present day. Likewise, the burgeoning movement of a large number of younger evangelicals into more historic and liturgical expressions of the Christian faith suggests that this book's approach is tapping into a broader movement in which the Spirit is calling us back to rediscover the fullness of our heritage as Christians.

Thus, this book posits that the church fathers represent a significant and largely untapped resource in expanding our imaginations for thinking about Christian teaching and learning. Despite having lived in what can seem like an entirely foreign world to us today, the early church fathers, like us, sought to explain, live out, and pass on the Christian faith in the midst of a complex and ever-changing world, characterized by pluralism, syncretism, and materialism, grappling with the fallout from plagues, economic upheavals, and the mass migrations of peoples. In so doing they left us with a variety of ideas, metaphors, and practices that constitute something of a "spiritual treasure box" from which we can draw. The church has long taught that the lives of these ancient church fathers were characterized by orthodoxy of doctrine, holiness of life, and approval from other Christians. Not only have many of their ideas stood the test of time, but the church fathers themselves were (and still are) considered worthy of emulation. If nothing else, the example of those heroes of the faith who came before us can inspire and encourage us in our own vocations, reminding us that we are part of a grand story that transcends our own lives. We are, the Apostles' Creed reminds us, part of a great "communion of saints," connecting us, in Christ, to other believers across time and space. Lest we succumb to the arrogance of historical amnesia or the pride of presentism, we must allow others, even (and perhaps especially!) those from radically different circumstances, to speak into our own situation, and the church fathers are the most time-honored place from which to start. If nothing else, our study of our Christian predecessors can help us to challenge the mistakes and point out the blind spots of Christian thinking in our present context.

This book focuses on one specific aspect of the heritage of the early church as it pertains to Christian teaching and learning: ascetical theology as the means of forming disciples of Christ. As traditionally understood, classical asceticism (from the Greek *askēsis*) refers to the practices of self-discipline and self-denial by which one seeks to advance along a given philosophical or religious path. To modern Christians, such a description may conjure up images of early Christian ascetics living on pillars in the desert or cloistered monks whipping their backs in penance for their sins. However, I have in view a more expansive notion of what we might term an "ascetical spirituality." While we will indeed wish to avoid some of the extremes of early Christian asceticism, it is nevertheless the case that our baptismal vows push us to embrace elements of the ascetical life. In the Anglican tradition, for instance, the Book of Common Prayer directs the baptismal candidate (or sponsors) to "renounce the empty promises and deadly deceits of this world that corrupt and destroy the creatures of God," and to "renounce the sinful desires of the flesh that draw you from the love of God." Thus, Greg Peters writes, "Asceticism, that most monastic of practices, is expected of all Christian believers by virtue of our baptism and is characterized by balance and moderation." In an age where comfort and consumption are privileged above all else, the ascetical tradition calls us back to a way of life in which our desires are rightly ordered.

In this book, then, I follow Martin Thornton's description of ascetical theology as that which is "dealing with the fundamental duties and disciplines of the Christian life, which nurture the ordinary ways of prayer, and which discover and foster those spiritual gifts and graces constantly found in ordinary people."³³ In other words, ascetical theology focuses on those practices and virtues by which, in cooperation with the Holy Spirit, we progress in the spiritual life. These practices and virtues must not, however, become an end unto themselves; rather, they are the means by which we journey towards our ultimate purpose or *telos*.³⁴ Historically, this *telos* has been identified not as

“going to heaven,” but rather as attaining the beatific vision, or, to use other words, the contemplation of God (Ps 27:4, 8). This deeply biblical idea is perhaps best exemplified by Paul’s words that “we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another” (2 Cor 3:18); thus, in turning away from ourselves and seeking the face of God (Ps 105:4), we find that we are actually becoming more like Christ. As articulated by the church fathers, contemplation is “a foretaste in the present life of the vision of God that characterizes the life to come.” At the heart of this contemplation is a personal experience of God; through ascetical practices such as prayer, fasting, and the devotional reading of Scripture, we are, by the power of the Holy Spirit, transformed into the image of Christ. We will perhaps even, like Paul, find our hearts drawn ever nearer to God’s presence in a profound encounter with divine love (2 Cor 12:1–10). To this end, we are called to develop in ourselves and in our students what James K. A. Smith calls the “habits of daily worship,” engaging students in those common practices that redirect the heart to God. It is, therefore, a primary contention of this book that the invitation to ascetical practices and virtues is a neglected and yet powerful means of forming our students in the Christian way into the kinds of people who do not just know about God but will become what Hans Boersma calls “apprentices” of God, by which Boersma indicates those who are guided by God in Christ “along the process of salvation” such that they are increasingly habituated to God’s presence and able to grow in their capacity to behold God in Christ.

Therefore, the truth to which the church fathers ultimately point us is that the spirit—that is, the defining or typical element—of Christian teaching is one in which the Spirit—that is, God’s own empowering presence—infuses all aspects of our work. If the goal of Christian education, and indeed the Christian life in general, is to be formed into Christ’s likeness, to become disciples of Christ, we can take heart from the knowledge that this is the work of the very Spirit of God, who seeks to draw our students into relationship with himself, not simply for their own salvation but for his purposes of mission and renewal in the world. Thus, even in this convulsed age, even with the enormity of the task before us, we have access to “power from on high” (Luke 24:49), to the Spirit who can give us the gifts we need to carry out our vocation (1 Cor 12:4–7) and can produce in us and in our students the fruit that characterizes a Spirit-empowered life (Gal 5:22–23). Undergirding all of the patristic claims we will examine in this book is the understanding that the Spirit leads believers into all truth (John 16:13), a truth that the church fathers believed would be received not just intellectually but in a way that is “inescapably participatory and transformative.” In other words, transformation happens not so much when we encounter ideas about God as when we encounter God himself; by the Spirit, God makes us a new creation, gives us new birth, and puts a new heart within us as we become increasingly transformed into the image of Christ. Thus, over the following chapters of this book, we will see how the church fathers present us with a historically rooted and theologically rich means of nurturing our imaginations as we seek, by the power of the Holy Spirit, to cultivate a distinctively Christian pedagogy adequate for the task before us.

An Invitation to the Journey

Many of the ideas we will encounter in this book will no doubt at first glance seem quite foreign or even strange, especially for those who have not spent much time in the company of the church fathers. My encouragement, then, is simply to consider this book as an invitation to a journey of reflecting on all that we do as Christian educators. We need not adopt wholesale every aspect of the church fathers’ thinking in order to find ourselves challenged to reimagine aspects of our classrooms. As your guide on this journey, I write as someone who has not myself “arrived” but has perhaps a unique vantage point for undertaking this endeavor: my formal training is in the history and literature of early Christianity, not education. And while I have taught at both the university and high school levels, I am also, as an ordained Anglican minister, deeply invested in the work of

education within the context of the local church. As a result, I hope that a broad array of Christian educators in a wide range of contexts will consider taking this journey with me.

To chart our journey ahead, we will draw on the insights of the church fathers to explore five key questions at the heart of teaching and learning. Who are we as teachers? Who are our students? What are we teaching? How are we teaching? How do we plan for growth? The basic structure of each of the following chapters of the book is to answer one of these questions by drawing upon the insights of a selected church father whose writings have the potential to stimulate our ability to reimagine this aspect of Christian education and to consider what kinds of habits and practices can help bring this new vision to life. Each chapter begins with a brief introduction to the life of the relevant church father so that readers unfamiliar with these giants of the faith can have a sense of the context in which the church fathers wrote. The subject matter of each chapter is largely discrete, and yet a distinct, coherent vision of Christian education gradually takes shape as each chapter builds upon earlier ones.

Thus, for those who, like me, need all the help they can get in being Christian educators in this convulsed age, I offer the following reflections not so much as “a new teaching with authority” (Mark 1:27) but rather as an invitation to consider with me, a fellow pilgrim on this journey, new ways in which we can consider how the teachings of the one to whom “all authority in heaven and on earth has been given” (Matt 28:18) might apply to our work as Christian educators in these troubled times. We will begin, therefore, by seeking to shed light on the most basic of questions: what does it mean to be a Christian teacher? <>

THE MATERIAL LOGIC OF JOHN OF ST. THOMAS:
BASIC TREATISES by John Poinsett, translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst, with a Preface by Jacques Maritain [The University of Chicago Press, 9780226758497]

My dear Friend,

By sending me a typewritten copy of John of St. Thomas' Logic you gave my eagerness the privilege of early satisfaction. It has been a joy for me to follow the progress of this translation ever since it was begun quite a few years ago. I know how much work it meant for you and your excellent collaborators. Friendship, together with stubborn dedication, is responsible for the successful completion of this difficult task.

My personal indebtedness to John of St. Thomas is great. In your introduction, you describe him as "an inspiring and charming teacher." This is indeed what he has been for me. He is among the greatest metaphysicians who ever existed. I admire and cherish him for the profundity of his thought and the illuminating power of his spiritual experience. I gratefully remember the intellectual delight provided by his interminable disputations, when I was groping after the basic insights of Thomism. Later, when I was engaged in projects designed to carry on the development of the Thomistic synthesis, I constantly found in John of St. Thomas a outstanding witness to the progressive character of St. Thomas' philosophy.

With such works as this Logic the commentators of St. Thomas, for the first time in history, are reaching a large audience. It is puzzling to realize that the treasures contained in their writings have remained, for so many generations, unknown except to a very few, and it is good to be alive at the

time when to read John of St. Thomas seems almost as natural as to read Berkeley or Leibnitz. Twenty-five years ago we could not even have dreamt of such a victory over age-old prejudices.

There will never be any question of substituting the works of the commentators for those of St. Thomas, nor shall we ever allow ourselves to read into St. Thomas what was contributed by Philosophy lives on dialogue and conversation; and it is a mark of any great philosophy that it can manifest constantly new aspects in a conversation which is pursued through centuries on the same accepted principles and with organic consistency. A philosopher finds reason for melancholy in realizing that the conversation about his own ideas (assuming that he is worthy of it) will begin only when he is dead and no longer has the opportunity of having his search for truth profit by it. Fortunate is he, if the very meaning of his dearest intuitions is not missed by the interlocutors. To continue the conversation with congenial and clear-sighted companions of the stature of Cajetan, Banez and John of St. Thomas is a privilege of the genius of Thomas Aquinas and of his grace-given mission.

The development of St. Thomas' doctrine in the works of the commentators is a fascinating process to which not enough attention has been given. The greater our familiarity with the writings of St. Thomas, the better we realize that by the character of his mission, by the nature of his interests and by his style, St. Thomas calls for commentators. Because the complete works of St. Thomas look huge on a bookshelf, it has been a surprise for many beginners to find that in a number of cases his treatment of important issues is very short. St. Thomas' works are free from the kind of obscurity which results from confusion, but they contain many difficulties framed in spiritual loftiness and lucid simplicity. To read St. Thomas well, the help of genius is needed and gratefully welcome. Our John is the latest and the most mature of the geniuses who explained St. Thomas.

Over and above the basic task of rendering the thoughts of St. Thomas more accessible, the commentators have performed feats of doctrinal progress with hardly any parallel in the history of philosophy. As we have often pointed out, progress in the philosophic sciences is normally effected not by the substitution of one system for another system, but by the accomplishment of greater profundity and comprehensiveness within one and the same continuously living body of truth. Yet history offers few examples of processes conforming to such a pattern. It is altogether accidental that philosophic progress should be achieved by way of substitution, but such accidents are so frequent that the really normal course of events has, historically speaking, the character of an exception. Considered in its relation to the philosophy of Aristotle, the work of St. Thomas comprises, besides many features of continuity, changes involving significant corrections. But, if we compare the work of John of St. Thomas—latest of the great commentators with that of St. Thomas himself, all important changes can be interpreted in terms of pure development.

It is in the field of logic that the school of St. Thomas exemplifies most successfully the method of progress which becomes the philosophic sciences. In logic a picture characterized by the predominance of continuity over discrepancy covers not only the several ages of Thomism but the work of Aristotle himself. The Logical Art of John of St. Thomas is in several respects the masterpiece of Aristotelian logic; yet, it includes issues that Aristotle hardly touched upon. In the context of John of St. Thomas, issues not treated by Aristotle never look un-Aristotelian; quite naturally, the system of logic founded by Aristotle takes over truths contributed by the Stoics and other philosophers, by grammarians and by theologians. At a time when the state of logical studies obviously calls for an ample process of integration, the work of John of St. Thomas demonstrates, in the most encouraging fashion, the integrative power of Aristotelian logic.

So far as I can judge, the mood of conquering vitality which distinguishes the work of John of St. Thomas is nicely conveyed by your translation. The most obvious function of the present book is to give college students a chance to read, besides whatever 'textbook' they may use, a "great books of

material logic (that is, of logic not only of correctness in reasoning, but of truth in knowing). It should not be held that John of St. Thomas is too difficult for beginners. As you say in your introduction "It is the privilege of a patient teacher to become less and less difficult to follow as the work of teaching goes on." A beginner who refuses to be discouraged by initial difficulties will soon notice that things are no longer so hard, and by that time he has already learned a great deal. The style of the translation, which will be of great help to beginners, will also play a significant part on the level of advanced research. Trained logicians, including those who have access to the Latin text, will notice that your sharp and graphic expressions often bring about helpful insights into obscure issues and a fresh understanding of familiar ones. You remark that 'intense and luminous life may find expression in scholastic language.' In spite of the known difficulty of translating scholastic language into a vernacular, I expect that through this translation the quiet ardor of intellectual life that we admire so much in the Courses of John of St. Thomas will endear itself to many readers. Jacques Maritain

The expression 'material logic,' used in the title of this book, is uncommon and paradoxical. Few logicians would hesitate to say that all logical problems are problems of form and that there is no room in logic for the consideration of any matter. But if such is the case, the common use of the expression 'formal logic' has to be accounted for. Unless some part of logic is not formal, to speak of formal logic seems to involve absurd redundancy. We might speak of symbolic algebra if there were such a thing as a nonsymbolic algebra, but because all parts of algebra are symbolic, the expression 'symbolic algebra' sounds nonsensical. The formal character of logic should rule out the expression 'formal logic' just as the symbolic character of algebra rules out the expression 'symbolic algebra.' Here are logicians to whom the notion of material logic is entirely foreign: from what do they intend to distinguish what they call formal logic?

In the usage of these logicians and in the common usage of our time, 'formal logic' is not meant to distinguish one part of logic from another. Rather it is meant to distinguish, at the cost of redundancy, logic itself from the inquiries described as 'theory of science,' 'scientific method,' 'critique of scientific knowledge,' 'epistemology,' etc. These unscrupulous neighbors of logic are not concerned with logical entities but with a universe of things and real relations; yet they are called by some, with no claim to rigor in the choice of words, 'logic of science,' 'applied logic,' etc. Redundancy is welcome if it serves to remove the threat of confusion between logic and these ill-defined disciplines.

Formal logic is universally held to deal with consistency alone. Let us, accordingly, approach the problem of material logic as follows: Should it be said that when the rules of consistency are established the task of logic is over and the possibilities of logic exhausted? Beyond consistency there is truth. No matter how rigorous our inferences, we fall short of truth if our principles are false, we fall short of certainty if our principles are uncertain, we fall short of understanding if our principles are devoid of explanatory power. It is certainly reasonable to ask whether, beyond the rules of consistent reasoning, any part of logic deals with the attainment of these scientific perfections: truth, certainty, and explanation.

To this question the vast majority of logicians answer in the negative. For them, the contribution of logic to the scientific ideal ends with the valuable achievement of strictly consistent inference. Any further achievement would be by the sciences themselves. "Whether the premises be true or false," Augustus De Morgan wrote, "is not a question of logic, but of morals, philosophy, history, or any other knowledge to which their subject-matter belongs: the question of logic is, does the conclusion certainly follow if the premises be true?" (Formal Logic, London, Taylor and Walton, 1847, p. 1). Along the same line, Abraham Wolf wrote, about a century later, "... logic is the study of valid

inference, not true inference. This is not because logic is not interested in truth, for its own function is to explain the true conditions of valid inference. It is simply a case of that division of labor which necessity has forced upon all the sciences. The study of the conditions of valid inference means the study of the general relations between inferences and premises. This is a sufficiently important task by itself. The study of the conditions of true inference would mean, in addition, an investigation into the truth of all possible premises—an obviously impossible task." ("Logic," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th ed.) To take a simple example, logic may define a type of inference based upon the transitivity of a relation; but in the argumentation, 'Chicago is north of St. Louis and St. Louis north of New Orleans, therefore Chicago is north of New Orleans,' logic will not let me know whether Chicago is in fact north of St. Louis and St. Louis north of New Orleans. The truth of the conclusion 'Chicago is north of New Orleans' depends upon facts known to geography and foreign to logic.

Logic cannot say what city is north or south of what city; more generally, logic knows nothing about things. But things admit of more than one way of existing. Over and above the primary existence that they enjoy in nature, things enjoy, as objects of understanding, a new existence—objective, intelligible, intentional—which brings forth in them a new system of properties. The object of logic is constituted by the properties which accrue to things by reason of the new existence that they enjoy as objects of the human mind. In opposition to the real properties or 'first intentions' of things, these logical properties are called 'second intentions' in scholastic language. The laws of second intentions are the rules of reasoning, and the art of reasoning is the same as the science of the second intentions.

From all this, it results that there is no such thing as a material logic if second intentions concern exclusively consistent inference. In other words, there is no such thing as a material logic if all laws of second intentions are merely rules of consistency. But if there are, within the broad field of the second intentions, properties placed beyond the achievement of consistency—i.e., properties whose laws concern the truth of our argumentations, their certainty, and their explanatory power—then there is such a thing as a material logic. No part or function of logic will ever decide whether a particular proposition, relative to the real world, is true or not. But logic may be able to say what general conditions an argumentation must satisfy in order to be not only consistent, i.e., formally perfect, but also demonstrative. Material logic is a possibility if and only if some second intentions are so constituted that their laws be the rules of scientific demonstration.

Suppose three consistent argumentations of the same formal type—say, three syllogisms in Barbara. One conclusion is false, one probable, and one scientific. Such diversity derives from diversity in the matter or content since, by hypothesis, the form is the same. At this point, the problem of material logic can be stated in entirely definite terms. Considering the matter or content which grounds the diversity of false, probable, and scientific argumentation, the question is to determine whether this matter or content is constituted by real properties alone, or also comprises logical properties. Once more: Considering the diversity of content which, within the unity of a single form (Barbara), divides argumentation according to falsehood, probability, and scientific certainty, the question is whether such diversity is merely one of first intentions or involves both first and second intentions. If the content which distinguishes the three argumentation as false, probable, and scientific is altogether reducible to first intentions, then there is no such thing as a material logic. If all questions of content are to be decided, like the question whether St. Louis is south of Chicago and New Orleans south of St. Louis, by inquiry into the real world, then logic is concerned with consistency alone and whatever perfection of discourse lies beyond consistency is the business of particular sciences. If, on the contrary, diversifying contents involve also a diversity of second intentions, then there is such a thing as a material logic.

The *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle are an inquiry into logical matter. This treatise considers the intentions which distinguish scientific argumentation from consistent reasonings devoid of scientific

character. To be sure, logical matter, in relation to the real content of science, retains the nature of a form. In a comparison between logic and the sciences of the real, the whole of logic is formal. But over and above the relation of form to matter which obtains between logical science and the science of reality, a comparison between the parts of logic reveals a further relation of form to matter according as a second intention concerns mere consistency or the scientific perfections of truth, certainty, and explanation. The law that a syllogism of the second figure must necessarily comprise one negative premise concerns consistency and pertains to formal logic. Whether the premises are false, probable, or certain makes no difference: if the middle term is twice predicate and if both premises are affirmative, nothing follows.

The Prior Analytics deal with such problems and the Posterior Analytics start where the Prior leave off. A past master in priority analysis—i.e., in the theory of consistency—if he never studied demonstration would lack logical instruments of decisive significance. In order to achieve scientific quality in my discourse about the real world, in order to obtain the highest degree of intelligibility in my dealing with things, I need familiarity with such logical intentions as primacy and immediacy, essential universality, essential connection, the modes of perseity, strict appropriateness, logical priority and posteriority, a priori demonstration and a posteriori demonstration, demonstration of fact and explanatory demonstration, etc.

Such second intentions, which do not regard the consistency of reasoning but its scientific perfection, constitute the subject of the Posterior Analytics. Among all the logical works of Aristotle, the climax is this treatise of material logic. Why, then, are Aristotle and his followers so commonly reputed to have constructed a logic purely formal in character? Among others, Mr. Bertrand Russell wrote: "Logic, in the Middle Ages, and down to the present day in teaching, meant no more than a collection of technical terms and rules of syllogistic inference."

To account for this legend, we may observe, first, that the Posterior Analytics are a book of extreme difficulty. Whereas the formal logic of Aristotle has been explained in countless digests, some of which are both exact and relatively easy to read, his material logic is not readily accessible in secondhand expositions.

Further, and more importantly, the reduction of logic to the treatment of consistency alone is a stubbornly recurrent accident originating in the sociology of knowledge. At all times the behavior of scientific men betrays willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of communication, intersubjectivation, and consensus. Such sacrifices may affect the very structure of science, as when modern physicists restrict themselves to those aspects of nature which can be expressed in "sharp statements." But, independently of what happens to the sciences themselves, it seems that the instrument of science, viz., logic, should also be the instrument par excellence of scientific communication. And thus logicians are led to think and to dream of a logical system independent of philosophic controversy, indifferent to the subjects that cause conflicts among philosophers, acceptable to the most diverse schools of philosophy, valid for the Platonist, the Aristotelian, the materialistic nominalist, the nominalistic rationalist, and the pragmatist as well.

Now it soon becomes evident that not all parts of logic lend themselves equally well to abstraction from philosophically controversial issues. The problem of the relation between logic and philosophic controversy can be outlined as follows:

1. Any question of logic, if treated with the depth and thoroughness required for greatest intelligibility, involves issues on which philosophers are divided.
2. On the level defined by merely utilitarian concern for safely working rules, it can be said, roughly, that formal logic, or an important part of it, admits of abstraction from philosophic controversy.

3. In material logic, rules are so closely bound up with their foundations that abstraction from philosophic controversy is altogether impossible.

Accordingly, a program of logic free from philosophic controversy will restrict itself to problems of form. Further, in the treatment of these problems it will shun inquiries into foundations and, generally, be not too particular about the intelligible establishment of its own rules. It is often possible to propose convincingly a rule of consistency without unfolding the ultimate reasons of its validity. Diversity regarding the justification of the rule proves compatible with common adherence to the rule itself—just as the ethical precept that one ought not to kill is commonly adhered to by the eudaemonist, the Kantist, the utilitarian, etc., though their reasons for not killing are diverse.

Take, for instance, the rule that in a syllogism of the second figure one premise must be negative: it is interpreted by the Aristotelian in terms of universal wholes and by the nominalist in terms of sets, and subsets, and members of a set or of a subset. Such diversity corresponds to very profound differences with regard to the most basic problems of metaphysics. Yet, this rule of the second figure is a subject and an instrument of agreement between the Aristotelian and the nominalist. Leaving aside the metaphysical issues, it is possible to achieve some common understanding of many rules of formal logic. Though utilitarian and shallow, this common understanding may by establishing a clear framework for discussions play a considerable role in the communication of knowledge. But the problems of truth, certainty, and intelligible necessity which material logic considers cannot be isolated from the subjects of philosophic controversy. Treated aside from philosophic controversy, material logic would hardly make any sense at all.

Logicians who want to avoid philosophic controversy must ignore material logic. So far as the sociology of knowledge is concerned, the situation of the material logician is much the same as that of the metaphysician. Both need the very particular kind of fortitude that it takes to live by rational evidence, with little or no support from society, in the midst of never-ending opposition. Wherever logic is principally regarded as an instrument of discussion and communication, material logic is likely to decline. Only a short time after the death of Aquinas, the Logical Treatises of Peter of Spain supplied schoolboys with a manual of logic from which posterioristic analysis is entirely absent. The maintenance and development of Aristotle's material logic were tasks for such geniuses as Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

In the work of Aristotle, the division of logic into formal and material is drawn with entire clarity so far as reasoning is concerned. But his treatises on apprehension and judgment do not express, by their divisions, the distinction of a form and a matter within logic. Thus On interpretation considers both such formal properties of propositions as universality and particularity (chap. 7) and such material properties as necessity and contingency (chap. 9). In most logical works patterned after the Aristotelian Organon, formal and material standpoints are distinguished only in the treatment of reasoning. John of St. Thomas, on the contrary, interprets all three operations—apprehension, judgment, and reasoning—in terms of logical form and logical matter. Considering, however, that for the logician, the first two operations of the mind are subordinated to the third, it is easily seen that this division pertains by priority to reasoning. Intentions belonging to terms or propositions are considered formal or material according as they are preparatory to the consistency of reasoning or to its demonstrative power. The relevance of the division of logic into formal and material is indirect in the case of the first two operations. Where relevance is but indirect, lesser clarity should be expected. In fact, the reasons why a problem pertaining to the first or second operation is treated in formal or in material logic are not always obvious and may not always be certain. Thus, John of St. Thomas places in material logic the problem of unity and diversity in the meaning of terms. No doubt, the treatment of this problem is, in several respects, preparatory to the theory of demonstration; but it is equally clear that without firm notions on univocity, equivocity, and analogy

we are apt to break the first law of syllogistic validity, viz., that there be no more than three terms in any categorical syllogism. Further, the distribution of subjects in the two main divisions of the Logical Art may occasionally be influenced by pedagogical considerations. In scholastic language formal logic is also called 'minor' logic and material logic 'major' logic. But 'minor' does not only signify that formal logic is shorter, and 'major' that material logic is longer. It is understood that minor logic is the kind of logic that can be taught to beginners—students have to begin with formal logic anyway—and major logic the kind of logic which presupposes a background and consequently can be taught only to advanced students. Hence a tendency to place in material logic all questions particularly deep and difficult, even though it may not be entirely clear that they concern the demonstrative power of argumentation more essentially than its formal validity. The same pedagogical concern accounts for the fact that reflection upon logic itself, which, in an Aristotelian and Thomistic vision of the sciences, belongs not to logic but to metaphysics, is placed in the opening section of material, or major logic.

The general pattern of Aristotle's *Organon* can be described in terms of a polar opposition between dialectic on the one hand and on the other hand analytic and science. This opposition, however, must remain subordinate and can never be allowed to grow into a picture of final disunity.

Aristotle's notion of dialectic admits of several approaches and can be defined in several ways. It seems that dialectic is primarily a rational system whose principles are not rational necessities but common opinions. Science, on the other hand, is a rational system whose principles are axioms, i.e., propositions endowed with rational necessity and evidence. In lieu of axiomatic truth, dialectic depends upon the verisimilitude, the probable truth of propositions accredited by their success in the society of thinking persons. Dialectic is a sociological substitute for science. In it the real content is never certain—or, if it happens to be certain, it is so for reasons extraneous to dialectic. Nothing is certain in dialectic except the logical arrangement of objects and signs. The dialectician knows nothing scientifically except second intentions. And yet he talks of real things, nay, of all sorts of things. The logical forms of his art organize a real matter supplied, under conditions of probability, by the authority of all men, or of most of them, or of all experts, or of most of them, or of the most famous of them. The dialectician can afford not to be a specialist: all that is certain in his art concerns second intentions, and these are general in character. The real content of dialectic is also general in character, though in an altogether different sense, since it is made of opinions commonly received among men. Because the principles organizing the dialectical art and constituting all the certainty found in it are logical, the logician, and no one else, constructs dialectical systems and writes books of dialectic. Historians and interpreters of logic have not given enough attention to the dual capacity of the dialectician. A treatise of dialectic comprises a system of logical propositions designed to get the best out of opinions commonly received in such domains as physics, ethics, or politics. It is also supposed to comprise an orderly collection of these commonly received opinions. The logician, as dialectician, trespasses the borders of the logical. He has much to say about real things, in his own tentative, talkative, unfinished, and uncertain style. Whenever the work of a logician comprises a dialectical section, we expect to find, framed in a logical system, an inquiry into real being. In fact John of St. Thomas has written no dialectic. But his extensive treatment of the categories involves a reinterpretation, in an analytical context and for analytical purposes, of material originally destined to supply the dialectician with a general knowledge of reality. As a result of this reinterpretation, the Logical Art of John of St. Thomas contains much philosophy of nature and much metaphysics.

In so far as it is directed toward analytic and science, logic does not have the same reason for inquiring into the world of reality. The analytician is not, like the dialectician, an ambiguous personage. He is all concerned with logical properties: real Properties are taken care of by another person, viz., the scientist. In analytic, the treatment of logic, both formal and material, can afford to

be pure. But care for logical purity cannot hinder the logician's quest for a deep understanding of his own objects. Because the second intentions are founded upon the first, the intelligibility of logical entities, directly or indirectly, flows from the intelligibility of things. (As shown in the foregoing, this is why divergencies in the philosophy of the real are inevitably paralleled in logic. Again, the logical consequences of philosophic positions are more evident as the logician goes more deeply into the explanation of logical properties and rules.) The foundations of the logical world are aspects of the real world, both physical and mental. These aspects of nature and of the soul concern logical research intrinsically, and there is no a priori restriction on the volume of real inquiry which will be needed in order to achieve satisfactory explanation of even the most familiar of logical objects.

To sum up: although the object of logic is entirely constituted by second intentions, there are two reasons why discourse about real being should appear in the works of a logician. In so far as logic is influenced by the purposes of its dialectical part, the logician discourses about the real because dialectic is ambiguous and comprises a real content. In so far as logic is influenced by the purposes of analytic and science, the logician discourses about the real because the explanation of logical intentions requires such discourse. Besides these two reasons, which are essential, a purely accidental factor deserves to be mentioned. Occasionally, the temptation to digress about interesting issues accounts for the consideration of real subjects in a logical context. John of St. Thomas, a metaphysician and theologian much interested in reality, and a teacher always generous with his time, is not immune to this temptation. But his frequent inquiries into the real world are motivated and vindicated, in the vast majority of cases, by his search for thorough explanation of logical properties. These properties are so related to nature, to the world of the human soul, and to the metaphysical universe that an exposition of logic centered about the explanation of logical properties inevitably develops into a general introduction to philosophy.

The author of the *Logical Art*, John Poinset, was a contemporary of Descartes. Contrary to popular belief, there still was, in this late phase of "decadent scholasticism," one man of genius among the so-called scholastics. But if we are to call him a 'scholastic philosopher,' let us bear in mind a properly restricted notion of scholasticism. Not so long ago, it was commonly assumed that there had existed a unified system or thought which could be designated as "scholastic philosophy." True, men whose mental habits had been formed by the reading of Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Hume, Kant, and J. S. Mill could not help detecting a family resemblance in St. Anselm, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas, Scotus, Ockham, Suarez, and a few others. Through improved acquaintance with the history of medieval thought, we now know that there has never been such a thing as a unified system of scholastic philosophy. A dozen or more philosophic doctrines, which are sharply at variance with each other, would have an equal right to be called scholastic: this makes it nonsensical to predicate 'scholastic' of any philosophy or doctrine. It is possible to speak of a scholastic period in the history of thought, in spite of inevitable vagueness in the definition of such a period. But the word 'scholastic' is predicated more relevantly of a certain language, of a certain method, and of a certain set of problems—what the Germans call *Problematik*. There is no unified scholastic doctrine or philosophy, but there is such a thing as a scholastic set of problems. Both with regard to language and to *Problematik*, John of St. Thomas remains a scholastic. In spite of his chronology, Galileo and Descartes are unknown to him. His uneventful life was, for the most part, spent in schools dedicated to scholastic problems and regrettably closed to the great scientific novelties of the Renaissance.

A member of the Dominican order and a professor at the celebrated University of Alcalá de Henares, John Poinset (1589-1644)—called John of St. Thomas because of his devotion to St. Thomas' doctrines—left a monumental work comprising a *Course of Philosophy* and a *Course of Theology*. The *Course of Philosophy* fills three thick volumes in modern editions, the *Course of Theology* ten. John of St. Thomas belongs to the line of St. Thomas' great commentators; Cajetan is

one of his most respected authorities. His expositions are parallel to basic works—treatises of Aristotle in the Course of Philosophy, *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas in the Course of Theology—but he does not use the method of the textual commentary. Most sections of his Courses begin with a sharp summary of a text; then, the main issues are discussed in extensive dissertations. Sometimes these dissertations follow each other so continuously as to make up a complete and strongly organized treatise. But John of St. Thomas considers that the requirements of completeness and continuity in exposition are met by basic texts and textual commentaries. He does not feel obliged to treat all questions normally included in a curriculum. His task is to explain—leisurely, patiently, thoroughly, and with unique skill in the selection and multiplication of standpoints—a restricted number of wonderful questions.

We do not need to elaborate on the reasons why the integral translation of a work which fills 839 two-column pages in the latest edition was held impossible. Since a choice had to be made, we turned to the field of material logic, where the shortage of great books is particularly felt. But no more than about three-fifths of John of St. Thomas' writings in material logic could be included within reasonable space limits. Our choice was governed by both doctrinal and pedagogical concerns. We made it a rule never to abridge an exposition having the character of a whole. Our shortest units are long articles. In several cases, our unit is a whole "question." On the subject of demonstration, it is the whole set of "questions" corresponding to the Posterior Analytics.

Whoever is aware of the situation of logical studies in our time knows that the most vexing of our problems is the problem of logic itself. Accordingly, much space is given to the issues concerning the object and nature of logic (I). The problem of the universal (I^A) is obviously of central significance for all logic and for the philosophy of knowledge. The "antepredicamental" discussions (III), consisting principally of an inquiry into analogy, constitute a masterly contribution to the theory of meaning.

The doctrine of analogy presented here is the subject of further developments in the articles on the division of being into categories (IV). The long study of the first four categories (IV) is a store of elaborate information on concepts basic in all parts of philosophy and in the interpretation of the sciences. From a certain standpoint, the pages on quantity and on relation can be considered supplementary to the introductory pages on the object of logic. Taken together, these three sections present much material and many precise instruments for the improvement of our ideas on the relations between the logical and the mathematical sciences. Section V is concerned with four timely issues: signification, the relation of knowledge to actual existence, reflection, and formalization. Lastly (VI) we present without any omission John of St. Thomas' treatment of demonstration and science.

A scholastic language is spoken on the campus alone and never in the market place. A vernacular, i.e., a language spoken in the market place, can be successfully translated into another vernacular; but the translation of a scholastic language into a vernacular is an enterprise whose difficulties are not always surmountable. Intense and luminous life may find expression in scholastic language; however, the intellectual life that a scholastic language succeeds in conveying is marked by austerity even in its phases of abundance. In vernacular translations, such austerity may look stiff. These general difficulties are complicated here by a disposition related to John of St. Thomas' best pedagogical qualities. A very patient teacher does not have much time left to polish his style. John of St. Thomas is capable of sharpness and beauty in expression, but he often writes in the uninhibited style of a teacher who depends confidently upon friendly communication with eager scholars. In many cases we have had to reshape clauses, to divide exceedingly long sentences, to modify the order of phrases, and effect other changes, on the same minor scale, for the sake of better readability. We believe that accuracy has never suffered in the process. In so far as the subject matter admits of anything like ease, we would not hesitate to say that John of St. Thomas reads easily when familiarity has been achieved with his vocabulary, his style, and his way of approaching questions, considering

and reconsidering them with indefatigable zeal. It is the privilege of a patient teacher to become less arid less difficult to follow as the work of teaching goes on.

From a philosophic standpoint, one major characteristic of our time is a deepened split between man's concern for mystery and the forms of scientific thought. Referring to well-known propositions of Maritain in *A Preface to Metaphysics*, let us say that a question can be predominantly a problem or predominantly a mystery. A problem is a question the true answer to which leaves no room for further elaboration. Descartes was praising the handiness of problems when he pointed out that a child who has performed a multiplication according to the rules of arithmetic knows as much about the product as any mathematical genius in the world. But a mystery is a question of such character that an answer unqualifiedly true and sound and appropriate not only admits of but also urgently demands further inquiries into inexhaustible intelligibility. The mystery aspect predominates in religion, in metaphysics, in philosophy generally, and in human affairs. The problem aspect predominates in the disciplines called the sciences by common usage, in techniques, and generally in the fields where the pattern of positive science exercises a strong influence. Interest in philosophy, religion, theology, human sciences, and humane studies is no less today than in celebrated periods of intellectual greatness. But it is impossible not to be struck by a widespread aversion to scientific forms in philosophy, theology, and human affairs—briefly, in the realms characterized by the predominance of mystery. What is most alive in the logical movement of our days is directed toward a universal and thorough problematization of science. True, the rigor achieved in the scientific handling of purely problematic questions is one glorious aspect of intellectual life in this century. At the same time a sense for mystery is not lacking. It is incomparably more profound in our contemporaries than it used to be in the golden age of rationalistic optimism—say, from the time of the *Encyclopédie* to the great terrors of the twentieth century. What is lacking in our relation to mystery is neither earnestness nor abundance of ideas, it is the rigor of the scientific spirit. There are things which will never be accomplished by "the tragic sentiment of life," "immersion in history," "experience of death," "esprit de finesse," "cultural refinement," "esthetic sophistication," "our cultural heritage," etc. Those things are clarity in the statement of questions and principles, firmness in inference, rational evidence of conclusions, appropriateness in predication, integral preservation of past developments, lucid order, and the unique defense against error that rational forms alone can provide. The ambition to explore scientifically the realms where mystery predominates receives little encouragement from the most up-to-date of our logicians. Some of them would say that one major merit of their work is precisely to have demonstrated the meaninglessness of metaphysical questions, and more generally of questions concerning what we call the realm of the mystery.

Let it be remarked, at this point, that the scientific type borne in mind by a logician exerts influence upon the factual product called a system of logic. This does not express an essential necessity: such things happen because our energy is exhaustible and our versatility limited. The logic of Aristotle is not exactly what it would have been if his scientific patterns had not been Greek geometry, an imperfectly disontologized mathematical knowledge, and a physics that was not disontologized at all. With the great abundance of metaphysical and theological genius which marks the work of St. Thomas and his commentators, the scientific patterns used by the logician change somewhat. Indeed, for St. Thomas and John of St. Thomas, mathematics—principally represented by Euclidean geometry—remains the best approximation to unqualifiedly scientific knowledge and consequently the pattern which the analytician bears in mind. But when logicians are so ardently interested in philosophy, they cannot omit the logical problems of particular relevance for the explorers of philosophic mysteries. A clear example of such concern is the treatment of analogy in the *Logical Art*. Here, the logician answers a question asked by the metaphysician with burning anxiety, for the answer will decide whether metaphysical and, more generally, philosophic issues are meaningless or

not. An inspiring and charming teacher, John of St. Thomas remains among us the logician who understands best the scientific ideal of the philosophers.

TRACTATUS DE SIGNIS: THE SEMIOTIC OF JOHN POINSOT Interpretive Arrangement by John N. Deely in Consultation with Ralph Austin Powell from the 1930 Reiser edition (emended second impression) of the *Ars Logica*, itself comprising the first two parts of the five part *Cursus Philosophicus* of 1631-1635, by the same author. First Published at Alcala de Henares (Complutum), Iberia 1632. In Bilingual Format Corrected Second Edition [St. Augustine's Press, 9781587318771]

In the spring of 1970 this work was undertaken because of, and later sustained by, the vision of Thomas A. Sebeok. Yet the work would not have reached its fulfillment without the learned assistance and patient counsel of Ralph Austin Powell, a graduate of Poinsett's own alma mater and his brother in religious life. Powell's subtle mastery of philosophical traditions—the Greek, the Latin, the German, and the French—was an improbable resource made priceless by being put at my disposal throughout the project.

Translation finally of the inscrutable Latin of Poinsett's "Word to the Reader" of 1631 and 1640 was owing to J. Kenneth Downing. Archaic usage was much reduced through detailed suggestions of Bert Mahoney. Editorial assistance in point of organization came from Heinz Schmitz, and in point of grammar from Brooke Williams, who also mastered Spanish Round Gothic script for the frontispiece. The task of getting the notes on the text into presentable typescript was executed with admirable fidelity and steadiness by Claire Levy, as were many related tasks performed by my student Felicia Kruse. Carl Lenhart contributed help with proofreading.

The aim for the Treatise text proper was to produce matching linguistic columns, beginning and ending within the same line of text on every page. The extent to which this goal has been realized is due to the involvement and consummate skill in typesetting of Bud MacFarlane, Production Manager of Composition Specialists.

Jack Miles of the University of California Press pursued contractual arrangements for this work with understanding, vision, and respect for detail. Chet Grycz of the same press stands out in the work's actual production by his distinct commitment to its being realized in the integrity of its design. His was not the first press to try to see how this might be possible, a fact which provides the reader an intimation of the exceptional talent Mr. Grycz brings to bear on his work.

A subsidy for publishing in bilingual format was provided from three sources, the American Midwest Province of Saint Albert the Great, the DeRance Publication Fund of the ACPA in response to a proposal initiated under the presidency of Desmond FitzGerald, and Mr. Jerome Powell. Free time along with typing and copying facilities for the initial draft of this work was provided by Mortimer J. Adler.

This work is dedicated to the memory of J. Eris Powell (1875-1949), whose concept of Public life in the end made this work possible, and to the memory of his wife, Mary Conroy Powell (1888-1960).

It is dedicated also to the memory of a monk of the abbey of Solesmes, with the hope that his work will be somehow continued—Dom Boissard, who produced the magnificent five volumes of the Solesmes edition of Poinso's theological *Cursus* according to standards the present little work has sought to realize in its own order. His death in December of 1979 robbed humane culture for the second time (the first was Pere Combefis' death in 1679) of a completed edition worthy of its proper merits.

Walker Percy expressed the view that "a few years from now John Poinso will be recognized as one of the major founders, if not the founder, of modern semiotics". The year was 1986, and the first edition—the first complete and independent edition—of Poinso's *Treatise on Signs* had been in print about seventeen months (Perch's letter was dated 27 October, whereas 4 May 1985 was the official date of the actual publication). Two days later, having spent "the last few days toiling away" at the *Tractatus*, he wrote to Thomas A. Sebeok:

I am persuaded that Poinso is the seminal man indeed. For example, I am endlessly intrigued by his insistence that "even in the case of stipulated signs the rationale of the sign must be explained by a relation to the signified [just as in the case of natural signs]...". thanks to you and Deely, that Dominican will be hooked up with Peirce and de Saussure as a Founding Father, if not the Founding Father.

With this corrected second impression of Poinso's seminal and foundational *Tractatus*, perhaps we are in sight of the fulfillment of Percy's prophesy. Certainly we are much closer than we were when, outside of mathematics, the name "Poinso" was unknown in intellectual culture, and even within mathematics it was not the Poinso concerned with the proper standpoint and paradigm for developing the doctrine of signs that was named. Thanks to the 1985 issuance of his *Treatise on Signs*, the name of Poinso has indeed become a familiar one in semiotics, philosophy, and related disciplines, overcoming even the reluctance of the Peirceans to concede that the triadic notion of sign had its birth among the Latins (whence Peirce himself originally glimpsed it), and its first unqualified statement in Book I, Question 3, of Poinso 1632.

So, by way of introducing this emended second impression of Poinso's semiotic, it behooves us to take a quick glance at the intervening years.

Since 1985, and a Little Before

Those of us who had been involved in semiotics with and through the pioneering work of Thomas Albert Sebeok (9 November 1920-21 December 2001)² were caught up in the immediate task of discerning the paradigm proper to semiotics as the doctrine of signs, and disentangling the *pars pro toto* confusion engendered by the late modern notion of semiology. We would take a while longer to realize that the late modern overlap of semiotics with phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and semiology together was actually a moment of epochal change, the true—that is to say, positive—beginning of postmodernity for philosophy and intellectual culture globally, a beginning in which semiotics stood apart from the rest, as it were, precisely by reason of not fitting in with any pre-existing paradigm.

Things are clearer now, and particularly clearer is the justice of one of Poinso's opening remarks concerning the doctrine of signs, namely, that it requires a standpoint transcending the realism/idealism opposition which had come to define modernity as a distinct epoch or period in the history of philosophy. This pill proved hardest to swallow for the self-styled realists, and I shall have to devote a Section of this Second Edition Foreword to wondering why. Suffice at this point to say that there are few left today who have not come to realize that even when things become objects, the objects do not simply reduce to the things but are sustained as objects by an additional network of relations that enable the objects to become matters of public debate with the often disconcerting

effect of revealing that many aspects of objectivity thought to be "real" were in fact fictions not yet recognized as such.

More disconcerting yet was the realization that these relations without which there would be no objects in their difference from (their irreducibility to) things are themselves indifferent to the difference, being themselves both apprehensive and mind-independent under one set of circumstances (when what is object exists also regardless of the apprehension, like a correctly diagnosed cancer) and—with no change whatever in the positive being of the relation itself as linking the one apprehending to something over and above his or her own subjectivity, something irreducibly "other", as might be said, as in the forlorn case of the lover who discovers only after a considerable lapse of time that the beloved has been killed by a meteor (of all things!)—while remaining apprehensive and apprehensive of the same object, become mind-dependent as relations under another set of circumstances. ^n short, the circumstances alone, not the relation itself, determine whether a given relation is real or fictional, or indeed a mixture of both.

Poinsot's insight is as simple as that: since signs fully actual consist in relations, signs partake both of the transcendence of subjectivity distinctive of relation and of the indifference to the boundaries which separate things in the order of 'substance' and 'inherent accidents' (subjectivity with its subjective characteristics), i.e., the boundaries making this thing natural and that one cultural, this phenomenon "inner" and that phenomenon "outer", etc.; whence it comes about that the Way of Signs winds everywhere.

Exclusively preoccupied with determining "what things are", seeking the substance of things (or at least with talking about it, however emptily on many occasions), whether thinking or extended, the moderns thought next to nothing of relations, save to regard them as creations of subjectivity, creatures of a "point of view". They were ill-prepared for the discovery that without relations as something real there could be no objects at all, neither real nor unreal. As the end of modernity approached, the ultramoderns went to the opposite extreme, declaring these thoroughly mind-dependent relations to be all and only—yet without in any measure realizing the singularity of relations as alone among the ways of being indifferent to the difference between obtaining in the order of substances intersubjectively with a mind-independent character (as between parent and offspring) or obtaining only in the order of what might have been, what was or could be, or even could not be at all (as in the pre-Copernican belief that the sun revolves about the earth; or as in the movie *Them* portraying mutated ants in the earth's gravitational field attaining the size of railroad boxcars, impossible for an exoskeleton lifeform under earth gravitation), "purely objectively", as it were.

The true break with modern nominalism, then—or, what comes close to the same thing, the beginning of a postmodern philosophical stance—came with Peirce (1839-1914) the only late-modern student of the Latins, it would seem, who learned from the study of the works of Poinsot's teachers, the Conimbricenses, along with his study of Aquinas and other Latins, Scotus above all to appreciate the reality of relations alongside substance even though a relation as such can never be instantiated save indirectly by the medium of related objects and related things as objects (when the relation, of its proper nature irreducibly suprasubjective, is intersubjective as well) and can never exist save dependently upon some subjective characteristic of an individual (a "substance").

Whether it be in the pure relativism of the ultramoderns, often mistaken for "postmodernism"; or in the actual postmodernism of the rediscovery of relations as not only obtaining in the order of fictional and conventional being, but also within the order of being really mind-independent, and rather as that singular way of being equally at home in the world of things as things, things as objects, or objects whether pretending or not pretending to be (mistaken or not mistaken for) things: the actual crossing of the threshold of postmodernity has been best described so far in the formulae of

Joseph Ratzinger according to which "the undivided sway of thinking in terms of substance has ended", because "relation is discovered as an equally primordial mode of reality".

The decisive move, then, lies not simply in the recovery of relation as singularly unconfined by any boundary between reality and fiction, but in the more complex realization that this singularity of relation is precisely the reason why the boundaries between what is real and what is not are shifting rather than fixed, a world wherein the future holds possibilities that cannot be foreseen or foretold within the horizon of any given "present" (any exclusively synchronic view), and where as a consequence the "meaning" of the past in its relevance (or irrelevance) to the present is never settled once and for all.

To put the more complex realization opening the door to a postmodern epoch of philosophy and intellectual culture in other words, it consists in the discovery that relations in their singular being, when they involve the objectification of related things (certainly when they actually do so, probably even when they do so only virtually), are not merely dyadic cause-effect products or 'after effects' but something more complex and more interesting: relations irreducibly triadic wherein one term of the relation stands to another term of the relation as presenting that other term to or for some yet third term. For in that case the relation in question brings about the situation of a signification, the paradigm case of the action of signs in contrast to things and to objects ("significates") alike.

The action of signs—"semiosis", as Peirce named it, in a term coined from the Greek term for signs of nature, [^][^][^][^][^][^] ("semeion")—is singular in the world of things, just as it is the singular being of relations on which the action of signs depends for its distinctiveness. The "causality" in this case, thus, is indirect. Peirce not so much mistakenly identified the action of signs with "final causality" as he mistakenly called that action "final causality", for want of familiarity with the more refined later Latin categories of causality as the notion applied both to the world of nature and to the world of culture in their experiential interpenetration.

Of course, so-called "final causality"—including extrinsic final causality, not only the intrinsic final causality or "teleonomy" that Aristotle identified in nature to describe the development of individual substances from initial to mature states—is involved in the action of some signs, but by no means in all (most notably not in the signs of nature originally called [^][^][^][^][^][^], such as smoke indicating burning, milk in the female breast indicating childbirth, etc.). The only causality involved in the action of all signs, and therefore the causality according to signs in their proper being, is extrinsic formal causality, as Poinot is careful to explain and was careful also to distinguish from final causality (whether intrinsic 'teleonomy', or extrinsic deliberate use) in making the necessary expansion of and additions to Aristotle's original fourfold scheme of causes specified to explanations of being only in the order of *ens reale*, not in the order of the being proper to signs transcending the contrast between *ens reale* and *ens rationis*.

Our present author, John Poinot, was the first one not only [1] to identify the distinctiveness of semiotic causality as extrinsic formal rather than some variant of final, but also [2] to set out in a thematic way the irreducibly triadic character of relations in producing the action of signs, showing [3] that the action in question is possible in the first place precisely by reason of the singularity of relation among the modes of being in being realizable with its proper and positive character unchanged when the instance of the relation under one set of circumstances make it to be mindindependent and under changed circumstances mind-dependent, while maintaining unchanged as its terminus the object signified, the same significate.

This triple originality underscores Walker Percy's assignment of the title of "founding father of semiotics" to Poinot's future: Poinot's work cannot come to be known without its author's claim to that title forcing itself upon the minds of readers in the 21st century generally familiar, as 20th century readers generally were not, with the idea of signs and their action as constituting a

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

distinctive field of inquiry that cannot be avoided by anyone interested to know, as Richard Morris put it in his review of Poinso's Tractatus in its first independent edition, "why we are able to talk about past and present, the real and the unreal, casting a net of significance over both". With his Tractatus de Signis Poinso anticipated and adumbrated an era beyond the development of the Way of Ideas upon which his contemporaries were even then setting forth on what was to become the modern mainstream development.

The semiotic of John Poinso here presented autonomously for the first time was disengaged from a larger work entitled the Ars Logics, itself but the first two parts of a five-part Cursus Philosophicus. Since this work has a considerable historical interest in its own right, and in order to minimize the violence of editing the tractatus de signis into a whole independent of that original context, we have settled on the following manner of presentation.

Putting ourselves in the position of a reader coming to the Ars Logics for the first time and interested only in Poinso's discussion of signs, we asked ourselves: What sections of the work would this hypothetical reader have to look at in order to appreciate that discussion both in its own terms and in terms of the whole of which it originally formed a part? To what extent are these separable philosophically?

The pages that follow make up our solution to this problem. We have left Poinso's text stand virtually entirely according to the order he proposed for it within the Ars Logics as a whole. To make this order clear, we have included title pages, and all general statements Poinso set down concerning the whole (and therefore the Treatise as part), inserting where appropriate and to bridge necessary jumps a series of brief comments designated "semiotic markers," designed to show the reader how the rationale of all editing is derived from the original author's own intentions; and second, we have included all and only those sections of the whole which have a direct bearing on understanding the doctrine proposed in the Treatise on Signs proper, as the semiotic markers make clear.

In other words, we have tried to provide the reader with a guided tour of the Ars Logics that leads directly to an understanding of the doctrine of signs contained in that work, but does so by enabling him or her to appreciate the historical origin of the account in the context of its author's own understanding of previous logical and philosophical traditions. We have chosen this format as the one best suited, so far as we could judge, to exhibit the unique mediating status Poinso's Treatise occupies "archeologically," as it were, in the Western tradition between the ontological concerns of ancient, medieval, and renaissance philosophy, and the epistemological concerns of modern and contemporary thought.

At the end of the work, the reader will find a lengthy "Editorial Afterword" explaining the entire work and giving its background and prospectus, much the sort of materials commonly given in an Introduction to a translated work. The device of the semiotic markers made it possible in this case to bypass the need for lengthy introductory materials enabling the reader to grasp the editorial structure of the whole, yet without of course obviating the need for detailed discussions somewhere of the principles of the English text, and of the historical situation of the author and his work. Thus we have been able to enter simply and directly into the doctrinal content of the main text, without cluttering its entrance with more than a very few lines of contemporary origin. <>

SAD LOVE: ROMANCE AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING by Carrie Jenkins [Polity, 9781509539581]

As a woman with a husband and other partners, philosopher Carrie Jenkins knows that love is complicated.

Love is most often associated with happiness, satisfaction and pleasure. But it has a darker side we ignore at our peril. Love is often an uncomfortable and difficult feeling. The people we love can let us down badly. And the ways we love are often quite different to the romantic ideals society foists upon us. Since we are inevitably disappointed by love, wouldn't we be better off without it?

No, says Carrie Jenkins. Instead, we need a new philosophy of love, one that recognizes that the pain and suffering love causes are a natural, even a good part of what makes love worthwhile. What Jenkins calls "sad love" offers no bogus "happy ever afters". Rather, it tries to find a way properly to integrate heartbreak and disappointment into the lived experience of love.

It's time we liberated love.

Review

"This book will transform the ways people think about their love relationships." **Myisha Cherry, author of *The Case for Rage***

"Do you ever get that feeling that a book just sees you? That was how I felt reading *Sad Love*. Jenkins deconstructs popular notions of happiness and romantic love with her characteristic combination of compassion, originality and rigour, challenging us to reconsider our foundational assumptions about what our relationships should even be for. I want everyone to read this book." **Eve Rickert, co-author of *More Than Two: A Practical Guide to Ethical Polyamory***

"Sad Love zings with frustration at fairy tales, Valentine's cards, romance novels and the 'happy ever after'." ***The Sunday Telegraph Magazine***

"Jenkins [...] brings a light-touch speculative air to her ruminations." ***London Magazine***

CONTENTS

Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction I The Paradox of Happiness
2 The Romantic Paradox
3 Daimons
4 Know Thyself
5 Eudaimonic Love
Notes
Index

Tell a philosopher you love her, and you'd better be ready to define your terms.

It's funny because it's true. Well, sort of. Some philosophers spend their entire working lives on questions of definition or the analysis of concepts. And this is not a pathology. It's important. Put a concept such as love under the microscope and you see how vague and fuzzy it is. How layered. Where the spiky bits are. Patterns invisible to the naked eye suddenly become fascinating objects of study.

That's why some of us spend our whole lives trying to get a better look. Philosophy, when it's working well, offers us a treasury of intellectual and imaginative tools: new ways of seeing things.

Conceptual microscopes, of course, but also conceptual telescopes, and distorting mirrors, and tinted lenses ... we need all kinds of different approaches. We need to examine our concepts close up, but we also need to get a better look at the ones that feel remote, and we need ways to look at things from new angles, through different filters. That includes the things we think we understand, the things most familiar to us. In fact, it's especially important to examine those, as they're often highly influential in structuring the way we live (whether or not we appreciate their playing that role). Deflecting and diffracting our most familiar images can reveal something totally new, perhaps something we would never have imagined it was possible to see.

As I suggested in my preface, this particular book is an attempt to build a conceptual mirror. I'm trying to reflect back to us an image of ourselves, and specifically of our ideas and ideals of romantic love. It's not an entirely flattering image, the one I end up with. It's almost grotesque. No doubt there are some distortions. But, as I said, sometimes we need a new angle, a vantage point from which the familiar looks weird.

I start from a curiosity about the real lived experience of sad love — love that defies the assumption that love stories end in "happy ever after." Sad love in our songs and stories tends to be a failure condition: a disaster and a tragedy. But I think there is much more to it than that. The realities of sad love are a clue that we're not seeing something properly. Something is missed because we tell only certain kinds of love stories. Sad love can't be happy ever after, of course. But it can be something else: something that I'll call eudaimonic (more on this word a moment). Eudaimonic love has deep connections with creativity and meaningfulness, of a kind that the search for happy ever after doesn't and could never have.

But who is this "us" I keep talking about? Words like "us" can be sneaky. Unless we're paying attention, "us" tends tacitly to exclude a "them." A simple word can mask swathes of assumptions about who one is writing for, who's included and who's excluded, who's normal and who's "other."

For the purposes of this book, "us" means me and the people in the same boat as me, as far as romantic ideology goes. It means people who were fed the same cultural soup that I was raised on, who imbibed the same "received wisdom" about what (real) romantic love is. In the broadest terms, it's those of us who grew up with the dominant (white, patriarchal, capitalistic and colonial) culture of North America and the UK serving as our baseline worldview. That's a vague and messy way to define an intended audience, but the vagueness is intentional. It's the only way to capture the group I have in mind, which is itself vague. This book is about — and for — those of us who are still swimming in that soup.

Much of the soup is made of stories. And our love stories are remarkably consistent, almost as if we are just telling one story over and over. Here's the short-form version of it:

X and Y sitting in a tree,
K-I-S-S-I-N-G.
First comes love, then comes marriage,
then comes baby in a baby carriage.

We teach this story to children. We teach them very early, before they are equipped with adult critical thinking, bullshit detectors, defensive armour of the mind. We feed kids this story, this bit of cultural soup, in simple rhyming packages, and that makes it easy for them to swallow and repeat to others. They receive it over and over again in fairy tales and stories and in snatches of adult culture - romcoms, romance novels, Valentine's Day greetings cards. And, of course, children watch grown-ups, and grown-ups model the story. We are supposed to start living out the story when we come of age, or at least do our darnedest to conform. For the children. If we cannot or will not conform, we aren't supposed to let the children see that.

It reminds me of something Wittgenstein said about rules: we just keep going. We call that "following" the rule. But, however it might feel from the inside, we're not really "following" anything. The way we go on is not determined by pre-existing constraints: it's up to us. We are creating the rule by going on the way we do.

I don't think all rules work this way, but a lot of them do. In particular, most of our "rules" for romantic love are created by our own choices about how to go on, individually and in social groups. By practicing love in a particular way, by representing it as being that way, we are constructing the rules and norms and expectations for what a loving relationship should look like. We teach all of this to children. We keep going, and call that "on." It's not only about creating the rule, it's also about creating the "us."

It doesn't stop when we grow up, of course. The cultural messaging comes blaring at us all the time. It comes in at us from every direction and can occupy any and every available medium: magazines, news, music, friends, colleagues, family members. Anything can become an avatar, a conveyance of cultural soup. (Have you ever noticed how much text is on display in your bathroom while you are brushing your teeth?)

We cannot exactly tune all this out, but we can stop paying conscious attention. Indeed we have to stop paying conscious attention, because we have to use our attention — that limited and precious resource — for other things. So most of the time we just let the messaging wash over us, and it seeps into our subconscious unchecked. This makes it even more powerful: the less attention we pay to all these messages hiding in plain sight, the more easily they reach into the most intimate parts of our lives. (These days, I wear underpants only from the company that advertises on all my favourite podcasts.)

But let's tune in for a moment: let's pay some conscious attention. There's more than just stories in the soup. There's also received wisdom. For now, I'm not going to analyze or critique this. I just want to lay it out, as cleanly and simply as possible.

- 1 A good life is one full of love and happiness. A bad life is one with neither.
- 2 Love and happiness (the best things in life) are "free."
- 3 In order to live a good life, one should pursue love and happiness (as opposed to crass things such as wealth, power or fame).

These three messages may sound very familiar and homey. Perhaps they seem "obvious." But my hope, in writing them out so starkly here, is that I can begin to defamiliarize them a little bit. What might we think of these messages if they were entirely new to us? If we were strangers to the social world they define?

When you listen in to that third message, the one about what one should do in order to live a good life, you might hear some moralistic overtones. Something like: it is unethical to pursue money, power and fame. That's what evil people do. But in this context I am calling attention to message number three, not as an ethical proposition, but as a piece of strategic advice. A "good life" in this context is not necessarily an ethical life but the kind of life that is good for the person living it. The kind of life we would wish on our friends, or that a loving parent wants for their child. That's what I'm homing in on here. And, in the context of the first two messages, we can see how the third message makes sense as strategic advice. If you want a good life, you've got to pursue the things that constitute a good life, right?

The messages might strike us at first as simply discouraging avarice. We are advised to replace the pursuit of worldly goods with that of immaterial, abstract things. But it's not that simple. There may be ways to live a good life that do not involve the pursuit of any of these things. Indeed, that's where

I think eudaimonia comes in. But, before we go there, let's take a look at where sad love fits into this cultural soup.

Let me round out this introduction with a summary guide to the rest of this book. To lay my cards on the table, the book's primary agenda is to urge that we replace the romantic conception of love with a eudaimonic conception. The romantic conception aims at an ideal (not realistic, but idealized) "happy ever after" — that is to say, a state that is pleasant for the individuals involved and is permanent. This ideal is what our current ideas about marriage are modelled on: monogamous and (mostly) heteronormative, and hence conducive to the creation of nuclear families which are culturally idealized as the locus of the happiest and most permanent kind of love. By contrast, the eudaimonic conception of love ditches the focus on pleasure (or "happiness") and orients instead towards meaningful, creative co-operation and collaboration.

This can occur in a wide range of forms and configurations, not all of which look like the nuclear family structure.

My understanding of what eudaimonic love is, and why it matters, came about through thinking about sad love. I called this book *Sad Love* for that reason. Sad love was my intellectual spark because it spoke back to romantic ideology so directly, demanding that I pay attention to the "happy" in the happy ever after and ask why it's there, what it's doing, and what is left of love when it goes away. But my goal isn't merely to talk about sad love or sadness per se. I am trying to frame a conception of love in which sadness has a role to play as something other than a failure condition. A eudaimonic conception of love has room for the full range of human experience, because it isn't oriented towards the "positive" emotions.

I will argue that the contemporary romantic ideal tends to make us miserable. But there are insights to be drawn from a close look at why that is the case and, indeed, why it's actually a predictable result given what we already know about how humans work. That's where I'll start in chapter 1. One thing philosophers have been trying to tell us for a long time is that, when we are deliberately trying to make ourselves happy - that is, when we are pursuing happiness for its own sake - it doesn't work. This is what's known as the Paradox of Happiness. This first chapter also surveys the contemporary context, against which this old philosophical idea sits somewhat awkwardly: North American positivity culture positions individualistic happiness as a core ideal, and the "pursuit of happiness" is baked right into the dominant ideology of my time and place. Against this, the Paradox of Happiness emerges as an important clue about who and what we are. It suggests important failings in a positivity oriented culture, which will turn out to have analogues in the context of romance.

Chapter 2 begins by tracing out those analogies. I argue that, just as pursuing happiness doesn't work, pursuing the romantic happy ever after doesn't work either. In fact this, too, tends to make us miserable. I call this the Romantic Paradox.

In chapter 3, I discuss a well-known response to the Paradox of Happiness, which I think will also help us with the Romantic Paradox. This response requires us to distinguish happiness from something else. The "something else" is often called eudaimonia, which tends to be translated as "flourishing" or "well-being." And so the classic resolution to the Paradox of Happiness, then, is to recognize that eudaimonia is more important than happiness and to engage in activities that promote eudaimonia (which may, as a side benefit, bring happiness in its wake).

It's one thing, however, to appreciate that eudaimonia is different from happiness. It's another — much tougher — thing to say what eudaimonia is. The concept of eudaimonia is ancient and is generally associated with the philosophy of Aristotle. But he didn't invent it. In any case, we have all

kinds of tools at our disposal now for sharpening the concept that Aristotle didn't have, such as twentieth-century literature and contemporary empirical research. Conceptions of eudaimonia inspired by Aristotle do not appeal to me, and some of his ideas about "human flourishing" all too easily spill over into ableism, or even eugenics. So in the remainder of chapter 3 I take up some of the tools available to me and try to fashion a very different conception of eudaimonia.

I take my cue from the etymology of the word eudaimonia, calling attention to the daimons — literally, "spirits" — that shape our loves, and indeed our lives. Daimons don't have to be understood as literally supernatural, but the daimon metaphor can be extremely useful for thinking about everything from an individual's "vibe" to the environment of a workplace, the spirit of a nation state, or the intangible presence of capitalism in our lives.

Chapter 4 brings further ingredients into the mix that I will use to expand upon what eudaimonic love is. It begins by surveying some of the (serious) methodological challenges that face anyone trying to understand love and happiness, which I try to locate in the context of general difficulties with "knowing ourselves." This leads into a conception of who and what we are that draws from existentialist philosophical traditions, emphasizing our agency in the process of creating ourselves.

This in turn can be applied to help me explain how eudaimonic love differs from romantic love, to which I turn in chapter 5. One of the most important differences is that eudaimonic love is active and dynamic, while romantic conceptions are typically passive and static. In the romantic framework we talk about "falling" in love, as if it were something that simply happened to us, like falling into a pit. Or being struck by a bolt of lightning (another common romantic metaphor). In eudaimonic love we choose our own way, guided by what makes our lives and our projects meaningful. Such choices are constrained by circumstances and the choices of others, but I understand these constraints by analogy with the role of constraints in artistic creativity. I also draw on research concerning "job-crafting" (a process by which employees craft their roles, adding to or even going against their job descriptions) to develop an analogous notion of "love-crafting," which is the creative practice of tailoring loving relationships to the skills, needs and values of the people in them.

Ultimately, I argue, we need to stop hearing "romantic" as a positive description. It's actually something that should raise a sceptical eyebrow. I urge that we move towards understanding ideal love as eudaimonic, not romantic. I also think we would do well to stop thinking so much about whether our partners "make us happy" and focus instead on whether they lovingly collaborate with us in the co-creation of meaningful work, and of our selves.

That, then, is this book's destination. Its starting point is a conversation I had a few years ago, with my American husband, about "the pursuit of happiness" ... <>

THE FUTURE OF DECLINE: ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE AT ITS LIMITS by Jed Esty [Stanford Briefs, Stanford University Press, 9781503633315]

As the US becomes a second-place nation, can it shed the superpower nostalgia that still haunts the UK? The debate over the US's fading hegemony has raged and sputtered for 50 years, glutting the market with prophecies about American decline. Media experts ask how fast we will fall and how much we will lose, but generally ignore the fundamental question: What does decline mean? What is the significance, in experiential and everyday terms, in feelings and fantasies, of living in a country past its prime? Drawing on the example of post-WWII Britain and looking ahead at 2020s America, Jed Esty suggests that becoming a second-place nation is neither disastrous, as alarmists claim, nor avoidable, as optimists insist. Contemporary declinism often masks white nostalgia and perpetuates a

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

conservative longing for Cold War certainty. But the narcissistic lure of "lost greatness" appeals across the political spectrum. As Esty argues, it resonates so widely in mainstream media because Americans have lost access to a language of national purpose beyond global supremacy. It is time to shelve the shopworn fables of endless US dominance, to face the multipolar world of the future, and to tell new American stories. *The Future of Decline* is a guide to finding them.

Review

"The USA will never again dominate world politics as it did at the end of the twentieth century. So far, American politics and culture have mainly thrashed and flailed in the face of this reality. *The Future of Decline* offers the necessary and urgent lesson that comparative national decline can, instead, be managed with good grace—as a blessing rather than a curse. In keeping with its teaching, Esty's book is a wise and even beautiful one." -- Benjamin Kunkel — *author of Utopia or Bust*

"The best thing about history is that it can always take another turn. *The Future of Decline* is a powerful provocation to craft a new national narrative, one that faces reality and locates tools for building something better." -- Catherine Hall — *author of Macaulay and Son: Architects of Imperial Britain*

"This is a consistently intelligent, sweepingly synthetic, and urgently important book." -- Michael Szalay — *author of Second Lives: Black-Market Melodramas and the Reinvention of Television*

"This book is a generative call to arms. Esty insists we have reasons to be cheerful amidst American decline—if we do the hard work of providing a renewed vision of a more equitable future for the nation." -- James Vernon — *author of Distant Strangers: How Britain Became Modern*

"*The Future of Decline* is sharp, provocative, and engaging at every turn." -- Gayle Rogers — *author of Speculation: A Cultural History from Aristotle to AI*

CONTENTS

Preface: Lost Greatness as a Way of Life

1 Against Declinism

2 After Supremacy: Ten Theses

3 British Pasts, American Futures

4 American Culture in the Age of Limits

Acknowledgments

Bibliography

Notes

Lost Greatness as a Way of Life

In August 2008, Americans watched the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, marveling at Zhang Yimou's spectacle of a newly confident, abundantly creative nation. Commentaries popped up all over the US media, noting that the impeccable organization, the daring aesthetics, the avant-garde architecture, and the massive scale of project management in Beijing heralded the arrival of a new Asian superpower. A month later, Lehman Brothers fell and tipped the world into financial crisis.

By the time 2012 rolled around, an economic recovery had been engineered in the US with the indispensable aid of Chinese capital. Over in London, the Olympics kicked off again, this time with an opening ceremony masterminded by Danny Boyle. Boyle's films, *Shallow Grave* and *Trainspotting* as well as *Slumdog Millionaire* and *Steve Jobs*, tell stories of cold poverty in the UK, hot wealth in the colonies. His "Isles of Wonder" show seemed forced even on the spot. It confused spectators.

Flashes of imperial glory jangled against dashes of socialwelfare pragmatism. Dancing health-care workers as a global sign of Britishness? The grandiloquent blend of past and present, with its hipster revisionism and blenderized ideologies, seemed to signify everything at once about the UK and therefore nothing at all. It highlighted the UK's unfinished business of reckoning with an imperial past and a European future.

Beijing 2008 and London 2012 struck a nerve for American viewers. The rising superpower across the Pacific and the fading empire across the Atlantic seemed to sandwich an American Century on the wane. The glamorous techno-futurism of Beijing and the zombie wax-museum antics of London threw America's uncertain fate into relief. With Wall Street so recently in free fall, the US media was divided between faltering belief in national power and swaggering insistence on American greatness.

For those of us who came of age in the 1970s, the two Olympic ceremonies simply rekindled what I suspect was a familiar sense of diminished expectations. For Generation X, political awareness began with Vietnam and Watergate. After the end of the gold standard, the oil crisis, stagflation, the drug wars, and the crime waves, the 1970s ended with the Iran hostage crisis and Carter's so-called national malaise speech. Where young Baby Boomers saw American greatness embodied in the Apollo missions, we saw the fiery failure of the Challenger crash in 1986. The 1980s and 1990s—the time of our youth—featured a strange subterranean battle between the slow steady ebb of national confidence and the resurgent rhetoric of "Morning in America," victory in the Cold War, and the tech boom. Those signifiers of American renewal often seemed stagey and brittle, more bravado than strength. Twilight and morning, autumn and apex: for my generation, the rhetoric of American destiny felt like a game of bad metaphors, a partisan opera played over a deep bass note of loss.

The twin crises of the Bush II era therefore hit like a return to the norm of national decline. 9/11 revealed the fragility of American security. The subprime crisis revealed the fragility of American prosperity. Both brought back familiar anxieties of a tottering superpower. They marked an Islamophobic and Sinophobic reboot of aggressive political sentiments that had already been aimed at Russia in my childhood, Japan in my youth.

As a graduate student and young scholar, I spent the last half of the 1990s studying literary culture in the UK's age of imperial contraction. Looking back now, I can see that my research was a refracted and delayed investigation into a problem closer to home: American decline. It was also an intellectual evasion of the racial and colonial problems underlying American supremacy. Back then, I wanted to know if Great Writing in English—the ability to capture whole worlds in a novel or a poem—depended on Britain's status as a Great Power. My research eventually took the form of a book somewhat misleadingly entitled *A Shrinking Island*. What it suggested was that British contraction produced a number of effects, not all of them negative, nativist, or scarcity-driven. The era of decolonization, of modernizing sex and gender norms, and of the Keynesian welfare state represented a step forward for many in the UK. Imperial contraction was not pure loss. Nor did the shrinking of the British domain translate into social backwardness. It was part of a modernization process, not a tumble back through time. To cede the pretensions of global hegemony—then or now—is not to regress or decline, except in the minds of those in thrall to superpower nostalgia.

The optimistic idea driving this book is similar: the US can move forward while its power wanes. The questions that faced the UK on its historical downslope face the US now. Can the waning of global power reinvigorate domestic society? Will post-peak America be even more divided? Can a culture of contraction inspire citizens to find an inclusive, egalitarian, contemporary sense of national purpose? The Trump-Brexit era has dramatized with remarkable immediacy the doubt embedded in such questions. The questions are not new, but they are more urgent as America becomes—any day now—a second-place nation. The answers will redefine US culture and society in the decades ahead.

The Future of Decline is a short study of a long American twilight, informed by British precedent. The undisputed peak of US power started in 1945, and its fade began in the 1970s. Americans have now been on the downslope for almost a generation longer than they were at the superpower summit. And the UK, which was a global hegemon from the end of the Napoleonic wars (1815) through to World War I (1914) has now been, by that time line, in decline for more than a hundred years.

Decline, in other words, lasts a long time. Empires fall dramatically in our lore, but hegemony dies slowly in fact. And declinism—the rhetoric of once and future greatness—lasts even longer. One hundred years of ebbing force in the UK have not stilled its lingering dreams of glory. Can the US escape that fate, or will the morbid symptoms of declinist thinking—MAGA and melancholia—stay with us for the long haul ahead? In America, declinism is practically a way of life, a cultural birthright, from the Puritan Jeremiad to the paranoid hegemony of the Cold War, from the lost City on a Hill to the closing frontier of F. J. Turner, from Sputnik to Watergate, from oil crisis to climate emergency, from the subprime crash to the Covid-19 pandemic.

As this book goes to press, the perennial dark fantasy of American declinism is converging with a new structural reality. By most projections, the 2020s will be the last decade when the US economy is the largest in the world. China already leads the world in so-called purchasing power parity—one leading indicator of national wealth. Countless books about the American eclipse will quickly follow, glutting an already saturated market. Whether left-leaning or right-leaning, fatalistic or optimistic, such books share certain features. First, mainstream declinist writing in the US—dominated by economists, journalists, and political scientists—tends to battle over metrics

and statistics while ignoring the decisive story lines that shape most Americans' perception of decline. Second, such writing tends to filter decline anxieties through an elite worldview. Declinism in most of its forms overidentifies with elite fears of lost power and position. It under-identifies with nonwhite, nonmale, nonpropertied citizens. Third, the prophets and pundits of US decline too often use the specters of fallen Rome and shrunken Britain to shake rather than inform readers.

By contrast, this book uses UK history to advance the idea that the loss of national greatness is neither quick nor catastrophic, neither tragic nor avoidable. The UK experience provides suggestive examples—and counterexamples—for US citizens hoping to live good, meaningful lives in an ex-superpower. Rather than evoke British imperialism as a spectacle of diminishment, it considers UK history since Suez as a story about the struggle for unevenly distributed resources. British decline forced UK citizens to try to redefine their national identity without the governing narratives of crown and empire at the forefront. Brexit shows how far from complete that process is (Barnett, O'Toole, Ward and Rasch). But it is a cultural process, not shackled to the iron laws of global trade. An ex-hegemon can become something other than a shadow of its former self. In the coming decades, Americans will need to relinquish Cold War certainties about American power in order to reinvent the shared meaning of US society.

For now, the narcissistic goad of "lost greatness" still resonates for many Americans, and not just right-wing patriots. It will resonate even after the memory of Trump's gross demagoguery fades. It resonates because there is a wide, bipartisan, and popular desire to stay on top after four decades of fading economic supremacy.

Most of all, it resonates because Americans do not have access to a galvanizing alternative language for a common national purpose. It is time to shelve the old habituated language of US dominance, to face the multipolar world of the future, to tell new American stories. To find and circulate those stories is a difficult but necessary task. They will have to be vivid and visceral, dense with real US history, ripe for collective affiliation. They will have to make multiracial democracy and social welfare

compatible with the lived experiences and popular culture of most Americans—not some, not half. That is a serious project for media, political, and academic elites—for cultural gatekeepers and knowledge workers of all kinds. To advance it, the traditional center must cede the language of US supremacy, and the progressive left must cede the language of anti-nationalism. America has to represent something more than global supremacy now. Eternal superpower status is a fantasy and—even were it true—it is a broadly antidemocratic desire, at odds with the nation's egalitarian ideals.

Conservative declinism blocks both the liberal goal of incremental progress and the progressive goal of social transformation. It tells its anxious adherents that America was once more truly itself than it is now. That is nonsense. America in 2020 is no less (nor more) America than it was in 1950. Heroic narratives of endless growth now obscure rather than reveal the meaning of America. We can no longer just light out for the frontier. The nation is no Huck Finn today, if it ever was. And even Huck was no innocent.

Rather than ape the nostalgia of the British governing classes over the long imperial twilight, US citizens might prefer—however much they are invested in social hierarchy—to abandon morbid and melancholy delusions. They might prefer to see the US as a decent society rather than a diminished hegemon. The American future need not repeat the Brexit present—a nation holding fast to its glory days like an aging quarterback. That's a geopolitical sequel nobody wants to see. The loss of the hegemonic top slot is an economic given. But the culture and politics of the response is not. What has a pressing claim on American attention now is the story of British adaptation to loss, not the spectacle of the loss itself.

Yet declinism almost always sells as part of the epic historical cycle of imperial rise-and-fall. That mesmerizing epic is, in a way, the subtext of almost all modern historical thinking, from Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* to Sid Meier's *Civilization VI*. It has served as the subtext and context for almost every consequential discussion of arts, politics, economics, ideas, and social institutions in the US since 1975. The welter of fading-hegemony literature feeds a national fascination with how fast and far we will fall, or—for the hopeful—how long America will hold on to solo superpower status. Both sides—the tragic and the magic—obscure a fundamental question: What does decline mean? What is the significance, in experiential and everyday terms—in feelings and fantasies as well as in metrics and policies—of living in a country past its prime? We know plenty about rising and falling empires.

But we have a fundamental—and bipartisan—deficit in our imaginative understanding of life after hegemony.

America is old enough now to have two archives telling the story of its destiny. One existed before it was a global power (but still a juggernaut of continental and colonial expansion). One came into being while it was a global power, in the twentieth century. At this new turning point in history, a third archive is beginning to emerge. What trajectories can we glimpse for an American future after its apex as a global power—even, perhaps, after Americans have acknowledged and adjusted to the downslope of history? In an effort to detach the national gaze from lost greatness, this book pursues four interlocking projects: (i) a critical overview of US declinism since 2000, outlining its bugs and features; (2) a list of ten theses for describing the future of decline without the pervasive drag of superpower nostalgia; (3) a comparative analysis of British and American thinking about national identity after global supremacy; and (4) a map of emerging narratives about American history and American destiny for the age of limits.

Growing up in the 1970s, I took in a steady stream of declinist images and narratives. By contrast, I believe that my grandparents, coming of age in the 1920s, saw the US as a nation on the rise and that my parents, coming of age in the 1950s, saw the US as a secure superpower. As this book goes to

press in 2022, I'm not sure my children believe in a meaningful American future. Four generations, one arc: from upswing to peak to downslope to crisis. America's season of global supremacy set the horizon of expectation for the Greatest Generation and the Baby Boomers. Even as they recede into historical haze, those expectations still define the outer limit of the public discourse. Few leaders or politicians will demur when asked if the US is the greatest country now, the greatest country ever. But the boomers are aging fast and the world is changing even faster. The old reflex to declare US greatness will stop twitching at some point, maybe sooner than we think.

Belief in US national superiority lives inside almost all the ordinary and available languages of American patriotism. It took a long time to build up this rigid version of nationalist feeling, and it will take a conscious effort to shed it. Belief in natural superiority was made in America the military-industrial complex's most successful

product. It can be unmade, too, without destroying patriotic sentiment, without losing wealth and security, without ceding the idea of robust citizenship. It can be unmade unless the rhetoric of greatness stays lodged in the American mind, too sacred to be dispatched by the light and logic of history on the downslope. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD 4 VOLUME HARDBACK SET

edited by Mark Philip Bradley, Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, Carla Gardina Pestana, Kristin Hoganson, Jay Sexton, Brooke L. Blower, Andrew Preston, David Engerman, and Max Paul Friedman [Series The Cambridge History of America and the World, Cambridge University Press, 4 volume pack ISBN: 9781108419208]

EDITORS: Eliga Gould, University of New Hampshire Paul Mapp, College of William and Mary, Virginia, Carla Gardina Pestana, University of California, Los Angeles, Kristin Hoganson, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Jay Sexton, University of Missouri, Columbia, Brooke L. Blower, Boston University, Andrew Preston, University of Cambridge, David Engerman, Brandeis University, Massachusetts, Max Paul Friedman, American University, Washington DC, Melani McAlister, George Washington University, Washington DC.

- The volumes cover a five hundred year period in chronological order across four volumes: 1500–1820, 1820–1900, 1900–1945, and 1945 to the Present
- Brings together 120 contributors to provide a new narrative of the history of American foreign relations
- Offers new perspectives on seminal events and developments in American foreign relations history

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD offers a transformative account of American engagement in the world from 1500 to the present. Representing a new scholarship informed by the transnational turn in the writing of US history and American foreign relations, the four-volume reference work gives sustained attention to key moments in US diplomacy, from the Revolutionary War and the Monroe Doctrine to the US rise as a world power in World War I, World War II and the Cold War. The volumes also cast a more inclusive scholarly net to include transnational histories of Native America, the Atlantic world, slavery, political economy, borderlands, empire, the family, gender and sexuality, race, technology, and the environment. Collectively, they offer essential starting points for readers coming to the field for the first time and serve as a critical vehicle for moving this scholarship forward in innovative new directions.

General Introduction: What is America and the World? by Mark Philip Bradley

The Cambridge History of America and the World (CHAW) offers a far-reaching and novel account of American engagement in the world from 1500 to the present day. CHAW takes as its interpretive starting point a deceptively simple insight: adopting frameworks that cut across rather than stop at

the nation's borders could upend established stories and generate new interpretive possibilities. What might happen, as nineteenth-century American historian Thomas Bender asked in a seminal 2002 essay, if historians followed "the movement of people, capital, things, and knowledge" across borders in ways that ignored artificial and state-defined boundaries? An outpouring of work over the last two decades has followed this translational turn in US history to deprovincialize how we understand the American past. It has now produced a fundamentally new history of America and the world.

Infused with common transnational sensibilities, this novel scholarship has taken a variety of interpretative paths. Some of these new histories were pioneered by diplomatic historians who increasingly placed the perceptions and policies of presidents, diplomats, and generals on a global stage or employed new and sometimes non American-based archives to illuminate the perspectives of non-state actors from the worlds of business, activism, religion, and what we now call nongovernmental organizations. Other scholars have crafted social and cultural histories, offering a wider vision of American engagement in the world by exploring how the construction of American state and society has intersected with global forces and contestations over identity abroad. At the same time this work shares many of the convictions that have animated new work on the Atlantic world, slavery, borderlands, migration and the environment, and in critical race and queer studies. In all these ways, historians have embraced multiple transnational optics to reimagine how US history was made.

CHAW brings this exciting new scholarship together for the first time to map the contours of these transformative approaches to the place of America and Americans in the world. In some ways CHAW builds upon more traditional diplomatic approaches to the field. It gives sustained attention, for instance, to such key moments in US international history as the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Monroe Doctrine, the nineteenth-century US rise as a world power, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. But importantly the volumes open out to other larger and smaller analytical frames for apprehending American engagement in the world while at the same time situating multiple actors and developments within broader global political, social, economic, cultural, and ecological processes.

The four volumes that make up CHAW feature more than 120 contributors from a variety of subfields within American history who explore these new explanatory vistas. While many diplomatic historians are among the contributors, the volumes cast a more inclusive scholarly net to include historians of Native America, the Atlantic world, slavery, political economy, borderlands, empire, the family, gender and sexuality, race, technology, and the environment. Collectively their contributions offer essential starting points for readers coming to the field for the first time, and serve as a critical vehicle for moving this scholarship forward in new directions.

The history of early America and the world that unfolds in Volume I occupies an especially important place in this Cambridge history. As readers will see, it quite self-consciously does not foreground the thirteen colonies that became the United States or the Revolutionary War, nor does "America" simply connote British America as it once did for many histories of American foreign relations. Volume I opens with first contacts in the early fifteenth century in the waters off North America's northeastern and western coasts, where fishing and fur brought Native peoples and Europeans together, and in the tropical band around the Caribbean and the territories that made up the Inca and Aztec empires, where exotic commodities along with gold and silver attracted the Spanish. It then moves to the comparatively late arriving colonists like the Dutch, French, and finally the English, who were left with what would become British North America. Indian Country, which in 1825 still covered much of what was later the continental United States, receives sustained attention throughout the volume, reflecting the crucial ways in which Native American history has become

central to new narratives of America and the world. So, too, the histories of men and women brought as slaves or indentured servants to the colonies that European settlers founded.

Volume I carries the narrative of early America and the world through relations between the great empires, Indigenous as well as European, before turning to revolutionary challenges to those empires. Here the focus is not only on the American Revolution but also antislavery campaigns, the broader Atlantic revolution, and state-making in the early republic. At the same time, contributors offer a set of thematic essays on statelessness, imperial trade, international law, women, the environment, and the circulation of ideas. It is important to note that much of the scholarship informing Volume I has occurred in isolation from the general field of American foreign relations, and its more traditional focus on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In offering a layered understanding of the complex nature of empires in the making, the volume provides a completely original take on America and the world in the early period. As the volume editors suggest, early America was a "messy, complicated and multidirectional world." Those transformative insights set many of the central interpretative pathways for the volumes of CHAW that follow.

Volume II takes the story of the United States and the world from the War of 1812 to the imperial wars of 1898 in Spain and the Philippines. Here, too, the essays that make up the volume mark a fundamental shift in how historians now see this period from global perspectives. "[^]mperial denial and self-congratulation," the editors of Volume II note, often colored an earlier historiography of this era, whereas in these chapters the nineteenth-century United States emerges as "an exclusionary nation-state forged in violence and an expansive, multiethnic imperial formation." The Mexican-American War and the Civil War, explored here in their transnational and global dimensions, become the fulcrum that links the volume's consideration of continental expansion and settler colonialism on the one hand and the late nineteenth-century worlds of industrial capitalism and racialized imperialism on the other. As one contributor to the volume puts it, these interpretative modes uncover "the myriad ways in which American history in the nineteenth century is inseparable from an understanding of the world beyond the United States." Together the chapters that make up Volume II illuminate the multiple pathways through which what had been previously seen as an isolationist nineteenth-century United States were in fact embedded in global fields of imperial power.

None of the nineteenth-century developments foregrounded in Volume II of CHAW emerge as preordained. The contributors painstakingly trace out the remarkable contingencies shaping the exercise of political and economic power over the course of the century from the perspectives of multiple actors. In part an emergent transportation and communication infrastructure along with a blue water navy and a growing state bureaucracy began to bind and integrate the national economy. At the same time iterative panics and extreme economic volatility increasingly linked the United States to the firmament of Victorian globalization and brought new domestic social unrest and political instability. Just as the state and its role in the rise of a two-ocean American empire is disaggregated in these chapters, the engagements of multiple non-state actors receive sustained consideration, among them migrants from Europe and Asia, African American activists, working-class mariners, Christian missionaries, military personnel, and Indigenous peoples. The making of space in the nineteenth-century American state is always near the surface of the volume, particularly the fluidities of its population and borders, processes of racialization and practices of ethnic cleansing, and the vast ecological transformations wrought by unrestrained capitalist development.

The first half of the twentieth century, sometimes oversimplified and even more often overshadowed by the Cold War that followed in an earlier historiography, emerges in Volume III of CHAW as a revolutionary era. "There was nothing inevitable," the volume editors point out, about "American global ascendancy." They remind us that for all the transformations of the previous

century, the United States in 1900 was still very much a developing nation. And Cold War was only cold in the West. Hot wars in Korea, Vietnam, and later Africa, along with sustained US campaigns of covert action against what were seen as left-leaning governments in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, often brought havoc and devastation in their wake, in part prompting massive transnational migration that unintentionally would put the United States on a path toward becoming a majority-minority country by the middle of this century.

Volume IV also traces the ways in which the intensification of neoliberal capital flows beginning in the 1970s, along with the growing power of nonstate challenges by human rights and environmental advocates, put further pressure on more conventional notions of American state sovereignty and power in the late twentieth century. Chapters on what the volume editors characterize as contestations over the rule of states uncover the often destabilizing role of oil, global religious formulations, and an emergent queer geopolitics in American engagements in the world during this period. At the same time chapters that trace the involvements and commitments of African Americans and Native Americans in a variety of translational projects open up the actors and issues that were critical to the making of America in the world after 1945. As the editors suggest, the post-Cold War world that closes the volume, particularly the forever wars following the September 11 attacks and the specter of climate change, further deepened the fluidities of power in an era in which the United States was often thought of as a singular superpower.

The chapters that make up all four volumes of CHAW can be read in multiple ways. Perhaps the configuration that allows readers to see just how radical a departure they are from past ways of seeing American foreign relations is to encounter them topically across time and space. For instance, each volume features chapters on Indigenous peoples and their centrality to a fuller understanding of how a plurality of "Americans" operated in the world. The environment also receives sustained treatment. An ensemble of chapters on the centrality of geographies and ecologies in the making of early America opens up Volume I, and this major interpretative thread gets taken up in subsequent volumes. Empire is another important strand across the volumes in chapters that place American empire in a global perspective, whether it be the encounter of Indigenous peoples with European and later American empires, the rise of intertwined domestic and imperial American empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or the tensions between empire, decolonization, and domestic social movements after 1945. The complex story of Americans and the world from 1500 to the present gains further nuance and richness in chapters throughout the four volumes that explore the histories of capitalism, gender and sexuality, borderlands, race and ethnicity, migration, religion, human rights, and humanitarianism. I encourage readers to pick up one or more of these threads that seem most intriguing, and to read the chapters on that subject across the four volumes to better appreciate the critical building blocks through which collectively CHAW offers a transformational set of new interpretative approaches to the merican past.

Questions of power are always at the center of work by historians of American foreign relations. Power in an earlier scholarship and for some historians today can sometimes be disconnected from the global flows and processes that affected other states and peoples. This kind of American exceptionalism was reinforced in the period after 1945 when many policy-makers and some of the scholars who chronicled their footprints in the world insisted that the preponderance of American power meant that opening up a discussion of its potential messiness and fragility was a fool's errand. The chapters that make up the four volumes of CHAW suggest a different path forward, offering histories that are simultaneously connected to the world and attentive to the multiple particularities, and singularities, of the American experience. Each of the contributors to these volumes helps us see a critical piece of how that more capacious vision moves toward a fundamentally new understanding of the exercise of American power in the world.

The final volume of CHAW lands on the Anthropocene with a searching chapter in which historian Joshua Howe points to the opportunities and potential perils that this conceptualization of climate change poses for future scholarship. He also reminds us that planetary environmental change, and the outsized role the United States has played in it, shapes our present century in ways that Americans cannot fully control. Howe writes, "Time will tell how — and how well — America deals with the world it has made." Together the four volumes that make up this Cambridge History of America and the World provide a frame to help us better come to terms with the always contingent, often unequal, and sometimes dangerous worlds that a diverse cast of American peoples have made and unmade, and to anticipate what future worlds may be in the process of becoming.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME I: 1500–1820 edited by Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, Carla Gardina Pestana [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419222]

The first volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World examines how the United States emerged out of a series of colonial interactions, some involving indigenous empires and communities that were already present when the first Europeans reached the Americas, others the adventurers and settlers dispatched by Europe's imperial powers to secure their American claims, and still others men and women brought as slaves or indentured servants to the colonies that European settlers founded. Collecting the thoughts of dynamic scholars working in the fields of early American, Atlantic, and global history, the volume presents an unrivalled portrait of the human richness and global connectedness of early modern America. Essay topics include exploration and environment, conquest and commerce, enslavement and emigration, dispossession and endurance, empire and independence, new forms of law and new forms of worship, and the creation and destruction when the peoples of four continents met in the Americas.

CONTENTS

Contents

List of Figures page

List of Maps

List of Contributors to Volume ^

General Introduction: What is America and the World? MARK PHILIP BRADLEY

Introduction: What Does America and the World "Mean" before 1825? ELIGA

GOULD, PAUL MAPP, AND CARLA GARDINA PESTANA

PART I GEOGRAPHIES

1. Changing American Geographies S. MAX EDELSON

2. Maritime Borderlands ANDREW LIPMAN

3. The Americas and the Contested Aquatic World of the Atlantic, Indian, and the Pacific Oceans RAINER F. BUSCHMANN

4. Extractive Industries and the Transformation of American Environments JENNIFER L. ANDERSON

PART II PEOPLE

5. Jews, Muslims, Pagans, and America DAVID ABULAFIA

6. Statelessness, Subjecthood, and the Early American Past CHRISTOPHER

HODSON

7. Mobility and the Movement of Peoples PATRICK GRIFFIN

8. How Native Americans Shaped Early America PEKKA HAMALAINEN

PART III EMPIRES

9. The Early Iberian American World KEVIN TERRACING
10. Making Colonies and Empires in North America and the Greater Caribbean ALISON GAMES
11. Imperial Wars, Imperial Reforms ERIC HINDERAKER AND REBECCA HORN
12. Law and Empire, 1500-1812 CATHERINE EVANS AND PHILIP GIRARD
- PART IV CIRCULATION/CONNECTIONS
13. West Africa, 1500-1825 REBECCA SHUMWAY
14. The Commercial Worlds of Early America EMMA HART
15. Uncertain America: Settler Colonies, the Circulation of Ideas, and the Vexed Situation of Early American Thought MICHAEL MERANZE
16. America and the Pacific: The View from the Beach KATE FULLAGAR
- PART V INSTITUTIONS
17. Slavery, Captivity, and the Slave Trade in Colonial North America's Global Connections GREGORY E. O'MALLEY
18. A Maritime World ELIZABETH MANCKE
19. Antislavery in America, 1760-1820: Comparisons, Contours, Contexts CHRISTOPHER LESLIE BROWN
20. Women, Gender, Families, and States HEATHER MIYANO KOPELSON
21. Empires and the Boundaries of Religion KATHERINE CARTE
- PART VI REVOLUTIONS
22. Independence and Union: Imperfect Unions in Revolutionary Anglo-America DANIEL HULSEBOSCH
23. Atlantic Revolutions JANET POLASKY
24. Citizenship JAMES SIDBURY
25. The United States and the Americas CAITLIN FITZ
- Index

Selections from: What Does America and the World "Mean" before 1825? by Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, and Carla Gardina Pestana

Studying "America and the World" in the period before the advent of the United States carries a different meaning than it does after 1776. As used by historians of the modern United States, as in the other volumes in this series, America and the world usually refers to the foreign policy and global interactions of the American republic, with the United States occupying the role of an independent power and, increasingly, an empire. This volume calls for a different agenda: to understand how the United States emerged out of a series of colonial interactions, some involving Indigenous empires and communities that were already present when the first Europeans reached the Americas; others the adventurers and settlers dispatched by Europe's imperial powers to secure their American claims; and still others men and women brought as slaves or indentured servants to the colonies that European settlers founded. For most of the 300 years after the first European voyages of discovery, we use America to refer not to a single political entity, much less an empire, but rather to a space within which other states, peoples, and empires, many of them centered outside the Western Hemisphere, interacted and vied for supremacy and control.

Invariably, the early history of America and the world is the history of contacts among places and peoples that had formerly been largely separated. Mostly fruitless Norse ventures and errant Pacific craft aside, Eurasia and Africa had little to do with North America before the late fifteenth century. Then, Europeans in growing numbers and with greater persistence began visiting North Atlantic fisheries, exploring Atlantic coasts, and gradually establishing their presence and that of Africans, who were sometimes among their number, in American lands. A handful of Europeans had come back with them first to prove the existence of American lands and later to sell as laborers. In West Africa, the Portuguese and their imitators traded for ivory and gold long before they treated enslaved Africans as a major commodity. The signal feature of early modern Atlantic history, what unites these disparate phenomena, is that water began to link the peoples and economies on both

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite 107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

sides of the ocean rather than separating them. New societies and eventually nations were one result, as were tragedies — disease, the slave trade, the ravaging of the American environment — on a scale that centuries of hindsight have made, perhaps, easier to understand intellectually, perhaps harder to comprehend emotionally. As we wrestle still with the legacy of early America's inhumanity, we wonder more why humans acted as they did.

The people of four continents intermixed. In North America, in no small part because Western Hemispheric peoples were disproportionately struck down by Eastern Hemispheric diseases, migrants from Europe and Africa had an especially significant impact. Major migration streams contributed to the repopling of British North America: colonists and bound laborers especially from England in the seventeenth century, and Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Germany in the eighteenth, as well as enslaved people from many parts of West Africa increasingly from the late seventeenth. Out of this migration, the colonies that Britain claimed became fairly densely populated. African arrivals — either directly from West Africa or coming via the West Indian islands — more often went to more southerly or urban locations, laboring in agricultural fields especially, in the south, and in urban households and businesses throughout British North America. Although the European migrants were primarily from the Irish and British archipelago, others came from northern European locations where their Protestant identities were challenged (French Huguenots, Salzburgers Exulanten) or their economic livelihoods threatened. This eclectic migration, in contrast with more tightly controlled movements of populations in the Spanish colonies to the south or New France to the north, meant that British North America was comparatively diverse. In further marked contrast to the French in North America and the Spanish in New Mexico, Texas, Florida, and California, the British colonies were densely populated, less reliant on Native alliances, labor, and missions, and more covetous of Native lands.

As Europeans moved into American lands, they imposed their own particular imperial forms, adapting institutions of long standing or creating new mechanisms for managing distant dominions. For the English, expansion was initially the work of designated individuals or groups: noble proprietors given American lands or chartered companies deputized to develop specific regions. As more people moved into the English Atlantic, a few even set up squatter settlements that had no official authorization. Eventually a scattering of English outposts flourished with burgeoning populations and increasing maritime trading connections. Their success drew the attention of metropolitan authorities and, over time, the central government took direct control over the majority of these outposts. In every colony's case, royal authority was overlaid upon older ways of conducting business. By the mideighteenth century, most colonies had a governor and a council appointed by the king, as well as a legislative body to make local laws (that had to be, in most cases, approved by the monarch). In all places, law courts met, magistrates kept the peace, and title to lands passed to heirs. The particulars of a given place created variation; for instance, all colonies had laws governing the institution of slavery, but colonies with many slaves boasted more such regulations as well as harsher penalties for certain infractions. Despite local variants, British North American colonies carried similar features that made up a British imperial practice. Everywhere, slavery marked British America's major difference from the British Isles, where, despite the presence of a small enslaved Afro-British population, the American form of chattel slavery did not exist. As a rule, Britons did not migrate in large numbers to colonies that lacked a representative assembly to promote their interests. Historians are still tormented by this juxtaposition of American slavery and American freedom.

The American Revolution marked the denouement of this early era, in which the "America" of later volumes in this series was in the process of becoming, and the start of a new era, in which the

United States became a distinct entity — the America that henceforth interacted with the world. When the United States broke from Britain, that split drastically shifted how this part of America related to the world. Having been part of a global empire, British North America's interaction was previously shaped and limited by that fact. Although residents pursued their own trading policies and commercial connections to the extent that they were able, these activities took place within the context of overarching British policy. Similarly, the migrants who arrived and the relations with neighboring states were affected by the region's place in the empire. As a newly independent nation, the United States created new trade relationships beyond those that came to it within the bounds of empire, welcomed its own choice of European and inter-American migrants, hammered out its own foreign policy, and undertook not only the transportation of the enslaved Africans that American consumers wanted but also set its own policies about slavery and the slave trade without regard to changing metropolitan norms. The new United States had suddenly to construct its relationship to the wider world.

If one task of the volume is to use the messy, complicated, various, multidirectional early modern Atlantic-American world to explore the question of how the United States emerged, implicit in this question is a consideration of what emerged. Should we see the young republic as a departure from the early modern empires treated in this book, or as a successor to them? As the heir of Athenian democracy, Roman republicanism, Magna Carta, and medieval assemblies? Or of Athenian, Roman, and English imperialism and two millennia of Old World servitude revived in the new? A colonizer, certainly, and therefore inescapably an empire? Or a colonizer whose racial exclusivity was one technique for escaping empire — at a moral cost we are still reckoning with? Perhaps a republic, as Edmund Morgan warned us decades ago, not simply whose ideas of freedom arose in part from the practice of slavery, but whose republicanism made the United States in some respects and for some people preferable to a typical empire, for other peoples tragically worse. Early America has always been more diffuse than a straightforward national narrative might like; the question now is whether it is too diffuse for a cohesive national narrative to stand, or comprehensive enough to serve as a foundation on which a more perfect union can be built. These questions, as difficult to answer as they have ever been, are far from new. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 2: 1820-1900 edited by Kristin Hoganson, Jay Sexton [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419239]

The second volume of *The Cambridge History of America and the World* examines how the United States rose to great power status in the nineteenth century and how the rest of the world has shaped the United States. Mixing top-down and bottom-up perspectives, insider and outsider views, cultural, social, political, military, environmental, legal, technological, and other veins of analysis, it places the United States, Indigenous nations, and their peoples in the context of a rapidly integrating world. Specific topics addressed in the volume include nation and empire building, inter-Indigenous relations, settler colonialism, slavery and statecraft, the Mexican-American War, global integration, the antislavery international, the global dimensions of the Civil War, overseas empire-building, state formation, international law, global capitalism, border-crossing movement politics, technology, health, the environment, immigration policy, missionary endeavors, mobility, tourism, expatriation, cultural production, colonial intimacies, borderlands, the liberal North Atlantic, US-African relations, Islamic world encounters, the US island empire, the greater Caribbean world, and transimperial entanglements.

CONTENTS

List of Figures page

List of Maps

List of Tables

List of Contributors to Volume ^^

General Introduction: What is America and the World? MARK PHILIP BRADLEY

Introduction to Volume II JAY SEXTON AND KRISTIN HOGANSON

PART I BUILDING AND RESISTING US EMPIRE I The United States between Nation and Empire, 1776-1820 NICHOLAS GUYANA

2 • Indigenous Nations and the United States DONNA L. AKERS

3 Settler Colonialism JEFFREY OSTLER

4 Slavery and Statecraft ROBERT BONNER

5 The Mexican-American War ALICE L. BAUMGARTNER

6 Containing Empire: The United States and the World in the Civil War Era BRIAN SCHOEN

7 The United States in an Age of Global Integration, 1865-1897 DAVID SIM

8 • The Wars of 1898 and the US Overseas Empire JOHN LAWRENCE TONE

PART II IMPERIAL STRUCTURES

9 The US Fiscal-Military State and the Conquest of a Continent. 1783-1900 MAX M. EDLING

10 The United States and International Law: From the Transcontinental Treaty to the League of Nations Covenant, 1819-1919 AILEEN P. SCULLY

11 The United States and Global Capitalism DAEL A. NORWOOD

12 Making the First International: Nineteenth-Century Regimes of Surveillance, Accumulation, Resistance, and Abolition CHRISTINA HEATHERTON

13 The Military and US Engagements with the World, 1865-1900 DIRK BUNKER

14 Technology and US Foreign Relations in the Nineteenth Century PETER A. SHULMAN

15 The Environment, the United States, and the World in the Nineteenth Century ANDREW C. ISENBERG

PART III AMERICANS AND THE WORLD

16 Foreign Relations between Indigenous Polities, 1820-1900 BRIAN DELAY

17 Immigration Police and International Relations before 1924 MADELINE Y. HSU

18 The Antislavery International R. J. M. BLACKEN

19 American Missionaries in the World EMILY CONROY-KRUTZ

20 Mobilities: Travel, Expatriation, and Tourism BRIAN ROULEAU

21 Colonial Intimacies in US Empire TESSA MARIE WINKELMANN

22 Flowers for Washington: Cultural Production, Consumption, and the United States in the World DANIEL BENDER

PART IV AMERICANS IN THE WORLD

23 The Changing Geography of Mobility, 1820-1940 DONNA R. GABACCIA

24 The United States and the Greater Caribbean, 1763-1898 LUIS MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ

25 Borderlands and Border Crossings SAMUEL TRUETT

26 The Liberal North Atlantic LESLIE BUTLER

27 "To Enter America from Africa and Africa from America" during the Nineteenth Century JEANNETTE EILEEN JONES

28 Islamic World Encounters KARINE V. WALTHER

29 The American Island Empire: US Expansionism in the Pacific and the Caribbean JOANNA POBLETE

30 Inter-Imperial Entanglements in the Age of Imperial Globalization IAN TYRRELL

Index

Selections from the Introduction by Jay Sexton And Kristin Hoganson

The nineteenth century witnessed the transformation of the United States from an insecure association of erstwhile colonies to a continental empire with a global reach. Though forged in a struggle for independence from the British Empire, the United States became a formidable empire in its own right. Historians have long recognized the significance of this transition for the United States and the world, but they have given different meanings to it over time and place. In contrast to critics in Latin America, the Caribbean, and other loci of anti-imperialist sentiment, most US scholars writing before the Vietnam War and contemporaneous civil rights movement regarded the "rise" of the United States as something to be celebrated. America's republican institutions, in this telling, challenged the oppressive monarchical order of the Old World, while white settlers' extension of the North American "frontier" gave birth to an exceptionally democratic national character. Even as they denied the existence of US imperialism, such appraisals echoed the boasts of avid US empire builders, among them Massachusetts statesman Henry Cabot Lodge, who heralded the US "record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion" as "unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century."

Both imperial denial and self-congratulation came under increasingly intense criticism from the 1960s onwards. As the historical actors deemed worthy of study expanded and diversified — not coincidentally at the same time as did the historical profession — the nineteenth-century history of the United States began to look very different. The republican ideology of elite statesmen ceased to serve as cover for the exploitative practices of enslavement and colonial dispossession. A broader array of US historians looked beyond triumphalist accounts reeking of white nationalism to foreground other perspectives, such as those of Paiute activist Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins. In her autobiographical account, Hopkins described the violence that forced her people onto a reservation and the violence that followed them there, including an 1865 attack by US soldiers on a group of families encamped by a lake: "The soldiers rode up to their encampment and fired into it, and killed almost all the people that were there. Oh, it is a fearful thing to tell, but it must be told. Yes, it must be told by me." If Lodge's account is one of imperial advance, Hopkins's is one of national retreat and existential struggle, extending beyond the murderous attacks on her own people to the campaigns that her grandfather, in alliance with US forces, waged against Mexicans. As her account suggests, centering Indigenous peoples' experiences and perspectives brings different themes to light, including horrific violence, suffering, loss, survivance, strategic maneuvering, and anticolonial resistance.

As the blind spots of once-dominant nationalist narratives have become increasingly clear, the pursuit of US economic, strategic, and cultural interests has appeared less as a harbinger of a thoroughly progressive "American century," and more as manifestations of an imperial power with illiberal tendencies. By the turn of the twenty-first century, American "exceptionalism" had been turned on its head: From the vantage point of a more multiracial democracy and the precipitous heights of seeming hegemony after the Soviet collapse, the nineteenth-century United States stood out not only for its "blessings of liberty" but also for its relentless pursuit of economic advantage, racist hierarchies, and imperial domination.

This volume takes these recent reappraisals of US nation and empirebuilding as its cue. It starts from the premise that, though it pioneered forms of republican self-government, the nineteenth-century United States was an exclusionary nation-state forged in violence and an expansive, multiethnic imperial formation. This volume's other starting premise — that there is no single perspective or narrative that can fully capture the history of the United States in the world — makes this history of US imperialism appear more contested and thus less inevitable than celebrants have made it out to be. The history of nineteenth-century North America is teeming with alternative political formations, ranging from Indigenous alliance systems to maroon communities and breakaway settler republics, most notably the slaveholding Confederate States of America. Though widely manifest, US empire-

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

building in this period was certainly not destiny. The diverse peoples caught in the vortex of the expanding American empire were not passive pawns in imperial chess games; they were important foreign relations actors whose on-the-ground actions — from family formation to intercultural mediation, knowledge dissemination, economic production, resource exploitation, diplomatic negotiations, and armed resistance — shaped the character and boundaries of the expanding United States and the extraterritorial exercise and reach of US power. The history presented in this volume differs from traditional accounts of the "rise" of the United States — of both the celebratory and condemnatory types — by foregrounding the contingency and on occasion sheer chaos that characterized struggles for sovereignty and power in this period.

To make sense of this complex story, this volume places US history into its wider, oftentimes global, context. Vicissitudes in international capital markets, dynamics of colonial competition and collaboration, individual decisions of millions of migrants, voters, and consumers — all of these and more determined the trajectory of the United States. The US empire took root within a hospitable geopolitical environment, one that was rapidly integrating under the auspices of Europe's imperial powers. As an ascendant power in a multipolar world, the nineteenth-century United States benefited tremendously from its ties to the leading empires of the day, Britain foremost among them. Despite rivalries with other powers and a policy tradition of remaining neutral in European conflicts, the United States assembled tacit alliances based on race and culture, with its ruling classes aligning more with imperial powers and creole elites than subjugated peoples. Yet even as it profited from its relations with European empires, the United States rattled these empires through destabilizing exports such as evangelical Christianity, financial panics, and the anti-imperial nationalism articulated in the globally reproduced Declaration of Independence.

The coalescence and magnitude of the US empire along with Americans' ability to work with strategic partners in a larger world not of their own making ultimately shifted the gravity of global power. The events of the nineteenth century made the United States the leading force field of the twentieth. This volume tells the story of these converging developments, pairing its eye on the big-picture exercise of power with an eye on the ways things played out on the ground. Mixing top-down and bottom-up perspectives, insider and outsider views, cultural, social, political, military, environmental, legal, technological, and other veins of analysis, it places the United States, Indigenous nations, and their peoples in the context of a rapidly integrating world.

Building and Resisting US Empire

There was no masterplan that guided the imperial expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century. Rather, the building of the US empire was piecemeal and contingent, though marked by periodic flurries of significant development. This volume opens with the War of 1812, the new republic's "second war of independence" against Britain and its first major war against a Pan-Indian resistance movement. The significance of the war for the United States is to be found both in the nationalism and in the acceleration of the conquest of Indigenous territory that it unleashed. Both facets of the conflict came to be personified in the titanic, and controversial, celebrity of Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of New Orleans and the most notorious practitioner of Indigenous dispossession, including in Florida, acquired by treaty from Spain in 1821. There is perhaps no better personification than Jackson of the connection between the United States' ongoing struggle for independence in a European dominated world order and the rapid development of its own imperial practices. And yet it is worth remembering that Choctaws provided essential assistance to Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans and his subsequent victory at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Jackson achieved his victories through alliance politics that reveal some of the strategic calculations made by Indigenous people in increasingly constrained circumstances as well as the ongoing military capacity of Indigenous people in the trans-Appalachian West.

The anti-imperialist movement that arose in response to the Philippine-American War denounced the United States for coming full circle. The "antis" expressed horror and shock that the postcolonial polity born in a struggle against British rule had evolved into an ocean-spanning empire bent on crushing anticolonial resistance movements and governing subject peoples. But the circle had been closed from the start. As the arch imperialists of the dominant Republican Party insisted, the wars that rang out the century were not so much a new departure as they were an extension in circumference.

Imperial Structures

Contingent and haphazard though the expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century was, underlying structures channeled the development of the US empire. As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, these included legal systems, religious institutions, political movements, newspapers, magazines, the US military, racist and other ideologies, and diasporic networks. Environmental considerations also undergirded the growth of the American empire, which was powered by a fabulous array of resources, including water, soil, coal, minerals, and commodifiable animals. To illuminate the workings of power, the chapters that follow pay particular attention to two structural forces, capital and the state, which often worked in concert to advance the interests of the middle and upper classes.

The close connections between private capital and the state can be seen in the development of transportation and communication infrastructures. These infrastructures were central to the imperial expansion and integration of the United States, a geographically immense entity that by mid-century spanned the continent with extended tentacles to Caribbean, Pacific Island, Latin American, and trans-oceanic markets. The construction of sprawling and financially volatile transport systems integrated markets, funneled migrants along certain pathways, and helped to account for the shapeshifting footprint of the US empire. The canal boom of the 1820s, which decreased transport costs, brought producers, traders, and consumers into closer association, and spurred financial innovations, including public subsidies to private transportation companies, set the stage for the era of steam that followed.

The spread of steam power in the mid-nineteenth century shifted an already rapid process of infrastructure development into hyperdrive. Even before the conclusion of the Mexican-American War, the United States government subsidized shipping lines that connected its ports on the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. By 1855 the United States had inaugurated regularly timetabled steam transportation between New York and San Francisco, with stops in Havana and the de facto US colony along the Panamanian transit route. Though only forty-seven miles long, the Wall Street-owned Panama Railroad became a vital node within a broader transportation network that channeled connections between hitherto distant peoples and markets. As early as 1860, the United States had more railroad mileage than the rest of the world combined, including what was then the longest railroad in the world, the Illinois Central, which connected Chicago and its midwestern hinterlands to the pulsing Caribbean port city, New Orleans. What an earlier generation of "transportation revolution" historians characterized as "internal improvements" were in truth a manifestation and enabler of imperial development.

Americans and the World

The title of this volume, "America and the World," may bring to mind a single entity, "America," but one of the main takeaways of this volume is that this abstraction hides the complexity of its many component parts. To be sure, the pages that follow contain plenty of analysis of state actions and

actors. Yet they also illuminate divisions among state actors as well as the historical significance of non-state actors. By opening the subject out beyond the state, the volume brings to light previously overlooked histories of Americans in the world. The diverse cast of characters who play a role in this history serves as a reminder that the category "American" has not always been self-evident. For starters, it is a European-origin term applied to the people of an entire hemisphere. But even if we take the word Americans to refer specifically to US Americans, this designation was not always clear cut in an age of shifting allegiances, stateless populations (such as enslaved workers and the Indigenous people subject to US sovereignty), racist restrictions on political inclusion, the assumption that a married woman's citizenship should be that of her husband, and tremendous human mobility.

Even as the people of the United States ventured beyond established borders, in many cases pushing and tugging those borders toward their new homes, the United States also drew millions of newcomers in, attracting an estimated 25 percent of international migrants in the long nineteenth century. For most of the nineteenth century, the British Isles, including Ireland, were the source of the majority of immigrants to the United States. Arrivals from German states and, to a lesser degree, Scandinavia, also figured largely in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The demographics of immigration changed in the final decades of the century with the arrival of "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe. Immigration from across the Pacific also grew in this period. The 1868 Burlingame Treaty with Qing China facilitated the arrival of workers desired by Western railroad builders. As early as 1870, the percentage of the nation's population that was foreign born surpassed 14 percent. It would remain around this level until 1920, peaking at 14.8 percent in 1890.

Earlier generations of historians were preoccupied with how migrant communities became "American," as they allegedly dissolved into a mythic "melting pot." But the inverse dynamic — how foreign-born migrants recast the American crucible — looms larger in this volume's chapters. The immigration booms of the nineteenth century provided the labor-hungry US economy with the muscle its growing industries and homesteads required. New arrivals — many of them not yet naturalized — provided military power in the United States' greatest moment of need: no less than a quarter of the mighty Union army in the Civil War was foreign born. Migrants brought to America their languages, cultures, religions, and social practices, diversifying their new homeland in the process.

Important, too, were the nativist backlashes that became a defining feature of US politics. The unprecedented inflow of Irish Catholics during the 1840s potato famine triggered the meteoric rise of the anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Party. Though the Know-Nothings soon dissolved as a distinct political organization, they anticipated future nativist movements. Prominent among the legislative results yielded by the anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic and anti-Asian xenophobia of the Gilded Age was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, a prototype for future discriminatory immigration restrictions. A short-term implication of Chinese exclusion, however, was to reveal the incapacity of the United States to enforce its borders. In the absence of a federal immigration facility, the United States outsourced the implementation of restrictions to an overburdened consular service and to private shipping companies. The ethno-nationalist nativists of the coming decades took on board this lesson, engineering a more powerful state apparatus capable of surveillance, border enforcement, and deportation. By the 1920s, nativism and state capacity met in the form of the National Origins Act, which filtered immigrants according to their presumed racial characteristics.

As the vast cast of characters who participated in US foreign relations suggests, there was a staggeringly wide array of interests at stake. There was no helmsman directing the United States in the nineteenth century; rather, competing interests jostled to turn the wheel of this motley ship of

state in directions of their choosing. The result was a nation whose foreign relations were notorious for sudden zigs and zags. The objectives of human traffickers were in direct opposition to those of the people they trafficked; tariff promoters found their opposition in importers; immigration restrictionists among those more open to new arrivals; proponents of an empire of slavery among those who envisioned one of freedom or no empire at all. Self-interest, religious interests, racist interests, ethnic interests, class interests: all had their proponents. So did non-US national interests, as advanced not only by Confederates but also by expatriate Cubans, Fenians, and other diasporic nationalists resident in the United States. Encompassing humanitarians, filibusterers, reformers, blockade runners, naval theorists, consumers, political theorists, refugees, labor migrants, commercial agents, itinerant performers, the offense intellectuals (as opposed to defense intellectuals) of US expansionism, and others, this volume pushes past the homogenizing abstraction of "America and the world" to bring to light the textured history of Americans in the world. And even as Americans abroad often sought to extend their own values and lifestyles, US foreign relations played a pivotal role in constituting the racialized, class conscious, gendered, religiously informed, politically driven, and indeed, nationalist world views that these "Americans" held so dear.

America in the World

Yet one more theme that carries prominently through this volume is the making of space. From our current perspective, much of the contents of this volume pertains to what is now US domestic history. But places such as Florida, Texas, New Mexico, the Great plains, Oregon, California, Hawai'i, Alaska, and Puerto Rico were not part of the United States at the start of our story. They were the lands of people such as the Seminoles, Karankawas, pueblos, Navajos, Utes, Sioux, Modocs, Yumas, Washoes, Mojaves, Hawaiians, Tlingits, Inupiat, and Yupiks, as well as places claimed by the Spanish and Russian empires, and by 1821, newly independent Mexico. The US nationals who ventured into such places were as much extraterritorial Americans as were the filibusters who went to Nicaragua and the goldseekers who crossed the Isthmus of Panama en route to California. After proclaiming themselves as separate from the United States for four years in the 1860s, the Confederate States of America attacked the United States and its citizens on land and sea. The eventual incorporation of all these places into the United States should not erase this past, nor its ongoing legacies for Indigenous nations, other peoples brought into the US fold, and the ways in which the United States has been always, simultaneously, both a nation in the making and a de facto empire. The stories of the places that got away — places such as Canada, Cuba, and Santo Domingo that were not annexed despite filibustering and state efforts to bring them under US jurisdiction — remind us that the current boundaries of the United States were never the inevitable outcome of some kind of divinely determined manifest destiny, but rather the contingent result of conflict and negotiation.

The current borders of the United States were also the product of its selective embrace of demographic mobility. Freedom of movement was integral to America's democratic identity and social consciousness. The United States was a nation perpetually on the move. But not all of the inhabitants of North America determined when and how they relocated. Enslavers and government agents forcibly relocated African Americans and Indigenous people, whether in chained comes or under the armed guard of removal agents, and they spatially constrained racialized groups through such measures as internment on reservations, the ruthless tracking efforts of slave patrols, and incarceration on military posts and in penal institutions. Oppressed racial groups responded with subversive movement: Indigenous peoples evaded their would-be captors and slipped away from reservations; enslaved workers followed the "Underground Railroad" toward freedom, in many cases in Canada and Mexico; and — most successfully of all — fled in large numbers toward Union lines during the Civil War, leading to the implosion of the Confederate slave empire.

This volume echoes previous accounts in its attention to European imperial powers. Yet along with highlighting the significance of the North Atlantic, it also tilts the East-West, US-European, axis that has captured so much attention in accounts of US foreign relations in this period. By reckoning more fully with the imperial scope of European states, the chapters in this volume add North-South depth to transatlantic relationships. In addition to drawing more attention to places such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, and mission sites from Africa to East Asia, they broaden the scope of analysis beyond bilateral framings to show how entire matrices of power shaped US relations with European empires and the rest of the world. Taken together, the stories of continental and overseas connections disprove old theses of US isolationism during the nineteenth century. Across vast geographies and interests, Americans sought cross-border connections, often working in conjunction with other states and foreign nationals to achieve their ends.

If the United States and its nationals did not truly have direct relations with the entire world by the end of the nineteenth century, the nation's official representatives and its private sector were certainly active participants in a globally networked system, just a handful of intermediaries away from microbes, merchandise, and news emanating from far reaches of the world.

This was the era in which the United States reached its maximum territorial size, before the relinquishment of the Philippines in the mid-twentieth century and the loss of low-lying coastal areas to the rising seas of the twenty-first century. As the United States grew in population, domain, power, and impact, new technologies seemed to shrink the world by speeding connections along the proliferating and intertwined routes of capital and empire. This is not to say that globalization proceeded in linear fashion: interconnectivity sparked disaggregative impulses such as higher tariffs, quarantines, border patrols, and immigration restrictions. The term "America first" emerged at the end of the century, in response to the all-too-palpable power of global capitalism. Yet long before the word "globalization" entered the Anglophone lexicon, its effects were palpable from banana plantations to dining rooms; steerage to guided tours; extractive frontiers to secret ballots; women's rights campaigns to opium interdiction efforts, *Wild West* shows to fairground encounters among Native peoples on display.

By the dawn of the so-called American century, most Americans reveled in their nation's power, celebrating US practices and attainments as harbingers of the future. Nevertheless, before the hubris-inducing victory in World War I, even prideful Americans understood their nation as a newly arrived power that might still learn from more time-tested empires and progressive pathbreakers. For all its power and ambition, the United States remained dispensable in most parts of the world. For all its potency, it could not impose its will at whim. Those who failed to grasp the extent to which the wider world had shaped the contours and character of the United States may have regarded it as a singular beacon, but the chapters that follow present the nineteenth-century United States as an empire among empires, even as it laid the groundwork for the awesome exercise of power to come. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 3: 1900–1945 edited by Brooke L. Blower, Andrew Preston [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419260]

The third volume of *The Cambridge History of America and the World* covers the volatile period between 1900 and 1945 when the United States emerged as a world power and American engagements abroad flourished in new and consequential ways. Showcasing the most innovative

approaches to both traditional topics and emerging themes, leading scholars chart the complex ways in which Americans projected their growing influence across the globe; how others interpreted and constrained those efforts; how Americans disagreed with each other, often fiercely, about foreign relations; and how race, religion, gender, and other factors shaped their worldviews. During the early twentieth century, accelerating forces of global interdependence presented Americans, like others, with a set of urgent challenges from managing borders, humanitarian crises, economic depression, and modern warfare to confronting the radical, new political movements of communism, fascism, and anticolonial nationalism. This volume will set the standard for new understandings of this pivotal moment in the history of America and the world.

CONTENTS

List of Figures page

List of Maps

List of Contributors to Volume III

General Introduction: What is America and the World? MARK PHILIP BRADLEY

Introduction to Volume III BROOKE L. BLOWER AND ANDREW PRESTON

PART I AMERICAN POWER IN THE MODERN ERA

1 The Sinews of Globalization KATHERINE C. EPSTEIN

2 The Territorial Empire DANIEL IMMERWAHR

3 Waging World War I JENNIFER D. KEENE

4 Technological Transformations MICHAEL ADAS

5 Law and American Power BENJAMIN A. COATES

6 Latin America and US Global Governance REBECCA HERMAN

7 Transatlantic Relations MARIO DEL PERO

8 The Open Door, Tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Union DAVID S. FOGLESONG

9 The Rise of the Modern Middle East CHARLIE LADERMAN

10 Competing Empires in Asia SHEILA MIYOSHI JAGER

11 Making a Modern Military MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

PART II COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

12 Fighting Jim Crow in a World of Empire ADRIANE LENTZ-SMITH

13 Wilsonianism and Its Critics JOHN A. THOMPSON

14 Humanitarianism and US Foreign Assistance JULIA F. IRWIN

15 Women's Politics in International Context MEGAN THRELKELD

16 The October Revolution and the American Left TONY MICHELS

17 Sexuality and Sexual Politics DAVID MINTO

18 Religious World Views MATTHEW AVERY SUTTON

19 Indigenous Sovereignities and Social Movements MEGAN BLACK

20 Fascism and Nativism MICHAELA HOENICKE MOORS

PART III THE PERILS OF INTERDEPENDENCE

21 Borders and Migrants MEREDITH OVEN

22 Economic Catastrophes ERIC RAUCHWAY

23 Corporate Imperialism and the World of Goods NAN ENSTAD

24 The Body Politics of US Imperial Power SHANON FITZPATRICK

25 Agriculture and Biodiversity COURTNEY FULLILOVE

26 Worlds of International Development DAVID EKBLADH

27 Preserving Peace and Neutrality ANDREW JOHNSTONE

28 The American Way in World War II THOMAS W. ZEILER

29 The Republic of Science and the Atomic Bomb ANDREW J. ROTTER

30 Visions of One World EREZ MANELA

Index

On the eve of the twentieth century, the devoted British imperialist Rudyard Kipling made his first visit to the United States. Arriving at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel, he found the gilt and mirrored

bar "crammed with people talking about money, and spitting everywhere." Others — he called them "barbarians" — "charged in and out of this inferno with letters and telegrams in their hands." Outside, the streets of this so-called most American city assaulted the young poet's senses. He discovered no color or beauty, only dirt for air, drab stone flagging underfoot, and overhead a tangle of wires and "absurd advertisements" for overpriced, inferior goods. Having seen firsthand the "grotesque ferocity" of the Midwest's largest metropolis, he desired "never to see it again." Chicago, he said, was "inhabited by savages" who seemed to have no higher purpose than personal profit. Americans, he thought, had yet to develop the will to use their political and economic gifts to earn themselves a place among the world's leading nations.

Many Americans understandably did not share Kipling's pessimism about their nation's potential and defensively countered such judgments. Preaching at Washington, DC's Metropolitan Methodist Church on New Year's Eve, 1899, with President William McKinley and his family listening on from their personal pew, Reverend Frank A. Bristol extolled the glorious global future that awaited the United States. "America has not proven herself a coward in the face of sublime and awful duty," he boasted, and for that reason Americans had been entrusted with the fate "of the civilized and civilizing nations of the world." The "unforeseen" struggle to bring the Philippines under control was the first of what would surely be many tests, but Reverend Bristol welcomed their coming. "God," he continued, "has taken the light of our glorious Americanism out from under the bushel and put it on the candlestand, nay, on the mountain-top; nay, in the highest heaven." McKinley, a devout Methodist who had decided to colonize the Philippines in the name of humanity, must have agreed.

But other Americans decidedly did not. Staring at the start of a new century, only five years after becoming the first Black recipient of a Ph.D. from Harvard University, the activist and scholar W. E. B. Du Bois saw the moment as an opportunity not for Americans to emulate the civilizing pretenses of European imperialists but to forsake them entirely in favor of greater racial equality and inclusion. "In this age, when the ends of the world are being brought so near together," he told attendees at the first Pan-Africa conference gathered in London in July of 1900, "the millions of black men in Africa, America, and the Islands of the Sea, not to speak of the brown and yellow myriads elsewhere, are bound to have great influence upon the world in the future, by reason of sheer numbers and physical contact." He appealed to the United States and the other "Great Powers of the Civilized world" to recognize that "the problem of the twentieth century" would be "the problem of the color line," and to reflect on "how far differences of race — which show themselves chiefly in the color of the skin and the texture of the hair — will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization." White men like Kipling and Bristol had assumed themselves to be the rightful leaders and sole interpreters of the world and its future. But during the first half of the twentieth century a growing chorus of voices like that of Du Bois rose to challenge them.

As these contrasting prophecies suggest, there was nothing inevitable about US global ascendancy. In 1900, the United States was still a developing nation with a predominantly rural population. It may have just emerged as the world's preeminent industrial and agricultural producer, but this remarkable growth masked chaotic boom and bust cycles and enormous inequalities. By other measures, the United States lagged far behind the most powerful nations in Europe, which dominated international affairs. London investors underwrote US industrialization and westward expansion. To project their power internationally, Americans relied on the financial resources and communications and transportation links forged and maintained by the British. The US Foreign Service comprised very few ambassadors and largely amateur, unpaid consuls. The nation's armed forces did not even rank among the world's top ten militaries. The US Navy depended on the coaling and bunkering stations of Britain's superior fleet, and in 1900, the US Army was bogged down in a protracted war with Emilio Aguinaldo's hastily assembled freedom fighters in the

Philippines. Many, like Kipling, dismissed the United States as a backwater. Aspiring American artists, intellectuals, architects, and others — John Singer Sargent, Mary Cassatt, Henry Ossawa Tanner, and Edith Wharton among them — sought training and inspiration in the universities, ateliers, and salons across the Atlantic. At home, aspirational Americans decorated their parlors with luxurious imports from Europe and Asia, but Europeans and Asians did not yet in turn crave the American consumer goods that would later become so ubiquitous in the world's markets. Little suggested that the United States would become the site of some of the modern age's most incredible technological and cultural innovations. The automobile, the radio, cinema — they had all been invented in Europe.

Yet by 1945 the United States would conquer an overseas empire, fight its first wars on the mainlands of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and supplant Europe as the nerve-center of industrial capitalism. By then Americans had built a modern welfare and warfare state, knitted together not only by national markets and communication networks but also by a widely shared sense of international importance and duty. While much of the rest of the world lay in ruins, the United States had raised the world's largest navy and air forces and its second largest army; it had invented the world's first nuclear weapons. The nation's universities and laboratories drained talent from abroad. Its consumer goods, movies, music, fads, and fashions poured outward, inspiring or angering millions beyond US borders. In retrospect the period's most startling development would be clear: during the twentieth century's first forty-five years, in the midst of a deadly era of sickness, famine, economic crisis, and global warfare, the United States became the most powerful nation in the world, possibly the most powerful for over a millennium.

Given the enormity of US state capacity at the end of World War II— and its further growth in subsequent decades — scholars of modern American foreign relations have often paid far more attention to the twentieth century's second half than its first. By the measurements of the national security state and prolonged conflicts of the Cold War, these earlier decades seemed little more than prologue. During and after World War II, internationalists who advocated sustained and even pre-emptive US intervention in world affairs laid the groundwork for such an assessment by promoting the idea that the United States had been misguidedly "isolationist" before 1941. Especially after Woodrow Wilson's brief and unhappy attempt at global leadership during World War I, longstanding conventional wisdom held, the nation turned sharply inward with fatal consequences that should never be repeated again. Historians who focused on formal US relations with Europe during the 1920s and 1930s found much to substantiate this interpretation. Congress, after all, refused to join the League of Nations, offer a security guarantee to France, or reconsider Allied war debts, and it passed a series of tariffs and neutrality acts that undermined the possibility for international economic cooperation and curtailed the president's ability to support overseas allies.

But over time two methodological shifts in the field have challenged these assumptions and revived a widespread interest in this period. First, as more and more scholars explore Americans' connections to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, they have broadened our understanding of the scope of US engagements beyond the North Atlantic world, dramatizing in the process just how Eurocentric the narrative of American isolationism has been. Second, as scholars have reconceptualized the nature of power itself — recognizing it not only in the hands of official statesmen but all kinds of informal actors, and finding its operations not only in the halls of government but also in everyday places and encounters — they have revealed the often subtle but consequential ways in which Americans projected their influence, or reckoned with that of others, especially at a time before the US state assumed such large proportions.

The rich histories that have emerged in recent decades offer deeper insight into the spectacular transformation of the United States from regional upstart to global superpower, casting that process not as a straightforward success story but as one founded on a series of unresolved contradictions.

As actors on the world stage, Americans appeared liberal yet imperial, internationalist but also nationalist, progressive but at the same time often reactionary, sometimes peaceful and at other times militaristic, promoting self-determination but denying it to millions, intent on making the world safe for democracy while sanctioning racist hierarchies both at home and abroad, founding the League of Nations only to turn away from it. How these habits of engagement took shape — how Americans fought over and wielded their newfound influence, how they sometimes made shrewd decisions and at other times squandered goodwill, how their hopes and hypocrisies animated their evolving world views, and how their impact unfolded on a global scale — is the subject of this volume.

American Power in the Modern Era

The period between the Civil War and World War I[^] marked a time of tremendous social and economic change as well as a burst of technological innovation that was unprecedented then, and possibly unmatched since. A number of modernizing developments that began in the nineteenth century — a set of processes the historian C. A. Bayly aptly dubbed "the great acceleration" — picked up pace and intensity after 1900.⁴ Steamships, railroads, automobiles, airplanes, telegraphs, telephones, and wireless communications such as radio brought people all over the world into closer and closer contact. Meanwhile, the advent of new industrial methods, such as standardized Fordist assembly-line production, and technological advances in electricity and petrochemicals reshaped daily life for millions worldwide. The result, which came much later to be known as globalization — with nations not just interconnected but interdependent, and societies not simply associated but increasingly integrated — dramatically altered the expectations, and the fates, of people around the world. Faster and cheaper forms of transportation enabled migrants to traverse vast distances in search of higher wages and better lives. Global migrant streams, which peaked in the 1910s and 1920s, linked Italian villages with Argentine homesteads, Polish shtetls with American factories, Chinese ports with Sumatran plantations, and Indian towns with South African mines. All kinds of other travel opportunities, for business and pleasure, proliferated during this the age that brought forth the opening of the Panama Canal and the gift of flight. Ritual journeys once reserved for the elite, from the Grand Tour of Europe to the Hajj to Mecca, suddenly fell within reach of the masses.

Competing Perspectives

Americans' world views and foreign policy preferences ran along all kinds of fault lines during the first half of the twentieth century. Matters of trade and tariffs pitted producers against consumers. Assessments of security threats often differed by region; fears about Asian migration, a so-called "yellow peril," emanated from the West Coast while calls for military "preparedness" against German militarism animated elites on the East Coast. Religious leaders offered contrasting solutions to the problems of the world and how the nation should use its growing power. With their extensive overseas missionary network, mainline — that is, mainstream and establishment — Protestants stood among the most prominent advocates of a new, US-led world order. Wilson's diplomatic ambitions, and later those of Franklin Roosevelt, drew heavily from the currents of their thought, especially ideas about ecumenical cooperation. However, fundamentalists, so-called because they refused to compromise the tenets of faith to the onrush of modernity, excoriated international organizations as violations of US sovereignty and the purity of the nation's Christian identity. In the process, they forged a new, long-enduring strain of populist antiglobalism.

The perils of Interdependence

Many Americans hoped that as the world became more interdependent, it would become more peaceful and just. Clearly this did not happen; the first half of the twentieth century stands as one of the most violent eras in human history. The heightened pace and intensity of interaction meant not just new opportunities but also new vulnerabilities. Knowledge spread faster and easier, but so did pathogens. Commodities traveled farther and wider, but so did market crashes. The facility of movement brought the world's cultures more frequently into contact, but the same could be said for its rival militaries. By the end of the era, the perils of interdependence threatened to destroy the world itself.

In one of the era's cruelest ironies, the forces of globalization actually stimulated national rivalries and set the states of Europe, and in time others, on the path toward the Great War (1914-18). The ability to have a "world war" — to mobilize more than 100 million soldiers and sailors, bring Australians to fight in Gallipoli and Gaza, deploy Senegalese troops to the fields of Flanders, send Indians to invade German East Africa, and cause Americans to lock arms in the woods of Belleau — required modern transportation networks capable of shipping men, horses, and materiel over vast distances. It also took modern industrial production and weapons technologies to produce a crisis of such magnitude that it toppled four empires, wiped entire villages off of the map, and killed upwards of 20 million people. The war's knock-on effects caused even more dislocation. Millions of Armenians, Jews, and others fled as the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires crumbled, new ethnic-nationalist authorities took charge, or as entire regions descended into chaos and civil war. The movements of so many troops and refugees added deadly fuel to the flu pandemic of 1918-19. Following an early outbreak among conscripts at Camp Funston in Kansas, the disease ripped through the close quarters of other camps, barracks, and mass transports worldwide before ultimately infecting a third of humanity and killing 50 million people, including some 675,000 Americans, more than twelve and a half times as many US citizens as had died during World War I itself.

Americans' ambivalence about their place in the world matched an unease about US power felt by many others witnessing the end of World War II. This was fitting, for people and events elsewhere would shape Americans' engagement with the rest of the world after 1945. Imprisoned since 1942 at Ahmednagar Fort for his part in the Quit India movement, the Indian nationalist Jawaharlal Nehru found plenty of time to think about the rapidly changing world outside. Into his prison notes he poured arguments for India's freedom and a manifesto for the anticolonial uprising that was about to sweep across much of the planet. A year after Nehru regained his freedom in June 1945, and the year before he became the first prime minister of an independent India, he published his wartime writings as *The Discovery of India*. His was a defiantly anti-Eurocentric book, but one that also came with a foreboding prediction: "Whatever the future may hold," the future leader of the Non-Alignment Movement warned, "it is dear that the economy of the U.S.A. after the war will be powerfully expansionist and almost explosive in its consequences. Will this lead to some new kind of imperialism? It would be yet another tragedy if it did so, for America has the power and opportunity to set the pace for the future."

Nehru was prescient. In the decades following World War II, the United States would be both expansionist and explosive. Its consumer-capitalist economy fueled spectacular growth in Europe and elsewhere, leading even the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm to call the postwar decades "the Golden Years." But the United States would prove to be explosive in other ways, too, not least as Cold War calculations eclipsed commitments to decolonization, leading to protracted wars and heavy-handed covert operations especially in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As Nehru

appreciated, the conditions for this kind of vast influence did not emerge suddenly in 1945. They were products of ambitions and sensibilities developed during the first forty-five years of the twentieth century when Americans dramatically expanded their investments beyond US shores, both through the political and military power of the national state, and through private institutions and the transnational travels and interactions of thousands of citizens learning to think about what it would mean to be an American in the modern world. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 4: 1945 TO THE PRESENT edited by David C. Engerman, Max Paul Friedman, Melani McAlister [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419277]

The fourth volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World examines the heights of American global power in the mid-twentieth century and how challenges from at home and abroad altered the United States and its role in the world. The second half of the twentieth century marked the pinnacle of American global power in economic, political, and cultural terms, but even as it reached such heights, the United States quickly faced new challenges to its power, originating both domestically and internationally. Highlighting cutting-edge ideas from scholars from all over the world, this volume anatomizes American power as well as the counters and alternatives to 'the American empire.' Topics include US economic and military power, American culture overseas, human rights and humanitarianism, third-world internationalism, immigration, communications technology, and the Anthropocene.

CONTENTS

List of Figures page

List of Maps

List of Contributors to Volume IV

General Introduction: What is America and the World? MARK PHILIP BRADLEY

Introduction to Volume IV DAVID C. ENGERMAN, MAX PAUL FRIEDMAN, AND MELANI MCALISTER

PART I ORDERING A WORLD OF STATES

1. Global Capitalist Infrastructure and US Power VANESSA OGLE

2. Overseas Bases and the Expansion of US Military Presence GRETCHEN HEEFNER

3. The Consolidation of the Nuclear Age MICHAEL D. GORDIN

4. American Knowledge of the World NICHOLAS DIRKS AND NILS GILMAN

5. The American Construction of the Communist Threat KENNETH OSGOOD

6. The Fractured World of the Cold War MARK ATWOOD LAWRENCE

7. The US and the United Nations System DAVID BOSCO

8. American Development Aid, Decolonization, and the Cold War CORINNA R. UNGER

9. Decolonization and US Intervention in Asia CHRISTOPHER GOSCHA

PART II CHALLENGING A WORLD OF STATES

10. US Foreign Policy and the End of Development BRAD SIMPSON 11. Oil and American 11. Insecurity CHRISTOPHER R. W. DIETRICH

12. US Mass Culture and Consumption in a Global Context PETRA GOEDDE

13. Imperial Visions of the World PENNY VON ESCHEN

14. Human Rights BARBARA KEYS

15. Compassion and Humanitarianism in International Relations MICHAEL BARNETT

16. Third World Internationalism and the Global Color Line CHARISSE BURDEN-STELLY AND GERALD HORNS

17. The Queering of US Geopolitics JULIO CAPO, JR.

18. Migration, War, and the Transformation of the US Population MADDALENA MARINARI
19. Christian and Muslim Transnational Networks ZAREENA GREWAL
20. Native Americans, Indigeneity, and US Foreign Policy PAUL C. ROSIER
21. Environment, Climate, and Global Disorder STEPHEN MACEKURA
22. Detente and the Reconfiguration of Superpower Relations JUSSI M. HAMHIMAKI
- PART III NEW WORLD DISORDER?
23. The Illusions of the United States Great Power Politics after the Cold War FRITZ BARTEL
24. Neoliberalism as a Form of US Power DANIEL SARGENT
25. The US Construction of "Islam" as Ally and Enemy on the Global Stage DEEPA KUMAR
26. Technology and Networks of Communication STEPHANIE RICKER SCHULTE
27. Humanitarian Intervention and US Power RAJAN MENON
28. Refugees, Statelessness, and the Disordering of Citizenship STEPHEN R. PORTER
29. Liberty, Security, and America's War on Terror KAREN J. GREENBERG
30. The Global Wars on Terror AARON O'CONNELL
31. America and the World in the Anthropocene JOSHUA HOWE
- Index

This volume of *The Cambridge History of America and the World* opens as World War II ends and the United States stands at the pinnacle of its power relative to the rest of the world. Indexes of that power abound: In 1950, for instance, the United States accounted for only 6.0 percent of the world population — but 27.3 percent of all economic activity (and a far larger share of industrial production), along with 66.3 percent of world military expenditure. Other forms of American global power were just as significant but harder to measure: the United States had taken the lead diplomatically, treating wartime allies like England and France as junior partners; it took a harsher attitude toward its other major wartime ally, the USSR. Economic and military strength, along with the ability to shape world politics — these very real and concrete forms of global power — were hardly the only dimensions of American power in the decades since World War II. By the 1940s, American firms had already begun shaping consumption patterns, especially in Europe; products of American movie studios appeared in an increasing share of cinemas worldwide, prompting fan clubs but also official restrictions. These trends were not new to the 1940s, but in most cases had been building over the previous decades, through world wars and economic crisis. But with the conclusion of World War II, these different vectors of American power had come together at a crucial moment.

The apogee of American power came just as an imperial order — which had organized the globe around European metropolises for centuries — began its uneven demise. And new technologies of communication and modes of social organization would shape not just the arenas of diplomacy and economic power but aspects of everyday life the world over. American power thus arrived at a particularly plastic moment in world history.

The 1940s marked, also, a particularly plastic moment in the history of the United States: Depression, war, and their aftermath had prompted new forms of social mobilization and new visions of organizing economy and society. Just as the United States came to have greater influence — economically, politically, culturally — on the world, so too did the world play a greater role in the United States, shaping cultural production, social movements, and everyday life in new and even unprecedented ways.

Any study of "America and the World" must reckon with these different forms available within the possibilities of the vague conjunction "and." Topics covered in "America and the World" thus include the trajectory of American influence upon the world, the domestic reconfigurations of a national security state, and the domestic and global impact of the deeper enmeshment of the United States in global flows of people, ideas, technologies, and capital. This volume seeks to present a historical arc

over some seventy-plus years after 1945, in some cases moving into the first years of the presidency of Donald J. Trump. Whether in the 1950s or in the 2000s, the extension of American power gave rise to countervailing forces and coincided with an increasing sense of American vulnerability. For example, new openness to immigration sparked a strong reaction against it. And the geographic spread of the US military presence provided new sites to contest American power. Such tensions and reversals do not lend themselves to a single authoritative interpretation; this would be challenge enough among the three co-editors, let alone among the thirty-three contributors. In assembling the chapters that follow, we have sought to highlight not just broad interpretations of changing American relations to the world, but also the internal fissures, divergences, and contradictions that came with that increased power.

This is a propitious moment to undertake a scholarly reexamination of the relationship of America and the world in the late twentieth century. For decades, professional divisions of historical labor tended to leave international topics to diplomatic historians who explored the formal relations between states, all too often from the sole perspective of the United States. Heated debates about the nature and operations of American power offered thorough details of motivations and politics on the US side — but had little to say about the motives, the purposes, or even the actions of those with whom American diplomats interacted. By the same token, those scholars who focused on social, cultural, and intellectual history felt comfortable within American borders — more comfortable, at times, than did their cosmopolitan subjects. Yet in the last quarter-century or so, the study of American history has undergone an energizing reorientation.

Since the early 1990s, scholars interested in expanding the horizons of diplomatic history have joined with social, cultural, and intellectual historians looking abroad. They have done so both within the nomenclature of existing fields as well as in this new field of "America and the World." The intellectual antecedents and institutional movers behind these changes are many and varied, but include increasing attention to flows of people, texts, and ideas across national borders; growing attention to the roles of actors beyond the US State Department and the White House; and a focus on the ways that activists drew energy from international events and movements — and on the ways that international events could shape domestic movements.

These changes were especially visible in studies of US global engagements after 1945. One index for the expanding enterprise of "America and the World" is the annual conference and the journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Founded in the late 1960s as social history began to take root in the American historical profession, this new organization brought together those interested in studying the history of American foreign policy. Debates within the field were varied and frequently fierce, but typically revolved around approval or disapproval of specific American foreign-policy decisions, often linked directly or indirectly to questions about contemporary US politics. When SHAFR created a journal, *Diplomatic History*, the early issues had an eagle on the cover. Changes in the field were driven above all by archival openings, tracking closely the declassification of diplomatic records; the subfield came of age racing to interpret newly available American archival materials from the 1940s and 1950s. The subfield grew rapidly, and focused increasingly on studies of the post-World War II period. But this growth unfolded in ways that frequently led diplomatic historians to criticize "mainstream" study of American history, which in this telling had left state power behind in favor of social and cultural history. A number of criticisms of the field — from within and without — only increased the alienation of diplomatic historians through the 1980s.

In the subsequent decade, however, the tide began to turn. Key diplomatic historians ushered in new approaches to scholarship by advising the work of students who did not abide by the previous assumptions and strictures of the field. Senior scholars, in their capacities as journal editors and

program committee chairs, self-consciously opened these core vehicles of scholarly communication to a wider set of voices. Pioneering works of scholarship showed just how much these new approaches could achieve. As the momentum for looking beyond the State Department grew, SHAFR also welcomed cultural and social historians whose own interests had led them to look beyond the borders of the United States. The result was a vibrant organization that hosted an increasingly diverse and intellectually dynamic field. And no area was more energized by these new approaches than studies of the post-World War II period.

This internalise account — which focuses on scholars interacting with each other and their sources — is, of course, only one way to tell the story. Another would be to see the changes in the field since the 1980s in conversation with historical circumstances. It might not be such a surprise, for instance, that the Cold War shaped scholarly discourse about foreign relations; arguments about diplomatic history were — often explicitly — arguments about the Cold War itself. The sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War led to a period in which globalization became a cause for both celebration and criticism. And who, after the events of September 11, 2001, could say that American power abroad had no effect on life within the United States?

Whatever the origins of the field's transformation, "America and the World" has become a scholarly enterprise all its own. Those publishing work under its banner vary markedly in their subjects of interest as well as their views of American power. We have tried in this volume to represent as wide a range of perspectives and approaches as we can. This volume of *The Cambridge History of America and the World*, like those that precede it, assembles scholars well-positioned to write authoritative accounts, to fashion their own arguments, and to offer not just coverage of events and trends but new ways of thinking about their topics.

These new histories, and new generations of historians, have helped reinterpret many aspects of the United States since 1945. This work has, among other things, brought about new understandings of the Cold War and the United States. The period following 1945 included — but was not limited to — the global American-Soviet conflict, which ended with the transformation and collapse of the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991. A history of America and the world that ignored the origins, operations, and implications of this global ideological conflict would be profoundly incomplete; the Cold War structured American foreign policy, most obviously, but also its domestic political, economic, and cultural orders. By the same token, the Cold War hardly encompassed everything Americans thought and did for over the four-plus decades of American—Soviet antagonism. In fact, imposing a Cold War framework on the analysis of the multifarious forms of American engagement with the world since 1945 — aside from excluding the whole period after 1991 — would repeat the same distortion produced by policymakers who did just that when confronted by nationalist leaders in developing countries, or movements for social justice at home and abroad, or cultural and intellectual developments that challenged US predominance. These multidirectional and multifarious influences applied all the more to understanding the US role in the world after the Cold War ended in 1991.

While the different components of this volume do not adhere to a strict timeline, they do move in roughly chronological order. The efforts to order a world of states predominated in the first fifteen or so years after 1945. The challenges that this order faced — from domestic as well as transnational forces — did not of course begin in the 1960s. But the newly emerging international system, with the United States playing an outsized role, underwent serious, even existential, challenges from many quarters in the two dozen years after 1960. And challenges only deepened in the subsequent years of "new world disorder."

Ordering a World of States

World War II contributed to a major restructuring of world power and world politics, accelerating some trends, redirecting others. Any accounting of the war has to begin with the tens of millions of lives lost, not just through the methodical killing of the Holocaust but also battlefield casualties and major disruption of civilian life. Millions more migrated, either by force or in an effort to flee violence. Economically, the war itself wreaked tremendous destruction across Europe and Asia; it also wrecked global patterns of trade and investment. And these are just some of the calculable costs of the war.

Even more importantly, the war challenged the imperial world order that had defined international politics for centuries if not longer. The economic demands of the war strained existing European empires, especially the British and the French, but also the Dutch and the Belgian. The ideological claims of the war, furthermore, gave significant ammunition and momentum to anti-colonial movements, especially in Asia. Nowhere were these trends more visible than in the "Jewel" of the British Empire: India. The Indian declaration of war against Nazi Germany, issued from London rather than the British-led government of India in New Delhi, prompted a massive "Quit India" campaign from the Indian National Congress. And the use of Indian resources to fight the war in Asia meant that England owed millions of pounds to the government of India — and ultimately to its postcolonial successor states.

To be sure, there was not a single moment of decolonization. Portugal fought ruthlessly to hold onto its African colonies well into the 1970s. Anticolonial activists worked, in their colonies and in international forums such as the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955), against the imperial world order. The "Year of Africa" in 1960, which saw the independence of seventeen new nations, in short order fundamentally altered the balance of voting power within the United Nations (UN), which itself became a venue for opposing imperial rule. The European powers lost their major colonies, some as a result of military defeat at the hands of anticolonial forces, and others because the price of maintaining the colonies grew politically and economically untenable. They reconfigured — uncomfortably — their national identities to be less reliant on their imperial status, even as they still maintain territorial control of islands in the Pacific and elsewhere. Yet those caveats should not occlude recognition of the fact that territorial empires were no longer the fundamental unit of international relations.

That function — the basic unit of international relations — had passed to the states. This was true in Europe, the home of the former colonial powers, and just as much so (if not more) in the former colonies in Asia and Africa. While the nation-state was not the only possible successor to the colony, efforts to create other units like federations quickly came to naught.

The rise of the state coexisted uneasily with the second major change of the post-1945 years: the emergence of American-Soviet tensions. These tensions, which were visible even during World War II's Grand Alliance, deepened quickly as the two antagonists differed significantly over the postwar settlement of Europe; their armies stood against one another without firing shots. The doyen of American foreign-policy commentators, Walter Lippmann, called this circumstance a "Cold War" — a term that came to define a whole era. Yet the term only described the conflict in Europe; as the tensions moved into the global arena, "hot wars" ensued.

Challenging a World of States

Secretary of State Dean Acheson found the task of ordering the world "just a bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis," and those present at the creation may soon have felt they were witnessing the fall. Faith in American superiority over any possible rival state or

system, an asymmetry that in 1947 gave President Harry Truman the confidence to declare an unlimited commitment to shape events around the entire globe, began to yield to anxieties, from intense fear that nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles made the United States vulnerable to Soviet attack, to mouse apprehensiveness over the changing racial order in the areas of the world emerging from colonial rule. As the civil rights movement began to undermine the tenets of white supremacy in the US political system, decolonization movements — which the Soviet Union ideologically and sometimes materially supported and opportunistically embraced as "wars of national liberation" — inflicted further military defeats upon European armies, most of them US allies, and even upon the United States itself. Although the country was at the pinnacle of its power, it faced the twin threats of an assertive Soviet Union and the rise of the "darker nations," in the coinage of W. E. B. Du Bois, who predicted that "the wicked conquest of weaker and darker nations by nations whiter and stronger but foreshadows the death of that strength." These two threats were interlinked in the minds of American policymakers and commentators, creating the spectacle of a superpower confident that its system naturally should be extended around the world, only to be startled at the world's ambivalent reception.

Ambivalence took many forms. Transnational processes and actors posed challenges to the system the United States had fostered. The United States prescribed an economic development strategy for other countries in which the state would build institutions and capacity while the invisible hand of the market would distribute rewards, American producers would supply goods and services, and American investors would be welcome to contribute their capital in remunerative ways. Yet the results were not always satisfying to those on the receiving end of the investment. Chile's Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes irritated US officials by pointing out that for every dollar the United States sent to Latin America in aid, Latin America sent 3.8 dollars back north in repatriated profits, yielding endemic underdevelopment. With such analyses leading to import substitution industrialization, capital controls, and other measures, developing countries increasingly turned to state-led models of economic development and national control of their natural resources while limiting American access.

Many came together at the United Nations to promote a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the mid-1970s. The NIEO was an economic nationalist program aimed at the defense of state sovereignty, one that also worked across national borders, bringing states together to challenge global inequities. Tanzania's socialist president, Julius Nyerere, saw the potential of South-South solidarity as a "trade union of the poor" — and American officials responded like a union-busting employer, seeking to undercut the message and divide the messengers.¹ An even starker challenge to the heart of the Western economic system came in the form of oil nationalism, as producing countries formed a cartel that enabled them to quadruple the price that the United States and its allies were accustomed to paying for the fuel that kept their industrial economies running. As Washington focused on the problem, it shifted from a policy of seeking to ensure access to sources of oil to seeking to control the price, a far more difficult endeavor.

Those relationships and that disparity began to seem unsustainable even as the organizing principle of the Cold War itself was called into question by the reconfiguration of superpower relations and the emergence of detente. Americans and Chinese had within living memory sent their troops to shoot at one another in Korea and were still jockeying for influence as one of them rained bombs upon a stubbornly independent Vietnam. Now their leaders drank toasts to one another and began to move toward mutual recognition and even "strategic partnership." Meanwhile, Moscow, long the villain in apocalyptic nightmares of nuclear war, became the site for the signing of far-reaching controls on the nuclear arms race. These trends furthered an uneasy equilibrium at the level of

geostrategic contest between East and West, even as transnational social movements of all kinds and the global circulation of capital, people, goods, and ideas increased their pace and further challenged the order the United States had tried to foster since 1945.

New World Disorder?

Perhaps the most important transnational actors of the late twentieth century were corporations, which increasingly challenged the sovereignty of states as anchors of the late Cold War order. Even as the US state supported the profit-making activities of corporations on a global scale, the corporations had little allegiance to the state. Neoliberals argued forcefully for a decreased role for the state and an increasing dominance of the market as an arbiter of global economic relations. And liberals like Robert Reich complained that "we are witnessing the creation of a purer form of capitalism, practiced globally by managers who are more distant, more economically driven — in essence more coldly rational in their decisions, having shed the old affiliations with people and place."

Nonetheless, neoliberalism was never simply a refusal or sidestepping of the state. It was, instead, a complex process of reorienting states to serve as the facilitator of the free market while limiting actions that would constrain the social or environmental consequences of capitalist expansion. In the ideal neoliberal order, the state might provide some welfare protections, but its role was increasingly understood as secondary to the market, except as a guarantor of the rights of capital. Corporations could cross borders freely, and US military and political power was increasingly used to support the freemarketization of the globe, sometimes under the auspices of transnational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, other times — as with Cuba or Iraq — with threats or actions to remove "illiberal" regimes. As economic globalization increased in the late twentieth century, even the notion of "American" or "Dutch" corporations came to seem quaint: it mattered less and less that Exxon was based in the United States or Shell Oil based in the Netherlands. Of course, states did not cease to matter in economic relations, and "national" corporate identities were never entirely unimportant. US economic sanctions on Sudan in the 1990s, for example, kept US corporations out and opened the way for China's National Petroleum Corporation to move in. Still, the expansive reach of transnational corporations, once a "chosen instrument" of US policy, made them increasingly independent of the far-reaching goals of the US state.

Any understanding of the future of America and the world must account for the reality that the world itself is undergoing transformation. Its fundamental material reality is altering, as temperatures rise, ice caps melt, forests recede, and deserts spread, and as species (animal and plant) disappear. The United States has been an outlier among the wealthy democracies for decades, often outright hostile to any limitations on economic expansion and slow to join the series of treaties that attempt to stave off environmental collapse. Thus this volume ends with a discussion of the Anthropocene — and the ways in which climate change is inevitably altering our global context, from the collapse of unsustainable forms of economic life to increasing numbers of refugees to the likelihood of more resource wars. The Cold War came and went, with short-lived triumphalism and claims that history itself had ended in a victory for the American way of life. Meanwhile, that way of life was promoting patterns of production and consumption that were altering the planet in undeniable and largely irreversible ways.

To some observers, the relationship between humans and the non-human world seemed to send a message through a global pandemic in 2020 and 2021 that forced industrial production, many kinds of consumption, and most forms of travel to come to a sudden halt. The results were complex and even contradictory. The spread of the disease highlighted the stakes of longstanding inequities, within

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

and between nations. The shutdowns amid the COVID-19 pandemic devastated employment in many countries — but stock markets reached new highs. The reduction in individual movement and economic activity produced the first clear skies in decades overcrowded cities. The longer-term effects are likely to be geopolitical as well, as everything from tracking the disease to how to protect against it revealed new elements of American engagements with the world. President Trump's decision to abandon multilateral efforts by scapegoating and then withdrawing from the World Health Organization, and the onset of "vaccine nationalism" and "vaccine diplomacy" on the part of the United States and other nations, showed that even unprecedented pandemics fit into familiar patterns. From its origins in human-animal contact to its impact on cities, the pandemic also laid bare the reality that, in the twenty-first century, the planet will continue to leave its mark, indelibly, on the futures that America and the world navigate. <>

RETHINKING UTOPIA: INTERDISCIPLINARY

APPROACHES edited by Ebru Deniz Ozan [Political Theory for Today, Lexington Books, 9781666906950]

Rethinking Utopia is a collection that discusses utopian thinking in relation to different philosophical themes. It seeks utopianism in political theory (particularly in Kant and Derrida), populism, Turkish Islamism, international law, and it fleshes out themes of modernism and classless society in the selected utopian examples. By discussing and showing the relationship between utopia and these topics, the book shows that the range of subjects related to utopias is wider than the current literature suggests.

The book attempts to bring together academic fields, which are not cross-fertilized in the existing debates on utopia, by building bridges between actual politics and futuristic visions. On the one hand, it looks at utopia as a means to think about and reconfigure contemporary politics (as in the case of international law and populist politics); on the other hand, it investigates how different philosophical/literary texts, from widely-known More and Le Guin to lesser-known Turkish Islamists Kısakürek, Karakoç and Özel, imagine their distinct utopian vision where a new form of anarchist, classless or Islamist society could be possible.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction by Ebru Deniz Ozan

PART I

Chapter 1: Utopia as Free Play by Hayrettin Ozler

Chapter 2: The Search for a Better Place: Populist and Utopian Redemption by Volkan Gul

Chapter 3: Utopia and The Law of Humanity: An International Humanitarian Law

Perspective by Ramazan Guresci

PART II

Chapter 4: Modernism in Thomas More's Utopia by Suleyman Sidal

Chapter 5: The Classless Society in Ursula K. Le Guin's Utopia: Always Coming Home by Ebru Deniz Ozan

Chapter 6: Turkish Islamism and Utopia: Collating the Works of Necip Fazil Kısakurek, Sezai Karakoç and İsmet Özel by Ertugrul Zengin

Index

About the Contributors

Rethinking Utopia

Ruth Levitas says that "For those who still think that utopia is about impossible, what really is impossible is to carry on as we are, with social and economic systems that enrich a few but destroy

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

the environment and impoverish most of the world's population. Our very survival depends on finding another way of living". Truthfully, the world is witnessing a multitude of crises ranging from the economic crisis to the pandemic and from the climate crisis to the migration crisis. In addition, humanity is facing and struggling with poverty, environmental problems and increasing authoritarian tendencies. While some relate these issues with the process of neoliberalism, others take a less holistic view by addressing the issues one by one. Regardless of how these problems are analysed, the re-emergence and re-thinking of utopianism take place exactly at these times. It seems that we resort to utopias especially in the times of crises or catastrophes, since utopias are expressions of our desire for being otherwise or being better. If we abandon utopian impulse in personal or political thinking, we imprison ourselves within the world as it is, and we are stuck with the way things are. The time and density of crises and discontent may awaken the desire for a better life both personally and collectively. Utopian thinking as a guiding spirit provides the necessary tools for the image of alternative societies and indicates their possibility.

This book shares the above-mentioned views of Ruth Levitas and Simon Critchley. Rethinking utopia or revisiting utopian texts is a way to remind ourselves, at a moment where actual politics imprison us to the exigencies of the present, that there have indeed been alternative ways of looking at the world throughout history. Thinking together with utopia might be an antidote to the learned helplessness of the present day: rather than bouncing back to "more of the same," utopian thinking as discussed in this book can be a means to envisage a world beyond the crisis, rather than trying to develop resilience and coping strategies.

In line with our conviction that utopia is a multidimensional and dynamic concept, this book acknowledges and expresses the value of seeing utopias in different ways rather than creating a working model of utopian thinking. It contains chapters on utopian thinking in relation to different disciplines, ranging from political thought and action (i.e., politics) to the reviews of some utopian texts. It emphasizes utopia as desire. It discusses populism and utopian thinking as two examples of redemptive politics. It also questions whether international law can be a guide in the world that is turned upside down, and whether it can provide a basis for the dream of a better world. It asks whether the concept of utopia is specific to modernism and whether it is an old-fashioned concept or not. It also examines the relationship between Islam, which has the feature of longing for another world like all religions, and utopian thought. Thus, the aim of the book is to link utopian thinking with all these issues and to open a discussion in these areas.

This book brings fields, which are not cross-fertilized in the existing debates on utopia, together by building bridges between actual politics and futuristic visions. While some contributors are looking into utopia as a means to think about and reconfigure contemporary politics (e.g. chapters on international law and populism), some are investigating how very different philosophical texts (e.g. Derrida and Kant) can be connected to utopia and how literary works, from widely known More and Le Guin to less known Turkish Islamists Kisakurek, Karakoc and Ozel, imagine their distinct utopian vision where a new form of society (anarchist/classless or Islamist) will be possible.

The book is divided into two sections. Although the chapters are related to each other in different ways, they can be read by themselves in a different order. The first part of the book is more theory oriented while the second part is more applied, in the broadest sense of the word. The aim of the first part is to discuss the concept of utopia in different disciplinary contexts and explore its relation to different concepts. Hence, rather than a general theoretical discussion of utopia, the chapters in the first part aims to broaden our perspective related to utopia by asking new questions about it and relating it to different concepts. The second part is where we look at specific utopian texts and examine them with novel focuses and considerations. We consider going back to the utopian texts important, because, as mentioned above, they remind us that there are alternatives, which we need

today arguably more than ever. Therefore, while theoretical discussions in the first part engage with new questions and concepts, the chapters in the second part focus on some important utopian texts.

The first chapter (Utopia as Free Play) focuses on utopian thinking in terms of its relationship with political theory. Ozler underlines the free play characteristic of the utopian thinking referring to some theoretical debates that range from Kant to Derrida. After discussing the intermediary, communicative and transient aspects of utopias, he argues that utopian thinking is somewhere between pure reason and practical reason whereby one can free play.

The second chapter (The Search for a Better Place: Populist and Utopian Redemption) discusses populism and utopianism as two ways of thinking about a "better" social and political life. Although a vision for a better place is often associated with utopianism since utopia means a better place that does not exist, this chapter will bring populism into our yearning for a better place. Discussing populism in this respect makes sense because populism is clearly arguing for and promising a better place. This also highlights the redemptive character of populism. Thus, while utopianism and populism generally are not discussed together, they are in fact two different modes of redemptive politics. The chapter aims to flesh out the redemptive qualities of both by looking at how they create their better place. To do this, the chapter will look at their engagement with the past, the present and the future.

The third chapter (Utopia and The Law of Humanity: An International Humanitarian Law Perspective) examines the relationship between the principle of humanity and utopia. The main aim of this chapter is to explore how this principle influences the IHL improvement process. It attempts to answer as to whether the principle, which is mostly considered as part of utopianism, plays an effective role in this process. The chapter claims that utopianism provides us with crucial guidance to transform IHL and utopian ideas substantially affect the process.

The fourth chapter (Modernism in Thomas More's Utopia) analyses the main text of utopian thinking, Thomas More's Utopia, in terms of modernism. It argues that Utopia is a multifaceted and complex work that reflects ancient Greek heritage, the traditional values of the Middle Ages and the innovative ideas of the modern-bourgeois society of the future. Sidal argues that More's work reveals the contradictions inherent in modernity.

The fifth chapter (The Classless Society in Ursula K. Le Guin's Utopia: Always Coming Home) analyses a utopian text, Always Coming Home. The chapter mainly traces a classless society in Ursula Le Guin's utopia. To do this, it analyses the property relations and the relationship with nature in Kesh society, focusing on the meaning of ownership, "giving," competition, technology, and exploitation in the society. In addition, the chapter argues that the society and the universe defined in the book are open to change and always can be reconstituted, as the metaphors of "the hinge (heyiya) and the gyre" and the metaphors of way and "coming home" in the book imply. This chapter claims that Always Coming Home in which Ursula K. Le Guin describes a utopian society is a work that can respond to critics who condemn utopianism as being either idealist or totalitarian.

The final chapter (Turkish Islamism and Utopia: Collating the Works of Necip Fazil Kısakurek, Sezai Karakoc, and İsmet Özel) discusses utopian thinking in terms of Turkish Islamism, focusing on the works of Necip Fazil Kısakurek, Sezai Karakoc and İsmet Özel, successively Ideological Kite, The Credo of the Generation of the Resurrection and Three Issues. Zengin claims that the common significance of these three texts relies on their ability to respond to the question of whether Islamism can or should formulate a perfect state and social order, a utopia. While the first two texts manifest Islamist utopia, the third one by İsmet Özel is not a manifestation but a critique of utopianism. <>

THE METAPHYSICS OF CULTURE: DEFINITIVE ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY by Rod Cameron [Academica Press, 9781680537604]

In this new and persuasively argued study, philosopher Rod Cameron argues that definitive absolute Idealism changes the definition of logic, annuls ethics, and diminishes objective truth. Entitlement to “logic” is due to knowledge of the logos. The logos is religion and reasoning’s common origin. They are thus made compatible. Logic accesses ontology: a metaphysical realm of causation. Logic performs philosophy’s missing function: synthesis. The individual and the nation, Cameron argues, share the same essences. This correlation allows the nation to cater to the individual. It answers major political questions and discloses purposefulness in history. Ontology and this teleology define culture, which allows “race” to be categorized as an attribute of culture. Joined to absolute truths, race matters. Defending culture rebuffs both multiculturalism and antiracism. The ability to defeat pseudo-absolutes is vital for our existence and effectively preempts authoritarianism. Those searching for meaning in these troubled times will absorb Cameron’s clear exposition of these concepts with great interest.

CONTENTS

Preparations:

An Introduction in five Parts

- i. Heterodoxy Rules
- ii. Reality is Not What It Used to Be
- iii. The End of Ethics
- iv. The Metamorphosis of Reason
- v. Introduction

Chapter One:

Logic and Absolute Truth

Part One: Political Truths and Their Philosophical Implications Part Two:
Logic and Sexuality

Chapter Two:

Ontology

Part One: The Second Synthesis, Immanence, Extrinsic Mind
Part Two: The Third Synthesis; Intrinsic Mind

Chapter Three:

Subjectivity + Objectivity

Chapter Four:

Teleology

Part One: The Philosophy of Hegel
Part Two: Enhancement

Chapter Five:

Three Major Issues

Chapter Six:

Belonging

Part One: The Taxonomy of Race Part Two: Racial Tribulations

Conclusion

Bibliography

All absolute Truths are life-supporting, existential dichotomies. Dichotomies furnish expected attributes of the Absolute: transcendent Reason, synthesis, unarguable causation and certainty. It is presumed that the Absolute will be rich in meaning. The Absolute has no meaning. It is extremely austere, only dichotomies – no meaning, no proof.

The simplest and seminal example of an existential dichotomy is male—female. We all come into the world via this dichotomy. This fact is sufficient to identify male—female as an absolute Truth. Male—female is causative, in the form of offspring, but this dichotomy is not an obvious example of knowledge of Truth and cause being synonymous. If male—female was recognised as a Truth our culture would not entertain same sex marriage.

Another obvious dichotomy is fruit—seed. This dichotomy is analogous to the creative cause. Subject—object is a dichotomy but our objectivist culture is adamant that the relationship is irreconcilable and thus it is seen as a dualism. Subject—object is a primary partnership, the foundation of connection, the beginning of synthesis and it has the inclusive characteristic of things—absolute. The dearth of obvious existential dichotomies, the idea that subjectivity and objectivity are diametric and the inability of science to detect a metaphysical realm have led to immanence being well hidden.

In the first two chapters, nineteen diagrams convey Truths. Diagrams are the means by which Idealism surmounts language. Language has predispositions that impede cognition of the Absolute. Sentences have subjects and the Absolute has no subject or focus. Diagrams present all pertinent information as a single statement. Once a diagram is presented, language can be employed to explain it, but sentences cannot substitute for a diagram.

Definitive Idealism aligns with the speculative Idealism of G. W. F. Hegel. To paraphrase Hegel, the real story of existence is the progressive awareness of consciousness itself, culminating in absolute consciousness. It is expressed through institutions, politics, art, religion and philosophy. The attaining of absolute consciousness is the purpose of Western civilization. It amounts to the evolution of consciousness from values to Truth.

Contents: Chapter One introduces logic and its political Truths, then analyses these Truths for ethical and epistemic implications, in addition to providing scientific substantiation for logic. Chapter Two builds a system from the political Truths to define ontology and impart a theory of creation. This leaves teleology [Chapter Four] and then the joining of ontology to teleology for a theory of Belonging [Chapter Six]. Chapters Three and Five provide continuity.

Ontology is the core of metaphysics and the most important topic in philosophy. Ontology is about 'being.' 'Being' has been a mystery since Platonic times but reasoning through dichotomies spells out what it implies. Being for humans is 'social being.' The dichotomy that explains social being is individual—nation.

We live in nations, yet do not know their metaphysics. The cornerstone of ontology is National Mind, the archetypal nation. National Mind is the key to identity, political Truth, religious Truth and history.

Knowledge of immanence depends on logic as a governing precept and actualities that add detail. Jungian archetypes detail logic to facilitate the systematising of immanence. The joining of archetypes and logic is the most consequential synthesis.

Extrapolating National Mind takes reasoning to the mystical heart of religion. The "creative cause" is the essential, religious doctrine. Duality blandly credits God with creation. Idealism can do better

than attribute creation to God. The logos, the key to creation, is common to religion and philosophy, so when creation is rationalised, philosophy supersedes dogma.

Teleology is tasked with providing a plausible chronicle of the discovery of the Absolute. European exceptionalism has its origins in medieval circumstances. By the High Middle Ages, Europe had regained civilization without an empire. The potential to be superior to other civilizations resided in the contrariness of duality, the divide between religious and secular authority and numerous kingdoms providing alternative politics. Changes to 'authority' are the telling developments. The Reformation, monarchical revolutions: English, Dutch, American and French, mercantilism, industrial revolution and ideological division account for the gestation of the seminal Idea: the logic of political economy. What to look for in history to recognise purposefulness, is only divined after ontology has revealed what a Truth is.

An awkward absolute value is peace. It is an attribute of the metaphysics of culture; it is not a Truth. It relies on nations functioning according to National Mind and having no aggressive ambitions. It also relies on religions appreciating they are not greater than Truth.

The last Chapter is entitled Belonging. "Belonging" concerns racially belonging to a culture. It elucidates culture—race identity and completes the overthrow of ethics by rebuffing anti-racism.

Both culture and race are beyond the capabilities of duality to categorise because they require synthetic reasoning to be understood. Consequently, racial matters are mishandled by truth and ethics. Liberals think they have the holocaust absolutely understood but they have neither knowledge of the Absolute nor a philosophy of history. The Nazis left philosophy problems the dualistic mind cannot process: cultural identity, the failure of truth to account for reality, the failure of ethics politically, racism as normal behaviour and consciousness being expedited by evil. These are matters that only Idealism can tackle.

The Absolute manifests through culture and, unbeknown to liberals, culture is the decisive absolute factor in racial matters. Ontology—teleology—race presents culture—race free of ethical attitudes. It declares multiculturalism a liberal delusion, an ethical subversion and a blight on identity. It takes the ultimate philosophy to make these points.

Transcendence is accessed by divine revelation, meditation or metaphysical logic. Only metaphysical logic can comprehensively explain what precedes appearances, i.e., immanence. Occasionally a mystic bears witness to immanence possessing another system of reasoning, but mystics cannot explain anything about absolute Truth. Still, mystics delineate distinct revelations in the meditative progression to the Godhead. The stages are repeated in this metaphysic, including the voidness of all things and the transcendence of good and evil. <>

HANNAH ARENDT AND THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT edited by Daniel Brennan, Marguerite La Caze [Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought, Lexington Books, 9781666900859]

Hannah Arendt and the History of Thought, edited by Daniel Brennan and Marguerite La Caze, enriches and deepens scholarship on Arendt's relation to philosophical history and traditions. Some contributors analyze thinkers not often linked to Arendt, such as William Shakespeare, Hans Jonas, and Simone de Beauvoir. Other contributors treat themes that are pressing and crucial to understanding Arendt's work, such as love in its many forms, ethnicity and race, disability, human rights, politics, and statelessness. The collection is anchored by chapters on Arendt's interpretation of Kant and her relation to early German Romanticism and phenomenology, while other chapters explore new perspectives, such as Arendt and film, her philosophical connections with other women thinkers, and her influence on Eastern European thought and activism. The collection expands the frames of reference for research on Arendt--both in terms of using a broader range of texts like her *Denktagebuch* and in examining her ideas about judgment, feminism, and worldliness in this wider context.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction by Daniel Brennan and Marguerite La Caze

PART I: ANTECEDENTS

Chapter One: "The Course of True Love": Arendt's Shakespeare, Love, and the Practice of Storytelling by Paul Dahlgren

Chapter Two: Jaspers, Kant, and the Origins of Hannah Arendt's Theory of Judgment by Matthew Wester

Chapter Three: Hannah Arendt and Early German Romanticism by Kimberly Maslin

Chapter Four: The Gendered Politics of Love: An Arendtian Reading by Maria Tamboukou

PART II: PEERS

Chapter Five: Arendt and Beauvoir on Romantic Love by Liesbeth Schoonheiml

Chapter Six: Arendt and Hans Jonas: Acting and Thinking after Heidegger by Eric Stephane Pommier

Chapter Seven: Hannah Arendt's Influence on Eastern European Dissidence: The Example of Poland by Katarzyna Stoklosa

PART III: IN PROSPECT

Chapter Eight: The Phenomenological Sense of Hannah Arendt: Plurality, Modernity, and Political Action by Laura McMahon

Chapter Nine: Arendt's Phenomenologically Informed Political Thinking: A Proto-Normative Account of Human Worldliness by Marieke Borren

Chapter Ten: Denaturalizing Hannah Arendt and Claudia Jones: Statelessness, Citizenship, and Racialization by Andrew Schaap

Chapter Eleven: The Life of the Unruly in Ada Ushpiz's *Vita Activa*: The Spirit of Hannah Arendt (2015) by Joel Rosenberg

About the Contributors

The breadth and depth of Hannah Arendt's reception in the world of ideas has been growing rapidly in recent decades. Her life and her writing continue to excite scholars, students, social thinkers, political commentators, filmmakers, and general readers alike. Numerous biographies have tried to capture the sense of Arendt's life as a narrative to study, by reading her ideas through the events of her life, and there is already a sizeable body of secondary literature that reads Arendt's thought for whatever specialist issue the volume considers—race, law, literature, politics, feminism.

Young-Bruehl and Kristeva's respective and seminal biographies of Arendt have provided scholars with a picture of Arendt as a life to be studied; however, each provides a different perspective on how that life should be read. On one hand, Young-Bruehl provides insight into Arendt's life to help explain the development of her political theory. Kristeva, on the other hand is not so much interested in how Arendt came to develop certain theories, but rather how the themes of love, and narrative, mostly in her earlier work on love in *Augustine*, and Arendt's biography of *Rahel Varnhagen*, with its unique discussion of Jewish identity, offer a complex portrait of humanity that is both in Arendt's writing and in her own life. This volume moves past those important works for understanding Arendt's life in two ways. Firstly, by in a sense combining historical; narrative, and philosophical perspectives the papers of this volume, taken together, offer a complex and nuanced account of the difficulty of unpicking one aspect of Arendt's thought from another. For example, in Laura McMahon's chapter, "The Phenomenological Sense of Hannah Arendt: Plurality, Modernity, and Political Action," the author shows how a consideration of Arendt's phenomenology necessarily leads to her political theory, and her enthusiasm for civil disobedience. Additionally, Paul Dahlgren's chapter "The Course of True love: Arendt's Shakespeare, Love, and the Practice of Storytelling," looks at Arendt's readings of Shakespeare and other literary texts, while also considering events in Arendt's life and relationships to help enrich the discussion. The second way this volume moves past the older biographies of Arendt and collections of essays on her work is by taking into account the ideas only relatively recently published in Arendt's thought diaries—her *Denktagebuch*.

More recently *The Bloomsbury Companion to Arendt*, a broad-ranging collection of scholarship on Arendt, demonstrated the incredible profundity and range of Arendt's thought, as it contains sixty-seven chapters, each devoted to a theme of Arendt's writing and life, from her key writings, philosophical foundations, politics, and social thought. However, by separating Arendt's themes from her writing, and from her sources, something can be missed, despite the size of the volume. The present volume, rather than asking Arendt's ideas to fit loose categories, considers her contribution to and involvement in the history of ideas. That perspective change allows the authors of this volume to show much more nuance to Arendt's thinking, as they are able to see a bigger picture, or as Arendt might say, an "enlarged" idea, by combining history, thematic focus, philosophical bases, and social and political thought. Hence pausing to consider Arendt as a thinker embedded in the history of ideas, and not as an outlier on the periphery of philosophy, despite her own denials that she is a philosopher or writing philosophy, is timely. This volume adds depth to those debates in which Arendt's ideas are now considered, by increasing our consideration of her role in the history of ideas, both as an inheritor of history and a driver of change.

Arendt was thorough in her engagement with thinkers of the past, from Ancient Greece, early Christianity, Rome, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and phenomenology. She was equally as thorough and rigorous in her engagement with those contemporaneous to herself. In her editor's introduction to *Arendt's Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, Liliane Weissberg recounts an anecdote shared by Alfred Kazin. It is worth recounting here:

I met Hannah Arendt in 1946 at a dinner party given for Rabbi Leo Baeck by Eliot Cohen, the editor of *Commentary*. It was that long ago. She was a handsome, vivacious forty-year-old woman who was to charm me and others, by no means unerotically, because her interest in her new country, and for literature in English, became as much a part of her as her accent and her passion for discussing Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Kafka, even Duns Scotus, as if they all lived with her and her strenuous husband Heinrich Bluecher in the shabby rooming house on West 95th Street. (Kazin in Weissberg, *Arendt*, 1997, 3)

Weissberg considers the anecdote, suggesting that Arendt is not described as a philosopher but as a host, "a person who offered room as well as words for others" (1997, 3). The consideration of Arendt as a host for Weissberg leads to a discussion of Varnhagen's salon, and the significance of

such places that could create light in dark times—the theme of her later book (1983). But to think this quote differently, to read against its sexism, many decades after its original context, one can also discern, along with the problematic reduction of the woman intellectual to a lively host, a recognition of her incredible knowledge across the history of ideas. Arendt herself invites us to consider the malleability of the roles society places on us. In the prologue to *Responsibility and Judgement*, which is the transcript of a speech delivered by Arendt upon receiving the Danish Sonning Prize, Arendt writes that individuals are recognized by the roles assigned to us through our professions, but within those professional masks there is the potential for natality to transform the meaning of the persona (2003, 13).

It is through this role, sounding through it, as it were, that something else manifests itself, something entirely idiosyncratic and undefinable and still unmistakably identifiable, so that we are not confused by a sudden change of roles, when for instance.., a hostess, whom socially we know as a physician, serves drinks instead of taking care of her patients. In other words, the advantage of adopting the notion of persona for my consideration lies in the fact that the masks or roles which the world assigns us, and which we must accept and even acquire if we wish to take part in the world's play at all, are exchangeable. (Arendt 2003, 13)

Arendt is obviously more than mere host. Her knowledge of and engagement with Augustine and Rousseau, for instance, and the philosophical autobiographical tradition, deeply informed her writing of the Varnhagen biography, and as one glances at the sheer breadth of her writing's themes and references, these are more than conversational contributions. Even though the idea of the Berlin salon and the place of a meeting of the intelligentsia were formative spaces for Arendt, her work on historical thinkers and contemporaries lives outside of such rooms and conversations as well.

Her ability to inspire critique and drive public discourse decades after her death means that the time is right to take stock of Arendt's standing in the history of ideas, and to encourage new avenues for scholarship. Rather than acting only as a primer on Arendt's texts and the themes therein, this volume of essays offers a guide to the ideas that drove Arendt's writing by exploring the contexts in which they were written, and the thinkers she worked through. Her readings of canonical figures offered different ways to understand established interpretations, and some of the chapters of this volume explore Arendt's way of reading and interpreting these figures. Essentially, Arendt's defense of the inherent pluralism of the world and concern with the dangers of imposing a certainty upon human affairs was not only a theoretical matter, explained in political writings as a warning against philosophical systems promising truth and fixed certainties, but embedded in her practice of thinking and writing as well.

This volume is strategically divided into three parts, Antecedents, Peers, and Prospects, which each aim to capture the way that Arendt simultaneously mined and undermined the history of ideas, while critically engaging with her contemporaries, and also inspiring future debates by leaving a body of work that can be used to initiate new conversations with those writing today, and also with those writing in her time that she did not explicitly enter into dialogue with, such as Simone de Beauvoir and Claudia Jones.

The volume also treats themes that are pressing and crucial to understanding Arendt's work, such as feminism, questions of ethnicity and race, civil disobedience, phenomenology, and thinking. The rigorous and broad reading Arendt extends through all of her explorations in ideas means that there is a need to expand the frames of reference for Arendt scholarship—this volume does just that. Arendt reads great works of philosophy and literature as multifaceted, pluralistic gems. As the author of the first chapter of this volume, Paul Dahlgren announces, there is also much more to say by reading the writers such as Shakespeare that Arendt quotes, beyond the parts that she quoted. When Arendt writes her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, she is, as Kimberly Maslin notes in her chapter "Hannah Arendt and Early German Romanticism" doing more than exploring questions of

Jewish identity, she is also employing the style and form of the disparate traditions of the Enlightenment and Romanticism to say something new.

The chapters of this book hence pay attention to Arendt's unique and varied style, and the processes of crafting her arguments, such as the way she reads Immanuel Kant's aesthetics, or how her relationships and letters can shed light on her thought beyond the semantic content of the writing. Discussions of Arendt's *Denktagebuch* (journal) also enriches the chapters' engagement with her reflections on the themes and philosophers' work (2002; Berkowitz and Storey, 2017). Furthermore, the book looks for the specters of ideas through her thought, which at times emerge explicitly, and other times remain beneath the surface of the text. For example, as a student Arendt's doctoral dissertation, supervised by Karl Jaspers and defended in 1928, reached back to the thought of Saint Augustine of Hippo. As Julia Kristeva notes in her biography of Arendt, years after the thesis was defended Arendt wrote to Jaspers that she was surprised to find traces of herself in the thesis (2001, 31). The thesis explored Augustine's thoughts on love. Arendt was searching for a paradigm of love in Augustine's work, and the resulting, quite secular account, written in a language very much indebted to Arendt's phenomenological education, is far from Augustine's intended theological arguments. Yet this is not to say that Arendt is a mis-reader; rather her reading is infused with a philosophical desire to say something new. While reading Augustine, Arendt is not only asking, "what is he saying?," but also "what does this mean for me?" This kind of reading, that Jaspers noted in his comments on the dissertation as perhaps doing "violence to the text" is arguably a feature of Arendt's engagement with the history of ideas and some of the chapters in this volume, such as Matthew Wester's "Kant, Jaspers, and the Origins of Hannah Arendt's Theory of Judgment" show the productive nuance to Arendt's readings which transform accepted interpretations, revealing new considerations concerning the autonomy of judgment. Furthermore, as Arendt herself notes in her glance back at her early thesis, her reading of the history of ideas leaves traces throughout her oeuvre. These traces, especially on love, are picked up by the contributors to this volume, as Arendt's unique style of reading was employed to make startlingly original arguments.

One especially sharp trace in Arendt's work is, as Kazin notes in the previously quoted anecdote, the literature that Arendt read voraciously and referred to throughout her writing. Authors like Karen Blixen, Franz Kafka, and Bertolt Brecht are the subject of essays and lengthy discussion in her work. Yet also throughout her writing are scatterings of references to contemporary authors, who appear fleetingly, yet are appropriately in place in her work. For instance, Patchen Markell has recently explored the references to William Faulkner's novels in Arendt (2015). Markell notes that in her references to Faulkner, Arendt adds nuance to her descriptions of action by including anonymity, whereas usually the activity of the unnamed is found in labor or a depersonalized society (2015, 78). That attention to the literary images and passages that Arendt cites can add to the pluralistic interpretation of concepts usually considered quite settled in the reception of her ideas is important. In her essay "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," Arendt concludes her discussion by suggesting that the examples found in literature are richer ways to consider one's duties, and that one can even learn to judge through a consideration of the examples of great works of literature (2003, 145). Arendt makes explicit reference to the examples of Shakespeare's tragedies, such as *King Lear*. She is also saying something more than that literature provides mere instruction to follow. If we look at Arendt's response to Eric Vogelin's criticisms of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, originally published in *The Review of Politics* and now found in the collection *Essays in Understanding*, Arendt discusses her perception of the role of style, the feature most fully embodied in literary truths, which might be empty of objective statements.

Thus, the question of style is bound up with the problem of understanding, which has plagued the historical sciences almost from their beginnings. I do not wish to go into this matter here, but I may add that I am convinced that understanding is closely related to that

faculty of imagination which Kant called *Einbildungskraft* and which has nothing in common with fictional ability. (Arendt, 1994, 404)

Style does more than evoke images. Style shows things to the imagination which turns the vision of understanding to show a different face to the world. Hence when Arendt evokes the literary examples of Hamlet and King Lear for instance, she is not simply suggesting that one emulates literature, but that more significantly literature reinforces pluralism, and through the operations of imagination, on which style leaves impressions, increases the effectiveness of judgment.

The first part of the book, "Antecedents," explores in detail Arendt's literary considerations, her style, and her thoughts on the imagination's role in judgment. The chapters in this part open up new directions for research on Arendt by exploring her engagement with canonical figures in the history of ideas, from literature, and philosophy. In the collection's first chapter, "The course of true love': Arendt's Shakespeare, Love, and the Practice of Storytelling," Paul Dahlgren explores Arendt's privileging of literature in her writing and her relationships with writers (and her influence on them). He has focused on the role of Shakespeare in previous work, an emerging interest in Arendt studies (2006). Dahlgren demonstrates that despite the great deal of scholarship around Arendt and literature, and Arendtian interpretations of literature (especially literary treatments of refugees and human rights) the picture is incomplete and requires further expansion. Dahlgren focuses on Arendt's debt to William Shakespeare, contending that Arendt's style, especially in the later writings, is deeply influenced by Shakespeare's plays. Consider, for instance, the notion of the two-in-one in thinking that is an essential feature of Shakespearean drama. That Arendt's references to Shakespeare are few, and short, is for Dahlgren is an opportunity to further flesh out some of her thinking, especially on the theme of love. Through a reading of *A Midsummers Night's Dream*, Dahlgren considers Arendt's fascination with Karen Blixen (Isak Dinesen), her failed marriage to Gunther Anders, and her affair with Martin Heidegger. The figure of Titania and her love for Bottom, a comic feature of the play, suggest how Arendt might have considered the flights of love and also hint at the unexplained depth to her conception of the private realm and the desires that dwell therein. For Dahlgren, Arendt's use of Shakespeare, and the play itself when read beyond Arendt's brief mention, give a more vivid understanding of the depths of Arendt's thoughts on love. The chapter suggests that the same expanding of horizons for scholarship on Arendt might be found in her treatment of other authors such as Randall Jarrell and Herman Broch.

For Arendt literature operates on our understanding, not just in the sense of making up fictions, but in showing things to us which might change our minds and aid our judgments. Arendt draws a lot of her ideas about imagination and understanding from the thought of Kant and the Enlightenment. Her relationship to Kant is famously ambivalent; however, even when Arendt is disagreeing with Kant it is not to cast his ideas aside, but rather to work through them. A seemingly trite example will illustrate the point; in her essay on Kafka, Arendt invokes Kant's description of the genius only to disagree (1994, 79). Arendt uses Kant's definition of genius, the innate disposition through which nature gives the rule to art, to offer her own variation where nature is replaced by humanity (1994, 79). On the face of it the disagreement need not have been printed. Why bother to announce an idea only to reject it and propose something else—especially if the rejected idea is not the topic of the essay? Yet there it remains, and in fact operates as a launching pad from which Arendt can present her own ideas—rather than Kant being wrong, he is the starting point from which to twist and turn an idea to reveal its other facets. Kant's philosophy is like a specter through Arendt's writing.

Matthew Wester, in the second chapter of this volume, "Jaspers, Kant, and the Origins of Hannah Arendt's Theory of Judgment," looks past the existing scholarship on Arendt and Kant, to insights found in the yet to be translated into English (although it has been translated into French) *Denktagebuch*, that is her diary of ideas. He has previously published on the relation between

Arendt's and Kant's thought (Wester in Grafton and Sari, 2020). Wester focuses on Arendt's reading, and misreading of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, to show how Arendt developed her ideas, under the influence of her mentor Jaspers and his interpretation of Kant, of judgment in the political sphere. What Wester locates is a strong claim by Arendt to have discovered a political philosophy in Kant's aesthetic theory. Wester points out that for Arendt, Kant was unaware that when he was writing on aesthetic judgments he was also describing a political theory that she claims supports her idea of the pluralism at the heart of judgment. The ability of Arendt to see something that the author did not is for Wester in part due to Jaspers' influence on Arendt. Jaspers, who wrote *The Great Philosophers* (1962), Wester contends, specifically inspired Arendt to read Kant's aesthetic theory to find political insights. Jaspers' treatment of reflective judgment in Kant allowed Arendt to read Kant as not abandoning the particularity of phenomena in judgments—significantly, as particularity is so central to Arendt's understanding of politics. As Wester notes, her reading of Kant through Jaspers was happening at the time that she was preparing the final draft of *The Human Condition* (1998). Even if not explicit until later, that reading's presence is still there early on her writing, guiding the direction her thought will take.

Arendt not only engaged with Enlightenment thinkers including Kant but also with Romanticism. Kimberly Maslin, in her chapter, "Hannah Arendt and Early German Romanticism," the third chapter of this volume, shows how the style of Arendt's biography of Rahel Varnhagen marked her break with philosophy, allowing her to make her own mark in the world of ideas. If Kant's philosophy grounded the fact of pluralism for Arendt, Maslin shows that the writing of the Varnhagen biography is Arendt's own attempt at writing to engender pluralism. Maslin appeals to Arendt's use of images of twilight rather than daylight to blur attempts of politics or philosophy to arrive at truth or certainty. For Maslin, Arendt revels in contradictions and the ability of art to shake certainties in a manner consistent with the Romantics. Maslin shows how Arendt employed irony in her biography to place contrasting and incompatible ideas beside each other so meaning can in a sense organically emerge through the activity of considering them, of active reading. For Maslin, the Romantic style, using irony and in fragments, allowed the space for her Jewish writings to consider how to foster a Jewish identity. Maslin contends that the style, developed in the Varnhagen biography, permeates her other Jewish writing—that is, the Romantic experiments with writing, and their focus on the passion gave Arendt a means of recasting Jewish identity as heroic, by using the literariness of the style to rethink history. That rethinking is not to rethink what happened, but the meaning of what happened.

As noted above, another powerful theme in Arendt, developed early in her writing, which is still present even when not explicitly articulated, is love. The ideas from Arendt's thesis on Augustine and love are found throughout her writing, developing, and inflecting her depictions of people acting with and toward each other. Wolfram Eilenberger, in *Time of the Magicians*, marks her dissertation as a decisive move from Heidegger, after their relationship, and a response to his philosophy—a filling of gaps that she identified in his work.

Arendt's philosophizing is distinguished by the ability to trace, illuminate, and elaborate all existential dimensions of the event of "You"—to which Heidegger, in the dwelling of his thought, had to remain blind,

For Eilenberger, the development of *amor mundi* in Arendt's work is a part of the ennobling of public action, that moves beyond Heidegger's more pessimistic conception of the collective "they." Whereas Heidegger saw us entangled in the world, Arendt's love allows us to make it anew—it fills relations in private spaces, and illuminates action by resisting certainty and embodying spontaneity. Looking at the multiple meanings of love in Arendt's work, apart from *amor mundi*, Maria Tamboukou's chapter 4, "The Gendered Politics of Love: An Arendtian Reading," explores the connection between the myriad kinds of love, gender, and her conception of pluralistic politics. Tamboukou's interest in Arendt relates to narratives and life-writing, and she has previous

considered Arendt's thought in relation to Rosa Luxemburg's letters and writings (2014). She focuses on Arendt's *Denktagebuch* to bring out how much more there is to say on the topic of love in Arendt that has not been remarked in scholarship hitherto. By showing how the original notion of the otherworldliness of love that is, the way love flies away from the world to find its beginning—developed in her thesis on Augustine, to the larger, and at times only implied consideration of love across Arendt's oeuvre and in her diary, Tamboukou demonstrates the richness of Arendt's uses of love by describing it through literary consideration of two examples of epistolary discourse. Through an analysis of the letters of the feminist activist Desiree Veret-Gay, Tamboukou adds layers to our understanding of *amor mundi* as a reconnection, through love, to the network of human relations in our social lives. Similarly, the letters of the activist Emma Goldman, brimful with the oscillations of passion, and exacerbated by the complex political situations Goldman found herself in, for Tamboukou demonstrate the complex way that love, as a destabilizing force, adds to the unpredictability of the human condition, demonstrating the way that plays out in all of the human interactions that Arendt characterizes in her writing.

The second part of the book, "Peers," looks closely at Arendt's relationships with her contemporaries, in her inner circle, and in her reception as she published. In the chapter on Gotthold Lessing in *Men in Dark Times*, Arendt celebrates the ability that the speech and action between friends has to preserve a space of openness and plurality, even under political conditions that threaten such spaces (1983, 30). As a student of Heidegger, Arendt was described by Richard Wolin as one of Heidegger's children (2015). Arendt's philosophical response to Heidegger has already been alluded to; however, in exploring the relationship she had with her contemporaries, it is necessary to search further into that Heideggerian collective, and Arendt's place in phenomenology more generally. In the fourth chapter of this volume, "Arendt and Beauvoir on Romantic Love," Liesbeth Schoonheim uses Arendt's break with Heidegger, especially his understanding of *Mitsein*, to place Arendt into dialogue with Simone de Beauvoir's, philosophy which was similarly indebted to Heidegger's *Mitsein*. Her research investigates themes of freedom and resistance in Arendt, Beauvoir, and Foucault, and she has considered Arendt's phenomenology of love in relation to personhood (2018). In exploring the differing ways that Arendt and Beauvoir responded to the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's ideas, Schoonheim is able to position the two thinkers, who had little to say about each other in their lifetimes, into a fruitful exchange that shows further how the concept of love, in the differing kinds of relationships where it can emerge and operate, adds to our understanding of how the personal and political impact on each other. Furthermore Schoonheim, through the conversation she initiates, is able to use Beauvoir's thought to highlight important questions that Arendt considered misplaced, such as the role of embodied romantic love in political situations, further shedding light on the complicated relationship Arendt's ideas have to feminism.

Another of Arendt's peers with a shared Heideggerian departure point is Hans Jonas. Jonas, another of "Heidegger's children," who delivered the eulogy at Arendt's funeral, is placed into contrast with Arendt in the sixth chapter of this volume, Eric Stephan Pommier's "Arendt and Hans Jonas: Acting and Thinking After Heidegger." Pommier has published a significant body of work on Hans Jonas, bringing Jonas's thought into conversation with major figures in phenomenology such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt. With Arendt, he has already provided an important comparison with Jonas, looking at their respective moral and political ideas (2013). Pommier has more recently focused on the biological philosophy of Jonas and in this volume the insights from that research enable a more thorough and updated comparison and contrast between Arendt and Jonas (2017).

While the philosophical positions of Arendt and Jonas are quite distinct, Pommier traces their origins to certain disagreements with how to move past Heidegger, especially from a humanist

standpoint. Pommier considers the relationship between thinking and acting in both scholars, showing that whereas for Arendt they are distinct, although thought can lead back to action, for Jonas, thought can be action. The differences, in Pommier's account, provide a fruitful way to approach the complexities of questions of science and technology, especially in developing the environmentally responsible actions required of us today. Rather than simply placing Arendt and Jonas into contrast, Pommier uses the opportunity to compare their thought to highlight gaps in both Arendt and Jonas, and to use the thought of the other to fill those gaps with a meaningful response.

The rich knowledge found by placing Arendt in dialogue with her peers is continued in a slightly different vein in Kataryzna Stoklosa's paper, the seventh chapter of this volume, "Hannah Arendt's Influence on Eastern European Dissidence: The Example of Poland." Stoklosa has previously published on Arendt's influence in Polish intellectual circles, and her large scholarship on Eastern bloc social and political crises, historical and current, are at the forefront in this revitalized look at how Arendt's ideas were received and circulated in Poland (2008). An emergent theme found across the chapters of this volume is the changing shape and terms of debates that have been conducted through Arendt's ideas. For instance, a number of the chapters have pointed out that the relatively recent publication of Arendt's thought diaries has revealed new avenues for scholarship and thinking that recast seemingly settled debates. What Stoklosa demonstrates is that in Eastern Europe, where significant dissidents were influenced by Arendt, such as Jan Patocka and Adam Michnik, the staggered publications of Arendt's work, and the manner in which her ideas could be debated publicly, as well as the drastic and rapid social and political changes, mean that it is impossible to speak of a unitary influence on Eastern European thought. That is, Stoklosa's chapter charts the historical reception of Arendt over time, noting its change as political events force a different perspective to be taken.

Focusing on the shifts in debate and focus on Arendt in Poland, Stoklosa looks at the Polish reception of Arendt's ideas, from her thoughts on the 1956 revolution in Hungary, through to the reception of her writing today, asking the question, "Why read Arendt in Poland any more?" It is accurate to say that Arendt's reception in Polish ideas was and remains turbulent. Arendt's thought has helped political theorists in Poland to frame discussions, from the teaching of Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* clandestinely, in unofficial and private seminars, in the 1970s, to the publication of her major works in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where major differences between Eastern and Western European political theory became blurred as Eastern thinkers quickly adopted many Western ideas as the iron curtain fell. Many Polish political thinkers, in the 1970s, used the ideas of Arendt they had access to and debated them in ways that were permitted in public discourse, or smaller audiences discussed them in secret. Even then, when limited numbers of people engaged in debate, Stoklosa demonstrates that the conversation was far from surface level. For instance, Polish political thinkers were pointing out that her definitions of totalitarianism, and the inherent use of violence in such systems did not quite capture their own experience of living under totalitarianism. Ultimately Stoklosa shows how Arendt was both a figure of freedom and a philosophical source—that is, she inspired action, but also was rigorously thought through—and even though the totalitarian system failed, Stoklosa details how Arendt's reception continues as issues of freedom and equality still pervade Polish political life, as they do elsewhere.

The final part of this volume, "Prospects," looks to explore the conversations Arendt might not have had and consider new directions in her research. The eighth chapter, Laura McMahon's "The Phenomenological Sense of Hannah Arendt: Plurality, Modernity, and Political Action," rather than looking at Arendt's reception over a period of political upheaval, instead takes a fresh look at Arendt's phenomenological perspective to revitalize Arendt's political thought. McMahon in her previous research has placed Arendt's ideas, such as natality and temporality, into conversation with

those of major phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, to add to our understanding of those concepts (2019). There has been much made of whether Arendt supplies a sufficiently systematic phenomenology to be considered a phenomenologist, and McMahon joins the debate by demonstrating not only the cohesion of Arendt's phenomenological account of the world in which we each share, but also the distinct place Arendt has alongside her peers and forebears in phenomenology. She does this by showing the consistency with which Arendt reflects the ideas and foci of major phenomenological writings. Beginning with Arendt's phenomenological account of pluralism, and situating it alongside the thought of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger, McMahon explores the problematic nature of modern bureaucratic logics that dehumanize and resist pluralism. In McMahon's account, when considering Arendt's critique of science, it has to be through Husserl's late works on the crisis of the sciences, as well as, more obviously, Heidegger's critique of technology, and Erich Fromm and Merleau-Ponty's work. By linking the phenomenology of pluralism to modernity's attempt to preclude plurality from our understanding of appearances, McMahon uses the phenomenology of Arendt to shine light on her political ideas. However, the effect is larger than simply declaring Arendt to be a phenomenologist, as McMahon demonstrates the essential connection between the phenomenological account of the world, and Arendt's politics. Also, importantly, her account of the political reinforces the significance of the phenomenology to her work, and, vice versa, the focus on the phenomenology also reinforces the strength of the political ideals.

The chapter addresses the complex question of the relationship between phenomenological thought and politics, as in Schoonheim's paper on Arendt and Beauvoir. McMahon weaves the phenomenological perspective of Arendt's ideas concerning political action through a discussion of the disability activists, who in 1977, organized by Judith Heumann, took part in a twenty-five-day sit-in protest to petition for disability rights to accessibility to become written into law. McMahon considers the protest, and uses both Arendt's phenomenology and politics to unpack the powerful significance of this protest, and the years leading up to it (now publicized in the documentary *Crip Camp* [2020]).

Arendt has become a major touchpoint for thinking about human rights, the meaning of experiences of statelessness, and the crimes committed against those whose rights are withheld from them. In part this is due not only to the writing she produced on the topic, but also to the seeming absence of a normative account of human rights. Critics of Arendt have sought in many different ways to ground a theory of human rights in Arendt's work, and all take different departure locations in her style and writings to do so. For instance, in *Hannah Arendt and Human Rights*, Peg Birmingham examined Arendt's work, especially that on literature, to ground a theory of rights based in a shared humanity (2006). More critically than Birmingham, Seyla Benhabib explored Arendt's thoughts on communication in the public sphere as the starting point for a discourse on rights, arguing that the thought of other thinkers, such as Jurgen Habermas, is needed to fill in gaps in thinking that Benhabib identifies (2007). Taking stock of the many approaches to Arendt's thoughts on rights, Marieke Borren's "Arendt's Phenomenological Political Thinking: A Proto-Normative Account," the ninth chapter of this volume, observes that thus far no major consideration of Arendt's thoughts on rights and stateless has started from her phenomenological perspective. Borren specializes in Arendt's work, political philosophy, and philosophical anthropology, and has published influential work on Arendt and statelessness and refugees (2008). Again, the importance of using Arendt's phenomenology to show the relationship of phenomenological modes of thinking to politics highlights not only the uniqueness of Arendt's phenomenology, but also the depth of her political thinking.

Borren notes that a feature of Arendt's distinctive phenomenology is not a shared humanness, but worldliness. As in McMahon's earlier chapter, Borren, by turning close attention to the

phenomenological description of worldliness in Arendt, especially in *The Human Condition* (1958), discusses the political solutions offered by Arendt as being grounded in her phenomenology. Borren considers how throughout Arendt's writing on rights and statelessness, her concern is always a loss of a world, a place and that consequently human dignity is tied to worldliness rather than a human essence. Borren hence demonstrates that the criticisms of Arendt for not offering a normative account of rights miss the point that deeply embedded in her phenomenological account of human action is a proto-normative notion of human dignity. Again, it is the theme of *amor mundi*, which appears in a number of the contributions to this volume, that shows this dignity as worldliness.

Further exploring Arendt's thoughts on the stateless, the condition of statelessness and her related ideas on the "right to have rights," Andrew Schaap, in chapter ten of this volume, places Arendt into conversation with her contemporary Claudia Jones. There is a clear gulf between the two political thinkers that stems from their respective views on the American Republic and its promise of beginning anew. On one hand, Richard King, in *Arendt and America*, describes Arendt's fascination with the American Republic as leading to the development of the idea of natality. For Arendt, America's promise to overturn corrupt practices, and begin things anew, was a counterpoint to the totalitarianism she witnessed and analyzed in Europe. She was, according to King, thus working to advance those aspects of republicanism in America that allowed new political beginnings and working to identify and resist the tendencies in the same system that could lead to a nation of thoughtless consumption and bureaucracy (King, 2015, 3). Claudia Jones, on the other hand, had a vastly more pessimistic view of the promise to empower new beginnings for immigrants and refugees due to her experience of racism, exclusion, and eventual deportation from America.

Arendt and Jones never met, nor referred to each other, and they are distanced by many other factors than their perception of the American republic, including Arendt's critique of socialism and Jones's support for it, Jones's preclusion from the European canon of political ideas and their never having discussed each other's work; however, Schaap demonstrates the timely necessity of bringing these thinkers into conversation. What Schaap brings out is that Arendt and Jones in fact shared many similar experiences, such as statelessness, McCarthyist politics, and the postwar anticommunist fervor of the United States, and that these shared experiences were central to the ideas of these respective writers. Hence it is very interesting that their ideas are so different. Schaap has previously written on Arendt's political ideas in relation to democracy and struggles for emancipation and inclusion (2020). In this chapter he breaks new ground by overcoming the neglect of Jones's important thought and bringing it to bear on Arendt's established ideas which are starting to gain the recognition they deserve (Dunstan and Owens, 2021). Rather than forcing a philosophical framework on them both and claiming that it is shared, Schaap treats their respective thought in its difference, using the historical events and experiences they shared to open the comparison. The chapter forges new paths in considering the importance and limitations of Arendt's understanding of race in her political theory, and also in showing the strength and nuance to Jones's thoughts, as well as where she diverges from more mainstream political thought.

Schaap uses the concepts of citizenship and statelessness—issues central to the lived experience of Arendt and Jones, and to their writing, to show how these concepts impact racialization and violent totalitarian responses to immigrants and refugees. Schaap shows how a racial understanding of citizenship, something Arendt failed to adequately recognize, and the operations of politics that make people stateless, mutually reinforce each other in the maintenance of political structures. Arendt has already been criticized for her lack of understanding of the way that political racialization affected people of color in the United States (Gins, 2014). Schaap, by approaching this issue through the experiences and ideas of Jones, points to new directions in research, which are not simply a furthering of Arendt criticism, but an insightful look at how racialization impacts the creation of stateless people—for instance he considers the recent treatment of Windrush migrants in Britain

who were denied their rights through politically and racially motivated processes. By expanding the canon and removing postcolonial prejudices that preclude Jones from canonical political debate, Schaap shows how that when we think with Arendt on issues of citizenship and rights, we must keep the very real and concrete processes of racialization and racially charged criminalization in the forefront of our minds as well, something that the European influenced lens of Arendt's analytical eye was not able to always focus on.

The final chapter of this volume takes stock of the ways that engagement with Arendt's ideas have moved from written arguments to filmic depictions. Its aim is to show how Arendt studies is moving into this new field of philosophy and film and the way the medium of film can expand our understanding of Arendt's thought. Focusing on Ada Ushpiz's (2015) documentary film *Vita Activa: The Spirit of Hannah Arendt*, but also drawing from Margarethe von Trotta's earlier fictionalized film *Hannah Arendt* (2012), which he has published work on previously (2014), Joel Rosenberg creates a tripartite dialogue between the depiction of Arendt's ideas on film, her written ideas, and the events of her time. Rosenberg considers how Arendt's thoughts on statelessness, between the world wars and after, is understood as it appears in selected shots, with the voices of actors softening or punctuating what usually is read on text. Arendt's ideas, as fragments in a documentary, for Rosenberg engage with themes through that layering of visual imagery. According to him, the film, even though it is made for a general audience, and focuses on Arendt's more generally popular works, is also an opportunity to return to her writing and see it with a fresh perspective enabled by having seen the ideas presented through the imaginative devices of film. Presented through a voice-over in the film, her words make her a kind of narrator and storyteller of the documentary. Like a number of other chapters, this chapter focuses on the role of love, conceived as unruly by Rosenberg, in Arendt's life and thought, which she felt affirms us and creates a home in the midst of the world. This experience of love, for Arendt, can act as a kind of counter to the experience of rightlessness.

Cumulatively these chapters, by focusing on Arendt and her role and place in the history of ideas, has done much more than catalog and reinforce a canon. While Arendt's commitment to pluralism is at the heart of her project, these chapters demonstrate that the attempt to look at the historical Arendt and her ideas in fact opens new roads for scholarship. The papers reconsider Arendt's writing as a whole, reading the ghosts in her texts, and the themes that travel across her writing. Love is clearly a central concern, not only in her doctoral theses, but through her phenomenological analysis of the social world, through to her diaries and personal private experiences, and her thoughts on action and her public activities. The link between her phenomenology and politics is another example, as the contributions of this volume show that when reading her politics, one should always keep her phenomenological approach in mind as well. The world, which for Arendt is a human concept, discovered through phenomenological deliberations, is shown in these chapters as another of these ghosts throughout Arendt's writing, and visible as *amor mundi*—a concept linking love, phenomenology, politics, thought, and action. Arendt's work has also been placed into conversation with thinkers of her time, such as Beauvoir, of whose work she wrote little, despite their shared interests. Those conversations have shown promising ways to critique, and move with and past Arendt, in debates ranging from love, to race, literature, rights, disability, identity, gender, the world and the environment. The consideration of Arendt and her relation to the history of the philosophical tradition is enriched and broadened, and new paths of inquiry are indicated. <>

FREEDOM, RESENTMENT, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS by Pamela Hieronymi [Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 9780691194035]

An innovative reassessment of philosopher P. F. Strawson's influential "Freedom and Resentment"

P. F. Strawson was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, and his 1962 paper "Freedom and Resentment" is one of the most influential in modern moral philosophy, prompting responses across multiple disciplines, from psychology to sociology. In *Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals*, Pamela Hieronymi closely reexamines Strawson's paper and concludes that his argument has been underestimated and misunderstood.

Line by line, Hieronymi carefully untangles the complex strands of Strawson's ideas. After elucidating his conception of moral responsibility and his division between "reactive" and "objective" responses to the actions and attitudes of others, Hieronymi turns to his central argument. Strawson argues that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis, true of everyone at all times, its truth does not undermine moral responsibility. Hieronymi finds the two common interpretations of this argument, "the simple Humean interpretation" and "the broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation," both deficient. Drawing on Strawson's wider work in logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, Hieronymi concludes that his argument rests on an implicit, and previously overlooked, metaphysics of morals, one grounded in Strawson's "social naturalism." In the final chapter, she defends this naturalistic picture against objections.

Rigorous, concise, and insightful, *Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals* sheds new light on Strawson's thinking and has profound implications for future work on free will, moral responsibility, and metaethics.

The book also features the complete text of Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment."

Review

"Hieronymi is an expert guide to the twists and turns of Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment,' arguably the single most influential paper on free will and moral responsibility. The book is an important contribution to our understanding of Strawson, and will become an essential reference for philosophers."—**Sarah Buss, coeditor of *Contours of Agency***

"This is an exciting and groundbreaking book that has the potential to reshape our understanding of the nature of morality and our practices of holding one another responsible."—**Angela M. Smith, coeditor of *The Nature of Moral Responsibility***

CONTENTS

- Preface
- Primer on Free Will and Moral Responsibility
- Introduction I Strawson's Strategy
 - Strawson's Picture of Responsibility
 - The Central, and Seemingly Facile, Argument
- 2 The Resource and the Role of Statistics
- 3 The Further, Implicit Point
 - The Generalization Strategy
 - Making Explicit the Further Point
 - Objections
- 4 Addressing the Crucial Objection

Unearthing Strawson's Naturalism	
Social Naturalism and the Central Argument	
5 The Remaining Objections	
Intermediate Principles and Cases	
A Pessimistic Metaphysics of Morals?	
Against Social Naturalism	
A Defense of Social Naturalism	
An Opening for the Generalization Strategy?	Error, Inconsistency, and Crises
Conclusion	
Reprint of P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment"	Acknowledgments
Bibliography	
Index	

When P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" first appeared, nearly sixty years ago, it forced a profound shift in the debate about free will and moral responsibility. For decades since, it has inspired views on wide-ranging topics. Most of the ongoing attention has focused on Strawson's fascinating and fecund notion of "reactive attitudes." In contrast, the central argument of the paper has received relatively little attention.

The central argument claims that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis, true of everyone at all times, its truth would not show that we are not, in fact, morally responsible. It is a startling claim. The neglect given to the argument for it would be surprising, if that argument were not so difficult to discern.

When the argument is considered, it is often interpreted as relying on a thought about our psychological capacities: we are simply not capable of abandoning the reactive attitudes, across the board, in something like the way we are simply not capable of remembering everything we are told. We do not have the right equipment. Given our psychological limitations, we are stuck treating one another as if we are morally responsible—we are incapable of doing otherwise. Therefore, according to this interpretation, we should rest content in the thought that we are morally responsible—asking whether we ought to treat one another differently is useless. I will call this "the simple Humean interpretation" and the thought on which it relies "the simple Humean thought."

A different line interprets Strawson as relying on something like a conceptual point: you can neither support nor call into question the whole of a practice using notions that are; themselves, constituted by that practice. Thus, you cannot ask whether our moral practices, taken as a whole, are, themselves, morally just, right, appropriate, or fair. Doing so would be like asking whether the game of baseball is, itself, "fair" or "foul" in the sense of those words established by the game—"fair" or "foul," in that sense, can be rightly asked of batted balls or of territory in the baseball field, but the question cannot be sensibly asked of the game itself, taken as a whole. On this second interpretation, Strawson accuses his opponent of a sophisticated kind of confusion. I will call this "the broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation" and the thought on which it relies "the broadly Wittgensteinian thought."

Both the simple Humean thought and the broadly Wittgensteinian thought can be found in Strawson's paper, and he makes use of each. But neither interpretation would lead you to expect what you will find, looking at the central text: Strawson twice accuses his opponent of being caught in some kind of contradiction. So neither interpretation, on its own, is correct.

By providing a close reading of the central text, I will do my best to articulate Strawson's more interesting, and more powerful, argument. The argument depends on an underlying picture of the nature of moral demands and moral relationships—a picture that has gone largely unnoticed, that is naturalistic without being reductionistic, and that is worthy of careful consideration. Having drawn out this underlying metaethical picture, I will begin to subject it to some philosophical scrutiny. I

hope to show that it can withstand the objections that are both the most obvious and the most serious, leaving it a worthy contender.

Let us now retrace from the beginning. Strawson is thinking, from the start, that we have a natural, nonrational commitment to engaging in characteristically interpersonal relationships—he is thinking that the quality of others' wills toward us matters to us, that we put some (or another) set of demands on the quality of others' wills, that we will react in certain (or other) ways when those demands are violated or exceeded, and that this fact about us is given with human society, not something for which there are or need to be reasons. Thus we will, as a matter of fact, typically engage with others in the characteristically interpersonal way. Moreover, the exact demands and reactions, the details of our ordinary interpersonal relationships, are themselves a natural fact, a product of life as it actually happens. And so the detail of our system will be sensitive to typical human capacities and typical circumstances. We sometimes suspend characteristically interpersonal relating when circumstances are extreme or when someone is incapable of engaging in it. More curiously, we sometimes exercise our "resource" to opt out of such relating, just to avoid the strains of involvement, or for therapeutic purposes, or out of curiosity. But it could not be the case that everyone is in unusual or extreme circumstances, nor could it be that everyone is incapable of ordinary relating—to say either is to assert a contradiction. Thus, the only condition worth considering is whether we could or should come to exercise our resource all the time, and so give up characteristically interpersonal relating. Could we do so? While saying so involves no contradiction, it seems practically inconceivable that we would do so. Should we do so? Engaging in characteristically interpersonal relating is not done for reasons, nor something that requires justification, and so the question is idle—we need not take it seriously. But there is a further point that can now be made explicit: we can know, in advance, that being determined* (the sense of "determined" at issue in the thesis of determinism) is not a reason to exempt, because (given Strawson's social naturalism) we can know that the principles that govern moral and interpersonal relating will not include the contradiction that would require: if we discover an apparent contradiction in our principles, we have discovered that we ought to revise our understanding of those principles. Thus we can rest assured that nothing true of everyone will provide a reason to exempt. If this is not enough, we can also note that, even if we could face a choice about whether to abandon our commitment to characteristically interpersonal relating, a choice Strawson finds unreal, our reasons for making the choice would not be the kind that motivate the pessimist—they would not be moral reasons. If we were to decide that no one should be held responsible, we would have to make that decision for reasons that concern not questions of desert or justice, but the gains and losses to human life. And, as Strawson says, the truth or falsity of determinism would have no bearing on this choice. <>

THE EXPERIENTIAL ONTOLOGY OF HANNAH ARENDT

by Kimberly Maslin [Lexington Books, 9781793612441]

In *The Experiential Ontology of Hannah Arendt*, Kim Maslin examines Hannah Arendt's political philosophy through a Heideggerian framework. Maslin argues that not only did Arendt grow beyond the role of naïve and beguiled student, but she became one of Heidegger's most astute critics. Well acquainted with and deeply respectful of his contributions to existential philosophy, Arendt viewed Heidegger's work as both profoundly insightful and extraordinarily myopic. Not contented to simply offer a critique of her mentor's work, Arendt engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms with the collective implications of fundamental ontology. Maslin argues that Arendt shifted to political philosophy less to escape her own disappointment at Heidegger's personal betrayal, but rather as an

attempt to right the collective flaws of fundamental ontology. Her project offers a politically responsive, hence responsible, modification of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. She suggests that Heidegger's allegedly descriptive and non-normative insight into the nature of being is necessarily incomplete, and potentially irresponsible, unless it is undertaken in a manner which is mindful of the collective implications. As such, Maslin shows how Arendt attempts to construct an experiential ontology that transforms Heidegger's fundamental ontology for use in the public sphere.

Review

"Kim Maslin's book offers a bold and comprehensive reassessment of Arendt's work in relationship to Heidegger's. It is lucid, daring, and timely, and will appeal to those interested in harnessing Arendt's work in order to understand contemporary events. This is a book of quality and importance." -- Martin Shuster, Goucher College

"Even politicians deeply opposed to identity politics will often talk about who it is that 'we are' as a country. In so doing, they reveal not only that ontology is political, but also that politics always has ontological roots. This basic insight guides Kim Maslin's rethinking of Arendt's relation to Heidegger, and their mutual relation to contemporary social existence. This book is excellent and the conclusions are persuasive even when surprising. It is a game changer in how we all should think ourselves, others, and politics as a philosophical task." -- J. Aaron Simmons, Furman University

"Maslin helps resituate Hannah Arendt against her most enduring philosophical background by showing that Arendt was first and foremost a critical (post-)Heideggerian thinker. Arendt consistently took Heidegger's phenomenological insights as her own implicit points of departure, repeatedly criticizing and seeking to move beyond Heidegger in her own work. Building critically on her understanding of Heidegger in this way, Maslin contends, Arendt developed an innovative and coherent ontological approach of her own that remains relevant and challenging today." -- Iain Thomson, author of *The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1946-2015* (2019)

"Kimberly Maslin offers a fresh perspective on 'thinking Arendt through Heidegger.' She traces the sweep of Arendt's work from Totalitarianism to its prescient compatibility with current issues: including fake news, alternative facts, and ultimately identity politics and #MeToo. Maslin's argument gives life to Arendt's brilliance and relevance for our times, bridging the gap between philosophy and political action." -- Jennifer Ring, University of Nevada

"Kim Maslin's book glitters with philosophical and literary erudition. It provides readers with scholarly honed insight into the entirety of Hannah Arendt's thinking. As such, it represents a major contribution to applications of political theory in the study of history, particularly genocide. Maslin's analysis reveals the central themes and abiding concerns that initially shaped Arendt's analytical perspectives and eventually became transformed into her theoretical vision. Maslin brilliantly reinterprets Arendt's relationship with Heidegger and shows both Arendt's admiration but also the vitality of her critique of Heidegger." -- Edward Weisband, Virginia Tech

CONTENTS

Introduction

- 1 Heidegger the Fox: Revealing the Trap
- 2 Rootlessness in Heidegger and Arendt
- 3 Concretizing Thrownness and Projection: Rahel Varnhagen
- 4 MitDasein I: Understanding Antisemitism
- 5 Mitdasein II: Understanding Imperialism
- 6 Vorspringen (Leaping Ahead): Understanding Totalitarianism

- 7 On the Political Importance of a Normative Ontology:
Eichmann in Jerusalem
- 8 The Politics of Existential Loneliness
- 9 Experiential Ontology: Implications for Identity Politics
- 10 Theorizing #MeToo
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author

The recent publication of Martin Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* has led to a resurgence of interest in his affiliation with National Socialism. Most of the first wave of scholarship following the publication of these notebooks focused on the question(s) of whether or not Heidegger's antisemitism had a philosophical grounding and the implications for philosophy of answering this question in the affirmative.' Although these efforts produced a fascinating body of scholarship, the latter question strikes me as off the mark, which is to say it takes us down a dead end path and, in the process, it misses a productive line of inquiry. The question of Heidegger's moral standing in philosophy misses the mark and the risk we run, in dismissing Heidegger as morally bankrupt, is that despite his shortcomings, he has important things to teach us about identity. Not in spite of, but because of, his disastrous foray into the political sphere, his students struggled with a particular set of questions. Despite her intense disappointment, Hannah Arendt was unable to abandon either existential philosophy or Heidegger's basic precepts. These precepts help us understand Heidegger's own failure, by suggesting that even the great philosopher existed in the world in a state of thrownness, simultaneously transcending and falling prey to his own throw. Given that falling prey and projectivity represent the quintessential human struggle, ever present in our daily lives, why would we expect Martin Heidegger to be exempt from this most human of all challenges?

Hannah Arendt shifts to political philosophy, less to escape her own personal disappointment than to reveal (and ultimately remedy) the flaws of fundamental ontology. She not only grew beyond the role of naive and beguiled student: she became one of Heidegger's most astute critics. Well acquainted with and deeply respectful of his contributions to existential philosophy, Arendt viewed Heidegger's work both as profoundly insightful and extraordinarily myopic. Moreover, not contented to simply offer a critique of her mentor's work, Arendt engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms with the political implications of fundamental ontology. In short, Arendt's goals are more distinctly Heideggerian than previous scholarship would have us believe. Moreover, I suggest that Arendt's work, far from rejecting fundamental ontology, may be to offer a politically responsive, hence responsible, modification of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. In other words, she suggests that Heidegger's descriptive and non-normative insight into the nature of being is necessarily incomplete, and potentially irresponsible, unless it is undertaken in a manner which is mindful of the collective implications, as such she constructs an experiential ontology. Drawing on Heidegger's fundamental ontology, she turns our attention to the ways in which concrete structures and experiences in the world shape our manner of being. In so doing, she illustrates the importance of political ontology.

Many have noted the Heideggerian impulse in *The Human Condition* and the philosophical preoccupation of *The Life of the Mind*. In this vein, *The Human Condition* is sometimes described as Arendt's return to philosophy. It is my contention that Arendt never returns to philosophy because she never leaves it. Rather, her entire oeuvre can be understood as an attempt to modify Heidegger's descriptive framework for use in the political sphere, because philosophy and politics, perhaps particularly existential philosophy and democratic theory, are utterly inseparable. Her Heideggerian roots are not something Arendt returns to, rather she uses Heidegger's insight into the nature of Being to help us understand the plight of the nineteenth-century Jewess, the

development of antisemitism, as well as, imperialism. My claim is that all of Arendt's work can be read as existential philosophy; my aim is to reveal the Heideggerian impulse in her early work, in particular. In what follows, I argue, first, that our reading of Arendt is informed by an examination of the Heideggerian concepts underlying it. Second, Arendt's project, far from rejecting fundamental ontology, may be to offer a politically responsive, hence responsible, modification of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, by grounding it in lived experiences, hence her work should be read as experiential ontology.

In the first chapter I examine Arendt's "Heidegger the Fox" essay, suggesting that Arendt uses the metaphor of a physical trap to both conceal and reveal her critique of Heidegger. She opines that Heidegger's approach to fundamental ontology leaves him unable to extricate himself from his own conceptual framework. Heidegger's project is to develop fundamental ontology and to reveal the limitations of philosophy as a mode of inquiry under conditions of modernity. Ironically he becomes so thoroughly subsumed by ontological questions that he fails to recognize that he has fallen victim to several of his own concerns about modernity. In the second chapter, I examine the role of rootlessness in the thought of both Heidegger and Arendt.

Though their politics differ, both assert that a lack of grounding in a particular place lies at the core of the Jewish problem. Moreover, their notions of rootlessness are strikingly similar as both derive from a deficient connectedness and lead to an inauthentic manner of being-in-the-world. The third chapter takes up the often overlooked, Rahel Varnhagen, arguing it should be read as a case study of three of Heidegger's most political concepts: thrownness, fallenness and projectivity. In short, Arendt undertakes an examination of Varnhagen's life in order to "thickly constitute" thrownness, fallenness, and projectivity, to reveal the ontological core of rootlessness, as well as the political implications of taking oneself up as a project. The Human Condition is often touted as Arendt's return to philosophy; whereas *Origins of Totalitarianism* is usually described as either a piece of political sociology or a historical text and vehemently criticized, as such. In chapters four, five and six, I examine *Origins*, not as a traditional historical work, but rather as a public performance of Heideggerian historicity which has two predominant impulses. First, it comprises part of the constitutive structure of *Dasein*, as such it plays a critical role in the search for transcendence. Second, it serves as a critique of the dominant interpretation of historical events. Thus, in her quest to take herself up as a project, Arendt challenges the dominant interpretations of Jewish and European history, by highlighting the interaction between ontic structures, existential choice and ontological conditioning.

The trial of Adolph Eichmann has often been described as a point of transition in the work, as well as the life, of Hannah Arendt. In the seventh chapter I argue, alternatively, that it represents a point of continuity in the development of Arendt's normative experiential ontology, both with and against Heidegger. Though Arendt never does get around to laying out a systematic theory of evil, she begins from a more or less Kantian perspective, uses the lived experiences of Adolph Eichmann to concretize abstract Heideggerian concepts in an attempt to understand both the ontological conditions, as well as the political implications of evil-doing.

Chapters eight, nine and ten consider the implications of Arendt's experiential ontology for the political philosophy. Loneliness draws on the Heideggerian notion of the inauthentic and applies it to the public sphere. The eighth chapter examines the use of isolation and loneliness in Arendt's work and suggests that a richer understanding of both concepts, as well as their politi

cal importance, can be attained by examining them through a Heideggerian lens. Building on the notion that Arendt's work can be understood as an attempt to take seriously Heidegger's claim that the ontological can only be approached through the ontic, chapters nine and ten turn our attention to identity politics. Both Heidegger and Arendt are often read as either indifferent to or hostile to

identity politics. Since Arendt's project is to first ground herself ontically, a rereading of Arendt, suggests that both thinkers are productive resources for contemporary identity politics. Chapter nine demonstrates that Arendt ends up anticipating someone like Judith Butler, by pointing us toward a phenomenological approach to identity. Moreover like Adriana Cavarero, she understands that taking seriously concrete political identities requires listening to historical narratives. In ways that will be picked up and expanded by thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, they both attend to the ontological stakes of such identity. Finally, chapter ten turns our attention to what these efforts might have to say about a moment in identity politics, such as #MeToo and its potential to rethink democratic theory, particularly the concrete ways that we construct our Being-with.

In the end, Arendt carves out her own path, an experiential ontology, by drawing on Heideggerian concepts, grounding them in lived experiences, demonstrating their political value and transforming the purely descriptive concepts into prescriptive ones. Any notion of a political ontology must draw on individual lives set in socio-historical context and only as such can they illuminate political events. Thus far from rejecting philosophy, she simply admonishes that as a matter of political prescription, philosophical categories can be used only with the utmost circumspection. Arendt's experiential ontology transforms fundamental ontology from its, at best, apolitical and, at worst, anti-political orientation and allows the ontological to assume its rightful place at the cornerstone of democratic theory. Since as she makes clear in *The Human Condition*, one's manner of being in the world is of the utmost importance in public life.

Elzbieta Ettinger's 1995 expose suggested that far from a mere youthful fling, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger shared a deeply passionate, lifelong, devoted relationship.' Moreover, Ettinger implied it was also a profoundly exploitative relationship in which Heidegger pulled the strings and Arendt never grew beyond the role of enthralled and devoted student. This revelation might have remained a topic of tangential academic interest, except that it also called Arendt's professional judgment into question, a damning charge to level against a political philosopher interested in judgment. In this project I argue that Arendt not only grew beyond the role of nave and beguiled student, she became one of Heidegger's most astute critics. Well acquainted with and deeply respectful of his contributions to philosophy, she viewed his work as both profoundly insightful and extraordinarily myopic. Additionally, not contented to simply offer a critique of her mentor's work, Arendt engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms with the political implications of fundamental ontology. She shifts to political philosophy, less to escape her personal disappointment, than to right the collective flaws of fundamental ontology. Moreover, I argue that Arendt's purpose, far from rejecting philosophy, is to offer a politically responsible, modification. In other words, she suggests that Heidegger's insight into the nature of being is necessarily incomplete, and potentially irresponsible, unless it is undertaken in a manner which is mindful of the collective implications.

Martin Heidegger elucidates highly abstract, descriptive concepts, primarily aimed at exploring the individual experience of being as Being. For example, he considers the challenges of thrownness without offering a single example. He claims that his concepts are non-normative, which is to say that he merely describes deficient and proficient forms of care, rather than attaching value judgments to either. Moreover, his focus is on the experience of Being, as an individual. He leaves questions related to the being-with of Being to the side. For example, can being-with ever facilitate projectivity? Arendt, on the other hand, employs Heideggerian concepts in a political context. She utilizes Heideggerian concepts in a manner that is attentive to the collective implications of the manner of being of Being, mindful of the imperative that political engagement must be a widespread, as well as authentic, endeavor. She grounds the political, ontologically and illustrates that the manner

of being of Being is inherently political. Moreover, she advocates an approach to the study of Being that derives guideposts or cautionary tales from the lived experiences of real people.

Hannah Arendt had an ambivalent relationship with feminism. As a German-Jewish political thinker, indebted in many ways to Martin Heidegger, gender was never the most salient marker of political identity for her. In thinking back over her relationship with Arendt, Elizabeth Minnich reveals, "I think Hannah Arendt did not want to be bothered much with 'the woman question.' Being a Jew pressed much harder on her." Arendt was mindful of the degree to which her Jewishness limited her ability to choose. I have suggested that Arendt can be read as less opposed to identity politics than is often thought if we understand her oeuvre to center around the project of taking up ontological questions through the ontic. As we have seen, in this way, Arendt continues an important Heideggerian philosophical strategy but toward a different end. For Arendt the ultimate goal was a collective one, that of learning to share the earth. With this interpretation in mind, Heidegger and Arendt can be viewed as important resources for contemporary debates concerning identity politics occurring within the frame of continental philosophy and political theory. While Heidegger rarely addresses otherness, Arendt routinely deals with otherness, albeit in ways that at times appear contradictory. None of her voluminous writings deal specifically with gender, though some of her work certainly deals with notable women. She both smoked cigars with the men and suggested that certain occupations were not very becoming to women. Moreover, she warned of potential danger in any political movement based only on shared victim status and touted the importance of finding political solutions to political problems. Yet both Heidegger and Arendt contribute in important ways to contemporary debates in identity politics by providing a framework within which the challenge of identity can be constructed, as well as, deconstructed.

They both understand, anticipating someone like Judith Butler, that taking seriously concrete political identities requires constructing and listening to historical narratives of such identities. Moreover, in ways that will be picked up and expanded by thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, they both attend to the ontological stakes of such identity. Namely, thrownness and the goal of projecting oneself into the future are neither the results of history nor should they be undertaken in the absence of some form of connectedness to or rootedness in self-understanding. Rather, thrownness and projection illustrate that historicity is the ontological condition for the ontic practice of history itself. As such, like Adriana Cavarero, Arendt and Heidegger allow us to attend to the specifics of historical existence without being tempted to reduce existence to history.

Further, the leaping-in/leaping-ahead distinction could be an important supplement to contemporary debates in identity politics. In particular, this distinction allows us to remain sensitive to the complicated ways in which identity is never something stable such that it could be taken over and handed back to a person or group, even with the best of intentions. Instead, identity is itself a project that allows a person or group to find their own possibilities, at least in part, in the task of taking themselves up as projected into the future in particular ways. These projects are shaped by, though never owned by, group affiliation. Relating to others by "leaping-ahead," allows us to take seriously the potential importance of interventionist political strategies, while attending to concrete ways that "handing back" could manifest itself. This approach requires us to always remain vigilant not to regard such intervention as a terminus (telos), but instead as an opening up for others to a future in which they have the necessary ontological, as well as, political tools (status and power) to be able to activate their own identity as a matter of their own project.

Thus, an examination of Arendt's own project, particularly when juxtaposed with her concern regarding political movements based on "shared victim status" and her attention to otherness suggests another possible interpretation of the metaphorical trap. Certainly one of Heidegger's main contributions to philosophy is the gender neutral, ontological concept: Dasein. As "that being for

whom its being is a question," neither gender nor race nor socio-economic status are relevant to Dasein's ability to take up questions of Being. As an ontic matter, Dasein is, of course, gendered. Ontologically, Dasein is not. In other words, for Heidegger, questions of being are not matters of gender, ethnicity nor socio-economic status. The neutrality of Dasein, though ontologically defensible, may also constitute a trap from which Heidegger cannot escape in so far as it leads him to undervalue certain questions and devote little attention to the nature of being-with-others. Without taking into consideration the concrete, ontic concerns which comprise the world in which Dasein finds herself, being-with-others is merely labeled a constitutive feature of Dasein without that proposition itself meriting sustained attention. Thus, both philosophically and perhaps personally, Heidegger's being-with-others is deficient. In an attempt either conscious or unconscious to remedy this flaw of fundamental ontology, Arendt approaches the ontological through the ontic by first situating herself in the world as a German Jewess and offering up her experiences as a way of reclaiming being-with-others as constitutive of Existenz and illustrating the concrete ways that being-with-others was a genuinely constitutive component of her authentic political existence.

In her 1960 address to the American Political Science Association, Arendt offered a justification of political philosophy as an undertaking.

Thought itself ... arises out of the actuality of incidents, and incidents of living experience must remain [the] guideposts by which it takes its bearings, if it is not to lose itself in the heights to which thinking soars, or in the depths to which it must descend. In other words, the curve which the activity of thought describes must remain bound to incident as the circle remains bound to its focus.


In other words, since thought requires isolation, any responsible philosophizing must necessarily remain "bound to incident." As such identity politics should be undertaken mindful, at least, of several admonishments that can be drawn from the conjoined work of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. First, Vogel suggests that we must, at the very least, regard the Other as a projecting being and pose the following question: can we facilitate the Other's transition to authenticity? In keeping with the rest of Arendt's work, this proposition sets a standard for authentic political engagement that may be nearly impossible to attain. Yet it is not an elitist conception. Authenticity in the public realm, though possibly rare, is a viable option for us all—indeed, this is one of the important results of Heidegger's conception of authenticity, as an ontological possibility, and not merely an ontic accomplishment. It does not require one to be conversant in Greek philosophy nor trained in legal precedents. In fact, extensive training in a particular system of thought may prove more of a distraction or even a trap. The most useful insight may derive from those who are quite simply willing to offer up their own experiences for interpretation. Herein lies the importance of a moment like #MeToo, which originates quite simply with individuals' willingness to share their own experiences for reflection, interpretation and reinterpretation.

Second, Arendt illustrates both personally and philosophically, the continued relevance of Stern's insight. Moments of self-revelation are inherently alienating. In other words, even if one approaches the ontological through the ontic, with an awareness of one's throw, a sense of rootedness in a time and place, the individual's act of projecting sets her apart from the group. The act of self-revelation, in and of itself, creates a separation from the group, if not necessarily a fissure within the group. Herein lies the paradox of being-with-others in the world, particularly as a political phenomenon. The political goal of a cohesive group or a stable agenda is antithetical to the individual's project of self-revealing. Moreover, in trying to act on a political agenda, the group presses upon and constricts, if not constructs, the individual's self-concept. The myriad of ways in which a group can press upon

an individual may either undermine the individual's awareness of his or her thrownness (as in the case of Benjamin Disraeli) or ostracizes the individual who does not conform to the group's definition of itself (as in the case of the pariah). Either one threatens the authenticity of the individual's project and undermines one of the primary goals of identity politics: facilitating the individual's transition to authenticity. As such the challenge of arriving at a legal definition or set of procedures may, in and of itself, undermine the project of identity.

In this text, I have tried simply to open the space for beginning to think about such contributions. I hope that in light of my arguments, the suggestion that Arendt and Heidegger are the wrong places to look for positive conceptions of identity theory within contemporary philosophy is problematized. Though neither thinker offers a fully formed theory, as we might have wished, each provides a way of thinking through the stakes of what such a theory might involve. The experiential ontology of Arendt—as a critical response to and appropriation of Heidegger's phenomenological approach to human existence—is a productive place to look as one continues to think through the critical questions in identity politics. Who is it that "one" is in the context of a "we"? Who do "we" understand ourselves to be and how do we arrive at that understanding? <>

CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN THE TIME OF CORONAVIRUS: A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT by Rachel Robison-Greene and Richard Greene [Open Universe, 9781637700068]



Microchips, government-replaced bird drones, QAnon and vaccine tracers: these are just a few of the most common conspiracies we have heard over and over again throughout most of 2020-2021's news cycles. There are common categories of conspiracy theories, variants of which pop up over and over again, and new and outrageous theories that seemingly appear overnight. While most of them are easily debunked, conspiracy theories and their root causes can be used to closely track people's most significant philosophical concerns at a point in time. In this up-to-date study of conspiracy theories, the authors look at the history of conspiracy theories, discuss the history and hallmarks of such theories, and examine what counts as a conspiracy theory--and what doesn't.

Review

In a time when conspiracy theories have made their way into mainstream media in unprecedented amounts, two Utah professors are exploring the impact conspiracy theories have on society with their new book "Conspiracy Theories in the

Time of Coronavirus: A Philosophical Treatment."

Conspiracy theories meet at the intersection of the specialties of Weber State University philosophy professor Richard Greene and Utah State University philosophy professor Rachel Robison-Greene. The couple began writing "Conspiracy Theories in the Time of Coronavirus" before the 2020 presidential election, just as the conspiracy theory landscape began to change rapidly. Greene specializes in the best practices of belief formation and the study of epistemology - theories of knowledge, while Robison-Greene is an expert on ethics and moral psychology. Both also study pop

culture and their publisher thought they were well suited to research the impact of conspiracy theories on society.

“Our account of what a conspiracy theory was didn’t change very much,” Richard Greene said. “However, all the social implications and the ways conspiracy theories spread and affected society changed quite a bit during the time of the election. We had to rethink a lot of our previous research.”

According to Richard and Rachel, conspiracy theories have almost always existed and will continue to exist, but harmful conspiracy theories being shared in unprecedented amounts on social media affects people’s health, lives and political leanings.

“The conspiracy theories surrounding the pandemic had significant real world implications,” Richard Greene said. “We’re talking about people’s lives here, and as we note in the book, conspiracy theories are being passed about in unprecedented ways and numbers — it’s a public health crisis really. So that’s why we wanted to focus on it in the book. We knew it was the case that everyone was being impacted by conspiracy theories related to the pandemic.”

Each chapter of the book begins with discussing different conspiracy theories that have been popular at various points throughout history such as birds not being real, the Illuminati and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

“So many conspiracy theories employ racist and antisemitic motifs,” said Richard and Rachel. “We hope to help people avoid becoming susceptible to that mindset.”

Richard and Rachel also hope that readers get a clearer understanding of what conspiracy theories are and how they’ve been used over time. Though the book covers lighter and heavier material, it is written for all ages.

“I think conspiracy theories at their core are about people feeling marginalized and frustrated at power imbalances,” Rachel Robison-Greene said. “If we constructed social systems where people felt less marginalized and focused on societal inequalities, we could mitigate some of the harmful conspiracy theories we’re seeing now.”

CONTENTS

Thanks

The Current Landscape

Part I Understanding Conspiracy Theories

1. Conspiracy Theories Past and Present

2. Conspiracy and Theory

3. What Are Conspiracy Theories?

4. The Various Natures of Conspiracy Theories

5. The Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories

6. A Puzzle about Identity

Part II Conspiracy Theories in the Modern World

7. Conspiracy Theories as Jokes

8. The Politics of Conspiracy Theories

9. Conspiracy Theories, Social Media, and the Internet

10. Existential Matters and Categories of Conspiracy

11. The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories

Part III Conspiracy Theories and Values

12. The Ethics of Belief

13. Conspiracy Theories and Human Virtues

14. What's at Stake When We Believe Conspiracy Theories?

15. Conspiracy Theories as a Social Problem

References

Index

The Current Landscape

At the time of this writing the world is in a horrible state. We are in the middle of a global pandemic that, at the time this book was written, has taken approximately 5.5 million lives with no end currently in sight despite there being a number of vaccines available, each of which has been proven to provide outstanding protection against death. As if that weren't enough, the political division that exists in many countries, including perhaps most notably the United States, presents serious existential threats to their most fundamental political systems and institutions—across the globe, democracy, where it exists, is hanging by a thread. Interestingly, conspiracy theories play a huge role in both of these things.

A New Plague

Deep in a cave somewhere in China, a virus mutated inside of a horseshoe bat. These bats aren't bothered much by coronaviruses. New strains regularly develop inside of them, some of them harmful to other creatures, others perfectly benign.

Enter, a pangolin. Pangolins are unique for two related reasons. First, they are the only mammals with scales. Second, they are the world's most trafficked creature. Pangolins call to mind both anteaters and pill bugs. They have long snouts and tongues that they use to forage for ants, termites, and larvae. When predators are near, pangolins roll up into a ball and their scales make them impenetrable to most hungry carnivores.

Somehow, a pangolin came into contact with the novel coronavirus. Coronaviruses are zoonotic diseases, which means that they can spread from one species of animal to another. This might have been the end of the story. The novel coronavirus may have thrived and then fizzled in bats and pangolins, were it not for the introduction of new predators—human beings. The scales of pangolins are highly valued in traditional medicinal practices. A 1938 article in *Nature* describes some of those practices:

The animal itself is eaten, but a greater danger arises from the belief that the scales have medicinal value. Fresh scales are never used, but dried scales are roasted, washed, cooked in oil, butter, vinegar, boy's urine, or roasted with earth or oyster-shells, to cure a variety of ills. Amongst these are excessive nervousness and hysterical crying in children, women possessed by devils and ogres, malarial fever and deafness.

It's illegal to sell pangolins, but that doesn't stop it from happening. In fact, the taboo related to the animals confers even more social standing to those who are able to acquire them and imbues the scales with more of a mystical status than they had before. As a result, it's likely that the pangolin which contracted the novel coronavirus from a horseshoe bat was poached and traded on the wildlife black-market.

Scene: A wet market in Wuhan, China. Wet markets exist all over the world. They are places where customers can buy fresh meat and produce. In some wet markets, animals are even slaughtered right in front of the customers. As one might imagine, conditions in these places are not always sanitary. Some wet markets are clean, and one might even think of them as models of local, sustainable food practices. Others, however, are breeding grounds for disease. It is in the latter position that we find our pangolin, contagious with SARS-CoV2. Once this virus spread at the market to human beings, globalization ensured that it steamrolled into a global pandemic. It would go on to kill millions of people, while devastating economies, putting a huge strain on medical resources, filling up hospital beds, shutting down schools, and increasing anxiety levels world-wide.

That is, in all likelihood, what happened. Many Americans believe other explanations altogether.

Fake News and Big Lies

We are undoubtedly living in a golden age of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories have nearly always existed, and there have been other golden ages in which conspiracy theories have existed in large numbers while playing key roles in the unfolding of significant events, but we've never seen so many conspiracy theories playing such prominent roles.

A number of factors serve to make this the case.

First, conspiracy theories spread much more easily due to the ways in which the Internet connects all of us together, and they do so in real time (this is particularly true since social media became a significant part of the Internet).

Second, conspiracy theories have been weaponized by politicians to discredit their political enemies as well as news sources that would speak out against them. Again, this is nothing new, but it is now happening with greater frequency and at the highest levels of government.

Third, there is a level of distrust of our leaders that is unparalleled in recent centuries. This distrust is not just a distrust of political leaders, although there is plenty of that to go around. There is distrust of business leaders, religious leaders, academics, scientists, the press, and just about any other group that might have wielded some influence at one time or another. In some cases, the distrust is warranted—members of each of the above groups have lied to the public at one time or another, although some groups are more prone to doing so than are other groups. In many cases the distrust is simply not warranted.

Fourth, there are a number of psychological factors at play that predispose certain people to be more readily accepting of conspiracy theories, not the least of which are the feelings of powerlessness and anger that a great number of people feel due to the fact that the pandemic has put a great many lives on hold. We find ourselves in a holding pattern due to circumstances beyond our individual abilities to control (although collectively we have more power than many people realize).

It's distressing, to say the least. Accepting conspiracy theories, at least to the extent that doing so gives us people to blame for our predicaments, allows some people to regain a little bit of that lost power. Finally, there are shameless promoters of conspiracy theories with huge followings and large bullhorns with which to spread their theories. Why would they want to do this? Well, it turns out that there is quite a bit of money to be made in peddling conspiracy theories. These are just a few of the factors that have given rise to this golden age of conspiracy theories. We'll discuss many more in the pages to follow.

It is noteworthy that conspiracy theories are so much a part of daily life now. It was not all that long ago that the majority of people were not all that familiar with the term and even fewer had a keen grasp of

the concept; now one seldom goes more than a day or so without hearing about some conspiracy theory or other. Certainly, the change in public awareness of them is partially due to the global pandemic, which has itself spawned a great number of conspiracy theories. Conspiracies theories breed in times of crisis. For example, there are conspiracy theories about the origins of the pandemic, there are conspiracy theories about the production, distribution, and contents of the vaccines, and there are conspiracy theories about the virus itself. (Poor Bill Gates! Most of these theories have attached themselves to him at one time or another.) The change in public awareness also has much to do with the current political climate. The top news stories of the day frequently make reference to conspiracy theories.

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

Despite the increase in awareness of conspiracy theories, there is still much to be said about them. People have the concept, but it is not clearly defined in the minds of many. Moreover, there are a number of questions pertaining to conspiracy theories that need to be addressed. The main purpose of this book is to highlight and answer many of these questions.

We need, for example, to know just what conspiracy theories are. Some maintain that any theory about a conspiracy counts as a conspiracy theory. We'll argue that this is not the case. What sort of features do conspiracy theories have? In what ways do they change and evolve? What features are unique to conspiracy theories? What is the epistemically responsible attitude to take with respect to conspiracy theories?

Should they always be rejected? Is there ever a time when one is justified in accepting a conspiracy theory? Some theorists argue that we should all become conspiracy theorists—or perhaps that we already are all conspiracy theorists. (See, for example, "From Alien Shape-shifting Lizards to the Dodgy Dossier" by M R.X. Dentith and "Everyone's a Conspiracy Theorist" by Charles Pigden, both listed in the References to this volume.) We'll argue that once conspiracy theories are properly understood, neither of these options are acceptable (even if we all turn out to be persons who accept or embrace some theories about conspiracies).

Conspiracy theories also give rise to questions about the obligations of politicians, the nature of existence, and human psychology. What do we bring to bear on the problems raised by conspiracy theories?

Finally, there are important questions to be addressed pertaining to the ethics of conspiracy theories. In just what ways do conspiracy theories harm us? Who is responsible for the promulgation of conspiracy theories? How bad is it to believe conspiracy theories? And, perhaps most importantly, who is responsible for solving the various problems raised by conspiracy theories? Alas, the solution to these problems is not going to be a simple one. It's not, for example, a matter of merely educating people that believing conspiracy theories is bad, or having everyone take a critical thinking course at their local college. There is an interesting paradox at play here. Seemingly the more one responds to conspiracy theories, that is the more one refutes, rejects, and debunks conspiracy theories, the more entrenched certain believers of conspiracy theories become. For many, accepting conspiracy theories is an essential part of their identity. Responding to conspiracy theories is tricky business.

We hope that these introductory remarks make it clear that conspiracy theories are generally not to be taken lightly, and especially not in light of our current political predicament and against the backdrop of a deadly ongoing global pandemic. The stakes are quite high and the threat is very real. Ironically, to many it doesn't seem that way. A lot of people think conspiracy theories are mostly fun. In some cases, this is correct.

(We do hope you have fun reading about conspiracy theories in this book!) There is something entertaining about thinking that aliens are being held in Area 51 or that birds are not real or that Jim Morrison is still alive. These, however, as we will see, are the exceptions. In a world where conspiracy theorists are being elected to congress, citizens are storming the capitol, and people are casting votes based on conspiracy theories, we can ill afford to take conspiracy theories with a chuckle or a grain of salt.

How to Read this Book

For those of you reading this book who are, in fact, conspiracy theorists, you'll want to search for the hidden messages that were written just for you. Perhaps you might try taking the first letter of each word and seeing if that amounts to anything. Alternatively, you might try stringing together the first words from each paragraph or the first sentences from each new section to see if either of

those reveal the secret messages. If these don't yield results, try reading the odd pages backwards, or using all the hints in The Da Vinci Code to point you in the right direction. One of these things is bound to work, and if none do, then keep trying. The truth is out there (or in here) and as no one says, fortune favors the diligent.

For those of you reading this book who are not conspiracy theorists, we can tell you that there are no secret hidden messages in the text. We would tell the conspiracy theorists, but they wouldn't believe us anyway. Still, you will be interested to know a bit about how this book is structured. Each chapter begins with a prominent conspiracy theory (or, in some cases, a handful of related conspiracy theories), which get related to the main themes in the chapter. The idea was to make the book both informational for the person interested in conspiracy theories, and philosophical. It's great to learn about both the philosophy of conspiracy theories, as well as about the conspiracy theories themselves. <>

PLATO'S CRATYLUS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM PRAGENSE

edited by Vladimír Mikeš [Proceedings of the Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, Series: Brill's Plato Studies Series, 9789004473010]

The present volume offers a collection of papers on one of Plato's most intriguing dialogues. Although not a running commentary, the book covers the majority of difficult questions raised by the dialogue in which the subjects of language and ontology are tied closely together. It shows why Plato's Cratylus has been highly regarded among readers interested in ancient philosophy and those concerned with modern semantics and theory of language. This collection also presents original views on the position of the dialogue in the whole Plato's œuvre and in the context of Plato's contemporaries and successors.

CONTENTS

Preface – Making Sense of the Cratylus by Vladimír Mikeš

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1 The Opening of Plato's Cratylus A Prelude to a Socratic Reading of the Dialogue by Steffen Lund Jørgensen

Chapter 2 Why the Cratylus Matters, or: Plato's Cratylus and the Philosophy of Language by Francesco Ademollo

Chapter 3 Intentionality and Referentiality in Plato's Cratylus by Francesco Aronadio

Chapter 4 What Remains of Socrates' Naturalist Theory Once Conventionalism Is Accepted by Vladimír Mikeš

Chapter 5 Forms and Names: On Cratylus 389a5–390a10 by Anna Pavani

Chapter 6 Platons Theologie der Götternamen by Jakub Jinek

Chapter 7 Commerce, Theft and Deception: The Etymology of Hermes in Plato's Cratylus by Olof Pettersson

Chapter 8 Gorgias and the Cratylus Author: Mariapaola Bergomi

Chapter 9 Quelques Différences entre le Cratyle et le Sophiste by Frédérique Ildefonse

Chapter 10 A Theory of Language between the Cratylus, the Theaetetus and the Sophist by Filip Karfik

Index Locorum

Making Sense of the *Cratylus* by Vladimír Mikeš

This volume is a collection of papers originally presented at the *Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, held in Prague in November 9th and 10th, 2017.

Some dialogues in the corpus of Plato's works have a straightforward importance, position and overall role. The *Cratylus* is not one of them. In this dialogue Plato touches on questions of longstanding importance to him – as we can conclude from other dialogues – and raises new questions which, given the space dedicated to them, should be worth asking when one is dealing with “correctness of names”. And yet there has been wide disagreement about the dialogue's meaning. It contains queries about speech and its parts, about things having their own natures *versus* consisting in mere appearances, about general flux *versus* the good and beautiful remaining always the same. There are examinations of semantics and of Forms behind names, and a famously lengthy exploration of etymology. Although for some of these questions we see where Plato's leaning is, we cannot be sure about his views of almost anything that is explicitly stated. And scholars indeed differ so much in saying what Plato's opinions are in this dialogue that it is almost without parallel in the whole corpus. Is Plato conventionalist or rather non-conventionalist in what concerns names? Is he giving any genuine answer to the initial question of the correctness of names? Are his etymologies to be taken seriously? Is he entirely sceptical about words and language as means to achieve knowledge or does he rather make distinctions with a purpose to show the way forward? Is the dialogue aporetic in its nature or does it convey some positive message we should retain? These are the main questions which have been raised. Most of them have not only received different answers from different scholars – which would not be exceptional – but to an unusual extent these answers are directly opposite. This controversial status of the dialogue has not escaped anyone's attention. It is therefore not surprising that there is something like a golden thread that can be observed going through many different interpretations. Very often interpreters have not taken their task to be to merely explain this or that particular theory or problem of the *Cratylus*, but to make sense of the dialogue as a whole, to defend its overall meaning, or to propose the way it should be understood in the collection of other dialogues, even in cases when they seek to interpret only a part of the text. We can observe this with a higher than usual frequency in the interpretations adopting an approach which can be seen as the most traditional, offering a closer scrutiny of chosen passage or passages. Very often the question of what makes the *Cratylus* worth reading is recognizable in the background. But there are also other approaches which are more directly related to its puzzling nature like larger summarising overviews of its arguments and different attempts to show how the dialogue appears in the context – the context of Plato's other dialogues, of ancient thought more generally or, last but not least, of distinctions made by modern semantics and philosophy of language.

All the aforementioned approaches are represented in the present volume. This may be taken as one of the features making it a worthy contribution to the debate. In relatively little space, it displays the controversial standing of the dialogue by exemplifying the variety of interpretations and approaches it allows for – and yet it does this without falling into repetition or stalemate. The texts offered here either propose new points of view or build upon preceding literature to make further steps in directions which have already been advocated. On the whole the volume proves that the *Cratylus* is an inevitable starting point for anyone who wants to learn about Plato's views on speech – *logos* – and the ontology related to it. It also makes clearer that it is a very complex dialogue that does not offer straightforward answers but necessitates a careful reading and evaluation of individual arguments against other arguments. This is an important achievement in that it shows a general way to approach a highly literary author whose style of thought and expression is everything but simple. Moreover, the *Cratylus* is probably the dialogue most resistant to the simplifying *either/or* kind of interpretation, as this volume makes sufficiently plain. For all these

reasons, this collection of papers is readable as a single book from beginning to end. It might be also of some interest that it is the first collective monograph on this dialogue.

The volume starts with *Steffen Lund Jørgensen's* contribution advocating a new way to look at Socrates' interlocutor Hermogenes as a means to better understand certain puzzling claims of the first part of the dialogue. It is followed by *Francesco Ademollo's* paper in which the author of the only modern commentary on the dialogue expands his views and provides a helpful comparison with modern semantics of Kripke, Russell and Frege, thereby giving a fine example of the context-widening interpretation as mentioned above. A not-dissimilar approach – taking an overview of central passages against a background of modern notions of referentiality and intentionality – is offered by *Francesco Aronadio*. In the same vein, the author of this introduction offers summary of the first part of the dialogue in order to make a case that even without bringing in modern concepts we can distinguish here a valuable insight into the nature of language. The paper by *Anna Pavani* is then a natural follow-up, defending the view that a key conceptual distinction is made in one of the arguments of the first part, namely the argument of the Forms of names.

The paper by *Jakub Jinek* revisits a much debated etymological part of the dialogue, in particular the etymologies of divine names, offering a new look at the combination of metaphysics and irony implied in them. Starting from Socrates' etymological analysis of Hermogenes' name, the paper by *Olof Pettersson* leads us to the second part of the dialogue and towards its conclusion about the relation of names and knowledge of things behind names, where the author sees a thoroughly sceptical stance on this point on Plato's part.

The three following papers have in common the emphasis on the wider contextualisation which is necessary, according to them, for the correct understanding of the dialogue. Thus *Mariapaola Bergomi* gives a very new impulse by arguing that Gorgias, though not mentioned in the dialogue, is present behind, and targeted by, some of its central arguments. *Frédérique Ildefonse* then proceeds in the previously suggested but insufficiently explored direction of reading the dialogue in connection with later dialogues, like the *Sophist*, and later philosophers, the Stoics, in her case. *Filip Karfik* makes yet further important steps on this ground, advancing arguments for a sceptical reading of the *Cratylus*, advocated already by Pettersson, in which the dialogue mainly shows impossibilities and is therefore Plato's preparation for the *Sophist* and the claims made there about different relations between language and reality.

Chapter I The Opening of Plato's *Cratylus* A Prelude to a Socratic Reading of the Dialogue by Steffen Lund Jørgensen

The paper argues that the opening of the *Cratylus* is a prelude to a Socratic reading of the dialogue. The paper has two main sections. The first section argues that the opening of the *Cratylus* characterizes Hermogenes as a Socratic philosopher and thereby introduces the reader to a Socratic reading of the dialogue. Specifically, the section argues that the opening portrays Hermogenes as modelling himself on Socrates by using two conversational devices that are characteristically Socratic: Socratic questioning and Socratic irony. In addition, the paper argues that Hermogenes displays a Socratic attitude to knowledge and inquiry. The second section argues that a Socratic reading of the dialogue significantly improves our understanding of the Socratic nature of the conversation between Socrates and Hermogenes as well as the Socratic nature of the theory they develop. Specifically, the paper argues that the general assumption of a Socratic conversation between Socrates and Hermogenes best explains the significance of the invalidity of Socrates' argument about the nature of things and actions (386d8–e9). In addition, the paper argues that the general assumption of the Socratic nature of the theory developed by Socrates and Hermogenes best illuminates Socrates' account of the expert name-maker as a *nomothetes* (388d6–389a4).

Chapter 2 Why the Cratylus Matters, or: Plato's Cratylus and the Philosophy of Language by Francesco Ademollo

In this paper I survey some central stages and aspects of the argument of Plato's *Cratylus*, paying special attention to their affinities with themes from modern and contemporary philosophy. My aim is to show that the dialogue is close to some of our current philosophical concerns and that, in particular, it can be read as a profound inquiry into the relation between reference, on the one hand, and description and representation, on the other. Among other things, I explore the dialogue's connections with Frege's sense/reference distinction and Kripke's arguments against it.

Chapter 3 Intentionality and Referentiality in Plato's Cratylus by Francesco Aronadio

The paper aims to show that in Plato's conception of names, and more generally of language, there is room for a differentiation between referentiality and intentionality. Firstly, Plato's account in the *Cratylus* of the relationship between names and named things is taken into consideration, in order to highlight the nature and the limits of the connection between linguistic units and reality. Secondly, particular attention is paid to Plato's awareness of the distinction between the epistemic and the merely communicative function of language, which vividly shows how language works even in the absence of knowledge of the true essence of things (and, consequently, in the absence of referentiality). Thirdly, and on this basis, it is argued for the possibility of distinguishing within Plato's ontological framework between intentionality, understood as the *dynamis* of linguistic units (i.e. their capability to address something), and referentiality, intended as the effectiveness of the relationship of those units with things named. Fourthly, the fruitfulness of this interpretative approach is pointed out by its application to the pages 237b–239a of the *Sophist*, which focuses on the problematic notion of *medamos on*.

Chapter 4 What Remains of Socrates' Naturalist Theory Once Conventionalism Is Accepted by Vladimír Mikeš

What is the main philosophical gain for a reader of the *Cratylus*? Led by this question, the author claims that the non-conventionalist theory of names developed in the dialogue's first part is not entirely nullified by the acceptance of conventionalism in the dialogue's second part. Against some older and some more recent readings, he argues that a core of the non-conventionalist theory remains valid in Plato's view and, together with Plato's professed conventionalism, represents a complex position on the relation between names and *nominata* – this is the main outcome of the dialogue (and is also consonant with much of what Plato says in other dialogues). For this reason the paper points out several important distinctions that are made in the first part of the dialogue, notably the introduction of forms of names as a third kind of thing distinct from both names and *nominata*. It is argued that the forms of names manifest a rational structure behind names, which, in its turn, is the basis for Plato's semantics and comes forth behind the etymologies and the principle of resemblance as they are successively introduced.

Chapter 5 Forms and Names: On Cratylus 389a5–390a10 by Anna Pavani

In discussing the way “the artisan of names” works, Socrates introduces the puzzling notion of the “*pephykos onoma*” (*Crat.* 389d4–5). What is usually downgraded to a “ghostly name” (R. Robinson) is to be understood within its argumentative context. Within the framework of the “tool analogy”, Socrates defines both the *kerkis* (a weaving tool to be identified not with a “shuttle”, but rather, as I argue, with a kind of comb) and the name as instruments whose specific function is to differentiate. As the structural and terminological parallels testify, producing a name is presented as strictly analogous to producing a *kerkis*. To refute Hermogenes' conventionalism as unfolded in the first part of the dialogue, Socrates shows that producing a name, just as producing a *kerkis*, entails two non-arbitrary components. There is room for arbitrariness when it comes to the actual choice of the

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

phonetic material and this is the reason why lawgivers from different places can produce names that are equally correct. By contrast, there is no room for arbitrariness for the Ideal Name, which the artisan has to look at, and for the *pephykos onoma*, which the artisan has to put into sounds and syllables. What different concrete names share, if they are to be equally correct, is the same *pephykos onoma*. This does not correspond to a “Platonic Form” nor to a “linguistic type” nor to a “meaning”, but rather, as I argue, to a concept.

Chapter 6 Platons Theologie der Götternamen by Jakub Jinek

The paper claims that the question of the correctness of divine names cannot be resolved by reference to the authority of the poets or by a certain semantic theory, but by turning to metaphysics. Socrates proceeds from revision of beliefs of the poets, through the formulation of the principle of “genetic synonymy”, which yet does not apply without exception, to the discovery of the cosmology and the metaphysics of principles hidden behind the theology of the names of the highest divine triad Zeus – Cronus – Uranus. However, it is, on the one hand, the current context of the debate shaped by the Aristophanic comic, and, on the other hand, the decision not to communicate the most important doctrines in the text that prevents Socrates from presenting these teachings explicitly; yet a number of intertextual references and allusions as well as the indirect Platonic tradition can help complete the whole picture.

Chapter 7 Commerce, Theft and Deception: The Etymology of Hermes in Plato’s Cratylus by Olof Pettersson

In the light of Socrates’ largely neglected etymological account of the name Hermes, this article reexamines the dialogue’s perplexing conclusion that reality should not be sought through names, but through itself. By a close scrutiny of three claims made in this etymology – that language is commercial, thievish and deceptive – it argues that Socrates’ discussion about the relation between names and reality cannot only be meaningfully understood in terms of his characterization of language as deceptive and therefore tragic, but that this point is also confirmed by the dialogue’s larger comedic structure and by Cratylus’ framing joke about Hermogenes’ name. As a consequence, the article also suggests that a closer examination of the etymology of Hermes can both help to assess a certain unwarranted optimism common in contemporary scholarship and the claim that the dialogue’s overarching purpose, rather than being an explanation of how human language grants access to the truth about the existing things, is a critical examination of such a project and of its hubristic assumptions.

Chapter 8 Gorgias and the Cratylus Author: Mariapaola Bergomi

The following paper argues that Gorgias, and his anti-eleatic treatise *Peri tou meontos* (PTMO), must be included among the critical points of reference of Plato’s *Cratylus* and, although Plato (as well as Aristotle) never mentions the treatise explicitly, that Gorgias’ linguistic conventionalism significantly influenced especially the third section of the dialogue and the arguments against Cratylus’ naturalism. The paper starts with some considerations on the importance of the PTMO, continues highlighting some interesting clues in the dialogue that may point to Gorgias as a philosopher and a philosophical character in Plato, and ends with some references to the arguments against Cratylus and especially to the argument on the impossibility of uttering false statements.

Chapter 9 Quelques Différences entre le Cratyle et le Sophiste by Frédérique Ildefonse

In this contribution I seek to propose an approach to certain aspects of the *Cratylus* by combining two paths: an approach to the *Cratylus* by way of the *Sophist*, and an approach, enlightened by Stoicism, that considers what each one of the dialogues develops. I do not propose to consider what

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

the *Cratylus* anticipates in the *Sophist* in terms of language study, but rather how the *Sophist* will shift the terms of the investigation of the name, specific to the *Cratylus*. By reading the *Cratylus* closely, one can better see what operations the Stranger carries out in the *Sophist*: on truth, on the relationship between *legein* and *logos*, on *logos* and its parts, as well as on the interlacing between the question of truth and the distinction between *legein* and *logos*, as well as on the interlacing between the question of truth and the relation between *logos* and its parts. I also propose to read some aspects of the *Cratylus* and the *Sophist* in light of Stoicism, which, for these dialogues as for others, sheds a particular light on the Platonic issues, but also allows us to understand the genesis of the Stoic concepts that arise, many of which emerge from a certain reading of Platonism.

Chapter 10 A Theory of Language between the *Cratylus*, the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* by Filip Karfik

On the surface, the *Cratylus* presents us with two competing theories concerning the “correctness of names”, a naturalist and a conventionalist one. More in depth, it attacks the very idea that the study of language is the privileged or even the only way of acquiring knowledge. Besides casting doubt upon the epistemological value of words it raises the question of the ontology allowing for a theory of knowledge. In comparison with the *Cratylus*, the theory of language put forward in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* marks a double shift: from *onoma* to *logos* and from the relation *onoma–pragma* to the relation *logos–dianoia–eide*. The alternative between an ontology of flux and an ontology of unchanging Forms which underlies the debate about the correctness of names in the *Cratylus* resurfaces in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* tries to resolve this conflict by assigning motion and rest their proper places among the greatest genera, thus replacing the primitive ontology of single Forms with a structured ontology of relationships among them. This ontology provides a basis for the theory of falsehood of judgement and speech and, more generally, for the theory of imitation which can be true or false. On this new basis, the conception of speech as a kind of *mimesis* can be reformulated. Since speaking and judging consist in a kind of imitation and since imitation, as such, allows for falsehood, neither speech nor judgement can be the criterion of truth. Only what is not itself an imitation can provide this criterion. <>

PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AS THEORY, METHOD, AND WAY OF LIFE: CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS edited by Przemysław Bursztyka, Eli Kramer, Marcin Rychter, and Randall Auxier [Series: *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, Brill, 9789004515789]

The “idea” of culture comprises almost all human activities, from science to art, from music to microscopy. Does anything important escape the limits of this idea? The authors of this collection argue that all philosophy is really the philosophy of culture, since in some way each and every discipline and subdiscipline is foremost a manifestation of our collective cultural effort. Further, they argue that by engaging with philosophy as a cultural activity and as a discipline to meaningfully engage with all dimensions of (inter)cultural life, we can live more meaningful, flourishing, and wisely guided lives.

CONTENTS

Dedication

Notes on Contributors

Introduction Philosophy of Culture and Humane-ization by Przemysław Bursztyka, Eli Kramer, and Marcin Rychter

Section 1 Philosophy of Culture as Theory and Method

Chapter 1 Toward a “Cultural Philosophy”: Five Forms of Philosophy of Culture by Jared Kemling

Chapter 2 Culture and Philosophy by Robert Cummings Neville

Chapter 3 Toward an Apophatic Philosophy of Culture by Przemysław Bursztyka

Chapter 4 Why Do We Need an Ontology of Culture? by Marcin Rychter

Chapter 5 The Field of Aesthetics as the Field of Culture: Reflections on French

Postphenomenology and the Community of Feeling by Monika Murawska

Chapter 6 Max Scheler’s Two Approaches to Philosophy of Culture by Kenneth W. Stikkers

Chapter 7 Politics and the Rule of Law in the Context of the Philosophy of Culture: The Battle of Purpose against Teleology by Randall Auxier

Chapter 8 Notes toward a Pragmatist Metaphilosophy by Joseph Margolis

Section 2 Philosophy of Culture as a Way of Life

Chapter 9 Humanism and Philosophy as a Way of Life Author: Matthew Sharpe

Chapter 10 The Virtues of Philosophy of Culture: Symbolizing Cassirer as a Renaissance Sage Author: Eli Kramer

Chapter 11 Philosophy as Eco-Systematic Way of Life: Paradox as a Spiritual Exercise and Philosophic Parrhesia as Cross-Cultural Virtue Author: Andrew B. Irvine

Chapter 12 Education, Philosophy, and Morality: Virtue Philosophy in Kant Author: Laura Mueller

Chapter 13 From a Metaphysics to a Metanoia of Enculturation: Some Usual and Unusual Suspects Author: Lucio Angelo Privitello

Section 3 Applications of Philosophy of Culture

Chapter 14 Culture and Science – Science in Culture: A Relational Approach to the Cultural Connectedness of Science Author: Gary L. Herstein

Chapter 15 Richard Rorty’s Cultural Politics and Public Philosophy on the Internet Author: Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński

Chapter 16 How the Arts Reorient Experience and Recontextualize the World Author: Rudolf A. Makkreel

Chapter 17 Adoption in the Cultural Orphanages as an Ethics of the Passerby Author: Myron Moses Jackson

Chapter 18 Progress and Reversions: Movement in the Hermeneutic Circle of Culture Author: Zofia Rosińska

Index

This volume is the expression of an ongoing dialogue between American and Polish philosophers on philosophy of culture, and its status and meaning in relation to philosophy as a way of life (PWL). The question at the heart of this dialogue is rather simple and striking: What does it mean to do philosophy of culture? Is it primarily theoretical inquiry, methodological orientation, a way of living, and in what ways and to what degrees?

Cassirer himself sought to at least partially answer some of these questions in several of his works, and in our times Zofia Rosińska and David L. Hall have done so as well. Others have sought to put it into clear practice and let their work speak for themselves, such as Roger Ames and John J. McDermott. One might also think of books that are even more tightly focused on particular kinds of or subjects within the domain of philosophy of culture, such as Morton White’s *A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism* or Kwame Anthony Appiah’s *In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. In the English language there are as yet no collections that give contemporary reflections on and applications of the meaning, purposes, status, and practice of philosophy of culture.

This volume seeks to take up this task. Further, by having the opportunity to dialogue with scholars of philosophy as a way of life, including those who consider themselves philosophers of culture, the contributors have sought to position philosophy of culture in relation to this nascent field. While

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

some essays directly address Pierre Hadot scholarship and the philosophy of culture, others utilize their own approaches to PWL drawing on Kant and other figures. Other contributors to the volume seek to look at philosophy of culture's broader role in society, and/or argue that PWL is only a part of (arguably) broader philosophy of culture endeavors. In all cases, this dialogue between PWL and philosophy of culture has fostered a community of scholars that want to help foster a much needed revival of the field outside a small group of departments in Europe and the United States.

We are convinced of the potential of philosophy of culture inside the academy and in greater culture as a force for humane-ization. We use "humane" here not in the sense of supporting the territorialization of anthropocentrically constructed human subjectivity, but in the sense of humanitas, as a critical, careful, and caring attention to holistic growth of the diversity of others and ourselves (however one defines the creaturely existence of ourselves and the personhood of others). Humane-ization is thus not tied to a mission of "civilizing" as a uniform project with a univocal vision of "progress" and cultivation. Such a vision is inherently dangerous. It is perennially used as part of the logic of imperialism, nationalism, fascism, and commitments to and structures of racial (especially White) supremacy with a correlate xenophobic attitude. Rather humane-ization is inherently pluralistic, expressing the diversity of ways philosophers of culture support critically challenging and attending to the condition of ourselves and others, and cultivating ourselves accordingly. It is a function of philosophy of culture, with ever new reconstructive projects emerging in different periods and contexts. As "persons of letters" philosophers of culture have a special role to play in the development of a fertile and pluralistic cultural life.

In the rest of the introduction, we sketch how in the very inception of Western philosophy of culture (though we think it is true for other traditions as well) one can find this commitment to humane-ization. From this preliminary outline we will be able to elucidate what role we think philosophy of culture can play today in this kind of rich cultural cultivation. We then turn to the essays themselves and their relation to this task. We conclude by inviting the reader to the serio ludere (serious play) of this volume, finding the fun, passion, adventure, and zest for life that is inherent to the philosophy of culture.

The Origins of Philosophy of Culture

Trying to look at philosophy of culture from a historical standpoint is not an easy task because of the ambiguities inherent in this very phrase. If the term itself seems to have been coined only in the nineteenth century, the questions concerning culture were of interest to philosophers at least since the times of the Greek sophists who were discussing the problems of human and earthly laws (nomos, physis), justice (dike) and education (paideia). In fact, the idea of paideia, seen by many as central to the ancient Greek civilization,⁷ was the idea of a certain model of culture (paideia is translated alternatively as "culture," "education" or "upbringing"). Plato's Republic may be considered as a complete presentation, along with a philosophical discussion and justification of a model of culture. A model that designs issues such as education, family and sex relations, gender roles, politics, ethics and morals, religion, art, poetry and music, astronomy, mathematics and others, also providing them with a general metaphysical foundation and framework. Notwithstanding, culture as paideia is, among other things, always being thought of as a transition, a process, and a task being put upon its participants. Thus understood, it marks out an account of a "civilized way of life," by presenting a distinct and ultimate goal to aim at and by teaching the means of achieving this absolute. Cicero, grafting this tradition on to the Latin world, famously compared culture to the agricultural process of cultivating (colere). People of culture tend to their souls (a process in which their bodies are also involved through gymnastics and sports) such as farmers do to their crops. According to this model, culture involves self-mastery and self-restraint, it also favors reason over emotions or desires. More generally, it sides always with that which is one and the same against what may be many and different. It also prefers identity and stability over dissimilarity and change.

This moral and theoretical ideal of antiquity (aspects of which then permeated Christian thought and imagery), along with the philosophical discourse that has laid it out and defended it, could be possibly, historically speaking, taken as one meaning of philosophy of culture.

Already within the antiquity, however, we find a discourse of a quite different sort which still, from a historical perspective and retroactively, might be referred to as philosophy of culture. This approach is different from Plato's one as it is more on the objectifying side, aiming at comparing, at analyzing different approaches rather than at promoting any central one. As such, it is also the more difference-focused one. Aristotle, to name just the first example in this series, putting forward in his *Politics* the principle of the succession (actually it is a succession by degeneration) of political orders, which describes the mechanisms of a historical, political and cultural change: oligarchy turns into tyranny which eventually gives in to democracy which inevitably degenerates back into oligarchy and so the circle closes. Notably, Aristotle, as the personal teacher of Alexander the Great was himself a witness to a decisive cultural change in the ancient world, namely the decline of the monoethnical and independent cities-states (*poleis*) and the rise of the multi-cultural, vast, and interconnected empire of Alexander. In the capital of this empire, at the very beginning of the first century, worked a philosopher responsible for an impressive cultural translation which might be taken as another philosophical approach to cultural diversity. Philo of Alexandria (or Philo Judaeus) successfully attempted the transcription of Jewish scripture into the very different language and concepts of Greek philosophy. As a means for this task, he developed the method of allegorical reading and interpretation which then became essential in theology and philosophy. Another philosophical approach to cultural diversity is to be found in Augustine's *The City of God*. While the whole book is an apologia for Christianity, Augustine also discusses there in depth religious and cultural practices of pagans and heretics (amongst other social and political topics). He describes the two rival models of culture, the conflict of which constitutes world history. The culture centered around the Catholic Church of Christendom, or the City of God, was aimed at reaching the otherworldly salvation with the help of divine providence. Opposed to this is the Earthly City, representing various cultures, goals, and lifestyles of people who are focused on worldly gains and pleasures, such as fame, political power, wealth, or bodily pleasures.

Yet another historical layer of philosophical reflection on culture may be associated with the thinkers of the Enlightenment, however their views are everything but univocal. One of the predominant topics in the philosophical literature of the eighteenth century was education and culture which German writers addressed using a single word, *Bildung*, that was meant as a translation and transposition into modernity of Greek *paideia*. To Kant *Bildung* meant freeing oneself from the irrational prejudices, both in theoretical and practical matters. This opinion was, however, criticized by Herder (and later by Schiller) as one-sided and downplaying the role of art and human creativity developing which, according to them, were essential for the process of education as it was for a good life of the humane individual. These opposing views were subsequently synthesized in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, a philosopher, linguist, and the architect of a massive educational reform project in the eighteenth century Prussia. In the English-speaking world, a similar idea of restoring the ancient ideal of *paideia* in the modern context was put forward by a British poet and essayist, Matthew Arnold, who identified culture with a total perfection achieved by knowledge and conscious self-development.

However, since the beginning of the Enlightenment, many affirmative philosophical positions promoting culture as the progress of liberty, autonomy, and reason which is achieved due to education, science, and technology, were accompanied by something that could be retroactively named a radical critique of culture – and here we approach yet one more historical semantic field that may be associated with philosophy of culture. To Rousseau, culture was first and foremost oppressive and the reason for that remained within its very essence. Strictly opposing culture to

nature, he claimed the former was inseparable from property and inequality. People want to be envied by possessing more than the others, and for that reason they produce things and ideas. In the pursuit of effectiveness and productivity, culture becomes ever more refined in every aspect. This in turn leads to isolating people from each other and narrowing the scope of their experience, as we see comparing the job of a factory machine worker to that of a traditional farmer, or comparing modern, narrowly scoped science to the holistic wisdom of ancient Greece. For Rousseau his current culture consisted of alienation-inducing factors which should be overcome – an idea which later reappeared in many different shapes (in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Heidegger, Adorno, just to name a few instances) and still is essential to many critical discourses of today.

The nineteenth century with its widespread interest in nations, national identity, cultures, and the human subject, is an especially important historical period for philosophy of culture. It is also the one that marks the beginning of its emancipation as a separate field, discipline, or discourse, so in the narrow sense (which we do not adopt here) one could say that philosophy of culture originated in the nineteenth century. An important historical context here is the emergence of the opposition against positivism and scientism at the humanistic faculties of the universities of the late nineteenth century. Their employees sometimes felt unsafe in the wake of the spectacular progress of rival natural sciences and engineering, and the amount of tangible profits they provided. In order to protect their disciplines, faculties and positions, the humanistic professors had to somehow defend or bolster their position. Wilhelm Dilthey, the father of contemporary hermeneutics, justified the legitimacy of philosophical and philological exegeses by stressing the opposition between explaining (*erklären*) and understanding (*verstehen*). The natural science explains things and events simply by providing their reasons, whereas the hermeneutic understanding reaches the domain of senses or meanings of cultural phenomena. This understanding requires a detailed and professional knowledge of the historical and cultural context: the more we know about the epoch the better we understand the works of a certain author belonging to it. This idea of a shift from the tangible, material reality of natural sciences to the humane world of senses, meanings and values, along with a certain reserve, if not open hostility, toward the “hard” sciences, influenced many philosophers of culture of the twentieth century, especially those on the phenomenological and hermeneutical side.

This hermeneutical root of philosophy of culture is accompanied by a neo-Kantian one. Kant claimed that philosophy should explore the hidden framework of human experience which precedes the experience itself (or its apriorical structure, as the philosopher himself would have put it). If Kant himself was focused on the a priori foundations of epistemology and ethics, his later inheritors, such as Windelband, Cohen, Rickert and, most famously, Ernst Cassirer, wanted to uncover the a priori mechanisms of culture, the mechanisms of creation of the cultural meanings which Cassirer called a philosophy of symbolic forms. Both the hermeneutical and neo-Kantian tradition share the assumption that there is deeper meaning (a sense or a symbolic structure) to cultural phenomena which needs to be uncovered and which is of intelligible nature.

To complete this sketch of a historical presentation we need to mention yet another historical model of philosophy of culture, one which rejects precisely the above-mentioned premise. For Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, to name only this most famous trio here, culture is a symptom or an epiphenomenon of something non-cultural and non-intelligible itself, be it ownership of the means of production and class conflict, healthy or unhealthy life, and the intensity of will-to-power, or the socially repressed sexual drive.

This short summary was not meant as a history of philosophy of culture, rather the goal was, as indicated at the outset, to work through the historical contexts loaded up into the phrase itself. In particular, it shows how throughout its history philosophy of culture has had an attention to our personal condition and how to cultivate ourselves for the better, while challenging and pluralizing our vision of who and what we are.

Philosophy of Culture's Role in Humane Flourishing

It seems to us that there are, at least, a few roles philosophy of culture not only can, but should play in serving the humane-ization of contemporary culture. And to say so already implies one particular role which will not be mentioned separately, but rather as permeating all others. This role has a specific vocational nature and refers to a fundamental obligation which is inscribed into philosophy of culture as such. To put it differently: philosophy of culture is always permeated – whether consciously and intentionally or not, explicitly, or implicitly – by a certain kind of normative/axiological determination and orientation. Both can be articulated in many different ways, but they certainly cannot be suspended. And so, there is some philosophical work to be done on culture. However, since philosophy as such originates from culture as its specific self-referential and self-reflective moment – this work on culture is always, by necessity, a work undertaken from within culture. This equivalence indicates a specific situation that is expressive of both philosophy and culture. Simply put, in this case there is no distance, no separation between the object of analysis and the analysis itself. The latter does not stand outside, or beyond, or on the margins of the former – it belongs to and is expressive of it. The former, in turn, even if cannot be limited to philosophy certainly cannot be separated from it. And that is so, for at least one significant reason – both culture and philosophy, when properly understood, share the same fundamental aim and the same fundamental feature. That is, both provide a kind of cultivation, a humane-ization (again in the sense of an attending to the development of oneself and the other) of reality. This entanglement of culture and philosophy calls for a specific reflective attitude which questions culture as at once the origin and the object of philosophy. What is culture that it emanates from itself philosophy? Why does philosophy direct itself to culture? Is this directedness something accidental or rather essential for philosophy as such? What are the purposes and potential values of this directedness?

This kind of question leads us to the first role philosophy of culture should certainly play, namely that of metaphilosophy. The latter is not to be understood here in a traditional way as an abstract philosophical reflection on ways, modes and methods of philosophizing. In this context the term “metaphilosophy” has a broader meaning.⁸ It is to be a philosophical reflection on culture understood as an originary realm of all human meaningful activities, of philosophy in its pre-theoretical, pre-reflective form. As Martin Heidegger put it: “So long as man exists, philosophizing of some sort occurs.” If so, then philosophy of culture understood as metaphilosophy is to be an activity of interpreting out of culture meanings which appear there long before any speculative, conceptually, and methodologically rigorous, explicit philosophical reflection. They are present and operative in the form of works and products (both material and intellectual), narratives, social imaginaries and shared emotions, symbols and archetypes, common forms of sensitivity and axiological frameworks which all at once emerge out and govern social praxis. All these workings of culture provide the most basic – ontological, existential, and axiological – coordinates drawing landscapes of our personal and communal lives, of our *Lebenswelten*. As such all these forms are, in fact, more spontaneous and more immediate responses to the very same questions philosophy poses. All these forms are primal modes of understanding reality, of making sense of what is “simply given,” they are attempts at making reality more comprehensible and humane, of reconciling ourselves to our cosmic condition so we can best serve ourselves and others. Philosophy of culture, as metaphilosophy, is to uncover and elucidate the ever-developing basic categories and values which underlie and constitute as meaningful even the most basic forms of social praxis. In this sense it becomes a specific form of its own genealogy: It reveals its primordial, spontaneous, most “natural” self-expressions. It also traces origins and development of its different modes and forms.

The second role philosophy of culture can and should play is strictly connected with the first one. That is, it should take a particular form of metahermeneutics. The world of human culture is inherently plural and highly diversified. It is divided into different regions of meaning to which correspond different forms of its articulation. Culture is never univocal, one-dimensional. It consists

of different universes of meaning. Each such universe represents its own irreducible and, more or less, comprehensive form of understanding reality. Correlatively it also represents its own ways and modes of articulating what was understood. Human understanding, as trivial as it sounds after Heidegger, begins with the most basic forms of practical engagement with our environment. And each such engagement, each human action pre-reflectively and pre-theoretically presumes/constitutes the world as a certain “totality of signification” without which it would be meaningless. We do not necessarily follow Heidegger with regard to the priority of practical engagement over other forms of meaningful, that is, constituting activities. We believe that it is not a question of priority, but rather of plurality and multiformity of meaning. That means, each developed and consistent form of human activity – be it practical or theoretical is a form of understanding, that is, it presumes/constitutes, more or less, a complete and meaningful world, even if only pre-reflectively. Practical dealing with things, scientific theories, philosophical systems/discourses, religions, artistic endeavors, and so forth – they all project some world which has its own coordinates, its own forms of space and time, to which correspond different forms of experience. They are not necessarily opposed to each other. Neither are they reducible to each other or to some meta-dimension. The main tasks of philosophy of culture are to recognize this irreducible plurality in its actual forms, but also to recognize in them their possible character, that is, to see each of them as one among infinitely many forms of human self-actualization. All that means philosophy of culture should take on the form of metahermeneutics, that is, hermeneutics of hermeneutics (the latter is obviously plural), hermeneutics of different, irreducible, comprehensive forms of reflecting on reality. It is to be an ongoing critical analysis of particular forms of the world we, as humans, relentlessly project; an analysis of their historical conditions, of their ontological status, of different forms in which humans experience them. As metahermeneutics, philosophy of culture helps humanity learn to attend to and openly interpret different horizons of meaning, without letting them dominate and foreclose others, different ways we can engage with and see the world. Such an open ability to interpret helps us expand and deepen ourselves as persons and helps us teach others to do so.

Given the highly complex, dynamic, fluid, ephemeral, and ever more virtualized character of contemporary culture one can say that even the celebrated phrase from Karl Marx – “all that is solid melts into the air” – seems to be not sufficiently radical as its description. This characterization obviously affects also all possible systems of values, philosophical and scientific theories, religions whose truths and validity have an ever more local and transient nature. Their truths are gradually reduced to transient truth-claims subject to ever possible modification. If we add to this picture the permanently fragmentating sphere of social praxis – not only the way it is ever more divided into mutually disconnected segments, but also the way it develops ever-new dimensions which often play a radically subversive role – and increasing specialization with which we are confronted in the world of academia, then we arrive at the point where can appear perhaps the most important role philosophy of culture should play. This role of crucial importance, and at the same time perhaps the most difficult one, is to create a kind of synoptic picture of the world we live in. Thus, the aim of philosophy of culture is here initiating and entering into a dialogue with different disciplines, languages, symbolic systems – sciences (natural as well as humanities), world-views, religions, and so forth. Furthermore, it aims at bridging the gap between *theoria* and *praxis* which throughout the history of, at least, Western culture was a kind of fundamental tension, but nowadays it seems that these two spheres constitute, for the most part, a radical opposition. The latter can take two apparently opposite forms – that of impoverishment of practical sphere (which often led to experiences of meaninglessness, axiological and existential disorientation, growing anxiety of individuals, etc.), and that of impoverishment of *theoria* (subject to superficial appropriation and instrumental usage by cultural dilettantes). In this context philosophy of culture is, in a sense, obliged to create a comprehensive conceptual, existential, and axiological map, a set of basic coordinates which would help us to orient ourselves in the whole myriad of cultural meanings. Philosophy of

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

culture, understood in this way, does not see culture in terms of a set of contents, but rather as a functional apriori within which all phenomena can appear in their essential inter-relatedness. Thus, while creating a synoptic picture of the world philosophy is to analyze all phenomena, all fragmentary contents of culture as expressive of a presumed unity of culture. But this unity is “not a unity of effects, but a unity of action; not a unity of products, but a unity of the creative process.” One can rightly say that in this highly complex and diversified contemporary culture any synoptic picture of the world can be seen only in terms of a regulative ideal, which, never fully attainable, can give us only a sense of direction. Well, yes and no. We intentionally speak here about a synoptic perspective that is never as solid, stable, and permanent as any “great synthesis,” which as a conception and as an actuality belongs exclusively to the past. We are fully aware that any synoptic picture is, by its very nature, transient and as such subject to reconfiguration. And only in this way can it provide us with a basic sense of orientation in a changeable cultural universe, as well as defend us against the intellectual temptation to reduce the plurality of cultural phenomena to any single principle, paradigm, or perspective which is to organize humane reality.

These remarks lead us to another significant role to be undertaken by philosophy of culture. Since culture, in most of the presented essays, is understood neither as a product, nor as a “complex whole that includes ...,” nor as any kind of substance, but rather as an all-encompassing horizon of all possible meanings or as a creative function – it follows that it has, in a sense, no object of knowledge. It is not interested in this or that region of reality, but in the whole of reality understood as the realm of meaningful activities. If so, it is not a discipline/sub-discipline among other disciplines. The very term “philosophy of culture” indicates rather a mode of philosophizing which is, by necessity, methodologically and “regionally” plural and perspectival as much as it is inter- and trans-disciplinary. That means, in all its analyses it tends to cross, move in-between, and even break the boundaries between itself, other philosophical subdisciplines, other humanities, and the sciences. What is of crucial importance here is not any uncompromising defense of the purity of a discipline but, above all, the fundamental care for the meaning of the thing in question. This strategy allows us to see, analyze, and describe it from different angles – in short, to see its different aspects and dimensions. In other words, philosophy of culture while analyzing any cultural phenomenon follows the logic inherent to that very phenomenon, which in most cases requires recourse to other disciplines. In all these cases philosophy of culture mediates between different languages, constitutes connecting links, projects and/or clarifies ideas and concepts, revealing an ontological status and axiological dimension/s of the analyzed phenomenon. But most importantly it is capable to situate this phenomenon in the broader context of human values, purposes, concerns, that is, to show it as being part and parcel of that great unifying, creative function called culture. It is in this sense an intra-disciplinary endeavor, moving between, across, and through disciplines to provide a moving image of the rich continuities and fraying that makes up the tapestry of culture life. In such a way philosophy of culture provides what Hadot called a “view from above” of the process of humane becoming of culture. It provides us the opportunity to see the systole and diastole of the living cultural activity and gives us the opportunity to reimagine it to serve humane growth and ends.

In short, philosophy of culture, in its metaphilosophical, metahermeneutical, and intradisciplinary dimensions is seeking to support a diversity of critically reconstructive and humane persons. While, given our ever complexifying and diversifying culture, and our own limited talents, we cannot hope to be master polymaths such as Cassirer, we aspire as philosophers of culture to model passion and engagement with our ever pluralistic cultural life. We are ever open to new connections, moving across, between, and through horizons of meaning, finding new continuities and disruptions, novelties and perennial wisdom, worth cherishing, challenging, and reconstructing anew. We can be “persons of letters,” seeking broad and open societies, instead of in-group navel gazing and overspecialization.

The Structure of the Collection

This dialogue on what it means to do philosophy of culture – a discussion we contend illuminates the value of philosophy of culture to humane-ization in the way described above – is broken into three distinct sections. The first two sections illuminate two different general orientations on doing philosophy of culture: First, those philosophers who integrate (and sometimes contest in some degree) the way of life dimension of philosophy of culture within different sorts of metaphilosophical, theoretical, and methodological perspectives; second, those philosophers who tend toward the opposite trajectory: integrating the other metaphilosophical, theoretical, and methodological dimensions of philosophy of culture within a distinct approach to philosophy as a way of life. The third section is devoted to philosophers who start “walking these paths” and enacting philosophy of culture as a way to address a variety of topics and themes.

In the first section, “Philosophy of Culture as Theory and Method,” we begin with Jared Kemling’s piece, which provides an accessible and succinct vision of five different forms of philosophy of culture: descriptive philosophy of culture, critical philosophy of culture, process philosophy of culture, teleological philosophy of culture, and cultural philosophy of culture. He then advocates and defends the essential value for philosophers of culture and philosophy more broadly of “cultural philosophy of culture” (or “cultural philosophy” for short). He insightfully provides a clear and flexible heuristic of the range of approaches to philosophy of culture, including a compelling account of what might be called “cultural philosophy as a way of life,” and for that reason it makes for a helpful introduction to the whole volume. Next, we have a piece by one of the world leading intercultural philosophers of culture and systematic philosophers of today, Robert Neville. In the essay, he seeks to untangle the messy situation of the relationships between culture and nature, and between philosophy of culture and systematic philosophy, which are meant to address the former areas of inquiry. The third essay in the section, by Przemysław Bursztyka, speaks to both of the proceeding pieces, providing an account of the apophatic “form” of philosophy of culture, and offering a unique synoptic vision of the field as a systematic project. Marcin Rychter undergirds such an account with a reflection upon the essential need for an ontology of culture and its relation to PWL.

Monika Murawska follows by providing yet another critical and different sort of theoretical/methodological perspective, that of an aesthetic post-phenomenological orientation on philosophy of culture. Kenneth Stickers then provides yet another route, promoting a revitalization of Scheler’s approach to philosophy of culture, with its horizontal axis of “real and ideal sociological factors” and its horizontal axis of “ethos” in the *ordo amoris*. Although his essay focuses on a historical figure, because Scheler’s philosophy of culture has only recently joined the broader discussion of the nature of philosophy of culture (through the work of Stickers), we consider it as part of our contemporary dialogue. It is particularly salient when trying to make sense of the ethos of global culture (especially in the U.S. and Europe) at this epochal moment. Randall Auxier’s essay provides prescriptive suggestions for the future of humanistic philosophy of culture, so that it can avoid the teleological reductionism ever embedded in Western conceptions of cultural progress, including in the philosophy of culture itself, especially when it comes to the sciences as a putative “progressive” symbolic form. We end with the late eminent American philosopher of culture Joseph Margolis’ account of pragmatism as a metaphilosophy. We consider this piece to be a succinct and critical piece on pragmatism as philosophy of culture, which avoids the reductionism of Morton White’s work previously mentioned.

The second section entitled “Philosophy of Culture as a Way of Life” begins with another propaedeutic essay: Matthew Sharpe provides an account of humanism as a way of life, defending it from Heidegger’s and later continental philosophy’s sometimes dismissive reading of it, and articulating it as a critical foundation for philosophy of culture. Philosophy of culture, as building on

humanism as a way of life, can in this light be considered the “road not taken” by most of broader professional philosophy after the Heidegger and Cassirer debate at Davos in March 1929. Eli Kramer then seeks to articulate the virtues one can find in the “lives of philosophers of culture.” This piece proposes a virtual symbol of the sage/exemplary philosopher of culture as an authentic “renaissance person.” Andrew Irvine then provides a vision of what might be called “intercultural philosophy of culture as a way of life,” showing how the global spiritual exercises of paradox and parrhesia provide two interconnected bases for this eco-systematic way of living. Laura Mueller follows with her own account of philosophy of culture as a Bildungs-virtue-philosophy in the spirit of Kant. Lucio Privitello ends the section with a hermetic and highly creative vision of the moments of philosophical conversion and insight in our cultures, and especially in our philosophy of culture as a way of life classrooms.

Our third section, “Applications of Philosophy of Culture,” begins by touching on a critical but highly contested horizon of meaning for philosophers of culture: science. Gary Herstein explores science as a cultural activity and the kinds of knowledge it produces, as well as reflects on its own dogmatisms and progressive potentials. His piece is followed by Chris (Krzysztof) Piotr Skowroński’s exploration of the role of philosophy of culture as Rortian cultural politics, and how public philosophy can expand and engage with the internet in ways that serve a richer, more humane culture. As one of the leading experts on Kant’s Critique of Judgment, hermeneutics, and as a philosopher of culture himself, the late Rudolf Makkreel explores the moral role that the arts and aesthetic experiences play in our personal and social lives. He challenges certain fundamental assumptions he sees in the work of the philosopher of culture Susanne Langer. Myron Jackson brings together many of the threads in this volume by providing a challenge to the assimilatory and appropriatory, territorializing behavior of a great deal of Western culture toward what it deems other, with what might be considered the spiritual exercises of “cultural adoption and sponsorship.” The volume ends with the long-time “Socrates” of this philosophy of culture dialogue, Zofia Rosińska, who provides us with a thoughtful account of the circle of reactionary longing for old values and traditions, while through creative anachronism bringing in the vital and new, in culture.

Conclusion: An Invitation

As can be seen, there is a pluralism to both reflecting on and engaging with humane-ization in the philosophy of culture, historically and today. There is yet however one key missing dimension to this humane work. From our own experience philosophers of culture engage with the serious work of humane flourishing, as, at its richest, playful, fun, and joyful, especially when in the company of friends. It has a zest for the adventure of ideas and for living well. In this spirit, we invite our readers to what the Italian academies of the Renaissance called *serio ludere* (serious play). We invite you to our festivities, luring each other to more joyful insight and fulfilled lives. <>

PROJECTING SPIRITS: SPECULATION, PROVIDENCE, AND EARLY MODERN OPTICAL MEDIA by Pasi Väliäho **[Stanford University Press, 9781503630857]**

The history of projected images at the turn of the seventeenth century reveals a changing perception of chance and order, contingency and form. In **PROJECTING SPIRITS**, Pasi Väliäho maps how the leading optical media of the period—the camera obscura and the magic lantern—developed in response to, and framed, the era’s key intellectual dilemma of whether the world fell under God’s providential care, or was subject to chance and open to speculating. As Väliäho shows, camera obscuras and magic lanterns were variously employed to give the world an intelligible and manageable design. Jesuit scholars embraced devices of projection as part of their pursuit of divine

government, whilst the Royal Society fellows enlisted them in their quest for empirical knowledge as well as colonial expansion. Projections of light and shadow grew into critical metaphors in early responses to the turbulences of finance. In such instances, Väliaho argues, "projection" became an indispensable cognitive form to both assert providence, and to make sense of an economic reality that was gradually escaping from divine guidance. Drawing on a range of materials—philosophical, scientific and religious literature, visual arts, correspondence, poems, pamphlets, and illustrations—this provocative and inventive work expands our concept of the early media of projection, revealing how they spoke to early modern thinkers, and shaped a new, speculative concept of the world.

Review

"This commanding, erudite history of the 'magic' that goes with optical technologies makes a major and enduring contribution to visual studies, to the history of science, and to the political economy of images." -- Tom Conley — *Harvard University*

"Moving seamlessly from early modern sources to current media studies theories, this book adds subtlety and nuance to our understanding of the ways optical instruments and visual metaphors shaped cultural sensitivities, modes of thought, and economic practices." -- Raz Chen-Morris — *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

"Pasi Väliaho provides a captivating take on projection. *Projecting Spirits* includes a historically rich and deep understanding of the connection between images and economies of both money and souls. As it maps how the virtual and the imaginary become effective anchors of the real world, this wonderful book amounts to nothing less than a project about time: an invention of such a future that becomes a speculative project." -- Jussi Parikka, Aarhus University and FAMU — *Prague*

CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgments

- 1 The Form of Projection
- 2 Projection and Providence
- 3 Government of Souls
- 4 Projecting Property
- s Shadows of Expectation

Epilogue

Notes

Bibliography

Index

It was commonplace in the early modern period to emphasize a distinction between the study of two types of phenomena of light. Catoptrics focused on the production of appearances by reflective surfaces such as mirrors, while dioptrics studied refractions of light on transparent bodies such as lenses. These two operations of light could not be easily set apart in the design of actual optical instruments, but it serves to bear the distinction in mind to the extent that, as Siegfried Zielinski intimates in his sketch for a genealogy of projection, dioptrics and catoptrics connoted two intertwined but nonetheless distinct techno-aesthetic practices. Whereas the former dealt with optical devices contrived for looking through into the world outside the apparatus, such as microscopes and telescopes, the latter implied beholding a surface inside the apparatus onto which images were projected, such as the screen of the camera obscura or the magic lantern. To put it schematically, whereas dioptric apparatuses were designed to function as "artificial eyes" (as the German Jesuit scholar Johann Zahn called the telescope) to augment reality, catoptric ones could also be fashioned for the production of artificial realities—wavering therefore, uncannily for many,

on the uncertain threshold between what was in the seventeenth century called "natural" and "artificial magic."

Microscopes and telescopes put a definitive stamp on the formation of the modern scientific worldview, marking what Hans Blumenberg called a "caesura," beyond which the perceptually and epistemologically accessible reality started to expand indefinitely. They made space stretch toward the infinite and introduced a plurality of worlds alongside the actual one. Although the contribution of camera obscuras, magic lanterns, and related contrivances to the development of early modern thought has been perhaps less straightforward to assess, these devices, too, played a role in shaping ways of seeing, visualizing, and knowing during the early modern period. The Italian scholar Francesco Algarotti proclaimed in the 1760s that "painters should make the same use of the Camera Obscura, which Naturalists and Astronomers make of the Microscope and Telescope, for all these instruments equally make known, and represent Nature." In this vein, historians of art and visual culture have evaluated the place of optical instruments in early modern artistic practice, as well as uncovering how the camera obscura's projections stood for a model of truthfulness and naturalness in seventeenth-century painting, and more generally for a model of the rational, disembodied intellect—even of a kind of "phantasy subject of reason"—in the early modern periods. Historians of science and ideas have more widely mapped the meanings and functions of camera obscuras and magic lanterns in early modern thought, encompassing such diverse fields as the development of modern optics as well as counterreformation metaphysics. Media historians, for their part, have provided detailed accounts of the generation of image projection devices along with their makers, often situated on a long lineage of "screen practices" culminating in the cinema. Historians of literature and philosophy, furthermore, have traced how the magic lantern's ghost projections became key epistemic figures in Enlightenment writing, from the emergence of German idealism to new conceptions about the status of the imagination in early nineteenth-century fiction and psychology.

This book's impetus is to contribute to this heritage with its own account of how optical media lent their shape to Western thought at the turn of the century. The book pursues a historical epistemology interested in the medial conditions of thinking (not only scientific but also philosophical, religious, and economic) based on the assumption that the movements of the intellect are embedded in and hinged on the objects, techniques, and visualizations that the intellect is surrounded by, and fundamentally "patched together from shifting object relations," as Sean Silver proposes. The following chapters play out a media history of thought, by exploring how circa 1700 optical projections—light-borne images cast by a more or less elaborate technical device onto a surface—gave a meaningful cognitive shape to attempts at planning and plotting how the world could, and should, turn out. The English novelist and trader Daniel Defoe famously characterized this historical moment in his native country as a "projecting age." By "projecting," Defoe, to be sure, did not primarily mean the practice of conjuring a colorful play of light and shadow on a screen—although his concept was not far removed from the aesthetics of optical projection, as we will later see. Rather, Defoe was referring to new speculative economic practices and ideas emerging within colonial trade and finance, which not only eroded older concepts of wealth but also radically challenged traditional ways of thinking about the purpose of human activity and God's place in the world. Projection meant a way of embracing the future immanently for the sake of taking risks and profiting on what was contingent and probable, instead of submitting the future to a pre-established design. Defoe's "projection" was cast against more established notions of God's providential care and governance of the world and human history, quietly questioning the basic premise, critical to the Christian cognitive universe still prevalent during the period, about the presence of divine guidance in the course of events and in one's actions. Within this universe, both intended actions as well as seemingly contingent occurrences were ruled by superior causes. As Thomas Aquinas forcefully argued:

Since man is ordered in regard to this body under the celestial bodies, in regard to his intellect under the angels, and in regard to his will under God it is quite possible for something apart from man's intention to happen, which is, however, in accord with the ordering of the celestial bodies, or with the control of the angels, or even of God.

The concept of projection embraced this epistemological problematic of "ordering," which gradually shifted its meaning from predetermination and divine intervention into speculative attempts at design and control that subsumed the future, or "fortune," into monetized relations. *Projecting Spirits* takes the conceptual and cognitive reorientation illustrated by Defoe as the general intellectual background for configuring the meanings and functions performed by optical media at the turn of the century. It is here that the book's historical excursion departs from more well-trodden paths. For some, approaching the history of optical media in relation to (apparently) far removed metaphors, analogues, and practices—and, at first sight, distant intellectual problems—might not come across as a most straightforward gesture. However, the intuition guiding this book is that from roughly 1650 to 1720, the aesthetic forms embodied by camera obscuras and magic lanterns became symbolic of a range of intellectual transitions: "symbolic" in the sense of providing the fitting figures of thought through which a world undergoing a series of changes could be made sense of, and in that respect also rendered as operable, actionable. This book sets out to show how, circa 1700, the projective screens of the camera obscura and the magic lantern became critical cognitive surfaces where the world was witnessed in ambiguously shifting shapes—where notions of preestablished divine harmony gradually dissolved into a complex sphere of contingent events, as well as the empty time of eternity into a future open to opportunities and risks. On these surfaces, furthermore, hermeneutic quests for invisible divine truths became juxtaposed with empirical observations of "matters of fact, and the divine management of the world anticipated the emergence of liberal, and above all speculative, economic ideas. These shifts were by no means linear and uniform; they were continuous and reversible, something akin to topological transformations where things can shift shape, bend, stretch, and twist—all without losing their key properties or functions.

This book's take on the early modern history of projection does not pretend to be exhaustive. It is centered on a handful of protagonists, both humans and machines: philosophers, scholars, friars, merchants, sailors, missionaries, and nuns, as well as the optical apparatuses they encountered and interacted with. As for the latter—the machines—this book focuses on camera obscuras and magic lanterns. These two apparatuses, designed for the processing of optical signals (light waves), shared the aesthetic function of projecting images but in symmetrically opposing ways: While the camera obscura transmitted light rays that projected mirror images of objects in the environment inside the apparatus, the magic lantern had a light source, such as a candle, positioned to illuminate a figure, drawn on a transparent slide, through a system of mirrors and lenses and to project that image outside onto a screen. As for the former—the humans—this book's historical excursion comprises individuals who were somehow in contact with camera obscuras and magic lanterns: those who developed new instruments or tweaked old ones; who wrote about the machines or used them in their artistic or scientific practice; who pictured the camera obscuras and magic lanterns in illustrations—satirical, scientific, or otherwise; and who thought, or merely dreamed, about the machines and their projections and turned them into tropes and metaphors, noetic analogues, as well as figures of thought.

The diverse and sometimes disparate stories of these devices and persons are brought together to show how the main aesthetic and cognitive function carried out by optical media in turn-of-the-century thought was to superimpose the real with a perceptual frame that could render the chaos of life as a negotiable design. The first chapter demonstrates in more detail how, during this historical moment, camera obscuras and magic lanterns were varyingly associated with an intuition of the world as a continuum of movements, differentiations, and variations (rather than as something fixed

and unified *per se*), and they were simultaneously understood as pertinent conceptual tools to rationalize and arrange these movements, differentiations, and variations into more or less durable shapes. Alongside anamorphic images, optical projections performed a play of differing perspectives—distorted and blurred, clearer and more comprehensible—that also acted out a distinction between the human and divine modes of apprehending the world. For philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, projection became a critical concept as well as an optical metaphor to understand how the universe varied from one viewpoint to another but was at once unified within a single divine optic that organized things into a geometric and logical harmony. Projection signaled what Leibniz called God's "government of the universe," thereby associating optical media importantly with an older Christian concept of "economy" (*oikonomia*), or divine administration and rule.

Taking its cue from Leibniz, this book is concerned with a changing economy of projection, both in the ancient and modern senses of the word "economy." Most generally, the concept of economy is used in this book to explore how the projective screens of camera obscuras and magic lanterns facilitated drawing relations between phenomena and one's imaginations, beliefs, and reasonings and to cognitively manage those relations. In this respect, the following chapters chart the visual economy of early modern optical media, to borrow a concept from Marie Jose Mondzain who explores how images became conceived as indispensable connectors between visible and invisible realities in the Byzantine era. In its original Greek sense, *oikonomia* signified the administration of the household (*oikos*), which in Christianity shifted its meaning to designate the divine providential government of the world and human history toward salvation. In both cases, indeed, economy meant a science of relations and their management. But whereas for the Greeks economy suggested the arrangement of goods, animals, and humans into a harmonious and profitable whole, in Christianity the concept was made to account for God's organization of divine life into a trinitarian form (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit), on the one hand, and the earthly, temporal unfolding of God's eschatological plan, on the other hand. Economy became reconsidered on a universal scale, encompassing the disjunctive relations between transcendence and immanence, the infinite and the finite, eternity and historical time, universal providence and human freedom, as well as concealment and disclosure. In Christianity, what is crucial is that images became considered as essential mediators of these relations, as "living linkages," as Mondzain puts it, between heaven and earth.

In the later seventeenth century, optical media became critical to this Christian concept of (visual) economy, as we will see in Chapters 2 and 3. Jesuit scholars in particular—the polymath Athanasius Kircher (also famous from extended histories of audiovisual media) at the forefront—drew optical apparatuses firmly into the providential *oikonomia*. Projections of light and shadow by technological means became regarded as relays between the holy and the profane space, and hence as potent agents of the divine providence and its economic and globalizing process. "Not divine power without projection," the Jesuits of the late seventeenth century seemed to think. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the concept and practice of optical projection among Jesuit scholars against the backdrop of Catholic counterreformation and colonial expansion, which it plots by tracing the movements of artifacts, books, missionaries, images, and ideas, not only within Europe, but also between Rome and New Spain as well as China. Among the Jesuits, optical projection became understood as natural but prodigious mediation between the spiritual and the temporal and therefore also as a potentially expansive, possessive form.

Chapter 3 studies how central to the Jesuits' concept of optical media was the association of projection, not only with the celestial but also with the phantasmatic—spirits, ghosts, and demons of all sorts. The key "property" to be annexed to ecclesiastic rule on a planetary scale was the individual soul, and the providential grasp of images cast on a screen was to expand, through homology, onto images in the mind. Immersing their beholders into a realm of illusions and visions,

projections of spirits (or, spiritual projections) were to direct individuals toward perfection—the "government of souls," to borrow a concept of Michel Foucault's.

However, during this historical period the economy of projection also played out in a different sense. While Anglican priests in England were preaching against the worship of images of all sorts (including the Catholics' relics and miraculous apparitions), seeking to lodge the holy firmly under the purview of words only, camera obscuras and magic lanterns simultaneously developed from media of theocracy and items of curiosity into experimental and exploratory devices—especially within the exploits of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, established in 1660, which was a new type of public body devoted to the corporate pursuit of knowledge. Among the Royal Society scholars—who promoted the radical reassessment of vision and cognition by Johannes Kepler at the turn of the sixteenth century and the new principles of scientific study proclaimed by Francis Bacon—devices of projection were turned toward empirical reality, to quasi-mechanically procure information about things and beings both near and distant, familiar and strange, ranging from the operations of light to flora and fauna in the West Indies, for instance. Charting these developments, Chapters 4 and 5 survey situations where established interpretations of projection and divine rule became challenged (although by no means unambiguously) within empirical investigations that sought to apprehend the world objectively as open to "chance and opportunity" (as Francis Bacon put it), sticking onto the visible surfaces of things rather than striving to interpret every contingent event as a manifestation of a deeper cosmic order.

Chapter 4 focuses on Robert Hooke's invention of a portable camera obscura, which illustrates how devices of projection participated in key epistemic developments at the turn of the century, in addition to becoming involved, at least in Hooke's imaginary, in the colonial expansion of both knowledge and trade. Crucial here was the implicit association that Hooke and his contemporaries made between the concepts of projection and property—the latter now starting to be relinquished from celestial possession in the writings of John Locke, among others, and becoming an extension of the person laboring and thereby appropriating the commons originally bestowed upon humanity by divine providence. Projection became involved in the calculation of financial gain and prospects for improvement, surplus and growth, which, as Devin Singh notes, the notion of *oikonomia* retained historically also in the Christian era. Chapter 5 continues on this theme, exploring how the mixed realities of optical media—alongside practices of calculation, which emerged as key cognitive techniques of finance during the period—gave an intuitive shape to processes in which property and value lost their traditional supports and became volatile, fluctuating, and subject to the conceits of speculative minds. Especially the magic lantern's ephemeral images, in want of solidity and stable form, provided the effective mental analogues for the emerging speculative economy as an ambiguous and illusory perceptual realm seemingly unmoored from material restraints. Overall, these two chapters show how in England circa 1700, optical media became cognitive relays allowing the subsumption of material relations under abstract and invisible, noetic, and even imaginary designs, facilitating thus the development of a new economic concept of the world as a *tabula rasa* for man-made projections.

Readers, be advised that this book wants to implicitly disengage, both historically and theoretically, the study of early modern technologies and cultures of projection from the shadows cast by film theory and its cinematic archaeologies. The historically specific economic concept of projection advanced in this book shouldn't be conflated with the psychological and ideological powers of optical projection explored and critiqued in (post-)1970s film theory in particular, most often from psychoanalytic and Marxist perspectives. In these debates, early modern optical devices found their place in deep histories of darkness, illusion, and influence that extended from Plato's cave to the movies, arguably committing to a fundamental optical and conceptual inversion whereby "men and their circumstances appear upsidedown," as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously put it in their

metaphoric association between the camera obscura and ideology. In these debates, furthermore, projection became primarily interpreted as a mental mechanism and associated with the regimenting of the gaze and positioning of individuals into conformity through identification and disavowal. For Sigmund Freud, as Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis tell us, projection was "always a matter of throwing out what one refuses either to recognise in oneself or to be oneself." Psychoanalytic projection, Laplanche and Pontalis note, is partly "comparable to the cinematographic one," in the way it describes the process in which the individual casts onto "the external world an image of something that exists in him in an unconscious way."

Such "repressed" manifestations of all sorts—spirits, demons, ghosts—featured prominently in the early history of optical media, ranging from the experiments by the Jesuits, and even sometimes by their fellow Protestant scholars, to popular projected image shows organized by traveling entertainers. In this book, I have decidedly avoided interpreting such apparitions in terms of the psychoanalytic concept of projection, as "embodiments of bad unconscious desires." By doing so, my aim has been not to refute this concept but to offer a historical account that doesn't employ psychoanalytic theory as an overarching narrative of modernity. Terry Castle suggests that it was not effectively until the turn of the eighteenth century that the ghosts and spirits conjured by means of magic lanterns became circumscribed as primarily inner mental phenomena, as products of the brain rather than as anything supernatural per se, and that projected images started to come across as belonging to a mental reality understood first and foremost in psychological terms.

The meanings and functions of projected images circa 1700 were neither fixed nor symmetrical; the form was in flux. Furthermore, the demarcations we today draw between economy, science, religion, and (optical) media—as well as rationality, factuality and fiction, or the phantasmatic—were not yet clearly in place during the historical period studied in this book. In the original turn-of-the-century context, these meanings and functions entered into an odd but creative mix. Projecting Spirits hence demands its readers approach a techno-aesthetic form (now familiar to us in the more limited sense of cinematic and "post-cinematic" entertainment, or a constituent function of the modern psyche) in its former semantic openness, complexity, and strangeness.

The turn of the seventeenth century signaled a particular historical juncture where the institution of divine harmony in the world and God's care of human history gradually shifted into a reality of contingencies, which presented unforeseeable risks as well as unprecedented opportunities: where the divine plan gave way to a spontaneous but fundamentally insecure organization, and the privilege of knowing the future was wrested from God by projecting minds that turned the world into its speculative image.

The previous chapters sought to demonstrate the place and meaning of the period's dominant optical media—camera obscuras and magic lanterns—in this process. "Projection" as both a techno-aesthetic practice and a concurrent cognitive form marked a particular threshold of modernity expressed by changing relations between contingency and organization. On one side, this involved a transition with which we are familiar: from theological models of interpretation and influence, based on the divine manufacture of miracles and sensory deceptions, to modern science's claims for objectivity and the factual and its program for the domination and "improvement of things and beings. Images cast inside the camera obscura, in particular, shifted from natural executors of divine rule to mechanical (and, therefore, purportedly objective) informants about the aleatory empirical world. On the other side, however, the history of optical media does not lend itself to a straightforward narrative of disenchantment. The spirits conjured by the Jesuits by means of their apparatuses of parastatic magic reappeared in attempts at grappling with the cognitive and socioeconomic disorder brought about by new capitalist ventures premised on speculation and

credit. What appears as a program of rationalization from one angle, comes across, from another angle, as a rewriting of the providence-problematic in relation to the unfathomably contingent and spontaneous processes of speculative capitalism, seemingly beyond the reach of human control and comprehension.

Although it coincided with the rise of modern science as well as economic relations, the history of camera obscuras and magic lanterns outlined above was thus not simply a purposeful progression from a world of superstition and belief to a world of rationality and knowledge. It did not simply spell the discovery of the "real" but rather different, even if concurrent and mutually implicated, modes of virtualization. Otherwise put, the techno-aesthetic form of optical projection provided an important intellectual frame of reference for a series of abstractions, each equally (ir)rational in its own way. At the turn of the seventeenth century, "projection" symbolized, at a minimum: (1) the theocratic abstraction of the world under divine light and providential care; (2) the epistemic abstraction of things and beings into "data" and objects of appropriation ("property"); and (3) the economic abstraction of things and relations into speculative mental designs in the processes of financialization. In each of these instances, optical projection afforded shadowy and virtualizing frames within which the world could be referenced with respect to the not (yet) realized. Optical projection, in other words, instantiated the critical visual economy of these dissimilar yet equally expansive and colonizing frames, which yoked visible effects with invisible powers. 'The Jesuits' planetary mission of converting souls, the English project of expanding networks of knowledge and trade, and the rise of speculative capitalism all involved, and even necessitated, a centrifugal visual system where distributions of light and shadow provided cognitive relays to virtualize physical and mental realities within an ideally growing system of government and/or profitability.

Although each of these historical processes of abstraction would merit a more detailed genealogy of its own, let's briefly highlight the one with the most contemporary repercussions, concerning the rise of finance and the colonization of time as an (imaginary) source of potentially infinite wealth. We have seen how the magic lantern's artificial realities helped in coming to terms with the early development of today's massive and triumphant form of capitalism that crunches basically anything into bits and pieces within its system of evaluation and accumulation, contributing to making sense of the "ghostification" of economic relations brought about by finance in its early days. Here, importantly, were laid the conceptual foundations for later attempts at understanding the operations of financial economy. Consider how Karl Marx drew on the ideas of optical projection and virtualization in a series of notes and remarks published in 1894 as part of the third volume of *Capital*, which focused on the development of bank credit, public debt, and shares. Marx outlined a process of abstraction whereby the value of securities became more and more speculative the more the securities circulated in the market. For instance, shares in shipping companies, Marx noted, initially represented real capital (the capital invested in these companies), but through the process of being sold from one investor to another and yet to another, and so on, the value ascribed to the shares lost its connection with the original investment and became instead determined based on the investors' predictions about future revenues (on those shares themselves). What, in other words, according to Marx gave rise to speculative capital was valorization detached from productive activity per se and based instead on the anticipation of future accumulation. Crucially, Marx observed how "everything in this [financial] system appears in duplicate and triplicate, and is transformed into a mere phantom of the mind." What Marx (following Charles Jenkinson) deemed "fictitious capital" was but the mind's projection, a product of desire and fantasy, a mere mirage transposed onto real relations.

The implicit media reference in Marx's characterization of speculative capital—"brain phantoms" (*Hirngespinnst*, in the original German)—was the art of magic lantern projections that the philosopher famously also evoked when discussing the nature of commodities. The commodity,

Marx wrote, "is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them the fantastic [phantasmagorische] form of a relation between things." With his choice of terminology, Marx evoked the phantasmagoria shows popularized by a Belgian physicist and magician Etienne-Gaspard Robert (or Robertson, which was his stage name), from the 1780s onward in France. In an abandoned Capuchin convent in Paris—which was, ironically perhaps, located near the residence that John Law owned for a brief period of time on the Place Vendôme in the late 1710s—Robertson "call[ed] forth phantoms" and "command[ed] ghosts" by means of optical media. With a range of visual effects—dark surroundings, mirrors, movable magic lanterns, black backgrounds of magic lantern slides, back projections, projections on hidden screens, smoke, and so on—Robertson staged spirit-shows that had a powerful emotional grip on their beholders, exploiting in particular, as he expounded, involuntary fears and "religious terror." The screen was not lowered until the audience was seated and the lights were dimmed; in this way, the spectators were lacking a spatial frame for the projections, which seemed to be hanging in air indeed like supernatural "bubbles." Phantasmagoria shows were first and foremost meant to trigger and exploit the "strange effects of the imagination," as Robertson put it.

Phantasmagoric magic lantern projections, as Stefan Andriopoulos shows, enjoyed a specific place and meaning in late eighteenth-century epistemological discussions about sensory perception and the limits of knowledge, particularly in Immanuel Kant's description of a subject "that projects its forms of intuition onto the external world and that is inclined to mistake subjective ideas for objectively given substances."⁸ The magic lantern embodied the mind's tendency to confound subjective ideas and imaginations with material objects, the endogenous with the exogenous. This is also the key idea behind Marx's analysis of the accumulation and circulation of financial capital. The *Hirngespinnste*—"brain phantoms," loosely translated—that Marx used to characterize the logic of speculation echoed Kant, who was tackling how the ghostly visions of spirit-seers were formed, how indeed the soul transposes "such an image, which it ought, after all, to represent as contained within itself, into quite a different relation, locating it, namely, in a place external to itself."⁹ In Marx's analysis, financial "projectors" equated with spirit-seers—seers whose visions Kant explained with reference to optical effects. Optical tricks with mirrors and magic lanterns, in other words, served to make sense of perceptual and epistemic distortions, which in turn became symbolic of the workings of finance capitalism.

Marx's understanding of speculative capitalism was indebted to two hundred years of development, not only in economics and philosophy, but also in optical media. Robertson's phantasmagoria shows took their inspiration from Athanasius Kircher and his fellow Jesuit scholars. The very notion of finance as optical illusion was first formulated by Defoe and others with reference to the magic lantern during the early eighteenth century. To be sure, such conceptual displacements from the past may seem irrelevant to present-day speculative economic practices, which appear to have become altogether divorced from the slow pace of human cognition, being driven instead by algorithms that crunch and manipulate numerical data circulating in optical fiber networks at infinitesimal speeds. Yet, if Marx was right, a certain process of perceptual and cognitive abstraction by which forms of property could dissolve into flows of capital was needed for such processes to function in the first instance. To arrive there, some optical adjustments were needed that could reinforce (if not realize) one's more-than-human dreams of infinite accumulation—adjustments that took place at the turn of the seventeenth century, when the world projected by camera obscuras and magic lanterns ceased to appear as a visual emanation of God's sovereignty and care and became instead a place of profitable knowing and speculating. <>

THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MAGIC by Jordi Camí, Luis M. Martinez, Translated by Eduardo Aparicio [Princeton University Press, 9780691208442]

How magicians exploit the natural functioning of our brains to astonish and amaze us

How do magicians make us see the impossible? **THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN** takes you on an unforgettable journey through the inner workings of the human mind, revealing how magicians achieve their spectacular and seemingly impossible effects by interfering with your cognitive processes. Along the way, this lively and informative book provides a guided tour of modern neuroscience, using magic as a lens for understanding the unconscious and automatic functioning of our brains.

We construct reality from the information stored in our memories and received through our senses, and our brains are remarkably adept at tricking us into believing that our experience is continuous. In fact, our minds create our perception of reality by elaborating meanings and continuities from incomplete information, and while this strategy carries clear benefits for survival, it comes with blind spots that magicians know how to exploit. Jordi Camí and Luis Martínez explore the many different ways illusionists manipulate our attention—making us look but not see—and take advantage of our individual predispositions and fragile memories.

THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN draws on the latest findings in neuroscience to explain how magic deceives us, surprises us, and amazes us, and demonstrates how illusionists skillfully “hack” our brains to alter how we perceive things and influence what we imagine.

Review

"This exploration of neuroscience through the lens of magic will appeal to science-oriented readers, as it is first and foremost a deep dive into how the brain processes information. It's also sure to find an audience in anyone who has ever witnessed a magic trick and wondered how the heck it works."-
--Ragan O'Malley, *Library Journal*

"Camí and Martínez provide an exciting and rich introduction to the cognitive science behind magic, showing us the fruitful relationship between both disciplines while also pointing to as yet unanswered questions. Through this book, we can all enjoy the search for answers!"—Juan Tamariz, magician

"It may seem odd that a magician is interested in neuroscience or, likewise, that a neuroscientist is interested in magic. However, both seek an understanding of how the brain works. While magicians may want to learn basic principles underlying their tricks, neuroscientists may find in magic a completely refreshing approach to study the brain. Camí and Martínez provide a superb account of these interactions, offering the most up-to-date and comprehensive introduction to the emerging field of neuromagic."—Rodrigo Quián Quiroga, author of *NeuroScience Fiction*

"Camí and Martínez give us the gift of a wonderful book that leverages one mystery—magic—to explain an even deeper one, how the brain makes sense of our experiences and how these, in turn, change our brains."—Judith Hirsch, University of Southern California

"This book will satisfy the curiosity of anyone who wants to know how the brain's perceptual

failures work, through the lens of magic. It will also help us magicians, who have always acted out of intuition, to understand why our tricks work. Books like this one allow us the opportunity to understand each other better.”—**Dani DaOrtiz, magician**

CONTENTS

1	The Art and Science of the Impossible
	The Art of the Impossible
	Where We Will Go in This Book
	The Grammar of Magic
	Your Journey with Us
	PART I: THE BASICS
2	Living in Illusion: The Human Brain and the Visual Pathway
	We Live in Illusion
	The Brain, Its Cells, and Its Structure
	Neurons
	Neural Networks
	The Visual Pathway
	The Photoreceptors: Cones and Rods
	What the Brain Sees
	The Beginning of Art
	Color and Luminance
	The "What" and "Where" Pathways
	The Expression of Emotions and the Act of Seeing
3	The Conception of Reality: We Are Our Memories
	Perception of the Outside World
	The Creative Processes of Our Brains: Feeling,
	Attending, Perceiving
	How the Brain's Memories Work
	Sensory Memory
	Short-Term Memory
	Long-Term Memory
	Emotions
	Feelings
	Emotional Memories
	PART II: THE MECHANISMS
4	We Build an Illusion of Continuity
	The Limits of the Brain and the Illusion of Continuity
	The Particularities of the Field of Vision
	The Various Types of Scanning Movements
	The Image Fusion Process
	The Illusion of Continuity and Cinema
	The Illusion of Continuity and Sound
	The Illusion of Continuity: A More General Process
	Change Blindness
	Prestidigitation: Is the Hand Faster than the Eye?
	Slow Magic
5	Magic and Contrast: The Key to It All
	The Funny Thing about Magic
	Contrast and the External Life of a Magic Effect
	We See Relatively, Not Absolutely
	Contrast Detectors
	Contrast Depends on Context
	Contrast in Magic

Avoiding or Reducing Contrast in Magic
 Strategies and Resources during the Presentation
 of a Magic Trick
 Presensory Manipulations
 6 We Filter and Process Only What Is Useful to Us
 Attention Filter
 Attention and Awareness
 The Concept of "Misdirection" in Magic
 Focal Attention
 Exogenous Capture of Attention and Open Diversion
 The Power of Nonverbal Communication
 Managing the Gaze
 Priority Movements
 Endogenous Capture and Covert Deviation
 Divided Attention
 Temporary Control or Continuous Direction of Attention
 Music as a Tool to Transmit Emotions and
 Synchronize Attention
 Deactivation of Attention in Magic
 The "Deconstruction" of a Magic Trick
 7 Perceiving Is a Creative Act, but Everything Is Already in Your Brain
 To Perceive Is to Interpret
 The So-Called Inverse Problem of Vision
 Bottlenecks in Brain Processing
 The Brain Is Slow
 Human Beings Anticipate the Future
 Magic as the Art of the Unexpected
 Developing Hypotheses Automatically: Amodal Perception
 in Magic
 8 To Remember Is to Rebuild
 The Function of Memories
 Explicit (Declarative) Memories
 Stages of Long-Term Memory Formation
 Memories Recorded in Especially Emotional Circumstances
 We Need to Forget in Order to Remember
 The Reconstructive Character of Memory Evocation
 False Memories
 Memories and Memory Manipulation in Magic
 Techniques for the Promotion of Forgetfulness in Magic
 Disinformation and False Solutions in Magic Long-Term Memories of a Magic Show
 9 Undervalued Unconscious Brain
 The Brain Never Rests
 Attention and Awareness
 Attention without Consciousness
 Unconscious Perception in Magic
 Implicit Memories
 Subtle Conditioning: The Case of Priming
 Priming in Magic
 10 The Magic of Decision-Making
 The Dual Functioning of the Brain
 Do We Make Expert Decisions?
 Judgments in Situations of Uncertainty and
 Instinctive Decisions

Types of Forcing	
Taking a Risk	
Word Maps	
The Framing Effect in Magic	
Reflective Decisions	
Reasoning in Hindsight in Magic	
PART III: THE RESULTS	
11 The Magic Experience and Its Audiences	
Experiencing the Illusion of Impossibility	
The Emotions of the Magic Experience	
The Unwilling Suspension of Disbelief	
The Magic Outcome as Cognitive Dissonance	
The Validity of the Illusion of Impossibility	
Magic and Superpowers	
Magic in the Twenty-First Century	
Is Live Magic in Front of Spectators the Best Magic?	
Magic Audiences	
Magic for Children	
When Magic Provokes the Spectators	
Magic for Magicians	
The Popularity of Magic	
12 Wrapping Up: Scientific Research and Magic	
The Science of Magic	
Is There a Scientific History Related to Magic?	
How Could Magic Contribute to Neuroscience?	
Acknowledgments	
Notes	
Bibliography	
Index	

Where We Go in This Book

Although magic uses many techniques and devices drawn from scientific disciplines as varied as mathematics, physics (including optics), mechanics, electronics, chemistry, and new materials, in this book we will focus on cognition.

When we refer to "cognitive processes," we mean those tasks or operations that the brain executes continuously to process the information we receive from the environment: attention, perception, memories, emotions, decision-making, reasoning, planning, problem-solving, and learning (focusing here on those processes that the magician usually controls or manipulates). It is through our cognitive processes that we create, analyze, and interact with reality, all the while relying on our prior experience and knowledge. Cognitive processes thus allow us to be flexible and to adapt our behavior almost immediately based on the changes and demands imposed by the different situations of everyday life.

When we discuss "magic tricks," we are focusing exclusively on the mechanisms of magic tricks that provoke the "illusion of impossibility"—the ones that audiences consider impossible because what happens at the end goes against the laws of nature. We do not cover the techniques used by "psychics" or any other practitioner of a method of divination; their universe of knowledge is different from—but not alien to—the procedures, resources, and methods used by magicians.*

Magic has its own schools, experts, and centuries of accumulated experience. Beyond its deceptions, magic is a scenic art that combines resources from theater and other sources to achieve successful effects, always at the service of a surprising outcome. After centuries of tests and empirical trials,

today's magic is the result of a wisdom accumulated overtime, based on experience and the perfecting of an immense catalog of materials and methods that magicians have created and baptized with their own names or unique characteristics.

In the past, the world of magic was responsible for discovering and validating these techniques. Today neuroscience wants to learn from this wisdom. The American magician Persi Diaconis, a scientist and professor of statistics, has verified that original contributions from magic have helped open new pathways of knowledge in the mathematical fields of cryptography and the analysis of DNA sequences. Our aim is to follow the lead of mathematics and facilitate an equally fruitful dialogue between magic and neuroscience.

The Grammar of Magic

To perform good magic, magicians rely on solid principles based on experience, most of which respond to cognitive processes. During the second half of the twentieth century, some theorists of magic, like the Spanish magicians Arturo de Ascanio and Juan Tamariz or the American Darwin Ortiz, developed authentic "grammars" of their language. In this book, we often refer to concepts coined by Arturo de Ascanio. Ascanio was born in 1929, and in the 1950s, after meeting the great Dutch magician Fred Kaps, he created a vast work on magic that he continued to build and elaborate on until his death in 1997. One of our goals has been to interpret and "translate" this language coined by magicians into concepts that cognitive neuroscientists can use to explain how the brain works. As the following pages demonstrate, we are convinced that exploring how magic works can bring new perspectives to neuroscience.

Your Journey with Us

In part I, we lay the foundation for understanding the neuroscience of magic. Chapters 2 and 3 present a simplified model of the structure and function of the brain, with special emphasis on the visual pathway, because magic enters through the sense of sight.

In part II, we examine the different cognitive processes involved in magic tricks. In chapter 4, we describe how the brain creates an illusion of continuity to compensate for the fact that we capture external information in a fractured way in both space and time. We'll see that magic takes advantage of this phenomenon in multiple ways. In chapter 5, we describe the key concept of contrast: magicians can either avoid or provoke contrast as a tool for attention control.

In chapter 6, we turn to attention, one of the brain processes that magic has learned to control with great precision. Through our attention, we continuously filter and select from the enormous amount of information we receive. Chapter 7 explores the creative world of perception, arguing that perceiving is literally a process of interpretation.

The neuroscience behind magic does not stop with information processing. As we will see in chapter 8, magicians are actually able to manipulate our memories during the few minutes that a magic trick lasts.

Chapter 9 looks at how magicians can condition us and take advantage of the multiple mechanisms of the unconscious brain. Moreover, as chapter 10 shows, magicians, unbeknownst to us, also know how to induce certain responses and decisions.

Part III of the book opens with chapter 11, a reflection on the magic experience and different audience reactions to it. We should note that all discussions of the magic experience in this book refer mainly to the Western culture with which we are familiar. In other cultures, the illusionist or magic experience may be interpreted differently: some may conclude that the magician possesses divine powers, while others may react to inexplicable effects with fear and aggressiveness. In this book, however, we do not delve into these other perspectives.

To close the book, chapter 12 recognizes the pioneering research efforts on magic that were made at the end of the nineteenth century and details how much more is still to be done.

We hope we have conveyed in this first chapter that magic is able to seduce us with its effects because of the way our brains understand the world around us. Knowing how the brain works and understanding the cognitive processes involved in magic effects can help us develop a full appreciation of magic—and help theoreticians of magic create the best possible magic.

At the same time, the empirical knowledge that magic has accumulated over time is a valuable source of knowledge for neuroscience. Though some techniques used in magic tricks correspond to wellknown mechanisms in the field of cognitive neuroscience, scientists do not yet understand the processes that underlie other magic techniques. These techniques therefore offer very attractive research opportunities. Many neuroscientists believe that artists in general—and magic is no exception—have intuitively discovered, after years of trial and error, how the brain works and how it interprets the world. Artists use this knowledge to enhance the impact of their work.

Jorge Wagensberg expressed that idea when he said: "The least banal relationship between science and art occurs when an artist offers scientific intuition to a scientist or when a scientist offers artistic insight to an artist."

Finally, this book is a recognition of the scientific foundations of magic and of those who practice it honestly and with good intent, as opposed to those who use its methods for illegitimate purposes or to make the public believe that they are endowed with supernatural powers, as some psychics do. Partway into the twenty-first century, we believe that there is no artistic endeavor important enough to justify deceiving spectators. We do well enough constantly deceiving ourselves.

Scientific Research and Magic

We presume that everyone will agree to the recognition of magic as an art. As a matter of fact, magic embodies both art and science. —Nevil Maskelyne and David Devant, *Our Magic* (1911)

The Science of Magic

Often in scientific research, to make observations as objective as possible, experimental designs have reached extremes that are far removed from reality—as when the experiment is carried out in a laboratory, with the subjects isolated, watching magic recorded on a computer and unable to move while the researchers monitor their reactions. In a contrary trend, current experimental models have become more ecological, with the magician performing live before an audience. This model is closer to reality because, after all, the goal is to make the results as representative and generalizable as possible, but it has a steep price: experiments conducted in especially realistic conditions are much more complex and expensive.

In the context of classic, laboratory-based cognitive experiments, a hypothesis is generally considered confirmed when the results are 60 percent positive. In a live magic session, however, the magician cannot help but hope that 100 percent of the spectators will experience the illusion of impossibility without exceptions! Ideally, this would be the scenario in which all magic experiments are done, and the result to which all scientific experiments on magic should aspire.

Magic tricks can be the subject or the object of scientific research. In other words, in addition to being the focus of research itself, magic can be used as a privileged toolbox for the scientific understanding of how the brain works. Neuroscience can learn from the experience that magicians have accumulated. Magic tricks can be magnificent resources for studying effects and mechanisms related to brain functioning in order to understand how people behave and how audiences are

managed. The collective behavior of audiences in manipulated environments is a very topical subject, but it requires a much deeper knowledge than is currently available.

Is There a Scientific History Related to Magic?

Many magic tricks and almost all key methods in magic have been performed and practiced for hundreds of years. The methods used in magic were discovered to be effective in a totally empirical way, based on trial and error, by those in the magic community, who had little knowledge of the cognitive processes that we cover in this book.

Throughout the evolution of magic, renowned magicians have made important theoretical contributions to the fundamentals of magic tricks, such as how best to construct and present them. From the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, the work of Robert-Houdin, Dessoir, and, later on, Maskelyne and Devant stands out. In this book, we have also cited the later works of Fitzkee and Sharpe, as well as the extensive theoretical contributions of other magicians throughout the twentieth century, including Ascanio, Randal, Bruno, Tamariz, Ortiz, and many others. For a closer look at these authors and their theoretical contributions, we refer the reader to *Magic in Mind*, a very interesting compilation edited by Joshua Jay and published in 2013.

One of the fathers of modern magic was the French magician Jean Eugene Robert-Houdin (1805-1871). He took magic off the street and into the theater. He also made countless contributions, some of which are still reproduced onstage. In Robert-Houdin's treatises on magic tricks, texts that he began with some "general principles of prestidigitation," he dealt with such diverse aspects as the show's structure, the demeanor that magicians should exhibit, and their appearance—he recommended wearing a tailcoat. Although Robert-Houdin was not the first magician to wear one, his sartorial choice became a model.

It was precisely at the end of the nineteenth century, at a time when magic was still linked to religious and supposedly supernatural experiences, that the formal interest in the science behind magic arose. Many magicians, like the nineteenth-century French magician Richard, affirmed that they should not claim supernatural powers for themselves. In those days, and for the first time, some famous magicians collaborated with scientists by revealing their tricks. We cannot overemphasize the value of this collaboration between professionals in two fields with such opposing methodologies—one of them based on deception and secrets and the other on transparency and open communication. This interest in collaboration was triggered by the increasing success of mediums, who flaunted their supposed supernatural powers to stage spectacles that competed directly with illusionism.

Alfred Binet (1857-1911), a psychologist at the Sorbonne, was a notable pioneer in the study of the foundations of magic; it was he who introduced the Binet-Simon scale to determine IQ. Binet studied prominent magicians of his time such as Arnould, Dickson, Melies, Pierre, and Raynaly. In 1894, Binet published "La psychologie de la prestidigitation," in which he revealed early on that magicians controlled the audience's gaze and attention. Binet also proposed that "passive illusions," from the perspective of magic, could be broken down into "positive illusions" (seeing what does not exist) and "negative illusions" (looking but not seeing). These concepts were based on James Sully's archaic distinction between active illusions, such as hallucinations, and passive ones, which everyone could experience. Concepts that we now know as open or covert deviations of attention were clearly already empirically grasped.

A contemporary of Bidet's, the German philosopher and psychologist Max Dessoir (1867-1947), upon discovering the importance and richness of psychological techniques in magic, argued that psychologists had much to learn from magicians.'

The outstanding work of the American psychologists Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944) and Norman Triplett (1861-1934) followed Dessoir's line of inquiry. Jastrow worked with the two great magicians and rivals Alexander Hermann and Harry Kellar and applied psychophysiological techniques to test whether they had above-average abilities. In a version of his doctoral thesis published in the *American Journal of Psychology* in 1900, Triplett proposed a very extensive taxonomy of magic tricks, outlining the methods used by magicians. The categories he proposed were tricks involving scientific principles, tricks involving superior mental abilities (such as mathematics), and tricks depending on the use of gimmicks, sheer manual dexterity, or fixed mental habits in the audience.

Scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries identified many of what have always been the great principles of magic, as explored in this book. Binet, for example, highlighted the importance of optical illusions in magic, spoke of screens that prevented perceptual reconstruction (by amodal perception), and described exogenous capture with an overt diversion of attention (what he called the ABCs of the craft) and covert diversion (looking but not seeing). He also provided a good example of divided attention, warned that the illusion of magic tricks was lost with repetition, and, as noted in chapter 4, experimented with chronophotography to identify those tricks performed so fast that they are undetectable by the eye.

As for the principle of non-repetition, it is interesting to read the advice of the British Charles De Vere to include different methods in the same trick if the same effects are to be repeated, a practice still followed today.

The nineteenth-century French magician Richard focused most of the "preliminary instructions" for his tricks on advice based on the principles of nonrepetition and non-anticipation. Even back then, he encouraged magicians to be inventive and to strive to rejuvenate old tricks, "if not in substance, in form."

Max Dessoir, besides anticipating concepts that would later be published by Binet (open deviation, divided attention), highlighted the illusion of impossibility, the necessary naturalness of the magician to avoid contrast, and the magician's need not to reveal where he is going with his tricks. Furthermore, Dessoir, in a time when nobody talked about what memory was, described techniques of disinformation and the elaboration of false clues while emphasizing that not everything that happens is going to be remembered. Dessoir felt that the word "prestidigitation" was not the best term for magic: it is not that the spectator is surprised by the marvelous speed used, he believed, but that the magician's success stems from *ars artem celandi*, art concealing art. According to Dessoir, magic is the art of disconcerting the spectators to such an extent that they are unable to suggest any solution to the wonders they have witnessed, and they go home accepting the explanations as conclusive, with a lingering feeling of having briefly lived in a world of wonder.

As mentioned in chapter 11, scientific interest in magic faded in the twentieth century, coinciding with a gradual decline in magic shows, largely because of the great expansion of cinema and television. More recently, the world of science has renewed its interest in magic and its mechanisms. But why did magic tricks receive little attention from the neuroscientific community for more than a century? An editorial by the renowned neuroscientist Richard Gregory, published in 1982 in the journal *Perception*, asked this very question. He remarked that the topic goes unmentioned in Hermann Helmholtz's treatise on physiology, which is considered the "bible of perception." Was this lack of interest related perhaps to the low visibility of magic shows and the smaller audiences during that period?

Although we have no clear answer to that question, we are confident that the accrued experience of magicians and the wealth of knowledge to be derived from magic tricks can enrich human knowledge about how the brain works. But proving this point requires work.

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

The current work of cognitive science to understand how magic works is led by, among others, Gustav Kuhn, the Swiss psychologist and magician. He has published several studies on the psychology behind magic tricks and theorized about the potential contributions of magic principles to the advancement of cognitive sciences. Kuhn was the lead author of one of the first experimental studies on divided attention and the perception of a magic trick. In 2008, he published an article in which he argued for the value of developing a "science of magic." Subsequently, Kuhn wrote other articles in which he elaborated on his theoretical proposals. One of these articles detailed an exhaustive taxonomy of tricks, always from a psychological perspective (see the section on misdirection in chapter 6).¹⁷ More recently, Kuhn has presented a plan for comprehensively and systematically tackling the study of the effects and methods of magic tricks from the same perspective. Other authors have followed a similar path, also from a psychological perspective

Simultaneously, in 2008, a team led by Susana Martinez-Conde and Stephen Macknik proposed the need for a more causal approach to magic tricks, one based on their neurobiological underpinnings. These neuroscientists explored some neuronal processes involved in magic tricks, in consultation with well-known magicians after a joint meeting in 2007. They later became extraordinarily popular after the publication of *Sleights of Mind*, a best-seller about magic and neuroscience. This notoriety, in turn, unleashed greater interest in both neuroscience and magic.

Peter Lamont, a psychologist and magician, objected to both Kuhn's and Macknik and Martinez-Conde's proposals. Arguing that the construction of a "science of magic" was an impossible goal to achieve (itself an illusion, if you will), he felt that the most realistic goal was to use magic tricks as tools to study cognition and other brain functions. Lamont himself acknowledged, however, that "there is currently no reason to believe that such processes are any different from those that have already been identified, or might be identified, in terms of attention, awareness, persuasion, deception, belief, and so forth."

To show that magic tricks are based on common mechanisms already studied in neuroscience has been precisely the purpose of this book. We have presented the cognitive processes behind the effectiveness of the diverse methods and techniques used to achieve the illusion of impossibility. In doing so, we have provided a fresh look that is focused not on the phenomena of magic, which is what characterizes the proposals of Kuhn's group, but on how those techniques and magic effects could be theorized and systematized to be used as experimental tools and guides in cognitive neuroscience.

During this tour, we have cited some of the most relevant, contemporary research-based literature relating to the impossible illusion provoked by magic tricks. A partial list of this literature appeared in a special issue of the open-access journal *Frontiers in Psychology*, entitled "The Psychology of Magic and the Magic of Psychology." In the aftermath, the Science of Magic Association (SOMA) was created. SOMA organized its first two congresses in 2016 and 2017 at Goldsmiths, University of London, and in 2019 it held its first conference in the United States, in Chicago. SOMA "promotes rigorous research directed toward understanding the nature, function, and underlying mechanisms of magic."

How Could Magic Contribute to Neuroscience?

Exploration of the relationship between science and magic so far has been mostly one-way, based on the work of a few scientists doing research to understand how magic works. We believe that the field should take a different but complementary route, reversing the direction of explanatory work. Instead of using the brain and behavioral sciences to study magic, we want to highlight the opportunity to use magic to study the brain and behavior.

The different cognitive processes involved in the magic tricks we have analyzed here suggest unexplored routes of research in which magic could contribute to a better understanding of human cognition. For example, we do not know the basis of the cognitive dissonance that leads to the illusion of impossibility, or its characteristics, degrees, types, and neural correlates, or whether these differ from those of deception and surprise, among other effects. Magic is experienced very differently depending on the context in which it is performed, the particular cultural background of the spectators, and the wide range of individual reactions to magic. As we have already explained, magic is also very different depending on whether it is directed at adults, children, or other magicians. Magicians rarely experience the illusion of impossibility, although they enjoy the technical skills and conceptual innovations of their peers. In addition, the reasons why magic does not draw huge crowds (compared to movies or serials) and why some people dislike magic tricks are, surprisingly, still open questions.

Beyond illuminating the questions that arise when we consider cognition through the lens of illusionism, magic can help us with the general challenge of developing a real-world neuroscience. Neuroscience and behavioral sciences have thrived in laboratory conditions, but do the processes measured in such artificial contexts accurately capture phenomena that occur in the real world? In fact, the very effectiveness of magic in real situations, compared to the lesser success of laboratory studies, invites a reexamination of many cognitive paradigms that have eluded an ecological approach. Most of the few existing research studies have been carried out under extreme laboratory conditions—that is, magic tricks are performed on video, often by less experienced magicians, with very few participants and without a representative audience. What we propose here is that, for several reasons, scientists should essentially adopt the role of the magician.

First, a simple magic trick can integrate many different cognitive processes at once. Alternatively, magic effects can be designed that target a particular cognitive process, allowing the experimental dissection of cognition into possibly more natural tasks than those normally explored in artificial laboratory environments. Second, while magicians always take the context into account when designing and presenting their effects, it is the other way around in laboratory experiments. In the lab, experiments attempt to eliminate any contextual information not directly related to the concrete process under study but doing so takes us far away from reality. Moreover, ensuring the absence of contextual information does not prevent participants from subjectively taking the context into account, adding a layer of confusion not considered by the scientist.

Third, magicians do not base the success of their tricks on statistical measures that blur the individual in favor of a nonexistent average spectator. They address each and every attendee and often with complete success, as we have discussed. Fourth, magicians perform their cognitive manipulations in real time, in direct contact with the audience, and in a single trial, since they cannot afford to repeat the trick if it fails. Finally, beyond individual behavior, social dynamics are a significant component of magic, as the individual cognitive processes of each spectator are combined with the group dynamics that emerge spontaneously from signals such as applause or laughter.

Following the analogy between science and magic also reveals unexplored conceptual territory. Consider the two realities that coexist in magic tricks, internal and external life. It is not unreasonable for magicians to conceive and perform their magic tricks in a manner comparable to how nature operates. Therefore, scientists maybe compared to spectators of a magic trick and impelled to discover how nature works from their own particular and limited point of view. We would even go so far as to speculate that some of the mysteries of how the brain works are discernible in the distinction between the external and internal realities of any magic trick.

In short, for neuroscience to benefit from magic and its refined methodology, overwhelming successes, and unique perspective, it is essential that the joint work between magicians and scientists

continue. This is an area of interdisciplinary research with a long journey ahead. In fact, from the late nineteenth century to the present, fewer than one hundred experimental research articles (not including reviews and editorials) in which magic tricks have been used as a source or as a research objective have been published. That is a very low figure from all points of view, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that, compared with the state of research in any other scientific field of study, when it comes to the relationship between magic and science, practically everything is yet to be done.

We believe that our breakdown of the cognitive processes behind magic provides a valuable toolbox for expanding our knowledge of how cognition works. It is our hope that the work presented here will help generate a greater interest in magic as a unique research opportunity for neuroscientists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and all who study the brain and human behavior. <>

PEACEFUL APPROACHES FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD edited by Sanjay Lal [Series: Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy of Peace, Brill, 9789004507210]

Events in recent times have led many to rightly question the compatibility such traditionally revered concepts as democracy, liberal tolerance, and capitalism have with the realization of social peace. Clearly, it can no longer be uncritically assumed that the values championed by earlier generations are conducive to reaching peaceful outcomes. In *Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World*, a wide array of scholars explore the challenges presented in the current age to conventional understandings of what is required for peace and provide insights that are both practical and constructive to a world in urgent need of conceiving new ways forward.

CONTENTS

Notes on Contributors

Chapter 1 Introduction *Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World* Author: Sanjay Lal

Chapter 2 Democracy and Peace Is Democracy Good for Peace? Author: Fuat Gürsözlü

Chapter 3 In Search of Justice through Dialogue Discourse Ethics and Virtue Ethics Author: Edward V. Demenchonok

Chapter 4 A Personal Approach to Engaging with Others Applying Levinasian Insights to Intercultural Community Initiatives Author: Anna Taft

Chapter 5 The Economic Consequences of Peace and Nationalism Revisiting John Maynard Keynes Author: Andrew Fitz-Gibbon

Chapter 6 The Virtue of the Chickadee, or Ethics for the End of the World Chief Plenty Coups, Judith Butler, and Anti-genocidal Ethics Author: Will Barnes

Chapter 7 Transforming Contradictions Dialectics of Nonviolence in 'Martin and Mao' Author: Greg Moses

Chapter 8 The Lies of the Land Post-truth, the Erosion of Democracy, and the Challenge for Positive Peace Author: Paula Smithka

Chapter 9 Tolerating the Intolerable—A Method to Prevent Radicalization Author: Hunter Cantrell

Chapter 10 Gun Violence, Honor, and Inequality in America Author: Robert Paul Churchill

Chapter 11 Kant's Rational Freedom Positive and Negative Peace Author: Casey Rentmeester

Chapter 12 Work Justice for People with Mental Illness "A Useful Resource" Author: Abigail Gosselin

Chapter 13 Wealth, Violence, and (In)Justice Refugees, Robin Hood, and Resistance Author: Jennifer Kling

Chapter 14 The Capitalist Peace and Pacific Capitalism Author: Andrew Fiala

Chapter 15 Discourse That Advances Economic Democracy Author: William Gay
Index

For peace activists and scholars a very real crystallization has occurred in recent times. During the past two decades, we've more clearly seen the challenges particular to the current age for better realizing a peaceful order. Can democracy and capitalism really underlie a just social system? What approach should those seeking a positive peace take toward nationalism? How should we understand the place of tolerance as well as strive to overcome polarization in liberal society? In what ways can we work to bring about greater levels of peace while celebrating the presence and perspectives of the historically marginalized? Throughout the 21st Century so far, world events have underscored just how crucial these questions are. In October 2018, Concerned Philosophers for Peace held its annual conference at the University of Colorado, Boulder. The above questions (and so many related to them) were central to the conference. From that meeting the present volume was born.

Many of the contributors to this volume have developed ideas first presented at the 2018 gathering. All authors offer thoughtful insights and profound reflections for anyone concerned about the kinds of pressing matters currently confronting efforts for bringing about greater global peace. What's more is that each author focuses on illuminating a path forward from the predicaments identified which are now hampering the genuine realization of peace.

For some time, it has been clear that this kind of realization involves considerably more than cessation of outward hostilities by those immersed in conflict. Such was clearly Martin Luther King's understanding in 1963 when he urged transition from "an obnoxious negative peace" characterized by a passive acceptance of oppression to a "positive peace, which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality."¹ It cannot be overemphasized that outward and physical expressions of violence are ultimately mere symptoms of the underlying absence of inner peace within individuals and societies. If nothing else, recent events have brought to greater light just what the specific matters are that demand our attention as we seek to bring about a world that better manifests the core elements of a positive peace.

While the authors in this volume cannot be said to speak with one voice, a survey of the various chapters reveals certain commonalities of emphasis and value among the diverse frameworks applied and perspectives represented. All of the contributors are aware of and sensitive to certain structural realities (however lamentable those may be) and seek to advance solutions that are both theoretically sound as well as practically viable. The charge of utopianism is typically (and not without some basis) leveled against advocates of peace. The essays in this volume however help to show that there is no reason to assume the pursuit of greater levels of peace within society (and indeed the world at large) necessary entails eschewal of a realistic understanding of human affairs.

In "Democracy and Peace: Is Democracy Good for Peace?" Fuat Gürsözlü the author explores the little considered relationship democracy has to domestic peace. While many of us today, given the much bemoaned phenomena of partisanship, may be inclined to answer the author's question in the negative Gürsozlu insightfully advances a notion of partisanship that underscores its positive value for democracy and distinguishes the concept from "social sorting"—identified as the real problem for attempts to realizing domestic peace within democracies. He ultimately calls on us to overcome political isolation in order to avoid the all too present adversarial political situations in which compromise and negotiation have become anathema. This chapter is a most useful and timely contribution to, not just peace studies, but also political philosophy. It does much to counter the disheartening tendencies of the present age.

In political theory, the matter of partisan disunity goes hand in hand with that of conflict resolution. Edward Demenchonok's chapter, "In Search of Justice Through Dialogue: Discourse Ethics and

Virtue Ethics” offers additional reflection related to the philosophical merits of democracy (with a particular focus on the idea of justice). Among both political philosophers and peace theorists, the place of justice has unquestionably been sacrosanct. Demenchonok comparatively analyzes leading understandings of procedural justice (as advanced respectively by Habermas and Rawls). Applying the insights of Fred Dallmayr, Demenchonok argues that the practice of “discourse ethics” can overcome criticisms of universal and deontological conceptions of justice. Of particular significance to him is that not only does discourse ethics emphasize a global approach but that it is a response to social tensions. This author’s chapter helpfully illuminates ways theorists can incorporate the affirmation of pluralism and diversity in conceiving the just society. The chapter is thus a significant contribution to understanding the ways in which modern society can be more inclusive and therefore better prone to harmony.

Anna Taft’s chapter, “A Personal Approach to Engaging with Others: Applying Levinasian Insights to Intercultural Community Initiatives”, gives a concrete and practical conceptual illumination of many of the preceding chapters key ideas. Taft adopts insights from Emmanuel Levinas while elaborating on her work as the founder and director of the Tandana Foundation. She shows why international development workers should forgo a “detached perspective” (one that she associates with Western cultures) and instead foster adoption of a “personal perspective” in pursuing their efforts (which are commonly thought to be an integral part of engendering peace). This chapter is a remarkable demonstration of applied philosophy.

Andy Fitz-Gibbon’s chapter, “Economic Consequences of the Peace and Nationalism: Revisiting John Maynard Keynes”, nicely dovetails with the arguments in the two preceding chapters. By invoking aspects of his own British upbringing, Fitz-Gibbon provides an engaging first person narrative as part of his defense of Keynes’ critique of nationalism. Fitz-Gibbon argues that though nations are inevitable their existence does not necessitate nationalism. While he directly focuses on the historical dynamics responsible for WWI, in recent years the rise of nationalist ideology and the obstacles it presents to realizing a more peaceful world order has become more evident than perhaps at any time since the beginning of the 20th Century. Thus, this chapter is also a timely contribution to the contemporary world.

It has been well-known that cultural chauvinism (clearly a close relative of nationalism) presents serious problems for the prospects of global peace. In the chapter “The Virtue of the Chickadee, or Ethics for the End of the World: Chief Plenty Coups, and Judith Butler, and Anti-Genocidal Ethics” Will Barnes offers a unique and refreshing perspective from which the matter of cultural chauvinism can be approached. He incorporates Judith Butler’s psycho-analytic insights (which emphasize the significance of reckoning with vulnerability) with Jonathan Lear’s reading of Chief Plenty Coups’ philosophy. This chapter provides an instructive synthesis and application of ethical theory that can serve as a model for addressing the psycho-social causes of identitarian hatred and genocide. Barnes aptly illustrates the immense virtue exhibited by Plenty Coups in not only understanding and accepting his existential plight but in responding to the profound cultural devastation around him. In addition to its value for Peace Studies Barnes’ chapter is a remarkable example of comparative philosophy.

This is also an accurate description of the contribution “Transforming Contradictions: Dialectics of Nonviolence in Mao and Martin”. As two major historical and intellectual figures of the 20th century Mao Zedong and Martin Luther King are seldom (if ever) associated with one another. Greg Moses however examines their respective speeches to show that distinctions drawn by Mao between “antagonistic” and “non-antagonistic” contradictions provide insight into King’s logic of nonviolence. Since Moses sees King’s approach as dialectical it is concluded at least some common ground exists between Mao and King regarding the former’s advocacy of contradiction without synthesis. Moses then applies these insights to the contemporary social issue of Medicaid expansion. Ultimately, it is

argued that a truly nonviolent analysis must go beyond ideological critique in order to practice “transformational contradiction”. This chapter ably shows the relevance earlier social reformers have for current attempts to advance a greater positive peace within the present world.

Also in keeping with the focus on social conflict and partisan divisions the chapter “Lies of the Land: The Erosion of Democracy, and the Challenge for Positive Peace” cpp President Paula Smithka examines the degree to which utter disregard of and, indeed, outright disrespect for truth has characterized contemporary political discourse. Smithka argues that present day realities, as they pertain to the place of facts, conflict with Kantian principles of respect for persons and thus hamper the realization of positive peace within so-called democratic societies (like our own). She guides the reader through notable political news items of recent years while drawing connections between them and (among other insights) the literary themes explored by George Orwell and T.S. Elliot. Instead of advocating a “fighting fire with fire” approach in which distortions of fact are countered with other factual distortions this author ultimately calls on society to undertake efforts that make the “respect for persons” principle foundational to our political system. The author sees this proposal to entail turning our attention to rectifying what actually causes polarization in the first place. In a world dominated by social media disagreements and cable news sound bites that are commonly seen as impediments to maintaining healthy levels of discourse (not mention blood pressures) Smithka offers a needed approach for elevating seemingly fruitless communication.

Issues relevant to partisanship (specifically how it relates to the limits of tolerance within liberal society) are also discussed by Hunter Cantrell in “Tolerating the Intolerable—A Method to Prevent Radicalization”. In keeping with the spirit of the preceding author’s proposal, this author calls on us to better understand the process by which individuals get radicalized (specifically by acknowledging the place that the wrongfully setting back of interests has to that process). For this author, moreover, it is the very act of toleration that we should see as essential for effectively countering the process of radicalization. Since, for many, there is a clear historical link between adoption of liberal principles and greater social peace this author’s insights are relevant to anyone interested in more broadly understanding liberal political philosophy.

Paul Churchill in his chapter “Gun Violence, Honor, and Inequality, in America” directs our attention to the more concrete topic of gun violence; specifically, he suggests new ways in which this controversy could be better engaged. The partisan implications of the gun violence topic are obvious. Moreover, its pertinence for peace studies is beyond question. Churchill counsels against responding with counter arguments to familiar pro-gun assertions and seeks instead to expose the “subterranean and occluded motives for wanting to own firearms.” In recent times, armed protestors have descended on various American state capitals and even disrupted the American tradition of a peaceful transfer of power. This has happened during a time in which mass shootings have become commonplace in the country and activists have felt powerless to enact meaningful gun reform given just how ingrained the attraction to firearms is in American culture. Churchill not only illuminates unnoticed dimensions of a quintessential partisan issue but offers the reader promising insights by which a greater level of mutual understanding on the acceptability of gun ownership can be pursued.

Disagreements about gun laws invariably involve different understandings of individual rights—perhaps the most central concept in liberal political philosophy. It is commonly assumed (not just in debates about guns) that there is no basis in liberal thought for understanding rights claims to require any real positive action on the part of the State, but only simple noninterference regarding the individual pursuits of citizens. In the chapter “Kant’s Rational Freedom: Positive and Negative Peace”, Casey Rentmeester counters this assumption. Rentmeester situates the Kantian injunction that people have a duty to respect other persons as autonomous agents within Kant’s project for perpetual peace. The author argues that this duty can be fulfilled only if there are social conditions

intact which allow for individuals to flourish—a necessary condition for attaining, what Kant calls, “rational freedom”. Thus, Rentmeester concludes that Kant gives us “the scaffolding for a viable conception of peace that is useful in a contemporary context.” Specifically, it is argued, that from a Kantian perspective individuals living in a meaningful and sustainable peaceful society would be able to claim the right to bodily integrity as well as the right to a clean environment. Rentmeester provides a helpful segue to subsequent discussions in this volume.

In “A Useful Resource: Work for People with Mental Illness” Abigail Gosselin gives further specific insight on the kind of positive action that would be conducive to genuine social peace. The author calls on our society to value work in a way that is broader than has traditionally been the case. Using a “positive peace/structural framework” the author argues that the individualistic approach of capitalist society oppresses those with mental illness in regard to employment matters. The author concludes that society must address certain structural issues in order to attain better levels of justice (and thus better overall levels of peace) regarding employment for the mentally ill. The chapter is another valuable demonstration of applied philosophy.

Like this author, Jennifer Kling in “Wealth, Violence, and Injustice: Refugees, Robin Hood, and Resistance” challenges conventionally accepted ethical understandings as they relate to the socially disadvantaged. Kling considers two contemporary real life examples—the seizing of assets from Syrian refugees and the “economic hacktivism” of internet groups siphoning small sums from the accounts of the wealthiest 0.01% in their attempts to help the less well-off. Both examples involve common notions of theft and injustice and also have wider implications for how schemes of distribution become legitimized in society. Kling’s analysis hones in on the question of what constitutes violence. She argues that since an acceptable understanding of violence should be neither too restrictive nor too permissive it makes sense to think of violence in terms of a violation of integrity or unity. From this point, it follows to Kling that Robin-Hood style tactics (like those pursued by the “hacktivists”) are acceptable tools available for those who seek to nonviolently resist unjust systems. This chapter’s approach to questions of violence and distributive justice is uniquely insightful and its challenges to commonly held intuitive understandings makes the chapter a fine example of public philosophy.

The challenges and insights these authors provide invite broader reflections on the philosophical viability of capitalism. In “The Capitalist Peace and Pacific Capitalism” Andrew Fiala critically explores the alleged link between capitalism and peace. Invoking the Gandhian emphasis on the unity of means and ends, Fiala argues for envisioning capitalism in such a way that profit and prosperity can result from peaceful (rather than exploitative) transactions. Thus, he concludes, “Profit and prosperity ought properly to be connected to a larger account of just and peaceful social relations.” At a time when discussions regarding economic justice are commonly characterized by binary thought and intense polarization Fiala’s analysis compellingly reveals an unexplored middle ground and is therefore also a valuable contribution to Peace Studies.

Similarly, in “Discourse that Advances Economic Democracy” William Gay emphasizes a distinction between “economic democracy” and “democratic socialism”. While the author is sympathetic to the goals of those who advocate for the latter he acknowledges that for many in our present day society the conversation has not reached a level that can enable them to see democratic socialism as a viable alternative. Additionally, Gay holds that the economic sphere provides a more promising space for the advancement of democratic ideals. He calls on us to be aware of and find alternatives to the negative memes and metaphors that are so prevalent in public discussions and examines ways in which an alternative frame of economic discourse can employ the terminology of care ethics. Since this is an approach to ethics that emphasizes the primacy of caring relationships, the preceding chapter is both a nice complement to this contribution as well as an insightful resource for anyone who seeks ways to better promote positive peace within the dominant institutional settings of our

times. What's more is that this chapter offers insights that would be interest to anyone who has wondered about the compatibility of a capitalism and care ethics.

The mixture between theoretical and practical considerations contained in these chapters testify to the value of reflective equilibrium. The ground covered by the authors as well as the depths of their analyses make each contribution worthy of serious consideration for peace scholars and activists alike (and not just peace philosophers). The present-day challenges confronting attempts for realizing genuine positive peace in the world underscore that this volume is a needed resource for our times. <>

DOMESTIC CAPTIVITY AND THE BRITISH SUBJECT, 1660–1750 by Catherine Ingrassia [University of Virginia Press, 9780813948096]

In seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Britain, captivity emerged as both persistent metaphor and material reality. The exercise of power on an institutional and personal level created conditions in which those least empowered, particularly women, perceived themselves to be captive subjects. This 'domestic captivity' was inextricably connected to England's systematic enslavement of kidnapped Africans, even as early fictional narratives suppressed or ignored the experience of the enslaved.

DOMESTIC CAPTIVITY AND THE BRITISH SUBJECT, 1660–1750 explores how captivity informed identity, actions, and human relationships for white British subjects as represented in fictional texts by British authors from the period.

Author Catherine Ingrassia is Professor of English at Virginia Commonwealth University and author of *Authorship, Commerce, and Gender in Early Eighteenth-Century England: A Culture of Paper Credit*.

Drawing on the popular press, unpublished personal correspondence, and archival documents, Ingrassia provides a rich cultural description that situates a range of literary texts within the material world of captivity. The book accentuates the difference between and among the discrete conditions while asserting captivity's significance for understanding Restoration and eighteenth-century culture. As the first chapter reveals, even those who, by any measure, occupied a position of privilege still perceived themselves as living within a culture of captivity.

An original and necessary contribution to the field of eighteenth-century transatlantic studies. Ingrassia's book works to illuminate how pervasive and how complex these domestic conceptions of captivity were. At the same time, she contextualizes her accounts with a constant awareness of the presence of Atlantic plantation slavery as a backdrop and a point of comparison. – George Boulukos, Southern Illinois University, author of *The Grateful Slave: The Emergence of Race in Eighteenth-Century British and American Culture*

Ultimately, **DOMESTIC CAPTIVITY AND THE BRITISH SUBJECT, 1660–1750** calls for a reevaluation of how literary texts that code a heretofore undiscussed connection to the slave trade or other types of captivity are understood. <>

THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY: BLACK SOCIETY IN JAMAICA, 1655-1838, 2nd edition by Orlando Patterson [Polity, 9781509550982]

Orlando Patterson's classic study of slavery in Jamaica, **THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY**, reveals slavery for what it was: a highly repressive and destructive system of human exploitation, which disregarded and distorted almost all of the basic prerequisites of normal social life.

Patterson is John Cowles Professor of Sociology at Harvard University and Chair of the Jamaica Education Transformation Commission at the Office of the Prime Minister of Jamaica.

What distinguishes Patterson's account is his detailed description of the lives and culture of slaves under the repressive regime in Jamaica. He analyses the conditions of slave life and work on the plantations, the psychological life of slaves and the patterns and meanings of life and death. He shows that the real-life situation of slaves and enslavers involved a complete breakdown of all major social institutions, including the family, gender relations, religion, trust and morality. And yet, despite the repressiveness and protracted genocide of the regime, slaves maintained some space of their own, and their forced adjustment to white norms did not mean that they accepted them. Slave culture was characterized by a persistent sense of resentment and injustice, which underpinned the day-to-day resistance and large-scale rebellions that were a constant feature of slave society, the last and greatest of which partly accounts for its abolition.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY is not intended solely for sociologists. It fills a vital gap in the history of Jamaica and the other English speaking West Indian Islands. For the first time it analyzes the nature of the society which existed during slavery in Jamaica, and in particular, concentrates on the mass of the Negro peoples whose labor, skills, suffering and perseverance and at times, defiance, managed to maintain the system, without breaking under its yoke.

This 2nd edition of **THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY** includes a new introduction by Orlando Patterson, which explains the origins of the book, appraises subsequent works on Jamaican slavery, and reflects on its enduring relevance.

... a lucid, densely packed, and extremely intelligent analysis of slavery... indispensable – Eric Hobsbawm, The Guardian

... an inventive and perceptive book – Jack P. Greene, The American Historical Review

... a valuable contribution to the study of West Indian history... Patterson has asked new questions and elicited some new answers in his discussion of the Jamaican slave society. – Elsa Goveia, The Times Literary Supplement

This book is a badly needed and well done study of the slave society of Jamaica... Refreshingly free of romanticism, it deals frankly with the impact of slavery upon all the members of Jamaican society. – Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, The Historian

Widely recognized as a foundational work on the social institution of slavery, **THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY** is an essential text for anyone interested in the role of slavery in shaping the modern world. <>

THINKING LIKE AN ICEBERG by Olivier Remaud, **translated by Stephen Muecke [Polity Press, 9781509551460]**

When we imagine the polar regions, we see a largely lifeless world covered in snow and ice where icebergs drift listlessly through frozen waters, like solitary wanderers of the oceans floating aimlessly in total silence. But nothing could be further from the truth.

This book takes us into the fascinating world of icebergs and glaciers to discover what they are really like. Through a series of historical vignettes recalling some of the most tragic and most exhilarating encounters between human beings and these gigantic pieces of matter, and through vivid descriptions of their cycles of birth and death, Olivier Remaud shows that these entities are teeming with many forms of life and that there is a deep continuity between iceberg life and human life, a complex web of reciprocal interconnections that can lead from the deadliest to the most vital. And precisely because there is this continuity, icebergs and glaciers tell us something important about life itself – namely, that it thrives in the most unexpected of places, even where there seems to be no life at all.

At a time when we are increasingly aware that the melting of ice sheets, glaciers and sea ice is one of the many disastrous consequences of global warming, this beautiful meditation is a poignant reminder of the interconnectedness of all life and the fragility of the Earth's ecosystems.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements
 The Issue
 Prologue: They are Coming!
 1 Through the Looking Glass
 2 The Eye of the Glacier
 3 Unexpected Lives
 4 Social Snow
 5 A Less Lonely World
 6 Thinking Like an Iceberg
 Epilogue: Return to the Ocean
 Notes

The Issue

Icebergs have been considered secondary characters for a long time now. They made the headlines when ships sank after hitting them. Then they disappeared into the fog and no one paid them any more attention.

In the pages that follow, they take centre stage. Their very substance breathes. They pitch and roll over themselves like whales. They house tiny life forms and take part in human affairs. Today, they are melting along with the glaciers and the sea ice.

Icebergs are central to both the little stories and the big issues.

This book invites you to discover worlds rich in secret affinities and inevitable paradoxes.

There are so many ways to see wildlife with new eyes.

Thinking Like an Iceberg

In one of the chapters of his *Almanac*, Aldo Leopold addresses cowherds on mountain pastures who are afraid of the wolf. He recounts the moment when his life changed. One day, as a hunter, he

shoots at a she-wolf and her pack of cubs as they cross a river ford. When he sees the 'green fire' of life disappear in the mother's eyes, he understands the mystery that unites not the hunter and his environment but the wolf and the mountain. He guesses that the wolf regulates the possible supernumerary deer and helps to prevent trees from becoming too defoliated. If it wants to maintain the balance of life in its biome, the mountain needs the wolf to avoid the fear of too many deer. The farmers would benefit from extending the relationship they have with their cows to the environment that includes all beings, together with predators. They would hear the cry of the wolf with a different ear:

A deep chesty bawl echoes from rimrock to rimrock, rolls down the mountain and fades into the far blackness of the night. It is an outburst of wild defiant sorrow, and of contempt for all the adversities of the world. Every living thing (and perhaps many dead one too) pays heed to that call ... Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of a wolf.

The deer is frightened, the pine anticipates the blood on the snow at the base of its trunk, the coyote rejoices in the leftovers he will enjoy, the cowherd fears for his finances. The hunter sharpens his weapons. The mountain understands the 'hidden meaning' of the howl. Leopold suggests that the cowherd should 'think like a mountain'.

Who has ever thought like an iceberg?

Let's imagine one last time the young Inuit imitating an iceberg in front of his friends sitting in a circle. In the igloo, seal oil is burning on the soapstone. His mother regularly snips the wick of dried moss so that the smoke does not extinguish it. A soft light spreads, shadows float in the warm atmosphere. The boy stands. He rests his forearms across his chest, lifting his shoulders a little, and begins to bend over. His body moves closer to the ground. He defies gravity. His voice makes slight squeaks. Then a cry comes from his mouth. He falls suddenly. The iceberg has just fallen into the ocean, causing the water to crest as if it were breaking on a reef.

Hiccups, snores and various gurgling sounds suggest that the boy is imitating the raging waves on his back. He restores his balance by banging the ground with his elbows. He then stretches his arms and starts to shear the air with grace. His limbs have become the pectorals of a whale calf. He twists subtly, leaning on his joined feet as if on a caudal. He is now flat on his stomach and shows his back. He opens his mouth. The waves are high. It is not easy to breathe. He finally rolls over and slowly stands up.

His eyes widen and his face turns in all directions. He has become an iceberg again. He is on the lookout because he has heard a noise in the distance. It is a motor. A boat is coming. His gaze fixes on a point above the heads of his assembled friends. He frowns. He is going to get angry. In order to frighten the members of crew approaching him, he manipulates his vocal cords to produce an ominous growl. He rests his cheek on his shoulder. His left side bows. Suddenly, the spectators roar and he throws his hands down in a violent gesture, as if he had to get rid of a burden. A heavy piece of ice breaks away from his sides. Bits of it brush the visitors. Then there is a long silence. The young boy turns and walks away towards the bottom of the igloo, where the shadows reign. The iceberg enters the mist and begins to drift. The theatre is over. Everyone applauds the performance. The artist is congratulated.

We are in the boat. From the deck, once we got over our fright, we interpret the departure of the iceberg as a banishment. Our eyes are clouded with melancholy. Since we do not attribute any concrete intention to them, the blocks seem to us to be emblems of solitude. We look at them in the way we look at the details of a seventeenth-century still life. A basket of old apples, wilted flowers, a burnt-out candle, an hourglass running out. They reflect the image of an inevitable end. The painting by Frederic Edwin Church which opens this book says the same thing. Mirrors of our

states of mind, icebergs are allegories of the passing of time, lures in our mundane life. They are beautiful vanities.

We deduce from the fate of the iceberg that the coldness of the ice extinguishes the glow of life. The frosty mists frighten us. They also reassure us. The slight shiver we feel comes from the fact that we do not live in these harsh lands and that we contemplate their dramas from more welcoming shores. We have constructed a scene and prefer the artifice of the show to the realities behind the decor. We can guess that what happens to them affects our lives. But they are out there. We look first deep into the icebergs for evidence of our mortal condition. We then turn our face to one of the surfaces and see only our reflection. Narcissus is no longer a mythological character, as in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.

Our narcissism condemns us to the cult of appearances.

The illusion is strange. The iceberg sliding across the ocean is a biotic environment in its own right. We understand this with difficulty because life develops below the waterline of the berg. We would have to put on thermal underwear and a wet suit. Diving into the cold waters, we would see it up close. You could walk beside its submerged walls. You could see organisms clinging to the little ice cups carved out by the saltwater currents. The polar cod would open its mouth facing upwards to pick up the suspended plankton. The bearded seal would come up from the depths and grab the cod. Then it would pull itself up onto a ledge to bask in the sunlight, vocalising.

Within seconds, the illusion of a dead block would be reversed.

Any iceberg that breaks off becomes a biological ark in no time. The cracking of its ice is like the howling of a wolf. It reveals the diversity of life forms. The iceberg brings people together around it. Why picture its birth as a sad and lonely fate? Is the ocean so ghostly to us? Let us awaken our pelagic consciousness. Icebergs carried by marine currents are not decorative elements in vanitas paintings, or images of solitude, but essential actors in the primordial cycles of life. The inertia of icy worlds is a misnomer. None of the places we call 'desert' are in fact deserted.

Icebergs illustrate a wild life at work everywhere. They share with animals the same art of appearing and disappearing. As we know, wild life is not always on display. The philosopher Irene J. Klaver reminds us that 'to be wild is to stand out and to disappear.' The animal shies away so as not to be devoured. It does not get too close in order to see better. It conceals itself in order to interpret the ways in which other beings inhabit their specific environment. Camouflaging oneself means erasing the contours of one's body, blending into the context, moving without being perceived, and then reappearing at the appropriate moments.

Being wild means knowing how to be discreet.

The iceberg also unites the visible and the invisible. Its identity is not limited to its appearance, nor its value to its visibility. We know how voluminous its underwater part is. Yet it always ends up turning over. What was visible disappears. And what remained hidden shows itself. Each iceberg plays a game of fleeting appearances. Its vital centre depends on the rotating movements that bring the submerged volumes to the surface and engulf the others, so that the visible and invisible sides are never the same. To see an iceberg is thus to see the visible and the invisible in alternation. Nothing is immobile, even if everything seems frozen to the eye that remains on the surface.

Like all living things, the iceberg is characterised by the way it expresses itself, moves, is born and dies. It falls with a crash into the water, only to disappear into anonymity a few months or years later. In the meantime, it shows a part of itself and hides the rest from us. Then it reverses this perceptual pattern by rolling over itself. Like the wolf, the deer, and so many other animals, it is distinguished by its ability to conceal itself. Even when it is huge and very apparent, it knows how to

hide from view. It suddenly disappears into the mist, almost silently. It reappears all the more strikingly when it is no longer expected. Its presence is paradoxically light. It slips away and leaves other things to live their own presences.

Basically, icebergs do not 'need' us. Above all, they need us to 'disappear' from time to time. This wild part is imitable. We could learn to develop an art of withdrawal that would be 'an experience in the midst of and with beings and things'. This art would require, for a time, 'laying down all sovereignty in order to open up to the unlimited possibilities of anonymous life.' If we became more discreet, we would in this way be wilder. If we were less visible, we would be more faithful to our principle of freedom. If discretion were our hallmark, we would undoubtedly inhabit environments populated by fabulously varied beings. We would finally imagine 'how much less lonely the world would be'.

Are icebergs too far away for us to be conscious enough of them? It is a reasonable objection. How can we feel close to entities that do not move at the same latitudes as most of the planet's inhabitants? How can we grasp the fact that our personal existences here are linked to their life cycles there? The gap is difficult to bridge. Abstract explanations are not enough. It can only be overcome if we interpret this distance as a figure of continuity; us being part of a common world in which each depends on the other. Icebergs are not solitary. They exist 'by themselves' by being 'well connected' to other beings. They are 'among us', with us, not far away in a wilderness devoid of life.

But there are more and more of them among us. The more they flood the fjords, the more their quantity is a sign of an anomaly. Their increase precedes their disappearance. The more heralds the less. This is the current vertigo, the equation of our near future. The glaciers are tired and the eternal snows are melting. The polar waters are turning blue. The Arctic is gradually becoming a great Mediterranean.

Considering the facts, icebergs are the best teachers. They teach us that every being is a world that brings together other beings and conjugates other worlds. They remind us that life teems in the most seemingly empty places. They invite us to make ourselves indistinguishable at times in order the better to coexist with all living things. Icebergs are discreet colossi, antidotes to narcissism. In them lies the preservation of the world. <>

IMMATERIAL: RULES IN CONTEMPORARY ART by Sherri Irvin [Oxford University Press, 9780199688210]

Irvin argues that rules are the key to understanding what's going on in contemporary art.

Contemporary art can seem chaotic: it may be made of toilet paper, candies you can eat, or meat that is thrown out after each exhibition. Some works fill a room with obsessively fabricated objects, while others purport to include only concepts, thoughts, or language. Immaterial argues that, despite these unruly appearances, making rules is a key part of what many contemporary artists do when they make their works, and these rules can explain disparate developments in installation art, conceptual art, time-based media art, and participatory art.

Sherri Irvin shows how rules are now an artistic medium: they are part of the work's structure and shape what it expresses. Rules are meaningful in themselves and help to activate the meanings of non-art materials and found objects, so audiences need to know about the rules to get the most out of their art experiences. Loss of information about the rules, like loss of a chunk of marble, can seriously damage the work, and preserving rules as well as objects is reshaping how museums maintain their collections. Where rules collide with real-world circumstances, they may be broken

maliciously, mistakenly, or for good reasons, threatening the work's meanings and sometimes its very existence.

Should we celebrate the prominence of rules in contemporary art? Irvin argues that, while rules aren't always used well, they can be used to create distinctive meanings and provide powerful immersive experiences not achievable through any other means.

- A lively discussion of how rules create and distinctive experiences and possibilities for expression
- Takes a careful look at the practices of contemporary artists, curators, conservators, and critics
- Draws on a rich and detailed set of examples across a variety of visual art forms
- Provides a novel explanation of disparate developments in contemporary art

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

List of Figures

Introduction

1. Rules in Art?

2. Rules for Display

3. Rules for Conservation

4. Rules for Participation

5. What Are Artworks Made Of?

6. Rules as Medium

7. Rules and Expression

8. Rules, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation

9. Rule Violations and Authenticity

10. Rules? Really?

Bibliography

Index

In this book, I focus on a cluster of developments in contemporary art. They have to do with material and what to do with it. Developments having to do with material have been widely recognized: many contemporary artworks are made of materials that are weird or have been put through a weird process on their way to arthood. The material of some artworks is an event instead of an object. For many artworks in new media, it is hard to pin down what the material is at all: neither the "thing" label nor the "event" label works very well. As the material has gotten weirder, the boundaries between (what used to be) different art forms have broken down.

One development about what do with the material has been widely noticed: interactivity. These days we may be able to walk around in an artwork, eat a piece of it, change its appearance, play with it, or take part of it away with us. A couple of other developments, though, have gotten less mainstream attention. First, the issue of how to display the material has gotten vastly more complicated. Some artists spend as much time telling museums how to display things as they spent making the things in the first place. Some artists don't make any things at all! They just tell museums to get some things and display them. Second, there are new questions about how to take care of the material, even when it isn't on display. These matters of display and conservation might seem like technical issues that only a museum professional could love. In this book, though, I'll argue that getting a handle on them is crucial to understanding much art these days. They affect what artworks are and what they can mean. Here is a quick taste of where we're headed.

Pranking Painting

Consider the art of painting up until, say, the late nineteenth century. Paintings were made on (approximately) flat supports. A painting was a picture of something. Displaying the painting was

straightforward: the painted surface should face away from the wall, and the picture should be right side up. Conserving the painting was always a complicated business, but it had a central goal: preserving the look and substance of the painted surface.

Now let's think about some twentieth- and twenty-first-century interventions in painting.

Intervention #1: Georg Baselitz (1978)

Georg Baselitz made pictures to be displayed upside down. The Gleaner is bending down to glean, but her feet and head are at the top of the painting rather than the bottom (Figure 0.1). Somebody who found The Gleaner in an attic (okay, unlikely), and didn't know the figure is supposed to be upside down, would seriously misunderstand it.

Intervention #2: Fiona Banner (2007)

Fiona Banner made a text-based drawing in graphite and framed it (Figure 0.2). She flipped it around and applied the words "Shy Nude" on the back. Then she gave instructions to show it leaning into a corner with the back side, rather than the drawing, facing the audience.



Figure 0.1 Georg Baselitz, Die Ahrenleserin (The Gleaner), 1978. Oil and egg tempera on canvas, 129/8 x 98% in. (330.1 x 249.9 cm). Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York. Purchased with funds contributed by Robert and Meryl Meltzer, 1987. © Georg Baselitz 2022, Artwork photo: Friedrich, Rosenstiel, Cologne, Courtesy Archie Georg Baselitz




Figure 0.2 Fiona Banner, *Shy Nude*, 2007. Graphite on paper with spray paint and aluminum frame. Frame: 50 1/2 x 34 3/4 in. (128.3 x 88.3 cm). Richard Brown Baker Fund for Contemporary British Art, 2009.11 © Fiona Banner. Courtesy of the artist and the RISD Museum, Providence, RI

Intervention #3: Saburo Murakami (1957)

Saburo Murakami made a series of Peeling Pictures (Figure 0.3). Historically, breaches of the painted surface had been a crisis—something to be stopped, fixed, hidden. Murakami made paintings that are designed to erode via peeling paint, and embraced this erosion as part of the work. (See discussion in Schimmel 1999.)

Intervention #4: Gerald Ferguson (1979-82)

Gerald Ferguson made a series of Maintenance Paintings. Each carries a label saying that the "end user" is allowed to repaint it (Figure 0.4). He said, "If someone bought a green painting, for example and felt it would look better white, they could repaint it. That would be aesthetic maintenance."1

Gerald Ferguson, "Notes on Work: 1970-1989." Undated document supplied by Curator of Collections Shannon Parker at the Art Gallery of Nova Scotia. Punctuation as in original.




Figure 0.3 Saburo Murakami, *Peeling Picture*, 1957. Oil on canvas, 20 7/8 x 17 15/16 in. (53 x 45.5 cm). Collection Axel & May Vervoordt Foundation, Belgium

These interventions changed how we have to understand painting as an art form. They destabilized the connection between the object and the artwork: if all you have is the object without further information, you don't yet quite know what the artwork is. They also highlighted something that was true all along, though not obvious: works of painting aren't just physical objects, but physical objects governed by rules. These rules were once fixed by social conventions that were so reliably in force that they were invisible: no one would have had to tell you that you should hang Artemisia Gentileschi's early seventeenth-century *Judith Slaying Holofernes* with the picture right side up, facing away from the wall so that it is visible to the viewer, or that preserving the painted surface is essential to avoiding the work's destruction. These rules were obvious enough to go unmentioned—but they were still rules. But one by one, our interventionists (those I've listed, as well as many others) challenged these conventions. Baselitz challenged the idea that the picture must be right side up. Banner challenged the idea that the principal marked surface must be presented to the viewer. Murakami made the work's surface an essentially evolving thing, transforming painting into a time-based medium. And Ferguson challenged the idea that the viewer must leave the painting alone. These challenges operate by violating conventions that had at previous points applied to all paintings. The violations do two things: they force us to notice the conventions, and they weaken their force.



Figure 0.4 Gerald Ferguson, labels on the reverse of Maintenance Painting No. 30, 1980-94. Latex on canvas, 12 x 10 in. (30.3 x 25.4 cm). Collection Art Gallery of Nova Scotia, 2005.801 Gift of Bruce Campbell, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, 2005 Courtesy of the Art Gallery of Nova Scotia. Photograph by RAW Photography

So: painting involves not just physical things but rules, and we have entered an era in which these rules are not fixed by rote application of convention. Artists can fashion custom rules for their work. This means we can no longer walk up to a painting and be sure we know what the rules are. If we see that a painting is hung at different orientations on two different days, does this mean someone hung it wrong at least one of those times? Or does it mean that the artist gave permission to hang it however you like? Or did the artist supply a strict schedule for changing the orientation? All of these possibilities, and others, are open. The artist gets to write the rules. This is what makes the situation I'm describing unique: it's not just that artists are breaking earlier rules—which has surely characterized artistic innovation in many contexts and historical periods—but that they are creating specific, custom rules that partly constitute works in art forms like painting that are often defined in terms of physical media.

The interventions I've listed feel like pranks, and they are. Instead of just making paintings, these artists are remaking painting. Some people find this annoying or boring: annoying because now you need background information just to know what the work is, and boring because all this attention to rules can undermine the attention to creating a surface that is visually satisfying. Why create a really stunning surface if you're just going to give people permission to paint over it or turn it away from the viewer? Neither Ferguson nor Banner has prioritized a visually lush surface.

I'm not here to tell you whether or not these pranks are annoying or boring. But I will say that writing custom rules for the artwork has become a big part of the job for some artists, and the rules themselves have become part of the medium that artists are working in. Painting used to mainly involve manipulating paint. Now artists can choose to manipulate paint + rules to make their work. This point about rules extends well beyond painting and has helped to break down the boundaries of medium in contemporary art. These rules are part of the medium because they help to generate the

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

work's meanings. If it were turned so that the inscribed surface faced the viewer, Fiona Banner's *Shy Nude* couldn't lead us to question, in the same way, the tradition of presenting nude bodies, especially nude female bodies, in art while treating their display as lewd and shameful in other contexts. The rule that thwarts our vision is essential to the way the work makes its point.

Feeling impatient? Here are some FAQs:

Q. Is it good for artists to have the power to write these rules?

A. Sometimes.

Q. What if we lose track of the rules over time?

A. What if we lose a physical chunk of an artwork? Depends how big the chunk is. Same story for rules.

Q. What if the rules aren't followed?

A. Depends how badly they are violated. The work might be destroyed, it might fail to be on display, or things might be mostly fine.

Q. What if audience members don't know (or care) about the rules?

A. Depends how significant the rules are. The audience might miss the work's point entirely, or it might be a minor issue.

Q. Where do the curators, conservators, and other folks who have to follow the rules fit in?

A. Everywhere.

Q. Is this story relevant to contemporary art that doesn't involve the artist devising custom rules?

A. Yes.

These questions are why I've written a whole book. I'll elaborate on the answers in subsequent chapters.

Disclaimers

Philosophy of "contemporary" art

What do I mean by "contemporary"? I don't care very much about the specific details of the definition. There is some art that I want to talk about, and I'm going to slap the label "contemporary art" on it because that's a label other people tend to slap on it.

If you like time periods: most of my examples are from the 1980s and forward, though at some points we will stretch back to 1960. So long ago, right?! Some of my claims about contemporary art apply to works created even earlier in the twentieth century. Is this my fault, or is it because the word "contemporary" is used in a strange way when it comes to art? Or both? You be the judge.

I include works that are obviously "visual" and works that are conceptual or performative but clearly connected to visual art traditions. Many of my examples are of what is often called "conceptual art" when that term is used broadly. [Narrowly speaking, conceptual art belongs to a movement mainly of the 1960s and 1970s—though, for some, it stretches as far back as the works of Marcel Duchamp

in the early twentieth century—in which, as Sol LeWitt put it, "The idea itself, even if it is not made visual, is as much of a work of art as any finished product" (LeWitt 1967). However, the label 'conceptual' is frequently applied to works of later decades that do not seem to exist as ideas independent of material realizations—and, indeed, where fabricated objects can play quite an important role—if these works also involve questioning of the nature of art, challenge to traditional boundaries among mediums, or reference back to the intention of the artist.] This is not because I think all contemporary art is conceptual, or only conceptual art is interesting. But conceptual art is the locus of key developments that affect how we should think even about contemporary artworks that aren't conceptual.

Philosophy of contemporary "art"

I'm not talking about all art made these days. How could I? I focus on art that is linked to the international network of contemporary art galleries, museums, and biennials: art that is shown there, aspires to be shown there, or responds to work shown there. Artists, galleries, museums, and art communities all over the world participate. I like and value many other kinds of art that don't fit this description—art that emerges from local communities or cultural traditions that either aren't in touch with the international gallery scene or just aren't engaging with it—where by "not engaging" I don't mean actively rejecting or disdaining, which are ways of responding that do fall within my purview. But these forms of art won't make much of an appearance here.

"Philosophy" of contemporary art

I am a philosopher, so this is a philosophy of contemporary art, not a history. I won't be examining specific artistic movements and how they influenced one another. I won't be looking much at the historical progression of the developments I discuss or offering a sociological perspective on the reasons why they came about. Even the interventions in painting I discussed weren't in chronological order—did you notice? I will pay more attention to showing that these developments have occurred and are pretty widespread and showing why and how this is important: because they affect what artworks can mean and what we need to know about them.

Some of the artworks I'll discuss are important and well known; others are obscure, perhaps rightly so. I chose some because they illustrate a point especially cleanly, some because I happened upon compelling documentation or intriguing details, and still others because they function jointly to show the very different ways that structurally similar rules can shape aesthetic experience and meaning in different contexts. Not all of the works I discuss are of deep art historical significance, but this is, in my view, as it should be. The developments I track are relevant to works both central and marginal; they are not restricted to a remote segment of the contemporary art world.

"Immaterial"??

Lucy Lippard wrote a famous book in which she spoke about the "dematerialization" of art in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Lippard 1973). Martha Buskirk (2003) writes of "the contingent object of contemporary art," also beginning in the 1960s. Art around that time was sometimes sold in the form of unrealized plans, and artists were given to saying things like this:

The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. (LeWitt 1967)

The art is formless and sizeless; however the presentation has specific characteristics. (Joseph Kosuth, quoted in Lippard 1973, 72)

1. The artist may construct the piece.
2. The piece may be fabricated.
3. The piece may not be built.

Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist ... (Lawrence Weiner, quoted in Lippard 1973, 73-4)

Such declarations by artists, along with the dematerialized structure of many conceptual works, has led some theorists, such as Goldie and Schellekens (2009), to suggest that ideas are the very substance or medium of conceptual art. I will argue, to the contrary, that conceptual artworks are continuous with prior materialized works in that they consist of structures that express ideas. The dematerialization of art consists not in a shift from objects to ideas, but in a shift from object-based works with implicit, conventional rules defining a fixed form to works that consist wholly or partly of explicit, custom rules for constituting a display, with rules functioning as a medium that is especially apt for expressing certain kinds of ideas.

Since the "high conceptual" period, art has been substantially rematerialized, but the relation of the artwork to its material has shifted. Whereas a specific fabricated object was once an unquestioned necessity, now the relation between the artwork and the material on display is far more variable. Some artworks have no necessary material: displays are newly constituted for each exhibition and then destroyed, leaving nothing in storage except documents (and, occasionally, not even those). Some artworks have materials that are necessary, but can or must be displayed in different ways on different occasions. Some have a combination of necessary objects and replaceable parts. And even for those with only necessary objects, what can or must be done with these objects varies: some must be carefully preserved in an ideal original state, while others may or must be interacted with or permitted to decay.

How does it happen that this relation varies from work to work? And what are the implications of this variable relation for audience members, for museum practitioners, and for the very nature of the artwork itself? This renegotiation of the relation between the artwork and the material of its display is what this book is about. I won't ignore the artwork's material elements, but I will argue that immaterial elements—like rules—have an equally critical role to play. <>

AS DEEP AS IT GETS: MOVIES AND METAPHYSICS by Randall E. Auxier [Open Universe, 9781637700082]

A lot of thought goes into making Hollywood films and television series. The best artists of the twentieth century chose this medium over the arts they would have practiced in previous centuries - the painters, sculptors, writers, musicians, actors, and most of all the director, the master auteur, packed up their gear and went west. As time has gone on, television and movie-making converged into one huge canvas for all that creative thinking. Let's think about some of the best things that got thunk in the last hundred years, see if we can uncover the deeper layers of that thinking and sling a little philosophy at the screen.

CONTENTS

About the Author

Note to the Reader

From the Alamo Draft House to the Livingroom Couch (Or There and Back Again)

Part I Rated G: General Audiences

1. I Know Something You Don't Know THE PRINCESS BRIDE

2. Lions and Tigers and Bears

SCARY STUFF IN THE WIZARD OF OZ

3. The Monster and the Mensch

A CHILD'S EYE VIEW OF SUPER 8

4. Chef, Socrates, and the Sage of Love FINDING LOVE IN SOUTH PARK

5. Killing Kenny
DEATH THERAPY IN SOUTH PARK
Part II Parental Guidance Suggested
6. The Good, the Bad, and the Beautiful SERGIO LEONE'S ANIMALS, ACTORS, AND AESTHETICS
7. Democracy Adrift
HITCHCOCK'S LIFEBOAT
8. Cuts Like a Knife
CUTTING TO THE CORE OF HIS DARK MATERIALS
9. Mrs. Coulter—Overwoman?
HER DARK MATERIALS
Part III Rated R: Restricted Audiences Only
10. A Very Naughty Boy
GETTING RIGHT WITH BRIAN AND MONTY PYTHON
11. Have You No Decency?
CLAIRE, FRANK, AND THEIR HOUSE OF CARDS
12. Vinnie's Very Bad Day
TWISTING THE TALE OF TIME IN PULP FICTION
13. Once Upon a Time
In Inception
14. Dream Time
In Inception
Part IV Director's Cut
15. To Serve Man
A Visit to The Twilight Zone
Bibliography
Suggestions for Reading
Index

From the Alamo Draft House to the Livingroom Couch (Or There and Back Again)

Don't be a slyboots. No one likes a shyboots. —STEVE MARTIN, *Cruel Shoes*

First things first. I don't claim to be a sophisticated film critic. I'm just like you (unless you are a sophisticated film critic, in which case, bully for you). I watch movies because I like movies. I think about movies because I think about everything. It's a problem. I'm a problem thinker, maybe an addict. Be that as it may, I figured out a way to make a living from my problem, so, from the jaws of pathology comes ... what? Does pathology have jaws? Maybe it has jaws. Shit that movie scared me. I was fourteen when I saw it at the theater. Still thinking about it. See what I mean?

So I admire sophisticated film critics. They know all sorts of fancy things I don't know. They actually study movies and stuff. I mainly watch and think. I know a little bit. I was the main character in a student movie once (like, in 1983), may my friend who made it rest in peace. He was not a happy person but I liked him. I hope he destroyed the movie, which was inspired by *A Clockwork Orange*. My university had a well-known film department and people came from all over to major in filmmaking.

The guy who lived across the hall from me in the dorm became a famous Hollywood director. We talked about movies all the time. He took our group of friends to the art cinema to see this great young pair of brothers who had made a student film called *Blood Simple*. He said they would be famous. He was right. He also took us all to see *Mystery Train*, the Jim Jarmusch movie. We were all

in Memphis where the film was set, so it was a lesson in how to use a city as a set. That now famous director explained many things to us. He doesn't answer my e-mails. So I won't name him.

Ironically, I had a bit part in another movie last year. I played an irritable and demanding Hollywood director, modeled roughly on Jim Jarmusch. I think he's a great director, but I'm a terrible actor. In one scene I lose my temper and smash a cell phone to bits. We had to do about twenty takes (very complicated scene with many moving parts), so I got to smash that phone twenty times (the props people had one that would fly into pieces but could be re-assembled). It was out of doors and started to rain before the director really got what he wanted, but he later said he made it work with what he had.

How? I have no idea how something like that is done. Fortunately, the movie is in Polish (my parts are in English, but the rest isn't), so that should discourage my friends from wanting to see it. I still have no idea how movies are really made. That's my point. Seems like magic to me. I am fascinated by movies in about the way a gorilla is fascinated by a big red ball. If I seem to know what I'm talking about regarding movies at any point in this book, I assure you it's an illusion.

So, I do know some things, but I don't know shit about the movies. This book is for people who don't know shit about the movies. People who do know shit will be disappointed, so they should stop reading. Or not. But it's on you. If you keep reading and you find yourself saying "This idiot doesn't know what he's talking about," just remember, I said it first. Na-na-na-na-na. I hope this is out of the way. I am thinking of one of my colleagues at the university who is a professor of film studies, and I hope he doesn't read this. I admire him, but I don't wish to bear his opinion.

The Slow Death of My Imagination (and Yours)

What I do know about is what it's like to love movies. And so much so that they really do and always have been the images that fill my head and accompany both my waking and dreaming with narrative, shots and angles, continuities and discontinuities that make me wonder whether people who lived before movies existed didn't have a completely different sort of consciousness than we have.

Let me give an example. I read Tolkien's hobbit books long before anyone had tried to bring them to any kind of screen. I had a mental image of Bilbo and Frodo and Golem and Smaug. I know I did. But now I can only see Peter Jackson's versions of them. I am stuck with Elijah Wood. You probably are too. I can't even remember how I once imagined these characters that were so close to my heart. It's just gone. Same for the Harry Potter characters. Once I've seen a movie, it's like I can't unsee it and return to the power of images that was mine. My autonomy of imagination has been seized by some casting director or art director and becomes his/her permanent captive. There is a part of me that hates this, doesn't want to see the movie after I read the book. But I always do it anyway.

My lifetime coincides with the rise of "TV consciousness." By contrast, "movie consciousness" already existed when I appeared on the scene. My mother had read *Gone with the Wind* before it was a movie. They had no movie house where she grew up in rural Alabama. And the one that was closest was well beyond her family's reach and means—not a good use of money when having shoes to wear was a genuine luxury. I never asked her whether Clark Gable, et al., had replaced her imagined characters. But I know she loved the movie when she finally saw it. I have never read that book. I don't intend to, now that I realize it glorifies and sentimentalizes things I hate. But for people of my mother's generation, movies were magic beyond my imagining. They only knew the big screen.

If you grow up with TV, it can even be confusing to grasp the difference. You know it's different, but TV is not some Johnny-come-lately for people my age, like it was for my parents; it's the visual record of our lives. I can't easily imagine the world without it. Sort of like my students today try to imagine the world without cell phones—and fail. For my parents' generation, the movies played that

role, that and the radio, especially radio theater. By the time I was cognizant, radio was for cool music and news, and that was about it. Movies were for family outings, and TV was for everyday entertainment. That's just how the world is, I grew up believing.

I now understand the story of TV and the movies better. Yet, none of us knew where it was going. I now had two lethal instruments to kill my imagination. By the time video games, computers, and cell phones arrived on the scene, I had little left to destroy. But you young people? How will your imaginations survive this barrage of images? If I do have some young readers, buckle-up kiddies, I'm taking you on a tour of the past so you can learn some things about how we arrived in the glorious present (and I grant it is pretty good to be alive right now, since I still am and so many others aren't).

A Little History (Very Little)

When television appeared on the mass market (late 1940s—and that is before my time, if you're wondering), people said it would kill the movies. People were wrong. If anything, the movies got more popular. The movie experience was different from TV, and—my point—so were the shows. Early television was more indebted to the theater than the movies. If TV killed anything, it was radio theater. I love watching those old TV shows, but they have no kinship to the movies of the same time. By the time I can remember any new movies they were very sophisticated. TV was simple and stupid: game shows, soap operas, situation comedies, cowboy serials, an occasional baseball game (man, I lived for the Saturday Game of the Week).

But soon enough, TV decided to try to compete. They were tired of paying exorbitant prices for the rights to air Hollywood movies. They said "fuck it, we'll make our own." In 1966, NBC started its World Premier Movie series, and ABC followed in 1969 with its Movie of the Week series. Most of these were B-quality movies, but people ate 'em up, sorta like they ate up B-movies from Hollywood. We like bad movies. We always liked bad movies. Quentin Tarantino taught us how good bad movies really are. I have a bit to say about him in what follows.

Once in a while something among the dull made-for-TV movies shined, like Stephen Spielberg's first feature film ever, *Duel* (1971), starring Dennis Weaver. That one even had a theatrical release in Europe in 1973. Christ on a cracker! The lines began to blur. There used to be a real distinction between TV stars and movie stars, and it wasn't easy to make the transition —Clint Eastwood managed it by taking risky roles in Spaghetti Westerns, but it paid off for him. The spell of the movie house's superiority was broken gradually as more and more movie stars began to realize that they needed to do TV. It took thirty years. The path is still rougher from TV to movies than from movies to TV. But the path into the movies as a starting place is no cakewalk either. You're an actor, you're waiting tables, someone says, "Hey, I got a commercial for you, pays \$350." You take it.

Over time, there was a greater convergence of TV and the movies. As HBO and Cinemax emerged, the made-for-TV movies got better and better. Hollywood began releasing some of its (unpromising) movies straight to video so they could compete in the growing video rental market. People finally were staying home, preferring that to the arduous (not) trip to the multiplex cinema at the mall. They could have a beer at home, after all, and popcorn, for a lot less money. The cinema owners had to get creative. The seats got more comfortable, the beer became available (still highway robbery), and eventually they had to start selling total experiences.

Remember the Alamo

It was 1997. Enter the Alamo Draft House. The clever people in Austin realized that the experience of going-to-the-movies was actually what they needed to sell, and that the movie was important but not the only important thing. People would get a group of friends together and go see a movie they could easily watch on their increasingly large TVs at home, but do the Alamo for a night out. A

classic movie was just as good (indeed, better) than a first run movie. Who doesn't want to see Casablanca on the big screen, again? Hell, I do. Here's looking at you Humphrey. They made a shit-ton of money and now they have, like, forty cities all over North America.

So, the wait staff seats us, takes our order (and the food is going to be good, too), brings it to us just as the main feature starts, comes by to refill our beer every half hour, and they will kill anyone who talks or pulls out a cell phone, and it costs about the same as dinner out. Everyone here has seen this movie before. There are occasional comments. From the screen we hear: "It seems the Colonel has been shot," and we hear in our minds, as everyone thinks "Round up the usual suspects." The audience shares a public laugh. The experience is different from the living room couch, and we will pay for it.

Is the first-run movie in trouble? Yes and no. The Alamo doesn't need it, can take it or leave it. Still, the opportunities for high-end writers, directors, crews, and actors have never been better. A new type of TV series is appearing at about this same time—The Sopranos leads the way. No one grasps yet that this is going to change everything. These series offered ambitious directors, writers, and eventually actors, a path around what little was left of the Hollywood studio system. The HBO movies were often good enough to compete with the Hollywood films, so the Golden Globes (RIP) starts to offer an important series of awards for these films, and the recipients don't want to "thank the Academy and all the little people." You wanna talk about biting the hand that feeds you? Jesus.

Down but Not Out in Hollywood

At this moment in history, the idea of a bigger canvas to paint ^n---the story arc of a seven-season series—began to become a clear path to the sort of stardom that only the Hollywood blockbuster could have produced in earlier decades. The new Richard Burton is the unlikely Brian Cranston, straight from Malcolm in the Middle to Heisenberg and showbiz immortality. And shortly thereafter, the subscription services start to kill the video stores, and eventually Netflix and Hulu become as important in moviemaking as any major studio ever was. That was where the energy, the risk-taking, and the big budgets settled in. The talent followed the money. They have a way of doing that. You would too.

Hollywood was down but not out. They had to learn a few licks from their more adventurous new competitors, but they were still selling tickets. To give one example, Stephen King's epic coming-of-age horror novel *It* was released in 1986. By then, a number of King stories and novels had been made into successful shows of numerous sorts. *Stand By Me*, was breaking records at that very moment, critically acclaimed, taken seriously. This is not to mention *The Shining* (the critics hated it, the public loved it), *The Dead Zone*, and of course *Carrie*. *Salem's Lot* was a made-for-TV mini-series that worked (nominated for three Emmys and with European theater releases in a cut-down version).

But there was a problem with *It*. It was over 1100 pages long and featured seven main characters, none of whom could be consolidated or cut. And scene after scene was simply written as if for the screen. And everybody read the book. You just couldn't get *It* into a movie intact. So they tried a TV miniseries (1990). Not very satisfying, even with the creepy and oh-so-excellent Tim Curry as Pennywise the evil clown. Everyone who ever read the book wanted to see, well, every scene, excepting perhaps the orgy scene featuring eleven-year-old children. I couldn't even read that part. Geez Louise, Steve! Is nothing sacred? Could you just not do that, please? I'm going to leave that aside, and I wish Mr. King had done the same. Still, this novel is an astonishing organic whole and needed to be presented whole. Definite exception of an orgy among children.

It still hasn't been done as a whole, so let me play the prophet. To show, in passing, that Hollywood is down but not out: Hollywood's establishment center, from New Line Cinema to Warner

Brothers, collaborated on a huge new production, in two parts, released in 2017 and 2019, of *It*. Part one became the fifth highest grossing R-rated film of all time (even adjusted for inflation) and the highest grossing horror film of all time. People wanted *It*. And they went to the big screen to get *It*. Part two didn't do as well, but it grossed \$473 million as of this writing.

Anyone can see the next thing that will happen. So maybe I'm not a prophet. There will be a Netflix or Hulu or HBO series—after all, that's how Hulu did, with fair success, the equally long *King of the Hill* novel *11/22/63*. I personally subscribed to Hulu just to see it, and we still have Hulu, so I guess that worked for them. They had the time, the space and the budget, so *11/22/63* was pretty well done. They spread it over eight two-hour episodes. But now my picture of the main character, Jake Epping, will always be James Franco, dammit. Couldn't they have gotten Tom Hanks?

The Disaster

And then, to bring this story to its ugly end, COVID. Great for Netflix and Hulu and HBO. A bummer for the cinemas. Who could have imagined the whole damn world locked in their living rooms for a fucking year? (Pardon my French. You will have much to pardon in this book.) There we were. With nothing to please us but ... HBO, Netflix, Hulu, and their lesser cousins. You want a conspiracy theory? How about HBO created COVID? But even the lucky (if luck it was) streaming services had to halt production on their new content. I have been waiting a very long time for the next season of *Outlander*...

Will the cinemas ever bounce back? Hard to say, but in my little town, they just re-opened the multi-plex cinema at the mall, and it had been closed for five years. I think some people are betting that there is likely a real itch in the pants of the public to get back out and into their comfy new stadium-style cinema seats. The pandemic keeps sucking, in waves, but beyond it? Probably movies. The movies and TV have merged and then re-emerged as new and better beasts than they were apart. The lines have been effectively erased and we still have both and better, if you ask me.

Like a lot of people, then, I have also spent a lot more time with movies of all kinds since the disaster. I took the time to see a bunch of movies for the first time that I had "always been meaning to see," and binged a bunch of series too, and I rewatched some of my favorites, including pretty much everything in this book. It is amazing to me how different things seem on the far side of this disaster—if we are on the far side, which is unclear as of spring 2022. A young friend of mine wrote an article recently in which he argued, convincingly, that the movies have lost the power they once had to bind us together, socially, culturally.) But he was talking about the old way of seeing the cinema and movies, pre-pandemic. I think something else is afoot now, something we couldn't have foreseen, something culturally and socially powerful.

I did not have that criterion specifically in mind when I chose the movies and series that are discussed in this book, but as I now survey the whole, ^ see that one thing all these shows have in common is tremendous social and cultural impact—some were mainly important at some time in history, like *Lifeboat*, while others have perpetual power, like *Oz*. Some are yet to exercise their full power, like *His Dark Materials*, but ^ am pretty confident people will say that all of these shows are "important" in some sense.

These movies and TV series end up covering, somewhat unevenly, pretty much the whole history of the movies, with representatives from about every decade since the advent of the talkies (with a cluster from the 1990s, admittedly). I wasn't trying to do that either, but I now appreciate the span that ended up getting covered. There was also an unintended predilection for American-made shows. The Brits will get some serious creds when I discuss Monty Python and *House of Cards*, but pretty much it's a New World affair. In my view, the US has contributed very little to the world that is of lasting significance, but our movies and our music are exceptions. It's not that Americans are

better at this than other places and peoples, it's that Americans are not good, in the scope of history, at very many things (making money is an exception, too), and in movies and music, we actually do have something permanent to contribute.

The criteria I actually used in selecting the shows were opportunity and preference. In terms of opportunity, often someone was doing a book and I was invited to contribute. Or in the case of Oz, I was (co-)doing the book and contributed. Many of the chapters in this book appeared, in a different form, in other books. They have been updated and rewritten into a single narrative here. In terms of preference, all of these shows made me think, as I said, and I liked that and liked something (or many things) about these shows, and all of them led me to trace my reflections on the action, dialogue, photography, etc., into what I know about philosophy. So, that's what every chapter does, in some way. The shows are platforms for thinking philosophically. And that brings me to this next (and final) topic.

Movies and Metaphysics: Better Together

This book is going to take cinema and TV together under the name "the movies." There are a few things I will talk about that never made it to the big screen. I will talk about South Park, for example, but after all, there was a very successful movie (war with Canada!). Even the most movie-ish of movies eventually shows up on our increasingly huge home theater screens. I don't see any point in treating these shows as fundamentally different. Even if they once were, they aren't for us today. It's all the movies.

But, as I said, what does any of this really have to do with philosophy? A lot, actually. I think that most people find themselves thinking about the philosophical ideas they see depicted in the movies—they're everywhere. But more important is the thinking we do on our own as a result of the movies. Most movies, even bad ones, have themes and moral dilemmas and existential struggles that we understand and identify with.

I watched Forbidden Planet for the first time recently. It is awful, in an excellent way. I had meant to see it ever since I was an undergraduate and was seeing The Rocky Horror Picture Show every week—they sing about that movie in the wonderful opening number. It took over thirty-five years and COVID to provide the opportunity. But there you are: the well-meaning Mad Scientist has externalized his own ego-id complex and now it's trying to have sex with his daughter, Anne Francis.

You think I could write an essay on that? Hell, anybody could. As if that macho astronaut-hero doesn't have in mind to do the same thing to Anne. (And as if the male half, and some of the females in the audience aren't following that same naughty path of unconscious desire from their seats.) The distance between Stephen King's actual gangbang of Beverly Marsh in It and the imminent situation of Anne Francis in that movie is, well, the distance is not great. And it's icky, and we don't want to see it, but we sort of do want to think it, unconsciously, from a safe and condemning distance.

And that's only the beginning of the boundaries that movies allow us to transgress in our minds, while feeling shocked in our senses and sensibilities. In this book I will connect some of the movies to some of the issues. Nobody could get at all the issues. But I'll cover a pretty big spread here. I hope it confirms some of what you already thought about. I also hope it gives you new things to think about and guides you to some of the philosophers in our history who explored those thoughts.

But why metaphysics and not, say, epistemology or ethics? The first reason is personal. Everything I touch turns to metaphysics anyway, and I can't help it. I'm like Joyce Taylor in "Rappaccini's Daughter" (from Twice Told Tales, 1963, one of Vincent Price's best performances, in my opinion). I have been slowly poisoned by a life of metaphysics and now am unable to touch anything without killing it ontologically. I note that the first vignette in that movie is "Dr. Heidegger's Experiment," and it seems almost impossible to me that Nathaniel Hawthorne could have, in 1837, understood what

Heidegger would write in 1927, but seeing is believing. "Time takes its toll," as Riff Raff famously said. I'll take on that Heidegger problem in Chapter 5.

So, in my weird brain (and I have the scans to prove it is in fact weird), ethics and politics and logic and aesthetics all just become types of metaphysics. Whether I was born that way or got that way by drip-drops is immaterial. Second, metaphysics is, they say, the Queen of the Sciences. I looked around and found there was no King of the Sciences, which suits me just fine, so I settled for the highest ranking royal available, and I assume it commands all the others. About like the venerable Elizabeth II so successfully controls her own family ... (and who among us didn't watch The Crown? Fess up). So in the end, this is both metaphysics in the movies and a metaphysics of the movies. You'll see.

In my opinion, you can justify the time spent here, to yourself and others, by feeling like you're learning something. Or you can just have fun with it. I'm doing some of both. I watch these movies and I think. Having thought I want to discuss. Having discussed I want to write. Having written I want someone to read it. That's your job. I hope you enjoy your work. <>

ASCETICISM, ESCHATOLOGY, OPPOSITION TO PHILOSOPHY: THE ARABIC TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF SALMON BEN YEROHAM ON QOHELET (ECCLESIASTES) by James T. Robinson [Études sur le Judaïsme Médiéval, Karaite Texts and Studies, Brill, 9789004191341]

Salmon b. Yeroham (fl. 930-960) – foundational figure in the Jerusalem school of Karaite exegesis – produced a substantial and influential corpus of polemical writing and biblical interpretation, including commentaries on Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Lamentations, Qohelet, Esther, Ruth, and Daniel. **ASCETICISM, ESCHATOLOGY, OPPOSITION TO PHILOSOPHY: THE ARABIC TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF SALMON BEN YEROHAM ON QOHELET (ECCLESIASTES)** presents a first critical edition of the Judaeo-Arabic Qohelet commentary together with an annotated English translation. The introduction situates Salmon's work in the history of Jewish Qohelet exegesis, explains Salmon's method of translating Qohelet into Arabic, identifies his sources and discusses his method of interpretation. The main themes Salmon finds in "Solomon's" book of wisdom – central themes in the early Karaite movement in general – will be explored at length, especially asceticism, eschatology, and an uncompromising opposition to reading "foreign books."

Review

"Robinson's edition is exemplary...This volume is an important addition to any collection of Karaitica, medieval Jewish biblical exegesis and Judeo-Arabic studies." -Pinchas Roth, Tikvah Scholar at the NYU Tikvah Center

CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgements

A Few Remarks on Format

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter One. Qohelet in Karaism

Chapter Two. On Salmon's Arabic Translation of Qohelet
Chapter Three. Sources and Use of Sources
Chapter Four. Methods and Approaches
Chapter Five. Main Themes: Asceticism, Eschatology, Opposition to Philosophy
Chapter Six. Description of the Manuscripts and Method of Editing .
Chapter Seven. Remarks on the English Translation
PART II
SALMON B. YERO 'HAM'S COMMENTARY ON QOHELET CRITICAL EDITION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Qohelet I-Qohelet I2
Bibliography
Index Locorum
Index of Medieval Authors
General Index

This is a very different book than the one I set out to write three years ago. The original plan was a single-volume history of medieval Jewish Qohelet commentaries that would update, expand, and supplant the pioneering survey of C.D. Ginsberg. But the more I worked on the different stages of this history, the more the book divided into separate units: first into a series of volumes organized by tradition—the Karaites, Spanish Peshat, French Peshat, the Philosophers, the Kabbalists, and the late medieval and early Renaissance commentaries; and then, when I realized that there is just too much basic research still to be done: that there are too many texts still languishing in manuscript, that we lack a complete foundation for writing such a history, I settled on a much larger project—a book-by-book, commentary-by-commentary study of the history of Qohelet exegesis, a serial history which will lay the groundwork for a synthetic study of the commentaries on and reception of a very difficult, always challenging, usually controversial, ever appealing biblical text: “Solomon’s” Book of Ecclesiastes.

The groundwork for this history was, in many ways, already laid in my dissertation-book on Samuel Ibn Tibbon.³ This present volume can be considered the second in the series. In terms of chronology, however, Salmon ben Yero ^ham’s commentary comes first: it is the earliest Jewish commentary on Qohelet that has come down to us. To follow will be a book dedicated to Yefet b. #Eli (to be published in *Karaite Texts and Studies*), then separate volumes on David b. Boaz, Isaac Ibn Ghiyath, Abdal-Barakát al-Baghdádī, Isaac Ibn Latif, Tan ^hum ha-Yerushalmi, and Immanuel of Rome—for starters. Each volume will give the opportunity to explore the commentary in exegetical, social, cultural, literary, and intellectual context. The goal is a “total” history of exegesis (though never possible, always worth aspiring to), exploring each commentary in relation to the biblical text it is commenting on, the history of the biblical book’s reception, and the intellectual world of the commentator that made possible his exegesis of it.

Qohelet In Karaism

All the words of Sulaymán in this book lead to the proclaiming of divine unity, to acting with obedience and doing good work, to the teaching of reward and punishment, and to the renunciation of this world. -Salmon b. Yero^ham, commentary on Qoh 3:11'

Sulaymán the sage adds here warning and threat regarding the desire for foreign books, saying: “More than these my son beware” (Qoh 12:12)—that is, beware lest you come to desire books other than the revealed holy books ... We learn that any speculation in and occupation with any book other than the books of the prophets is forbidden for Israel, for it leads to the beliefs of the Gentiles. -Salmon b. Yero ^ham, commentary on Qoh 12:122

The “Middle Ages” in Jewish history began not with the Fall of Rome in the fourth century but with the rise and spread of Islam in the seventh and eighth. The Islamic conquests of Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, North Africa and Spain completely changed the political landscape of world Jewry, as suddenly the majority of Jews throughout the world were living under Muslim rule. Jews were no longer subject to the policies of the Romans, Persians, Byzantines, and Christians. Instead they were allowed relative autonomy under Muslim leaders. This shift in political power also changed Judaism’s relationship with Christianity since both Jews and Christians were minorities ruled by Islam. They were equally “peoples of the book” subject to the same restrictive legislation.

In literary and cultural history an epochal change took place one century later. Up until the ninth century most of Jewish literature was still very much in continuity with Rabbinic Judaism as it had developed in late antiquity. Writing took place in Hebrew or Aramaic, and communities throughout the Islamic world looked to the Talmudic Academies in the East for legal and religious guidance. In the ninth century, and especially in the tenth, this continuity was broken. Arabic displaced Aramaic and Hebrew as the primary language of Jewish culture, new forms and methods of writing—often very individualistic and untraditional—developed, and Karaism, a Biblicist movement, emerged as a rival to the Rabbinic establishment. It seems that the Karaites were the first Jews to adopt Arabic as the primary language of discourse and the first to cultivate the new genres and approaches to traditional texts, including systematic Biblical commentary, which appears for the first time at precisely this time.

Among the many Karaite contributions to Jewish thought and literature during this formative transitional period was a unique and distinctive interpretation of Qohelet—a “contemptus mundi” reading, to borrow a term applied to early Christian commentaries. The Karaites saw “Sulaymán’s” book of wisdom as encapsulating many of the movement’s core ideas and aspirations. They considered it a theological primer teaching divine unity, creation ex nihilo, suffering in this world and otherworldly justice; an ethical manual inculcating pious resignation and ascetic renunciation; and—perhaps more than anything—a curricular guide promoting utter distaste for anything other than the Bible, the only Book worth reading. By the end of the tenth century, Qohelet was one of Karaism’s central texts, as reflected by the fact that at least five Karaite commentaries had been written on it: by Benjamin al-Naháwāndī, Ya`qúb al-Qirqisánī, Salmon b. Yero[^]ham, Yefet b. `Eli, and David b. Boaz. In contrast, the first Rabbanite commentary was not written until the eleventh-century in Spain by Isaac ibn Ghiyath.

The goal of this chapter is to set out the background relating to the emergence of Karaism in general and the Karaite reading of Qohelet in particular. The various views about the origins and early development of the movement will be surveyed briefly and the main figures introduced before turning to the commentaries produced during the “golden age.” Attention will also be given to secondary use of Qohelet in Karaite writings—in works of grammar, lexicography, polemics, and theology. In the following chapters Salmon b. Yero[^]ham’s commentary will be the primary focus of our investigation. Here in this chapter Salmon’s work will be situated in a much larger historical and literary context.

In Antiquity, translation played an important role in liturgy, popular instruction, and exegesis. The Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Georgian, Coptic, Ethiopic and Latin translations of the Bible laid the foundations for the emerging Christian cultures of the Near East, whereas the Aramaic Targumim served the Rabbinic communities in Palestine and Babylonia. With the rise of Islam and the general assimilation of non-Muslims into the Arabic-Islamic world, translation of Scripture became a subject of great concern once again during the Middle Ages. Christians, Samaritans, Rabbanites and Karaites all produced different, sometimes competing translations of the Bible into Arabic.

Within these different communities, most attention was given to the Torah, the central text of the religious cult. But the other Biblical books were translated as well, often several times. This is certainly true of Qohelet. Assuming that the commentaries by Dáwid al-Muqammi^{ʿs} and Ya`q^ʿb al-Qirqisán^ī included translations, Qohelet was rendered into Arabic no less than eight different times during a period of about two hundred years: by Dáw^ʿd al-Muqammi^{ʿs}, Ya`q^ʿb al-Qirqisán^ī, Salmon b. Yero^ʿham, Yefet b. `Eli, David b. Boaz, Anonymous (Brit. Lib. Or. 2552; IMHM 6329), along with the two Rabbanite exegetes Isaac ibn Ghiyath and Ab^ʿal-Barakát al-Baghdád^ī. Among other things this means that Salmon's translation is the earliest Judaeo-Arabic rendering of Qohelet that currently survives. For this reason alone it deserves special attention.

The Karaite translations of the Torah have received full monograph treatment by Meira Polliack. Through careful linguistic, literary and historical study of the surviving translations by the Jerusalem Karaites Yefet b. `Eli, David b. Boaz, Yeshu^ʿah b. Yehudah, #Al^ī b. Sulaymán, and Anonymous, in comparison with the Rabbanite translation by Saadia Gaon, she has shown that the competing traditions developed very different approaches to rendering the Torah into Arabic. The Jerusalem Karaites were hyper-literal in their approach, sometimes creating a very artificial translation language which imitated the original Hebrew. In contrast, Saadia translated much more idiomatically and aimed toward consistency with classical Arabic usage. To say it in a slightly different way: The Jerusalem Karaites privileged the source text and source language over the target text and target language; they forced Arabic to accommodate the peculiar needs of Biblical Hebrew; they brought the target reader to the source text and not vice versa. Saadia did just the opposite: he adapted Biblical Hebrew to Arabic thus producing a readable target text; he made readability and accessibility in Arabic the primary goal; he brought the source text to the target reader and not vice versa.

Salmon b. Yero^ʿham, who produced the first known translations in the Jerusalem Karaite tradition, represents an intermediate position.¹ In general he translates Qohelet literally, even hyper-literally: He translates word-for-word, reproduces the Hebrew word order even when awkward in Arabic, and prefers to translate with Arabic cognates and lexical equivalents. Yet he often abandons the literal approach, varying his word choice and changing word order, introducing unstated referents, paraphrasing and providing alternative translations, expanding the text in order to solve a textual problem or eliminate an impious interpretation, and changing the text to fit standard Arabic usage. The result is a translation that is literal yet readable; and which, more important than anything, works closely with the commentary, supporting and representing, really mirroring the interpretive work of the commentator. In other words, the translation is not simply a hyper-literal rendering to work off of or against, a starting point or background against which the exegete can show his work. It is very much a part of the interpretive process itself; it is an integral part of the commentary.

Throughout the notes to the English translation in Part II, I provide specific discussion of Salmon's translation technique with reference to M. Polliack's book and other sources; I include remarks about terminology, grammar and syntax, alternative translations, pious interpolations, and comparisons with the other Arabic translations. Here in this chapter, in order to introduce Salmon's Arabic translation of Qohelet more generally, the focus will be on the verses in Qohelet which include Salmon's explicit remarks about his translation. There are more than twenty such comments which cover a range of subjects and reveal much about the translator's sources, methods, and ideals, from his reflections on translating prepositions and particles to the rendering of figures of speech and euphemisms. A selection of these remarks will be presented with a view to bringing out the relationship between translation and interpretation, that is, to highlighting the interpretive repercussions of the translator's choice of one word or phrase over another. To provide some contrast Salmon's translation will be given together with the King James Version (KJV, 1611). I will occasionally refer to the later Arabic translations mentioned above as well, also for comparative purposes: to identify continuity and show contrast. <>

CREATION: THE STORY OF BEGINNINGS by Jonathan Grossman, translated by Sara Daniel [The Noam Series, The Michael Scharf Publication Trust of Yeshiva University Press, Maggid Books, 9781592645039]

In **CREATION: THE STORY OF BEGINNINGS**, Jonathan Grossman unveils the hidden meaning of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. His insightful and creative literary analysis interweaves theology, psychology, and philosophy, extracting a fresh and refreshing understanding of the biblical text. Drawing upon the words of the sages and the great medieval commentators, and employing contemporary literary tools, Grossman journeys back to the beginning of creation to show how human initiative goes hand in hand with both sin and progress. This volume is part of the Maggid Tanakh Companion series and is published in partnership with YU Press.

CONTENTS

Foreword

Preface

Introduction

The Creation: Humanity and Nature (1:1-2:3)

Growing Up in Eden (Chs. 2-3)

Cain and Abel: Seeds of Hatred, Seeds of Exile (Ch. 4)

The Family of Cain and the Line of Seth (4:17-5:32)

Sons of God and Daughters of Man: On Flesh and Spirit (6:1-4)

The Flood: Destruction and Re-Creation (6:5-9:7)

The Covenant of the Rainbow: Growth and Fulfillment (9:8-17) .

Noah's Vineyard: Family Curse and National Blessing (9:18-29)

The Dispersal of the Nations: Three Families, Seventy Nations (Ch. 10)

The Tower of Babel: Technology and Imperialism (11:1-9)

From Noah to Abraham: Ten Generations (11:10-21)

Bibliography

Excerpt: In Jewish tradition, peshat or "plain sense" exegesis is often regarded as a gold standard for interpreting the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Much ink has been spilled defining peshat exegesis. By now it is clear that peshat is not simply "the literal sense." After all, the Bible — like any literary work — often employs figurative language. Is peshat the "original intention"? Is it the way the text was understood by its original audience? Is it the sense determined through philological analysis? How does peshat relate to midrash? These questions can hardly be answered in this context. Yet they are relevant to consider when reading Jonathan Grossman's *Creation: The Story of Beginnings*, which to my mind illustrates the potential richness of peshat interpretation in a contemporary setting. Firmly rooted in the multi-faceted tradition of parshanut hamikra (Jewish Bible interpretation), this work also engages fully with modern scholarship while opening new avenues in understanding the cultural-religious significance of the Hebrew Bible. Through Grossman's insightful and often creative literary analysis, we are made to appreciate ethical and theological dimensions of the first eleven chapters of the Torah in the spirit of "the way of peshat" prized in Jewish tradition.

For some readers it may be surprising to associate peshat with theology, ethics, or even contemporary applications of the ancient text of Scripture. It may also seem unusual to characterize peshat as a creative form of interpretation. All of these are features typically associated with midrash. Indeed, Jonah Fraenkel, a contemporary scholar of rabbinic literature, avers that peshat is a type of interpretation largely devoid of creativity since it aims to reveal only the original meaning of the Bible. On the other hand, derash or darshanut is innovative by definition, as it connects Scripture to new ideas with contemporary religious relevance. As noted by James Kugel, the Rabbis of the

midrash did not view the Bible as a book of history, but rather a "Book of Instruction" for readers in all ages, teaching them how to behave and think — in ways not necessarily connected to the original meaning.

Yet recent scholarship of the tradition of Jewish interpretation has shown that there are seventy faces to peshat — which, in fact, calls for exegetical creativity and innovation. The great pashtan Rashbam reports that his grandfather Rashi was revolutionary in introducing a peshat program within Ashkenazic learning. More importantly, Rashi also acknowledged "the peshat interpretations that newly emerge every day" (*hapeshatot hamithadeshim bekhoy yom*) — further interpretive innovations within his circle of students and beyond. (See Rashbam's commentary on Genesis 37:2.) As Rashbam, and perhaps even Rashi before him, came to learn, other schools of peshat interpretation had already emerged in faraway centers of Jewish learning in the Muslim East, in Spain, and in the Byzantine orbit. The multiplicity of peshat rather than its singularity was already evident in the formative medieval period — and continues to this day.

Indeed, modern critical theory questions the very notion that "the text itself" ever has a singular meaning. As the British literary critic Frank Kermode has remarked, "the plain sense ... must be of the here and now rather than of the origin," since "the body of presuppositions which determines our notions of the plain sense is always changing." The plain sense thus depends on the imaginative activity of interpreters who provide Scripture with a variety of contexts, some imposed by authority and tradition, others by the need to make sense of the ancient text in a different world ("The Plain Sense of Things," *Midrash and Literature*, ed. G. H. Hartman and S. Budick [New Haven 1986], 190-191). While peshat exegesis aims, in some sense, to illuminate an original meaning, it also necessarily bridges chronological and cultural gaps between the Bible and its readers.

Both the classical tradition of Jewish peshat interpretation and modern critical theory inform Jonathan Grossman's *Creation: The Story of Beginnings*. This rich and highly learned volume also incorporates midrashic material, modern Bible scholarship, and contemporary Jewish thought. Grossman extracts new meaning from the biblical text, drawing upon the words of the sages and the great medieval commentators, such as Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides, both of whom recognized the symbolic dimensions of the opening chapters of Genesis. Grossman lays the theoretical groundwork for his readings of Genesis 1—11 by discussing the representational nature of the Creation, Eden, and Flood narratives, which "depict ... the raw materials, the basic elements, of our familiar world as they come into being." In the opening chapters of Genesis, as Grossman observes, we witness "a world where primal boundaries have not yet been stabilized, where giants walk and terrorize all around." These chapters are "the stuff of myth and legend, of a wild prehistorical age, where heaven seeps into earth, and men live for centuries alongside giants. The world has not yet been tamed into the familiar, natural, mostly realistic setting of the rest of the Bible." Maimonides advanced this sort of approach in the twelfth century, drawing upon rabbinic learning and Greco-Arabic philosophical and literary conceptions; Grossman offers a twenty-first-century account using the tools made available by contemporary scholarship and the rich Jewish tradition.

According to Grossman's reading, the opening narratives of Genesis depict humanity gradually achieving independence from God — a theme that continues throughout the Book of Genesis, as Grossman himself has argued in earlier published works. While the lineage of Abraham becomes the focus of Genesis from chapter 12 onward, its first chapters "are universal stories, and there is therefore room for comparison between biblical etiology and parallel stories from the ancient Near East that depict the creation of the world and humanity." Within these stories Grossman finds universal messages in the Bible relevant for all of humanity.

A fine example of Grossman's insightful reading of the biblical narrative relates to the Garden of Eden episode, which endows the familiar story with new meaning through literary-structural analysis.

According to Grossman, it is a "story of autonomy achieved by rebellion," through which every person stakes his or her own path, becoming "aware of his or her own body and its mortality." Grossman cites Sigmund Freud, who describes how an individual achieves freedom from the authority of his parents at the cost of the pain of independence. Within this reading, the serpent represents an internal voice aroused within mankind — bringing him out of the innocence of childhood into turbulent adolescence. Placed at the Tree of Knowledge, the serpent invites Eve to become "like God, knowing Good and Evil." Were it not for the serpent, Eve would not have even taken notice of the forbidden tree. The serpent induces her to perceive its bold, bright colors — and succumb to their temptation.

Adam and Eve believed that rebelling against God by eating the forbidden fruit would bring them independence, autonomy, and control over their own lives. Their punishments, however, reveal the harsh truth adolescents inevitably learn as they become adults: freedom comes at the cost of the heavy — sometimes even crushing — burden of adult responsibilities. Rebellion leads to a new sort of enslavement, not the absolute liberation initially imagined. Informed by the perspective of modern psychology, Grossman offers the following paraphrase of the biblical text:

Woman will long for man, and he will rule over her; man will toil away at the earth, and reap in sorrow for the rest of his life. Woman's freedom is handed over to others; man no longer controls the ground that he must work and keep, and it will bring forth thorns and thistles along with man's hard-earned bread. The serpent's promise of godlike power and freedom is eclipsed by the daily struggle of survival this freedom exacts.

And as Grossman concludes:

In this narrative, maturity is presented as a painful process.... Knowledge comes at a heavy price, shattering the child's world of blissful ignorance. The rebellious teenager leads himself to a world tainted with sin and burdened with toil, but the ground is waiting for him, waiting for him to break the crust of the soil and tease out its fruits....

In this way, the Garden of Eden plays a dual role in the narrative: it is a physical site, the source of four mighty rivers and the setting of humanity's first drama, but it also functions as a symbolic site that every person passes through over the course of his or her development.

Grossman here echoes Nahmanides, who wrote that "the Garden of Eden exists somewhere in this world," along with "the four rivers and the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge," since "everything appearing in Scripture in the Creation section is true in its literal sense." Yet Nahmanides goes on to say that "the matters are twofold in meaning": they "all are literal (*kemashma ám*) ... true and firmly established, but also are written to convey a wondrous mystery (*sod*)" (*Kitvei Ramban*, Chavel ed., 11:295-297). Nahmanides in the thirteenth century evinced the symbolic meaning of the Creation narrative through Kabbalah. Grossman does so using tools provided by contemporary scholarship and thought — both Jewish and non-Jewish.

The serpent in the Garden has long been identified with the "evil inclination" (*yetzer hara*) in Jewish (and Christian) tradition. Grossman's nuanced reading of this myth-like creature is based more directly on Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaKohen Kook's depiction of the "evil inclination hidden deep in the depths of the soul" as "a bone-rotting envy that drenches any hint of light in dismal darkness." This "is envy of God," as "humanity envies God for His infinite joy, His absolute perfection. This envy," continues Rabbi Kook, "distorts reason and plunges sense into darkness.... It results in utter heresy" (*Shemona Kevatzim*, 1:129). Grossman takes this "heresy" as a reference to Nietzsche, for whom the ideal man (*Übermensch*; "over-man" or "super-man") must break the shackles of religion, effectively replacing God. Yet Rabbi Kook's characterization implies a spark of light in this darkness,

since the desire to be "like God" is a creative force that at once is the source of rebellion and idealism. As Grossman writes:

Reality and Symbolism

Everything follows its beginning," quotes Rabbi Haim Vital in the name of Rabbi Isaac Luria, the Ari, and even without delving into deep kabbalistic secrets, we intuitively feel its truth in many realms of our lives. The root of something reveals much about its nature, and exposing its point of origin often illuminates its entire process. This is certainly true when we shift our gaze to how the world came into being, indeed how being itself began. These primeval narratives reveal the nature of the world and its purpose, and the nature of humanity and man's role in the world. At the same time, they reveal those first primordial conflicts and failures that are imprinted deep, deep within the world's formation and being.

The primordial nature of these narratives affects their style and design. The first eleven chapters of Genesis are clearly distinct from the rest of Genesis and the Bible as a whole, in regard to their content, style, and atmosphere. Beginning with God's revelation to Abraham in chapter ii, the narrative takes on the classic biblical historical style. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are realistic, fleshed-out characters, whose lives resemble the paths our own lives take. While most of us, of course, are not approached by God, or even while the sages made various attempts to identify the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge as actual species, suggesting that the forbidden fruit was either the citron, the fig, wheat, or grapes, the most straightforward reading is that of Ibn Ezra:

Many hold that the Tree of Knowledge was a fig tree, as they "sewed fig leaves." However, if this was so, it would have read this way: "And they sewed the leaves of the Tree of Knowledge." Many also say that it was wheat. I believe that these two trees were inside the Garden of Eden, and cannot be found anywhere else on earth.

As we will see below, Ibn Ezra is generally wary of charging the text with symbolism, but his approach towards the Tree applies to the wider context of the story, which is painted in the bold, bright colors of ancient myth. This is a vastly different palette than the realistic shades of the rest of the Bible.

This is true not only of the Eden narrative, but of the rest of the stories in this section. The Creation narrative depicts the raw materials, the basic elements, of our familiar world as they come into being; the Flood narrative paints a world immersed in primal waters, a world where primal boundaries have not yet been stabilized, where giants walk and terrorize all around. This is the stuff of myth and legend, of a wild prehistorical age, where heaven seeps into earth,

visited by angels, such interactions are a normal part of the biblical narrative, and they are an integral part of the more routine aspects of the forefathers' lives, such as birth, marriage, and death. This kind of biblical realism is not present in Genesis 1-11. These narratives present an entirely different biblical reality. For example, when the serpent opens up its mouth and speaks to the woman in the Garden of Eden, she is not surprised, and casually responds. In contrast, when Balaam is addressed by his donkey, the narrator explains that this is a miracle, that "God opened up its mouth," and Balaam recoils in shock, just as we would if we were to witness it ourselves. The serpent's capacity for speech, however, seems part of life in Eden, and loss of speech is not mentioned as part of its punishment, which implies that the text views its uncanny ability to speak as nothing unusual.

Nahmanides notes this phenomenon and views it as proof that the serpent is also a symbol of something mystical:

Know, believe, that the Garden of Eden is within the Land, and so is the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, and from there the river flowed out and separated into four rivers we are familiar with, for the Euphrates is in our own land and within-our own borders, and the Pishon is the Nile of Egypt, as the sages say. But while they are on earth, they all have heavenly counterparts, which are their elemental counterpart, as it says, "Let the king bring me into his chamber".... These are the chambers of Eden, from here they said, the work of the heavens is like the work of the Garden of Eden (Song of Songs Zuta 1:4). The rivers are parallel to the four heavenly camps, from where the powers of earthly rule are drawn ... and the serpent does not have the power of speech today, and if it had in the first place it disappeared with its curse, for it was the fiercest curse of all! But all these are double entities, truly revealed and secret together.

Nahmanides emphasizes that not only can the serpent be read as a mystic symbol, but also the rivers, and the entire narrative. and men live for centuries alongside giants. The world has not yet been tamed into the familiar, natural, mostly realistic setting of the rest of the Bible.

This does not mean, of course, that the first chapters of Genesis are tantamount to the myths of the ancient world. In fact, a comparison with myths from other cultures reveals yawning disparities, not only in content but in moral and theological premise and atmosphere.' Yet, these first stories should be read as a unique biblical genre in themselves, as stories that predate and illuminate familiar history, its premises, and its purpose.

This paradigm has several implications. I especially wish to focus on the question of interpreting these stories as vehicles of symbolic meaning. This substantial question can be applied generally to the rest of the Bible as well: When should something be read as a symbol for a more abstract concept?

This question is exemplified in a fascinating midrashic debate about the Burning Bush, in the form of a dialogue between R. Yehoshua b. Karha and "a certain non Jew":

A certain non Jew asked R. Yehoshua b. Karha, "Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, decide to speak to Moses from within a bush?"

He said to him, "Had it been from a carob or sycamore, you would have asked the same question. But as I cannot leave you without an answer, why from a bush? To teach you that there is nowhere without Divine Presence, even a bush:"

The fact that the Midrash places this question in the mouth of a non Jew undermines its legitimacy. R. Yehoshua's initial response cautions against loading symbolic meanings onto narrative elements. Yet his next statement is somewhat confusing. Why does he feel compelled to further answer him if he believes that the bush does not necessarily have symbolic meaning in itself? Moreover, his answer is a typical midrashic didactic answer, one without any show of contempt for the questioner. And strangest of all, this midrash is part of a series of midrashim where various sages ask the very same question as that non Jew and propose various answers, and the midrash itself goes on to list eight different explanations that charge the Burning Bush with symbolism. To cite just two of them:

- R. Yohanan: Just as the bush serves as a fence for a garden, Israel serves as a fence for the world.
- ^ Another option: Just as a bush can flourish only with water, Israel can flourish only with the Torah, which is called water, as it says [regarding the word of God], 'All who are thirsty, come to the water' (Is. 55:1).

The logical flow of this midrash, therefore, has a keen effect, where the initial impression is that this question lacks legitimacy, but is then swiftly echoed and thereby legitimized by Israel's own sages. While the question of when and whether narrative elements can be ascribed a symbolic meaning exceeds the scope of this discussion, in the context of Genesis 1—11, this issue has special weight. I

wish to recall Nahmanides' interpretation of the serpent in Eden in light of the polar debate between medieval commentators. Rabbi Obadiah Sforno begins his commentary of the Eden narrative with a declaration that the serpent is merely a metaphor:

The serpent is the devil, the evil inclination.... For some entities are described in ways that are similar to it, just like the king is called a "lion," as it says, "The lion has come up from its copse" (Jer. 4:7), and dangerous enemies are called "poisonous serpents," as it says, "I am about to unleash poisonous serpents against you" (Jer. 8:17). In the same way, the Omnipresent refers to the enticing Evil Inclination as a "serpent," because it is similar to the serpent, whose benefit is minimal and whose harm is great.

Following the sages, Sforno identifies the serpent with the devil, with the evil inclination. Note, however, that he is not merely claiming that the evil inclination is like a serpent. Rather, he considers the serpent an actual metapho, and its narrative a parable. Just as a king is referred to as a lion, or an enemy is likened to a snake, without any real lions or snakes involved, the evil inclination is referred to as a serpent in this narrative, without any actual serpents present in the scene. The advantage of this reading is that it easily justifies the serpent's human speech and intelligence, and the fact that it lures the woman to sin, since real serpents do not speak any human language, nor lure people to sin.

In contrast to Sforno, the Ibn Ezra writes:

Some say that the woman understood the language of animals ... while others said it is the devil. But then how can they explain the end of the scene? How will "the devil" crawl on his belly, and eat dust? And what is the point of the curse "He will strike your head"?... Rather, it seems to me that things are as they are, and the serpent originally walked upright, and He who made humans sentient beings also made it a sentient being. As the verse itself testifies, it was craftier than any other creature, just not as much as a human.

Ibn Ezra is opposed to the idea that the serpent is an embodiment of the evil inclination, and he supports his position with the fact that the actual serpent — the familiar snake that crawls on its belly and bites people — is cursed at the end of the story. Why would such a curse be relevant if the serpent were merely a symbol of the evil inclination?

This dispute is a good example of the deliberation that accompanies the reading of the Eden narrative, and the first eleven chapters of Genesis in general. Do the regular rules of allegory apply, or does the unique mythical nature of these narratives invite a reading more heavily inclined towards symbolic understanding? Even those who believe that the historical narratives (beginning with Abraham) should be read as historical accounts with minimal symbolic weight must admit that the question is more complex when applied to Genesis 1—11.

I believe that a certain compromise can be reached between Ibn Ezra and Sforno. Sforno is correct that these narratives have substantial metaphorical weight; the creation account is not merely a historical event, but reflects a fundamental approach to reality. We will yet explore how the story of Eden takes place in every generation, within every individual. From this perspective, it is an archetypal narrative that certainly tends towards the allegorical. Yet these primeval stories are not merely theological allegory. If this were the case, its allegorical nature would presumably have been more obvious. And, with the exception of the Eden narrative, there are no scenes of a fantastical nature. These narratives function on the premise that they actually took place.

The solution lies in a simple semantic substitution with great implications: rather than the term "parable" or "allegory," the appropriate term to use is "symbol." Unlike a parable, which dissipates with interpretation, the literary symbol remains substantial, adding another layer of significance on top of the literal meaning of the text. To claim that the Burning Bush is a symbol does not negate its actual existence — its leaves and branches, its color and shape, its form. It only means that this bush, beyond its botanical existence, also represents certain abstract ideas. The same is true of the first

eleven chapters of Genesis. To paraphrase the aforementioned words of Nahmanides, while these narratives take place on earth, they also have heavenly counterparts. Each historical event, and each element of these narratives, express certain abstract concepts as well.

One of the boldest philosophers in this context is Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaKohen Kook. Discussing the relationship between the biblical narratives and parallel stories from the ancient Near East, he writes that they should be considered symbolic ideas more than actual historical events. As he responds to Dr. Moshe Seidel, who often consulted with him about philosophical and ideological issues:

In regard to this, I believe that anyone with proper sense should know that even if there is no truth whatsoever in [the new studies about the formation of the biblical text], there is no need to deny their actual questions, because it is not the Torah's purpose to relate simple facts and events that took place. The main part is its content, its inner reflection about its ideas, and this can be elevated yet further wherever there is an apparent contradiction we are encouraged to overcome. Most of these ideas have already been stated by the medieval commentaries, and above all in Guide for the Perplexed, and today we are prepared to develop these ideas further.

It makes no difference whether there was an actual golden age when humankind exulted in all the physical and spiritual goodness, or whether reality began from the bottom, from the lowest level of being and continually rises. All we need to know is that there is the ultimate possibility that humanity, even if it reaches utter greatness, can lose everything if its ways are corrupt, and can bring evil upon itself and many generations that follow, and this is what we can learn from the reality of humankind in the Garden of Eden, its sin, and its expulsion.

The understanding that the genre of these stories is close to myth shapes our reading, and may also influence the interpretation of specific verses. An apt example is the definition of "day" in the creation narrative. John Day, a noted Bible scholar, challenges the claim that the creation narrative is merely symbolic:

Moreover, the text clearly speaks of creation in seven, or rather six, days, and since each day has an evening and a morning it is hardly plausible that we should interpret the days as geological periods, as some apologists have sometimes supposed.

However, while he is correct that the first narrative in the Torah is a description of actual events rather than a mere parable, his claim that each day represents a regular twenty-four-hour period is misguided. If this narrative were part of the historical narrative of Genesis ii and on, he would be correct. There is no justification for interpreting, "Be prepared for the third day, for on the third day the Lord will descend before all the eyes of the people upon Mount Sinai" (Ex. 19:11), as a symbol for three stages of preparation before the revelation at Sinai. Here, three days means three days. Even if these three days have further symbolic meaning, their primary meaning is a simple chronological description. Given that the creation narrative is rooted in the symbolic sphere, however, each "day" may well be a stage in the process of the "six days of creation" leading up to the Sabbath, without necessarily entailing the actual passing of time. I concur with the reading that each "day" marks a certain "peri^d." This is certainly supported by the fact that three "days" pass before the creation of the celestial bodies that dictate Earth's diurnal course. While day and night are defined on the first day, with the creation of light, the passing of each day is described with the phrase "And there was evening (erev) and there was morning (boker)," words that denote the movement of the setting sun (maariva) marking the onset of night, and the rising sun lighting up the dawn. How can these phrases have literal meaning before the creation of the sun and moon?

We will yet discuss the significance of a week of days leading up to the Sabbath. The week necessarily consists of days, but this does not of necessity mean that the sky was created in twenty-

four hours, on the second day of creation. What is important is to distinguish between various stages of creation and to define them as "days" that comprise a "week," as a chronological paradigm to perpetually recall how the world came into being.

This example, of course, is but a window into the vast sea of deliberations that accompany these chapters. On one hand, the Tree of Life certainly functions as a symbol, but on the other hand, the shame of nakedness is real, as are the clothes that cover it up. Our task is to navigate these stories by walking the fine line between symbol and reality, which is to appreciate the symbolic interpretation as a convenient, sometimes obvious solution, while recognizing the historic reality that the narrative seeks to illuminate. The boundary between symbol and reality is diaphanous, and we will flit back and forth as we attempt to explain reality and, at the same time, give it meaning.

Is Genesis I-II an Independent Unit?

In order to focus on these chapters, we must first assume that they form a distinct, cohesive section. Unlike the Abraham cycle or the Jacob cycle, which each revolve around a single protagonist and are thus easily defined, Genesis I—II rushes through the first two millennia of world history, with no single central character or narrative, yet everyone who divides up the book of Genesis defines the first eleven chapters as a separate section. This is undoubtedly related to their unique character, the prehistorical atmosphere that ends with the birth of Abraham. This section, therefore, can be seen as an introduction to Abraham, or as an introduction to national history.

The definition of this section as an independent unit does not negate profound connections between this unit and the rest of Genesis. On the contrary, it leads up to the Abraham cycle and the ancestral cycles that follow with perfect continuity. This is generated, first and foremost, through chronological synthesis, with chapter II ending with the birth of Abraham. Other factors also contribute to this unit's cohesion within the rest of Genesis, despite its distinct character. I wish to point out several components that will inform our discussion throughout the rest of this book.

Theological development: I will propose that a process connected to character development and divine providence unfolds throughout Genesis. From this perspective, the first eleven chapters of the book are an integral part of this process. In these first narratives, we see humanity gradually achieving independence, something that continues to be developed throughout Genesis. This idea also has implications for the inner process of chapters I—II and its literary structure: a contingency plan. While not strictly ideal, this new plan was more successful given the circumstances.

Although simple, this idea is also unspeakably audacious, with two extreme theological implications for the biblical approach towards God's relationship with the world. The first touches upon the issue of free choice as a meta-principle in biblical thought. The second asks: why is the world so far from ideal?

Above all, the basic idea of a failed first creation that requires the Creator to renew the world differently teaches about the biblical emphasis on free choice. Time and again, the premise of these narratives will be that it is up to humans to determine the course of the future. This is salient through the contrast between chapter I and chapter 2. In chapter I, God speaks and the world becomes; "Let there be light" instantly produces light. The success of creation is constantly reiterated in the refrain, "And God saw that it was good." What a painful disparity there is between this divine refrain and the second creation and its aftermath, when divine command cannot determine the course of human action. Human beings have free will, and they do not always act in accordance with divine will. Adam and Eve eat from the forbidden fruit. God's words to Cain do not prevent Abel's subsequent murder. These decisions will affect the course of history. The genesis of the world unfolds through the tension between divine will and human will, to the extent that God regrets the course set by humanity and wipes out the world to begin anew.

The second principle that arises from the understanding that the world is not ideal is that history reflects a process, that history is not just a series of sporadic, coincidental, unconnected events. Rather, there is an ultimate purpose to the course of history, that gradually, painstakingly, reality will reach an ideal state, and that once-lost paradise will be regained. There is still a promise of utopia, of a divine garden where animals do not kill each other, where man and woman live in harmony. The parallel structure of Genesis 1—11 is not a chiasmic structure that reflects tragic, irreparable reversal, but a classic structure that often conveys a two-step process. The ideal state of the beginning of the first half is not negated; it is simply not yet fulfilled. In this way, Genesis 1—11 serves as an introduction to the entire Bible, as a blueprint for the course of history.

Repentance Preceded the World's Creation

In other words, reality is moving and evolving towards its point of origin. The world was created with Adam and Eve living in the Garden of Eden, without death, without suffering, with complete harmony between them and their surroundings. After their expulsion from the garden, and moreover, after the Flood, the human's relationship with the world changes. We will explore this change in human status at length, but for now, I will point out the most drastic change. After the Flood, Abraham is elected to lead the world back to its ideal state through God's name. This is not merely the election of a leader; this is a profound change in human order. After the Flood, nations are born, and the world evolves and develops through these nations.

This pattern of failure and a new path to tikkun is woven throughout Genesis 1—11. The Eden narrative revolves around this theme, where man and woman fail to meet Eden's standards and they must leave the garden, but the conclusion of the narrative hints that with the establishment of the Tabernacle and the cherubim, man will once again walk alongside God. The Tower of Babel narrative assumes that linguistic

diversity is the result of divine intervention, and a return to one universal language is also anticipated in messianic prophecies: "For then I will change the speech of the peoples to a pure speech, that all of them may call on the name of the Lord and serve Him with one accord" (Zeph. 3:9). After the Flood, the once-vegetarian world was divided into predators and prey, but there are messianic visions of a return to a world where animals are no longer eaten (see especially Is. 65:25). As we will see, the general sense that accompanies Abraham's election is despair of the old world and hope that change and rectification will transpire through Abraham and his covenant with God, that through Abraham, "all the families of the earth will be blessed" (12:3).

In light of this pattern, it emerges that the world is heading not to an unknown destiny, but back to its beginning. The optimistic vision of the future guides the world throughout history back towards its familiar primal origin. Similar to Plato's theory of forms, the shadow of Eden is imprinted upon the universal subconscious. The fact that the distant future is embedded within the distant past renders it possible, within reach. This is no wild apocalyptic vision without any relation to reality. On the contrary, redemption is rooted deep within the nucleus of reality. Similar to Franz Rosenzweig's idea that creation anticipates revelation and redemption, Genesis 1—11 contains the fruits of the ancient past that, in turn, bear the seeds of the imminent future.

Genesis and the Ancient Near East

Given that Genesis 1—11 describes the beginning of creation and the birth of humanity, its horizon transcends nationality. While the course of history depicted in the Bible gradually narrows its focus to the line of Abraham, its first chapters are universal stories, and there is therefore room for comparison between biblical etiology and parallel stories from the ancient Near East that depict the creation of the world and humanity.

Over half a century ago, one scholar coined the scholarly obsession of comparing biblical narratives to other narrative traditions as "parallelomania," and some noted that this "mania" was especially rampant in regard to Genesis 1—11. The perpetual scholarly search for comparisons between Genesis 1—11 and other Mesopotamian creation myths is often exaggerated. It is actually difficult to find legitimate parallels between the biblical creation account and the Babylonian creation epic Enuma Elish or other Babylonian myths. While the Egyptian creation myth is more closely related, the disparities remain significant, and only specific parallels can be justified. While other Mesopotamian myths share certain elements that are found in the Eden narrative (especially the Babylonian myth of Adapa, who refuses the food of immortality), such as the creation of humans from clay, these are specific motifs rather than grounds for comprehensive comparison. Such parallels with the story of Cain and Abel are very weak, and even though the Tower of Babel narrative has many Mesopotamian characteristics, there are no parallel plots to be found in Babylonian literature, only certain shared motifs.

The only biblical narrative with substantial Mesopotamian counterparts is the Flood narrative. The main elements of the plot can also be found in the story of Atrahasis, the Akkadian flood myth, and the story Utnapishtim tells Gilgamesh in the Epic of Gilgamesh. The scholarly consensus is that these flood myths spread from ancient Babylon towards the west during the Amarna period in the fourteenth century [^]CE. It thus makes sense that the Israelites were familiar with these myths before they heard the biblical account, and it thus makes sense to focus on the differences between these myths and the biblical version, and whether it contains any polemic subversion. Even given this fascinating premise, many have rightly commented that there are still substantial disparities between the biblical Flood narrative and other flood myths, both theologically and on the level of plot. The same holds true of the vast range of motifs and themes common to biblical narratives and other ancient traditions.

Again, with the exception of the Flood narrative, it is difficult to find ancient material that can substantially be compared to Genesis 1—11, and the most precise formulation of the connection between biblical narratives and other narratives from the ancient Near East may be that some central themes of Genesis [^]1—11 can also be found in other ancient myths of the beginning of the world and humanity. The premises of these stories, such as the assumption that the world was actually created, are common to many cultures, but these are alternate descriptions rather than works that sustain textual comparison. It is thus no wonder that some saw these parallels as evidence of a "common universal memory": "The proposal, however, is not of a common text or an original story or a cultural continuum, but rather a common universal memory."

Ray Kook wrote of these common motifs:

When the idea of prophecy is understood in its proper depth, we will also understand its relationship to science and knowledge... and thus we will find that many concepts in the Torah, both in the laws and the narratives, are certainly present in the works of the great leaders of the ancient nations.

Even if this is not a strictly literary parallel, and even if one text is not in intentional dialogue with another, the common motifs encourage exploration of their function in the biblical narrative based on their function in other ancient texts. In this way, we can point out how the biblical perspective differs from other prevalent perspectives in the ancient world. While I will discuss specific motifs in context, for now I wish to point

out the fundamental disparity between the premises of these ancient myths and those of Genesis 1—11. Many have pointed out that the idea of monotheism is the main biblical revolution, and the introduction of monotheism is certainly one of the salient themes throughout the Bible. Even if this

principle is not central in the patriarchal cycles, it is certainly a major idea championed throughout the rest of the Bible.

However, even more than monotheism, a completely new concept of divinity is presented in the biblical text. To quote Yehezkel Kaufmann's response to Preuss' claim that the Witoto tribe's belief in their god Naimuena is another example of early monotheism:

Naimuena is nothing but a pagan god in all respects. This god is the head of a pantheon, a god who was born..., this god dies and goes down to the underworld, and from there he sends forth water to fertilize the earth. He is associated with fertility. He makes the forest sprout up from his own saliva, and the trees and plants from his own urine.

This comment is crucial to the understanding of the biblical revolution. The essential difference between biblical divinity and pagan divinity is not a factor of how many gods rule in the world — one or many — but of an entirely different paradigm of the concept of divinity. In the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism, for example, it is believed that there are only two forces at play (Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu in the case of Zoroastrianism), but these two forces can also be considered as part of the general "pagan concept." According to Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda, while not actually created, is not fully omnipotent. That is, the existence of these gods are subject to external conditions, and they themselves form an essential part of life and the world. In contrast, the biblical God's unique nature is His essential being. He is extrinsic to the world and its rules.

The ancient world perceived their gods as part of reality, and this is evident in their creation myths. This is especially salient in Babylonian creation myths, where the heavens and earth are formed from the corpse of the defeated goddess Tiamat, and humankind is formed from the blood of Kingu, Tiamat's son, whose arteries are slashed to obtain his blood. In this sense, the gods were an almost physical presence in human life, and they are characterized as such. They quarrel and fight, they require sustenance, and they give birth. Similarly, the Babylonians believed that humans could turn into gods or demigods, that a state of divinity was achievable by man. This motif is a fundamental component of many ancient Mesopotamian myths, such as the myths of Tammuz, Lugalbanda, and Gilgamesh, who are all humans who became gods or demigods. This potential transition is even reflected in the Sumerian language, whose nouns are divided into two separate grammatical categories: one for gods and humans, and one for animals and inanimate objects.

Such fusions do not exist in the Bible. A person cannot become a god, and is never granted immortality. Even Moses, referred to as "the man of God," is only described so in the same verse that mentions his future death (Deut. 33:1). The only narrative that seems to allude to the blurring of boundaries between the human and the divine — the sons of God who take the daughters of man — ultimately retains the barrier between deity and mortal. On the contrary, it is this very episode which leads to the limitation of the human life span.

Characterization: God and Human

In Genesis 1—11, there is almost no penetration into the characters' thoughts. This is not surprising, given that it is also true of most of the biblical narrative. Here, however, not only are their thoughts and emotions concealed from the reader, but there is almost no direct speech. To prove this point, it suffices to present all the direct quotations from the four main human protagonists of this unit:

1. Adam: He names "woman" (2:23) and responds to God after he eats from the forbidden tree (3:10-12).
2. Eve: She responds to the serpent (3:2), to God after her sin (3:13), and names Cain and Seth (4:, 25).
3. Cain: He answers God after Abel's murder (4:9, 13-14).

4. Noah: He responds to his sons' actions by cursing Canaan and blessing Shem and Japheth (9:25-27).

Even considering the general paucity of speech in biblical narrative, the characters' silence in this section is extreme. Throughout three intense chapters, before, during, and after the Flood, Noah opens his mouth just once, only to promptly close it again and step off the biblical stage.

On the other hand, these chapters are not entirely devoid of speech, or even thoughts. The characters' silence is complemented by God's relative effusion. Creation is a series of divine statements, and in the Eden narrative, a full thirteen verses are God's direct speech. In the story of Cain, God makes two substantial speeches, the first after Cain's offering is rejected (4:6-7), and the second after Abel's murder (4:9-15). The contrast between God and the human characters is especially salient in the Flood narrative, when Noah silently obeys all of God's lengthy orders (6:13-21; 7:1—4; 8:15-17; 8:21; 9:1—7; 9:8-17). These narratives are full of God's speech to Himself and to others, including orders and punishments, blessings and curses, and promises and covenants. Yet, throughout these stories, His human audience is almost silent. The only narrative in which there is balance between human speech and divine speech is the story of the Tower of Babel. There, humans make two consecutive speeches in the brief, nine-verse narrative:

- And they said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks and burn them thoroughly" (11:3).
- And they said, "Come, let us build us a city and a tower whose top will reach heaven, and let us make a name for ourselves, lest we be scattered over the face of the whole earth" (11:4).

In contrast, God also makes two statements after He witnesses the construction of the city:

- And the Lord said, "Look, they are one people and with one language, and this is what they have begun to do. Now nothing they intend to do will be impossible for them" (11:6).
- "Come, let us go down and there confuse their language, so that they will not understand one another's language" (11:7).

The balance between human and divine speech here is logical, given that the main theme of this narrative is human language and communication. God's response is that humans will no longer be able to understand each other's language.

Given the ratio of divine speech to human speech in these chapters, it emerges that God is its main actor. This is true of other biblical narratives, but unlike those of a more historical nature, here the relationship between God and His world is based on a stark hierarchy of divine intervention in the world.

This premise is consistent with the theory I will develop below, namely, that over the course of the book of Genesis, divine providence evolves from a salient, active force to a subtle Hand that works behind the scenes. This is especially evident in the final episode of Genesis, the Joseph story.

And indeed, in the first eleven chapters of the book, God is wholly active. He brings the world into being and gives names to each creation, He plants a garden and walks about in the cool of the day, He refuses to accept Cain's offering but responds to him personally, He shuts the door of Noah's ark before unleashing the Flood upon the earth, He goes down to see the city of Babel under construction and muddles the workers' language. This overt intervention gradually winds down over the course of Genesis, with the most obvious cut-off line between Genesis 11 and the patriarchal cycles that begin in Genesis 12 (which sees a similar but more subtle process). This gradual change has profound theological significance for questions of God's relationship with the world and divine providence. It is no wonder, therefore, that Genesis 1—11 sees several episodes that are deeply

concerned with the boundaries between heaven and earth, such as God's concern that after eating from the forbidden fruit, humanity would indeed be "like God," or the allusions in the brief story of the sons of God intermingling with the daughters of man, or the divine interruption of the building of a "tower whose top reaches the heavens." At the same time, human characterization also undergoes a stark change between Genesis ii and the Abraham cycle. We know nothing about Adam and his life outside of Eden, we know very little about Cain, who murdered his brother, and despite almost four chapters describing the Flood and its aftermath, we hear Noah's voice only once. There is a rapid shift from human protagonist to human protagonist in the first eleven chapters of Genesis. In contrast, the Abraham cycle focuses fully on a single character, his family, and the events that befall him. This allows for developed characterization and identification with the protagonist. Moreover, it reflects interest in a particular human, interest both literary and theological. In the Abraham cycle, there are several episodes in which God plays no part at all (such as Lot's rescue from captivity in Genesis 14) and other narratives of a striking political-national nature (such as Abraham's covenant with Abimelech in ch. 21).

In parallel to the broader process of the book of Genesis, a similar process takes place over the course of chapters 1—11. God is obviously the sole player in the creation story of chapter 1; He alone invents reality and brings it into being. As we will see in our analysis of the Eden narrative (chs. 2-3), the central theme is humankind's "maturation," man and woman's transformation to autonomous beings who converse with God for the first time and even stray from His instructions. It is no coincidence that the serpent's temptation focuses on the illusion that man and woman can become "like God" by eating from the Tree of Knowledge (3:5).⁶⁷ In this sense, humanity achieves certain independence in the second story of Genesis. In the next generation, Cain takes initiative and offers up an offering to God from his own free will. This offering

is not ordered by God, but is a voluntary act that expresses independence and free moral choice. This initiative eventually leads to murder, which is an expression of the dangerous side of this free will. I will yet point out the profound connection between the story of Cain and the story of Eden. Beyond this connection, there is a crucial difference between Adam and Eve and their son Cain. Adam and Eve hang their heads and silently accept their punishment, while Cain speaks up and responds to God's decree. Whether his response should be understood as a solemn expression of regret, or as a complaint at the severity of his punishment, his reaction differs from that of his parents. His exchange with God after his sentence leads to a certain sign "so that no one who found him would kill him" (4:15). The Midrash draws attention to this disparity from another angle:

'And Cain went out from the Lord's presence.' From where did he go out?... R. Hama, in the name of R. Hanna son of R. Isaac said, "He went out happy, as it says, 'He is coming out to meet you, and when he sees you his heart will be glad— (Ex. 4:14). He met Adam, who said to him, "What was your decree?" He said to him, "I repented and made reconciliation:'

Adam slapped his own face, "Such is the power of repentance, and I had not known."

Humanity's role develops further by the end of Cain's line in chapter 4. There, the human is presented as the key to a complex cultural world of science and art, and at the end of the chapter, with the birth of Seth's dynasty, there is even religious development: "Then people began to call on the name of the Lord" (4:26). Even if, as some have noted, this description is in dialogue with Abraham's calling on the Lord's name (12:8), Abraham does so as a result of God's revelation to him, while the worship of Enosh's generation is presented as a voluntary human initiative. As we will see, these developments are complex, but in light of my current argument, this undoubtedly marks a new stage in human development and initiative.

While the precise identity of the "sons of God" in chapter 6 requires careful analysis, regardless of whether these beings are human or divine the story conveys a sense of violated boundaries, of upheaval and the loss of order.

If so, the world's development from creation, until the Flood that brings its destruction, sees the gradual rise of human independence. From being sheltered under the trees of God's garden, huddled under the wings of the Shekhina, eating from the Tree of Life, humanity begins its journey towards autonomy and independence. This autonomy gives rise to culture, art, science, and religion, but also to violence and destruction, for "the inclination of the human heart is evil from its youth" (8:21). As we will see in our analysis of the Flood narrative, the difference between the prediluvian world and the postdiluvian world hinges on this very point. After the Flood, humanity becomes God's partner in the world's re-creation, and its role changes in the world. While the crown, the privilege granted to humanity with creation, is taken away, there is hope and an expectation that the crown will be restored through human action and responsibility.

Genesis 1—11 reflects a complex process that unfolds in each individual unit and over the course of the entire section. It is not merely a "prelude" or an "introduction" to the book of Genesis. While it does lead up to the story of Abraham and the chosen people, it tells the story of the first attempt to build a world, of the distant past that anticipates the distant future. <>

BECOMING ELIJAH: PROPHET OF TRANSFORMATION

by Daniel C. Matt [Jewish Livesm, Yale University Press,
9780300242706]

The story of the prophet Elijah's transformation from fierce zealot to compassionate hero and cherished figure in Jewish tradition

"In a series on Jewish Lives, this volume is about the Jewish life—the one that goes on forever. *Becoming Elijah* blends meticulous scholarship with bold literary and poetic imagination. Don't miss it!"—Arthur Green, author of *Judaism for the World*

"The author's erudite prose and masterful command of history and faith traditions bring his subject to vibrant life. This is an edifying and accessible chronicle of a towering religious figure."—*Publishers Weekly*, starred review

In the Bible Elijah is a zealous prophet, attacking idolatry and injustice, championing God. He performs miracles, restoring life and calling down fire. When his earthly life ends, he vanishes in a whirlwind, carried off to heaven in a fiery chariot. Was this a spectacular death, or did Elijah escape death entirely? The latter view prevailed. Though residing in heaven, Elijah revisits earth—to help, rescue, enlighten, and eventually herald the Messiah. Because of his messianic role, Jews open the door for Elijah during each seder—the meal commemorating liberation from slavery and anticipating final redemption.

How did this zealot turn into a compassionate hero—apparently the most popular figure in Jewish tradition? *Becoming Elijah* explores this question, tracing how Elijah develops from the Bible to Rabbinic Judaism, Kabbalah, and Jewish ritual (as well as Christianity and Islam). His transformation is pertinent and inspirational for our polarized, fanatical world.

Review

"The author's erudite prose and masterful command of history and faith traditions bring his subject to vibrant life. This is an edifying and accessible chronicle of a towering religious figure."—*Publishers Weekly*, starred review

"A lucidly written religious biography/history that will appeal to readers of all faith traditions."—*Kirkus Reviews*

"In a series on Jewish Lives, this volume is about *the* Jewish life—the one that goes on forever. *Becoming Elijah* blends meticulous scholarship with bold literary and poetic imagination. Don't miss it!"—Arthur Green, author of *Judaism for the World*

"*Becoming Elijah* is a work of rare intellectual and spiritual depth. With erudition, Daniel Matt captures the unique role Elijah has played in the Western religious imagination and demonstrates how this prophet continues to inspire millions of spiritual seekers today!"—David Ellenson, Brandeis University

"A jewel of scholarship and poetic imagination, this lucid and beautifully crafted book highlights the tensions in Elijah's personality as it evolves from the biblical narratives through to its final, Hasidic reconfiguration."—Avivah Zornberg, author of *Moses*

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments,
Introduction I. ^ Have Been So Zealous for YHVH. Elijah in the Hebrew Bible,
2. The Compassionate Super-Rabbi: Elijah in the Talmud and Midrash,
3. Inspiring the Mystics: Elijah in the Kabbalah,
4. Elijah and the Daughters of Judaism,
5. Rituals of Anticipation,
6. Becoming Elijah,
Notes,
Bibliography,
General Index,
Index of Sources,

His electrifying name—Eliyyahu—means YHVH is my God." Many Hebrew names include a divine element, but Elijah has two, an excess of divinity. In the biblical book of Kings, he lives his intense name. A zealous devotee, he is enraged by the idolatrous worship of Baal and Asherah spreading through Israel, promoted by King Ahab and especially by Queen Jezebel and her cohort of prophets. He seeks to purge the Israelites of this taint and restore their faith in the one true God, bringing them back "beneath the wings of Shekhinah (the Divine Presence)."

Empowered by his intimacy with YHVH, Elijah confronts Ahab and declares a devastating drought. After several years, by silent prayer, Elijah finally brings rain, but only after he champions YHVH by vanquishing the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel, rousing throngs of Israelites to exclaim, YHVH, He is God; YHVH, He is God! (i Kings 18:39).

The biblical Elijah is a miracle worker, promising a starving widow that her jar of flour and jug of oil will be wondrously replenished for as long as she needs. Soon afterward, he revives the woman's lifeless child with divine help, after accusing God of having killed the boy. Twice he calls down fire from heaven: once to consume his sacrifice during the contest with the prophets of Baal, and later when he incinerates a hundred soldiers sent to apprehend him.

Immediately after defeating the false prophets on Mount Carmel, Elijah's zeal to extirpate idolatry impels him to slaughter them. Yet he can be zealous for human justice too, as when he condemns King Ahab to death for murdering an innocent man to expropriate his vineyard.

Elijah is fearless, fierce, and untamed—a hairy man, with a leather loincloth bound round his waist (2 Kings 1:8). The world, it seems, cannot bear him; finally, he is taken up to heaven in a chariot of fire. His ascent may have been a spectacular, supernatural death; but the scriptural account is ambiguous, leaving open the possibility that Elijah endures, living forever. If so, couldn't he return to earth? He frequently does so in rabbinic literature, Jewish folklore, and popular imagination. In this scenario, Elijah's disappearance from the world marks the beginning of a new career, in which he is transformed. His outstanding quality is no longer zealotry but compassion. He helps the poor, rescues those in danger, defends Israel from its enemies, and will one day redeem the whole world by heralding the Messiah.

Because of Elijah's messianic role, Jews open the door for him at each Passover seder—the ceremonial meal that commemorates the liberation from Egyptian slavery and includes the hope for ultimate redemption. Similarly, every Saturday night around the world, as the Sabbath departs, traditional Jews chant: "Eliyyahu ha-Navi (Elijah the prophet)! ... May he come to us speedily with the Messiah, son of David!"

Elijah follows the path of the archetypal hero: uncertain origins, trials and adventures, transformation, and return into the world. In his case, the fierce biblical zealot turns into the most beloved, cherished figure in Judaism. In the Israel Folktale Archives (fittingly located in Haifa on Mount Carmel, site of the prophet's triumph), there are more stories about Elijah than Moses, King Solomon, or anyone else. Over the centuries, the belief in his powers sustained the masses, while his inspiration enthused the mystics.

Whereas the biblical Elijah is a chastiser of Israel, the postbiblical Elijah is a benevolent savior. Undeniably, there are compassionate elements in his biblical personality and harsh elements in his later one, but it often seems there are two different Elijahs. What links them? Why does Elijah return to earth? How does the original figure become full-fledged?

To explore him we must begin, of course, with the biblical account. But how reliable is it? Some scholars contend that if he ever existed, Elijah was a charismatic holy man, purportedly able to bring rain, who lived in the time of King Ahab in the ninth century BCE. Gradually, legends were woven around him and then given literary form in the scriptural saga.

According to one view, the biblical tale of Elijah was composed to justify a coup against Ahab's son, King Jehoram, led by an army commander named Jehu. As the book of Kings records, Jehu assassinated Jehoram, had Jezebel thrown down from a window of her palace, and killed Ahab's descendants and then the prophets and followers of Baal. To legitimate this extermination, court scribes may have produced accounts of Elijah condemning Ahab and predicting Jehu's rise to power and his slaughter of the idolaters.

Whether or not such speculation is correct, there are certainly legendary elements in the biblical cycle of Elijah stories. Over the following two millennia, Jewish folklore (in the Talmud, Midrash, and countless later tales) expanded his role and his powers. He became the protean prophet, capable of assuming numerous forms—often that of an old man, but also a young man, an Arab, a Roman official, a slave, and once (for a noble purpose) even a prostitute.

Who is Elijah? His flexible identity keeps us wondering. In his fervor, he recalls the earlier biblical zealot Phinehas, grandson of Aaron the priest, who stopped a divinely sent plague by killing two flagrant sinners. But according to a persistent tradition, Elijah did not just resemble Phinehas; he was Phinehas! Despite the chronological impossibility of this identification, it is psychologically revealing and accords with Elijah's timeless, elastic nature.

Elijah is not limited to the confines of a single personality. Since he is destined to return and announce the Messiah, followers of Jesus could believe that John the Baptist was none other than Elijah, proclaiming Jesus as the Christ, the anointed one. According to the New Testament, Jesus accepted this identification of John with Elijah, while some of Jesus's followers thought that Jesus himself was Elijah.

Elijah is elusive, like the *ruah* (wind, spirit) with which he is associated. King Ahab's God-fearing steward knows how hard it is to locate Elijah and tells the prophet worriedly, The spirit of YHVH will carry you off to ^ know not where (Kings 18:12). This is how Elijah's contemporaries conceived of him: appearing and disappearing unexpectedly, as if blown by the wind, conveyed by the divine *ruah*. When he leaves earth—vanishing in a whirlwind, aboard the fiery chariot—his disciple's followers wonder if the spirit of YHVH has carried him off and flung him down on some hill or into some valley (2 Kings 2:16).

Elijah's disciple, Elisha, yearns to inherit his master's *ruah*. As Elijah ascends heavenward, Elisha lifts up the master's fallen mantle and receives the spirit. Empowered, Elisha proceeds to strike the Jordan River with the mantle, splitting the waters in two. Elisha's followers declare, The spirit of Elijah has settled upon Elisha! (2 Kings 2:15).

As Elijah evolves in rabbinic literature, he learns how to convey *ruah ha-qodesh* (the Holy Spirit). To worthy sages, he transmits teachings from the Academy of Heaven, which he regularly attends; occasionally he reveals what God is saying or feeling. He personifies the Holy Spirit.

In the Kabbalah, Elijah expands his inspirational role. According to various sources, several founders of Kabbalah experienced *gillui Eliyyahu* (a revelation of Elijah), channeling mystical insights. If some of those insights seemed radically new or unorthodox, their authenticity was guaranteed by the noble figure of Elijah, whose felt presence validated the mystics' creativity. With some exaggeration, it has been claimed that "what Moses was to the Torah, Elijah was to the Kabbalah."

Elijah is filled with *ruah*, at times obsessed by it. The spirit makes him zealous and stormy, unpredictable, restless. He is always on the move, his biblical roaming spanning the entire land of Israel: from Zarephath in Phoenicia (north of the Israelite border) to Beersheba in the south and on to Mount Horeb in the Sinai Desert; from the wadi of Cherith (east of the Jordan River) to Mount Carmel on the Mediterranean coast. Fittingly, in the Talmud, he is credited with originating *tefillat ha-derekh* (the Prayer for the Way). By then, he has become Master of Wings, riding the *ruah*, and his range has increased immensely. With four strokes of his angelic pinions, he can traverse the entire world.

In roaming the world, Elijah enacts a narrative that parallels the theme of the Wandering Jew; but he is the antitype of that dark, derogatory image. In medieval Christian folklore, this mythical Jew is seen as cursed for rejecting the Messiah, doomed to wander aimlessly until Christ returns at the end of days. Elijah, too, is destined to rove the world until the Messiah arrives, but always for a purpose or on a mission: helping those in need, spreading the awareness of God, and ultimately making the world fit for redemption.

Elijah refuses to be pinned down. We should refine the question "Who is Elijah?," reframing it: "How is Elijah imagined and reimagined? Who does Elijah become?" Each generation pours their yearnings into him and draws comfort from him. Consequently, the various portrayals of the immortal prophet reveal at least as much about the mind of the people of Israel—their needs and ideals—as about the character of Elijah.'

The chapters that follow explore the major stages so far in Elijah's endless career. Chapter 1 traces the prophet's biblical life in the book of Kings. Chapter 2, focusing on rabbinic literature, shows

Elijah evolving from a zealot into a compassionate hero and an angelic colleague of the sages. Chapter 3 discusses Elijah's formative influence on Kabbalah, his role and personality in the Zohar, and his relationship with the messianic pretender Shabbetai Tsevi.

In Chapter 4, I turn to the figure of Elijah in Christianity and Islam—the daughter religions of Judaism. As mentioned above, the New Testament links Elijah with both John the Baptist and Jesus. In medieval times, Elijah inspired the formation of the Carmelites, who became one of the main mendicant orders of the church. The original Carmelites were crusader pilgrims who forged a monastic life on Mount Carmel and who believed they were following in the footsteps of Elijah, who long ago had supposedly established a contemplative group there.

In Islam, the mysterious figure of al-Khidr (the Green One) is associated, and sometimes identified, with Elijah. Al-Khidr shares many characteristics of Elijah, including immortality. Often appearing as an old man, he is capable of numerous other guises. He saves those in trouble, spreads kindness, and enlightens spiritual seekers, before suddenly vanishing.

Chapter 5 discusses Elijah's extensive role in Jewish ritual, especially at the Passover seder, circumcision, and Havdalah (concluding the Sabbath). Every year, every week—even several times a day in the grace after meals Jews around the world mention Elijah or chant his name, many anticipating his arrival. Most Jews who know anything about Elijah remember opening the door for him during the seder or seeing his goblet of wine on the seder table. These enduring ritual moments demonstrate that whoever he was twenty-nine hundred years ago, Elijah is still active.

In the concluding chapter I delve further into Elijah's transformation and reflect on *behinat Eliyyahu* (an aspect of Elijah) within each of us, which expands the meaning of this book's title. <>

THE CHARACTER OF DAVID IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM WARRIOR, POET, PROPHET AND KING edited by [Themes in Biblical Narrative, BRILL, 9789004465961]

King David is one of the most central figures in all of the major monotheistic traditions. He generally connotes the heroic past of the (more imagined than real) ancient Israelite empire and is associated with messianic hopes for the future. Nevertheless, his richly ambivalent and fascinating literary portrayal in the Hebrew Bible is one of the most complex of all biblical characters.

This volume aims at taking a new, critical look at the process of biblical creation and subsequent exegetical transformation of the character of David and his attributed literary composition (the Psalms), with particular emphasis put on the multilateral fertilization and cross-cultural interchanges among Jews, Christians and Muslims.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Abbreviations

Transliteration

Notes on Contributors

The Variety of Davids in Monotheistic Traditions

An Introduction by Marzena Zawadowska

I David in History and in the Hebrew Bible by Lukasz Niesiolowski-Spanò

PART I

The Images of David in Medieval Jewish, Muslim and Christian Sources

- 2 David the Pious Musician in Midrashic Literature and Medieval Muslim Sources by Sivan Nir
- 3 The Weeping King of Muslim Pietistic Tradition: David in the Kitāb al-waraʿ of ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbīb (d. 238/853) and in Earlier Islamic Sources by Mateusz Wilk
- 4 David and the Temple of Solomon in Medieval Karaite Sources: The Arabic Commentaries of Yefet ben ʿEli on the Books of Kings and Chronicles by Yair Zoran
- 5 David as Warrior, Leader, and Poet in Medieval Hebrew Poetry of al-Andalus: Shmuel ha-Nagid's Self-Portrait as "The David of His Age" by Barbara Gryczan
- 6 David in Medieval Jewish Thought: Judah Halevi's Book of the Kuzari as a Reconciliation Project by Marzena Zawadowska
- 7 Saint Louis as a New David and Paris as a New Jerusalem in Medieval French Hagiographic Literature by Jerzy Pysiak
- 8 David and Jonathan as a Paradigm of Male Friendship in Medieval Latin Literature by Ruth Mazo Karras
- PART 2
- The Psalter of David in Monotheistic Traditions
- 9 David the Prophet in Saʿadya Gaon's Commentary on Psalms and Its Syriac and Karaite Contexts by Arye Zoref
- 10 Psalms to Reason, Psalms to Heal: The Scriptures in Early Rūm Orthodox Treatises by Miriam Lindgren Hjältn
- 11 Images of David in Several Muslim Rewritings of the Psalms by David R. Vishanoff
- 12 David's Psalter in Christian Arabic Dress: ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Faʿl's Translation and Commentary by Juan Pedro Monferrer-Sala
- 13 King David and the Psalter in Ethiopian Cultural Setting by Witold Witakowski
- 14 David's Psalms in Eastern European Karaite Literature by Zsuzsanna Olach
- PART 3
- David and His Women: The Cross-Religious Reception Exegesis of the Bathsheba Narrative
- 15 The Four Wives of David and the Four Women of Odysseus: A Comparative Approach by Daniel Bodi
- 16 Josephus' Retelling of the David and Bathsheba Narrative by Michael Avioz
- 17 Our Mother, Our Queen: Bathsheba through Early Jewish, Christian and Muslim Eyes by Diana Lipton and Meira Polliack
- 18 God's Master Plan: The Story of David and Bathsheba in Some Early Syriac Commentaries by Orly Mizrahi
- 19 Ibn Kaʿīr's (d. 774/1373) Treatment of the David and Uriah Narrative: The Issue of Isrāʾīlīyāt and the Syrian School of Exegesis by Marianna Klar
- PART 4
- Reinventing David in Early Modern and Modern Religious Thought and Literature
- 20 "David Was Secretly a Woman": King David as a Messianic Topos in the Teaching of Jacob Frank by Jan Dóktór
- 21 Davidic Narratives in the Contemporary Roman Catholic Liturgical Readings by Elzbieta Lazarewicz-Wyrzykowska
- 22 The Reception of David and Michal in Twentieth and Twenty-First-Century Literature by Lena-Sofia Tiemeyer
- Index of Sources
- Index of Sacred Scriptures
- Index of Ancient and Medieval Literatures
- Index of Authors
- General Index

The Variety of Davids in Monotheistic Traditions: An Introduction by Marzena Zawawska

One of the most central figures in all of the major monotheistic traditions is King David. He personifies, in many respects, the heroic past of the (more imagined than real) ancient Israelite empire, of which he is commonly believed to have served as a unifying and effective king for about forty years (ca. 1010–970 BCE). David's religious persona as a righteous king is underlined in the Hebrew Bible and in the New Testament, where he is hyperbolically described as a man after God's own heart (1 Samuel 13:14; Acts 13:22), while in the Qurán he is depicted as God's "vicegerent on earth" (Sura 38:26). His prophetic abilities are also elaborated in the Hebrew Bible through God's various revelations to him and prophecies conveyed through him, while his righteousness is underscored in the Psalms attributed to him, which led to his subsequent recognition as a prophet in Islam.

In religious imagination, as well as in wider culture, literature and the arts, the figure of David has not only come to symbolize the golden period in the remote past of the ancient Kingdom of Judah and Israel of the first millennium BCE, but also as a source of revival and messianic hopes for the future, as in the famous biblical metaphor "a shoot from the stump of Jesse" (Isaiah 11:1–12). From post-exilic times, Jews believed that the messianic savior-king who will usher in an era of eternal peace and prosperity was to come from Davidic lineage, and it is in this light that the early Christians conceived his connection to Jesus which they made clear in two of the Gospels (Matthew 1; Luke 3:23–38).

While the reception exegesis in all three religious traditions generally tended to idealize his image, David's literary portrayal in the Hebrew Bible is one of the most complex of all biblical characters. On the one hand, he is depicted as a valorous warrior who bravely defeated Goliath (1 Samuel 17:49–50), the powerful army commander and ruler responsible for unifying a kingdom around the Jebusite city, Jerusalem, which he conquered and then established as capital, a gifted musician (1 Samuel 16:14–22), who by himself invented musical instruments (Amos 6:5; 1 Chronicles 23:2–5), a pious poet who authored some of the psalms contained in the Book of Psalms (generally attributed to his authorship in later sources), an affectionate lover (e.g., of Abigail in 1 Samuel 25), and a devoted friend (e.g., of Jonathan in 1 Samuel 13–23) and father (cf. his mourning over Absalom's death in 2 Samuel 18:33). On the other hand, he is described as a vassal of the Philistine king Achish of Gath (1 Samuel 27), a ruthless politician, who ended the dynasty of Saul through acts of murder and force (2 Samuel 1–4), and someone who committed adultery with a married woman, Bathsheba, and eventually conspired to murder her husband, Uriah, one of his chief warriors (2 Samuel 11–12). For having "shed much blood" (1 Chronicles 22:8–11) and his infamous love affair, he is strongly criticized in the Bible itself (2 Samuel 12). By divine decree, and as a result of his morally dubious behavior, his offspring fall into calamity, culminating in the rebellion and subsequent killing of his beloved son Absalom (2 Samuel 18–19; Kings 2) and God defers the building of the Temple to the time of his son from Bathsheba, Solomon (2 Samuel 7; 1 Kings 8; 1 Chronicles 17:4; 2 Chronicles 6:9). Little wonder, therefore, that David's richly ambivalent and fascinating biblical portrayal engendered varied interpretative traditions and that his character consequently underwent significant transformations in perception and reception in the three monotheistic traditions.

For many centuries, one of the most dominant and common modes through which the story of David was addressed was the translation and commentary of the sanctified texts. Yet there were also other important forms of composition (such as legends, liturgical poems, homilies etc.) which developed alongside this traditional form of religious expression and which not infrequently elaborated on the Davidic narratives. Consequently, there existed in the pre-modern period a range of literary works which were used as a framework for intellectual reflections on David and his

attributed book of Psalms, ranging from geographic, historical, and grammatical, through pietistic, ethical and heresiographical, to mystical, philosophical and/or theological. In the modern period, the popular genre of biblical translation and exegesis was used alongside secular literature and art in addressing King David. The present volume is devoted, in the main, to the pre-modern understanding and interpretation of David in the three monotheistic religions, as reflected in the translations and commentaries on the Scriptures written by Jews, Christians and Muslims. Nevertheless, papers devoted to selected works belonging to other genres of their respective religious (and to a lesser extent non-religious) literature are also included.

The most fervent exegetical activity took place in the Middle Ages, the period when Judaism, Christianity and Islam consolidated their respective religious traditions, by creating or reshaping them in constant conversation with and (often polemical, or apologetic) response to one another. After the canon of the Hebrew Bible had been sealed, sometime around the mid second century CE, Jews, later joined by Christians, engaged in interpretative processes not only to establish its inherent meaning but also, and more importantly, its meaning within a given religious community. Muslims, too, became part of this process due to the Prophet Mu'ammad's essential verification of the divine message contained in the Scriptures of the "People of the Book" (Ar. ahl al-kitāb) and the acceptance of their Prophets as God's chosen messengers in the Qur'an. Thus the three groups needed to position themselves vis-à-vis the others, with whom they shared a belief in the revelatory nature of some (if not all) of the Scriptures. In this sense, the medieval period, ranging from the rise of Islam to the High Middle Ages (around the eighth to the twelfth centuries CE) constituted a mosaic of different monotheistic traditions and their intellectual legacies, and was characterized by intensive, cross-fertilizing contacts as well as cross-cultural transfers of concepts and ideas between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This was the most important period in the theological crystallization of the three religions, all of which were engaged in defining their cultural and religious identities vis-à-vis the other. It is likely that the common core of these three religions, as we know them today, gained many of its distinctive traits during this period, through a complex process of "dialogue," by which is meant mutual interchanges and subsequent transformations of textual traditions, including their appropriation to their own specific cultural and intellectual contexts, as well as their considerable propensity for strife and conflict.

The wide array of exegetical techniques elaborated during the medieval period includes: Jewish, midrashic atomizing and homiletical gap-filling methods; allegorical and analogical readings typical of Christian exegesis; grammatical, literary-contextual and historical approaches, which significantly developed in the realm of Islam. These systems eventually overlapped in their usage and cross-fertilized each other, and the specific explanations they offered in resolving scriptural conundrums and interpretative cruxes became fundamental to many later approaches to reading and studying the sacred texts. They also informed later interpretative methods, including modern secular ones.

The main focus of the present volume is therefore on the Middle Ages, although articles exploring works composed in other periods are also included as comparative sources, in an attempt to trace the development of chains of interpretive traditions, as well as the evolution and transformation of exegetical ideas. An additional reason for focusing on the medieval period is that it witnessed a conspicuous rise in popularity of the biblical figure of King David and his post-biblical lineage. Jewish and Christian traditions, prior to the emergence of Islam, exhibited a concern with the House of David but it is only after the emergence of Islam in the seventh century CE that a gradual growth of the spiritual importance of his family, as well as of the social-administrative status of its members may be observed in Jewish and Christian sources. The concern with Davidic ancestry is borne out by the fact that the number of individuals claiming to be either direct (Heb. nāšī'im), or at least spiritual (Byzantine, Carolingian and Capetian kings) descendants of King David noticeably increased, and that for the first time in history pedigrees tracing medieval dynasties back to their alleged Israelite

forebear were produced. Also, the new and unmistakable preference for the name David, until then avoided and (with only few doubtful exceptions) completely absent from earlier epigraphic, literary, and documentary sources, suddenly emerged sometime in the eighth century, in the Islamic realm.²

Finally, the Middle Ages witnessed an unusual degree of spiritual unrest, especially in the Middle East, which brought about not only the emergence of new religions like Islam and other religious movements and sects, described in medieval heresiography, but also major divisions within existing religions such as the split between the adherents of Sunnism and Shi'ism within the Muslim world, or between the Rabbanites and Karaites within the Jewish world. The example of Karaism is particularly important in the context of the present volume since it seems to have emerged as the result of the Jews' encounter with the Islamic scriptural model.³ The Karaites' rejection of the rabbinic concept of the "Oral Torah" and the post-biblical texts in which it was incorporated (mainly the Mishnah and Talmuds) seems to be connected to the medieval Jews' need to authenticate the Hebrew Bible vis-à-vis the Qurán. At least at the initial stage of its development, Karaism was a conglomerate movement, which combined representatives of the Jewish (gaonic) elite alongside marginalized Jewish sectors and members of various heterodox groups and, consequently, it played an important role in cross-cultural interchanges with Christians and Muslims.⁴ As such it constitutes a salient case study for exploring cross-cultural interchanges among different monotheistic traditions, especially in the Middle Ages.

...

The present volume aims at taking a new, critical look at the process of biblical creation and subsequent exegetical transformation of the character of David and his attributed literary composition, with particular emphasis put on the multilateral fertilization and cross-cultural interchanges among Jews, Christians and Muslims. To this end it brings together scholars from various research disciplines (such as literary, linguistic, cultural and religious studies) related to Jewish, Christian and Islamic studies, who critically examine different source texts related to King David and the book of Psalms. Thanks to this, the volume encompasses a detailed and comparative view of converging and diverging tendencies in the way David, his character and narratives on his life, as well as his attributed book were reclaimed, and fashioned in these religious cultures. It includes papers whose authors not only investigate transformations of the biblical materials in one given religious tradition, but also – and above all – in the intertwined worlds of the three major monotheistic cultures in cross-fertilizing contact. Therefore, in addition to monographic chapters devoted to the reception of David and the Psalter in individual religious movements and cultures (e.g., Ethiopian Christianity, Carolingian and Capetian empire, or Frankism), a significant number of articles utilise a comparative approach, scrutinizing the various texts in which David's character and his attributed book have been appropriated and re-positioned in different traditions of the so-called "People of the Book" from biblical times and late antiquity until the early modern period. The twenty two chapters of the book are divided into four coherent thematic sections which focus on different aspects of the reception history of David and the Psalms in monotheistic traditions. As far as it was possible, individual chapters within each section were ordered chronologically.

Structure

Everything begins with the Hebrew Bible, the chief (if not unique) textual evidence on the historical King David, which served as an inexhaustible source of inspiration for later literature, especially of an exegetical nature, composed in different times and places by representatives of different religious traditions. Therefore the opening chapter, contributed by Lukasz Niesiolowski-Spanò, David in History and in the Hebrew Bible, is devoted to an historical survey of this scriptural character, offering a rich review of various scholarly approaches to the intricate and much debated question of David's historicity. It explores the complex relationship between the biblical and extra-biblical

evidence for David, discussing inter alia the etymology of the name David, the reliability of extra-biblical testimonies (inscriptions) to the House of David, as well as historical context and circumstances in which the biblical character was supposedly active. It conjectures that, assuming the historicity of this figure, David might have been a local leader of a small, Habiru-like group active in the tenth century BCE in the Southern territories dominated by the Tribe of Benjamin and politically controlled by the Philistines from the City of Gath.

The Images of David in Medieval Jewish, Muslim and Christian Sources

The first chapter in this section focuses on I Samuel 16:14–22, where David is depicted as an accomplished musician and I Chronicles 23:2–5, where he is credited with the invention of musical instruments. Due to his centrality to all Abrahamic religions, medieval sources, both Jewish and Muslim, had to consider how to address David's proclivity for music in a manner that would suit their different religious traditions, communities and views on music. In the paper David the Pious Musician in Midrashic Literature and Medieval Muslim Sources, Sivan Nir explores different ways in which Judaism and Islam treated the subject, highlighting their mutual interdependence as well as originality in this respect. It shows that the Talmuds, Ruth Rabbah and Midrash on Psalms depict David as a musician turned nightly scholar, and investigates how the midrashic imagery informed medieval Jewish commentaries on Psalms 107–108, as well as how it influenced portrayals of David's piety in Islam and the depictions of his musical skills (used against the demons) in various classical Muslim sources.

In the next chapter of this section, The Weeping King of Muslim Pietistic Tradition: David in the Kitāb al-waraʿ of ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbīb (d. 238/853) and in Earlier Islamic Sources, Mateusz Wilk discusses the image of king David (Dāwūd) in the traditions contained in the Kitāb al-waraʿ, a compilation of Islamic piety – more specifically, religious scrupulosity – by ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbīb (d. 238/853), against the backdrop of earlier and contemporary Muslim literature. He argues that this hitherto unpublished work contains numerous traditions on prophets, yet David is the only one to whom a separate chapter is dedicated. The article presents and analyzes the role of David in the paradigm of Islamic piety of the third/ninth century through comparisons of Kitāb al-waraʿ with other similar sources from this period (e.g., Ibn ʿAnbal's Kitāb al-zuhd). By doing so, it serves a starting point for further investigation of the role of prophets in the classical Islamic pietistic literature.

The following article by Yair Zoran, David and the Temple of Solomon in Medieval Karaite Sources. The Arabic Commentaries of Yefet ben ʿEli on the Books of Kings and Chronicles, delves more deeply into the subject of the medieval Karaite tradition of interpreting the Hebrew Bible, a tradition which exerted significant influence on later Jewish exegesis of Scripture as a whole. One of its most important and influential representatives was Yefet ben ʿEli who lived in the second half of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century, mostly in Jerusalem. He was the first to compose a comprehensive commentary, including running Arabic translation, on the entire Hebrew Bible. The article explores his treatment of David's testament to Solomon in I Chronicles 28 which relates to the building of the Temple, demonstrating the exegete's literary sensibilities, as well as his ingenuity and originality in the artful way in which he combines different biblical passages and weaves them together into a unified literary structure that sheds a new light on the interpreted text.

King David was a central figure not only in medieval exegetical and pietistic texts, but also in poetry. Our next author, Barbara Gryczan, contributes a paper David as Warrior, Leader, and Poet in Medieval Hebrew Poetry of al-Andalus: Shmuel ha-Nagid's Self-Portrait as "The David of His Age," in which she provides a detailed analysis of an autobiographical poem, Back away from me now, my friend, composed as a commemoration of Shmuel ha-Nagid's victory over the troops attacking the

foregrounds of Granada. During the battle, he served as the-commander-in-chief of the army of the Berber king of this city-state. The article explores the process of artistic auto-creation, unravelling the complex matrix of biblical intertexts and historical allusions as well as artistic devices and poetical mechanisms introduced by the poet in order to portray himself not only as a righteous leader of the nation and a direct heir of the Levites, but also a divinely inspired poet, an anointed “singer of God,” and “the David of his age.” It also offers a commentary on the cultural and socio-historical background of ha-Nagid’s times, as well as specific biographical insights, which put the examined poem in the broader context of the author’s various activities as poet, scholar, soldier and community leader.

In the following article, *David in Medieval Jewish Thought. Judah Halevi’s Book of the Kuzari as a Reconciliation Project*, Marzena Zawadowska investigates the way in which the character of David was used in a philosophical-theological text written by one of the most famous medieval Jewish poets, Judah Halevi. She demonstrates how the author of the *Kuzari* de-biblicized the biblical character of David, using his idealized image as an instrument to convey and underscore what he considered the chief values and most important legacy of Judaism, namely: the Hebrew Bible (David as one of its authors); the Hebrew language (David as the author of the Psalms); the Chosen People with their unique gift of prophecy (David as a prophet); the Land of Israel with the Temple in Jerusalem as its “holy of holies” (David as responsible not only for providing the plans of the Temple, but also for establishing the cultic ritual in it). Zawadowska argues that the figure of David served Halevi as a vehicle to transmit his constructive critique of his present day Jewry, aimed at healing or repairing and improving the entire Jewish nation – in terms of both Rabbanites and Karaites alike – and bringing about their re-unification, thereby restoring Judaism to its former glory.

The next author, Jerzy Pysiak, brings us to the medieval Kingdom of France, showing how the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century French chroniclers and hagiographers fashioned Saint Louis’s image after the model of biblical King David, as the pious and godly king of a New Israel – France. In his *Saint Louis as a New David and Paris as a New Jerusalem in Medieval French Hagiographic Literature*, he demonstrates that the development of this royal ideology was closely connected with the cult of saints and relics, and especially with the translation of Passion relics which, already in the Byzantine empire, was believed to have been tantamount to the translation of Jerusalem to a new location – the Christian capital city of Constantinople in that case. Exploring the complex history of the origins of the royal ideology of the Capetian kings, the paper argues that although it undoubtedly echoes the Byzantine imperial ideology, it evolved independently and its origins should be sought more accurately in the Carolingian epoch, in which – starting from the time of the anointing of Pepin the Short, David had become an ideal model for the kings of the Franks.

In the last chapter of this section, Ruth Mazo Karras focuses on Latin Christian literature. In her *David and Jonathan as a Paradigm of Male Friendship in Medieval Latin Literature*, she uses the story of David and Jonathan to examine how Christian and Jewish traditions in the Middle Ages treated friendship between men in relation to marriage between men and women. It demonstrates that David and Jonathan’s friendship was most often invoked in the Christian Central Middle Ages in a monastic context, but also outside it. The deep and intimate love between two men could parallel that which would be found in a marriage, or even go beyond it. It argues that discussions of friendship in the Jewish tradition often occur in commentaries on *Pirke Avot*. Male friendship is seen in this treatise in two ways: in terms of (1) companionship and partnership in Torah study, and (2) a relationship between David and Jonathan, which is on a spiritual level. This second kind of male friendship is contrasted with love between men and women. Karras concludes that the common denominator between both traditions is that the line between friendship and love is not sharp.

The Psalter of David in Monotheistic Traditions

In contrast with mutual influences between medieval Jewish and Muslim cultures and literatures, relatively little attention has so far been paid to Jewish Christian cross-cultural interchanges in the Middle Ages. In his paper, *David the Prophet in Sa'adya Gaon's Commentary on Psalms and its Syriac and Karaite Contexts*, Arye Zoref analyzes Sa'adya's Commentary on the Book of Psalms against the backdrop of similar commentaries produced by Christian (in Syriac) and Karaite (in Arabic) exegetes. He argues that in an attempt to stress the unity of the book of Psalms and its prophetic nature, Sa'adya adopted only those concepts from the Syriac commentaries which best suited his purpose, and demonstrates that the Gaon modeled his introduction to the commentary on Psalms on the introductions of two Syriac commentators (Moshe Bar Kepha and Ishodad of Merv), and that he adopted the Syriac Nestorian idea that David wrote all the Psalms, but rejected some of the Nestorian interpretative approaches, such as a general disregard for the Psalms' headings.

In the following chapter, *Psalms to Reason, Psalms to Heal. The Scriptures in Early Rüm Orthodox Treatises*, Miriam Lindgren Hjälms examines different approaches to Scripture in general, and exegetical uses of the Book of Psalms in particular, in early Rüm Orthodox (Melkite) texts. From this corpus of texts, she singles out general statements relating to Scripture and explains them both in terms of reception of the Patristic heritage and as a message delivered to an audience in a specific context. Another question discussed in the paper relates to the authors' conception of the Hebrew text of the Bible (e.g., Abü Qurra seems unaware that certain biblical books are not canonical among the Jews as well as ignorant of the fact that the Hebrew, Syriac and Greek versions sometimes differ, while Agapius of Manbi' invests much effort in proving that such deviations were introduced by the Jews for the purpose of obfuscating the notion that the Christ was the Messiah). In addition, the paper investigates the uses of the Psalms' quotations in the analyzed texts. She demonstrates that, most often, Psalms that are understood to be prophetic are chosen to prove Christian doctrines as expressed in the New Testament. By Agapius, however, they are also used to recapitulate events recorded within the Old Testament corpus. Finally she shows how Agathon of Homs, makes the most complex use of the Psalms. The conclusion is that the genre of the text dictates the exegetical use of the Psalms.

Among the many extant Arabic manuscripts of "the Psalms of David" are some that begin by sounding like translations of the biblical Psalms but turn out, on further investigation, to contain fresh compositions by Muslim authors. Our next author, David R. Vishanoff, in his paper *Images of David in Several Muslim Rewritings of the Psalms*, identifies several different versions of these psalms, each of which starts with a shared core of one hundred psalms and then edits, reorganizes, rewrites, and adds to that core material. It demonstrates that each version presents David in a somewhat different light: although all present him as a model of repentance and otherworldly piety, some emphasize the gravity of his sin and tearful repentance, while others minimize his sin and promote a piety of strict orthodoxy and obedience. In addition, the article shows that each editor uses the shared symbol of David and his Psalms to advance his own vision of Islamic piety, not in opposition to Jewish or Christian pieties, but as a critique of worldliness within the Muslim community.

Among all the Arabic versions of the Book of Psalms produced by Christian translators, one stands out for its unique features. It is a translation of the text of the 151 Psalms from the Greek original (according to the Septuagint) prepared by the eleventh century Melkite deacon Abü 'l-Fat' Abd Allāh ibn al-Fa' al-Mu'rān al-An'ākī. The author also added a fine commentary (in Arabic) to his translation. In the chapter *David's Psalter in Christian Arabic Dress: Abd Allāh ibn al-Fa' al-Mu'rān al-An'ākī's Translation and Commentary*, Juan Pedro Monferrer-Sala offers a description of Ibn al-Fa' al-Mu'rān al-An'ākī's Arabic translation and commentary on the Psalms, and argues that the importance of this text is

confirmed by the existence of numerous revisions of the original Arabic version. In addition, the article includes an edition and analysis of Psalm 28 according to Ms. Sinai Ar. 65 which illustrates the changes to which the original Arabic version was subjected through the various revisions.

In the next paper of this section, King David and the Psalter in Ethiopian Cultural Setting, Witold Witakowski demonstrates that although few compositions in Classical Ethiopic (Ge'ez) are devoted specifically to David, or attributed to him, he is not an insignificant figure in Ethiopian culture and tradition. The paper argues that his importance and popularity depend on two circumstances: (1) David is regarded to be the author of the biblical Book of Psalms, which in Ethiopia is simply referred to as *Dāwit*, and whose popularity is based on the fact that the Psalter is used as a primer in traditional schools by which children learned how to read and write; (2) David is connected to the sphere of the cult of Mary as one of her ancestors, sometimes just being called "The Father of Mary." Consequently, he often appears in the texts devoted to Mary, such as the *Miracles of Mary*. In addition, Witakowski shows that even more impressive testimonies of David's importance can be found in iconographic representations. For instance, the image of David playing *bägäna*, a traditional Ethiopian stringed instrument, can be found in manuscript illuminations and in wall paintings in various churches. The article offers a synthetic overview and analysis of all these diverse sources, which have so far been unstudied or understudied.

The Book of Psalms has always played an important role in the life of Eastern European Karaites, who had been using the Hebrew Psalms in liturgy held in the prayer houses called *kenesa*. At the turn of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the language of liturgy changed from Hebrew to the Turkic vernacular of the Eastern European Karaites (so-called *Karaim* language). At about the same time, new Latin and Cyrillic based orthographies were introduced, and started to gradually replace the previously used Hebrew orthography. In the paper *David's Psalms in Eastern European Karaite Literature*, Zsuzsanna Olach investigates how these processes, together with the "emancipation" of the Eastern European Karaites, brought about the emergence of Eastern European Karaite Bible translations, including translations of the Book of Psalms, both in old Hebrew script and in new orthographies. She argues that the significance of the Psalms among the Eastern European Karaites goes far beyond the liturgical context, demonstrating that individual Psalms have been adapted into hymns and religious poems by *Karaim* poets (e.g., Zarax ben Natan and Josef ben Shemuel), while singular verses and stanzas from the Psalms were profusely quoted in their poetical compositions. The article discusses various adaptations of individual psalms into poems offered by *Karaim* poets, offering the first results of a study of the use of the Book of Psalms in Eastern European Karaite literature.

David and His Women: The Cross-Religious Reception Exegesis of the Bathsheba Narrative

The Bible did not emerge in a cultural vacuum. Rather it bears witness to the fruitful cultural encounters between the ancient Jewish and the surrounding non-Jewish cultures, most notably the Greek/Hellenistic one. In the first chapter of this section, *The Four Wives of David and the Four Women of Odysseus: A Comparative Approach*, Daniel Bodi offers a literary analysis which juxtaposes the female biblical characters of Michal, Abigail, Bathsheba and Abishag, with those of the Greek epic, *Odyssey*: Calypso, Circe, Nausicaa and Penelope. It demonstrates that the Hebrew Bible places women at significant moments in David's career – from a young humble warrior to a seasoned warlord and an aging ruler – which is comparable to the role played by women in the career of Odysseus from his ten-year absence from his island Ithaca for the duration of the Trojan war and his additional decade-long return voyage home to his faithful wife Penelope. The paper argues that all these female figures (symbolically representing the four types of women a man can

meet in his life), who played a crucial role in the lives of David and Odysseus, act as reflecting mirrors, bringing to the fore different aspects of David and Odysseus' personalities and, allowing both characters to acquire a truer perception of themselves, their limits and shortcomings. In addition, Bodi points to the existence of other similarities between the analyzed narratives: Both Odysseus and David are major cultural heroes who are the main characters of the stories associated with them. Both the Homeric Epic and the biblical story of David offer fine observations on human nature. Both cultural heroes are depicted as being in need of the help of women in order to advance their lives and careers. In both cases, weakness or failure occurs because of their impulsive, heroic temperament – a traditional theme.

Yet, the Bible has always inspired interest not only as literature, but also – and perhaps above all – as a historical document. From the exegetical point of view, one of the most problematic episodes in the biblical narrative on David is his affair with Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11:1–12:25). Many questions arise from this remarkable story: How is David evaluated by the biblical narrator? What was Bathsheba's part in this affair? Why did Uriah not go to his house as ordered by David? Did he know of David and Bathsheba's affair? Why did Nathan choose to convey the divine message through a parable, rather than convict David directly? Why was David punished for his sin in a different way than Saul? In the chapter, Josephus' Retelling of the David and Bathsheba Narrative, Michael Avioz focuses on the way in which the ancient Jewish historian addressed these questions and rewrote the David-Bathsheba narrative. He discusses the subject against the backdrop of the biblical text and its traditional rabbinic interpretations, and demonstrates that although it posed a great challenge to Josephus' generally positive view of King David and despite the fact that he could have followed the Chronicler's account and omitted this episode, the author of the Antiquities of the Jews decided to retain most of the problematic source material (with minor changes) and to confront it head-on. Avioz uncovers Josephus' techniques when rewriting this narrative and tries to understand the reasons behind the changes he introduced (as influenced by Greek culture and its values, such as piety, justice, courage, obedience).

The next, panoramic article by Diana Lipton and Meira Polliack, *Our Mother, Our Queen: Bathsheba through Early Jewish, Christian and Muslim Eyes*, considers the complex portrayals of David and Bathsheba in the three religions which, in different ways, see themselves as David's heirs. In a story about succession and inheritance, Bathsheba appears at first to be a cartoon character in a cautionary tale about the dangers that beautiful women pose to powerful men. But, eventually, Bathsheba turns out to be pivotal in the so-called "succession narrative"; her son, Solomon, is David's heir. Lipton and Polliack analyze a representative selection of textual and visual sources, mainly – though not uniquely – medieval, in an attempt to better understand Jewish, Christian and Islamic exegetical approaches – internal and in relation to each other – to dealing with complications in the Davidic lineage.

Ancient Christian Bible exegesis has much in common with rabbinic interpretations, largely due to the common use of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament. This is true in the Syriac literature even more so than in the Greek and Latin works. Syriac Christian writings contain many exegetical points that appear to have been influenced by rabbinic Judaism. At the same time, the Syriac-speaking church had been in constant conflict with Judaism since Syriac literature first emerged in the late third century, and consolidated in the fourth century. In the next chapter, *God's Master Plan: The Story of David and Bathsheba in Some Early Syriac Commentaries*, Orly Mizrahi argues that all this is reflected in the Syrian exegesis of 2 Samuel 11–12. So, for instance, David is perceived as a prefiguration of Christ and his repentance is perceived as characteristic of His future era, when the biblical law will be annulled and the most important act of the Christian believer will be repentance. The paper demonstrates that during the Christological controversy in the fifth and in the sixth centuries, two independent Syriac-speaking churches were established. Thus, the biblical

commentaries on these chapters are also a source of information concerning an internal dialogue between Jacob of Edessa and his predecessors in the Syrian Orthodox Church, on the one hand, and Ishodad of Merv and those who preceded him in the Church of the East, on the other.

In the last article of this section, Ibn Kaʿir's (d. 774/1373) Treatment of the David and Uriah Narrative: The Issue of *Isrāʿīliyyāt* and the Syrian School of Exegesis, Marianna Klar demonstrates that Ibn Kaʿir's treatment of the David and Uriah narrative, held by many to underpin the qurānic pericope at Sura 38:21–25, is tantalizingly brief. Indeed, the visible tip of his act of exegesis consists merely of a two-pronged dismissal of "the story that the exegetes relate," a gloss of the qurānic vocabulary, and an aphorism: "the good deeds of the pious are the bad deeds of [God's] intimates." The paper argues that underlying this, however, is a sizeable degree of unspoken scholarly interaction between Ibn Kaʿir and the works of his peers. It demonstrates that Ibn Kaʿir may rarely cite later exegetes by name, but he appears to have engaged substantially with their works, and indeed to have assumed his scholarly audience to be as familiar with their main points and their principal arguments as he was. It posits the existence of a specifically Syrian school of exegesis, whose parameters influenced Ibn Kaʿir much more profoundly than has previously been acknowledged: the importance of al-ʿāzin al-Baghdādī, in particular, would appear to have been critically overlooked. Finally, it postulates that Ibn Kaʿir's usage of the term *isrāʿīliyyāt* should meanwhile be viewed within a much wider discussion of contemporary attitudes towards inherited exegetical material in general.

Reinventing David in Early Modern and Modern Religious Thought and Literature

The first chapter of this section brings us to eighteenth century Poland and the fascinating figure of Jacob Frank (1726–1791), a Polish-Jewish religious leader who claimed to be the reincarnation of the biblical patriarch Jacob and of the self-proclaimed messiah Sabbatai Zevi. Frank arguably created a new religious movement, later called Frankism, which combined some aspects of Judaism and Christianity. In the chapter, "David Was Secretly a Woman": King David as a Messianic Topos in the Teaching of Jacob Frank, Jan Doktor explores the reception of King David and the shaping of his image in the teaching of Jacob Frank. The article investigates the reason why the figure of David caught Frank's attention, despite his having pointedly abandoned the traditional messianic idea of returning to the Holy Land and the restoration of the kingdom of David. In addition, it addresses the question concerning which of David's "messianic attributes" Frank wished to imitate and why, and demonstrates that Frank viewed David as "secretly a woman" (an incarnation of the Shekhinah [Heb. *Šeʿinā*]). Accordingly, in his opinion, it was David's femininity that endowed him with salvific skills. Finally, the paper delves more deeply into the question of how this Davidic femininity should be understood – whether, in a literal sense, he was a woman, or whether a feminine aspect of divinity manifested itself in his person – and deals with Frank's progressive idea that the arrival of the messianic era will put an end to gender segregation.

The next paper by Elzbieta Lazarewicz-Wyrzykowska, Davidic Narratives in the Contemporary Roman Catholic Liturgical Readings, examines the passages from Davidic narratives in the books of Samuel and I Kings included in the contemporary Roman Catholic breviary and lectionary as "readings," in light of the Christological focus of these liturgical collections. It argues that the decision about the inclusion of these passages in spite of the complex and potentially problematic image of David they convey was influenced by a number of interpretative traditions. This includes both the praise of David in Sirach 47:2–11, easily yielding itself to generally Christian and specifically Catholic exegesis, and the Christian reception of David in the Gospel passion narratives, as well as later exegetical traditions, i.e., medieval monastic teachings of Aelred of Rievaulx and thirteenth century Dominican homiletics. The article explores also the means employed by the compilers of the liturgical collections to harmonize the selected biblical passages with these traditions.

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

Finally, in the last chapter, *The Reception of David and Michal in Twentieth and Twenty-First-Century Literature*, Sophia Lena Tiemeyer analyses the way in which four selected twentieth century novels function as midrash, understood in its broad sense as literature which interacts with and interprets the biblical material. The paper focuses on the novelists' interpretations of the relationship between David and Michal. The biblical narrative offers but a brief description of their interaction, yet these sparse references encourage readers to explore further their respective feelings for each other and the motives behind their actions. The article is centered around a set of questions, originally posed by David Clines vis-à-vis the biblical narrative. (1) Why does David marry Michal, given that Saul initially offered his elder daughter Merab as a reward? (2) Why does Michal love David? (3) Does David love Michal back? (4) How should Michal's position between her husband David and her father Saul be understood? (5) How should the presence of the teraphim in David's and Michal's bedroom be understood? (6) What does Michal feel about her husband Paltiel? (7) Why does Michal reproach David when he dances in front of the Ark of the Covenant? In addition, Tiemeyer addresses the following questions: What answers do these select novels offer and how do their modern perspectives influence their readings of the ancient tale? She argues that all the novels base their readings on existing narrative gaps in the text which they, in turn, seek to fill. The biblical story is ambiguous and this ambiguity paves the way for a wide range of interpretations. Thus, in a broad sense, these novels offer valuable interpretations of the biblical Davidic narrative.

...

We believe that the collection of chapters included in the present volume will contribute to our understanding of how different religious traditions accommodated one another and shaped their respective boundaries through the process of an ongoing, intensive and extensive dialogue over their sanctified texts. Its main beneficiaries will be scholars and students of Jewish, Christian and Islamic studies, especially those interested in Bible and Qur'an exegesis and other religious literature, but also scholars of comparative literature and literary theory, historians, historians of art, cultural scientists and possibly also sociologists. Yet, we hope too that the book will offer something of interest to a wider public which will also benefit from its results, given the socio-historical importance of interreligious relations and the impact that these religious traditions had on the development of human culture and civilization as a whole.

Far from offering a comprehensive account of the reception history of King David and the Psalms in all monotheistic traditions throughout the ages, the volume intends to illustrate the diversity and richness of the process of cross-cultural interchanges among Jews, Christians and Muslims, especially in the Middle Ages, as exemplified in their perceptions and receptions of this central biblical figure and his attributed book, recognized in all monotheistic traditions as a sacred text. Accordingly, it contributes to our understanding of the multilaterally fertilizing effect that these interchanges had upon the major monotheistic religious traditions, their cultures and literatures, helping us to recalibrate and reassess the nature of the complex, enduring relationship between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and to reconstruct the trajectories of cross-cultural contacts and transfers of ideas between them. <>

MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND ITS LITERARY FORMS edited by Aaron W. Hughes and James T. Robinson [New Jewish Philosophy and Thought, Indiana University Press, 9780253042514]

Too often the study of philosophical texts is carried out in ways that do not pay significant attention to how the ideas contained within them are presented, articulated, and developed. This was not always the case. The contributors to this collected work consider Jewish philosophy in the medieval period, when new genres and forms of written expression were flourishing in the wake of renewed interest in ancient philosophy. Many medieval Jewish philosophers were highly accomplished poets, for example, and made conscious efforts to write in a poetic style. This volume turns attention to the connections that medieval Jewish thinkers made between the literary, the exegetical, the philosophical, and the mystical to shed light on the creativity and diversity of medieval thought. As they broaden the scope of what counts as medieval Jewish philosophy, the essays collected here consider questions about how an argument is formed, how text is put into the service of philosophy, and the social and intellectual environment in which philosophical texts were produced.

Review

This well-written, accessible collection demonstrates a maturation in Jewish studies and medieval philosophy. It convincingly opens up the canon of philosophical texts and authors, and will enrich readers' understanding of the diverse literary forms of medieval Jewish philosophical projects. . . . Highly recommended. — *Choice*

Comprising sophisticated scholarship and realizing its goal of challenging conventions in the study of medieval Jewish philosophy, [*Medieval Jewish Philosophy*] convincingly advocates for a fruitful approach that, it may be hoped, others will be inspired to pursue. — *H-Judaic*

Succinctly put, this book argues that form matters. When medieval Jewish philosophy is analyzed as a socially constructed practice, it emerges as nuanced, complex, compelling, and meaningful, inviting Jews and non-Jews to appreciate it anew. -- Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, author of *The Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life*

CONTENTS

- Introduction / Aaron W. Hughes and James T. Robinson
- 1 Animal Fables and Medieval Jewish Philosophy / Kalman P. Bland,
- 2 Biblical Commentaries as a Genre of Jewish Philosophical Writing / Raphael Dascalu
- 3 Commentaries on The Guide of the Perplexed: A Brief Literary History / Igor H. de Souza
- 4 Philosophical Commentary and Supercommentary: The Hebrew Aristotelian Commentaries of the Fourteenth through Sixteenth Centuries / Yehuda Halper
- 5 The Author's Haqdamah as a Literary Form in Jewish Thought / Steven Harvey
- 6 Does Judaism Make Sense? Early Medieval Kalam as Literature / Gyongyi Hegedus
- 7 Dialogues / Aaron W. Hughes
- 8 Poetry / Aaron W. Hughes
- 9 Poetic Summaries of Scientific and Philosophical Works / Maud Kozodoy
- 10 The Philosophical Epistle as a Genre of Medieval Jewish Philosophy / Charles H. Manekin
- 11 The Sermon in Late Medieval Jewish Thought as Method for Popularizing Philosophy / Chaim Meir Neria
- 12 Lexicons and Lexicography in Medieval Jewish Philosophy / James T. Robinson
- 13 Theological Summas in Late Medieval Jewish Philosophy / Shira Weiss
- Index

We raise the issue of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself.... Far from being a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific.

With this statement, Hayden White suggests that the only meaning that history can have is the one that narrative imagination assigns to it. In this volume, we wish to suggest, in a similar vein, that the only meaning that philosophy can have is through the various literary genres that provide it form. There is not one abstract notion of philosophy, in other words, to which we assent but only various narratives of philosophy that organize, build an argument, and, in the process, ultimately seek to influence a readership. This is as true for Jewish philosophy, as White suggests, as it is for all types of philosophy.

The academic study of medieval Jewish philosophy began in Central Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. In their desire to make Jews rational and to show how Jewish philosophy coincided with the various species of non-Jewish rationalism, towering figures such as Moritz Steinschneider (1816-1907), Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), and Jakob Guttman (1845-1919) created the parameters of a field of study that is still largely in place to this day. Such individuals wrote during a period of inner turmoil within Judaism to be sure, one wherein all of the major denominations of Judaism were created, all of which revolved around the perceived relationship between Jews and non-Jewish ideas and culture. While none of this was unique to the nineteenth century—Jews after all had been intimately involved in other cultures since at least the first century CE—what was new was the creation of a distinct field devoted to the academic study of Judaism in general and medieval Jewish philosophy in particular. Methods supplied by larger disciplinary frameworks such as history and philology formed the context for this new endeavor. *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, the predecessor to the modern field of Jewish studies, also established many of the categories and subdisciplines—medieval Jewish philosophy, Kabbalah, rabbinics, *parshanut* (i.e., biblical exegesis), and so on—that continue to structure how premodern Jewish texts are categorized and studied both in North America and Israel. In addition to these rubrics, the non-Jewish temporal periodizations of medieval Jewish philosophy, which continue to be employed, were also developed to subdivide medieval Jewish philosophy: Platonic, Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Averroistic, humanist, and so on.

While recent years have witnessed many new trends and developments in the more general study of the Middle Ages, many of these trends and developments have made few or no inroads into the field of medieval Jewish philosophy. The field continues to develop largely along the technical and insular lines laid out by *Wissenschaft des Judentums* over a century and a half ago. Despite the increased intersection between medieval studies and the larger humanities in which they are located, the study of medieval Jewish philosophy remains a fairly technical and unwelcoming field. The present volume seeks to redress this oversight by providing what we believe to be a set of new and critical investigations into the study of medieval Jewish philosophical texts by focusing on the important role of genre.

This overwhelming evidence on a generically constructed "medieval Jewish philosophy" too often overlooks the ways in which ideas contained within the texts associated with them are presented, articulated, and developed. While this may be forgiven in the modern period, in which philosophy tends to be written in technical monographs and disseminated through university presses, this has not always been the case. The medieval period, for example, witnessed a host of different genres and forms to express, to communicate, and to teach the more technical aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Because of this diversity of genres, proper attention must be paid to the various literary forms of these texts and not just their contents. It is not insignificant, for example,

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

that some philosophers chose to express their ideas using the genre of dialogues, that some did so using poetic meter, or that others chose to present their ideas through commentaries of either earlier philosophers or sacred scripture.

Such literary genres, of course, need not mean that the contents are not philosophical. However, too often within Jewish studies that deal with the medieval period, "nontraditional" genres are written off as unoriginal and then subsequently lumped into another subfield created by *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, such as *parshanut* or poetry. It is frequently assumed, for example, that a philosophical commentary is an unoriginal genre because it simply restates, albeit in different language, that which is found in an earlier composition (be it Plato, Aristotle, Maimonides, or Averroes). Such an assumption, however, overlooks the often extremely original and creative ideas embedded in the genre. Indeed, one could even go so far as to claim that the genre provides a certain conservative cover under which innovative or even dangerous ideas could be expressed. A similar case could be made for poetry. Today there is a tendency to think, and this may well be part of our Platonic inheritance bequeathed to us by our *Wissenschaft* forebears, that poetry is the antithesis of philosophy. Yet we all know that Plato was an expert in mythopoesis, and that some of the great Islamic philosophers, such as Al-Farabi and Avicenna, argued for the philosophic importance of the genre. Such a conceit also ignores the fact that many medieval Jewish philosophers—especially the Neoplatonists associated with the Andalusí tradition—were highly accomplished poets and made a conscious effort to write their philosophy in poetic style. This does not mean they were inept philosophers, as Hermann Cohen implied, but, as Aaron Hughes argues in his chapter devoted to poetry, these philosophers felt that the poetic medium offered a particular way of thinking about the cosmos and metaphysics that the standard philosophical treatise fundamentally lacked.

A renewed attention to genre shows us to what extent medieval thinkers made connections between the literary, the exegetical, the philosophical, and the mystical—three spheres that *Wissenschaft des Judentums* tore asunder and made into separate subdisciplines. However, this artificial and retroactive distinction betrays both the creativity and what we today call the "interdisciplinarity" of medieval philosophical thought. In order to correct some of these wrongs, we have commissioned chapters from some of the leading voices currently engaged in the study of medieval Jewish philosophy. The result, *Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Its Literary Forms*, is meant to challenge many of the conventions that have grown up around the field and to simultaneously set an outline for new and future research into the material. In so doing, we also hope to widen the scope of what gets to count as medieval Jewish philosophy. Rather than perpetuate tradition and confine analysis to the usual suspects—such as Solomon ibn Gabirol, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, and Gersonides—we hope that a renewed attentiveness to genre might open up the traditional canon. Unfortunately, it is the types of assumptions documented above that were responsible for constituting that canon in the first place. Maimonides's *Guide* is the perfect example. Although Leo Strauss famously defined it as a book of biblical exegesis,¹ it has nevertheless been held up by generations of scholars as the most original work of medieval Jewish philosophy. While there can be no denial of this treatise's importance, its elevation may come at the expense of other works and other thinkers, most of whom are imagined either as leading up to Maimonides or as his subsequent epigones. This can be seen in the overwhelming volume of secondary works published on Maimonides to the detriment of other medieval Jewish thinkers.

This is certainly not to deny that there exist several important introductory books, edited collections, and monographs devoted to some of the more technical features of medieval Jewish philosophy. Very few of them, however, focus specifically on genre. We would further not be so bold as to imply that no work has been done on the role of several literary forms employed by medieval Jewish philosophers. Much important work has been done, for example, on the genres of

commentary on the Bible, commentary on rabbinic Aggadah, dialogue, encyclopedias, sermons, and poetry, to name a few. What is unique about the present volume is the sustained theoretical focus on all of these forms, an abiding interest in the various ways that genres produce content, and an attentiveness to the various contexts in which this occurs. When taken as a whole, as opposed to considering individual parts, we are able to see some of the lines that connect these diverse genres, thereby appreciating how these literary forms develop and disseminate philosophical ideas and, in the process, what features they have in common.

Within this context, our goal as editors has been to assemble a leading team of internationally recognized scholars and to charge them with the task of writing a chapter on a particular genre or literary form. While chapters are rooted in medieval sources, they are also forward-looking, and authors are not afraid to engage with more modern issues in both literary studies and contemporary philosophy. The end result is a unified collection that seeks to reframe some of the questions traditionally asked of

both medieval and modern Jewish philosophy and to begin the process of breathing new life into a field of study that has unfortunately remained isolated from some of the larger frames of analysis supplied by the humanities.

MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND ITS LITERARY FORMS has several aims. Our primary goal is to create a new path into the field of medieval Jewish philosophy by developing a set of questions about form as well as content and by focusing on how an argument is presented in addition to the actual argument. Whereas we possess many studies that focus on the latter, our claim is that we also need to spend time contextualizing and assessing the former. How a philosophical (or indeed any) text generates an argument is intimately connected to the argument itself. The frame and what is framed cannot be neatly extracted from each other. Instead, an appreciation of the complex entanglements between genre and content shows us the ways texts are imagined and constructed and the purposes for which they are written. In this way we see something of the larger contexts of medieval Jewish philosophy. Do Jewish philosophers, for example, employ genres that are similar to or different from those of non-Jewish philosophers? If similar, do they deviate in important ways from the others and, if so, for what purposes? Likewise, if Jewish thinkers compose philosophical treatises using genres that differ from the majority, why do they do so and again for what purposes?

Second, a sustained analysis of genre and literary form illumines the social construction of meaning. Rather than imagine philosophical treatises as existing in hermetically sealed and timeless bubbles, the chapters that follow demonstrate clearly that philosophy takes place in specific communities and often in response to distinct concerns within them. Despite the claims of many philosophers, philosophy is not an unembodied and timeless activity. Instead, individuals who write philosophy are connected to and embedded in real communities. Within these contexts, philosophical texts are written with specific audiences in mind and as a way to persuade them of a particular position. It is thus important to understand the connections between philosophers and their social and intellectual environments. Our goal in the present volume is to understand how various literary forms relate to the social production and dissemination of philosophy.

Third, we hope to create a new understanding of medieval Jewish philosophy by opening it up to questions supplied by other fields, such as literary studies, religious studies, and medieval studies. Within this context, we seek to develop an analytical framework that will focus not just on a text's content, as mentioned, but also upon the form wherein that content is expressed. An understanding of genre, the way in which an argument is framed and constructed, is just as important as the argument. With so many genres to choose from, why did certain philosophers choose one over another? Why, for example, are some arguments framed as dialogues as opposed to poems, and vice

versa? What does the literary and technical structure of a dialogue provide an argument that a poem cannot?

Fourth, most the chapters focus on some of the minor or at least lesser known thinkers of medieval Jewish philosophy. Many of these thinkers were often seen as unoriginal or epigonic precisely on account of the genres in which they expressed themselves. By examining them and their treatises, we hope to widen the canon of medieval Jewish philosophy. In this sense, we sincerely hope that our volume will function as an accessible and nontechnical introduction to the breadth of medieval Jewish philosophy by focusing on one aspect of its production—that of genre. <>

UNVEILING THE HIDDEN—ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: DIVINATORY PRACTICES AMONG JEWS BETWEEN QUMRAN AND THE MODERN PERIOD edited by Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum [Series: Prognostication in History, Brill, 9789004445062]

In **UNVEILING THE HIDDEN—ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: DIVINATORY PRACTICES AMONG JEWS BETWEEN QUMRAN AND THE MODERN PERIOD**, Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum collect ten studies based on primary sources ranging from Qumran to the modern period and covering Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The studies show Jews practising divination (astrology, bibliomancy, physiognomy, dream requests, astral magic, etc.) and implementing the study and practice of the prognostic arts in ways that allowed Jews to make them "Jewish," by avoiding any conflict with Jewish law or halakhah. These studies focus on the Jewish components of this divination, providing specific firsthand details about the practices and their practitioners within their cultural and intellectual contexts—as well as their fears, wishes, and anxieties—using ancient scrolls and medieval manuscripts in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Judaeo-Arabic.

Contributors are Michael D. Swartz, Helen R. Jacobus, Alessia Bellusci, Blanca Villuendas Sabaté, Shraga Bar-On, Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas, Amos Geula, Dov Schwartz, Joseph Ziegler, and Charles Burnett.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Tables for the Transliteration of Hebrew and Arabic Characters

Notes on the Contributors

Introductory Essay: Divination in Jewish Cultures—Some Reflections on the Subject of This Book Author: Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas

Chapter 1 Divination as Transaction: Rhetorical and Social Dimensions of Ancient Jewish Divination Texts Author: Michael D. Swartz

Chapter 2 Aramaic Calendars in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Question of Divination Author: Helen R. Jacobus

Chapter 3 Jewish Oneiric Divination: From Daniel's Prayer to the Genizah Še'ilat Ḥalom Author: Alessia Bellusci

Chapter 4 The Judeo-Arabic Version of the Pitron Ḥalomot ("Interpretation of Dreams") Attributed to Ḥai Gaon Author: Blanca Villuendas Sabaté

Chapter 5 If You Seek to Take Advice from the Torah, It Will Be Given: Jewish Bibliomancy through the Generations Author: Shraga Bar-On

Chapter 6 Judah bar Barzillai and His Role in Abraham bar Ḥiyya's Letter on Astrology

Author: Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas

Chapter 7 Abraham bar Ḥiyya's Letter to Judah bar Barzillai—Translation Authors: Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Amos Geula

Chapter 8 Maimonides on Magic, Astral Magic, and Experimental Science Author: Dov Schwartz

Chapter 9 On the Various Faces of Hebrew Physiognomy as a Prognostic Art in the Middle Ages Author: Joseph Ziegler

Chapter 10 Inscriptio characterum: Solomonian Magic and Paleography With an Appendix on the Making of the Grimoire by Nicholas Pickwoad Author: Charles Burnett

Bibliography

Indexes

The Inevitable Presence of Divination in Culture

This monograph opens with a quotation from a Spanish contemporary poet in which the poetic *persona* complains about his inability to get good peaches from a market stall. He has never cared about distinguishing peaches by their visible colors—yellow and red—, so how will he be able to distinguish good from bad, these qualities being even less apparent to the eye? This inability to be mindful of visible details in order to discern hidden qualities—he confesses—is the root of all his misfortunes, but it does not prevent him from continuing to demand good peaches from other people, namely, the fruit seller. Is he wise in deeming the fruit seller an expert in distinguishing good from bad (fruit), or is he just leaving his decision to someone else? Whichever the case, is it not perhaps his attitude and corresponding assumption the root of all his misfortunes—namely, his dependence on the knowledge of others? The subject of this book, inquiring—from others or by means that are not entirely within one's reach—about what is hidden or unknown (whether these be the future, secrets, or far away things), reminded me of this poem and the paradoxical circumstances of its poetic *persona*.

Divination was a controversial subject in some religions and societies, but a careful eye cannot fail to detect the persistence of this phenomenon in most cultures. Why do people want to anticipate the future or uncover what is hidden? The answer is apparent: to avoid errors in the important decisions of life, to have some advantage over chance and the unexpected, to improve a given situation with reliable decisions, to make easy money, to keep only trustworthy friends, to choose the right partner, etc. Not all of those who practice divination or believe in omens and portents have the same understanding about the state of things in the world and the result of individual actions, what one might call fate. The divinatory phenomenon seems to work within different mental attitudes regarding past, present, and future events, for instance a *hard* or a *soft* version of fate as regards the future (using modern terminology and leaving room for a spectrum between the two). In the *hard* version nothing can be changed, while in the *soft* version there is a possibility of changing the outcome or of adapting or preparing oneself for whatever is anticipated. These different understandings of fate are usually not referred to explicitly or discussed in the context of the divinatory performance and are likelier to emerge in theological and philosophical discussions disconnected from actual practices. However, careful analysis of the specific divinatory practice and the use of the language and terminology of the practitioner and his/her client can reveal underlying beliefs and assumptions regarding fate and the role of human choices. The ancient *heimarmene* of the early Stoics—"the compulsion/necessity" of the stars or "interdependence of causes" in the universe—left room mainly for a *hard* version, while the interrogational astrology outlined by Dorotheus Sidonius implied that individual fate is not completely determined and divination can help to mold it. This is not the place to discuss these long and contradictory traditions, which do not concern only Judaism or divination, but also other cultures and other human endeavors. Nevertheless, we can say that most Jewish divinatory practices presented and discussed in this book

seem to work in a more or less *hard* understanding of fate, although—as several examples mentioned in its chapters show—the belief was that Jews can tip the balance to a *softer* version when they live within the path indicated by their religion.

In the Middle Ages, astrology was classified among the empirical and mathematical sciences, although it was also frequently considered an art rather than a science. Along these lines, the Iberian astronomer Abraham bar Hiyya (twelfth century), considered astrology an art based on experience whose results are not always accurate. But astrology was also considered as one of the highest forms of divinatory technique, because it deals with signs coming from the highest levels of the universe (stars and planets). Similar classifications of divination are used in Christian Latin sources; for example, the twelfth-century Iberian translator Dominicus Gundisalpinus defined divination as conjectural knowledge of the future based on human opinion (i.e., probable knowledge), and the Dominican Albertus Magnus (thirteenth century) interpreted prognostic knowledge as knowledge based on conjecture (conjectural knowledge). Fidora reflects on this classification in his interesting introduction to a monograph on the epistemology of medieval divination. As interesting as Fidora's study is, its understanding concerns a limited selection of Christian Latin authors, disciplines (astrology, medicine, and meteorology), and a very specific definition of divination (as only knowledge of the future).

Even a superficial glance at divinatory practices among medieval Jews reveals that not all practitioners and clients of divination undertook the divinatory performance with the same assumptions of what they were doing and why it might work. There are important differences in terms of the epistemology that underlies the different divinatory practices that were in use, an assertion that also applies to divinatory practices in other cultures and religions. Those practices based on randomness (bibliomancy), those based on technical knowledge (astrology, physiognomy, palmistry), and those based on a combination of both (for instance, astrological geomancy) evidently operated within different epistemological frameworks that need further study beyond the specific cases that have received scholarly attention so far. Differences also emerge in the gap between learned or sophisticated forms of practices (any of those previously mentioned) and folk or popular forms of them (e.g., onomancy, omens, etc.). Gundisalpinus' and Albertus Magnus' understandings of divination do not do justice to the complex and multicultural phenomenon of divination and the different forms in which it was practiced in the medieval period. Their approach excludes inspired divination and divination based on randomness, as well as mixed forms of divination—all practices that were in use in the Middle Ages.⁴ These definitions also exclude a divination that is intended not to know the future, but rather what is hidden or unknown, whether it be something in the past, the present, or the future.

As for the specific nature of the divinatory signs, which are the stuff of all divination, technical or inspired—a sign or a message has to be interpreted not just in technical, but also in inspired divination when the message is not directly given. Depending on their understanding, signs determine whether divination is considered a non-science (in the Aristotelian understanding), or a conjectural or non-Aristotelian science (in Gundisalpinus' view) in which the practitioners consider that divinatory/prognostic signs indicate but do not cause what they indicate. Nonetheless, divinatory signs deserve careful study, for their role in Jewish and non-Jewish sources is complex and at times even contradictory. It is clear that some signs are just signs (e.g., any geomantic figure) or symptoms (as in medicine), while others seem to have some causal role depending on the authors and the disciplines (e.g., stars can work as secondary or intermediate causes in astrology). Furthermore divinatory signs are more often than not perceived as unquestionable, unequivocal, and infallible in their roles either as signs or as causes, and thus human interpretation is considered the main reason for mistakes in judgments related to divination. It is possible to classify divinatory practices according to the sign that is observed or perceived and then interpreted. The sign can be natural, spontaneous,

or constructed or sought (as in lecanomancy, referred to in Chapter Seven of this book). It can be normal (the regular periodical movements of the stars, or non-periodical like the croaking of a raven) or abnormal (like monsters, comets, etc.). It can be established as a sign *a priori* (a pre-coded sign), *a posteriori* (one decides that something is a sign after perceiving it), or simultaneously. The semiology of divination is a topic that rarely emerges in scholarship, except in the form of case studies, which gives a very partial and biased insight into their nature and status.

We need more sources to be edited and published and more case studies analyzed before we can obtain a more accurate general picture of this intriguing human inclination to fathom the unknown by pushing the limits of human knowledge, especially now that divination and other *dark* disciplines have become a licit (if not *respected*) scholarly subject.

Criteria and Limitations of the Approaches in This Book

At the end of the long process that is reading, properly understanding, organizing, and creating a common structure from the different subjects collected in this book, we realized two paradoxes: first of all, it is not at all easier to be a historian than a diviner; and secondly, somehow it is a less complicated task to write a book than to edit one. We can predict with a high degree of accuracy that not everybody (authors, editors, and readers) will find what they are expecting here, but let us hope that ultimately we are better historians than diviners!

As previously said, this monograph emerged from a workshop, with most of its chapters stemming from the papers presented at it; other papers were requested and added later during the collection of the contributions in an effort to reflect as much as possible the catalogue of divinatory practices available and used in Jewish cultures. We were more interested in actual divinatory practices, both the variety of ways used to unveil what is hidden and unknown, and with how Jews understood their divinatory practices within the frame of contemporary religion, philosophy, and science. I think both aspects are well (though partially) reflected in this book (the former in Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five, Eight, and Nine, the latter in Chapters One, Six, and Seven). It is, however, apparent that further research in both dimensions must be pursued in order to get a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the divinatory phenomenon in pre-modern societies, cultures, and mentalities.

Given that divination seems to be a human phenomenon in all periods and cultures, the choice of the papers was determined—following the workshop—by the focus on what might be specifically Jewish about the forms of divination that Jews practiced, some of which are still in use. Divination, prognostication, and manticism are used in this book as synonyms. Bar-On (Chapter Five) and Ziegler (Chapter Nine) are the only ones to use the term “manticism” to denote divination, perhaps because the authors of these chapters are aware of certain connotations in the root of the word “divination” that they prefer to avoid. Prognostication, as Ziegler uses it (Chapter Nine), is a term more connected to medicine and related to physiognomy and its non-divinatory aspects.

The field of Jewish divination has inherent limits but also a huge scope, and is still barely explored, as Villuendas Sabaté (Chapter Four) makes clear in relation to dream divination: her account implies that between the Babylonian Talmud, the first example of a Jewish dream book, and the last, most famous, dream handbook by Solomon Almoli (1516), the study of Jewish medieval dream books remains virtually unexplored. She concludes that more critical editions and further study are necessary to understand the transmission and connections of dream divination in medieval Arabic and related cultures. A similar conclusion can be applied to the remaining forms of divination described or mentioned in this book: we need to collect and analyze more case studies in order to understand how, why, and what for.

In this monograph, two necessary self-restrictions are evident in the table of contents and the titles of the different chapters. One restriction is temporal and relates to the decision to exclude the Biblical period and its contexts, which are so rich in this respect. Divinatory practices in the Bible have long been discussed in the context of Biblical scholarship, as well as in books and articles dealing with ancient Near Eastern religions, though this should not imply that there is nothing left to refute, confirm, or discover: for instance, the highly relevant connection of prophecy with divination, and especially with inspired divination might need further research. Notwithstanding the stated omission of Biblical divination, forms of divination mentioned in the Hebrew Bible are still present everywhere in this monograph within the context of discussions about the legitimacy of divination in Jewish religion, and Biblical sources are quoted, cited, and used with this purpose in several chapters of this book (notably, Chapters Three and Seven). The convenor of the workshop is a medievalist, and medieval divinatory practices, underexplored in Jewish culture, were her main interest, though some latitude was allowed for studies dealing with antiquity (Chapters One and Two) and the modern period (Chapter Five). Readers should keep in mind that this is the first book in the field of Jewish studies dealing exclusively with divination among Jews, as its title makes clear, and only for that it is already an important contribution.

The other self-restriction is methodological, resulting from the absence in this book of any discussion about the definition of divination and its relation to magic. Magic is a popular subject in the field of Jewish studies, perhaps due to the long historical association of Jews with it. Possibly divination's neglect in general scholarship is exacerbated by its overlapping with magic, which in some cases is clearly indistinguishable, and not only in Jewish sources. The end of Chapter One discusses this overlap of magic and divination, which might have been customary in ancient and medieval times (see also Chapter Eight), but the fact is that some medieval Jewish authors saw them as very different fields (see Chapters Six and Seven), at least in the intention of the practitioner and the forces being put to work. Bellusci, following Gideon Bohak and others, considers dream-requests and divination in general to be a branch of magic (she calls dream-requests a "magical technique" several times in her chapter). The relationships of divination and magic need further clarification, especially regarding certain forms of divination in which non-human or angelic revelation plays no role at all (for example, astrology as in Chapters Six and Seven, physiognomy as in Chapter Nine, geomancy, etc.), though divination always operates in Jewish cultures within a more or less theocentric understanding of the universe. Did ancient and medieval practitioners consider both kinds of practices—magical and divinatory—as identical, similar, or just related? This is a highly complex question that indirectly emerges in this book and awaits further research.

A few excellent monographs dealing with magic in Judaism have been cited in this book (these can be found in the general bibliography); however, none of these books extensively discusses the relationship between magic and divination, considering both as one single category, magic. Though this assumption could be questioned, most authors wrote their chapters with the understanding that there is no separation between magic and divinatory practices, but the author of the twelfth-century Hebrew text translated in Chapter Seven was very concerned with this separation.

In theory, magic and divination might look like closely related fields separated only by their goals. On a simplistic level, one might say that knowledge is the purpose of divination, even if its acquisition is frequently intended to change things in the world, while action/change/control of the world and its beings would be the main purpose of magic. However, magic and divination historically frequently overlapped in practice, for instance in astral magic or in the knowledge of the hidden and the future attained by revelatory means (for instance, in dream-requests and bibliomancy). Magic and divination can both be considered forms of technology; some form of control is the intended purpose in both and their knowledge is built upon experience and tradition, though also upon divine inspiration. Hence, they are both technical knowledge in different degrees, depending on the specific form of the

practice and the expectations of the practitioners and their clients. They can also be understood, in certain cases, as forms of science, especially considering that in ancient and medieval times *science* denoted just *knowledge*, any knowledge, contrary to the very specific meaning of the modern concept, based in mathematics (measure) and the experimental method (repeatability of the same phenomena under the same conditions).

Many of the chapters let us glimpse how intrinsic the assistance of non-human or spiritual beings might be to the diviner in attaining the desired knowledge about the future or the hidden. All the divinatory techniques explained in this book are either forms of technical or deductive (also known as artificial or mechanical) divination, and natural or emotive (also known as inspired) divination (for example, divination by possession or oracles), or a combination of both. What separates technical from natural is the training required by the performer of technical divination, who needs the tools of deductive thought to attain a result and, above all, his/her independence from non-human beings and means to achieve the intended knowledge. Nevertheless, inspired or natural divination also requires some sort of technique or experience in order to get an answer (as in Chapter Three). These questions should be considered in more depth in future research, for they concern not only Jewish divinatory practices but the phenomenon of divination in general in all cultures and periods. Diviners are technicians, just like magicians.

The diviner who forecasts when possessed by the god has no possibility of being wrong (only of being misunderstood, as many examples in ancient sources show), while technicians of any sort can always make mistakes either in the procedure or in the interpretation, so that they need a long training period to become experts through study and experience. Diviners perform their art and display their expertise and knowledge before clients but also before their peers, other fellow diviners, who confirm or refute their expertise. Certain divinatory performances (like astrology, geomancy, dream interpretation, etc.) imply some sort of negotiation of meaning, just as in any dialogic situation between people. If the speech of the diviner turns out to be unrelated to the circumstances of the client, it is always possible to work retrospectively and correct previous inaccurate or wrong answers in the light of the new information provided by both, or by changing the questions, for wrong questions can invalidate the whole process. It is unfortunate (but significant) that most of the time this dialogical process, and, in general, the process of interpretation is neither written nor described in manuscripts or printed texts. We frequently are given just a few sentences that do not help much in reconstructing the actual scenario and dialogue of the divinatory seance. The dialogic character of technical divination allows us to consider it a form of rationality, just as Marcel Sigrist holds for magic.

It is also pertinent to keep in mind that there is an important body of material culture that illuminates different and unexpected aspects of divination that do not emerge in textual sources and frequently escape the attention of scholars. An attentive reader will notice the explicit mention or the silent necessary presence of divinatory artifacts in some of the chapters, though almost all the studies take a textual approach to their respective subjects. As Chapter One (Swartz) enunciates it, divination is “a quest of meaning” and it looks for signification in everyday objects and events, but most material aspects of divinatory practices are not to be found in texts. Notwithstanding, the physicality of the divinatory act is, in some practices, very clear, for instance in the handling of books in bibliomantic contexts (Chapter Five) or in the use of specific materials and their handling in magical performances (Chapter Ten), in horoscopes calculated and frequently drawn on paper or parchment for astrology (Chapters Six and Seven); as well as, in other senses, in the facial and corporeal signs that have to be interpreted in physiognomy (Chapter Nine), or the lists of specific signs and their corresponding specific meanings in dream handbooks and lottery books (Chapters Three and Five, respectively). Chapter Ten focuses directly on the materiality of its topic, with a complete immersion in the most material aspects of the kind of magic that relies on writing names

(using skins, inks, writing tools, etc), a practice which seems to be especially associated with Jews or Jewish figures (notably, King Solomon).

Comparative approaches are frequent, especially with Christian and Islamic cultures. Chapter Three gives keys for understanding the historical background of dream-requests in antiquity (notably the Greek and Demotic magical papyri) and in the Middle Ages in both Jewish and non-Jewish sources (Arabic *istikāra* in *ḥadīth* literature and dream requests in magical Latin texts). Dream-requests can be studied not only in the long tradition of dream divination in ancient and medieval Near-Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations, but in the context of an extensive tradition of interrogational systems for decision-making, in which the Arabic *masā'il* and the Hebrew *še'ilot* (both of which deal with different systems to get an answer) are clearly placed. Further research could explore this approach, with possible roots in Babylonian sources of the second millennium BCE: one of the Akkadian words denoting a diviner is *ša'ilu* ("one who asks or questions"), which suggests that *the art of divining* might have started and developed as *the art of inquiring*, the art of "framing a question" in such a way that the given answer would be clear and unambiguous. With this in mind, a clear difference should also be made among divinatory practices according to the kind of answer they can provide: a yes or no answer to a definite question resulting from a procedure based on revelation or randomness, or a more complex answer resulting from a more or less long and complex interpretational process performed by a specific diviner. As Guillaume put it: the former can only answer the question *shall*, while the latter can answer the question *what*. It was not infrequent in medieval divination for the client to ask the diviner to provide not only the answer to a question, but sometimes also the question itself, often with the intention of testing the expertise of the diviner, as Judah al-Ḥarizi's *maqama* shows.

Physical books and written words are read or heard in different divinatory contexts (Chapters One, Three, and Five), and these could be combined. Thus it is possible to find bibliomancy at the heart of an oneirocritic episode, so that the forecast would be given by a Biblical verse heard during a dream (examples in Chapters Three and Five). Astrology is present in our volume under different aspects (Chapters Two, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight), and a physical artifact associated with its practice (an astrolabe) is briefly mentioned in Chapter Six. Chapter Two gives an idea of how astrological anticipation was dependent on tables and written calculations, which are, in the end, artifacts of a written variety. Chapter Six mentions the use of astronomical data in Bar Ḥiyya's *Letter*, which must have been available in the form of tables or through the use of an astronomical instrument. Furthermore, instruments in Chapter Two are mentioned as evidence. Qumran scrolls 4Q208–4Q209 present "gates" numbered 1 to 6 that Jacobus contends are here synonymous with the zodiac signs. She completes the fragmentary calendar in these scrolls and proposes that it synchronizes a lunar year of 354 days with a solar year of 360 days. The gates of this calendar refer to twelve points of a local horizon where the sun rises, which—using the astrological notion of the ascendant—she makes equivalent to the twelve zodiac signs, i.e., the horizon-based zodiac system of Babylonian MUL.APIN astronomy. Jacobus underpins her hypothesis with evidence found in astronomical Greco-Roman instruments. One of the editors is working on medieval scientific instruments and is familiar with the use of different devices in prognostication and divination contexts. The use of instruments in these contexts can give us an insight into the actual practice that very frequently is not in texts and can confirm how *real* the actual practice was, as well as providing daily-life details about the specific performances.

This book cannot and did not intend to examine all the forms of divination practiced among Jews, so that some widespread practices are mentioned only briefly (palmistry, geomancy, scrying, etc.). However, the second part of Bar Ḥiyya's *Letter* translated in Chapter Seven constitutes a treasure of divinatory practices certainly known if not practiced by many of Bar Ḥiyya's contemporaries (both

Jews and non-Jews). Some of these missing practices are shown in images as they appear in Hebrew manuscripts (notably, geomancy and palmistry, see Figures in pp. 260 and 332, respectively).

It is possible to find underlying epistemological connections among different prognostication practices. In Chapter One Swartz, who follows Richard Gordon's four characteristics for building the authority of a practitioner in a healing event—namely, empirical knowledge, prestige of traditional knowledge, ritual actions, and verbal utterances or charms—finds an identity between the states of the person consulting a healer and the person consulting a diviner. Furthermore, the Jewish text translated in Chapter Seven compares the practice of astrologers choosing the right moment to perform an activity with that of physicians who choose the right drug to treat an illness. It is relevant to remember that medicine was likewise considered a prognostic art or science.

Swartz, who approaches ancient and early medieval Jewish divination within the larger framework of ancient divination, underscores our reliance on textual sources to know and understand divination in the ancient world (Chapter One). The exclusively textual approach of this book allows readers to realize some linguistic aspects of Jewish divinatory texts (though not exclusive to Jews). Chapter One opens with the frequently under-acknowledged fact that divination is also “a field of literature,” which Swartz confirms with examples taken from Qumran to the medieval period, notably through the introductions and preliminary prayers distinctive of magic and divinatory texts, which root them in a long and legitimate Jewish tradition. The language and style of these texts and what they might have in common with similar texts in other cultural and linguistic traditions are sources about the nature, scope, and roles of these practices in Jewish societies.

Chapters Three and Four, dealing with dream divination, are, consequently, focused on the philological: they include the edition and translation of several Genizah fragments in Hebrew and Judaeo-Arabic, respectively, but they also analyse the language and the structure of these specific divinatory texts. Chapter Three (Bellusci) considers Hebrew recipes (instructions) and finished products (part of the ritual) of the dream-request, which are equally based on ritual sleep (the necessary condition for experiencing the ritual dream) and linguistic magic (adjurations, invocations, magical formulae, and prayers, many of them consisting of clusters of Biblical verses). This linguistic aspect of dream-requests allows Bellusci to make an illuminating analysis of the language, verbal constructions, and prayers that are distinctive of these Genizah texts, pinpointing their proximity to the language of mysticism, liturgy, and magic. Chapter Four (Villuendas Sabaté) presents the topic in the context of a “cross-cultural written legacy of dream symbol codification” dating back to 2000 BCE, which also shares the linguistic expression of dream *omina* in the form of conditional sentences (“if you see x, y will happen”), also noticed by Bellusci in the expression of dream-requests. Villuendas Sabaté distinguishes between earlier dream books (lists of symbols and their meanings in conditional form) and later dream treatises (expanded versions of the former that include more materials related to the interpretation of the dream). Villuendas Sabaté perceptively notes that dreambooks are composed of “units that can be easily isolated and then relocated elsewhere within the text or transferred to others,” which is explained by their formulaic language, the recurrence of lists, and the weakness or absence of textual coherence that characterizes this literary genre. This structure might be applicable to most kinds of divinatory texts and their formulae, but this remains the subject of future research.

Finally, is there something specifically Jewish in the divinatory practices described and analysed in this book? Chapter One (Swartz) is quite right in not placing any emphasis on differences between cultures and religions regarding divinatory practices, although he points out that, in contrast to other ancient civilizations that institutionalized divination, Jewish divination (except for a short period with the *urim* and *tummim* of the high priest) was always a private business. It remained a private business throughout the Middle Ages, even when divination was performed in courtly contexts for the sake

of rulers and princes. Bar-On forthrightly acknowledges “the inevitable presence of manticism in the Jewish tradition” in Chapter Five: divination and prognostication are an ubiquitous phenomenon in Jewish cultures, from Biblical times up to the present, albeit with bans, discussions, nuances, and conflicts that depend on the author and the period. However, it is still clearly a Jewish phenomenon, too, because it happens among Jews and in distinctive Jewish contexts. Bar-On, Bellusci, and Villuendas Sabaté underscore the persistence of these divinatory techniques even up to present times. Are there specific Jewish forms of divination? This is another topic needing further research.

Some chapters (One, Three, Five, and Nine) suggest that certain divinatory practices have a long tradition among Jews and might have an origin in Biblical times, but most practices seem to be Jewish adaptations or Jewish developments of divinatory practices that were not originally Jewish; more research would clarify their history. These adaptations or developments took on a Jewish flavor to fit Jewish religious and customs, possibly to escape religious and social polemics and elude halakhic bans. Bar Ḥiyya (Chapter Seven) echoes the Jewish belief that Abraham was an astrologer, which certainly presents astrology as a distinctively Jewish science and art. The patriarch Joseph and the prophet Daniel practiced dream divination (Chapters Three and Four), which also presents this practice as genuinely Jewish. The *Book of Daniel* seems to be of paramount importance in the Jewish tradition (Chapters Three and Seven) and is frequently quoted in the context of dream-requests, though it remains uncertain whether there was a established Second Temple period tradition of Jewish oneiric divination.

Preliminary prayers and invocations (Chapters Three and Five) addressed to the God of Israel somehow made the practices *Jewish* and licit and certainly gave them a Jewish flavor. What is more concretely Jewish is the introduction of certain sources (Hebrew Bible, Talmud, Rabbinic literature) and figures (Moses, Abraham, King Solomon, etc. and later figures like Ḥai ben Sherira Gaon and Elijah Gaon of Vilna) in the discussion and the practice of divination. Another intriguing and distinctive feature of Jewish divination is the belief that Israel is entitled to a special communication with God, which separates it from the other nations of the world, as mentioned in Chapter One. This topic also figures prominently in Chapter Seven regarding the talmudic question about whether Israel has a star. As Bar Ḥiyya states in his *Letter*: “*Israel does not have a star*. This means that the righteous ones of Israel can nullify the stellar decrees that act upon them, by their righteousness and their prayers. The other nations of the world cannot do this.” Specifically Jewish ritual aspects are also fundamental in establishing the Jewish character of the practice (Chapters One, Three, and Five), even if ritualistic aspects in divinatory performances generally are present in all cultures and religions. These established ways of performing and validating the practice usually include preliminary prayers and serve to legitimate it. Bar-On (Chapter Five) classifies the ritual as “magical pietism” following a expression coined by Swartz (Chapter One), which Bellusci (Chapter Three, “magical piety”) also uses to denote the religious attitude of the practitioner of divination. It should be noted that prayer is especially important in the preparatory rituals preceding those forms of divination that rely more on revelation and randomness than on the technical and professional expertise of a diviner, though it can be found everywhere.



MS London British Library Or. 10878, fol. 17v (Hebrew fortune wheel). Collection of brief texts on astronomy, mathematics, music, and astrology (parchment, fifteenth century, Ashkenazi semi-cursive script). Image by permission of the British Library

Arrangement of the Chapters and Overview of Their Contents

As for the arrangement of the chapters, the order is roughly chronological according to their contents. Chapters One (Swartz) and Two (Jacobus) discuss the oldest forms of divination in

Judaism presented in this book, namely Second Temple practices dating before or around the turn of the eras—leaving aside references to divinatory practices in the Hebrew Bible that surface many times in different chapters (notably, Chapter Seven and Bar Ḥiyya’s discussion on Biblical terms related to divination and magic). Chapter One takes a theoretical and general approach which justifies its introductory position and gives context for the topics that follow. Chapter Two discusses Aramaic calendars in the fragmentary scrolls of Qumran. These calendars (which Jacobus has reconstructed) are based on a luni-solar cycle that considers the days of the lunar month that the sun and the moon entered the different signs of the zodiac and constitute a schematic zodiac ephemeris that can be easily adjusted for any date for all time. Jacobus’ proposal is that this ephemeris was used by the sectarians of Qumran to construct simple horoscopes using just the positions of the sun and the moon in the zodiac across a year of three-hundred and sixty days with twelve months of thirty days each. Most of the remaining chapters deal with the description of specific divinatory practices.

Thus Chapters Three and Four deal with dream divination. Bellusci (Chapter Three) studies Hebrew dream-requests in fragments of the Cairo Genizah, in which the client, after performing certain preparatory rituals (concerning the body of the sleeper and the sleeping place), inquires about a subject with an answer expected during the dream. This answer may come from a divine or angelic source, or from the interpretation of certain codified signs perceived in dreams. Villuendas Sabaté’s study (Chapter Four) focuses on a fragmentary dream handbook attributed to Ḥai ben Sherira Gaon in its Hebrew versions (Pseudo-Ḥai’s *Pitron ḥalomot*), which she reconstructs from eleven Judaeo-Arabic Genizah fragments, providing the edition, Hebrew parallel version, and English translation of the chapter dealing with bloodletting.

Chapter Five (Shraga Bar-On) discusses the divinatory practice known in Hebrew as *goralot*, an ambiguous Hebrew term that here denotes, specifically, bibliomancy, in the form that was most widespread among Jews, namely the use of the Hebrew Bible for decision-making.²⁵ Bar-On (quoting Van der Horst) shows that some form of bibliomancy might have been used in Qumran, but it remains unexplored how and why Jews passed from a specific and limited “Lot of the Torah” to broader and unspecific “lottery books” that seem to be a whole literary genre, expanding the use of Biblical texts to include other literary pieces of different (and perhaps non-Jewish) provenances. Though Bar-On states that bibliomancy was the most accepted form of divination among Jews, this is perhaps something to be discussed and explored in more detail given, for instance, the frequent occurrences of dream divination (Chapters Three and Four) and astrology (Chapters Two, Six, Seven, and Eight) in Jewish cultures.

Chapter Six (Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas) presents an introduction to the *Letter* (a *responsum*) that Abraham bar Ḥiyya addressed to Judah bar Barzillai, with the personal purpose of defending himself from an accusation of “consultation of Chaldeans” for supporting the use of electional astrology to choose the hour of a wedding. The broader and more ambitious purpose of the *Letter* is to defend astrology as a legitimate, beneficial, and required knowledge and practice for Jews. Because it uses halakhic language and arguments, this *Letter* becomes a very important document in the history of divination among Jews. Judah ben Barzillai is doubtless the addressee of the *Letter*, but he has been also identified as the objector by most scholars. Rodríguez-Arribas refutes this identity and concludes that the objector must have been a foreigner who attended the wedding.

Chapter Seven (Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Amos Geula) presents an English translation of Abraham bar Ḥiyya’s *Letter* to Judah bar Barzillai, whose basic features the previous chapter has already introduced. This *Letter* is an essential document to understand the halakhic strategies that allowed medieval Jews to learn and practice astrology.

Chapter Eight (Dov Schwartz) is a good companion piece to Chapters Six and Seven. While Chapters Six and Seven deal with the defense of astrology and the illicit character of other divinatory practices for Jews (those related to magic and some forms of *qesamim*), Chapter Eight deals with Maimonides' refutation of any form of divination and magic based in stellar knowledge. According to scholars, Maimonides forbade all kinds of magic in his halakhic works and in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, but Schwartz argues for some nuance in this position. Maimonides differentiated between professional (astral magic) and popular magic (non-astral magic); the former was the only one targeted in Maimonides' condemnation, but he did accept experiential science (*segullot*), whose knowledge can only be attained by experience, as long as it was unrelated to astral magic. The double classification of magic extends to idolatry, which also presents two forms, one learned (which involves astral magic) and the other popular (with no knowledge of astrology and relying only on the tradition or authority of others). The former is actual true idolatry while the latter is not, only resembling true idolatry. In Schwartz' view, Maimonides' major challenge was refuting the first form. Maimonides made a separation between *segullot* (true and halakhically permitted) and "the ways of the Amorite" (imaginary and banned) in the efficacious character of *segullot* confirmed by experience and unrelated to astrology with respect to Amorite practices.

Chapter Nine (Joseph Ziegler) deals with physiognomy in medieval Jewish and non-Jewish sources and discusses the increasing non-mantic character of this discipline, which places this practice closer to the fields of medicine, natural philosophy, and psychology than to divination. There is textual evidence that the Second Temple community at Qumran imported physiognomical knowledge which was clearly divinatory from Babylonia, and used it together with the zodiac sign of the person to determine the adequacy of candidates for membership in the sect. Similar practices, as well as chiromancy and metoposcopy, were also used among Merkavah and Hekhalot mystics to determine the qualities of applicants, in the Zohar and later kabbalistic movements, and among the *Hasidei Ashkenaz* to determine not only a man's character but also his future. These practices relied on mastering the techniques of the art but also on religious intuition and union with the divine intellect. Ziegler notes the "skewed understanding of Hebrew physiognomy by modern historians of Jewish thought and science, who stressed its mantic character and transposed it entirely to the realm of esoteric magic."

Chapter Ten (Charles Burnett) introduces the consideration of the material aspects of books of magic, namely the different skins and writing supports, inks, writing instruments, and bindings used in the making of these books and the ways in which these materials were selected and handled. The focus is on Latin books of magic dealing with those practices that the *Magister speculi* in the *Speculum astronomiae* considers "detestable," i.e., "spirits, demons, or jinns are summoned with these names." King Solomon appears especially associated with this category of talismanic magic that relies on "the writing of characters which have to be exorcised through certain names," i.e. magic that works through "writing names" rather than "speaking names out loud," which links this chapter with Jewish culture, as well as the use of magic to foretell future. The chapter closes with an Appendix by Nicholas Pickwold on the making of a grimoire as described in *The Four Rings of Solomon*, pinpointing the very specific material steps that underlay the process of making the grimoire. Burnett concludes that "the emphasis on writing ... is likely to reflect the character of the works originally written in Hebrew."

In conclusion, in spite of necessary omissions of content, what is covered in this book makes an intriguing and variegated display of what divination meant and implied in Jewish cultures (though not all Jewish cultures are equally represented here). With this volume we hope to open a window on some illuminating views, even if partial, of this enticing and neglected landscape of Jewish culture. <>

EMMANUEL LEVINAS'S TALMUDIC TURN: PHILOSOPHY AND JEWISH THOUGHT by Ethan Kleinberg [Cultural Memory in the Present, Stanford University Press, 9781503629448]

In this rich intellectual history of the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures in Paris, Ethan Kleinberg addresses Levinas's Jewish life and its relation to his philosophical writings while making an argument for the role and importance of Levinas's Talmudic lessons. Pairing each chapter with a related Talmudic lecture, Kleinberg uses the distinction Levinas presents between "God on Our Side" and "God on God's Side" to provide two discrete and at times conflicting approaches to Levinas's Talmudic readings. One is historically situated and argued from "our side" while the other uses Levinas's Talmudic readings themselves to approach the issues as timeless and derived from "God on God's own side." Bringing the two approaches together, Kleinberg asks whether the ethical message and moral urgency of Levinas's Talmudic lectures can be extended beyond the texts and beliefs of a chosen people, religion, or even the seemingly primary unit of the self. Touching on Western philosophy, French Enlightenment universalism, and the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition, Kleinberg provides readers with a boundary-pushing investigation into the origins, influences, and causes of Levinas's turn to and use of Talmud.

Review

"Can we read Levinas's work as wholly immanent to the history of philosophy, or must we see it as the worldly trace of a transcendent truth? Kleinberg explores this contest between history and revelation without presuming to declare the victor. A venturesome and ingeniously crafted book that confirms the author's leading role in modern European intellectual history." -- Peter Gordon
— *Harvard University*

"A boundary-pushing, interdisciplinary work, challenging scholars and students to think through and with the audacity of Levinas's claim for alterity." -- Sarah Hammerschlag — *University of Chicago*

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

Chronology of Levinas's Talmudic Lectures at the Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue française

Introduction: God on Our Side / God on God's Own Side

1 Being-Jewish, from The Temptation of Temptation Vilna to Paris (Shabbath, 88a and 88b)

2 The Alliance Israelite Old as the World Universelle, Shushani, (Sanhedrin, 36b-37a) and the Ecole Normale Israelite Universelle

3 The Talmudic Lectures at Beyond Memory the Colloque des intellectuels (Berakhot, 12b-13a) juifs de langue française

4 Hebrew into Greek: Contempt for the Torah as Idolatry Translation and Exemplarism (Sanhedrin, 99a and 99b)

Conclusion: Constitutive Dissymmetry

Notes

Index

Constitutive Dissymmetry

The question that vexes me and has vexed me throughout the writing of this book is one Fred Moten posed in *The Universal Machine*, why can't we let ourselves go? Why couldn't Levinas let

himself go? Clearly, his turn to the study of Talmud was marked and motivated by the issues of Jewish existence and identity after the Holocaust. The three strands of the braid—Western philosophy, Enlightenment Universalism, and Lithuanian Talmud—were woven together for the purpose of ensuring the survival of Judaism in the post-Holocaust world. In Levinas's Talmudic lectures, however, we encounter the ways in which the lessons he taught encourage us to let go of essentialist notions of identity based on a particular history or people. As we saw in Levinas's lecture "Beyond Memory," the primary lesson to be taken from Exodus is that we must work toward the future emancipation from servitude and enfranchisement of all humanity while the historical event of the exodus from Egypt is the secondary one. The emphasis is not on the self but on the other. Yet even here, the names of both Jacob and Israel are conserved as is the particular history: "'You will not be called Jacob, but your name will be Israel' does not mean that Jacob 'loses his place,' but that Israel will be his primary name and Jacob his secondary name" (BM 70, AS 95). In our everyday existence, is it even possible to let go of identity, character, personality, or nationality?

The particular history of Levinas's turn to Talmud in the years after the Holocaust and following World War II demonstrates the myriad ways that Levinas's Talmudic lectures and his related category of "being-Jewish," conceived in the confinement of a German prisoner of war camp, conserve an emphasis on identity, essentialism, and exemplarism that is in tension with the teachings of his Talmudic lectures and his philosophical works in general. As we saw at the end of chapter 3 and throughout chapter 4, this tendency created a blind spot in which Levinas conserved aspects of the authentic/inauthentic distinction inherited from the philosophy of Heidegger, which in turn enabled Levinas to afford a privileged and exemplary status to Judaism by emplotting its historical journey past religiosity, past atheism, and then back to a relation with God purged of immaturity or hubris. These retentions cannot be taken lightly because in the aftermath of the Holocaust, Levinas realized all too well the potential and actual danger of these constructs in both the Hegelian and Heideggerian form. And yet, it is because of the Holocaust that Levinas could not let go of Judaism for fear that the very annihilation assigned to the Jews by the Nazi final solution would come to be fulfilled by assimilation into the "modern" world.

This same desire to maintain Judaism and what he calls the ontological category of being-Jewish simultaneously motivate Levinas's commitment to ethics as first philosophy and the concomitant deposition of the self in favor of the other. For Levinas, Jewish Scriptures and their interpretations are what make such an ethics of alterity possible. "Alterity becomes proximity. Not distance, the shortest through space, but initial directness, which extends as unimpeachable approach in the call of the face of the other, in which there appears, as an order an inscription, a prescription, an awakening (as if it were a 'me'), responsibility—mine, for the other human being." Here we reach a seemingly intractable problem. The basis for the ethical lessons that Levinas asserts should apply to all humanity are only to be found in the reading of particular sacred texts and on the basis of a particular tradition of textual interpretation.

The role played by ethics in the religious relation allow us to understand the meaning of Jewish universalism. A truth is universal when it applies to every reasonable human being. A religion is universal when it is open to all. In this sense, the Judaism that links the Divine to the moral has always aspired to be universal. But the revelation of morality, which discovers a human society, also discovers the place of election, which, in this universal society, returns to the person who receives this revelation. This election is made up not of privileges but of responsibilities.

Any access to the universal ethics, of which Levinas writes, must be drawn from Judaism and from the reading of sacred Jewish texts.

Not just any reading of these texts but the strategy of interpretation offered by Levinas himself in what we can call the postrabbinic Lithuanian tradition. As we have seen, Levinas's dynamic reading of

Torah and Talmud, based in Jewish tradition and his tutelage under Shushani but also his particular training in philosophy, is the mechanism by which he attempts to recover what was destroyed in the Holocaust: the very academies and practitioners of the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition. It is also the means by which Levinas employs his own interpretative methods to make sense of Jewish scripture in a post-Holocaust world.

The problem of exemplarism, essentialism, and identity is further complicated by the creation of the State of Israel, the instantiation of an actual political state as opposed to a diasporic relation with God. In a short piece, "From the Rise of Nihilism to the Carnal Jew," written for the edited volume *D'Auschwitz á Israel, vingt ans a^res la Liberation from 1968*, Levinas ties these two historical events together.

There is a firm distinction between Israel understood as a relation with the Infinite and Israel understood as a modern state or a particular people. Israel as relation with God or the Infinite is on our side but as such is the opening to the other side. The means by which this relationship occurs for Levinas is through the study of Torah. "A God not incarnate, surely, but somehow inscribed, whose life, or a part of it, is being lived in the letters: in the lines and between the lines and in the exchange of ideas between the readers commenting upon them—where these letters come alive and are echoed in the book's precepts—ordering without enslaving, like truth—to answer in justice to one's fellow, that is, to love the other". Israel conceived as a modern political state or particular people exists only on our side and as such it is nonrelational and solipsistic. This Israel is akin to what Levinas calls idolatry. As in the discussion of the Exodus, the relational understanding of Israel should be the primary lesson while the state or people of Israel must be the secondary one. The Israel of state or people takes the Jew to be a category that belongs to a historically and culturally conditioned ontology. Israel as relation takes the Jew to be the relationship with the name for the infinite itself.

This is a shift in temporality from the past to the future and in emphasis from the particular to the universal even if the constitutive dissymmetry that is its condition will not allow for either to fully unfold. The past is always in the future and the future is always in the past. The meaning and the message is larger, more universal, than the particular individual, even if it is the particular individual or event that provides the impetus, the memory, to inspire the action. Each pushes the other forward wherein the good for the one is directed to the good for all but the good for all must always account for every one. It is innovation that liberates a meaning for the future from a tradition or memory of the past. To achieve human universality (and a universalism that extends beyond the human animal) we must be prepared to jettison our prior and proper identity, even if it is that very identity that provides the template by which we seek human universality, as was the case with Levinas's Judaism. The invisible universality of which Levinas speaks is a universality that begins and ends with the individual (it is enacted by the individual) but directed toward the other (a particular subject in a particular place and time). If all commit to such an ethics of deferral, we are in the kingdom of heaven on earth and it is in this sense that we are each the Messiah. "The Messiah is Myself; to be Myself is to be the Messiah.... Who finally takes on the suffering of others, if not the being who says 'Me.' The fact of not evading the burden imposed by the suffering of others defines ipseity itself. All persons are the Messiah." Messianicity. Of course, the humility at play recognizes the inhuman as well as the Inhuman, which undergirds the predisposition to self-sacrifice.

It is not enough to read about ethical action and responsibility or even to write about them. It is certainly not enough to claim affiliation with the people and texts Levinas sees as the model for such action. "That the mere fact of race is not a guarantee against evil, the Talmud saw and said better than anyone and with nearly unbearable force: the Jew without mitzvot is a threat to the world".

Actions are what count. It is not enough to recognize the grounds on which our institutions have been built and the peoples displaced or enslaved to do so. We must actually do the work to repair the future. This, of course, brings one perilously close to the "inaugurative structuring of the subject through persecution and ethical demand," but in the act of repair we are always close to identifying the subject as victim. The ethical imperative of constitutive dissymmetry destabilizes any such essentialist logic through the emphasis on self-sacrifice that conditions the vulnerability but the emphasis on the work, the mitzvot, that need to be done, the not yet. When one is cut off from the world to come, one is also cut off from the world in which one lives. By deactivating the possibility of justice in the future the idolaters threaten not only their future but also their present as well. By contrast, attention to the work that needs to be done in the future leads to action now.

The history of Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures is about identity and authority on one side or the other. The story can be told on our side by looking to the contextual circumstances, influences, and relations that led him to Talmud or in relation to the other side by accepting the possibility of a transcendent relation between God and Humans made manifest in a text. Working through this history on both registers forces one to think twice, to think differently. While this applies to the specific case of Levinas, asking one to think differently about Levinas is also asking one to think differently about everything. It is to consider an alternative logic of what makes sense and how the world works, which in turn questions the logic and stability of the assumptions we hold dear. It makes one uncomfortable and uneasy because it dislodges our sense of what we consider to be essential. The goal is to imagine what happens when we let ourselves go to think about the past and the future in accord with a totally different logic. This means letting go of all the coordinates by which we find ourselves privileged so as to dissociate from essentialism as much as we can, in regard to how we comport ourselves as a person, a people, a religion, or a temporal vector. This would truly be an opening to the other. <>

WHY AM I A JEW? SPINOZA REVISITED by Michael Baum **[Resource Publications, 9781666730999]**

The book starts by considering mankind's role in the complex ecological system of our planet and then considers the place of mankind in the cosmos while also looking inward at our own microcosm. It then explains how these scientific insights lead to the ontological search for God. The good, the bad, and the ugly sides of religious beliefs are considered and it is suggested that we are looking for "God" in the wrong place. The book then explains a justification for the author's apparent cognitive dissonance of retaining a Jewish identity whilst denying the existence of a God with the attributes of man. The author then argues that we should look for "God" in the infinitely small spaces within ourselves instead of the infinitely large spaces of the universe. His "God" would not mind whether individuals believed in "him" or not, so long as they practiced their life as the author practices his medicine: in a never-ending quest to improve the length and quality of the lives of his patients. This book should improve the reader's knowledge of the philosophers who wrote on the ontology of God. It also rediscovers that Baruch Spinoza had already reached the conclusions of modern-day thinkers more than 350 years ago.

Review

"This is not merely a hugely ambitious book but a courageous one. Baum invites readers of all faiths and none to accompany him on his extraordinary and deeply personal spiritual journey in quest of the essence of God and the nature of Jewish identity. The result is an exhilarating and rewarding intellectual adventure. Hold on tight and enjoy." --David H. Stone, University of Glasgow, emeritus

"This most-readable, impressive, and challenging account of the *mysterium tremendum* that reveals itself to Baum through the sciences he has mastered and the moral philosophy he has embraced gets mightily close to a religious odyssey. His blistering critique of the numerous atrocities that are perpetrated in the name of religion is most timely, and his basic thesis that 'we are looking for God in the wrong place' resonates strongly with some Jewish mystical ideas." --Jeffrey M. Cohen, author of *The Book of Psalms: Poetry in Poetry*

"A thought-provoking memoir. . . . Baum has internalized the Royal Society's motto--'Take nobody's word for it'--as a directive to study and refine medical treatments and to wrestle with God's teachings . . . in a continuing attempt to heal the world. I would love to be his next-door neighbor, sharing experiences and insights and debating our obligations to this world and its people." --Avrum Z. Bluming, University of Southern California, emeritus

Contents

Prologue

CHAPTER 1	A Very Small Spider in a Very Large Book
CHAPTER 2	Was the Spider Created or Did it Evolve?
CHAPTER 3	Are We Looking for God in the Wrong Place?
CHAPTER 4	Development of Ethical Code beyond a Belief in the Supernatural
CHAPTER 5	The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of Monotheistic Religions
CHAPTER 6	A Question of Community
CHAPTER 7	Why Am I a Jew?
CHAPTER 8	Circumcision and Kashrut
CHAPTER 9	Why I Am a Zionist?
CHAPTER 10	The God of Inner Space
CHAPTER 11	Baruch Spinoza I
CHAPTER 12	Spinoza II: A Book Forged in Hell
CHAPTER 13	Faith in Science
CHAPTER 14	My Search for the Divine

Bibliography

Index

This is a very ambitious book and at the time of writing I was never sure of completing the task and not even sure how it would end. In other words, I made it up as I went along and much of it surprised me as it appeared in writing. I'm not implying that there was anything supernatural about this process, I don't believe I was taking dictation from above (God forbid) or that there was a muse sitting on my right shoulder, but the book seemed to write itself. Effectively this work attempts to put my beliefs on trial as witness for the defense as I challenge myself, on behalf of the prosecution, to justify myself for those opinions. In this book, I express my opinions on multiple philosophical and religious questions that have challenged all the great thinkers of the past. I am a dilettante and self-taught philosopher but if I see further, it's not so much that I'm standing on the shoulders of giants (pace Isaac Newton), it's because I've had to practice their philosophical teachings in my efforts to support and cure my patients facing the existential threat of cancer.

I have been privileged to enjoy more than one career in my long and busy life.

I qualified as a doctor in 1960 and was appointed to my first chair of surgery in 1980 at Kings College London and went on to be appointed Professor of surgery at the Institute of Cancer

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

research in 1990 and then to a chair of surgery at University College London (UCL) in 1997. I retired from my clinical work as a surgeon at the age of 67 but was kept on as a part time non-clinical post with the title of visiting professor in Medical Humanities at UCL. In that role, I helped set up a new curriculum in the teaching of the humanities to medical students. This involved teaching scientific philosophy, moral philosophy, the psycho-social impact of disease, communication skills, narrative based medicine, the history of medicine, and the role of the performing arts and the visual arts in the practice of medicine. The students took to this novelty in their curriculum, like ducks to water but many of my senior colleagues who had spent their careers isolated in silos, were deeply skeptical.

After my hectic life as a surgeon and a leader of a cancer research group, I found my life as a Professor in the “soft sciences” much less stressful, allowing me the time to develop other interests including philosophy and art.

I set out to write this book to leave a legacy to students and teachers of medical humanities of the future, however as I described above, it took on a life of its own. I seem to have ended up with a dissertation that attempts to unify many different aspects of scholarly discourse that cross boundaries of all the faculties of the Universities that have employed me. C.P. Snow, preempted me in part with his Rede Lecture in 1959, “The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution” (Cambridge University Press). I would like to quote from this as follows.

Literary intellectuals at one pole-at the other scientists, and the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf mutual incomprehension-sometimes hostility and dislike, but most of all a lack of understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other. Their attitudes are so different that, even on the level of emotion, they can't find much common ground.

In my lifetime things have greatly improved and the fact that we were able to establish a course in the humanities in the Science faculty at UCL is evidence enough but there has been no reciprocity. I'm unaware of any teaching of the scientific method in the Arts faculties of British universities. The model of harmony I'm trying to compose is multi-dimensional to include the biological sciences, cosmology and the ontology of God!

I start off by describing my encounter with a very small red spider and my awe of the beauty of its structure and its microscopic function. This then sets me off thinking about the meaning of “her” life compared with the meaning of my life and our roles in the complex ecological system of our planet. This is followed by considering the place of mankind in the cosmos but also looking inward at our own microcosm at increasing degrees of magnification.

I then set about trying to explain how all these scientific insights set me off in the ontological search for God. I start off by describing the good, the bad and the ugly sides of religious beliefs and argue that we are looking for “God” in the wrong place. I then try to justify my apparent cognitive dissonance of retaining my Jewish identity whilst denying the existence of a God with the attributes described in the five books of Moses. I argue that we should look for “God” in the infinitely small spaces within ourselves instead of the infinitely large spaces of the universe. My “God” would not mind whether I believed in “him” or not, so long as I practiced my life as I practice my medicine; in a never-ending quest to improve length and quality of life for all those in my orbit in the hope that others would do the same.

Along the way whilst writing this book I was trying to improve my knowledge of the philosophers who wrote on the ontology of God. To my delight, I realized that all my efforts ended up by rediscovering Baruch Spinoza, he reached the same conclusions in the mid 17thC, more than 350

years ago. He got there first, so I dedicate this book to the eternal memory of this humane and much misunderstood man. <>

**A HISTORY OF MODERN JEWISH RELIGIOUS
PHILOSOPHY: VOLUME III: THE CRISIS OF HUMANISM:
A HISTORICAL CROSSROADS** by Eliezer Schweid,
translated by Leonard Levin, annotated by Leonard Levin,
Christoph Hopp, Yuval Lieblach [Series: Supplements to The
Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Brill,
9789004375383]

The culmination of Eliezer Schweid's life-work as a Jewish intellectual historian, this five-volume work provides a comprehensive, interdisciplinary account of the major thinkers and movements in modern Jewish thought, in the context of general philosophy and Jewish social-political historical developments, with extensive primary source excerpts.

Volume Three, **THE CRISIS OF HUMANISM**, commences with an important essay on the challenge to the humanist tradition posed in the late 19th century by historical materialism, existentialism and positivism. This is background for the constructive philosophies which sought at the same time to address the general crisis of moral value and provide a positive basis for Jewish existence. Among the thinkers presented in this volume are Moses Hess, Moritz Lazarus, Hermann Cohen (in impressive depth, with a thorough exposition of the *Ethics and Religion of Reason*), Ahad Ha-Am, I. J. Reines, Simon Dubnow, M. Y. Berdiczewski, the theorists of the Bund, Chaim Zhitlovsky, Nachman Syrkin, and Ber Borochov.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Historical and Methodological Introduction

I The Crisis of Humanism in German Philosophy

1.1 Karl Marx's Historical Materialism

1.2 Marx on Judaism

1.3 The School of "Historical Materialism" and Humanism

1.4 Truth and Ethics Undermined: the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche

1.5 The Existential Crisis of the Individual from the Perspective of Religion: the Religious Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard

1.6 Empirical Science in Place of Philosophy: Comte, Darwin, Spencer

2 Defense of Humanism through a Return to the Sources of Judaism in Germany

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Moses Hess: Humanistic Socialism from the Sources of Judaism

2.3 Moritz Lazarus: Realizing Kant's Ethical Idealism as a Way of Life, According to the Sources of Judaism

3 The Philosophical Campaign for Realizing Humanism as a Universal Jewish Mission: the Philosophy of Hermann Cohen

3.1 The Development of Cohen's Personality and His Method

3.2 The Mission Expressed in the Renewal of Kant's Idealist Philosophy

3.3 Did Cohen's Methodology Change in Order to Accommodate the Discussion of Religion?

3.4 Defining the Task of Philosophy in Culture and Its Relation to Its Sources

- 3.5 The "Principle of Origin"
- 3.6 The Ethics: Law and Justice, Politics and Morality
- 3.7 Comparing Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone to Religion of Reason from the Sources of Judaism
- 3.8 The Idea of Correlation
- 3.9 Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism
- 3.10 God's Unity/Uniqueness, and the Problem of Proofs for God's Existence
- 3.11 Creation and Revelation
- 3.12 "You Shall Be Holy for I Am Holy" and "Love Your Neighbor as Yourself: I Am the Lord"
- 3.13 Sin, Repentance, Atonement, and Prayer
- 3.14 The Idea of Messiah and the Election of Israel for the Sake of Human History
- 3.15 Halakha and Jewish Nationality
- 3.16 The Vision of Peace and the Sabbath
- 4 The Doctrine of Jewish Nationalism Based on Positivism: the Teaching of A^had Ha-Am
- 4.1 The Development of the Personality and Thought of Ahad Ha-Am (Asher Ginzberg)
- 4.2 "The Problem of the Jews" and "The Problem of Judaism"
- 4.3 The Roots of National Identity
- 4.4 Judaism as a National Culture
- 4.5 The Place of the Religious Worldview in Shaping Secular Jewish Culture
- 4.6 Jewish Ethics and Halakha
- 5 The Debate in Eastern Europe on Judaism as a Secular Culture
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 A National Philosophy of Religion in Religious Zionism: the Thought of Samuel Aleksandrow and Isaac Jacob Reines
- 5.3 The Social-Historical Existence of the Jewish People: Simon Dubnow's Theory of the "Spiritual Center"
- 5.4 Nietzsche's Influence among the Younger Generation in Modern Hebrew Literature, and Micha Josef Berdyczewski's "Transvaluation of Values"
- 5.5 Does Judaism Have a Future? The Nihilism of S. Y. Hurwitz 385
- 6 Jewish Socialism and Marxism in Eastern Europe
- 6.1 The Appearance of Jewish Workers' Movements in Eastern Europe, and the Background to Their Differences
- 6.2 Socialist Tendencies in the Radical Haskalah: Aaron Samuel Lieberman's Ha-Emet
- 6.3 Jewish National Social Democracy in the Ideology of the Bund
- 6.4 Jewish Socialist Nationalism: the Teaching of Chaim Zhitlovsky
- 6.5 The Essence of Jewish Socialism: the Socialist-Zionist Philosophy of Nachman Syrkin
- 6.6 The Dialectic of Fate of the Jewish People in the Social Revolution: Marxism and Zionism in the Thought of Ber Borochov
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index

Historical and Methodological Introduction

The third period in the history of modern Jewish religious philosophy began at the beginning of the 1880s and continued to the middle of the twentieth century.

These dates demarcate a distinct period in the history of the nations of Western culture and of the Jewish people. We make this determination on the basis of general historical considerations, not because of changes in philosophical thought. In retrospect, we can say that this period saw the emergence of new philosophic systems, representing new intellectual movements and ideals. It was also a watershed for the research of Jewish history, in terms of both method and the quantity and quality of knowledge: description and documentation, terminology and evaluation. These justify the

determination that we are speaking here of a unique period in the history of general and Jewish philosophy, although its boundaries and terms were determined by historical developments that expressed transformations in the social and cultural structure and constituted a challenge for research and for philosophy.

During the hundred years that passed from the end of the eighteenth century until the early 1880s, economic and political arrangements were formed and started to fall apart; social stratification developed and started to be undermined; educational and spiritual cultures were developed and already appeared out of date; patterns of life were established and cast into doubt; and the prospects—or more correctly, the fears—of the future were overthrown. An understanding of the historical events and the processes that drove them already necessitated methodological and conceptual changes in philosophical thinking at the start of the period. Philosophy was forced to adapt itself to social transformations and events that it had not anticipated and that did not fit with its preconceived rational certainties. This required it to reevaluate the sources of philosophical thought: Was it as independent as it had assumed? Did it flow independently from the regularity of intellect and reason? Or did it perhaps reflect developments whose regular pattern had its roots in irrational nature? And if it turned out that it was not reason that shaped the course of history—and consequently of the twists and turns of thought that guided it—then everything was up for reexamination: epistemology, sociology, ethics, and political theory—and not least, the question of the role of religion in culture had to be reexamined as well.

The challenge was expressed in the falsification of the social, political, and cultural expectations that had nourished both the rationalistic, idealistic philosophies of the Enlightenment and rational humanism and their counterparts—the philosophies of Romanticism that were skeptical of progress but trusted that a return to ancient sources would foster a renaissance. By the early 1880s it was already clear that there was no compatibility between the social and political changes actually taking place and humanistic idealism. The nation-state did not resolve the struggles with the Church or the conflicts among the religious faith-communities. On the contrary—it intensified these confrontations and generated new ones, especially on the social and international fronts. Attacks were thus opened from various directions on the fundamental assumptions, values, ideals, and modes of thought that had nourished the prospects of “progress.” Radical philosophers sought revolutionary alternatives, and those who sought to defend the original ideals of gradual progress that did not generate traumatic crises or demand great sacrifices were required to update their thought through critical self-examination: Where had they erred? Where had they failed? What had they not taken into account?

We must emphasize the tremendous sense of urgency. The unrest from the social and international reality was expressed already at the beginning of the period through the organization of revolutionary mass movements that strove to change the social and international order by wresting power from the strata that held it. Even if these movements were not yet ripe enough to realize their desire, they presented an immediate tangible threat. Obedience to law was undermined. Planned organized disturbances broke out that threatened the social and political orders with impending downfall. It was sensed that the masses harbored within them instinctual forces beyond the control of intellect and reason, and it appeared to the political leadership that it was better to divert them into international war to prevent their bringing down the government at home. It stood to reason that if this cynical policy embodied the “cunning of reason” operating in history, as Kant and Hegel taught, this was a crafty and wicked reason indeed that would lead in the end to establishing tyrannical regimes.

The immediate result at any rate was the appearance of revolutionary mass movements of the left and the right. The movements of the left represented the working class and turned in the direction

of socialist revolution, whether moderate (Social Democracy) or radical (Communism), whereas their counterparts on the right turned in the direction of a nationalist revolution that would solve all problems through military conquest. The common aspect of these was a violent struggle between forces that fought for the realization of messianic goals: the “end of history” in the messianic formula of the left, or a “return to the beginning of history” in the messianic formula of the right. They also had in common a turn to the masses to enlist them in seizing power by force in order to realize a new order through violent compulsory means, not shrinking from any form of cruel punishment. But no side knew what the new order would be or how they would realize the good that was promised to the masses that should support its establishment. The goal was first of all to obtain the power that would enable them to achieve whatever would occur to the minds of the new rulers in accord with their principles. There thus emerged an equivalence of the left and the right, with respect both to their authoritarian objective and to their means: the end sanctified the means. Utility was the only ethical criterion for which these movements had regard, and thus the humanistic ideals lost their validity both for the socialist left, though it seemed to be striving for realizing the values of justice, freedom, and human dignity, and for the right, which spoke in the name of national honor and glory.

Another aspect of agreement between the revolutionary left and right was expressed in their attitude to religion. It appeared to both sides as a fundamentally conservative factor that gave support to the current regime and sought to deter the masses from realizing their desires through the direct, purposeful use of the enormous power latent in them. The idea of human autonomy, and the recognition that religion’s idea of God was nothing but the creation by certain human beings designed to serve their sovereign interests as opposed to another’s, appeared in both opposing camps of the radical mass movements: man himself must realize his sovereignty directly, and the only question that remained open for decision in the struggle of violent forces was who was the authentic representative of “the general will” in its universal collective meaning of the will of humanity. Here, too, was a kind of realization of the idea of humanism in a way that overturned its ethical, idealistic sense, turning it into a prop of a regime whose enslaving and oppressive power purported to embody the sovereignty of humanity.

The first signs of this profound ethical crisis were riots, violent demonstrations, threats of war, and the outbreak of war itself. Mass organization under the banner of revolution revealed the growing strength of movements subversive of the regime whether of social or nationalist background: Marxist socialism (antireligious and anti-Jewish) on the one hand, and extreme nationalism (anti-Semitic) on the other. International tensions based on power struggles, in the European and imperial arenas, intensified in parallel, as we have said, in a calculated response of the defensive regimes, which intentionally incited international tensions as well as internal tensions against national or religious minorities (especially against the Jews) in order to assuage the fury of the masses.

In summary: Most of the numbers and institutions of the Jewish people in European countries stood in the 1880s at a fateful crossroad. The collective future of the people faced the choice of survival or perishing. There were several avenues of refuge from physical destruction or loss of identity, which were bound up with each other, but the traditional communal frameworks of the people were in a process of breakup, and their leadership was losing its authority and effectiveness. In order to cope with the new reality, what was required was an inclusive representative political organization and leadership that could represent the consensual collective will, present a solution, and lead the people together toward its realization, but such an organization did not exist, and the processes of breakup destroyed the basic conditions for setting up an effective alternative. The meaning of the Emancipation from the standpoint of collective existence was thus a deepening and worsening of the condition of exile: not only dispersion but uprooting and disconnecting, homelessness, and breakup

of the frameworks that maintained the independent identity and the capability of collective coping with the environment.

In these conditions, the need to organize anew and establish effective collective leadership stood at the head of the ladder of priorities, even from the viewpoint of those individuals who found themselves isolated and powerless in the face of the existential challenges whose root cause lay in their own collective identity. Already in the Enlightenment period, this need was expressed in the appearance of the modern movements that proceeded from the Haskalah, but in the early 1880s it became clear that these movements did not provide a sufficiently effective alternative to the traditional communal organizations, perhaps because from the outset they were designed to serve the process of entry into general society, not to stand up to its opposition. In any case, in the early 1880s one saw the emergence of energetic collective organizations of a new kind, imitating the forms of political organization in the general society in order to deal with them: national and international parties and umbrella organizations whether national or international (the Zionist Organization was the most outstanding example of general-Jewish political movements). A guiding theory was required among other things to help direct the foundation and policy of such organizations.

But we must emphasize again that the power of these organizations was very limited and their utility doubtful. We are speaking of a voluntary organization that could not create organs for imposing obligatory authority on its members. Its functioning was dependent on the willingness of individuals to affiliate with them, the willingness of other individuals—and they were few—to contribute the money necessary for their functioning, and the voluntary readiness of other individuals, whom nobody has counted, to bear the responsibility of leaders who would set policy and propose a direction. And as there was no infrastructure for a political organization with authority and the personal positions multiplied and clashed with each other, the act of organizing gave expression to splintering, fragmentation, and anarchy more than to an expression of the will to unity. At this fateful crossroads, the people organized themselves into contending parties in order to move at the same moment in several contradictory directions: toward emigration, toward aliyah to the land of Israel, toward absorption by way of assimilation or joining the revolution, or toward the formation of “autonomous” national frameworks in the Diaspora. It is clear that each direction determined also a form of comprehensive social and cultural identity, and the theoretical thought that guided the mobilization of the people for its struggles needed to cope with the exceptional challenges of this anarchic reality.

The fateful decisions for which these individuals had to bear direct responsibility were complex and had consequences in all areas of life: choosing a place of residence, choosing an occupation or profession, choosing a class affiliation, choosing a social and national affiliation, choosing a political orientation, choosing a spoken language, choosing professional education, choosing a world outlook and values that would determine a way of life and especially the education of children, choosing the forms in which individuals would concretize their desire to continue to be Jews or to flee from their identity. It was clear that every decision in each of these areas had direct or indirect implications on the others. Choosing a place of residence was distinct from considerations of affiliation and preferences of identity, but at the same time it had a shaping effect and consequences in these areas, whether one wished it or not. What had priority over what? What was preferable to what, from the standpoint of the individual or of the community? These were the questions one needed to address, not only from some general orientation, but also from paying attention to circumstances and the real possibilities embodied in them. Jewish thought needed to provide guidance for this whole range of issues.

As we said, the decision was entrusted to individuals, and they bore responsibility for its realization. It is thus clear that each of them set his priorities and sought the organization that would assist him in following his path. The array of parties and organizations that came and went, that united in order to split and split in order to unite, grew in this manner and varied sometimes from year to year. At this historical crossroads it appeared that the people were wandering in confusion and turmoil in all areas of their life at the same time but in contradictory directions, and they were not able to progress in sufficient measure to the realization of a single one of them. What prevented complete disintegration? Probably the pressure of hostility and rejection from the outside: the despairing sense of “no exit” that engendered from time to time also a certain measure of solidarity and indicated, for want of an alternative, the direction where they must go at that time because there was no other. These facts also influenced the crystallizing patterns of thinking that strove to achieve orientation and responsible guidance. They had to fathom the direction to which the “no alternative!” in the Jewish people’s destiny was pointing—could one divine it?

Rifts appeared, to be sure, in all areas of collective activity, but the most serious from the standpoint of the inner continuity of the people’s existence was the rift that continued widening from the beginning of the Enlightenment period between the parental generation and their children. In the period that we are discussing it turned into a burning controversy with feelings of rage, deep frustration, and hatred between the generations. Most of the parents could not change their situation because of the yoke that lay upon them, because of their poverty, and because of their limited, one-sided education. They had no choice but to remain in the place where they were on account of their residences, their livelihood, their education, way of life, and faith. On the other hand, the young were forced to leave. They had no choice but to choose their path far from the place and far from the situation where they had been born and had received their first education, even though it was doubtful if everything that appeared attractive and within reach was indeed for them to choose. Their parents could not stop them. On the contrary—by opposing their course and digging zealously into their positions, they incited them. But could the confronting generations sever their ties without causing damage to themselves? Could they renounce responsibility toward each other without betraying themselves?

In respect of fidelity to self-identity, the moral and existential dilemma of the generation gap was the existential axis of the profoundest discussion regarding one’s respective relation to the sources of Judaism and of general culture, as well as regarding one’s motivation to struggle for a Jewish future despite the persecutions. The generation gap fed the pressures toward alienation, uprooting, and change of identity through acculturation—and these would require further in-depth examination—but it also fed the idealistic readiness to self-sacrifice for the sake of the people, as well as the sense of mission that brought certain individuals, prominent in their talents and their dedication, to found the movements and parties, to take charge and strive for realization by setting an example of personal devotion. The extremism that was a factor inciting polarized schisms and the war of all against all stemmed also, of course, from the same traumatic gap, and it is clear that the guiding theoretical literature expressed this trauma in its depths, and its models and objectives were determined by it.

These, then, were the existential, personal-collective circumstances that shaped the intellectual agenda. They were what determined the perspectives, the methods, the styles, and above all the planes of discussion. From the viewpoint of writing the history of Jewish philosophy, it is proper to emphasize that philosophical discussion on the topics of intellectual, religious, national, or cultural identity in this period generally appeared too remote, abstract, and irrelevant to the immediate existential challenges, especially when we are speaking of guiding mass revolutionary movements on the one hand and of individuals driven by tempestuous emotions, acting out of pressure and

intuition, on the other hand. The communal agenda comprised mainly practical problems that required scientific research and a response hammered out on the ideological plane.

But it was nevertheless clear that it was impossible to sacrifice the deeper dimensions. On the contrary—these dimensions were uncovered by the traumatic events on every side. The motivation to act also stemmed from them, not only among the individual thinkers who acted out of a sense of mission, but among the people. Feelings welled up from the depths, and insights embodied values and perceptions of truth that nourished the searching, debates, and questioning until the light of some ideology shone forth, which, even if it was one-sided and simplistic in itself, nevertheless radiated the power of faith that shone forth from the depths.

There was thus a need to express truths and value-assertions that were of the genuine stuff of philosophy, within a more topical deliberation on practical questions of economics, social stratification, national belonging, and organization both along party lines and transcending them. In this way the connection was uncovered between the practical plane and the values that determine cultural or religious identity, and when deeper grounding was called for, it was aimed mainly at clarifying the substance of this connection. It thus turned out that the philosophical discussion on the question of Judaism focused during this period on topics that were regarded as marginal from the standpoint of the formation of Jews' religious and cultural identity. This applied especially to social theory in its economic and class aspects and to national theory in its political aspects: How should Judaism be expressed as a social doctrine in all its domains? How should Judaism be expressed as a theory of nation and state in all its domains? Even religious thought was required to weigh in on these topics: Did the Jewish religion have a special contribution to the combination of problems that arose in these areas? How does faith come to expression in social and national existence? The discussion of the status of halakha and its evaluative elements was channeled in this direction.

It is self-evident that the change in definition of the principal topics of discussion had implications for those disciplines that could help deal with them: Jewish thought of this period had recourse to prephilosophical and prehistoriographical disciplines—the disciplines of social and political sciences and the humanities—more than to philosophy as a discipline. However, although thought that begins in research and concludes in ideological decisions does not belong to philosophy proper, it would seem that a discussion of the full trajectory of the thought that guided the consciousness of Jewish identity in this period would be deficient and defective if it did not deal also with those areas of thought that were expressed primarily in these terms, for the philosophical basis is plotted out by way of them, whether explicitly or implicitly.

In the same connection, it is proper, in the end, to point out the development of alternative forms of thought than philosophy from the standpoint of the role of the educator, who conveys values, establishes worldviews, sets forth ideals and ways of realizing them, and awakens the motivation to identify, devote oneself to, and achieve realization: belles-lettres, especially existential reflective poetry, the essay literature that connects philosophy to ideology without being immersed systematically in either, and the publicistic literature that grounds and enriches the ideology through interpretative observation of developing social and political reality. The thought that was created with these tools is not considered philosophy in the proper disciplinary sense, and rightly so, yet one cannot document the Jewish philosophical thought that was created in this period without having recourse to all varieties of thought in the effort to uncover the philosophical basis that nourished them or permeated them.

The guiding principle and objective of these chapters in the study of the history of Jewish philosophy should thus be to present the agenda of the period and all the directions of thought whose influence on the people's existential reality came to expression in intellectual movements that strove for concrete realization. To this end we need to expand the notion of "philosophy" in this work as

follows: all modes of thought that sought to crystallize an inclusive worldview on the basis of values and insights into truth should be included in its framework, even if they were not philosophical in the academic sense. We observed this practice in effect in some chapters of the previous section. We shall thus show that, as in the previous periods so in this period, most of the influential systems of thought in central- and west-European Jewry came to expression on the philosophical level, whereas in eastern Europe they took the forms of literature and poetry, the essay and the pamphlet, which indeed were based on the ideas of general and Jewish philosophy that developed in central Europe but preferred their own original forms of expression.

Because of the complexity of the process that we have described above, we shall divide the discussion of the history of Jewish religious philosophy in this period into two parts. In the first part, we shall describe the crossroads as it was reflected in general philosophical thought in respect of the problematic that was set on the intellectual agenda and the philosophical methodologies that branched out from it. This description is of course necessary as general background, but it is required no less because of the participation of Jewish philosophers in the formation of the general philosophical agenda and its specific intellectual tools—philosophers who made an original contribution to it, whether they dealt directly with the problems specific to Jewish religious philosophy or whether they ignored them and identified the problem of Jewish religion or Jewish national-social existence with the problem of religion, nationhood, and society in general as the problems of humanity. Prominent in this respect is the phenomenon that has already been presented in the previous sections of our work: general philosophy became combined with Jewish philosophy, either directly by dealing with it or indirectly by absorbing its influence, to the same extent that Jewish philosophy became combined with general philosophy, so that one could not draw a definite distinction between them. In the second section we shall present the Jewish religious philosophical systems that were proposed on the basis of the general background.

Defense of Humanism through a Return to the Sources of Judaism in Germany

The intensification of the crisis of humanism in German society in the final decades of the nineteenth century found the majority of German Jews as individuals (not as a collective entity) quite immersed in German culture and identifying with the idealism of liberal German nationalism. Insofar as it was up to them, they saw themselves as Germans in every respect. German was their mother tongue, and German culture was the foundation of their education. The fact that they were Jews did not in their view separate them from their German environment. Just the opposite—they saw in their Judaism an original German value, and their spiritual leadership reiterated to them that their religious distinctiveness was a providential contribution to humanity in general and to Germany in particular. Ordinary Jews, who did not serve as rabbis, teachers, or communal leaders, immersed themselves by and large in their civic lives—in their economic, social, political, and cultural activities—each in his own domain. Intellectuals, too—writers, thinkers, artists—made their creative contribution in the general arena. Their Judaism was given marginal expression, mostly ceremonial, in the synagogue and to some extent in the family. As an inevitable result, they became disconnected from Jewish sources. Their Jewish literacy was shallow compared to their general German education. Jewish identification was reduced to an ideological affirmation, signified by superficial rites lacking connection to a fuller lifestyle.

Thus the Jewishness of German Jews was being uprooted and dying on the vine. At a certain stage this process aroused uneasiness and fear in the hearts of the leaders of the modern religious movements, who had encouraged integration into German society but did not wish assimilation to progress to the point of disappearance. It called for a critical stocktaking of the messages that the leaders continued to recite by rote to their flocks. Perhaps the mission of cultural integration had

overshot its mark. Perhaps the time had come to change the emphasis and to start to speak of intensifying the connection to the sources of Judaism so that Jewish identification should once again be deep, serious, and affirmative?

There was no direct connection between this transition and the crisis of humanism. It was an inherent consequence of the process of assimilation. But it gained strength and urgency from the sobering realization forced on German Jews by the crisis, which undermined the fundamental assumptions of the policy of emancipation. The first response was naturally a denial to recognize that this was no mere temporary setback but a longer-term historical reversal that would intensify and was liable to eventuate in catastrophe. In the end, it was impossible to ignore the fact that the majority of German society, especially the cultural elites into which German Jews wished to integrate, did not see the Jews as the Jews saw themselves. Just the opposite—the cultural elites, who had the absorption of the Jews forced on them by the law (and exacerbated by the eager impatience of the Jews themselves), saw them as uninvited foreign guests who burst into their homes and saw themselves as free to do whatever they pleased.

The anger grew the more the Jews increased their involvement. The more that they reiterated their claim of being rooted in German culture, the more the Germans saw them as counterfeiting that legacy. Some sensitive individuals, such as Graetz, responded to this charge with a lofty disclaimer and a sharp critique of German culture. It is especially instructive that precisely those assimilating Jews who cut themselves off completely from their Jewish heritage considered themselves qualified to launch a piercing critique of German society and culture for betraying its humanistic values. But most of the Jews who identified with the German nationality responded in the opposite way: this turn of events reinforced their faith in the importance of their providential contribution to the culture of Germany. German society was betraying its humanistic ideals, but the Jews were true to them. By identifying with their Jewish values, they were standing strong in defense of the authentic ideals of German culture. It followed that the Jews had to return to their original self-identity and deepen their attachment to it in order to fulfill their mission and restore German society to its fundamental values.

In any case, if in the previous generation there was a need to emphasize the Jews' obligation to reform themselves and to become worthy of integration in German society and culture, in this generation it was necessary to emphasize the identification with Jewish values in order to reform German society. This was a mighty ambition, whose inevitable consequence was to intensify the distancing of German society from the Jews, especially in those intellectual and cultural elites that the Jews aspired to join. Thus was fashioned the myth of Jewish-German "symbiosis," which the Jews desired and felt to be a reality, whereas the German elites despised it and categorically denied it.

In hindsight, we can see that the return to Jewish sources was not totally novel but was built on tendencies that were expressed among certain thinkers of the previous generation, such as Solomon Ludwig Steinheim and Samuel Hirsch. Modern Orthodoxy developed originally from this tendency, and now the principal leaders of Reform and Conservatism were drawn to it. But the intensification of the crisis of humanism caused not only a deepening of the desire to reconstitute Jewish identity within the framework of the modern movements but also an awakening of a desire for return among Jews who had assimilated and cut themselves off from the Jewish establishment. Among them were prominent individuals—mostly from assimilating families—who had succeeded in achieving positions of leadership in German society and culture. Their acquired knowledge and experience of Jewish culture was quite meager. But a typical phenomenon was manifested in them: the greater the distance that they had to skip over in order to return to themselves and the more profound the alienation that they had to overcome, the greater was their willpower and devotion. For them this was an intensive process whose objective was to reconstitute their Jewish selves by raising their

level of education and deepening their Jewish experience to the same heights and depths that they had achieved in their German cultural achievements, if not higher. To be sure, they did not forsake their German culture, but they strove to Judaize it by setting their Jewish self-identity at its core. One should not be surprised, therefore, that the most penetrating philosophical and literary expression of the movement of return to Judaism for the sake of saving humanism came precisely from such individuals. Nor should one be surprised at the strong resonance that they generated, both within the Jewish community and outside it. Their achievements and status in the general society and culture afforded them the authority—transcending institutions—of the spirit that was manifested in full force in their mission to their people.

Indeed, this phenomenon should not be so novel or surprising. We saw that the modern religious movements within the Jewish people arose out of a pendulum-like alternation from assimilating pressures to a corrective reconstitution of the original self-identity. There were also precedents for the return to the Jewish sources on the part of Jews who had been cut off from Judaism—even to the point of apostasy—and had achieved prominence in German culture. An outstanding example was the career of the German-Jewish poet Heinrich Heine (1797–1856). He converted to Protestant Christianity in order to gain acceptance as a German poet, but he never denied his origin or his responsibility to his suffering compatriots.¹ All his life he struggled with the question of his relation to Judaism and to Christianity. It was no attraction to Christianity that brought him to forsake Judaism. The Protestant Church offered him a compromise way out; within it he was able to defend his individual intellectual freedom in a state that required of its citizens at least formal affiliation with a religious community. On this basis he was able to permit himself a certain measure of freedom to criticize his state, his society, and his culture and to preach liberal humanism.

Belonging to the Jewish community imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of critical expression, as did belonging to the Catholic Church, so Heine chose Protestantism. But the ideal life for him in his youth was secular and worldly. He was attracted to the classical esthetic Greek legacy in Western culture, as expressed especially in the creative achievement of Goethe. Indeed, it was typical that despite this he criticized Goethe on account of his amoral world outlook, which was expressed among other things in his equivocal attitude toward the struggle for liberal democracy in Germany. In this respect Heine embraced the un-Hellenic ideal of moral obligation. It would seem that his aspiration for a synthesis between the legacy of Athens and that of moral obligation (whether Jewish or Christian) inclined him toward the philosophy of Kant and afterward towards that of Hegel. Both of these reinforced his critical attitude toward Judaism and Christianity. But in the course of his later struggling with the social, political, and cultural reality in Germany, he became critical of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel as well.

It became clear to him that the dogmatism of idealistic philosophy fostered a political nationalism that was dangerous to individualistic liberal humanism. This recognition, as well as his existential suffering as a man exiled from his homeland and eventually growing old and sick in increasing isolation, influenced him in the end to forsake the estheticist idealism of the legacy of Athens. He recognized the hubris implied in man's ambition to supremacy, and he rediscovered the Bible: the belief in a personal God before whom a person could pour out his distress while acknowledging his human frailty, and the superiority of the prophetic commandment of ethics and justice.

Heine testified to a turning point that occurred in his world outlook—his distancing from Hegel, to the point of destroying the manuscript of a book that he wrote about him, and his return to the faith of the biblical prophets—in his *Confessions*.⁴ He did not manage to develop his new outlook in a separate work. But his personal struggles and the turning point that occurred in his thought stand out as a harbinger of the turning point that occurred with Moses Hess in his grappling with the amoral, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian dialectical materialism of Karl Marx.

The Debate in Eastern Europe on Judaism as a Secular Culture

Ahad Ha-Am's doctrine was created in stages through essays that were written in the course of the debate that took place around them. This was a bitter and stormy debate among a wide spectrum of personal and movement positions that confronted each other on the historical "crossroads." Several additional axes of the debate (which will be examined shortly) were manifested. However, we can say that Ahad Ha-Am's essays constituted the principal axis of the debate that broke out among the various streams of the Zionist movement—and to some extent, between Zionists and non-Zionists—around the questions of continued Jewish existence and the continuity of Jewish spiritual identity. The doctrines of several prominent thinkers, of both the right and the left, were developed in the course of the same debate.

Ahad Ha-Am himself initiated the practical debate over the essence of the Zionist idea and how it should be realized. But the principal disputations revolved around the fundamental assumptions of Judaism, around which Ahad Ha-Am wished to unite the people. We discussed above his innovative efforts to discover in the depths of the canonical sources values that could be the basis for a broad cultural and national consensus. We saw how he labored to mediate between the older generation clinging to the "past" and the younger generation eager to welcome the modern "future"; between those who held firm to Jewry's absolute distinctiveness from all nations and those who aspired to be like all the nations and accept their culture; between those who felt that preserving the spiritual identity of the people was the exclusive task of Zionism and those who sought in it a solution to their material distress. But in order for them to agree on a common denominator, Ahad Ha-Am demanded in the name of their interest of survival that they change the orientation that led them toward polarization—in other words, that they recognize that, even from their own various standpoints, the will to national unity that expressed the "will to life" of the whole Jewish community (and that must therefore throb in their heart of hearts) ought to overcome the personal and factional wills that made for rifts that could doom them all in the end.

It is therefore understandable why Ahad Ha-Am's demand for unity should arouse stormy opposition from all sides. Precisely because each side could find something of the truth dearest to its own heart in his words, they objected to it the more vehemently. From his opponent's perspective (though not from his own), his doctrine said one thing and its opposite, so the truth that they found in his words was falsified in their eyes. In the eyes of the older generation wedded to religion, he appeared the most dangerous rebel against the Jewish heritage, whereas in the eyes of the younger generation, he appeared as a conservative who came to quash the wave of their rebellion.

To explain the severity of the debate, we should mention that this was the period in which the divisions that had developed in east-European society from the start of the Enlightenment period found organic institutional expression. Even those independent thinkers who operated as individuals beyond party lines were accepted in effect within the party frameworks and contributed to their crystallization. This was the political significance of the "parting of the ways" with which Ahad Ha-Am grappled. The community that encompassed within itself the strata, the generations, and the streams as a single society disintegrated; the authority of spiritual leadership was undermined and collapsed. The vacuum was filled by parties and factional voluntary organizations of various kinds that used ideological confrontation and propaganda as their primary strategy to enlist the masses to their ranks. Of course, each of the parties sought to unify the people by seizing hegemony for itself, not through consensus among the various parties.

This tragic reality explains both the admiration of Ahad Ha-Am's disciples, who saw him as a prophet and pathfinder for a generation that was wandering like a flock without a shepherd, as well as the hostility that he provoked among his opponents. But in the context of the history of the

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

development of philosophical thought on Judaism, we should reemphasize that, despite the opposition that he provoked or perhaps even on account of it, he became the teacher from whom all learned, whether through agreeing with his views or disagreeing with them—and most of all from the various combinations and permutations of agreement and disagreement.

We mentioned earlier the polemic of Jehiel Michal Pines against Ahad Ha-Am from the viewpoint of Orthodox religious Zionism. However, Pines crystallized his worldview before Ahad Ha-Am, and one should see him as a rival peer rather than a disciple. It is our interest here to clarify how religious Zionist thought took a developmental path parallel to that of Ahad Ha-Am through confrontation that led it to internalize his way of thinking. Indeed, it appears that even from the religious side a pattern of opposition was evident that internalized the thought categories of the opponent through an inverted interpretation. In place of a doctrine that appeared, from the religious perspective, as a humanistic-nationalistic transformation of religious values, some thinkers of religious Zionism proposed a religious transformation of humanistic and national values. Like Ahad Ha-Am, they wished to create through their transformative interpretation a common denominator for the unity of the people but within the circle of religious discourse, not outside it. This development was discernable first among two thinkers prominent for their originality in religious Zionism—Rabbi Samuel Aleksandrow and Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines—and found systematic expression somewhat later in the thought of Rabbi Abraham Kook.

The religious thinkers rejected Ahad Ha-Am's secular substitute for the religious definition of Judaism as a falsification. The same complaint was also found among his left-wing critics. For them, it was a double falsification: of the religious version of truth against which they were rebelling (but of which they had inside knowledge), and of the humanistic truth they sought to attain. Like Ahad Ha-Am, they thought that the time had passed for religion in general and Jewish religion in particular. It could no longer play the role that it had in the past—of crystallizing the people's cultural identity. Inclined to radical approaches, they concluded that the secular transformation of religion that Ahad Ha-Am proposed was also doomed to failure, like the religion from which it sprang. They therefore opted to cut themselves off not only from religion but from all the cultural values that it represented.

In the eyes of the “younger” generation, the values of the old Judaism were the perverted products of “Galut” [Jewish Exilic] existence. In order to achieve full redemption, they had to liberate themselves from the whole Jewish-exilic mode of existence and to internalize the earthy cultural values of “normal” European nations. But did it follow from this that the Jewish people must assimilate to the point of fading away and disappear from the stage of history? There were many youths in eastern Europe who answered this question with a decisive “Yes,” especially among those who joined the ranks of the socialists and marched forward toward the revolution. However, the external and internal obstacles soon became clear, in proportions that were orders of magnitude greater than the obstacles to assimilation in central and western Europe. Even those who turned to the way of revolution were forced to form separate Jewish workers' parties (of which the most prominent was the Bund) because anti-Semitism had infiltrated the revolutionary workers' parties and was tailored to serve the needs of revolutionary propaganda.

To this were added internal social, emotional, and cultural impediments. Most of the rebellious “youths” in eastern Europe came, like Ahad Ha-Am, from religious homes that shaped their primary education, their habits of thought and feeling, and the ethos that was expressed in their social conduct. This was the source of their powerful rebellion against their parental homes and communal existence, which bore more than one stripe of self-hatred. But it was the source, too, of the forced recognition of the truth that Ahad Ha-Am had pointed out: whoever was raised in Judaism bore the impress of its values and contents, whether he chose it or not. Such a person was Jewish to the core

of his being, and it was impossible to change that fact by external imitation of the surrounding culture. Indeed, the modern Hebrew literature of this period documented the tragic experience of this sort in the phenomenon of the deracinated hero: a young Jew in rebellion, who seeks to cut himself off from his people and to assimilate into his “goyish” environment, but who is left in the end a stranger both to his own people and to the surrounding culture.

The combination of the obstacle of anti-Semitism and the inner recognition that assimilation was a falsification of one’s own nature, leading to self-effacement devoid of self-respect, turned a portion of the rebellious youths in the direction of Jewish nationalism and Zionism. But once they arrived at the nationalist position, they were faced with another truth that Ahad Ha-Am had pointed out. In order to preserve the Jewish people as an independent nation, they had to find a basis of independent national identity like those that distinguished the “normal” peoples around them. There is no nationalism without a connection to the distinctive cultural memory of the people: a national language, a national literature, a national homeland, a historical consciousness that preserved the connection to these elements, patterns of a unifying social ethos, and unifying cultural patterns. Even Herzl, who thought of creating a modern Jewish national culture with a universal Western character, understood that distinctive elements such as these are the conditions for grounding the argument that the Jews were a nation deserving of independent existence like all other nations. If so, despite the aspiration to be liberated from the Galut existence and from its culture, even the young rebels who turned toward nationalism and Zionism had need of an infrastructure comprising language and literature, historical memory, and a historical homeland, which could be found only in the ancient tradition against which they were in rebellion.

The dialectic of opposition to Ahad Ha-Am’s doctrines among the “younger generation” who found their way to Zionist nationalism or autonomism thus brought about the realization that, if the nationalist alternative to religion that he proposed was unacceptable to them, it was up to them to come up with a revolutionary alternative to his alternative. This was achieved by a transvaluation of the values of the traditional legacy or by creating a modern national culture that would draw the larger share of its values from the outside but would develop them independently in the national language of the Jews, which would be converted from the “sacred tongue” to a secular tongue, and in their historical homeland—the Land of Israel—which would no longer be the Holy Land but a “normal” homeland. Several solutions were arrived at in this spirit by prominent thinkers and writers of the younger generation. Their principal spokesman was Micha Josef Berdyczewski. <>

HUMANITY DIVIDED: MARTIN BUBER AND THE CHALLENGES OF BEING CHOSEN by Manuel Duarte de Oliveira [Series Studia Judaica, De Gruyter, 9783110740745]

With exacting scholarship and fecund analysis, Manuel Oliveira probes through the lens of Martin Buber (1878-1965) the theological and political ambiguities of Israel’s divine election. These ambiguities became especially pronounced with the emergence of Zionism. Wary, indeed, alarmed by the tendency of some of his fellow Zionists to conflate divine chosenness with nationalism, Buber sought to secure the theological significance of election by both steering Zionism from hypertrophic nationalism and by a sustained program to revalorize what he called alternately “Hebrew Humanism.”

As Oliveira demonstrates, Buber viewed the idea of election teleologically, espousing a universal mission of Israel, which effectively calls upon Zionism to align its political and cultural project to universal objectives. Thus, in addressing a Zionist congress, he rhetorically asked, “What then is this spirit of Israel of which you are speaking? It is the spirit of fulfillment. Fulfillment of what? Fulfillment

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

of the simple truth that man has been created for a purpose (...) Our purpose is the upbuilding of peace (...) And that is its spirit, the spirit of Israel (...) the people of Israel was charged to lead the way to righteousness and justice."

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Foreword by Paul Mendes-Flohr

Preface

Introduction

PART ONE – RABBINIC AND BIBLICAL BACKGROUND

1 From Divine Election to Self-Deification

2 Biblical Background: 'Particularism' vs. 'Universalism,' or Exemplary Uniqueness?

3 Revelation to Moses at Sinai: Exodus 3

4 Israel at Sinai

5 The Book of Deuteronomy

PART TWO – THE MODERN PERIOD

6 Foundations of a Völkisch Movement

7 Passion for Land and Volk: The Threat of Neo-Romanticism

8 Ecclesia Triumphans and the Silent Servant

9 The Jewish Task in World History

10 Towards the End: A Center Without a Center

Epilogue

Bibliography

Index

I do not know of anyone else who is as honest as he [Martin Buber] is with respect to spiritual and intellectual matters, and as dependable in human affairs. —Franz Rosenzweig

With exacting scholarship and fecund analysis, Manuel Duarte de Oliveira probes through the lens of Martin Buber the theological and political ambiguities of Israel's divine election. These ambiguities became especially pronounced with the emergence of Zionism. Wary, indeed, alarmed by the tendency of some of his fellow Zionists to conflate divine chosenness with nationalism, Buber sought to secure the theological significance of election by both steering Zionism from hypertrophic nationalism and by a sustained program to revalorize what he called alternately "Hebrew Humanism" and "Biblical Humanism," as he entitled two of his most seminal essays on the spiritual and cultural renewal of Judaism.

In these and allied essays, as Oliveira deftly demonstrates, Buber viewed the idea of election teleologically, espousing a universal mission of Israel, which effectively calls upon Zionism to align its political and cultural project to universal objectives. Thus, in addressing a Zionist congress, he rhetorically asked, "What then is this spirit of Israel of which you are speaking? It is the spirit of fulfillment. Fulfillment of what? Fulfillment of the simple truth that man has been created for a purpose (...) Our purpose is the upbuilding of peace (...) And that is its spirit, the spirit of Israel (...) the people of Israel was charged to lead the way to righteousness and justice." In elucidating the presuppositions of Buber's ramified writings on "the challenge of chosenness," Oliveira provides the reader with the conceptual leverage to confront with refined theological and ethical sensibilities what the former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Jonathan Sacks has aptly called, "Chosenness and its Discontents." —Paul Mendes-Flohr

In order to stimulate new thinking, it is necessary to undermine the myths that have determined structures of thinking. Some of my findings may cause storms of controversy.

RTReview.org © Copyright /Scriptable /11312 US 15-501 North, Suite107 /PMB #226 /Chapel Hill NC 27517 /USA

/ph. 9195425719 /fax 91986916430

But they may also serve as a catalyst in evolving new positions and alternate solutions. —
Simha Flapan

I have decided not to postpone what I have to say. ^ consciousness of my responsibility urges me to speak before the confusion increases. What I am going to deal with is the unambiguous demarcation of a kind, a degenerate kind of nationalism, which of late has begun to spread even in Judaism. —Martin Buber

There appears to be no escape from the most evil of all idolatry. —Martin Buber

If Israel renounces its own mystery, it renounces the heart of reality itself. National forms without the eternal purpose from which they have arisen signify the demise of Israel's specific fruitfulness. —Martin Buber

Yet, a deeper and perplexing question remains: how could such a theological concept ever have become the driving force of a project so ubiquitously secular in its genesis?

"Written over a period of about thirty years, the essays in this volume represent a dual attempt: first, to clarify the relation of certain aspects of Jewish thinking and Jewish living to contemporary intellectual movements, and second, to analyze (and refute) those trends within Jewish life which, surrendering to certain current ideologies, tend to weaken the teachings of Israel internally. (...) My presentation aims to point to the reality of this historical moment: out of its distress one can find a way only by rediscovering the eternal, forgotten truth, one of whose rays has entered the teachings of Israel. So begins Martin Buber [1878-1965] the Preface of what would become one of his most important works, entitled *Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis*, published in Jerusalem, in February 1948, just a few months before the creation of the State and the beginning of the War of Independence.

This book has also been in the making for an extended period of time. It started as a sincere, yet perhaps 'naïve' search for an understanding of what might be implied in the concept of the divine electiⁿ/ch^seness of Israel. As Daniel Frank stated in his Introduction to *A People Apart: Chosenness and Ritual in Jewish Philosophical Thought*: "It is unarguable that the doctrine of chosenness (or election) is the most difficult for modern Jews to accept. It smacks of elitism or, at least, an antiassimilationist ideology. (...) 'Chosenness,' 'apartness,' seems to resist the modern age. (...) [H]ow can chosenness be rendered meaningful and viable for the modern Jew, all of whose social and political affiliations are permeated by an egalitarian outlook?" And Frank concludes: "Is it possible for the modern Jew, ex hypothesi dwelling in a democratic society, a society that accords equal legal and political rights to all of its members on the basis of a natural equality, to defend the traditional Jewish doctrine of chosenness?"

It is indeed particularly difficult to assess how to strike the right balance between the dimensions of singularity/particularity and universality implied in this concept. In one of his commentaries to Jehuda Halevi's poems, Franz Rosenzweig refers to Jewish 'singularity' in the following manner:

This people's singularity (...) consists in the fact that the people sees itself exactly as it is seen from the outside. An entire world calls the Jewish Tribe both rejected and chosen, and the tribe itself confirms these words of others, instead of countering them with words of its own. It is only that the thing as perceived from the outside assumes the form of an external connection, of a historical consequence, while on the inside it is experienced as intrinsically inseparable, meaning that the vessels of curse and of blessing are so interconnected that the one can run over only when the other is also filled to the brim.

How open and inclusive should chosenness be vis-[^]-vis other human beings? As Dana Hollander emphasizes, for Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig, Jewish chosenness is a chosenness viewed

from a messianic perspective, involving an impact in universal history: "The Jewish people derives its eternal existence not from the fact of being the contingent bearer of a trait or a message, but from living the chasm between the particularity and the universality of chosenness."

A significant number of similar questions remain open: Is the concept of divine chosenness still binding on the Jewish people today? If yes, does it also bind the large percentage of secular Jews, or only the religiously committed ones? What are the contents of that concept vis-a-vis the relationship between the Jewish nation and other nations? Is the prophetic call for service on behalf of other nations still binding or has it been tacitly/unwillingly entrusted to other monotheist religious traditions such as Christianity and Islam? If the call for the service of others has been entrusted to other traditions, does that substantively change the nature of the Jewish tradition itself? Does God exercise preferences vis-à-vis His chosen ones, or are those preferences only ancillary to a larger goal, and will thus disappear once the goal will be reached? Can the Jewish nation, or the Jewish State, be considered an 'end-in-itself'? What would be wrong with that? Is the concept of 'alterity'/otherness — represented from a horizontal perspective in the call for service on behalf of other nations and, from a vertical one, in the unflinching demand of loyalty and commitment to be observed in the covenanted relationship with the Caller — an intrinsic element to be taken into consideration in the fulfillment of chosenness? Does the absence of a conscience of 'otherness' (i.e., if one loses sight of the distance between one's self and the reference point one intends to achieve) inevitably lead to the dreadful consequence of idolatry and the potential oppression of others (under the impression of acting according to an absolute power overriding other potential considerations)? These were some of the questions that set me on the way.

As my research evolved into the second half of the nineteenth century, a growing apprehension arose: the realization of how deep the inspiration that Jewish thinkers received from nineteenth century streams of European nationalist thought was increasingly being absorbed and subsequently integrated into Jewish nationalist ideology. Gradually, this influence became evermore self-evident. The similarities and impact that neo-Romanticism had on both the Jewish and German nationalist ideologies was indeed overwhelming. This sense of bewilderment would merge into a feeling of urgency, given the outcome that one of these ideologies had already proven to be able to unleash on others, in a not so distant past. Could the previous mistake of attempting to idolatry a whole nation under false pretenses of racial supremacy, taint the emerging Zionist project itself, albeit under different theological/ideological premises?

More recently, I became aware of yet another serious aspect to be considered: the realization of how a significant number of Jewish thinkers conceive the 'Jewish soul' par rapport the 'soul' of other human beings, hideously imagined as deprived of a divine semblance and thus considered immensely inferior. The consequences of such a world view, I think, can likewise be appalling, especially if such world view will ever become sufficiently predominant to be integrated in the power structures of a State. Given the urgency of the hour, I decided to bring this study to light, perhaps with the sole consolation of having done as much as I could, by refusing to become silently complacent with a political process that progressively trumps upon fundamental values that ought not to be ignored.

A deep passion and admiration for Jewish Thought has enlightened my study of the Jewish tradition during the last four decades of my life. In this process, as my awareness of certain critical issues of Jewish nationalism grew deeper, so grew the understanding that such research, if fallen into the wrong hands, could potentially have a negative impact on the fragile community that I so much loved. That made me set back and silence the unflinching intuition that year after year resounded ever more forcefully. I waited for as long as I could. Today, though, to continue in silence would be tantamount to betrayal of some of the important principles that I was honored to discover in that ancient tradition. The threat that some forms of religious, political, and messianic Zionism bring to

the Jewish civilization, has the potential to trigger the downfall of Judaism itself, including those crucial principles that have enabled our deeper understanding of human dignity and other fundamental values transversal to humankind.

During my ten years of doctoral studies in the Department of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, I had the privilege and frequent opportunity to witness the amazing things that the revival of the Jewish presence on the Land brought into life. However, I also witnessed the dramatic existential conditions lived by the other side of the story, the non-Jewish side. It is painful to watch one people breaking another, methodically, generation after generation. The most recent steps of this process started just a few years after the creation of the State of Israel, in October 1953, when in reprisal for recurrent terrorist attacks, an Israeli military unit crossed the border into the Kingdom of Jordan and laid siege to an Arab village, leaving over fifty of its civilian inhabitants dead and destroying multiple homes. This incident was met with fierce national and international condemnation. One of those internal voices came from an Israeli scientist and critical thinker, demanding an answer to a problem that to this very day remains without an answer: "What produced this generation of youth, which felt no inhibition or inner compunction in perpetrating the atrocity, once given the inner urge and external occasion for retaliation? After all, these young people were not a wild mob, but youths raised and nurtured on the values of a Zionist education, on concepts of the dignity of man and a humane society.'

From very early on, Yeshayahu Leibowitz tried to sculpture his own answer to what he thought would be one of the greatest challenges confronting the existence of the State of Israel in its obstinate refusal to draw a clear distinction between the religious and the political realms:

The answer is that the events of Kibiyeh were a consequence of applying the religious category of holiness to social, national, and political values and interests - a use widely made in our education and mass media. The concept of holiness - the concept of the absolute that is beyond all categories of human thought and evaluation - is applied to the mundane sphere. From a religious perspective only God is holy, and only His imperative is absolute. All human values and all obligations and undertakings derived from them are profane and have no absolute validity. Country, state, and nation impose pressing obligations and tasks that are sometimes very difficult. They do not, on that account, acquire sanctity. They are always subject to judgment and criticism from a higher standpoint. For the sake of that which is holy - and perhaps only for its sake - man is capable of acting without any restraint.

And Leibowitz concluded: "In our discourse and practice we have uprooted the concept of holiness from its authentic ground and applied it to matters for which it was not destined, courting all the dangers implied by its distorted use." In doing so, Yeshayahu Leibowitz was well aware of the unforgiving excesses practiced by important sectors of Israeli society, such as those instigated by Zvi Yehuda Kook, who unabashedly declared:

We must remember now and forever: What is sanctified is sanctified! (...) the State of Israel and the order of government in Israel - is holy. And all that is necessary to perform this commandment, all the tanks and all the other weapons (...) all belong to this sanctity.

This reminds me of an interesting story shared by a colleague of the Hebrew University, in the context of the scud missiles launched each night from Iraq, during the First Gulf War in 1991. As we were standing in a packed bus driving from Mont Scopus through the Central Bus Station, I asked my friend who lived in Tel-Aviv with her family: "How are you enduring down there?" "Well, we are fine," she said, "but for our daughters it is a bit more complex. The other day, the one who is five asked the older one who is nine: 'If God is all powerful, why does He allow the scud missiles to reach us? Isn't He everywhere?' 'Of course, He is! [the older replied] He is even inside those missiles!' Yes, there is some truth here, but God's omnipresence should not be held responsible for the human decisions and actions taking place in His place, as R. Zvi Kook appears to imply.

A crucial question remains: for how long will Israeli parents consent to send their children to the front lines, while also allowing them to participate in such ignominious abuses that betray the singular ever-legitimate purpose of self-defense? This reminds me of an important text by Martin Buber regarding the 'sacrifices' demanded of young people (including those that serve the subjugation of whole populations):

Time and again, when I ask well-conditioned young souls, 'Why do you give up your dearest possession, your personal integrity?' they answer me, 'Even this, this most difficult sacrifice, is the thing that is needed in order that (...).' It makes no difference, 'in order that equality may come' or 'in order that freedom may come,' it makes no difference! And they bring the sacrifice faithfully. In the realm of [^]loch honest men lie and compassionate men torture. And they really and truly believe that brother-murder will prepare the way to brotherhood! There appears to be no escape from the most evil of all idolatry. There is no escape from it until the new conscience of men has arisen that will summon them to guard with the innermost power of their souls against the confusion of the relative with the Absolute, that will enable them to see through illusion and to recognize this confusion for what it is. To penetrate again and again into the fa s' absolute with an incorruptible, probing glance until one has discovered its limits, its limitedness — there is today perhaps no other way to reawaken the power of the pupil to glimpse the never-vanishing appearance of the Abs[^]lute.

As time goes by and the gap between the two sides of this drama grows deeper, I fear that mistreating each other might ultimately lead to the demise of the long awaited Jewish project. Yet, so long as hope is not completely destroyed (although with unswerving trepidation, I must confess, as I feel that the Shekhinah [the divine Presence] is set, once again, to go into Exile), I proudly will support a form of Zionism that constructively acknowledges the need to create space for a covenanted commitment to establish a society where Truth and Justice will determine the purpose of its existence, a place where the inalienable fundamental rights and existential aspirations of each human being living on the surface of that special Land will be thoroughly respected, not in letter alone, but in fact and attitude, independently of ethnicity or religious affiliation. However, in the current situation, those goals seem ever more unreachable, not only given the outstanding alienation within major secular sectors of Israeli society from the Jewish sources that were supposed to bring this project into being, but also because some of the religious sectors that attempt to take selective aspects of those sources into consideration, tend to consider them from a messianic / quasi-apocalyptic perspective, dangerously trumping upon other fundamental considerations — especially ethical and legal in nature — frequently falling in the trap of degrading segments of the non-Jewish reality to a quasi-infra-human level. Their main purpose consists in imbuing Zionism with messianic religious contents, reinstating divine worship within the context of a theocratic national framework that might enable the revival of some form of kingship, the reinstatement of sacrifices on the Temple Mount, and the re-establishment of the Sanhedrin.

In the course of those intense years of study in Jerusalem, I frequently had the pleasure of visiting friends and spending time in different places in the country. In one of my journeys to Eilat, for example, as we were passing through a checkpoint in the Negev, three or four Israeli soldiers entered the bus and asked for the identity cards of only a small number of passengers (they did it gently; much worse would happen in years to come). Astonished with that highly selective scrutiny, I asked one of them how they knew which ones to check? Unabashedly, he replied: "I look at their humiliated faces [panim mushpalot]!" In doing so, these soldiers were just applying a policy called 'mediniyut hashpalah' [the policy of humiliation], which methodically struggled to create such unbearable existential conditions for the 'non-Jewish' residents living on the Land, that in the end they would either freely leave the country on their own or, alternatively, 'be put into cages and transported away.' Those 'humiliated faces' transported the marks of untold sufferings, sometimes endured beyond comprehension.

In her critical essay on "Zionism as Psychoanalysis," following Hannah Arendt's prediction that an ethos of survival 'at any price' could not only become brutalized but place the safety and sanity of the nation at risk, Jacqueline Rose unveils the perplexing memories of Liran Ron Furer, while serving in the territories: "I was carried away by the possibility of acting in the most primal and impulsive manner. Over time the behaviour (...) became nonnative (...) without fear of punishment and without oversight (...) a place to test our personal limits - how tough, how callous, how crazy we could be." I could not but be deeply shocked and appalled with the shortsightedness of such policies. How in the world could a civilized nation use such 'methods' in order to impose its power and control over another nation? Which values in the Jewish tradition could sanction such a despicable behavior? Wasn't Jewish history dangerously in the process of writing one of its darkest pages? Why do light and darkness have to walk 'hand-in-hand' in human history? After all, as a doctoral student, I was trying to understand the core of one of the most complex theological / philosophical concepts - the divine Election of a particular People, believed to be brought into being as a 'Light to the Nations.' In the end, I might have found way more than in my wildest dreams I could have expected, but it should be acknowledged that the great majority of Israelis are decent people who deplore those and similar policies, frequently displaying their public condemnation of abuses of power, considered abhorrent in the eyes of any sensitive human being. The Land remains both a kaleidoscope and a magnifying glass of human nature and, as such, it contains and reflects the complexities, hopes and contradictions that the human mind is able (and willing) to conceive.

Ithamar Greenwald, professor of Jewish history at the Tel Aviv University, and someone deeply aware of the complexities in the Land, in an article entitled "Can Messianism Survive Its Own 'Apocalyptic' Visions?" portrayed the situation in the following manner: "Although criticism was occasionally raised against extreme forms of maltreatment of the non-Jewish, mostly Arab, population, the overall attitude toward the Palestinian Arabs was largely oriented by uncompromising ideologies. Here religious ideas taken with no further thinking out of the pages of Scripture set the desired attitude toward those Arabs on the same premises as the attitude toward the ancient People of Canaan. All this amounted to fundamentalism par excellence. When linked to orthodox views of the non-Jewish 'other,' that maltreatment was often theologically 'upgraded.'"

All things considered, it is possible that the expected relation between Israel's divine Election and its tangible universal projection, from a Jewish point of view, was a misplaced hope. After all, just a few years before my arrival in the Land, it had already been written and well understood that such a prophetic aspiration would be beyond the reach of the present contours of Jewish history. For example, just one decade after the Six-Day War, in an essay entitled "The Religious and Moral Significance of the Redemption of Israel," Yeshayahu Leibowitz unambiguously asserted that: "The state of Israel does not radiate the light of Judaism to the nations, nor even to the Jews. I vehemently oppose the view that Zionist theory and practice are necessarily or essentially connected with the idea of 'Light to the Nations.'" Indeed, Leibowitz proclaimed:

The idea that the people of Israel has been endowed with a capacity for instructing and guiding all of humanity has no basis in authentic Jewish sources, and played no role - at least no more than a marginal one - in the consciousness of generations of Jews who assumed the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven in the form of the yoke of Torah and Mitzvot. This idea was fabricated by the heretics - from the Apostle Paul to [David] Ben-Gurion - who meant to cast off the yoke of Torah by substituting for it a faith in an abstract 'vocation.' The Jewish people were not given a mission; it was rather charged with a task - the task of being servants of God ('A Kingdom of Priests and a holy nation')

As my research continued to develop, and I came across a few additional unexpected experiences, I started to realize that, side by side some incredible gems of Jewish wisdom and examples of virtuous behavior, there were deeply troubling contradictions and dark spots that could explain the abuse of

power and humiliation of non-Jewish others in Israeli society, both in practice and discourse. But how could such attitudes take shape in a public space and be endorsed and condoned by this special Community and by those representing a People who too frequently had been victim of some of the most atrocious crimes and horrendous persecutions perpetrated in the course of [un]human history? "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Gen. 4,9), some could ask. "Yes [I should reply]! At least as long as he/she is under your direct jurisdiction and control! And, besides that, how can you not be aware of and respect the divine image in each and every human being living in your midst?" As we will see in the following pages, there is a 'method' for that too: Deny them the fundamental right to be considered Human, by scandalously stating that not all humans are, in fact, descendants of Adam from a theological perspective commonly assumed as the Father of Humanity], and you will feel empowered and justified to treat them as less than human and, perhaps in the eyes of some, even bellow common 'beasts.'

These are profoundly perplexing issues that lie beneath the structural foundations of the study that follows. As the former Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, Jonathan Sacks, wisely acknowledges, in his work on *The Dignity of Difference*:

"One belief, more than any other (...) is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great history of ideals. It is the belief that those who do not share my faith - or my race or my ideology - do not share my humanity. At best they are second-class citizens. At worst they forfeit the sanctity of life itself. As mentioned above, time and again I asked myself what is it in this amazing tradition, that enables such a mistreatment of the other, sometimes beyond reasonable proportions, as in countless humiliations perpetrated under State control? Perhaps, better than anyone else, Ya'akov Cohen, in his poem "The Zionist Revolution," in just a few words, offers a hint that might help probe a larger answer - Sacred Cruelty:

Daring to the point of chutzpah [somewhere between shameless audacity and insolent arrogance], courageous to the point of risking his life, defending his opinion to the point of fanaticism, fanatic to the point of cruelty - these are the characteristics that are praiseworthy and sacred to the revolution. Sacred audaciousness and sacred cruelty - audaciousness toward the mighty ancient gods, their doctrine and regime, and cruelty toward himself and others, near and far, for the sake of the sacred goal.

It is possible that a few aspects of the critique expressed in this study might elicit a sense of discomfort or unease in some. Yet, in my humble view, serious research should dare to be above such concerns which, most often, in an attempt to overcome the potential embarrassment of historical reality, succumb to apologetical thinking. This work tries to go beyond the fateful drive towards such apologetical thinking, which frequently defile not only Jewish thought, but so many similar streams of theological/political reasoning. Only recently, I think, are Jewish scholars, in particularly Israeli ones, daring to be more self-critical of their own tradition(s), exploring ways to venture beyond previous ideological motivations, frequently disguised under a litany of victimhood and self-justification. Fortunately, a courageous new generation of Jewish critical thinking is on the rise. One trailing in the path that Seyla Benhabib so acutely describes in just a few words: "It is my hope to create cracks and fissures in the edifice of discursive traditions large enough so that a new ray of reason which still reflects the dignity of justice along with the promise of happiness may shine through them." Yet, it should be acknowledged, as courageous and as new as this remarkable undertaking might seem, it is not unique. In his own time and environment, a number of centuries ago, Moses Maimonides, one of the greatest pillars of Jewish thought, shining into eternity, dared to declare in the Introduction to the perplexed readers of his and future generations:

Lastly, when I have a difficult subject before me - when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way of teaching a well-established truth except by pleasing one intelligent man and displeasing ten thousand fools - I prefer to address myself to the one man, and to take no

notice whatever of the condemnation of the multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may attain perfection and be at peace?

Maimonides was indeed ready to confront the `multitude'! Are we? <>

THE LIFELINE: SALOMON GRUMBACH AND THE QUEST FOR SAFETY by Meredith L. Scott [Brill's Series in Jewish Studies, Brill, 9789004514393]

During the first months of World War II, nearly one thousand refugees and asylum seekers held in French internment camps sought the help of one man: Salomon Grumbach. Meredith Scott's **THE LIFELINE** is a ground-breaking study of Grumbach, an Alsatian Jew, journalist, and socialist politician who became one of Europe's most important interwar refugee advocates. Focusing on his remarkable life in Germany and France, it uncovers the identities that drove his international crusades for democracy and human rights. *The Lifeline* offers lessons that transcend national boundaries and historical moments, challenging us to rethink our ideas about resistance, mobilization, and activism.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Introduction

I Foundations

I Hattstatt and beyond, the Early Years

I Roots

2 Pre-war and Wartime Controversies

3 World War I

2 Towards Reconciliation, 1918–1932

I Contours of Public Engagement

2 Rapprochement and a Fragile Peace

3 And When We Wake Up, It Will Be Too Late, 1932–1936

I Sounding the Alarm

2 The Crisis of February 1934

3 The Crisis Begins

4 Voices from the Abyss, 1936–1939

I Deputy of Castres

2 Fragmentation

3 Munich and Beyond

4 Birth of the Internment Camp System

5 Survival, 1939–1945

I Establishment of Vichy and the Massilia Affair

2 Captivity

Conclusion

I Stability, Security, and Peace

Bibliography

Index

“In my great distress and immense despair, I write to you in the name of nearly 400 Germans and Austrians interned at Camp de Catus,” begins a December 1939 letter to Salomon Grumbach, Deputy of Castres and known refugee advocate. I “We are poorly housed, like cattle. We live in stables and sleep on rocks and sand barely covered with filthy straw. The rats roam around night and day. In these conditions, not even the least hygiene is possible.” The author, like thousands of

other men, women, and children since 1933, fled the Third Reich for safe haven in France. France, however, was no longer the land of asylum that they had hoped to find. Its legacy of universal republicanism, generous immigration policies, and human rights had eroded in the face of economic depression, fear of war, and restricted visions of nationhood. Rather than acquiring asylum, the author of this letter was arrested and sent to an internment camp where daily miseries were surpassed only by fear of repatriation to Germany and the threat of the Nazi war machine.

Using the pseudonym “Schneider” to protect himself from camp guards’ strict monitoring of correspondence, the letter writer details his situation and appeals to Grumbach for help:

There are six German- speaking doctors here, but they cannot help due to lack of instruments and medications. The military doctor promised us an improvement in our situation, but nothing has changed. We cannot properly clean ourselves because the water is not quite clean. Thanks to this state of affairs, one man in the camp, aged 60, is dead ... transported to the hospital only to die there. That’s how they treat humans here and if our situation doesn’t change soon, the same fate will be reserved for many others among us. The food isn’t sufficient and it’s bad ... one of my friends who wrote the truth about the camp was put in the cachot and his letter was confiscated. For that reason, I am wary and sign with a false name. Most people here want to fight Hitler and have voluntarily signed up. However, I don’t think the situation in the camp will deepen their love for France ... Please help us, before others die.

Against improbable odds, Schneider’s letter made its way, uncensored, into the hands of Salomon Grumbach. And it is not surprising that Grumbach was its intended recipient. He had already received hundreds of other letters just like it. At a time when France restricted its borders, tracked foreigners, and created an internment camp system, upwards of a thousand refugees and asylum seekers wrote to Grumbach as their best chance for help. He was a known champion for human rights and refugees, a reputation gained through both ordinary and extraordinary forms of personal and political intervention for over two decades. In journalism, voluntary associations, and politics, he nurtured connections and resources forged through years of deliberate engagement in France and beyond. These experiences proved crucial in the last years of the Third Republic, in 1939 and 1940, when he helped secure the liberation of refugees from French internment camps. Yet Grumbach’s activism did not begin in 1939. Examining the fullness of his efforts reveals a worldview that transcended spheres of belonging and national frontiers; it enriches our understanding of Jewish life in twentieth- century France and Germany.

An Alsatian Jew, journalist, and socialist politician, Salomon Grumbach is known for his roles in the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party— sPD), the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (French Section of the Worker’s International— sFlo), and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (Human Rights League— LD h). However, his extensive social and political activism and his fight for refugee rights during the 1930s have remained largely hidden from view. This is the first study of Grumbach, who brought together diverse international actors and resources in his efforts to influence French and European political developments and, in the 1930s, to protect refugees. The Lifeline excavates Grumbach’s extensive involvement in European political and associational life, which enabled him to make connections throughout France and the international community. It presents a history of Jewish activism that facilitated critical resistance and aid during the fraught years of the late Third Republic and World War II. Born of his cumulative experiences, this activism was aimed at protecting the rights of all and upholding the French Republic’s core commitments to its people.

The case of Grumbach allows us to follow the development of Jewish activism across multiple decades and countries. It enriches our understanding of how Jews in interwar France adapted to changing circumstances to fight for their rights and the rights of others. Grumbach's example illustrates how members of democratic societies can engage civic spaces even at times of turbulence and adverse public opinion. But more specifically, his life provides insight into critical events of the first half of the twentieth century, as well as the mentalities that underlay his work. This study considers Grumbach's efforts within a transnational framework, stressing the importance of his experiences in Alsace under the German Empire and during the Great War before giving central focus to interwar France and World War II.

This book relies substantially on Grumbach's hitherto unavailable personal papers held at the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) in Paris, as well as his files in the Pantheon collection at the French National Archives. Both sets of documents are invaluable. Those at the AIU contain letters to, from, and about hundreds of refugees and interned foreigners, while the Pantheon collection details additional aspects of his public life and refugee advocacy. After the fall of France in 1940 and Grumbach's subsequent arrest, German authorities took them from his home, probably looking for information about him and those with whom he had been working.⁶ The portion now held in the National Archives was recovered after the liberation of France, while Grumbach's other papers—a key source for his interventions on behalf of refugees in the late 1930s—remained unavailable for nearly seventy years.⁷ They were first sent to Berlin, and after the Soviets occupied the city, these documents made their way to Moscow. They remained there until his son, Jean- Marc, requested their return to France, designating the AIU archives in Paris as their repository.

The papers at the AIU preserve the details of Grumbach's largely unknown work on behalf of refugees, many of whom were Jews and socialists fleeing the Third Reich. I was fortunate to discover them in 2008, while they were still in the process of being catalogued. They deal with around eight hundred individuals between 1939 and 1940 alone, offering details on life in France, the Third Reich, and French camps long missing from the historical record. Paired with his papers at the National Archives, they allow me to trace much of Grumbach's refugee work. However, to build a holistic study that considers his contributions prior to and after the refugee crisis, I also turn to departmental and municipal repositories, Grumbach's public writings, and articles in French newspapers such as *L'Humanité*, *L'Œuvre*, *Le Populaire*, and *La Lumière*. Together, these sources shed new light on Jewish life in France prior to World War II. They document how Grumbach acted through a wide range of organizations, both Jewish and non- Jewish, to work towards common goals within the realms of politics, social involvement, and humanitarianism.

Grumbach belongs to a group of humanitarian and political figures in interwar France—including Léon Blum and Victor Basch—who were known as much for their leadership roles as for their Jewishness. These men were state Jews who, in the words of Pierre Birnbaum, “took advantage of the universalistic and egalitarian values of the post- revolutionary French state, advancing through the meritocratic system to achieve emancipation through public service ... serving the state as bureaucratic and civil servants and military officers, doing their utmost to protect and defend it.” Grumbach joined this cohort after World War I, and his experiences under the German Empire prior to 1918 profoundly shaped his interwar activities. Conceptions of Jewishness and Jewish solidarity molded his outlook, as did his adolescent participation in Alsatian socio- political activities and his involvement in the SPD of Rosa Luxemburg and August Bebel.

Throughout these activities, Grumbach maintained a firm dedication to internationalism, developing commitments and contacts that were unimpeded by national frontiers. He therefore viewed most matters, including the regional particularism of Alsace- Lorraine, through an internationalist lens, positioning them within broader European concerns. This was about more than ideological

frameworks; Grumbach's internationalist mindset also had pragmatic implications. His approach to socio-political engagement comprised a surprising mix of local, national, and international contacts who together constituted an enormously useful and efficient collection of resources. Talbot Imlay's work on international socialism sheds light on this practice. Internationalism, he points out, is not a linear process of increasing connectivity; rather, it comprises "clusters of activity, some interconnected and some not, occurring in multiple spaces, at various speeds and intensities, and with different durations."¹⁰ Indeed, Grumbach sought varying levels of international involvement as he adapted to ongoing circumstances. He created a flexible and informal network that stretched into the worlds of journalism, voluntary associations, and politics on both sides of the Rhine River.

Grumbach's political work allowed him to influence French foreign policy in the 1920s and agitate on behalf of refugees in the 1930s. His position in the *sfio*, as well as his tenures as Deputy of Mulhouse and Deputy of Castres, facilitated enduring relationships within, and a nuanced understanding of, the apparatus of the French state. Even when out of elected office, he deliberately remained close to the halls of government. Yet official positions in government were not the sole focus of his work, and one has to wonder whether Grumbach would have participated as extensively in French and international organizational life if he had experienced electoral victory early in his career. Repeated losses in legislative elections prior to 1939 (apart from those of 1928 and 1936, which he won) forced him to find other means of political involvement. Onlookers often referred to his seemingly ubiquitous presence at all conferences and meetings throughout Europe. Moreover, he gained a reputation for routinely criticizing the French state. He believed in France's foundational ideals and publicly held it accountable for what he believed to be its shortcomings. In these ways, Grumbach leveraged his roles as activist, politician, and writer in meaningful ways for more than thirty years.

This book has two central objectives. First, it explores how decades of activism through French and German public life allowed Grumbach to exert influence on matters of European peace, human rights, and democracy prior to the 1930s. It highlights details of Alsatian life not often considered and underscores the importance of his efforts in the years before Hitler's rise to power. These decades reveal the contours of his international approach and ever-widening circle of contacts. I first examine the years before 1914—while he still lived in the German Empire—and the emergence of his outlook on activism and politics, considering the evolution of his ideas on public engagement and the various influences on his worldview. I explore the roots of his political convictions and the encounters that challenged them. In the 1920s, Grumbach, now a French citizen, applied himself to the fragile postwar situation. He exposed human rights abuses and drew attention to the need for improved Franco-German relations to ensure enduring European peace. He made himself indispensable to those who decided foreign policy and gained a reputation for incisive political analyses. He was both a longtime admirer of the French republic and a frank critic of its policies, whether they concerned Germany after World War I or the handling of Alsace-Lorraine. This willingness to oppose the state meant breaking with former colleagues and it earned him enemies from across the political spectrum.

The Lifeline's second objective is to investigate Grumbach's activities during the 1930s and throughout World War II. As France anxiously dealt with the Great Depression and neighboring fascist regimes, it was also on the frontlines of the refugee crisis. It was, in the words of Vicki Caron, the "foremost nation of asylum in the world." When Hitler took power in Germany in 1933, Grumbach found many ways to advocate for refugees and refugee rights in France. He also began to receive letters from, or on behalf of, German Jews, socialists, and other targets of Hitler's persecutory regime. He received these letters first as a private citizen and then, after 1936, as the Deputy of Castres. They continued to arrive, even after war broke out, as word of his successful interventions reached more of those in need of help. Grumbach was one of several figures in France at the vanguard of the fight for refugees, and he worked alongside colleagues who prioritized refugee

rights, such as fellow socialists Leon Blum and Marius Moutet and Victor Basch of the LDH. His working knowledge of the French state, his relationship to Jewish communal life, and his connections to refugee initiatives made him a valuable ally and successful advocate. When France established internment camps and began arresting German- speaking foreigners in 1939, many refugees considered Grumbach their best hope for liberation.

In the context of these efforts, Grumbach's knowledge of the state was of paramount significance. He became a vital intermediary between refugees and the government. He knew the best means to expedite cases through government channels and secured liberation for scores of internees until the spring of 1940, when developments in France jeopardized his own life. Under Vichy, authorities arrested Grumbach as a traitor and moved him several times between political prisons and house arrest. In these perilous years, he took the same approach that he had in previous decades, reaching out to potential allies— in this case, members of the Resistance. His already- precarious situation became even worse after 1942, when his name appeared on Nazi arrest lists. Grumbach and his wife fled the Gestapo and SS on more than one occasion, with one particularly close call in early 1944, and survived the war by hiding in the Cévennes. After liberation, Grumbach returned to the National Assembly and became President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs. In these roles, he addressed France's postwar relationship with Germany, called for the Marshall Plan to help Jewish organizations such as *Obschestvo Remeslenovo i Zemledelcheskovo Trouda* (Society for Trades and Agricultural Labor— *ort*), and worked alongside the architects of European integration.

The relationships that Grumbach fostered through his social and political life were critical to his activism and its effectiveness. Throughout this book, I use the term network to describe these relationships, even though they belong to an era before modern conceptions of networking or network theory. Although never expressing it as such in personal writings or public appearances, Grumbach's systematic creation of individual and organizational contacts was neither haphazard nor unintentional. Community activism through organizational life has gained attention in works on twentieth- century France and its empire. It is within that contextual framework that Grumbach should be understood, but his work was exceptional in that it cut across political, national, and religious boundaries. He could pursue his form of activism because of France's particular socio- political context— namely, a multifaceted civil society and a political culture that encouraged popular involvement in voluntary associations.

Foundations

THE LIFELINE is both a national and an international story, one that considers events and encounters in France within a transnational context. It explores Jewish use of the public sphere and the vitality of international Jewish activism, enriching the findings of foundational twentieth- century scholarship that wrestled with interwar Jewish experiences amid the refugee crisis, recrudescant antisemitism, and the Shoah. These works on Jews in modern France broke new ground and illuminated details that, without which, today's research would not be possible. As Pierre Birnbaum asserted in *Jews of the Republic*, for example, Jews during the Third Republic did not have to repress their identities in order to be French or take part in civil society. Nadia Malinovich's more recent study of Jewish society in twentieth- century France supports similar conclusions. She posits that Jews successfully navigated "the challenge of carving out a place for themselves in the French nation that would allow them to express their particularism fully while simultaneously holding on to the values of republican universalism." The Jewish experience in the 1930s, however, remains largely untouched since Vicki Caron's examination of the refugee crisis in France, in which she highlights not only the fluctuation of immigration policies but also the ways that French Jews worked to aid Jewish refugees and influence politics.

THE LIFELINE returns to interwar France with a fresh set of questions that benefit from a new generation of scholars, including Ronald Schechter, Lisa Moses Leff, Maud Mandel, Laura Hobson Faure, Nadia Malinovich, and Ethan Katz. These scholars have constructed innovative frameworks for examining Jewish history across the centuries. Zvi Jonathan Kaplan and Nadia Malinovich's edited volume *The Jews of Modern France* offers a variety of case studies covering topics ranging from legal and architectural history to arts and politics. Meanwhile, Ronald Schechter's examination of Jews in eighteenth-century France reveals how, prior to emancipation, they asserted their place in the nation through symbolic acts and patriotic liturgy. In addition, Lisa Leff's study of the aju in the nineteenth century shows that French Jewish internationalism facilitated aid for foreign coreligionists and created alliances across political divides, advancing both the secular state and the anticlerical movement. She sheds light on ideals that were critical to Grumbach's own worldview, particularly a form of international cooperation that highlighted "tolerance, equality, and religious freedom." According to Leff, French Jews "developed the rhetoric of Jewish international solidarity ... to defend their own rights by linking them to the progress of the revolutionary tradition."

My study of Grumbach especially benefits from the scholarly focus on organizational life in both national and international contexts. Laura Hobson Faure, for example, examines the interplay between American and French Jewish aid organizations as they facilitated care for Holocaust survivors, especially children, and re-established Jewish life in France. In particular, she focuses on the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and its interactions with Jewish communities in France. Closely related works include Daniella Doron's study of Jewish youth, memory, and reconstruction in France and Maud Mandel and Ethan Katz's cross-generational examinations of Jewish politics in the second half of the twentieth century. Other scholars have considered state and non-state Jewish actors within global contexts; for example, Jaclyn Granick focuses on Jewish humanitarianism during World War I, while Nathan Kurz analyzes Jewish internationalism after the Holocaust. Similarly, my study of Salomon Grumbach demonstrates that twentieth-century Jewish activism addressed issues related to democracy, peace, and human rights by focusing on international political and organizational life. Thus, Grumbach's story contributes to the growing body of Jewish history that approaches questions of identity, self-representation, and public engagement.

Grumbach fits a trend among Jews in modern France who were fully integrated into the public sphere of the Third Republic but pursued forms of social and political engagement that were uniquely Jewish, creating new spaces in which to articulate their identities and concerns. Embedded in the culture of the Third Republic, energetic involvement in voluntary associations and political activities reinforced French republicanism and belonging, contributing to what Philip Nord characterized as a "general resurrection of civil society." But *The Lifeline* also unpacks Grumbach's distinctly international approach to social and political change, revealing how Jewish activists adapted to meet unprecedented challenges; Grumbach serves as an example that extends beyond twentieth-century France. This book thus sheds light on how individuals can employ the public sphere to overcome obstacles found in democratic societies both during periods of peace and in moments of crisis. Ultimately, Grumbach's networks facilitated advocacy, aid, and survival. He is an ideal vehicle to expand our understanding of French and Jewish history between the world wars, compelling us to reconsider the meanings of activism, politics, and resistance. <>

AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY by Rafael Medoff [The Jewish Publication Society, 9780827615182]

The first comprehensive volume to teach about America's response to the Holocaust through visual media, **AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY** explores the

complex subject through the lens of one hundred important documents that help illuminate and amplify key episodes and issues.

Each chapter pivots on five key documents: two in image form and three in text form. Individual introductions that contextualize the documents are followed by explanatory text, analysis of historical implications, and suggestions for further reading. A concluding state-of-the-field essay documents how scholars have arrived at the presented information. A complementary teacher's guide with questions for discussion is available online.

The twenty chapters address a broad range of subjects and events, among them America's response to Hitler's rise, U.S. public opinion about Jews, immigration policy, the Wagner-Rogers bill to save children, American rescuers, news coverage of atrocities, American Jewish and Christian responses to the Holocaust, the campaign for U.S. rescue action, the question of bombing Auschwitz, and liberation.

Viewing real documents as a means to understanding core issues will deepen reader involvement with this material. High school and college students as well as general readers of all levels of knowledge will be engaged in understanding this crucial chapter in American history and weighing questions regarding mass atrocities in our own era.

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Responses to Hitler's Rise

America Hopes for a Restrained Hitler

DOCUMENT 1.1 "Just in Case He Goosesteps Too Much!"

Dorothy Thompson Reports from Germany DOCUMENT 1.2 "Starve, Humiliate, Degrade the Jew; In Every Walk, Trade Profession, Nazi Pressure in Law and Slogan"

The New York Times Interviews Hitler

DOCUMENT 1.3 "Hitler Seeks Jobs for All Germans"

Boycotting German Goods

DOCUMENT 1.4 "No Trading with Germany"

Hitler on Trial at Madison Square Garden DOCUMENT 1.5 Hitler on Trial—Resolution and Verdict

Further Reading

2. The American Mood

Antisemitism in Congress

DOCUMENT 2.1 Representative John Rankin's

Remarks before the House

"Racial Science" Spreads

DOCUMENT 2.2 The Passing of the Great Race

Father Coughlin and Hate Radio

DOCUMENT 2.3 Father Coughlin's Radio Address

Concerning Kristallnacht

Antisemitic Attitudes among the Public

DOCUMENT 2.4 Polls by Roper (1938) and Opinion Research (1940) on Antisemitic Attitudes

Antisemitism in the State Department

DOCUMENT 2.5 Antisemitic Remarks by State Department Officials

Further Reading

3. Doing Business with Hitler

U.S. Participation in the Nazi Olympics

DOCUMENT 3.1 "To the Sport-Loving Public of the United States"

Apologizing to Hitler

DOCUMENT 3.2 Secretary of State Apologizes to Hitler

A Cabinet Member Participates in a Pro-Nazi Rally DOCUMENT 3.3 "'Heil Hitler' Resounds as Steuben Society Denounces Boycott, Acclaims New Germany"

Censoring Criticism of Hitler

DOCUMENT 3.4 FDR Objects to Secretary of the Interior's Criticism of Hitler

FDR Urges "Quarantining" of Aggressor Nations DOCUMENT 3.5 FDR's Quarantine Speech

Further Reading

4. The Universities and the Nazis

Nazi Ambassador Speaks at Columbia

DOCUMENT 4.1 "Luther Calls Hitler Critics 'Old-Timers'"

Nazi Official Visits Harvard

DOCUMENT 4.2 "Render unto Caesar"

A Nazi University Celebrates

DOCUMENT 4.3 "Heidelberg"

American Students in Nazi Germany

DOCUMENT 4.4 "Germany Discussed by One Who

Spent Junior Year There"

Abandoning Refugee Scholars

DOCUMENT 4.5 Hamilton College President's Letter

Regarding Hiring Refugee Scholars

Further Reading

5. U.S. Immigration Policy

Immigration Statistics

DOCUMENT 5.1 "Annual Quotas and Quota

Immigrants Admitted, Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 1925 to 1944, by Countries"

When Anne Frank Tried to Come to America DOCUMENT 5.2 Anne Frank's Father Asks American

Industrialist to Help the Frank Family Immigrate

"Postpone and Postpone and Postpone"

DOCUMENT 5.3 The Assistant Secretary of State on

Ways to Obstruct Immigration

The "Close Relatives" Rule

DOCUMENT 5.4 U.S. Immigration Regulation

Regarding Applicants Leaving "Close Relatives" Behind

Albert Einstein's Plea to the First Lady

DOCUMENT 5.5 Albert Einstein Asks the First Lady

to Oppose New Immigration Restrictions

Further Reading

6. Searching for a Haven

James McDonald Resigns in Protest

DOCUMENT 6.1 Resignation of the High

Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany

Eyewitness to Horror

DOCUMENT 6.2 "Jews Humiliated by Vienna Crowds"

The Evian Conference

DOCUMENT 6.3 Refugee Problem Announcement in

Preparation for the Evian Conference

Suicide of a Jewish Refugee

DOCUMENT 6.4 "Ends Life to Escape

Return to Germany"

FDR Responds to Kristallnacht
 DOCUMENT 6.5 President Roosevelt's Statement
 Concerning the Kristallnacht Pogrom
 Further Reading
 7. The Doomed Journey of the St. Louis
 Offer of Haven in the Virgin Islands
 DOCUMENT 7.1 "Virgin Islands Too Offer Haven for Oppressed Jews"
 A Child Appeals to the First Lady
 DOCUMENT 7.2 Eleven-Year-Old Beseeches the First Lady to Accept the Refugees
 St. Louis Passengers Appeal to the White House DOCUMENT 7.3 St. Louis Captain's Log
 Record of Passengers' Telegram to the White House
 Secretaries of State and Treasury Discuss the St. Louis
 DOCUMENT 7.4 Secretary of State and Secretary of
 the Treasury Confer on the St. Louis
 "The Saddest Ship Afloat"
 DOCUMENT 7.5 "Refugee Ship"
 Further Reading
 8. The Wagner-Rogers Bill to Save Children
 The Wagner-Rogers Bill
 DOCUMENT 8.1 Text of the Wagner-Rogers
 Bill (H.R.J. Res. 165 and 168)
 "20,000 Ugly Adults"
 DOCUMENT 8.2 Remark by FDR's Cousin against
 Wagner-Rogers
 President Roosevelt's Position
 DOCUMENT 8.3 FDR's "File No Action" Note on
 Wagner-Rogers
 Helen Hayes Testifies for Admitting Children DOCUMENT 8.4 "First Lady of the American
 Theater"
 Testifies for Admitting German Refugee Children
 Agnes Waters Testifies against Admitting Children DOCUMENT 8.5 "Mother Witness"
 Testifies against Admitting German Refugee Children
 Further Reading
 9. American Rescuers
 The State Department Rebuffs Varian Fry
 DOCUMENT 9.1 "You Should Inform Dr. Bohn and Mr. Fry"
 The Krauses Rescue Fifty Children from Germany and Austria
 DOCUMENT 9.2 Erika Tamar's Passport to America
 The Sharps' Rescue Mission in Czechoslovakia
 DOCUMENT 9.3 Martha Sharp's Recollections about Rescue Work in Czechoslovakia
 Lois Gunden Shelters Children in Vichy France
 DOCUMENT 9.4 Recollections of Hiding French Jewish Children from the Nazis
 Roddie Edmonds Shields Jewish GIS from the Nazis
 DOCUMENT 9.5 Testimony Regarding Master Sergeant Roddie Edmonds's Bravery
 Further Reading
 10. Genocide Confirmed
 The Bund Report
 DOCUMENT 10.1 "Report of the Bund Regarding the
 Persecution of the Jews—May 1942"
 The Riegner Telegram
 DOCUMENT 10.2 Gerhart Riegner's Telegram
 Revealing the Nazis' Annihilation Plan
 The Sternbuch Telegram

DOCUMENT 10.3 The Sternbuch Telegram Revealing
 Additional Details of the Mass Murder
 The Allies' Declaration
 DOCUMENT 10.4 "German Policy of Extermination of the Jewish Race"
 Jan Karski Reports to President Roosevelt
 DOCUMENT 10.5 A Polish Underground Courier's 1943 Conversation with President
 Roosevelt
 Further Reading
 11. All the News the Media Could Fit
 The New York Times on Babi Yar
 DOCUMENT 11.1 Two Reporters' Contrasting
 Accounts of the Babi Yar Massacre
 The Media and the Allies' Declaration
 DOCUMENT 11.2 U.S. News Mediás Coverage of the Allies' Declaration on the Mass
 Murder
 The Media and the Deportations from Hungary DOCUMENT 11.3 "Jews in Hungary Fear
 Annihilation"
 The Nation Urges Rescue
 DOCUMENT 11.4 "While the Jews Die"
 I. F. Stone Investigates
 DOCUMENT 11.5 "Justice Department Immigration
 Figures Knock Long Story into Cocked Hat"
 Further Reading
 12. American Christian Responses
 Rabbi Wise Pleads with Christian Clergy DOCUMENT 12.1 Meeting of Rabbi Wise and
 Christian Clergy, 1933
 The U.S. Catholic Press on Kristallnacht
 DOCUMENT 12.2 "Nazi Atrocities and the American
 War Fever: Are We Preparing for War with Germany?"
 Christian Century Doubts the Holocaust
 DOCUMENT 12.3 "Horror Stories from Poland,"
 "From Rabbi Wise," "From the Editors"
 Jewish and Christian Students Speak Out
 DOCUMENT 12.4 "On Implementing Brotherhood"
 A Baptist Farmer's Gesture
 DOCUMENT 12.5 "Farmer Rogers, His Brother's Keeper"
 Further Reading
 13. American Jewish Responses
 The President and the Rabbi
 DOCUMENT 13.1 Rabbi Wise's Student Questions
 His Relationship with FDR
 Jewish Leaders Appeal to the President
 DOCUMENT 13.2 "Report on the Visit to the President"
 Jewish Congressmen Meet with the President
 DOCUMENT 13.3 "Minutes of Dinner Meeting on Wednesday Evening March 22nd at the
 Statler Hotel"
 "If They Were Slaughtering Horses"
 DOCUMENT 13.4 "Confidential Memorandum of Rabbi Meyer Berlin"
 Jewish Leaders Discuss Strategy
 DOCUMENT 13.5 Meeting of Jewish Leaders
 Concerning Rescue Advocacy
 Further Reading
 14. The Bermuda Conference
 A Jewish Proposal for Bermuda

DOCUMENT 14.1 "The Following Proposals Are Respectfully Submitted"
 Announcement at the End of the Conference
 DOCUMENT 14.2 "Report of the Bermuda Meeting on the Refugee Problem"
 Congressman Emanuel Celler's Response
 DOCUMENT 14.3 Response to Bermuda
 A Jewish Leader's Response
 DOCUMENT 14.4 "The Mockery at Bermuda"
 "An Appeal to the Conscience of the World" DOCUMENT 14.5 "I am taking the liberty of addressing to you, Sirs, these my last words"
 Further Reading
 15. Obstacles to Rescue
 Congressional Sympathy
 DOCUMENT 15.1 Text of the Barkley Resolution
 (Senate Concurrent Resolution 9)
 A Cartoonist Challenges the State Department DOCUMENT 15.2 "Refer to Committee 3, Investigation Subcommittee 6, Section 8b, for Consideration"
 FDR on "Rescue through Victory"
 DOCUMENT 15.3 "Speech of the Honorable A. A. Berle Jr."
 The Allies' Declaration in Moscow
 DOCUMENT 15.4 "Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security"
 Empty Ships for Refugees
 DOCUMENT 15.5 "Shipping for Refugees"
 Further Reading
 16. The Campaign for Rescue
 The Bergson Group's "Race against Death"
 DOCUMENT 16.1 "This Is a Race against Death"
 The Rabbis' Petition to FDR
 DOCUMENT 16.2 "In the Name of God, Creator of the Universe"
 Congressional Resolution on Rescue
 DOCUMENT 16.3 Text of the Gillette-Rogers Resolution (H. Res. 352)
 Breckinridge Long's Testimony
 DOCUMENT 16.4 "Statement of Hon. Breckinridge
 Long, Assistant Secretary of State"
 Exposing the State Department
 DOCUMENT 16.5 "Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews"
 Further Reading
 17. Zionism and the Holocaust
 The White Paper
 DOCUMENT 17.1 Excerpt from
 "Palestine Statement of Policy
 Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty"
 A Christian Zionist Speaks Out
 DOCUMENT 17.2 "The Fifth Freedom"
 Proposed Anglo-American Statement
 DOCUMENT 17.3 "Statement for Issuance by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom Regarding Palestine"
 1944 Republican and Democratic Party Platforms DOCUMENT 17.4 Republican Party Platform of 1944 and Democratic Party Platform of 1944
 FDR's 1944 Statement on Zionism

DOCUMENT 17.5 Proposals and Revisions of President Roosevelt's October 1944
Statement Regarding Palestine
Further Reading
18. The War Refugee Board
Creation of the War Refugee Board
DOCUMENT 18.1 "Executive Order No. 9417 Establishing a War Refugee Board"
A Presidential Warning
DOCUMENT 18.2 Proposals and Revisions of President Roosevelt's March 24, 1944,
Statement Regarding Nazi Collaborators
A Surprising Poll
DOCUMENT 18.3 Gallup Poll Findings Concerning
Temporary Admission of Refugees
Rescuing Romanian Jews
DOCUMENT 18.4 Life Line to a Promised Land
Raoul Wallenberg's Mission
DOCUMENT 18.5 With Wallenberg in Budapest
Further Reading
19. Bombing Auschwitz
The Auschwitz Escapees' Report
DOCUMENT 19.1 "The Extermination Camps of
Auschwitz (Oswiecim) and Birkenau in Upper Silesia"
A Plea to Bomb the Railways
DOCUMENT 19.2 Diary of Jacob Rosenheim
A Plea to Bomb the Gas Chambers
DOCUMENT 19.3 World Jewish Congress Official
Urges Assistant Secretary of War to Bomb Gas Chambers at Auschwitz and Nearby
Railways
The War Department's Rejection Letter
DOCUMENT 19.4 Assistant Secretary of War Rejects
Proposal to Bomb Railways to Auschwitz
A Public Appeal for Bombing
DOCUMENT 19.5 "Last Chance for Rescue"
Further Reading
20. Liberation
A GI Encounters the Holocaust
DOCUMENT 20.1 Liberation of Dachau
Eisenhower Urges Media to See the Camps
DOCUMENT 20.2 Call for Prominent Witnesses to "Conditions of Indescribable Horror"
Marlon Brando, Holocaust Witness
DOCUMENT 20.3 A Flag Is Born Play
An American Chaplain in Buchenwald
DOCUMENT 20.4 An American Chaplain Encounters
Survivors in Buchenwald
The Harrison Report
DOCUMENT 20.5 "Report of Earl G. Harrison"
Further Reading
State of the Field
Notes
Bibliography
Index

The first comprehensive examination of America's response to the Holocaust through visual media,
AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY explores this complex

subject through the lens of one hundred important documents that help to illuminate and amplify key episodes and issues.

The history of how America responded to the Nazi persecution of European Jewry revolves around the interplay between government officials, rescue advocates, and bystanders. The one hundred documents selected for this volume present a cross-section of perspectives reflecting the attitudes and actions of political leaders, activists who sought to influence policymaking, and ordinary individuals.

Each of the twenty chapters focuses on five key documents: two original images and three documents that have been recreated. The introduction to each chapter prepares the reader for understanding the context and back story of the documents. Explanatory text, analysis of historical implications, and suggestions for further reading follow.

Proceeding sequentially from the rise of Hitler to power, in 1933, until the end of World War II and the Holocaust, in 1945, the chapters cover a broad range of subjects, among them America's response to Hitler's rise, U.S. immigration policy, Americans who rescued Jewish refugees, U.S. news coverage of Nazi atrocities, American Christian and Jewish responses to the Nazi genocide, obstacles to rescue, campaigns by American refugee advocates, the question of bombing Auschwitz, and the Allies' liberation of Nazi concentration camps. By examining the period chronologically, rather than thematically, **AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY** will enable high school and college students as well as adult learners to explore responses to the news from Europe in the context of what was actually known—and which rescue options may have been feasible—at each point along the timeline. A concluding state of the field chapter documents the process by which scholars have arrived at the information presented in this book.

There is a broad consensus among the vast majority of scholars in this field as to the major findings of the research to date: that sufficient information about the mass murder was known in time for the the United States to have intervened; that President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration spurned opportunities to rescue Jews from the Holocaust; that major U.S. news media chose not to publish or give prominence to much of the available information about the genocide; and that political action by rescue advocates and dissidents within the government brought about limited U.S. aid to refugees near the end of the war. The documents comprising this book reflect that scholarly consensus.

AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY will be useful to teachers of students with varying degrees of background in American, Jewish, and world history, as it does not presuppose prior knowledge. Discussing these documents as examples of core issues will deepen readers' involvement with this material. Instructors will find it useful for teaching broader subjects such as U.S. immigration history, the history of American Jewry, or contemporary human rights issues, as well as focusing on American responses to the Holocaust. All readers are encouraged to make use of the companion teacher's guide featuring suggested questions for discussion at <https://jps.org/study-guides/>.

The question of America's response to Nazism and the Holocaust remains as compelling today as ever, in light of continuing mass atrocities around the world and the ongoing public debate over whether the United States should intervene against human rights abuses overseas. Understanding how Americans responded to news of the Nazi persecution of European Jewry provides lessons for responding to crises in our own era. <>

FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY by Gisela Striker [Oxford University Press, 9780198868385]

FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO: ESSAYS IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY draws together a selection of Gisela Striker's essays from the last forty years in the areas of research for which she is best known. The first two essays are translated from German: they address specific questions in Aristotle's logic and also complement her commentary on *Prior Analytics I*. Following on from these, there are three papers on Aristotle's ethics and moral psychology, and the second part of the volume presents five recent studies on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics. Three of the essays have not been published previously.

Contents

Introduction

1. Aristotle on Syllogisms 'from a Hypothesis'
 2. Necessity with Gaps
 3. Assertoric vs. Modal Syllogistic
 4. Perfection and Reduction in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*
 5. Aristotle and the Uses of Logic
 6. Aristotle's Three Theories of Argument
 7. The 'Analysis' of Aristotle's *Analytics*
 8. A Note on the Ontology of Aristotle's *Categories*, Chapter 2
 9. Emotions in Context
 10. Aristotle's Ethics as Political Science
 11. Two Kinds of Deliberation: Aristotle and the Stoics
 12. Academics Fighting Academics
 13. Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy
 14. Epicurean Epistemology
 15. Mental Health and Moral Health. Moral Progress in Seneca's Letters
 16. Panaetius *Peri tou kathēkontos* in Cicero's *De Officiis*
- Bibliography
Index of Names
Index of Passages

This collection brings together different lines of research that I have been pursuing throughout my academic career: Aristotle's logic and ethics, and Hellenistic epistemology and ethics.

At the University of Göttingen, where I got most of my philosophical education, a doctoral degree in philosophy required the addition of two secondary fields, for which I chose the two classical languages, Greek and Latin, which I had already learned in high school. After receiving my doctoral degree with a dissertation on Plato's *Philebus*, I continued to work on ancient philosophy, but turned to the Hellenistic period, a field less studied by scholars than the great classics, although it had an enormous influence on later European philosophy. Now, since teaching is not limited to one's specialty, during the first fifteen years, while still in Göttingen, I was also teaching courses in contemporary philosophy—epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind—that kept me in touch with recent developments. Since I moved to the United States, I have been mostly responsible for teaching ancient philosophy, but I have continued to follow contemporary philosophy in the fields I

A few years into my time in Göttingen, I was invited to produce a new German translation and commentary on Aristotle's *Analytics*. Since I had long been interested in Aristotle's logic, I accepted—vastly underestimating the difficulties of the task and the time it would take me to complete it. In the meantime, Hellenistic philosophy was having a kind of renaissance among philosophers interested in the history of their subject, who had until then more or less limited themselves to the study of the Presocratics and the two great classical philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. This led to a lively exchange of ideas between scholars, both philosophers and classicists, now working in this field. So I continued my research in both areas, slowly making my way through Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, first in German, then in English, while also publishing papers on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics.

The present collection includes a number of essays on Aristotle's logic that deal with questions in more detail than would have been appropriate for a commentary, including an, as yet unpublished, paper on the title 'Analytica' (chapter 7), and a short piece outlining the development of Aristotle's theory of argument that might serve as a background to the paper on analysis (chapter 6). It was presented at a conference to celebrate Aristotle's 2400th birthday in Sofia, Bulgaria. The first two chapters were originally published in German. I am very grateful for the meticulous translations of Joshua Mendelsohn.

The four articles on Aristotle that follow those chapters are mainly the result of teaching these subjects for many years. The second part of the collection contains later studies in Hellenistic epistemology and ethics. After a lot of discussion and new contributions by other historians of philosophy who had begun to investigate Hellenistic philosophy in the preceding decades, I have been going beyond the earlier generation of Stoics and Epicureans and Sceptics, and also sometimes trying to correct my earlier views. The series ends with a, yet to be published, study of a work by Panaetius, a Stoic of the second century BC, whose book on appropriate action Cicero used as a model for his last philosophical work, the *De Officiis*. At a time when Cicero was still being read as a philosopher in his own right, that book, dedicated to his son, became a vademecum for young gentlemen from the Renaissance until at least the end of the eighteenth century. It was clearly read as a general book of morality and manners, not as a work of Stoic philosophy, and I was interested in the changes, if any, in Stoicism that made this book enormously influential, quite apart from the influence of Stoic philosophy in other fields. <>

THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, 2 VOLUME SLIPCASE: DELUXE EDITION, ENGLISH AND ANCIENT GREEK EDITION by Franco Montanari, Editors of the English Edition: Madeleine Goh & Chad Schroeder under the auspices of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C.: Advisory Editors: Gregory Nagy & Leonard Muellner [Brill, 9789004298118]

THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION is also available as a single volume and online. This luxury edition offers the same high-quality content as the regular edition but is bound in two slimmer volumes with linen stamped covers and comes in a linen-clad box. **THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION** is the English translation of Franco Montanari's *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*. With an established reputation as the most important modern dictionary for Ancient Greek, it brings together 140,000 headwords

taken from the literature, papyri, inscriptions and other sources of the archaic period up to the 6th Century CE, and occasionally beyond.

Features:

- The principal parts of some 15,000 verbs are listed directly following the entry and its etymology. For each of these forms, the occurrence in the ancient texts has been certified. When found only once, the location is cited.
- Nearly all entries include citations from the texts with careful mention of the source.
- The Dictionary is especially rich in personal names re-checked against the sources for the 3rd Italian edition, and in scientific terms, which have been categorized according to discipline.
- Each entry has a clear structure and typography making it easy to navigate.

THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION is also available as a single volume and online. This luxury edition offers the same high-quality content as the regular edition but is bound in two slimmer volumes with linen stamped covers and comes in a linen-clad box. **THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION** is the English translation of Franco Montanari's *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*. With an established reputation as the most important modern dictionary for Ancient Greek, it brings together 140,000 headwords taken from the literature, papyri, inscriptions and other sources of the archaic period up to the 6th Century CE, and occasionally beyond. **THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION** is an invaluable companion for the study of Classics and Ancient Greek, for beginning students and advanced scholars alike. Translated and edited under the auspices of The Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, DC, **THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION** is based on the completely revised 3rd Italian edition published in 2013 by Loescher Editore, Torino. Features The principal parts of some 15,000 verbs are listed directly following the entry and its etymology. For each of these forms, the occurrence in the ancient texts has been certified. When found only once, the location is cited. Nearly all entries include citations from the texts with careful mention of the source. The dictionary is especially rich in personal names re-checked against the sources for the 3rd Italian edition, and in scientific terms, which have been categorized according to discipline. Each entry has a clear structure and typography making it easy to navigate.

Translators:

Rachel Barritt-Costa, Michael Chappell, Michael Chase, Ela Harrison, Patrick Paul Hogan, Jared Hudson, Sergio Knipe, Peter Mazur, Serena Perrone, Chad Schroeder, Chris Welser

Review

"Franco Montanari is a giant in our field, and his Dictionary is a major leap forward for us." -- Professor Gregory Nagy, Harvard University

"For a number of years now, scholars at ease in Italian have benefitted enormously from the riches, layout, concision, and accuracy of Professor Montanari's *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*, with its added advantage of the inclusion of names. Hence classicists in general will welcome the English version of this very valuable resource." --Professor Richard Janko, University of Michigan

The layout is attractive and easy to use, and scholarly depth is exceeded only by the (still incomplete) *Diccionario Griego-Espanol* production overseen by the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Madrid. Brill is releasing single-volume and online editions in addition to the boxed, two-volume deluxe set, to suit a variety of users' needs. For all collections supporting study of classics, religion, philosophy, and Greek language and literature. Summing Up: Essential. -- P.E. Ojennus, CHOICE June 2016 vol. 53 no. 10 <>

Special Preview Insert **THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF
ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION:**

GE

Greek English

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek

Franco Montanari

Preview

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek

Franco Montanari	Franco Montanari	
Editor in Chief	Editor in Chief	
Editor	Editor	
Editor	Editor	
Editor	Editor	



Editor in Chief
Editor
Editor
Editor

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek is the English translation of Franco Montanari's *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*, published by Loescher. With an established reputation as the most important modern dictionary for Ancient Greek, it brings together 140,000 headwords taken from the literature, papyri, inscriptions and other sources of the archaic period up to the 6th Century CE, and occasionally beyond. *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* is an invaluable companion for the study of Classics and Ancient Greek, for beginning students and advanced scholars alike. Translated and edited under the auspices of The Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, DC, *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* is based on the completely revised 3rd Italian edition published in 2013 by Loescher Editore, Torino

Features

- The principal parts of some 15,000 verbs are listed directly following the entry and its etymology. For each of these forms, the occurrence in the ancient texts has been certified. When found only once, the location is cited.
- Nearly all entries include citations from the texts with careful mention of the source.
- The Dictionary is especially rich in personal names re-checked against the sources for the 3rd Italian edition, and in scientific terms, which have been categorized according to discipline.
- Each entry has a clear structure and typography making it easy to navigate.

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek will also become available as an online resource.

* This booklet is a preview of *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*.
The format and paper used for this preview are not indicative of the final, printed version of the dictionary.

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek

By

Franco Montanari

Editors of the English Edition

Madeleine Goh (β – σ) & Chad Schroeder (α , υ – ω)

under the auspices of the

Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C.

Advisory Editors

Gregory Nagy (*Harvard, CHS*)
Leonard Muellner (*Brandeis, CHS*)



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Visual Guide

Entry	<p>A, α, τό (ἄλφα) <i>indecl.</i> alpha, <i>first letter of the Greek alphabet</i>: ἐγὼ εἰμι τὸ ἄλφα καὶ τὸ ὦ, ὁ</p> <p><i>ἄλφα</i> <i>copulative prefix</i> (α ἀθροιστικόν) <i>expressing togetherness</i>: ἄ-πας all; ἄ-λοχος bed companion, wife τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχού τὸ ὅμοῦ alpha often signifies ‘together’ PLAT. <i>Crat.</i> 405c</p>	<p>Grammatical tag (<i>indecl.</i> = indeclinable)</p> <p>Translation (bold text)</p> <p>Comment (italic text)</p>
Example	<p>πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end NT. <i>Apoc.</i> 22.13 num. α' = 1; ,α = 1,000.</p>	Source (New Testament, <i>Revelation</i> 22.13)
Translation (regular text)		
Explication and commentary	<p>ἄ- and ἄ- [IE *sm-; Lat. sem-, sim-, Skt. sa-; see ἄμα] <i>copulative prefix</i> (α ἀθροιστικόν) <i>expressing togetherness</i>: ἄ-πας all; ἄ-λοχος bed companion, wife τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχού τὸ ὅμοῦ alpha often signifies ‘together’ PLAT. <i>Crat.</i> 405c</p>	Etymology (IE = Indo-European; the asterisk signals a reconstructed form; Lat. = Latin, Skt. = Sanskrit.)
article, nominative feminine singular Lesbian	ἄ art. nom. fem. sg. Lesb., see ὁ, ἡ, τό.	Reference entries
article, nominative feminine singular Doric	ἄ art. nom. fem. sg. Dor., see ὁ, ἡ, τό.	
relative pronoun, nominative feminine singular Lesbian	ἄ rel. nom. fem. sg. Lesb., see ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.	
present indicative middle 3 rd person singular of the verbs ἄω and ἀάω respectively	<p>ἄαται HES. Sc. 101, pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of ἄω.</p> <p>ἄαται pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of ἀάω.</p>	
	<p>ἀγαθοδότης -ου [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] giver of good DIOTOG. (STOB. 4.7.62) etc. ♦ <i>adv.</i> ἀγαθοδότηως giving good EUSTR. in EN. 387.11 generously DION²¹. CH. 120B</p> <p>[...]</p>	
adverbial form of ἀγαθοδότης as separate entry	ἀγαθοδότηως <i>adv.</i> , see ἀγαθοδότης.	
	<p>ἀγαθοεργία and ἀγαθοεργία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοεργός] good deed, benefit HDT. 3.154.1 IUL. 4.135d etc. • <i>Ion.</i> -λη.</p>	Variant form of the entry
Numbers on a black background demarcate uses and senses of the word. Further distinctions of significance and usage are introduced by letters in square boxes.	<p>ἀγαθός -ῆς -όν ❶ of pers. good: ❶ well-born, noble IL. 21.109 etc. with ἀφνειός IL. 13.664 with εὐγενής SOPH. fr. 724.1; καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες well-born men, aristocrats PLUT. <i>Demosth.</i> 4.1 cf. καλοκαγαθός ❷ valiant, skilful, capable, excellent: ἄ. βασιλεὺς good king IL. 3.179; ἄ. θεράπων excellent servant IL. 16.165 ► with acc. of relation: βοῶν ἄ. good at the battle-cry, of powerful voice IL. 2.408, <i>al.</i>; ἄ. γνῶμην skilled at giving</p>	Source (<i>Iliad</i> 21.109; etc. = et cetera, when the word is also found in other authors)
Sign introducing the adverb	934 ♦ <i>adv.</i> ἀγαθῶς well HP. <i>Off.</i> 4.7 ARISTOT. <i>Rh.</i> 1388b 6 etc. <i>interject.</i> good!, very well! VT. <i>Reg.</i> 1.20.7 ■ <i>crasis</i> τὸ ἄ. ► τὰγαθόν, τοῦ ἄ. > τὰγαθοῦ, οἱ ἄ. > ἀγαθοί, τὰ ἄ. > τὰγαθὰ <i>prodelision</i> ᾧ ἄ. > ᾧ' γαθέ (instead of <i>crasis</i> ᾧγαθέ) Lac. ἀγασός ARISTOPH. <i>Lys.</i> 1301 Lesb. ἄγαθος Cyp. ἀζαθός <i>later compar.</i> ἀγαθώτερος (<i>common. suppl.</i> ἀμεινῶν and ἀμεινότερος, ἀρείων, βελτίων and βέλτερος, κρείσων, λῶων and λωίτερος, φέρτερος) <i>later superl.</i> ἀγαθώτατος (<i>common. suppl.</i> ἀριστος, βέλτιστος and βέλτατος, κράτιστος, λῶστος, φέριστος e φέρτατος).	Source (<i>Iliad</i> 2.408; <i>al.</i> = <i>alibi</i> (elsewhere), when the word is found in other passages of the same author)
Sign introducing grammatical and dialectal forms and graphic variants		Indicates transformation (in this case τὸ ἀγαθόν becomes τὰγαθόν by <i>crasis</i>)
Numbered homographous entries	<p>1. ἀκτὴ -ῆς, ἡ wheat, as flour or food IL. 11.631 etc.; Δημήτερος ἄ. fruit of Demeter IL. 13.332, <i>al.</i> [...]</p> <p>2. ἀκτὴ -ῆς, ἡ [ἀκ-] ❶ shore (of the sea), high cliffs, land's end, promontory IL. 24.97, <i>al.</i></p>	

Within the principal parts section, the double vertical bars (||) separate the tenses; the single bars (|) separate the moods within each tense.

Subdivisions of the entry. The numbers on a black background followed by *act.*, *mid.*, and *pass.* in italics indicate the respective subdivisions of the entry according to the verb's three voices.

Subdivisions of the entry. The bold letters in square boxes introduce different uses and meanings of the verb.

Further subdivisions of the entries are introduced by the double (||) and the single (|) bar.

αἴρω *impf.* ἤρον, *mid. pass.* ἡρόμην || *fut.* αἰρώ, *mid.* αἰρούμαι || *aor.* ἤρα, *mid.* ἡράμην || *inf.* αἶραι, *mid.* αἶρασθαι | *ptc.* ἄρας, *mid.* ἀράμενος || *pf.* ἤρκα (*gener. in compd.*), *mid.* ἤρμαι (*mid. signif.*) || *ppf.* 3. pl. (ἀπ)ήρκεσαν, *mid. pass.* 3. sg. ἤρτο || *aor. pass.* ἤρθην || *fut. pass.* ἀρθήσομαι.

① *active* [A] **to raise, lift, with acc.** | *intrans. act.* **to rise** [B] **to take, in order to carry or transport** || **pick up, gather, of grain** | **of water to draw** [C] **to take upon oneself, assume** || **to nurture, educate** | **of garments to put on** || **to nurture, educate** [D] *milit.* **to decamp, depart** | **of ships to raise anchor, embark, abs.** || **to enroll, enlist** [E] **to take away, remove, eliminate** |, **to destroy, kill, annul, suspend** || *philos.* **to contest, deny** [F] *fig.* **to arouse, exalt, excite, aggrandize, exaggerate** || **to exalt, praise** ② *middle* [A] **to raise, lift, lift up, exalt** [B] **to take for oneself, choose, with acc.** || **to obtain, conquer** [C] **to take on oneself, take to oneself** [D] **to remove, eliminate** || **to destroy, kill** [E] *fig.* **to rouse up, undertake** ③ *passive* [A] **to be raised up, rise** || *aor. pass.* **to be raised, rise; ppf. to be suspended, hang** || *med.* **to swell** [B] *milit.* **to embark** || **to leave** [C] **to be taken away, removed, eliminated** [D] **to be exalted, be aggrandized, increase** [E] **to be aroused, undertaken**

① *active* [A] **to raise, lift** ▶ *with acc.* νεκρὸν αἶραντες lifting the corpse IL. 17.718, *al.* OD. 1.141, *al. etc.*; ἀρ' ὀρθὸν αἶρεις ... τὸ σὸν κάρα; won't you lift up your head? AESCHL. Ch. 496, *al. etc.*

on VT. Reg. 1.2.28, *al.* || **to nurture, educate** HEROND. 9.13 [D] *milit.* **to decamp, depart, with the troops** ▶ *abs.* THUC. 2.23.1; ἄρας τῷ στρατῷ

HLD. 9.22.5 ② *middle* [A] **to raise, lift:** αἰρεσθαι τὰ ἱστία to hoist the sails HDT. 8.56, *al.*; αἰρόμενος τοὺς ἱστούς having set up the masts (of the

HDT. 4.150.3 ③ *passive* [A] **to be raised up, rise** IL. 8.74 OD. 12.432 THUC. 2.94.1 *etc.*; ἐς αἰθέρα ... ἀέρθη she rose into the ether OD. 19.540

• *epic pres. Ion. poet.* αἰρώ (*ἄ-fer-), *Lesb.* αἰέρω, *epic poet. mid.* αἰέρομαι | *imper. Lesb.* αἰέρρετε SAPPH. 111.3 (*v.l.* -ατε *aor.*) || *epic impf.* αἰείρον *epic Ion.* -ἤειρον || *epic aor.* αἰείρα, *epic Ion.* -ἤειρα, *mid.* 3. sg. Dor. ἄρατο | *subj. act.* 3. sg. *poet.* αἰέρσῃ | *opt.* 2. sg. ἄραις | *imper. mid.* 2. sg. *epic Ion.* αἰείραο | *epic inf. mid. Ion.* αἰείρασθαι | *epic ptc. Ion.* αἰείρας, *mid.* αἰειράμενος || *later epic pf. mid.* ἤερμαι (*pass.*) || *epic ppf. mid. pass.* 3. sg. ἄωρτο (< ἤορτο) || *epic aor. pass.* ἀέρθη *epic Ion.* ἤέρθη, 3. pl. *epic* ἀερθεν || *always* ἄρ-; *for* ἄρ- see ἀφνύμαι.

Principal parts: recorded next to the lemma, contains actually attested forms. In forms with a single attestation, the source for the form is sometimes recorded, together with the historical and dialectal context when appropriate.

Recapitulatory overview. Especially complex entries (like prepositions, some verbs, pronouns, and conjunctions) begin with a recapitulatory overview that aids orientation in the entry's component parts.

Sign introducing indications of government of case, and other syntactic constructions

At the end of the entry, the sign • introduces dialectal, poetic, or otherwise notable variant forms.

Translators

Rachel Barritt-Costa

Michael Chappell

Michael Chase

Ela Harrison

Patrick Paul Hogan

Jared Hudson

Sergio Knipe

Peter Mazur

Serena Perrone

Chad Schroeder

Chris Welser

Proofreaders

Mike Chappell

Ela Harrison

Patrick Paul Hogan

A α

A, α, τό (ἄλφα) *indecl. alpha, first letter of the Greek alphabet*: ἐγὼ εἰμι τὸ ἄλφα καὶ τὸ ὦ, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end NT. *Apoc.* 22.13 || *num.* α' = 1; α = 1,000.

1. ἄ- (ἀν- bef. a vowel) [IE *h₂-; Lat. in-, Skt. a(n)-, Goth. un-] *privative prefix* (α στερητικόν) *with negative force, indicating lack or absence*: ἄ-φίλος without friends, ἀν-ώνυμος nameless • *in poetry often ᾱ when followed by two short syllables*

2. ἄ- [see ἄ-] *intensive prefix* (α ἐπιτατικόν) *with strengthening force, related to the copulative ἄ- (see) but distinguished by the gramm.: ἄ-τενής stretched tight, very intent*

3. ἄ- *prothetic vowel, bef. a consonant or consonant cluster*: ἄλκιφω, ἀστήρ (or followed by a vowel after the disappearance of F: ἄ-Feῖδω > ἀεῖδω).

ἄ- and ἄ- [IE *sm̥-; Lat. sem-, sim-, Skt. sa-; see ἄμα] *copulative prefix* (α ἀθροιστικόν) *expressing togetherness*: ἄ-πας all; ἄ-λοχος bed companion, wife | τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχού τὸ ὅμοιο alpha often signifies 'together' PLAT. *Crat.* 405c ἄ *art. nom. fem. sg. Lesb.*, see ὁ, ἡ, τό.

ἄ *art. nom. fem. sg. Dor.*, see ὁ, ἡ, τό.

ἄ *rel. nom. fem. sg. Lesb.*, see ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

1. ἄ *rel. nom. acc. neut. pl.*, see ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

2. ἄ *rel. nom. fem. sg. Dor.*, see ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

ἄ *rel. dat. fem. sg. Dor.*, see ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

ἄ and redupl. ἄ ἄ *interjec. ah! and ah! ah!*, *expressing pity, contempt, warning, amazement* ARCHIL. 109.1 (*doub.*) AESCHL. *Ag.* 1087, *al. SOPH. Ph.* 1300, *al. EUR. Hel.* 445, *al. ARISTOPH. Ran.* 759, *al. etc.*: ἄ, μὴ κόλαζε, πρέσβυ, τόνδε Ah! Do not rebuke him, old man SOPH. *OT.* 1147; *often with adj.* IL. 11.441, 17.443; ἄ δειλοί ah! miserable ones OD. 20.351 *etc.*; ἄ τάλας ah! unfortunate man SEM. 7.76; ἄ μάκαρ ah! blessed one THGN. 1013 BACCHYL. *Dith.* 16.30 HIPPON. 117.6; *also ἄ ἄ ἄ and ἄ ἄ ἄ EUR. Cycl.* 157 (*codd.*) • *poet., rare in prose*: PLAT. *HipMa.* 295a.

ἄ ἄ *interjec. ah! ah! COM. CGFP* 239.17 *EUR. Rh.* 687 (*v.l.*) [GREG.] *ChrPat.* 637, 809, *al.*, see ἄ | *σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπιφώνημα* HSCH. α4; ἀπόφασις ἀρνητική PHOT. *Lex.* α1 SCH. PLAT. *HipMa.* 295a

ἄ ἄ (or ἄ ἄ) ha! ha!, *expressing laughter, γέλωτα* δηλοῖ HSCH. α2 PHOT. *Lex.* α2; *problematic attestation: conject. in EUR. Cycl.* 157 (*codd.* ἄ ἄ ἄ) and PLAT¹ 16

ἀάατος -ον [see ἄω ?] *invulnerable or undeceiving, of the water of the Styx* IL. 14.271 (ἄἄἄ) || *unimpeachable, without error, thus decisive or terrible, fatal, of a contest* OD. 21.91, 22.5 (ἄἄἄ) | κάρτος ἄ. invincible in strength AP. 2.77 (ἄἄἄ) NB *unc. signif. and etym.*

ἀαγής -ες [ἀγνυμι] *unbreakable, solid* OD. 11.575 THEOCR. 24.123 • ἄἄ AP. 3.1251 QS. 6.596.

ἀαδής *see* ἀδής.

ἀάζω [see ἄζω] *onomat. to exhale, breathe, only pres.* ARISTOT. *Pr.* 964a 16, *al.*

ἀάλιος -ον *doub. signif. confused, weak, or perhaps untouched* AP⁹. HSCH. *PHOT. Lex.* *etc.*

ἀάνθα, ἡ [οὗς, ἀνθος ?] *earring* ALCM. 127 ARISTOPH². *fr.* 422

ἄάπτος -ον *untouchable, dreadful, invincible* IL.

1.567, *al. HES. Op.* 148, *al. OPP.* 5.629 • *v.l. ἄεπτος (trag.)*.

Ἀαρών, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* [A] Aaron, brother of Moses VT. *Ex.* 4.14, *al. NT. Lu.* 1.5, *al.* [B] ark EPIPH. *Mens.* 4 (43.244C) (*perhaps for* Ἀρών).

ἄας (ἄας ?) [see ἡώς] *gen. sg. of * ἄα tomorrow or the day after tomorrow* IL. 8.470 (ZENOD². *v.l.* for ἡούς, *see* ἡώς) HSCH

ἄασα, ἄασάμην, ἄασθην *aor. ind. act., mid., pass. of* ἄάω.

ἀασιφόρος -ον [ἄάω, φέρω] *bringing harm* HSCH ἀασιφορονία -ας, ἡ [ἄάω, φέρη] *folly* AP⁹. PHOT. *Lex.* α14

ἀασιφοροσύνη *see* ἀεσιφοροσύνη.

ἀασίφρων *see* ἀεσίφρων.

ἄάσκω [ἄάω] *to harm* HSCH

ἀασμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἄάζω] *exhalation, breath* ARISTOT. *Pr.* 964a 18

ἀάσπετος QS. 3.673, *al.*, *see* ἄσπετος.

ἀάσχετος IL. 5.892 *etc.*, *see* ἄσχετος.

ἄάται *pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of* ἄάω.

ἄαται *HES. Sc.* 101, *pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of* ἄω.

ἄάτη -ης, ἡ *HES. Op.* 352 (*v.l.*) CALLIM. *fr.* 557, *see* ἄτη.

ἄάτηρ -ήρος, ὁ [ἄάω] *dishonorer* MAN¹. 4.56

1. ἄάτος, *contr.* ἄτος -ον [ἄω] *insatiable*: ἄατος πολέμοιο insatiable in war *HES. Th.* 714 = ἄτος πολέμοιο IL. 5.388 (*v.l.* ἄατος); μάχης ἄ. insatiable in battle IL. 22.218, *al.*; ἄατος ὕβρις insatiable violence AP. 1.459 (ἄἄ)

2. ἄάτος QS. 1.217, *see* ἄητος.

ἄάω ❶ *active to disturb, upset (the mind), deceive, harm* IL. 8.237 OD. 11.61, *al.* QS. 13.429; ἄασάν μ' ἔταροι my companions ruined me OD. 10.68 ❷ *middle* [A] = *active* IL. 19.91 [B] *gener. intrans. (aor.) to be bewildered, blind, in one's mind* IL. 9.116, *al.* AP. 1.1333, *al.* QS. 5.422, *al.* NONN. *D.* 5.478, *al.* ❸ *passive (aor.) to be disturbed, upset, bewildered* IL. 19.136 OD. 4.503, *al.* HOM. *D.* 2.258 *HES. Op.* 283 AP. 4.412, *al.*; φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἄασθεῖς bewildered in his mind OD. 21.301 • *pr. only mid. 3. sg.* ἄάται (*contr.*) || *aor.* ἄασα (ἄἄ IL. 8.237; ἄἄ OD. 10.68; ἄἄ MATR. *Conv.* 29, *conject.*) *contr.* ἄσα, *mid.* ἄασάμην *contr.* ἀσάμην, *3. sg.* ἄασ(σ)ταο IL. 9.537 | *contr. inf. act.* ἄσαι AESCHL. *fr.* 417 | *pt.* ἄσας SOPH. *fr.* 628 || *aor. pass.* ἄάσθην || *esp. epic, rare in trag.*

ἄβα *Lesb.*, *see* ἥβη.

1. Ἀβα -ης, ἡ *Aba, city: in Phokis (sanctuary of Apollo)* HDT. 1.46.2, *al.* ARISTOT. *fr.* 601 *etc.* | *in Arabia* DIOD. 32.10.2 | *in Karia* STEP¹. | *in Lykia* SCH. *SOPH. OT.* 899 • *also pl.* Ἀβαι -ών, αἱ.

2. Ἀβα -ης, ἡ *Aba, female name* STRAB. 14.5.10 | *nymph* HAR¹. (*s.v.* Ἐργασκη) *etc.*

Ἀβα(δ)δών, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Abaddon, name of a fallen angel NT. *Apoc.* 9.11

ἄβάδιστος -ον [βαδίζω] *untrodden, unploughed, the sea* SCH. *OPP.* 2.526

ἄβαθής -ές [βάθος] *not deep, without depth* GAL. 1.127 (wounds) ARR. *Tact.* 5.6 SEXT. *P.* 3.43 SIMP. *in Phys.* 572.25

ἄβαθρος -ον [βάθρον] *without foundation, immense* GEORG^P. *Hex.* 131 CYR². (C)

Ἀβαι *see* Ἀβα.

Ἀβαῖος -ου, ὁ [Ἀβα 1] *Abaian, inhabit. of* Aba PAUS. 10.3.2, *al.* STEP¹. (*s.v.* Ἀβαι) • *also* Ἀβεύς STEP¹. *Lc.*

ἄβαξ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* byssus, fine linen cloth VT. *Chr.* 1.4.21

Ἀβάκαινα -ης, ἡ *Abakaina, see* Ἀβακαίνινος.

Ἀβακαίνινος -ῆ -ον [Ἀβάκαινον] *inhabit. of* Abakainon DIOD. 14.78.5, 19.110.4 STEP¹.

Ἀβάκαινον -ου, τό *Abakainon, city in Sicily* DIOD. 14.90.3 PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 3.4.12 STEP¹.; *in Media* PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 6.12.17 • *also fem.* Ἀβάκαινα.

ἄβάκειον *see* Ἀβάκειον.

ἄβακέω, *contr.* [ἄβακής] *to stay silent, out of amazement or surprise*: οἱ δ' Ἀβάκησαν πάντες they said nothing, kept quiet OD. 4.249 *cf.* AP⁹. 2.16 HSCH. α54 PHOT. *Lex.* α21-22 NB *doub. signif.* (*perhaps to fail to recognize*: EUSTATH. 1494.60, *al.*) • *aor. inf.* Ἀβακήσαι.

ἄβακέως *adv.*, *see* Ἀβακής.

Ἀβακήμων -ονος [Ἀβακέω] *speechless, silent or foolish* AELD. α3 HSCH. *PHOT. Lex.*, *see* Ἀβακής.

Ἀβάκης -ές [βάζω ?] *prob. speechless, silent, hence calm, tranquil*: Ἀβάκηγν τὰν φρέν' ἔχω I have a calm mind SAPPH. 120 (*cf.* HSCH. α51, 53) • *adv.* Ἀβακέως *foolishly (doub.)* PHOT. *Lex.*, *see* Ἀβακήμων. • *Aeol. acc.* Ἀβάκηγν SAPPH. *Lc.*

Ἀβακίζωμαι [Ἀβακής] *to be kind, gentle, only pres. ptc.*: μεμάθηκά σε ... τῶν Ἀβακίζομένων I have learned that you are one of the kind-hearted ones ANACR. 99.4

Ἀβάκειον -ου, τό [ἄβαξ] [A] *small abacus, small board, used for counting (with stones)* ALEXIS 15.3 POL. 5.26.13 | *board, covered with sand, for drawing geometric figures* PLUT. *CMi.* 70.8 | *board, for playing dice* POLL. 10.150 [B] *plate* PCAIR.ZEN. 71.1 (III^a) [C] *stair (unc. signif.)*, *dim. of* ἄβαξ L. *Sud.* α16 • Ἀβάκειον PCAIR.ZEN. *Lc.*

Ἀβάκισκος -ου, ὁ [ἄβαξ] *small stone, for mosaic or inlay work* MOSCHIO¹ (ATH. 5.207c)

Ἀβακοειδής -ές [ἄβαξ, εἶδος] *shaped like a small board* SCH. THEOCR. 4.61

Ἀβάκτης and Ἀβάκτις, ὁ [Lat. ab actis] *indecl. secretary, clerk* NILANC. *Ep.* 2.207 (79.309B) (*title*) PFLOR. 71.509 (IIP)

ἄβακτος -ον *unfortunate or irreproachable* HSCH. *PHOT. Lex.* || *as a proper name* Ἀβακτος, ὁ Abaktos [HDT. 1.32 (*v.l.*) • *v.l.* ἄβυκτος (*see*).

Ἀβάκχευτος -ον [βακχεύω] [A] *uninitiated in the Bacchic rites* EUR. *Bac.* 472 LUC. 17.3 NONN. *D.* 40.295 *etc.*; ἄ. θίασος un-Bacchic, *i.e.* joyless, band EUR. *Or.* 319 [B] *without wine, of a table* NONN. *Ev.* 2.15

Ἀβακχιώτος -ον [βακχιώω] *not of Bacchus, undrinkable, of rain* TIMOTH. 15.62

Ἀβάλας -ου, ὁ *Abalas, port in Calabria* APP. 17.112 Ἀβάλε [ἄ, βάλλω] oh that..., would that ALCM. 111 *cf.* AP⁹. 2.15 HSCH. *PHOT. Lex.* *etc.* | ► *with unreal ind.* CALLIM. *fr.* 619 | ► *with inf.* AP. 7.699.3 || *cf.* βάλε.

Ἀβαμά *Hebr. indecl.* high place VT. *Iez.* 20.29 • *also* Ἀββαμά and Ἀβανά.

Ἀβαμβάκευτος -ον [ἄμβακος] *not seasoned, without spices, of food* PYRG. 1 (ATH. 4.143e) • *v.l.* -κευστος.

Ἀβανασσος -ον [βανασσος] *liberal, generous* CAP. 2.3.3 • *adv.* Ἀβανασσώς *with generosity or dignity* CLEM¹. *Ep.* 44.3

Ἀβανθίς, ἡ *Abanthis, female name* ALCAPPH. 35.8 SAPPH. 22.10 (*conject.*) • *voc.* Ἀβανθί.

Ἀβαντες -ων, οἱ *Abantes, people of Euboea* IL. 2.536 HDT. 1.146.1 *etc.*

Ἀβαντία, ἡ HDN. 2.370.14, see Ἀμαντία.

Ἀβαντιάδης -ου, ὁ [Ἀβας] descendant of Abas BACCXYL. *Epin.* 11.40 AP. 1.78, al. *Dor. gen.* -δα.

Ἀβαντιάς -ἄδος, ἡ CALLIM. *H.* 4.20, see Ἀβαντίς.

Ἀβαντίδας -ου, ὁ Abantidas, tyrant of Sikyon PLUT. *Arat.* 2.2 PAUS. 2.8.2

Ἀβαντίς -ἰδος, ἡ [Ἀβαντες] Abantis, region of the Abantes, Euboia EUR. *HF.* 185 STEPH¹.

ἄβαξ -ακος, ὁ /ἄᾱ/ [Heb. ' abāq?] [A] abacus, board, for counting votes ARISTOT. *Ath.* 69.1 | board, sprinkled with sand, for drawing geometric figures SEXT. *S.* 9.282 IAMB¹. *Protr.* 34, al. || small board, for playing dice CARYST. 3 [B] plate, coarse CRATIN. 93 [C] archit. abacus, of a column VITR. 3.5-5 (Lat. abacus) | square, panel VITR. 7.3-10 || step, of the entrance to an arena or balustrade, in an amphitheatre AAP. *PTh.* 36 (p. 262.7) etc.

ἄβάπτιστος -ον [βαπτίζω] [A] that does not sink, of a net PIND. *P.* 2.80; ἄ. τρύπανον trepan with a guard (to prevent it from drilling too deep) GAL. 10.447 | fig. BAS. *epist.* 161.2.5 [B] that does not plunge itself PLUT. 46.686b (in drunkenness) || Christ. not dipped in baptismal water, unbaptized ATHANAS. *EpEnc.* 5 etc.

ἄβαπτος -ον [βάπτω] not tempered, of iron HSCH. *L. Sud*

Ἀβαρβάρη -ης, ἡ Abarbareē, nymph IL. 6.22 etc. Ἀβαρβάριστος -ον [βαρβαρίζω] free of barbarisms L. *Vind.* 294 ♦ *adv.* Ἀβαρβαρίστως without barbarisms L. *EM.* 331.37

Ἀβαρβίνα Abarbina, city in Hyrkania PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 6.9.6

ἄβαρής -ές [βάρος] not heavy, light ARISTOT. *Cael.* 277b 19 etc.; ἄ. γῆ light earth MELEAG. (AP. 7.461.2) || fig. light, slight, of freedom of speech PLUT. 4.59c | of the pulse ARCHIG. (GAL. 8.651) | unburdensome to others, of pers. NT. *Cor.* 2.11.9 ♦ *adv.* Ἀβαρῶς without pain or sorrow, without penalty SIMP. in *Epict.* p. 85 Ἀβαρίς [βαρίς] without a boat, belonging to dry land HDN

Ἀβαρίς -ἰδος, ὁ Abaris, male name PIND. *fr.* 270 HDT. 4.36.1 PLAT. *Ch.* 158b etc. • *Ion. gen.* -ιος | *acc.* -iv.

Ἀβαρκαγεῖν *Hebr. indecl.* thorns, brambles VT. *Judic.* 8.7

Ἀβαρνιας -ἄδος, ἡ ORPH. *A.* 487, see Ἀβαρνίς.

Ἀβαρνίς -ἰδος, ἡ Abarnis, city and prom. in Mysia XEN. *Hel.* 2.1.29 AP. 1.932

Ἀβαροι -ων, οἱ Lat. Avars, people near the Danube AGATH. (AP. 16.72.3)

Ἀβαρῶς *adv.*, see Ἀβαρής.

Ἀβας -αντος, ὁ Abas, male name IL. 5.148 PIND. *P.* 8.55 etc. | a river in the Caucasus PLUT. *Pomp.* 35.3 etc.

ἄβασάνιστος -ον [βασανίζω] [A] not subjected to torture, not tortured IOS. *Bl.* 1.635 etc. [B] unexamined, untried, unverified, inaccurate ANTIPHO 1.13 POL. 4.75.3; πίστις faith EUS¹. *PE.* 1.1.11; ἀρετή virtue BAS. *epist.* 166.10 | *subst.* τὸ ἀβασάνιστον ignorance τῶν δογμάτων of doctrine ORIG. *Io.* 6.6.31 ♦ *adv.* Ἀβασανίστως [A] without suffering AESOP. 177; ἄ. ἀντιβλέπειν ταῖς ἀκτίσι τοῦ ἡλίου to stare at the rays of the sun without suffering AEL. *NA.* 10.14 [B] without critical examination, without foundation, without care THUC. 1.20.1 DION. *Comp.* 25.34 PLUT. 2.28c AL. in *Metaph.* 48.13; οὐκ ἄ. not without critical examination ATH. *L2b*

Ἀβασγία -ας, ἡ Abasgia, region of the Abasgoi, in Kolchis PROC¹. *B.* 4.9.15, see Ἀβασγοί.

Ἀβασγοί see Ἀβασκοί.

ἄβασιλευτος -ον [βασιλεύω] not ruled by a king THUC. 2.80.5 XEN. *Hel.* 5.2.17 | *extens.* without

government, without rule PLUT. 74.1125d || *Christ. against the kingdom of God* GREG. *Or.* 30.4.7

ἄβασκάνιστος -ον [βάσκανος] free from envy, grudge PLUT. 47.756d (prob. *f.l.* for ἀβασάνιστος). ἄβασκάνος -ον [βάσκανος] [A] free of envy or jealousy TEL. p. 56.1; ἄ. ὄμμα look free of envy GREG. *Carm.* 1.2.15.117 | *subst.* τὸ ἀβασκάνον lack of envy PHIL². *Post.* 138 [B] deserving faith IOS. *Bl.* 1.192 ♦ *adv.* ἀβασκάνως without envy or jealousy MAUR. 1.16.6

ἄβασκάντος -ον [βάσκανος] [A] protecting against spells or woes DIOSC². 3.91 (v.L) [B] free from charms or evils, misfortunes, often with auspicious force PGISS. 76.8 (IP) PPGM 13.802 HSCH. etc. [C] *voc.* ἀβασκάντε, of pers. AESOP. *Vit.* W 30; *signf.* unclear [D] *bot. subst.* τὸ ἀβασκάντον mugwort, see ἀρτεμισία [GAL.] *Lex.* 386.12 ♦ *adv.* ἀβασκάντως safely from harm or envy AP. 11.267.2 POXY. 292.12 (IP)

Ἀβασκάντος -ου, ὁ Abaskantos, male name GAL. 13.278, 14.177 etc.

Ἀβασκοί -όν, οἱ Abaskoi, people of Kolchis ARR. *Eux.* 11.33 etc. • -σγοί PROC¹. *B.* 4.3.18, al.

Ἀβασκος -ου, ὁ Abaskos, river ARR. *Eux.* 18.2

ἄβαστακτος -ον [βαστάζω] that cannot be carried PLUT. *Ant.* 16, 3 || unbearable ARR. *EpictD.* 1.9.11 (v.L) || *subst.* τὸ ἀβαστακτον unbearable-ness, of the glory of god DID¹. *Trin.* 1.9 (3b), al. || not removed IERG. 8(3).37 ♦ *adv.* ἀβαστάκτως unbearably HSCH

ἄβᾶτάς, ὁ CALLIM. *H.* 5.109, *Dor.* for ἡβητής.

Ἀβάτης -ου, ὁ Abatean, a Kilikian wine ATH. 1.33b ἄβατον -ου, τὸ abaton, plant (eaten pickled) GAL. 6.623

ἄβατόμοι, *contr.* [ἄβατος] to be devastated, made desolate VT. *Ier.* 30.14 (aor. subj. pass. ἀβατωθή).

ἄβατος -ον [βαίνω] [A] where one cannot walk, inaccessible, of land EMPED. *PStras.* a(ii).13; of mountains HDT. 4.25, al. SOPH. *OT.* 719 | not fordable, impassable, of a river XEN. *An.* 5.6.9; of the sea PIND. *N.* 3.21 | impenetrable, of a forest SOPH. *OC.* 675 STRAB. 5.4.5 || sacred, inviolable SOPH. *OC.* 167, al. PLAT. *Criti.* 116c etc.; ἀβατώτατος ὁ τόπος the place is most inviolable (oftombos) ARISTOT. *Pr.* 924a 5 | *subst.* τὸ ἄβατον sanctuary THEOP¹. 313 [B] fig. inaccessible, to the human senses, of the knowledge of god CLEM. *Str.* 5.6.33.6 [C] untrodden, inviolate: ἄ. ἐπὶ λειμῶνας on untrodden meadows EUR. *fr.* 740.4; οὐρανὴν δ'οἶμος ἄ. inviolate celestial way ALPH. (AP. 9.526.4) | virginal, of women LUC. 63.6, 46.19 || fig. chaste, pure, of the soul PLAT. *Phaedr.* 245a [D] desolate, deserted VT. *Ier.* 12.10 | (sc. γῆ) desert VT. *Ier.* 33.18, al. [E] impeding the ability to walk, of gout LUC. 74.36 || *superl.* -ώτατος ARISTOT. *Lc.* • *fem.* ἄβάτη EMPED. *Lc.* | *acc.* ἄβάταν PIND. *N.* 3.21.

Ἀβαύχας -ου, ὁ Abauchas, male name LUC. 57.61 Ἀβάφης -ές [βάπτω] not tempered, see ἄβαπτος, thus of wine without strength, diluted and pale in color PLUT. 46.650b (conject., v.l. ἀναφής) || not dipped, of bread ORIG. *Io.* 32.22.289 • ἄβαφος -ον GLOSS. 2.215.9 (prob. *f.l.*). Ἀββᾶ and Ἀββᾶς, ὁ [Aram. abba] *indecl.* father NT. *Mar.* 14.36, al. || of a monk PALL. *L.* 22.6 | abbot EVAGR. *Or.* 108 • also Ἀβᾶ and Ἀπᾶ.

Ἀβγαρος -ου, ὁ Abgaros, male name PLUT. *Cr.* 21.1 etc.

ἄβδελυκτος -ον [βδελύσσομαι] not execrable, pure AESCHL. *fr.* 137 HSCH

Ἀβδηρα -ων, τὰ Abdera, city in Thrace HDT. 1.168 etc. | in Spain STRAB. 3.4.3 PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 2.4.7 • Ἀβδαρα PTOL⁴. *Lc.*

Ἀβδηρίτης -ου, ὁ [Ἀβδηρα] Abderite, inhabit. of Abdera HDT. 8.120 etc. || *prov.* simpleton, fool DEMOSTH. 17.23 HP. *epist.* 14.20

Ἀβδηρίτικος -ή -όν [Ἀβδηρα] of Abdera, like an Abderite, *prov.* foolish, stupid LUC. 59.2 CIC. *ad Att.* 7.7.4

Ἀβδηρίτης -ἰδος, ἡ [Ἀβδηρα] Abderitis, region of Abdera THPHR. *HP.* 3.1.5

Ἀβδηρόθεν [Ἀβδηρα] *adv.* from Abdera LUC. 27.13

Ἀβδηρολόγος -ον [Ἀβδηρα, λέγω] speaking like someone from Abdera, stupid TAT. *Or.* 17.1

ἄβδης, ὁ whip, lash HIPPO. 130

ἄβεβαιος -ον [βέβαιος] unsteady, moving, of the eye ARISTOT. *HA.* 492a 12 || insecure, unstable ALEXIS 283 (sup.) MEN. *Dysc.* 797 | unstable, of the state of a disease HP. *Aph.* 2.27; of sleep HP. *Coac.* 1.147 | fickle, of fortune DEMOCR. *B.* 176; of friendship ARISTOT. *EE.* 1236b 19; of pers. DEMOSTH. 58.63; ἄ. αἰτία cause without basis EPIC. 4.134.6 | not valid, of an opinion BAS¹. *Or.* 4.1 (85.65B) || *subst.* τὸ ἀβεβαίον instability HERACLIT⁴. 7; of fortune POL. 15.34.2 | ἔξ ἀβεβαίου from an insecure position ARR. *An.* 1.15.2 (v.L) || *superl.* -ότατος ♦ *adv.* ἀβεβαίως changeably MEN. *Georg. fr.* 1.4

ἀβεβαιότης -ης, ἡ [ἀβεβαίος] instability, inconstance, of fortune POL. 30.10.1, of pers. DIOD. 14.9.8 PHIL². *Deus* 27, *Somm.* 1.202

ἀβεβαίωσις -εως, ἡ [ἀβεβαίος] instability AN. in *Rh.* 117.34

ἀβεβήλος -ον [βέβηλος] inviolable, sacred, pure PLUT. *Br.* 20.6 etc.

ἄβει(ρ)ά *Hebr. indecl.* fortified city, citadel VT. *Neem.* 1.1

Ἀβ(ε)ιρών, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Abiram VT. *Num.* 16.1 • Ἀβίραμος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AL.* 4.19 al.

Ἄβελ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Abel, son of Adam VT. *Gen.* 4. 2 NT. *Lu.* 11.51 • Ἄβελος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AL.* 1.67.

Ἄβελ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Abel, son of Adam VT. *Gen.* 4. 2 NT. *Lu.* 11.51 • Ἄβελος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AL.* 1.67.

Ἀβέλτερος [ἀβέλτερος] HDN. 1.137.10, see ἀβέλτερος • ἀβέλτεριον or -τήριον PHOT. *Lex.* s.v. ἀβέλτερος L. *Sud.* s.v. ἀβέλτερος.

ἀβελτερεύομαι [ἀβέλτερος] to play the fool EPIC. 31.28.7 (pres. ptc.)

ἀβελτερία -ας, ἡ [ἀβέλτερος] stupidity, fatuousness, ignorance PLAT. *Theat.* 174c, al. DEMOSTH. 19.98 PHILOD. *LL.* 87.9 etc. || *Christ. corruption of human nature* [IO.] *HPasc.* 8.278C • *s. times* -τηρία; perhaps an ancient alternate ἀβελτεροκόκυξ -υγος, ὁ [ἀβέλτερος, κόκυξ] fool PLAT¹. 64

ἀβέλτερος -α -ον [βέλτερος] foolish, stupid ARISTOT. *Nub.* 1201, al. PLAT. *Phil.* 48c, *Rp.* 409c DEMOSTH. 19.338 MEN. *Epit.* 450, al. || *compar.* ἀβελτέστερος GAL. 18(2).337 | *superl.* -τερώτατος ♦ *adv.* ἀβελτέρως foolishly POLYSTR. *Cat.* 8 PLUT. 11.127c, 38.531c

Ἀβεντίνος -ον Aventine: τὸ Ἄ. ὁρος the Aventine Hill STRAB. 5.3.7, al. = *simpl.* τὸ Ἄ. PLUT. *Rom.* 9.4, al.

ἄβερβήλος -ον large, heavy, awkward, stupid, unsteady (*unc. signf.*) HSCH. *L. Sud*

Ἀβεύς see Ἀβίος.

Ἀβιά, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Abia, male name VT. *Chr.* 1.3.10 NT. *Mat.* 1.7, *Lu.* 1.5

Ἀβιαθάρ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Abiathar, male name VT. *Reg.* 1.22.20 NT. *Mar.* 2.26 • Ἀβιαθάρος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AL.* 7.110.

ἀβιαστικός -ον irresistible PPGM *Suppl.* 95.12 (VP) ἀβιαστος -ον [βιάζω] [A] unforced, free, not subject to coercion PLAT. *Tim.* 61a PORPH. (EUS¹. *PE.* 5.10.10) [B] unaffected, natural, of style DION. *Dem.* 38.6 [C] irresistible SCH. *OPP.* 2.8 | invincible ISID⁴. *epist.* 3.148 ♦ *adv.* ἀβιάστως

without violence ARISTOT. *MA.* 703a 22 (*conject.*) AET¹. 9.28

ἀβίβαστος -ον [βιβάζω] inaccessible POXY. 1380.115 (IP)

ἀβιβλής -ου, ὁ [βιβλος] without books Tz. *Hist.* 6.401, *al.*

Ἀβίλα -ων, τὰ Abila, city (various) POL. 5.71, *al.* etc. IOS. *AI.* 4.176, *al.* PTOL¹. *Geog.* 5.15.22 etc. • also fem. sg. Ἀβίλη, Ἀβέλη or Ἀβίλα, Ἀβελα.

Ἀβίλη -ης, ἡ Abile, prom. in Mauritania STRAB. 17.36

Ἀβίληνός -ῃ -όν [Ἀβίλα] Abilene or of Abila: fem. Ἀβίληνῃ, ἡ (sc. γῆ) Abilene or Abila, in Coele-Syria NT. Lu. 3.1

Ἀβίλλιος -ου, ὁ Abillios, male name PLUT. *Rom.* 14.8

Ἀβίλυκός -ῃ -όν [Ἀβίλως] of Abilyx: ἀκρα prom. SCYL. 111 = στήλη HSCH. cf. Ἀβύλη and Ἀβίλως, ἡ. 1. Ἀβίλως -υγος, ὁ Abilyx, male name POL. 3.98.2, *al.*

2. Ἀβίλως -υκος, ἡ Abilyx, prom. in Mauritania STRAB. 3.5-5

Ἄβιοι -ων, οἱ Abioi, Scythian people IL. 13.6 etc.; interpreted also as adj. ἄβιοι without fixed subsistence, nomads SCH. IL. 13.6d STRAB. 1.1.6 STEPH¹, see Γάβιοι.

1. ἄβιος -ον [βίος] [A] unlivable, unbearable: ἄ. βίος life that cannot be lived LEON. (AP. 7.715.3); αἰσχύνῃ ἄ. unbearable shame PLAT. *Leg.* 873c [B] without livelihood, poor LUC. 77.15.3 etc. || nomad, people without fixed subsistence or agriculture (cf. Ἄβιοι) SCH. IL. 13.6d STRAB. 1.1.6 NICOL¹. 104 STEPH¹. [C] [ἀ-intens., βίος] wealthy ANTIPH¹ B 43 SCH. IL. 13.6d

2. ἄβιος -ον [A] [ἀ- cop., βίος] archer NICOL¹. 104 STEPH¹. [B] [ἀ-priv., βίος] not using a bow HSCH 3. ἄβιος -ον [βίος] not violent AP⁹. HSCH. STEPH¹. ἄβιοτος -ον [ἄβιος 1] unlivable, making life unbearable EUR. *Hip.* 821, *Ion* 764 (*conject.*) AP. 9.574.2 (v.l.)

Ἀβιούδ, ὁ Hebr. indecl. Abihud, male name (various) VT. *Chr.* 1.8.3 NT. *Mat.* 1.13 etc.

Ἀβιραμος see Ἀβ(ε)ιρών.

Ἀβισάρης -ου, ὁ Abisares, Indian king AEL. *NA.* 16.39 etc.

ἄβιωτον -ου, τό [ἄβιωτος] hemlock DIOSC². 4.78a, cf. ἄβιωτος.

ἄβιωτοποιός -όν [ἄβιωτος, ποιέω] making life unbearable SCH. EUR. *Hip.* 821 (*gloss.* of ἄβιοτος).

ἄβιωτος -ον [ἄβιος 1] not to be lived, unbearable EUR. *Alc.* 242 ARISTOPH. *Pl.* 969 PLAT. *Pol.* 299e; ἄβιωτον φεῖτ' ἔσσεσθαι τὸν βίον αὐτῷ he thought that life would be unbearable for him DEMOSTH. 21.131 | ► *abs.* ἄβιωτον (sc. ἐστὶ) it is impossible to live PLAT. *Rp.* 407a = ἄβιωτον ζῆν PLAT. *Leg.* 926b; ἄβιωτον ἡμῖν life is unbearable for us EUR. *Ion* 670 || *subst.* τὸ ἄβιωτον hemlock DIOSC². 4.78a • *adv.* ἄβιώτως so as to make life insupportable, unbearable: αἰσχυρῶς καὶ ἄ. ὑπ' ὀδύνης διετέθησαν (some) have been reduced through grief to a shameful and unbearable situation PLUT. *Sol.* 7.4; ἄ. ἔχειν to be unlikely to live PLUT. *Di.* 6.2

ἀβλαβεία -ας, ἡ [ἀβλαβής] [A] harmlessness, innocuity: *Lat.* innocentia CIC. *Tusc.* 3.8.16 [B] freedom from harm, safety, peace PLUT. 73.1090b; ἐπ' ἀβλαβείᾳ so that there be no harm AESCHL. *Ag.* 1024, see ἀβλαβία.

ἀβλαβέως *adv.*, see ἀβλαβής.

ἀβλάβής -ές [βλάβος] [A] not causing harm, harmless, innocent AESCHL. *Eum.* 285 PLAT. *Rp.* 375b; ► *with dat.* AESCHL. *Eum.* 474 POL. 11.29.10 EUS². 1 = ► *with gen.* PORPH. *Aph.* 32 = ► *with πρός and acc.* PHILOD. *Piet.* 65.7 p. 95 || preventing or averting harm THEOCR. 24.98

[B] not suffering harm, unhurt, unscathed, safe SAPPH. 5.1 PIND. *O.* 13.27, *al.* AESCHL. *Sept.* 68 PLAT. *Rp.* 342b XEN. *Cyr.* 4.1.3 POL. 5.110.11 PLOT. 2.1.4 [C] *signif. specified by verb:* ἄ. τοῦ δράσαι τε καὶ παθεῖν without harm in acting or suffering, *i.e.* without causing or suffering harm PLAT. *Leg.* 953b || *compar.* ἀβλαβέστερος | *superl.* -έστατος • *adv.* ἀβλαβῶς [A] without causing harm, without causing offence, without injuring ARR. *An.* 6.19.2 *al.*; ἄ. τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ ἐμμένειν respect the alliance without violating the terms THUC. 5.47.8; ἄ. τῇ γαστρὶ without hurting the stomach METROD¹. 41 [B] without suffering harm, in safety, with impunity HLD. 10.8.1 | ἀβλαβέως: ἄ. ζῶειν to live in safety THGN. 1154 | *superl.* -έστατα: ἀβλαβέστατα εἶναι without causing any harm to oneself XEN. *Hip.* 6.1 • *Ion. gen.* -βέως | *dat.* -βί HDN. *Epim.* 254.11 | *Aeol. acc.* ἀβλάβην SAPPH. *Lc.*

ἀβλαβία -ας, ἡ [ἀβλαβής] harmlessness PHILOD. *Piet.* 28.20 p. 148; ἐπ' ἀβλαβίῃσι νόοιο with innocence of mind, without bad intentions HOM. 4.393, see ἀβλάβεια.

Ἀβλάβιος -ου, ὁ Ablabios, male name AP. 7.559.2 etc.

ἀβλαβύνιον -ου, τό rope made of Egyptian papyrus, perhaps a magical object HSCH

ἀβλαβῶς *adv.*, see ἀβλαβής.

ἀβλαπτos -ον [βλάπτω] harmless NIC. *Th.* 488 • *adv.* ἀβλάπτως without injuring ORPH. *H.* 64.10 ἀβλαστέω, *contr.* [ἀβλαστής] not to produce leaves, of a plant THPHR. *CP.* 1.20.5 || not to germinate, of seeds THPHR. *Ign.* 44

ἀβλαστής -ές [βλαστάνω] not growing, of a plant THPHR. *HP.* 2.2.8; of a seed that does not germinate THPHR. *HP.* 8.11.7 | unfruitful, of places THPHR. *CP.* 2.4.1 GEOP. 9.9.4 (*comp.*) || *fig.* not productive or causing to grow, of virtue PLUT. 3.38c; of wealth THEM. *Or.* 18.22id || *compar.* -έστερος.

ἀβλάστητος -ον [ἀβλαστής] not sprouting THPHR. *CP.* 1.3.2 (v.l.)

ἄβλαστος -ον [ἀβλαστής] not growing, of fiber THPHR. *HP.* 1.2.5

ἀβλασφήμητος -ον [βλασφημέω] not subject to blame, of Christ GREG¹. *Mart.* 46.776A etc. || *subst.* τὸ ἀβλασφήμητον immunity from blame SOCR³. *HE.* 5.19.9 (PG 67.617A).

ἄβλαυτος -ον [βλαύω] barefoot, without slippers OPP¹. 4.369 PHILOSTR¹. 5.2 HSCH

ἀβλεμέως *adv.*, see ἀβλεμής.

1. ἀβλεμής -ές [ἀ-intens., βλεμεῖν] strong NIC. *Al.* 82 • *adv.* ἀβλεμέως without moderation PANYAS. 17.8

2. ἀβλεμής -ές [ἀ-priv., βλεμεῖν] weak SCH. NIC. *Lc.* HSCH. EUSTATH. 892.5 | *fig.* without force AN. *Subl.* 29.1

ἀβλενής -ές [βλένναι] [A] without fluid AP⁹. 51.32 (*gloss.* ἄχυμος) [B] ichthyol. DIPHT². (ATH. 8.355f), see ραφίς and βελόνη.

ἀβλεπτέω, *contr.* [ἀβλεπτος] act. to overlook, disregard POL. 30.6.4 HDN. 1.433.24 | to commit an error of valuation EUS¹. *HE.* 10.8.8 etc. || *subst. ptc. pass.* τὰ ἀβλεπτηθέντα disregarded things HP. *Dec.* 13

ἀβλεπτήμα -ατος, τό [ἀβλεπτέω] omission, error ARR. *EpictD.* fr. 12 HSCH. *L. Sud.* = POL. fr. 90

ἀβλεπτής -ές [see ἀβλεπτος] overlooking HSCH ἀβλεπτος -ον [βλέπω] [A] unknowable, invisible, obscure SCH. OPP. 1.778 HDN. 1.433.23; of life after the resurrection GREG¹. *Res.* 46.88B [B] blind SOPHRON. *Mir.* 69 (87.3660D) [C] astr. independent, unconnected, of stars (*Lat.* ableptus) FIRM. 2.22.1, 2.23.7

ἀβλέφαρος -ον [βλέφαρον] without eyelashes ANTIPHIL. (AP. 11.66.2)

ἀβλεψία -ας, ἡ [βλέπω] [A] blindness, inability to know HIEROCL³. in *CA.* 25.17, with *gen.* POLYSTR. *Cat.* 9 | blindness of the mind, in mystic perception ORIG. *Cels.* 6.31.6 etc. || *fig.* thoughtlessness SUET. *Caes.* 5.39.1 [B] invisibility PPGM 13.267

Ἀβληρος -ου, ὁ Ableros, Trojan warrior IL. 6.32

ἀβλής -ήτος [βάλλω] not shot, of an arrow not used IL. 4.117 AP. 3.279

ἄβλητος -ον [βάλλω] not hit, by an arrow IL. 4.540 HSCH

ἀβληχής -ές [βληχή] without bleatings ANTIP¹. (AP. 9.149.5)

ἀβληχρός -ές [ἀβληχρός] weak, mild NIC. *Th.* 885 ἀβληχροποιός -όν [ἀβληχρός, ποιέω] rendering weak EUSTATH. 1676.57

ἀβληχρός -ά -όν [βληχρός] weak, delicate, light, of walls IL. 8.178; of the hand of Aphrodite IL. 5.337; of natural death, not violent OD. 11.135; of mild pain EPIC. 6.4.3; of sleep AP. 2.205; of fever PROC¹. B. 2.22.16

ἀβοᾶτι [βοή] Dor. *adv.* without being called, spontaneously PIND. *N.* 8.9 • ἀβοητί v.l. in EUPHOR. 54.2.

ἀβοᾶτος Dor., see ἀβόητος.

ἀβοηθήσια -ας, ἡ [ἀβοήθητος] helplessness VT. *Sir.* 51.10

ἀβοηθητος -ον [βοηθέω] [A] incapable of being helped, incurable, without remedy HP. *Acut.* (Sp.) 33 THPHR. *HP.* 9.16.6 POL. 1.81.5, *al.* PLUT. 29.454d etc. || helpless, without resources, of pers. VT. *Sal.* 12.6 PLUT. *Arat.* 2.3 EPIC¹. *Ench.* 2.4 [B] unserviceable, useless, ineffective PLUT. 4.61b DIOD. 20.42.2 • *adv.* ἀβοηθήτως without the possibility of help, irreparably [Diosc².] *Th.* 12 GAL. 5.122

ἀβοηθί [βοή] *adv.* EUPHOR. 59.2 (*doub.*), see ἀβοηθήτως.

ἀβοητί see ἀβοατί.

ἀβόητος -ον [βοᾶω] [A] not announced, not spread by voice, in silence NONN. *En.* 12.173, 18.62; of fame IIG 2-3² 12764.3 (II^a) [B] without lament IIGVI 1539.1 (IP) = EPIGR. 2.200.2 • Dor. ἀβόατος.

Ἀβοιόκριτος -ου, ὁ Aboiokritos, Boiotarch PLUT. *Arat.* 16.1

ἀβόλεω, *contr.*, fut. ἀβόλησω || *poet. aor.* ἀβόλησα | *inf.* ἀβόλησαι HSCH.; to meet, come together AP. 2.770 CALLIM. fr. 24.5, 619

ἀβολητός -ύος, ὁ [ἀβόλεω] meeting, coming together HSCH

ἀβολήτωρ -ορος, ὁ [ἀβόλεω] one who meets, witness (*unc. signif.*) ANTIM. 76 HSCH

ἀβόλιστος -ον [βόλιζω] unfathomable, with a sounding line (of ocean water) or unsinkable, that does not sink to the bottom (of bodies) [ATHANAS.] *Quaest.* 136

ἀβολιτών -ιονος, ἡ [Lat. abolitio] cancellation, annullment, abatement, of a lawsuit PALL. *Io.* 14.46 (*mss.* ἀβουλητ-)

ἀβόλλα -ας, ἡ [Lat. abolla] cloak [Arr.] 6

Ἀβόλλα -ης, ἡ Abolla, city in Sicily HDN. 1.55.34 STEPH¹. || name of a river HDN. 2.652.37, see Ἀβόλος.

Ἀβόλλατος -α -ον [Ἀβόλλα] inhabit. of Abolla HDN. 2.872.22 STEPH¹.

ἀβόλλης -ου, ὁ [see ἀβόλλα] cloak, of wool POXY. 2593.24 (IP) etc.

1. ἀβόλος -ον [βόλος] that has not lost its first teeth, of a colt SOPH. fr. 408 PLAT. *Leg.* 834c ARISTOT. *HA.* 576b 15 etc. || *subst. neut. pl.* τὰ ἄβολα unlucky throw, of dice POLL. 7.204 • *f.l.* for ἀβωλ- in *pap.*

2. ἄβρολος -ου, ἡ [see ἀβόλλης] **cloak, of wool** ALCIPHR. 3.40.2 (conject.)

Ἄβρολος -ου, ἡ **Abolos, river in Sicily** PLUT. *Tim.* 34.1, see Ἄβρολλα.

ἄβρόρρορος -ον [βρόρρορος] **without filth** SOPH. *fr.* 367 (mss. ἄβραρ-).

Ἀβοριγίνες -ων, οἱ **Aborigines** DION. 1.9.1 etc.

ἄβρορος -ον [βιβρώσκω] **greedy, gluttonous** SCH. IL. 8.178

ἄβροσχής -ές [βρόσχω] **unfed, fasting** NIC. *Th.* 124

ἄβρόσκητος -ον [ἀβροσκή] **without pasture, not grazed** BABR. 45.10 (of a mountain) PAUS². α38

ἄβρότανος -ον [βοτάνη] **without vegetation** [IO.]

Salt. 8.40B

Ἄβοτις, ἡ **Abotis, city in Egypt** HEC. 313 STEPH¹.

Ἀβοτίτης -ου, ὁ [Ἄβοτις] **inhabit. of Abotis** STEPH¹. • also Ἀβοτιεύς STEPH¹.

ἄβροτος -ον [βρόσχω] HSCH., see ἀβρόσκητος.

ἄβροκόλητος -ον [βουκόλεω] **fig. unobserved, disregarded: ἀβροκόλητον τοῦτ' ἐμῷ φρονήματι** this does not concern me AESCHL. *Suppl.* 929

Ἄβρολα -ας, ἡ **Aboula, city in Spain** PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 2.6.61

ἄβρουεῖ [ἀβρούλος] **adv. inconsiderately** HDN. *Epim.* 255.7 PHIL². *Leg.* 3.187 (mss. -λί) L. *Sud.*, cf. ἀβρούλως.

ἄβρούλευτος -ον [βουλεύω] **inconsiderate, without reflection** OR. *Sib.* 12.220 HIPPOL. *Noët.* 10 (p. 251.18; PG 10.817A) • **adv. ἀβρούλευτως without thinking, inconsiderately** VT. *Mac.* 1.5.67

ἄβρούλεω, *contr.* [ἀβρούλεω] **aor. inf. ἀβρούλησαι** HSCH. | *ptc.* ἀβρούλησας DCASS. 55.9.8; **to be unwilling abs.** PLAT. *Rp.* 437c; ἀβρούλονται αὐτοῦ without his wishes PLUT. 72.1076d; οὐκ ἀβρούλων not without wishing PLOT. 6.8.13 | ► **with acc. and inf.** PLAT. *epist.* 347a || **to disapprove of** ► **with acc.** DCASS. *Lc.*

ἄβρουλησία -ας, ἡ [ἀβρούλητος] **lack of will** CYR¹. *Trin.* 2.456a, *al.*

ἄβρούλητος -ον [ἀβρούλεω] [A] **involuntary, without the intervention of will** GAL. 2.610 (heartbeat) etc. [B] **not according to wish or desire, unpleasant** PLAT. *Leg.* 733d (interpol.) PHIL². *Cher.* 29, 34 *al.* DION. 5.74.3 PLUT. 44.599b etc. [C] **inconsiderate** CYR¹. *epist.* 5². 22B • **adv. ἀβρούλητως involuntarily** GAL. 1.66, *al.* PORPH. *Abst.* 4.15

PLUT. 46.63ic SEXT. *P.* 1.19

ἄβρουλι see ἀβρουεῖ.

ἄβρουλια -ας, ἡ [ἀβρούλος] [A] **thoughtlessness, ill-advisedness** PIND. *O.* 10.41 HDT. 7.9. γ, *al.* AESCHL. *Sept.* 750 (pL) EUR. *Med.* 882 PLAT. *Crat.* 420c MEN. *fr.* 714.8; ἐξ ἀβρουλίας πεσεῖν to fall through senselessness SOPH. *EL.* 398

[B] **irresolution, indecision** DEMOCR. *B.* 119 THUC. 5.75.3 • *Ion.* -ίη.

Ἀβουλίτης -ου, ὁ **Aboulites, male name** PLUT. *Alex.* 68.7

ἄβρούλος -ον [βούλωμαι] [A] **thoughtless, inconsiderate, senseless** SOPH. *Ant.* 1026 MEN. *Peric.* 812 THUC. 1.120.5 PLUT. *Di.* 43; ἄ. ἔργον senseless work SOPH. *OC.* 940 [B] **heedless, indifferent** ► **with dat.** SOPH. *Tr.* 140 || *pejor.* ill-disposed, hostile SOPH. *EL.* 546 || *compar.* -ότερος || *superl.* -ότατος • **adv. ἀβρούλως thoughtlessly** HDT. 3.71.3, *al.* EUR. *Rh.* 761 ANTIPHON 1.23 etc. || *superl.* -ότατα.

ἄβρούτης -ου [βούς] **without oxen, thus poor** HES. *Op.* 451 (*gen.* -τέω) PLUT. *fr.* 66

Ἄβρα -ας, ἡ **Abra, female name** PLUT. *Cic.* 28.3

ἄβρα -ας, ἡ [aram. habra?; or see ἀβρός] **favorite or devoted slave, maidservant** MEN. *fr.* 58, 371, 453 VT. *Ex.* 2.5, *al.* PLUT. *Caes.* 10.3 LUC. 57.14

CHARIT. 1.41 | *fm. com. stock character* POLL. 4.154

Ἀβρ(α)ῆμ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abraham, man** VT. *Gen.*

17.5, *al.* NT. *Mat.* 3.9, *al.* AP. 1.65.1 etc. • Ἄβραμος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AI.* 1.148 etc.

Ἀβραδάτας -ου *and* -α, ὁ **Abradatas, male name** XEN. *Cyr.* 5.1.2 LUC. 37.20 etc.

Ἀβράθους -ου, ὁ **Habrathoos, male name** NONN. *D.* 26.153

ἄβραμαῖος -α -ον [Ἀβρ(α)ῆμ] **of Abraham, of the stock of Abraham** VT. *Mac.* 4.9.21, *al.* ATHANAS. *Ar.* 3.40 etc. || **similar to Abraham** ATHANAS. *Hist.* 45 etc. • ἄβραμαῖος *v.l.* in VT. *Mac.* 4.18.1.

Ἀβραμίδης -ου, ὁ [Ἀβρ(α)ῆμ] **Abramides, descendant of Abraham** GREG. *Carm.* 1.1.18.72, 2.2.3.318

Ἀβράμιος -ου, ὁ **Abramios, male name** PALL. *L.* 53 SYN. *Ep.* 99

ἄβραμῖς -ιδος, ἡ *ichthyol.* **mullet, fish** OPP. 1.244 ATH. 7.312b (ἄβρ-) • **also ἀβραβῖς in pap. | dim.** ἀβραμίδιον -ου, τό XENOCR¹. 78.

Ἀβραμίτις -ιδος, ἡ [Ἀβρ(α)ῆμ] **Abramitis, descendant of Abraham** VT. *Mac.* 4.18.20

Ἄβραμος see Ἀβρ(α)ῆμ.

Ἀβρασάξ *indecl.* **Abrasax, name given by the Basilidian heretics to the first of the 365 heavens, namely: α' =1 + β' =2 + γ' =100 + α' =1 + σ' =200 + α' =1 + ζ' =60 equals 365, the same as the number of days in a year** HIPPOL. *Haer.* 7.26.6 POXY. 1566.4 (IVP) etc.

ἄβραστος -ον [βράζω] **not boiled** [GAL.] *Lex.* 389.8 SCH. ARISTOPH. *Tz. Ran.* 553a

Ἀβρέας -ου, ὁ **Abreas, male name** ARR. *An.* 6.9.3

ἄβρεκτος -ον [βρέχω] **not wet, dry** HP. *Aff.* 52 CALLIM. 384.34 GAL. 14.97 PLUT. 23.381c MOSCH. 2.114 NONN. *D.* 17.129

Ἀβρεττηνή -ης, ἡ **Abrette, region of Mysia** STRAB. 12.8.9 STEPH¹.

Ἀβρεττηνός -ῃ -όν **inhabit. of Abrette** STEPH¹, see Ἀβρεττηνή.

ἀβρίζομαι [ἀβρός] **to be refined, be adorned** (*doub.*) HSCH. *L. EGud.*

ἀβριθής -ές [βριθός] **of no weight: βάρος οὐκ ἀβριθές a not inconsiderable weight** EUR. *Suppl.* 1125

ἄβρικτος -ον [βρίζω] **wakeful or hard of hearing** (*doub.*) HSCH. *L. Sud.*, *L. EM.* 4.48

ἀβριξ [βρίζω] **adv. watchfully, as s.o. wakeful** HSCH. *L. EM.* 4.49

Ἀβριόριξ, ὁ **Abriorix, male name** PLUT. *Caes.* 24.2 (*v.l.*)

ἄβροβάτης -ου [ἀβρός, βαίνω] **with an effeminate gait** AESCHL. *Pers.* 1073 || ὁ Ἀβροβάτης **Habrobates, male name** BACCHYL. *Epin.* 3.48 (conject.)

ἄβρόβιος -ον [ἀβρός, βίος] **living effeminately** BACCHYL. *Dith.* 18.2 PLUT. *Demetr.* 2.3 etc.

ἄβροβόστρυχος -ον [ἀβρός, βόστρυχος] **with effeminate hair** *Tz. Hist.* 1.233, *al.*

ἄβρόγους -οον, *contr.* ἄβρόγους -γουν [ἀβρός, γός] **lamenting effeminately** AESCHL. *Pers.* 541

ἄβρόδαις -αιτος [ἀβρός, δαίς] **of refined foods** ARCHESTR. 61.1

ἄβροδαιτα -ης, ἡ [ἀβροδαίματος] **refined lifestyle, soft living** L. *Sud.* AG. *Bek.* 322

ἄβροδαιτάομαι [ἀβροδαιτα] **to have a refined lifestyle** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Pax* 1227b

ἄβροδαιτέω, *contr.* [ἀβρός, δαιτάω] **to live dissolutely** THEOD⁸. *epist.* 11.33

ἄβροδαίματος -ον [ἀβρός, δαιτα] **of refined, effeminate lifestyle** AESCHL. *Pers.* 41 GAL. 13.949 | *subst.* τὸ ἄβροδαίματος **effeminacy** THUC. 1.6.3 etc. • **adv. ἀβροδαιτέως luxuriously** PHIL². *Agr.* 154

ἄβροσεῖμων -ον [ἀβρός, εἶμα] **dressed effeminately** COM. *CAF* 1275

Ἀβροζέλμης -ου, ὁ **Habrozelm, male name** XEN. *An.* 7.6.43

Ἀβρόθοος -ου, ὁ **Abrothoos, male name** NONN. *D.* 26.153 (*v.l.* Ἀβράθοος).

Ἄβροια -ας, ἡ **Abroia, female name** LUC. 39.4

Ἀβροκόμας -ου, ὁ **Abrokomas, male name** XEN. *An.* 1.3.20, *al.* • *Ion.* -ης HDT. 7.224.2.

ἄβροκόμηγος -ου [ἀβρός, κόμη] **with luxuriant foliage, of palm** EUR. *Ion* 920 || **of pers. with long or abundant hair** ORPH. *H.* 56. 2 NONN. *D.* 13.91, *al.* MELEAG. (AP. 12. 256.9)

ἄβρόκομος -ον NONN. *D.* 13.456 MAN¹. 2.446, see ἄβροκόμηγος.

ἄβρόμιος -ον [Βρόμιος] **without Bacchus** AP. 6.291.5

ἄβρομίτερης -ου [ἀβρός, μήτηρ] **with elegant diadem** HSCH

ἄβρομος -ον [ἀ-2, βρόμος] **rowdy, noisy** IL. 13.41 [B] [ἀ-1, βρόμος] **noiseless, silent, of a wave** AP. 4.153 QS. 13.68 [C] COSM¹. 11.12 etc., see ἄβρωμος.

ἄβρόπαις -παιδός [ἀβρός, παῖς] **of tender children inscribed epigr. from Ptolemais in Riv. Fil. 1937 p. 54.**

ἄβροπάρθεος -ον [ἀβρός, παρθένος] **made up of delicate maidens, of a chorus** LYR. *Al.* 22

ἄβροπέδιλος -ον [ἀβρός, πέδιλον] **of delicate or elegant footwear, of Eros** MELEAG. (AP. 12.158.2)

ἄβροπενθής -ές [ἀβρός, πένθος] **suffering languidly, of Persian women** AESCHL. *Pers.* 135 • *v.l.* ἀκροπενθ-.

ἄβροπεπλος -ον [ἀβρός, πέπλος] **with delicate robes** IZPE 14.21

ἄβροπέτηλος -ον [ἀβρός, πέτηλον] **with soft leaves** IO². 2.2

ἄβροπηνος -ον [ἀβρός, πήνη] **of delicate texture** LYC. 863

ἄβροπλουτος -ον [ἀβρός, πλοῦτος] **luxuriant, rich, of hair** EUR. *IT.* 1148

ἄβρόπους -ποδός [ἀβρός, πούς] **delicate-footed** HSCH. (s.v. σαυκρόπους)

ἀβρός -ά -όν [see ἄβρα; see ἡβη ?] [A] **delicate, tender** HES. *fr.* 339 SAPPH. 44.7, *al.* ANACR. 37.1, *al.* SOPH. *Tr.* 523 PLAT. *Symp.* 204c etc.; **of the body and limbs** PIND. *O.* 6.55 EUR. *Tr.* 506 || **alluring** CHARIT. 5.3.6 || **magnificent, splendid, of things** PIND. *I.* 8.66, *al.* || **precious, of speech** HERMOC. *Id.* 344.25 || **soft, effeminate, of the pop. of Asia** HDT. 1.71.4, *al.* etc.; ἄβρᾱ παθεῖν to live softly SOL. 18.4 THGN. 474 || *adv. neut.* sg. EUR. *Med.* 1164; *pl.* [Anacr.] 43.3. 44.5; ἄβρᾱ βαίνων stepping delicately EUR. *Tr.* 821 || *compar.* -ότερος | *superl.* -ότατος • *Lesb.* ἄβρος || *poet. fem. also* -ός || *gener. poet.* ἄβ- EUR. *Med.* 1164, *Tr.* 821, *not ep., rare in Att. prose* • **adv. ἀβρώς delicately, softly, delightfully** STESICH. 35.2 ANACR. 93. 2 EUR. *Med.* 830 etc. || *compar.* -ότερον HLD. 1.17.1 || *Aeol. adv.* ἄβρω SAPPH. 2.14.

ἄβροσαρκία -ας, ἡ [ἀβρός, σάρξ] **physical delicacy** GEORGP. *Carm.* 1.100

ἄβροσία -ας, ἡ **luxury** SCH. EUR. *Or.* 350, see ἄβροσύνη.

ἄβροστᾶτης -ές [ἀβρός, στάζω] **drenched in perfumes** L. *Sud*

Ἀβρόστολα -ων, τά **Abrostola, city in Phrygia** PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 5.2.23

ἄβροσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀβρός] SAPPH. 58.25 (*acc.* -σιν) EUR. *Or.* 349 etc., see ἄβρότης.

ἄβρόσφυρος -ον [ἀβρός, σφυρόν] **with delicate ankles** LYR. *Al.* 3.3

ἄβροτάζω [see ἄμαρτάνω] **to miss, only aor. subj. act. 1. pl.: μὴ πῶς ἀβροτάζομεν ἀλλήλοις ἐρχομένω** lest we miss each other as we go IL. 10.65

ἄβρόταξις -εως, ἡ [ἀβροτάζω] **error** HSCH. *EU-STATH.* 789.52

ἄβροτῆμων -ον [ἀβροτάζω] **erring** HSCH

ἄβρότης -ητος, ἡ [ἀβρός] [A] **splendor, luxury, softness, delicacy** PIND. *P.* 11.34 XEN. *Cyr.* 8.8.15 etc.; ἄβρότατος ἐπὶ μεγάλας in a state of great

luxury PIND. *P.* 8.89; οὐκ ἐν ἀβρότητι κείσαι you are in no position to play the delicate one EUR. *IA.* 1343 [B] *rhet. grace, charm, of style* HERMOG. *Id.* 311.21 • *Dor.* ἀβρότας.

ἀβρότιμος -ον [ἀβρός, τιμή] **fine, of great value, of sails** AESCHL. *Ag.* 690 (*lyr.*)

ἀβροτένινος -η -ον [ἀβρότονον] **made of abrotonum** DIOSC². 1.50

ἀβροτονίτης -ου [ἀβρότονον] **scented with abrotonum**: οἶνος wine, medicinal vermouth DIOSC². 5.52

ἀβρότονον (and ἀβρότονον) -ου, τό *bot. abrotonum, aromatic plant* THPHR. *HP.* 6.7.3 *etc.*; ἄ. ἄρρεν male abrotonum GAL. 11.804; ἄ. ἡλίη female abrotonum DIOSC². 3.24 • *rar. fem.* -ος EPIPH. *Haer.* 51.1.1.

Ἀβρότονον -ου, ἡ *Habrotonon, female name* PLUT. *Them.* 1.1 *etc.*

ἄβροτος -ον and -ος -η -ον [βροτός] [A] **immortal, divine, holy, of night** IL. 14.78 (*fem.* -η *v.l.* ἀμβρότη) [B] **without men, deserted, of solitude** AESCHL. *Pr.* 2 (*fem.* -ος: *v.l.* ἄβρατον) • *see* ἄμβροτος.

ἀβροφυνής -ες [ἀβρός, φύω] **of delicate nature** PHILOD. (*AP.* 9.412.4, *conject.*).

ἀβροχαίτης -ου [ἀβρός, χαίτη] **with abundant hair** AP. 9.525.2 [Anacr.] 43.8 • *Dor.* -ας.

ἀβροχέω, *contr.* [ἄβροχος] *aor.* ἡβρόχησα || *pf.* ἡβρόχηκα; **not to be inundated, of fields** PFAY. 33.13 (II^p) *etc.*

ἀβροχία -ας, ἡ [ἄβροχος] **lack of rain, drought** VT. *Sir.* 35.24, *al.* IOS. *AI.* 8.324 *etc.* || **lack of inundation of fields** PSB 8858.15 (III^a)

ἀβροχιζω *pf. ptc.* ἡβροχισκώς *see* ἀβροχέω PFAM. *TEBT.* 52.10 (III^p) *etc.*

ἀβροχικός -ή -όν PFLO. 286.23 (VI^p), *see* ἄβροχος. ἀβροχίτων -ωνος [ἀβρός, χιτών] **with soft blankets** AESCHL. *Pers.* 543 || **with soft tunic** AP. 9. 538.1 (LINDOS 19715 (-χιτ-))

ἄβροχος -ον [βρέχω] **not wet, dry** AESCHN. 2. 21 *etc.* | ► *with gen.* NONN. *D.* 1.75 || **waterless, dry, arid** EUR. *Hel.* 1485 CALLIM. *H.* 1.19 AP. 1.58.2 | **not inundated** PHAMB. 188.8 *al.* (III^a) • *adv.* ἀβρόχως **without getting wet** LIB. *Or.* 11.217

ἄβρυνα -ων, τά [*see* ἀβρύνω ?] **mulberries** PARTH. (*ATH.* 2.51f)

ἀβρυνητής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀβρύνω] **fop, dandy** ADAM. 1.23

ἀβρύνω [ἀβρός] *impf.* ἡβρυνον PHILOSTR. *VS.* 2 (p. 567.16), *mid.* ἡβρυνόμεν || *aor. mid.* (ἐν)ἡβρυνόμεν EUSTATH. 1961.3 • **active to make delicate, charming**; μὴ γυναικὺς ἐν τρόποις ἐμὲ ἄβρυνε do not soften me in womanly wise AESCHL. *Ag.* 919; εἰς γάμον ἀβρύναις may you deck (her) out for marriage LEON. (*AP.* 6.281.4: *corr.* in ἄδρ-)

• **middle and passive to be haughty, put on airs, be fastidious** AESCHL. *Ag.* 1205 SOPH. *OC.* 1339 PLAT. *Ap.* 20c | ἀβρύνεσθαι τινι to boast, brag, be proud of sthg. EUR. *IA.* 858 XEN. *Ag.* 9.2 CLEAR¹. 48

ἄβρωμα -ατος, τό [ἀβρύνω] **woman's garment** HSCH

ἄβρωμος -ον [βρώμας] **free of bad odor** DIPH². (*ATH.* 8.355b) • • *gener. v.l.* ἄβρομος.

Ἄβρων -ωνος, ὁ *Habron, male name* DEMOSTH. 43.19 *etc.*

Ἀβρώνιχος -ου, ὁ *Habronichos, male name* HDT. 8.21 THUC. 1.91 *etc.*

ἀβρώς -ώτος [βιβρώσκω] **not devoured by mosquitoes** P¹. (*AP.* 9.764.5)

ἀβρωσία -ας, ἡ [ἀβρωτός] **lack of food, fast** POLL. 6.39 || **abstinence** EUR. *Hip.* 136 (*conject.*)

ἄβρωτος -ον [βιβρώσκω] [A] **inedible, uneatable** ARISTOT. *HA.* 505b 20, *al.* MEN. *Dysc.* 452 PLUT. 46.733e *etc.* || **not eaten** PORPH. *Abst.* 2.27 *etc.* | **not devoured (by moths), of wood** THPHR. *HP.*

5.1.2 [B] *of pers. fasting, without food* SOPH. *fr.* 967 CHART. 6.3

ἀβστινατεύω to disinherit IUST. *Nov.* 89.3 PANT. 3.153.8a5 (VI)

Ἀβυδηνός -ή -όν [Ἄβυδος] **of Abydos** HDT. 7.44 *etc.* || ἡ Ἀβυδηνή (*sc.* χώρα) territory of Abydos XEN. *Hel.* 4.8.35

Ἀβυδόθεν [Ἄβυδος] *adv.* from Abydos IL. 4.500, *see* Ἄβυδος.

Ἀβυδόθι [Ἄβυδος] *adv.* at Abydos IL. 17.584, *see* Ἄβυδος.

Ἀβυδοκόμης -ου, ὁ *Abydokomes, nickname for a sycophant* ARISTOPH. *fr.* 755 • *v.l.* Ἀβυδοκώμης and -κόμος.

Ἄβυδος -ου, ἡ *Abydos, city in the Troad* IL. 2.836 *etc.* | *in Egypt* PLUT. *Caes.* 69.7, 23.359a *etc.* • *masc.* ὁ Ἄ. *ATH.* 12. 525b *etc.*

ἀβύθητος -ον SCH. *OPP.* 2.216, *see* ἄβυθος.

ἄβυθος -ον [βυθός] **bottomless** PLAT. *Parm.* 130d (*v.l.*)

ἄβυκτος -ον AG. *Bek.* 323, *see* ἄβακτος.

Ἀβύλη στήλη *prob. prom. of Abyla* PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 4.1.6, *cf.* Ἀβιλυκός.

ἀβύρρευτος -ον [βύρσα] **untanned** Sch.D II. 2.527

ἄβυρτάκη -ης, ἡ **spicy sauce** PHEROCR. 195 *etc.*

ἀβυρτακοποιός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀβυρτάκη, ποίειω] **making spicy sauce** DEM³. 1.5

ἀβυρτακώδης -ες ἀβυρτάκη like **spicy sauce** HSCH. (*s.v.* νεοδάτης)

ἀβύσσαίος -ον [ἄβυσσος] **of or from an abyss** ALCH. 403.1 *al.* (*v.l.* ἐναβύσσ-).

ἀβυσσικός -οῦ [ἄβυσσος] **abyssal** HIPPOL. *Haer.* 5.14.1

ἄβυσσος -ον [βυσσός] [A] **bottomless, profound, unlimited, boundless** HDT. 2.28.3 AESCHL. *Suppl.* 1058 *etc.*; ἄτης ἄβυσσον πέλαγος unfathomable sea of ruin AESCHL. *Suppl.* 470; ἄ. πλοῦτος immeasurable wealth AESCHL. *Sept.* 950 [B] *subst.* ἡ ἄβυσσος **great depth, abyss, before creation** VT. *Gen.* 1.2, *al.*; depths of the underworld NT. *Lu.* 8.31, *Apoc.* 9.1; realm of the dead NT. *Rom.* 10.7 *etc.* || depths of the sea, thus sea, ocean VT. *Is.* 44.27 || *fig.* ἄ. ... ἀγαθότητος abyss of goodness, of God THEODORET¹. *QuGen.* 1.8 || **infinitly** PPGM 3.554

ἀβωλόκοπος -ον [βῶλος, κόπτω] **not hoed** POLL. 1.246

ἄβωλος -ον [βῶλος] **not mixed with earth, pure, clean (of grains)** PTERT. 370.13 (II-III^p) *etc.*

Ἀβώνου, τεῖχος, τό *Abonuteichos, city in Paphlagonia* LUC. 42.9 *etc.*

ἄβωρ (= ἄβωρ) HSCH., *Lac. for ἡώς.*

ἄβως and ἀβῶς [βοή] **speechless** HSCH. *L.* EM. 4.54

ἄγ *apoc.* of ἀνά before κ, γ, χ (*see* ἀνά).

ἄγ- [cf. IE. *ng-?; *see* μέγα; or cf. Av. aš-aojah?] *intens. pref. very*

ἄγᾶ Dor., *see* ἀγρή.

ἄγᾶ Dor. *see* ἄγρη.

ἀγάσθαι, ἀγάσθε *ep.*, *see* ἄγαμαι, ἀγάομαι.

Ἀγαβάτας -ου, ὁ *Agabatas, Persian* AESCHL. *Pers.* 959

Ἄγαβος (and Ἄγαβος) -ου, ὁ *Hagabos, prophet* NT. *Apost.* 11.28, *al.*

ἀγαγεῖν *aor.2. inf. act. see* ἄγω.

Ἀγαγύλιος -ου, ὁ *Agagyllos, name of a month in Thessaly* IIG 9.2.554.5

ἀγάζω [ἀγαμαι ?, ἀγαν ?] *act. only pres.* || *impf. mid.* ἡγαζέμην ORPH. *A.* 64 || *fut. mid.* ἀγάσσομαι and *aor. mid.* ἡγασάμην *see* ἄγαμαι • **active** [A] **to exalt, perhaps in τὰ θεῶν μηδὲν ἀγάζειν** do not exalt (too much) the things of the gods or nothing in excess even as regards the gods (*oth.* do not inquire or submit with resignation) AESCHL. *Suppl.* 1061 | **to admire**

THEODOS. *Can.* 17.20 | **to get irritated** HSCH. [B] **to be trusting or daring** SOPH. *fr.* 968 (*doub.*) • **middle to honor, venerate, adore** PIND. *N.* 11.6 HSCH. *L.* EM. α12 | **to be irritated** OD. 10.249 (*v.l.*), 20.16 (*v.l.* GAL. 5.305) HSCH. *ecc.*

ἀγαθαγγελος [ἀγαθός, ἄγγελος] **bringing good news** NICOL¹. 66.13 (*trans. of Persi.* οἱ βάρας).

ἀγαθαῖνων SIMP. *in Epict.* P. 70, *see* ἀγαθύνω.

Ἀγαθάνωρ -ορος, ὁ *Agathanor, male name* AP. 7.554.1

ἀγαθαρχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, ἀρχω] **beginning or source of the good, of the Trinity** DION²¹. *DN.* 3.1

Ἀγαθαρχίδας -ου, ὁ *Agatharchidas, male name* THUC. 2.83.4 *etc.*

Ἀγαθαρχίδης -ου, ὁ *Agatharchides, of Knidos, historian and geographer* LUC. 12.22

ἀγαθαρχικός -ον [ἀγαθαρχία] **that is the beginning or source of goodness, of the Trinity** DION²¹. *DN.* 3.1, *al.*

Ἀγαθαρχίς -ίδος, ἡ *Agatharchis, female name* AP. 6.352.4

Ἀγάθαρχος -ου, ὁ *Agatharchos, male name* THUC. 7.25.1, 70.1 *etc.*

ἀγαθεικελος -ον [ἀγαθός, εἶκελος] **like the good** HDN. *Epim.* 187.1

ἀγάθεος *Dor. see* ἡγάθεος.

Ἀγαθιάς -άδος [Ἀγαθιάς] **of Agathias** AGATH. (*AP.* 6.80.1) • *v.l.* Ἀγαθιάς.

Ἀγαθιμερίς -ίδος, ἡ *Agathemeris, female name* IIG 9.2.545.20 (IP) *etc.*

ἀγαθήμερος -ον [ἀγαθός, ἡμέρα] **of good days** AGATHANG. *Greg.* 99 (p. 50)

Ἀγαθήμερος -ου, ὁ *Agathemeris, male name* IIG 12.5.772 | *geographer* GGM 2.471 *etc.*

ἀγαθηφόρος -ον, ὁ [ἀγαθός, φέρω] **bearer of the good** HIPPOL. *Haer.* 5.7.28

Ἀγαθίας -ος, ὁ *Agathias, historian and poet* AP. 6.79 title L. *Sud.* • *Ion.* -ῆης.

ἀγαθίδιον -ου, τό [ἀγαθίς] **small ball of thread** HSCH.

ἀγαθικός -ή -όν **earnest, honest** EPICHR. 99 EUDEM³. 2a.15 *ecc.*, *see* ἀγαθός.

Ἀγᾶθινος -ου, ὁ *Agathinos, male name* XEN. *Hel.* 4.8.10 *etc.*

ἀγάθιον -ου, τό *poultice* PAEG. 2.57

Ἀγαθίπινη -ης, ἡ *Agathippe, female name (myth.)* PLUT. *Fluv.* 7.1 *etc.*

ἀγᾶθις -ίδος, ἡ **ball of thread, skein** PHEROC. 148 AEN. 31.19 *etc.* || *prov.* ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθίδες skeins of goods, i.e., great prosperity COM. *CAF* 827 EPICHR. 226

Ἀγαθόβουλος -ου, ὁ *Agathoboulos, philosopher* LUC. 9.3 *etc.*

ἀγαθογνώμων -ον [ἀγαθός] **of good opinions** HEPH. 3.45.4

ἀγαθογονία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, γίγνομαι] **creation of good** IAMB¹. *Nic.* 82.22

ἀγαθοδαίμονέω, *contr.* [ἀγαθοδαίμων] *astr.* **to occupy the position of the good genius** VETT. 62.20, *al. etc.*

ἀγαθοδαίμονημα -τος, τό [ἀγαθοδαίμων] **position of the good genius** HEPH. 2.11.4, 11

ἀγαθοδαίμονητικός -ή -όν [ἀγαθοδαίμονέω] *astr.* **belonging to the position of the good genius** IUL¹. (CCA 5.184)

ἀγαθοδαίμονισται -ῶν, οἱ [ἀγαθοδαίμων] **moderate drinkers, i.e., who drink only to the good genius** ARISTOT. *EE.* 1233b (*v.l.* -νιασταί).

ἀγαθοδαίμων -ονος, ὁ [ἀγαθός, δαίμων] [A] **good genius, astr. position of the good genius, in the heavens towards the east** VETT. 128.22

[B] *agathodaimon, Egyptian serpent* PHILUM. *Ven.* 29

ἀγαθοδοσία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **action of giving good** AL. in *Metaph.* 707.19

ἀγαθοδότης -ου [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **giver of good** DIOTOG. (STOB. 4.7.62) etc. ♦ **adv.** ἀγαθοδότηως **giving good** EUSTR. in *EN.* 387.11 | **generously** DION²¹. CH. 120B

ἀγαθοδότης -ιδος [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **lavishing good** DID¹. Trin. 2.14 (126a) (*the Trinity*) etc.

ἀγαθοδότηως **adv.**, see ἀγαθοδότης.

ἀγαθόδωρος -ον [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **generous, munificent** MAX². Amb. 215a

ἀγαθοειδής -ές [ἀγαθός, εἶδος] **like good** PLAT. *Rp.* 509a etc. || **having the form of good** PLOT. 1.7.1, al. IUL. 4.135a IAMB¹. *Protr.* 3 etc. || **compar.** -έστερος || **superl.** -έστατος ♦ **adv.** ἀγαθοειδῶς **in a good manner, benevolently** DION²¹. CH. 257C, al. etc.

ἀγαθοειδῶς **adv.**, see ἀγαθοειδής.

ἀγαθοεργασία -ας, ἡ [see ἀγαθοεργία] **doing good** PROC¹. *Aed.* 1.7.5 (unc.)

ἀγαθοεργέω and ἀγαθοεργέω, **contr.** [ἀγαθοεργός] **aor.** ἡγαθοῦργησα; **to do good, benefit** NT. *Tim.* 1.6.18, *Apost.* 14.17 etc.

ἀγαθοεργία and ἀγαθοεργία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοεργός] **good deed, benefit** HDT. 3.154.1 IUL. 4.135d etc. ♦ Ion. -ίη.

ἀγαθοεργός and ἀγαθοεργός -όν [ἀγαθός, ἔργον] **doing good deeds, beneficent** PLUT. 68.1015e IUL. 4.144d DAMASC. *Isid.* 296 PROCL. *Theol.* 122, 133 || **pl.** οἱ Ἄ. Agathourgoi, *Spartans sent on missions abroad* HDT. 1.67.5 ♦ **adv.** ἀγαθοεργῶς **beneficently** DION²¹. EH. 3.11 (441B), al.

ἀγαθοθέλεια -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοθέλης] **desire of good** L. *Sud.* || **good will** NILANC. *Ep.* 1.298 (79.192B).

ἀγαθοθέλης -ές [ἀγαθός, θέλω] **benevolent** HEPH¹. 2.18 GLOSS

Ἀγαθόκλεια -ας, ἡ Agathokleia, **female name** PLUT. *Cl.* 33.2 etc.

Ἀγαθόκλης -έους, ὁ Agathokles, **male name** PLAT. *Lach.* 180d etc.

ἀγαθολογέω, **contr.** [ἀγαθός, λέγω] **to speak kindly, politely** EUSTATH. 378.30, al. ♦ **aor¹. ptc.** act. ἀγαθολογῆσας EUSTATH. 1236.46.

Ἀγαθόνικη -ης, ἡ Agathonike, **female name** AP. 1.18.1

Ἀγαθόνικος -ου, ὁ Agathonikos, **male name** AGATH. (AP. 7.574.1)

ἀγαθοποιέω, **contr.** [ἀγαθοποιός] **fut.** ἀγαθοποιήσω PHOT. *Bibl.* 221b19 || **aor.** ἡγαθοποίησα [A] **to do good, act well** NT. *Ep.* 1.2.20 SEXT. *S.* 11.70 etc. || **with acc.** **to benefit:** τινα s.o. NT. *Lu.* 6.33 = ► **τινι** VT. *Mac.* 2.1.2; ► **τινά τι** s.o. in sthg. VT. *Num.* 10.32 [B] **to make good** PLOT. 6.7.22 etc. || **to exert a beneficent influence** PROCL. *Ptol.* 292 || **astr.** **to make propitious** VETT. 194.4 IUL¹. (CCA 5.1.185; *pass.*).

ἀγαθοποίησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαθοποιέω] **EUSTR. in EN.** 17.25, see ἀγαθοποιία.

ἀγαθοποιία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοποιός] **action of doing good** NT. *Ep.* 1.4.19 (v.l.) etc. || **favorable influence** PROL⁴. *Tetr.* 38

ἀγαθοποιός -ον [ἀγαθός, ποιέω] **doing good, beneficent, acting well** VT. *Sir.* 42.14 NT. *Ep.* 1.2.14 PPGM 13.1028 || ► **with gen.** PPGM 8.16; **name of Osiris** PLUT. 23.368b etc. || **creating good** DAMASC. *Pr.* 33 || **astr.** **exerting a beneficent influence** PROL⁴. *Tetr.* 38, al. ARTEMID. 4.59

ἀγαθοπρεπής -ές [ἀγαθός, πρέπω] **suiting the good** DION²¹. DN. 2.1, al. ♦ **adv.** ἀγαθοπρεπῶς **in a way suiting the good, benignly** DION²¹. CH. 121B

ἀγαθοπρεπῶς **adv.**, see ἀγαθοπρεπής.

ἀγαθοπτενός -όν [ἀγαθός, ὁράω] **capable of seeing good** DION²¹. DN. 4.23

ἀγαθόρρυτος -ον [ἀγαθός, ῥέω] **from which good**

flows, of the divine source SYN. H. 9.129 ♦ **gen.** -οιο.

ἀγᾶθος -ῆ -όν ❶ **of pers. good:** [A] **well-born, noble** IL. 21.109 etc. | **with ἀφνειός** IL. 13.664 | **with εὐγενής** SOPH. *fr.* 724.1; **καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες** well-born men, aristocrats PLUT. *Demosth.* 4.1 cf. **καλοκαγαθός** [B] **valiant, skilful, capable, excellent:** ἄ. βασιλεύς **good king** IL. 3.179; ἄ. θεράπων **excellent servant** IL. 16.165 || ► **with acc. of relation:** βοῆν ἄ. **good at the battle-cry, of powerful voice** IL. 2.408, al.; ἄ. γνώμων **skilled at giving advice** SOPH. *OT.* 687; ἄ. πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν **endowed with every virtue** PLAT. *Leg.* 899b; ἄ. τὰ πολέμια **valiant in the things of war** HDT. 9.122.3; ἄ. τὰ πολιτικά **politically adroit** PLAT. *Gorg.* 516c, al. = ► **with dat.:** πολέμῳ ἄ. **brave in war** XEN. *Oec.* 4.15 || ► ἄ. εἰς **ti** **skilled at, fit for, capable in sthg.** PLAT. *Alc.* 1.125a = ► **πρός τι** PLAT. *Rp.* 407e = ► **περί τι** LYS. 13.2; ἄ. κατὰ πάντα **capable, fit for everything** THUC. 4.81.3 || ► **with inf:** ἄ. μάχεσθαι **fit for fighting** HDT. 1.13.16; ἄ. ἡπτεύεσθαι **skilled at horsemanship** HDT. 1.79.3; ἄ. ἱσάνα **practiced at weighing** PLAT. *Protr.* 356b [C] **good, morally** THGN. 438 SOPH. *El.* 1082 PLAT. *Rp.* 409c etc.; **πιστός καγαθός** **faithful and good** SOPH. *Tr.* 541; **δίκαιος καγαθός** **just and honest** SOPH. *Ph.* 1050; **καλὸς καγαθός** **fair and good, i.e., respectable, excellent, perfect man (common., see καλός and καλοκαγαθός):** οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ **good citizens** PLUT. *Cic.* 11.2 || **iron.:** τὸν ἀγαθὸν Κρέοντα **the good Creon** SOPH. *Ant.* 31 [D] **propitious, favorable, benevolent:** ὁ ἄ. δαίμων **the good genius** ARISTOPH. *Ve.* 525; ἡ θεὸς ἀγαθὴ **the good goddess, at Rome (Lat. bona dea)** PLUT. *Caes.* 9.4 etc.; ἀγαθὴ τύχη **good fortune** PLUT. 15.198a [E] **of courtesy:** ὦ γαθέ **my good man, my good friend** PLAT. *Prot.* 311a etc.; **crasis ὡγαθέ** AESCHL. *fr.* 78c ❷ **of things good:** [A] **excellent, perfect:** δαίς ἀγαθὴ **excellent meal** OD. 15.507; ἀγαθὴ κουροτρόφος (Ithaca) **good reared of youths** OD. 9.27 [B] **suitable, useful** ► **with dat.:** ἄ. ἀνδρὶ **suitable for a man** OD. 17.347; ἄ. τῇ πόλει **useful to the city** XEN. *Cyn.* 13.17 || ► **with gen.:** ἄ. ἐλχῶν καὶ φυμάτων (a root) **good for wounds and abscesses** THPHR. *HP.* 9.11.1, al. etc. || ► **with inf:** ἀγαθὸν (ἔστι) **it is good** IL. 7.282, al. OD. 3.196 etc. || ἀγαθὸν ὅτι **it is good that** VT. *Reg.* 2.18.3 || **abs.** εἰς ἀγαθὸν **or ἀγαθὰ** **to good purpose, with good intention** IL. 9.102, al. [C] **propitious, favorable, auspicious:** ἀγαθὴ ἡμέρα **propitious day** XEN. *Oec.* 11.6; **of days or omens** HES. *Op.* 783, *fr.* 240.11 || **prosperous, fortunate, lucky:** ἀγαθὸν τί σε βούλονται πράττειν **they want your affairs to prosper** XEN. *Oec.* 12.7 [D] **good, sound, morally, of thought** AESCHL. *Eum.* 1013; **of action** DEMOCR. B 177 NT. *Rom.* 2.7 etc. ❸ **subst. neut.** τὸ ἀγαθὸν [A] **good, benefit:** φίλον δὲ μέγιστον ἄ. εἶναι **φασι** **a friend, which they say is the greatest good** XEN. *Mem.* 2.4.2; μέγ' ἀγαθὸν **darling, of a baby** MEN. *Sam.* 28 | ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ **τινος** **for the good of s.o.** THUC. 5.27.2 etc.; ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τοῖς πολίταις **for the good of the citizens** ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 1487; **τινός** ἀγαθοῦ **τοῦτο** **ποιοῦσιν** **for what purpose do they do this** LUC. 34.1 | **good, good action** NT. *Rom.* 2.10 etc. || **philos. good** ARISTOT. *EN.* 1094a 3, al. EPICET. *Ench.* 24.3, al. etc.; ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα **the form of the good** PLAT. *Rp.* 508e, al. | **Christ. highest good, of God** CLEM. *Paed.* 1.8.63.2 GREG¹. VMos. 1.7 etc. [B] **pl.** τὰ ἀγαθὰ **and τάγαθὰ** **goods of fortune, wealth, power, endowments** HDT. 2.172 THUC. 1.82.3, al. PLAT. *Leg.* 661a, 697b XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.63 etc. | **Christ. worldly goods, in contrast to spiritual ones** NT. *Lu.* 12.18, al. etc. || **good qualities, spiritual gifts** ISOCR. 8.32 etc. | **poetic virtues** ARISTOT. *Poet.* 1460b

2 || **good physical traits, of a horse** XEN. *Hip.* 1.2 || **good advice:** οὗτοι καμοῦμαι σοι λέγουσα **τάγαθὰ** **I shall never tire of giving you good advice** AESCHL. *Eum.* 881 || **good news** SOPH. *OT.* 934 ♦ **adv.** ἀγαθῶς **well** HP. *Off.* 4.7 ARISTOT. *Rh.* 1388b 6 etc. | **interject. good!, very well!** VT. *Reg.* 1.20.7 ♦ **crasis** τὸ ἄ. > τὰγαθόν, τοῦ ἄ. > τὰγαθοῦ, οἱ ἄ. > ἀγαθοί, τὰ ἄ. > τὰγαθὰ || **prodelision** ὦ ἄ. > ὦ γαθέ (*instead of crasis ὡγαθέ*) || **Lac.** ἀγασός ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 1301 || **Lesb.** ἀγαθος || *Cypr.* ἀζαθός || **later compar.** ἀγαθώτερος (*common. suppl.* ἀμείνων **and ἀμεινότερος, ἀρείων, βελτίων and βέλτερος, κρείσσων, λῶων and λωίτερος, φέρτερος) | **later superl.** ἀγαθώτατος (*common. suppl.* ἀριστος, βέλτιστος and βέλτατος, κράτιστος, λῶστος, φέριστος **e φέρτατος**).**

ἀγαθόσύμβουλος [ἀγαθός, σύμβουλος] **good adviser** GLOSS

ἀγαθότης -ητος, ἡ [ἀγαθός] **goodness** VT. *Sal.* 1.1, al. *Plot.* 4.8.6 etc. || **your benevolence, honorific tit.** IUL. *epist.* 12.36 GREG. *epist.* 28.2 etc.

ἀγαθοτυχέω, **contr.** [ἀγαθός, τύχη] **astr.** **to occupy the position of good fortune** VETT. 79.30 CCA 1.118 (see τύχη).

ἀγαθοεργ- see ἀγαθοεργ-.

ἀγαθοφανής -ές [ἀγαθός, φαίνω] **appearing good** DEMOCR. B 82

ἀγαθοφιλής -ές [ἀγαθός, φίλος] **loving good** DION²¹. *epist.* 8.1

ἀγαθοφόρος -ον [ἀγαθός, φέρω] **bearing good news** PPGM 4.3166 || τὸ ἄ. **the bearing of good news** CCA 2.170

ἀγαθόφρων -ον, **gen.** -ονος [ἀγαθός, φρήν] **of good intentions, well-disposed** PROL⁴. *Tetr.* 169 VETT. 378.30

ἀγαθοφύης -ές [ἀγαθός, φύω] **good by nature, of the Word** DION²¹. DN. 2.1

ἀγαθῶ, **contr.** [ἀγαθός] **fut.** ἀγαθῶσω || **aor. inf.** ἀγαθῶσαι ❶ **active** **to do good, benefit** ► **τινι** s.o. VT. *Reg.* 1.25.31 = ► **τινα** VT. *Sir.* 49.9 etc. ❷ **passive** **to be made good** NUM¹. (EUS¹. *PE.* 11.22.6)

ἀγαθύνσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαθύνω] **action of making good** EUSTR. in *EN.* 276.32

ἀγαθύνω [ἀγαθός] **fut.** ἀγαθύνω || **aor.** ἡγάθυνα || **aor. pass.** ἡγαθύνην || **fut. pass.** ἀγαθύνησμαι ❶ **active** [A] **to do good, benefit** ► **τινι** (to) s.o. VT. *Iudic.* B 17.13, al. HLD⁴. in *EN.* 86.41 || ► **abs.** **to do good, do well** VT. *Ps.* 35.4 [B] **to make good** DION²¹. DN. 4.35 [C] **to honor, magnify** VT. *Reg.* 3.1.47 || **to adorn** VT. *Reg.* 4.9.30 || **to cheer:** ἄ. καρδίαν **to make the heart merry** VT. *Iud.* 19.22 ❷ **passive** [A] **to be made good** DION²¹. *epist.* 2, al. [B] **to rejoice, exult** VT. *Iud.* 16.25, al. [C] **to be esteemed** VT. *Esd.* 2.12.5 || **impers.** **to seem good or opportune:** ἐπὶ τινα ἐν τινι **to s.o. concerning sthg.** VT. *Esd.* 2.7.18

Ἀγαθῦρσοι -ων, οἱ Agathyrsoi, **Scythian people** HDT. 4.48.4, al.

Ἀγαθύρσος -ου, ὁ Agathyrsos, **female name** HDT. 4.10.2

ἀγαθῶμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαθός] **personification of good** PROCL. in *Parm.* p. 683

Ἀγάθων -ωνος, ὁ Agathon, **male name** IL. 24.249 PLAT. *Symp.* 172a, al. etc.

ἀγαθωνυμία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, ὄνομα] **the name of good, divine attribute** DION²¹. DN. 3.1, al.

ἀγαθωσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγαθός] **good** VT. *Chr.* 2.24.16; εἰς ἀγαθωσύνην **for my good** VT. *Neem.* 13.31 || **goodness, benevolence** VT. *Neem.* 9.25 NT. *Gal.* 5.22, *Eph.* 5.9 etc.; also ἀγαθωσύνη ORIG. *frag. Io.* 124.12 etc.; ἡ ἡμέρα ἀγαθωσύνης **the day of judgement** HYPER. *Mon.* 150 (PPG 79.1488D) ἀγαίωμα [ἀγαίμαι] [A] **to be indignant:** τι **at sthg.**

OD. 20.16 etc. || **to be enraged, angry** ▶ *τινι* with s.o. HES. *Op.* 333 HDT. 8.69.1 (v.l.) [B] **to admire** ▶ *τι sthg.* ARCHIL. 19.2 OPP. 4.138 || **abs.** ἀγαίομενος full of admiration AP. 1.899, *al.* **only pres. and ep. and Ion.** | *impf.* 3. sg. ἀγαίετο HES. *fr.* 211.4.

1. ἀγαίος -ον [ἀγα-] **enviable** HSCH. AG. *Bek.* 334 L. EM. 8.50

2. ἀγαίος -α -ον [ἀγω] **leading the procession** IGD1 2561 D 38 (IV^a) (*doub.*)

Ἀγαίος -ου, ὁ Agaios, *male name* HDT. 6.127.3 etc. ἀγαλκῆς -ές [ἀγα-, κλέος] **very famous, illustrious, of pers.** IL. 16.738, *al.* | *of things and places* BACCHYL. *Dith.* 16.12 PIND. *Paec.* 4.12, *al.* ♦ *adv.* ἀγαλκῶς famously HP. *Prae.* 12 ♦ *voc.* -κλέες | *ep. gen.* -κλήος | *dat.* -κλέι | *acc.* -άκλεα PIND. P. 9.106, *al.*; *pl.* -κλέας ANTIM. 67 || *ep.* (not OD.) *and lyr.*

Ἀγάκλῆς -ῆος, ὁ Agakleēs, *male name* IL. 15.571 etc.

ἀγαλκετός -ή -όν [ἀγα-, κλέος] *of pers.* **very famous** IL. 2.564 HES. *Th.* 1016 etc. || *of things* splendid, magnificent OD. 3.59, 7.202 || **extraordinary, of suffering** SOPH. *Tr.* 854 (*lyr.*)

ἀγαλκεῶς *adv.*, see ἀγαλκῆς.

ἀγαλκήεις *nom. pl.* see MAN¹. 3.324

ἀγαλκήεις -εσσα -εν [see ἀγαλκῆς] **famous** I MAMA 1.267.8

ἀγαλκῦμένη -ης [ἀγα-, κλέος] **very illustrious** ANTIM. 16.2

ἀγαλκῦτός -ή -όν [ἀγα-, κλέος] **very illustrious, of pers.** IL. 6.436 OD. 8.502 AP. 9.672.3 etc. | *of things* OD. 3.388, *al.*

ἀγακτιμένη -ης, ἡ [ἀγα-, κτιζω] **well-built (city)** PIND. P. 5.81

ἀγαλακτία -ας, ἡ [ἀγάλακτος] **lack of milk** AUTOCR. 3

ἀγαλματός -ον [γάλα] [A] **deprived of milk** HP. *NatPuer.* 30 | **weaned, deprived of mother's milk** AESCHL. *Ag.* 718 | **having never suckled** NONN. *Ev.* 9.103 || **not suited to producing good milk, of a pasture** GAL. 6.346 [B] *of the same milk, related* HSCH

ἀγάλαξ -ακτος [γάλα] **without milk** CALLIM. *H.* 2.52

ἀγαλλιᾶω [ἀγάλλω] [A] **active to insult** HSCH. L. EM. [B] **middle to rejoice** PSB 7695.9 (VI-VIII^a) IO. CGal. 10.729D **only pres.**

ἀγαλλιᾶμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαλλιᾶω] **transport of joy, exultation, happiness** VT. *Is.* 16.10, *al.* BAS. *epist.* 243.2.34 etc.

ἀγαλλιᾶς -άδος, ἡ NIC. *fr.* 74.31, see ἀγαλλίς.

ἀγαλλιάσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαλλιᾶω] **exultation** VT. *Ps.* 29.6 NT. *Lu.* 1.14, *al.* etc., see ἀγαλλιάς.

ἀγαλλιᾶω, *contr.* [ἀγάλλω] *impf.* mid. ἡγαλλιῶμην || *fut. mid.* ἀγαλλιᾶσμαι || *aor.* ἡγαλλίασα, *mid.* ἡγαλλιάσασμην || *pf. inf. mid. pass.* ἡγαλλιάσθαι ORIG. *Io.* 6.3.15 || *aor. pass.* ἡγαλλία(σ)θην || *fut. pass.* ἀγαλλία(σ)θήσομαι; **to rejoice, be glad, exult** NT. *Mat.* 5.12, *Apoc.* 19.7 (v.l.) etc.; *gener. mid.* = *act.*: ▶ *τι* in *sthg.* VT. *Ps.* 58.17, *al.* = ▶ *τινι* VT. *Ps.* 94.1 = ▶ *ἐν* *τινι* VT. *Ps.* 32.1 = ▶ *ἐπὶ* *τινι* VT. *Ps.* 34.9 = ▶ *ἐπὶ* *τι* VT. *Ps.* 118.162

Ἀγαλλίς -ίδος, ἡ Agallis, *female name* ATH. 1.14d, *al.* etc.

ἀγαλλίς -ίδος, ἡ *bot.* dwarf iris, plant HOM. 2.426 ἀγαλλύομαι [see ἀγάλλω] **to rejoice, be glad** [PROC.] *Prov.* 8.31 (*impf.* 3. sg. ἡγαλλύετο).

ἀγάλλω [see ἀγαμαι ?] *impf.* ἡγάλλον, *mid.* ἡγαλλόμην || *fut.* ἀγάλλω || *aor.* ἡγάλα || *aor. pass.* ἡγάλθην [A] **active to exalt, glorify, honor** ▶ *τινα* s.o. PIND. O. 1.86 ARISTOPH. *Th.* 128 PLAT. *Leg.* 931a etc. || **to adorn, prepare:** γαμηλίους εὐνάς ἀγάλλαι adorn the wedding bed EUR. *Med.* 1027 [B] **middle** [A] *trans.* **to honor:** θεόν the

god EUR. *Bac.* 157 [B] *intrans.* **to rejoice, exult** ▶ *τινι* in *sthg.* IL. 2.462, *al.* OD. 5.176 THUC. 2.44.2 ARISTOPH. *Pax* 1298 PLAT. *Theat.* 176d etc. = ▶ *ἐπὶ* *τινι* THUC. 3.82.7 XEN. *Cyr.* 8.4.11 = ▶ *τι* APOLLON¹. (AP. 7.378.4); διὰ τὰλλα καὶ ὅτι besides other reasons also because DCASS. 66.2.1 **to be proud, vaunt** ▶ *τινι* (of) *sthg.* IL. 12.114 || ▶ *with ptc.* IL. 17.473 etc.; ἦν ἕκαστος πατρίδα ἔχων ... ἀγάλλεται (a city) which each is proud to have as homeland THUC. 4.95.3 || ▶ *abs.* HDT. 4.64.2, *al.* EUR. *Bac.* 1197 etc. || **to flourish** PLUT. 36.517d [B] **passive to be honored:** θυσίαις ἀγαλθῆναι to be honored with sacrifices DCASS. 51 20.3 • *ptc. mid.* ἀγγλόμενα HSCH. (*doub.*).

ἀγάλαμα -ατος, τό [ἀγάλλω] [A] **ornament, glory, pride** IL. 4.144 OD. 3.274 PIND. N. 3.13, *al.* AESCHL. *Ag.* 208 SOPH. *Ant.* 704 EUR. *El.* 206 PLAT. *Tim.* 37c etc.; ἀγάλαμα τύμβου τοῦδε as an ornament of this tomb AESCHL. *Ch.* 200; Νηρέως ἀγάλαμα pride of Nereus, of the Nereids EUR. *IT.* 273 [B] **votive offering** OD. 8.509 | *of an ox* OD. 3.438 | *of a tripod* HDT. 5.60, *al.* | *of a sepulchral stone grave marker* PIND. N. 10.67 LYC. 559 [C] **statue, esp. of gods** HDT. 1.131.1, *al.* AESCHL. *Sept.* 258, *Eum.* 55 SOPH. *OT.* 1379 PLAT. *Phaedr.* 251a, *al.* LYS. 6.15 ISOCR. 9.57 etc.; as a votive offering SIM. (AP. 13.19.1); in general PLAT. *Men.* 97d etc. [D] **extens. image** EUR. *Hel.* 705 etc.; *of God in man* CLEM. *Str.* 7.5.29.6 | **portrait, picture** EUR. *Hel.* 262 | **representation, figure, symbol, beneath which divine reality is concealed** DION²¹. *CH.* 145A, *al.* || *pl. figures* PLAT. *Symp.* 216e | *copies* PLAT. *Rp.* 517d | **hieroglyphic signs** PLOT. 5.8.6

ἀγαλματίας -ου, ὁ [ἀγαλμα] **beautiful as a statue** PHILOSTR. *VS.* 2.25.6

ἀγαλμάτιον -ου, τό [ἀγαλμα] **statuette** THEOP. 47 PLUT. *Lyc.* 25.4 LUC. 32.3

ἀγαλματογλύψης -ου, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, γλύφω] **sculptor** AESOP. 90.2

ἀγαλματογλύφος -ου, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, γλύφω] **sculptor** VETT. 4.12

ἀγαλματομική, τέχνη, ἡ [ἀγαλμα, τέμνω] **art of carving images** CALL. *fr.* 100, *abbrev. from* ἀγαλματοτομή.

ἀγαλματοποιῶ, *contr.* [ἀγαλματοποιός] *aor. inf. pass.* ἀγαλματοποιηθῆναι SCH. CLEM. *Paed.* 311.27; **to make statues** POLL. 7.108 STEPH². in *Rh.* 280.10 (*pass.*)

ἀγαλματοποιητικός -ή -όν [ἀγαλματοποιέω] **of the art of sculpture** IUL. *Gal.* 235c || *subst.* ἡ ἀγαλματοποιητική (sc. τέχνη) **art of sculpture** [GAL.] *Intr.* 14.686, see ἀγαλματοποιία.

ἀγαλματοποιία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαλματοποιός] **art of sculpture, sculpture** HIPPIAS A2 PORPH. *Abst.* 2.49

ἀγαλματοποιικός [ἀγαλματοποιέω] POLL. 1.13, see ἀγαλματοποιητικός.

ἀγαλματοποιός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, ποιέω] **sculptor** HDT. 2.46 PLAT. *Prot.* 310c ARISTOT. *Pol.* 1340a 38 etc.

ἀγαλματοπώλης -ου, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, πώλης] **seller of images** AESOP. 99 title

ἀγαλματοουργία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαλματοργός] **art of sculpture** MAX¹. 33.3

ἀγαλματοουργικός [ἀγαλματοργία] MAX¹. 33.3, see ἀγαλματοποιητικός.

ἀγαλματοργός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, ἔργον] **sculptor** POLL. 1.12 etc.

ἀγαλματοφορέω, *contr.* [ἀγαλματοφόρος] *fut.* ἀγαλματοφορήσω; **to bear an image, have an image in mind** PHIL². *Op.* 69, *al.*

ἀγαλματοφόρος -ον [ἀγαλμα, φέρω] **carrying an image** HSCH

ἀγαλματοφώρας, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, φώρα] **robber of sacred objects** ISCHWYZ. 424.13 (IV^a)

ἀγαλματόω, *contr.* [ἀγαλμα] *impf.* ἡγαλμάτου SCH. *Lyc.* 843 (p. 273.24) || *aor. ptc.* ἀγαλματώσας LYC. 845; **to make into a statue** ll.cc.

ἀγαλμοτυπῆς -έως, ὁ [ἀγαλμα, τύπτω] **maker of statues** MAN¹. 4.569

ἀγάλοχον -ου, τό *bot.* aquilaria DIOSC². 1.22 etc.

ἀγάμαι [ἀγα-] *impf.* ἡγάμην || *fut.* ἀγάσσομαι || *aor.* ἡγασάμην || *gener. aor. pass.* ἡγάσθην || *later fut. pass.* ἀγασθήσομαι [A] ▶ *abs.* **to wonder** OD. 18.71, *al.* | ▶ *with ptc.* IL. 3. 224 | ▶ *with acc.* **to admire** ▶ *τινα* or *τι* s.o. or *sthg.* IL. 3.181, *al.* HDT. 8.144.3 XEN. *Cyr.* 2.3.19 etc. | ▶ *τινά* *τινος* s.o. *sthg.* PLAT. *Rp.* 426d XEN. *Cyr.* 2.3.21 | ▶ *τί* *τινος sthg.* of s.o. EUR. *IA.* 28 || ▶ *with gen.* **to marvel at, admire, of a thing** XEN. *Mem.* 2.6.33 PLAT. *Euthyd.* 276d etc.; ἀγαμαι δὲ λόγων I admire these words ARISTOPH. *Av.* 1744 | *of pers.* ▶ *with ptc.* HDT. 6.76.2 etc.; ἀγασθῆς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα amazed at his saying this PLAT. *Rp.* 329d; ἄ. *τινος* ὅτι to marvel that s.o. PLAT. *HipMat.* 291e = διότι XEN. *Mem.* 4.2.9 etc. || ▶ *with dat.* **to be delighted, be content:** *τινι* with s.o. or *sthg.* HDT. 4.75.2 XEN. *Cyr.* 2.4.9 | ▶ *ἐπὶ* *τινι* with s.o. or *sthg.* DEMOSTH. *epist.* 2.11 etc. | *with imper. please* CEPHIS. 3 etc. [B] in *pejor. sense to be envious, jealous* ▶ *τινι* of s.o. IL. 17.71, *al.* | *περὶ* νίκης for victory IL. 23.639 | ▶ *τινι* and *inf.* of s.o. because OD. 5.119, *al.* = *τινι* οὐνεκα OD. 8.565 || **to be annoyed, be angry:** *τι* at *sthg.* OD. 2.67, *al.* • *for the ep. pres.* see also ἀγάω || *ep. fut.* ἀγάσσομαι || *ep. aor.* ἡγασάμην and ἀγασ(σ)άμην.

Ἀγαμεμνόνειος -α -ον [Ἀγαμέμνων] **of Agamemnon** EUR. *IT.* 1290

Ἀγαμεμνόνειος -η -ον [Ἀγαμέμνων] IL. 23.295 OD. 3.264 etc., see Ἀγαμεμνόνειος.

Ἀγαμεμνονίδης -ου [Ἀγαμέμνων] **son of Agamemnon** OD. 1.30 SOPH. *El.* 182 (-δας) etc.

Ἀγαμεμνόνιος -ια -ιον [Ἀγαμέμνων] **of Agamemnon** PIND. P. 11.20 AESCHL. *Ag.* 1499, *Ch.* 861 etc.

Ἀγᾶμεμνων -ονος, ὁ Agamemnon IL. 1.94, *al.* etc. || *epith. of Zeus at Sparta* STAPH. 8 EUSTATH. 168.10 ἀγαμῆνωσ *adv.* from *pres. ptc.* of ἀγαμαι **with admiration, with respect** PLAT. *Phaed.* 89a ARISTOT. *Rh.* 1408a 18

ἀγάμετος -ον [see ἀγαμος] SOPH. *fr.* 970, see ἀγαμος.

Ἀγάμηθη -ης, ἡ Agamede, *female name* IL. 11.740 etc.

Ἀγάμηδης -ους, ὁ Agamedes, *male name* TELEG. *arg.* 1 etc.

Ἀγάμηστωρ -ορος, ὁ Agamestor, *male name* AP. 2.850 etc.

ἀγάμητος [see ἀγαμος] COM. *CAF* 315, see ἀγαμος. ἀγαμία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαμος] **celibacy** PLUT. 31.491e etc. ἀγάμιος -ον [ἀγαμος] *only in* ἀγαμίου δική **judicial action against bachelorhood** PLUT. *Lys.* 30.7; ἀγαμίου ζημία penalty for bachelorhood ARISTO 1.89.36 (STOB. 4.22.16).

ἄγαν [ἀγα-] *adv.* [A] **unmarried, single, widowed, of a man (ἀνανδρὸς of a woman)** IL. 3. 40 XEN. *Symp.* 9.7 VT. *Mac.* 4.16.9 etc. || *of a woman* AESCHL. *Suppl.* 143 SOPH. *OT.* 1502 EUR. *Or.* 205 NT. *Cor.* 1.7.34, *al.* [B] **not a marriage:** γάμος ἄ. marriage that is not a marriage, SOPH. *OT.* 1214 EUR. *Hel.* 690

ἄγαν [ἀγα-] *adv.* [A] **very** HDT. 2.173.2 etc.; *with adj.*: ἄ. βαρὺς very heavy AESCHL. *Pers.* 515 || *with superl.* ἄ. ἀγριωτάτους by far the most savage AEL. *NA.* 1.38 || *with adv.* ὑπερθύμως ἄ. very angrily AESCHL. *Eum.* 824; ὠμῶς ἄ. very harshly XEN. *Vect.* 5.6 || *with subst.* ἡ ἄ. σιγὴ complete silence SOPH. *Ant.* 1251; ἡ ἄ. ἔλευθερία

total freedom (*opp.* to ἡ ἄ. δουλεία complete slavery) PLAT. *Rp.* 564a | *without art.* PLAT. *Rp.* 564a || *subst. with article:* τῶν ἄ. γὰρ ἀπτεται θεός for the god is engaged in important things EUR. *fr.* 974 || *with a verb* AESCHL. *Pr.* 180 [B] **too much**, *gener. in* μῆδεν ἄ. nothing in excess (*prov.*) THGN. 335 PIND. *fr.* 35b EUR. *Hip.* 265 | *iron.* οὐκ ἄγαν not too, not particularly EUR. *Med.* 305, 583, *El.* 1105, *al.* ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 598 [C] ἄγαν γε also unfortunately AESCHL. *Ag.* 1241 SOPH. *Tr.* 896, *al.* • *gener.* Aeol. *Dor.* and in *trag.*, not in IL. and OD. || *later poet.* ἄγαν.

Ἀγανάγαρα -ας, ἡ Aganagara, city in India PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 7.2.7

ἀγανᾶκτεω, *contr.* [ἀγαμαι ?] *impf.* ἡγανᾶκτου || *fut.* ἀγανᾶκτῃσω || *aor.* ἡγανᾶκτῃσα, *ptc.* mid. ἀγανᾶκτῃσάμενος || *pf.* ἡγανᾶκτῃκα, *mid.* ἡγανᾶκτῃμαι HYP. *fr.* 70 || *aor. pass.* ἡγανᾶκτῃθην • **active** [A] **to bubble, ferment, of wine** PLUT. 46.734e | *fig. of the soul* PLAT. *Phaedr.* 251c; καὶ μου τὰ σπλάγχν' ἡγανᾶκτεῖ my guts are seething, with anger ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 1006 [B] **to shudder, be vexed, be irritated, be angry, regret** ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 499 | ► *with compl. of a thing:* τινι by s.o. PLAT. *Phaed.* 63b = ► τι PLAT. *Phaed.* 64a = ► ἐπὶ τινι LYS. 1.1 ISOCR. 16.49 = ► ὑπὲρ τινος PLAT. *Euthyd.* 283e = ► περὶ τινος PLAT. *epist.* 349d = διὰ τι PLAT. *Phaed.* 63c = ► πρὸς τι EPICT. *Ench.* 4.4.31, *al.* | ► *with compl. of pers.:* τινι with or at s.o. XEN. *Hel.* 5.3.11 = ► πρὸς τινα PLUT. *Cam.* 28.5 = ► κατὰ τινος LUC. 25.18 | ► *with ptc.:* ἄ. ἀποθνήσκοντας to regret their death PLAT. *Phaed.* 62e | ► *with ὡς or ὅτι* that, because common. || ► *with εἰ or ἐάν* if, at the fact that AND. 1.139 PLAT. *Lach.* 194a [C] *med.* **to feel or experience irritation** HP. *Liq.* 2 GAL. 13.632 etc. • **middle** = **active** LUC. 32.4 HYP. *fr.* 70.1 • *ptc.* ἀγανᾶκτέων HP. *epist.* 27.13 LUC. 48.19 and (προσ)ἀγανᾶκτέυντες HP. *epist.* 17.289.

ἀγανᾶκτῃσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγανᾶκτέω] **irritation, pain** PLAT. *Phaedr.* 251c (*from teething*) AN. *Par.* 34.3.3 (*of the diaphragm*) GAL. 10.251 (*of a wound*) || **indignation** THUC. 2.41.3 PLUT. *Marc.* 33.8 etc.

ἀγανᾶκτῃτέον [ἀγανᾶκτέω] *verb. adj.* it is necessary to be irritated: τινα at s.o. PLOT. 4.8.7

ἀγανᾶκτῃτικός -ῆ -ὄν [ἀγανᾶκτέω] **irritable** PLAT. *Rp.* 604e (v.l.), 605a.

ἀγανᾶκτῃτός -ῆ -ὄν [ἀγανᾶκτέω] **irritating** PLAT. *Gorg.* 511b

ἀγανᾶκτῃτικός -ῆ -ὄν [ἀγανᾶκτέω] **irritating** LUC. 28.14 ♦ *adv.* ἀγανᾶκτῃκῶς with irritation MAUR. 11.13, see ἀγανᾶκτῃτικός.

Ἀγανᾶζαβα Aganzaba, city in Media PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 6.2.11

Ἀγανίππη -ης, ἡ Aganippe, female name AP. 14.120.4 etc.

Ἀγανίππος -ου, ὁ Aganippos, female name QS. 3.230

ἀγαννίφος -ον [ἀγα-, νίφα] **covered in snow, snow-clad, of Olympus** IL. 1.420, *al.* etc. | *of a peak* EPICHR. 130

ἀγαννιβλέφαρος -ον [ἀγανός, βλέφαρον] **with a pleasant look, Persuasion** IB. 7.3 etc.

ἀγανόμματος -ον [ἀγανός, δμμα] LYR. *Al.* 20.1, see ἀγαννιβλέφαρος.

ἀγάνορ- *Dor.* see ἀγηνορ-.

Ἄγανος Aganos, male name CYP. 12

ἄγανός -ον [ἀγνυμι] **broken (wood)** SOPH. *fr.* 198b ἄγανός -ῆ -ὄν [see γάνος] **pleasant, mild, gentle** IL. 2.164, *al.* OD. 2.230, *al.* PIND. *P.* 4.101, *al.* AESCHL. *Ag.* 101 (*doubt, unique in tragedy*) etc. | *of the shafts of Apollo and Artemis that cause an easy death* IL. 24.759, *al.* OD. 15.411, *al.* || *superl.* -ώτατος ♦ *adv.* ἀγανῶς mildly, gently ANACR.

28.1 EUR. *IA.* 601 || *compar.* -ώτερον ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 886

ἀγανοφροσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγανόφρων] **kindness, gentleness** IL. 24.772 OD. 11.203

ἀγανόφρων -ον, *gen.* -ονος [ἀγανός, φρήν] **sweet, gentle** IL. 20.467 ARISTOPH. *An.* 1321 IEG 64.81 (III-IV^p) etc.

ἀγανώπις -ιδος [ἀγανός, ὤψ] **with a pleasant look** MARC. 80

ἀγάνωτος -ον [γανός] **not glazed (with tin)** POSID¹. (PAEG. 20.26) ZOS¹. p. 220

ἀγαπάζω [ἀγαπάω] • **active** [A] **to treat kindly, receive with affection** ► *with acc.* IL. 24.464 OD. 16.17; νέκυν παιδὸς ἄ. to tend to (my) son's body EUR. *Ph.* 1327 [B] **to relish, love** PIND. *I.* 5.54 • **middle** = **active** PIND. *P.* 4.241 (► *with acc.*) etc.; κύνεον ἀγαπαζόμενοι κεφαλὴν τε καὶ ὤμους they kissed his head and shoulders tenderly OD. 21.224 • **ep. and lyr.** || *pres.* 3. *pl.* *Dor.* ἀγαπάζοντι | *ep. inf.* ἀγαπαζέμεν || *ep. impf.* ἀγαπάζον, *mid.* *Dor.* ἀγαπάζοντο || *aor. only inf.* ἀγαπάξει CALLICR. 107.10.

Ἀγαπαίος -ου, ὁ Agapaios, male name DEMOSTH. 9.59

ἀγαπατός *Dor.* see ἀγαπητός.

ἀγαπάω, *contr.* *impf.* ἡγάπων, *mid. pass.* ἡγάπων-μην || *fut.* ἀγαπάω || *aor.* ἡγάπησα | *inf.* mid. ἀγαπησῶσθαι BAS. (PG 31.1633.22) || *pf.* ἡγάπηκα, *mid. pass.* ἡγάπημαι || *ppf.* ἡγάπηκειν, *mid. pass.* ἡγάπημην || *aor. pass.* ἡγάπηθην || *fut. pass.* ἀγαπηθήσονται • **active** [A] **to treat with affection** ► *τινα* s.o. OD. 23.214; ἄ. νεκρούς to perform the last rites for the dead EUR. *Suppl.* 764 | **to pet (puppies and little monkeys)** PLUT. *Per.* 1.1 || *extens.* **to love, be fond of** ► *with acc.* PLAT. *Rp.* 330c, *al.*; ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου you will love your neighbor NT. *Mat.* 5.43, *al.* | ► *with double acc.:* (ἀγάπη) ἦν ἡγάπησεν αὐτὴν (the love) which he showed her VT. *Reg.* 2.13.15 || *of God's love of man and man's love of God* NT. *Mat.* 22.37, *Mar.* 10.21, *al.* | *of sexual love* PLAT. *Symp.* 180b LUC. 21.2 etc. | **to prefer:** τι ἀντί τινος sthg. to sthg. else DEMOSTH. 18.109 = τι πρό τινος PLUT. *Cam.* 10.7 || *with inf.* **to be fond of, to be accustomed** ARISTOT. *Oec.* 1348a 29 [B] **to be pleased, be satisfied** ► τι with sthg. ISOCR. 4.140 DEMOSTH. 6.9 = τινι LYS. 2.21 DEMOSTH. 1.14 = ► *rar.* τινος ALEXIS 130.7 || *with ὅ* with the fact that OD. 21.289 || ► *with ὅτι* that THUC. 6.36.4 etc.; οὐκ ἀγαπῶντες ὅτι not content to LUC. 52.3 || ► *with εἰ* if PLAT. *Rp.* 450a etc. = ἐάν PLAT. *Rp.* 330b = ► ἦν ARISTOPH. *Ve.* 684 etc. | ► *with ptc.* ISOCR. 12.8; τιμῶμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν they are satisfied to be honored PLAT. *Rp.* 475b || ► *with inf.* ISOCR. 18.50 DEMOSTH. 55.19 etc. | *abs.* LYCURG. 73 etc. [C] **to persuade, entreat** VT. *Chr.* 2.18.2 • **passive** **to be treated with affection** PIND. *I.* 6.70 || **to be loved** PLAT. *Pol.* 301d DEMOSTH. 61.9 | λιθίδια τὰ ἀγαπώμενα precious stones PLAT. *Phaed.* 110d • *Dor. inf.* ἀγαπῆν METOP. (STOB. 3.1.110) || *impf.* ἡγάπευν LEON. (AP. 7.664.4) || *ep. aor.* ἀγάπησα. ἀγάπη -ης, ἡ [ἀγαπάω] [A] **love, affection, charity** VT. *Eccl.* 9.1, *al.* | *of God and for God* PHIL². *Deus* 69 NT. *Lu.* 11.42, *Cor.* 2.5.14 etc. | *fraternal* NT. *Cor.* 1.13.1 || **charity, alms** PGEN. 14.7 (IV-V^p) [B] **brotherly meal, Christian agape, eucharistic feast (gener. pl.)** NT. *Eph.* 2.2.13 etc. [C] *your Love, honorific title* GREG¹. *epist.* 19.3 etc. ἀγάπημα -ατος, τό [ἀγαπάω] **object of affection, joy, delight** AXION. 4.6 LYR. *Al.* 24 etc. ἀγαπήνωρ -ορος [ἀγαπάω, ἀνήρ] *virile, epith. of heroes* IL. 8.114 etc.

Ἀγαπήνωρ -ορος, ὁ Agapenor, male name IL. 2.609 etc.

ἀγάπησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαπάω] **affection, joy** PLAT.

Def. 413b ARISTOT. *Metaph.* 980a 22 PLUT. *Per.* 24.7

ἀγαπησμός -ου, ὁ [ἀγαπάω] MEN. *fr.* 387, see ἀγάπησις.

ἀγαπητέος -α -ον [ἀγαπάω] *verb. adj.* **to be loved** PLAT. *Rp.* 358a

ἀγαπητικός -ῆ -ὄν [ἀγαπάω] [A] **affectionate, tender, loving, fond** PLUT. *Sol.* 7.3 MAUR. 1.13; τοῦ ἐνός ὄντως θεοῦ ἄ. loving the one and only true God CLEM. *Str.* 7.11.68.3 etc. || *subst.* τὸ ἀγαπητικὸν **faculty or capacity of loving** BAS. *Is.* 19 [B] **relating to charity, love** CLEM. *Str.* 4.18.113.5 etc. ♦ *adv.* ἀγαπητικῶς affectionately PHIL². *Migr.* 169 etc. | **lovingly, charitably** CLEM. *Paed.* 1.3.9.1 etc.

ἀγαπητός -ῆ -ὄν [ἀγαπάω] [A] **loved, dear, desirable, of pers. and of things** IL. 6.401 OD. 2.365 PLAT. *Alc.* 131e DEMOSTH. 21.165; τὸ ἄ. object of desire ARISTOT. *Rh.* 1365b 16 THEOCR. 15.149; ἀδελφε ἀγαπητὸν dear brother VT. *Tob.* 10.13 | *often as an epistolary term of address* NT. *Rom.* 12.19 etc. || **dearest** NT. *Mat.* 3.17 etc. [B] **agreeable, to be acquiesced in** AND. 3.22 etc.; ἀγαπητόν (ἐστί) εἰ or ἐάν one must be content if PLAT. *Prot.* 328b XEN. *Oec.* 8.16 = ► *with inf.* DEMOSTH. 18.220 ARISTOT. *EN.* 1171a 20 || *superl.* -ότατος ♦ *adv.* ἀγαπητικῶς satisfyingly, gladly PLAT. *Leg.* 735d DEMOSTH. 19.219 ACH. 8.18.4 || **hardly sufficiently, hardly, barely** PLAT. *Lys.* 218c; ἀγαπητῶς ὀλίγω πρότερον σεσωσμένους ἐφ' ἕτερον κίνδυνον ἵέναι after having barely escaped one danger a little earlier, to face another LYS. 16.16 • *Dor.* -ᾰτός PIND. *fr.* 193.2.

ἀγαπώντως [ἀγαπάω] PLAT. *Leg.* 735d NUM¹. (EUS¹. *PE.* 14.5.4), see ἀγαπητός.

Ἀγάρ (and Ἀγάρ), ἡ indecl. Hagar, female name VT. *Gen.* 16.1 NT. *Gal.* 4.24 etc.

Ἀγαρηνός -ου, ὁ [Ἀγάρ] **descendant of Agar** VT. *Chr.* 1.5.19, *al.*

Ἀγαρία -ας, ἡ Agaria, region of Sarmatia DIOSC². 3.1.2

ἀγάρικόν -ου, τό [Ἀγαρία] **agoric, several varieties of fungi** DIOSC². 3.1.1, *al.* GAL. 11.813, 14.39, 96, *al.* AL⁶. *Febr.* 5 (1.381.11), *al.* • ἀγ- or ἀγ- GAL. *ll.* cc.

Ἀγαρίς -εως, ὁ Agaris, male name IIG 5.1.1303.1 etc.

Ἀγαρίστη -ης, ἡ Agariste, female name HDT. 6.131.2 PLUT. *Per.* 3.2 etc.

Ἀγάριστος -ου, ὁ Agaristos, male name ISEG 10.464 (V^a) etc.

Ἀγαροί -ων, οἱ [see Ἀγαρία] Agaroi, inhabit. of Agaria APP. 12.400.2

Ἀγαρρα or Ἀγάρρα, ἡ Agarra, city in India PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 6.3.5

Ἀγαρρικός -ῆ -ὄν of Agarra (see Ἀγαρρα) CRINAG. (AP. 9.430.1)

ἀγαρρίς, ἡ [ἀγείρω] **meeting** IIG 14.759.12 HSCH ἀγάρροος -οον, *contr.* ἀγάρρους -ορον [ἀγα-, ῥέω] **violently flowing, sea** IL. 2.845 HOM. 2.34 etc. ἀγασθενής -ές [ἀγα-, σθένος] **very strong** OPP¹. 2.3 etc.

Ἀγασθένης -ους, ὁ Agasthenes, male name (myth.) IL. 2.624 etc.

Ἀγασίας -ου, ὁ Agasias, male name XEN. *An.* 4.1.18 (v.l.) PLUT. *Arist.* 13.3 etc.

Ἀγασικλῆς, *contr.* Ἀγασικλῆς -έους, ὁ Agasikleës, male name HDT. 1.144 etc.

ἀγασίς, ἡ [ἀγαμαι] **rejoicing** L. *EM.* 9.52 || **envy** HSCH

ἀγασμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαμαι] **object of veneration** SOPH. *fr.* 971

ἀγαστάχους -υ [ἀγα-, στάχους] **with abundant ears** GREG. *Carm.* 2.2.4.45

ἀγαστωνός -ον [ἀγα-, στένω] [A] **roaring loudly, of the sea** OD. 12.97 etc. [B] **much-lamenting**

AESCHL. *Sept.* 99 AP. 14.123.3 NONN. *D.* 46.207 || **lamentable** NAUM. (STOB. 4.22.32)
 ἀγαστός -ή -όν [ἀγαμαι] **A** **worthy of admiration, admirable** AESCHL. *fr.* 268 XEN. *Hel.* 2.3.56, *An.* 1.9.24 PLUT. *Aem.* 22.6 etc. **B** **lovable, dear** ▶ *with dat.*: οὐκέτι μοι βίος ἀγαστός ἐν φάει life in the light of the sun is no longer dear to me EUR. *Hec.* 168 ◆ **adv.** ἀγαστῶς **admirably** XEN. *Ag.* 1.24 ◆ *Hom.* ἀγῆτος (see).
 Ἀγαστροφος -ου, ὁ Agastrophos, female name IL. 11.338
 1. ἀγάστωρ -ορος [ἀ-, γαστήρ] **born from the same womb, kindred, consanguine** LYC. 264
 2. ἀγάστωρ -ορος [ἀ- 1, γαστήρ] **fasting** GREG. *Carm.* 2.2.5.148
 ἀγασυλλίς -ιδος, ἡ bot. *ferula* DIOSC². 3.84
 ἀγασυρτος -ου [ἀγα-, συρτός] **dirty** (doub.) ALC. 429
 ἀγᾶτος *Dor.* THEOCR. 1.126.7 (v.l.), see ἀγῆτος ◆ ἀγᾶτον *f.l.* for ἐρατόν HOM. 3.515.
 Ἀγαυή -ης, ἡ *Agave, Nereid* IL. 18.42 etc. ◆ *Dor.* -ά || **according to some, accented** Ἀγαυή, cf. SCH. IL. 9.150.
 Ἀγαυός -ου, ὁ Agauos, male name DEMOSTH. 23.202
 ἀγανός -ή -όν [ἀγαμαι] **A** **of pers. illustrious, noble** IL. 3.268, al. OD. 11.213, al. SAPPH. 21.10 PIND. *P.* 4.72 AESCHL. *Pers.* 986 (unique in trag.) etc. **B** **of things splendid, magnificent** HOM. 4.442 ARAT. 71 (v.l.) etc. || **superl.** -ότατος.
 ἀγαυριάμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαυρίαμαι] **pride** VT. *Is.* 62.7, al. etc.
 ἀγαυρίαμαι, *contr.* [ἀγαυρός] **to be proud** VT. *Iob* 3.14 (impf. *pl.* ἡγαυριώντο) | *later act.* EUS¹. *Is.* 2.32 HSch. etc.
 ἀγαυρισμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαυρός] **wrestling** EUSTATH. 1444.8
 ἀγαυρός -ά -όν [see γαυρός] **majestic, proud, splendid** HES. *Th.* 832 || **superl. neut.** -ότατον NIC. *Th.* 832 | **superl. adv. neut. pl.** ἀγαυρότατα **with great splendor** HDT. 7.57.1
 ἀγάφθεγκτος -ον [ἀγα-, φθέγγομαι] **much resounding** PIND. *O.* 6.91
 ἀγάω, *contr.* [ἀγαμαι] **1** **active to admire, only** ALCM. 129, see ἀγάω **2** **middle A** **to admire, marvel at** OD. 16.203 **B** **to be jealous, envy** ▶ *with acc. HES.* *Th.* 619; ▶ *with dat. and inf.* OD. 5.119 **C** **to be angry, be irritated** HES. *fr.* 30.12; ▶ *τινι* with s.o. OD. 5.122 ◆ *ep. pres. mid.* 2. *pl.* ἀγάσθε | *inf. mid.* ἀγάσθαι | *ptc. mid.* ἀγόμενος || *impf.* 3. *sg.* ἀγάτο HES. *fr.* 30.12 | *ep. mid.* 2. *pl.* ἡγάσθε || *Lesb. aor. opt. mid.* 3. *sg.* ἀγήσαιτο ALC. 310.
 Ἀγβαλος -ου, ὁ Agbalos, male name HDT. 7.98
 Ἀγβάτανα -ων, τά HDT. 1.98 etc., see Ἐκβάτανα.
 Ἀγβάτας, ὁ Agbatas, male name AESCHL. *Pers.* 961
 Ἀγγαῖσοι -ων, οἱ Angaisoi, *Italic people* LYC. 1058
 ἀγγαρα, τά [ἀγγαρος] **daily stage, of couriers** L. *EM.* 7.17
 ἀγγαρ(ε)ία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγαρος] **enlistment for public service** IOGIS 665.21 (IP) ARR. *Epict.* 4.1.79 COD. *Iust.* 12.37.19 HSch. || *pl.* courier service *ISYLL*³. 880.53 (IIIP)
 ἀγγαρευτής -ου, ὁ [ἀγγαρεύω] **act. recruiter** HSch. || *pass.* **recruit, laborer** PPSI 200.2 (VIP)
 ἀγγαρεύω [ἀγγαρος] *Byz. impf.* ἡγγάρευον || *fut.* ἀγγαρεύω NT. *Mat.* 5.41 || *aor.* ἡγγάρευσα || *aor. ptc.* **pass.** ἀγγαρευθείς **1** **active to press into service** PPSI 1401.9 (IIa) | *fig.* **to compel, force** NT. *Mat.* 27.32, al. **2** **passive to be enlisted** MEN. *fr.* 373 | *fig.* **to be constrained** PROCL¹. *Arc.* 13.29
 ἀγγαρήιον -ου, τό [ἀγγαρος] **postal service** HDT. 8.98.2

ἀγγαρήιος -ου, ὁ [ἀγγαρος] *Ion.* **courier** = ἀγγαρος *doub.* HDT. 3.126.2 (v.l.: ἀγγελιφόρον).
 ἀγγαριικός -ή -όν [ἀγγαρος] **relating to the postal service** PCAIR.PREIS. 33.6 (IVP) (*conject.*), see ἀγγαρήιος.
 ἀγγᾶρος -ον **A** **subst.** ὁ ἀγγαρος **mounted courier, for the postal service** XEN. *Cyr.* 8.6.17 etc. || *fig.* **messenger, courier, used of a beacon fire** AESCHL. *Ag.* 282 || **postal, of mules** LIB. *Or.* 18.143 **B** *derog. of pers.* **stupid** MEN. *fr.* 186, 349 L. *Sud* ἀγγαροφορέω, *contr.* [ἀγγαρος, φέρω] **to be a messenger** PROCL¹. *Arc.* 30.16, al. || **to toil** MEN. *fr.* 353
 ἀγγεῖδιον -ου, τό [ἀγγεῖον] **small vessel** THPHR. *HP.* 9.6.4 (pl) HERO *Pn.* 1.6. etc. || *anat.* **gall bladder** RUF. *Anat.* 30
 ἀγγειολογία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγεῖον, λέγω] **treatment of blood vessels** ANTILL. *HLD*². (ORIB. 45.18.32) AET¹. 7.95 PAEG. 3.22.5, al.
 ἀγγεῖον -ου, τό [ἀγγος] **A** **vessel, container** HDT. 1.188.2, al. THUC. 4.4.2 PLAT. *Pol.* 287e XEN. *An.* 6.4.23 PLUT. *Lys.* 16.2 VT. *Reg.* 1.25.18, al. NT. *Mat.* 25.4 etc. || **extens.** **reservoir** PLAT. *Leg.* 845e, *Criti.* 111a (hollow of the sea-bed) XEN. *Oec.* 9.2 | **wardrobe** PLUT. *Alex.* 22.10 | **chicken coop** PLUT. *TG.* 17.1 | **sarcophagus** IIG 12.2.494 etc. **B** *med.* **blood vessel, artery, vein** HP. *Morb.* 4.37, *Epid.* 6.3.1 ERASISTR. 161.9, al. | **cavity, covering, of an organ** SOR. 1.33.5 etc. | *of the entire body* MAUR. 3.6 | **placenta** SOR. 1.57.2 || *bot.* **covering, capsule, of a plant** THPHR. *HP.* 1.11.1 ◆ *Ion.* ἀγγήιον | *also* ἀγγίον, ἀγγίον in *pap.*
 ἀγγειοτομία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγεῖον, τέμνω] **cutting of a vein** PAEG. 6.31.2
 ἀγγειουργός, ὁ [ἀγγεῖον, ἔργον] **potter** IIG 2².1576.69 (IVa)
 ἀγγειώδης -ες [ἀγγεῖον] **in the shape of a vessel, hollow** ARISTOT. *PA.* 671a 23 MAUR. 10.38.2 etc.
 ἀγγελία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγελος] **A** **news, message** ▶ **τινος** about s.o. or sthg. OD. 1.408, al. THUC. 8.15.1 etc.; ἐμήν ... λυγρὴν ἀγγελίην sorrowful news concerning me IL. 19.337; οἶαν ἐδήλωσας ἀνέρος αἰθῶνος ἀγγελίαν news of the fiery warrior have you revealed SOPH. *Ai.* 222 | ▶ *with* ὅτι: ἀ. τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστᾶσι news about the cities: namely, that they revolted THUC. 1.61.1; ἤκουσεν τὴν ἀ. ὅτι ἐλήμφθη ἡ κιβωτός he heard the news that the ark (of the covenant) was taken VT. *Reg.* 1.4.19 | ἀγγελίην φέρειν to bring news IL. 15.174; φάτο δ' ἀγγελίην he reported a message IL. 18.17 = ἀ. ἀπέειπε IL. 7.416 | ▶ *with verbs of motion:* ἀγγελίην ἐλθεῖν to come to deliver message, to bring tidings IL. 11.140 | *gener.* **τεν ἀγγελίης μετ' ἐμ' ἦλυθες**; have you come to bring me some news? IL. 13.252, see ἀγγελίης || *Christ. gospel message:* ἡ ἀγγελία ἣν ἀκηκόαμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ the message which we have heard from him NT. *Elo.* 1.1.5 etc. **B** **announcement, proclamation** PIND. *P.* 2.4 || **order, command** HOM. 2.448 PIND. *O.* 3.28 **C** **narration, description** AN. *Subl.* 43.3 **D** *personif.* Ἀγγελία, ἡ **Fame, Report** PIND. *O.* 8.82 ◆ *ep. Ion.* -ίη.
 ἀγγελίαρχος -ου, ὁ [ἀγγελος, ἀρχω] **head of the angels** AGATH. (AP. 1.34.1)
 ἀγγελιαφόρος -ον [ἀγγελία, φέρω] **messenger** HDT. 1.120.2 ARISTOT. *Mund.* 398a 31 etc. || **king's chamberlain, in Persia** HDT. 3.118.2 || **military courier** DCASS. 78.15.1, 79.39.3 ◆ *Ion.* ἀγγελιφόρος.
 ἀγγελίη, ἀγγελιηφ- *Ion.* see ἀγγελία, ἀγγελιαφ-.
 ἀγγελίης, ὁ [ἀγγελος] **messenger** ANTIP². (AP. 6.198.2) ◆ *proper. gen. sg.*, see ἀγγελία in IL. 3.206 (but as *nom. masc. in Sch.*), 13.252, 15.640.
 ἀγγελικός -ή -όν [ἀγγελος] **A** **of a messenger, conveying information** PHRYN². *SP.* p. 45 [GAL.]

Def. 19.378 etc. **B** **angelic** BAS. *Asc.* 1.2 GREG. *Or.* 38.9.5 PROCL. in *Tim.* 1.341.16, al. etc. || *subst.* οἱ ἀγγελοὶ **Angelic, Christ. sect** EPIPH. *Haer.* 60.1.1 **C** *prob.* **sacred to Artemis** *Angela*: ὀρχησις dance, at Syracuse ATH. 14.629e etc., cf. ἀγγελος, ἡ ◆ *adv.* ἀγγελικῶς **angelically, like an angel** PROCL. in *Tim.* 3.192.27 ORIG. *Io.* 13.7.41, al.
 ἀγγελιτέω ICRET. 44.146.4 (IVa), see ἀγγέλλω.
 ἀγγελιώτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγγέλλω] **messenger** HOM. 4.296 CALLIM. *H.* 1.68
 ἀγγελιώτις -ιδος, ἡ [ἀγγέλλω] **female messenger** CALLIM. *H.* 4.216
 ἀγγέλλω [ἀγγελος] *impf.* ἡγγέλλον, *mid. pass.* ἡγγελλόμεν || *fut.* ἀγγελῶ || *aor*¹. ἡγγελα, *mid.* ἡγγελάμεν in *compd.* || *pf.* ἡγγελα, *mid. pass.* ἡγγελμαι || *ppf.* *mid. pass.* ἡγγελέμεν || *aor. pass.* ἡγγέλεθν *later aor*². ἡγγέλην || *fut. pass.* ἀγγελεθήσμαι GAL. 16.699, *later* ἀγγελήσμαι in *compd.*
 1 **active A** **to bear a message, bring news** IL. 8.409; ▶ *τινι* to s.o. OD. 4.24, al. | *with inf.* IL. 8.517 OD. 16.350 || ▶ **abs.** **to bring news** ▶ *τινα* of s.o. OD. 14.120 = ▶ **repert.** **τινος** SOPH. *El.* 1111 **B** *gener.* **to announce, report, bring news** ▶ *τι* sthg. ION 8a TrGF, al.; ▶ *τί* *τινι* (of) sthg. to s.o. IL. 15.159, al. THUC. 8.74.3 etc. = ▶ *τι* *πρός* *τινα* XEN. *An.* 1.7.13 etc. | *prov.* οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγέλλεις you're not announcing war, i.e., that is good news PLAT. *Phaedr.* 242b, al. || ▶ *with* ὅτι that IL. 22.439 = ὡς EUR. *IT.* 704 DEMOSTH. 18.169; ἀγγελε ... ὁδοῦνεκα τέθηγκ' Ὀρέστης announce that Orestes has died SOPH. *El.* 47 || ▶ *with ptc.* Κύρον ἐπιστρατεύοντα ... ἡγγελα I announced that Cyrus was undertaking an expedition XEN. *An.* 2.3.19 | *with* *ως* and *ptc.* ἡγγελας ὡς τεθηγκότα you announced that I was dead SOPH. *El.* 1341 2 **middle (only pres.)** **to announce oneself:** Τεύκρω ἀγγέλλομαι εἶναι φίλος I announce that I am a friend of Teukros SOPH. *Ai.* 1376 3 **passive to be announced, be reported** THUC. 6.34.7; τὸ δ' αὖ λαν παρεῖλες ἀγγελεῖσά μοι γενναῖος but the report of your noble comportment has reduced the excess (of my grief), to EUR. *Hec.* 591 || ▶ *with ptc.* THUC. 3.16.2 XEN. *Hel.* 4.3.13; ζῶν ἢ θανόν ἀγγέλλεται; is there word whether he is living or dead SOPH. *Tr.* 73 | ▶ *with inf.* PLAT. *Ch.* 153b | *with* ὅτι that XEN. *Hel.* 1.1.27 ◆ *iter. impf.* ἀγγέλλεσκον HSch. || *fut. Ion.* ἀγγελέω || *aor*². (παρ)ἡγγελον *later* *doub.* || *ppf.* *mid. pass.* 3. *sg.* ἀγγελετο v.l. in HDT. 7.37.1.
 ἀγγελα -ατος, τό [ἀγγέλλω] **news, message** EUR. *Or.* 876 etc.
 ἀγγελοδείκτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγγελος, δείκτης] **revealer of angels** PPGM 4.1374
 ἀγγελοειδής -ές [ἀγγελος, εἶδος] **similar to an angel, angelic** GREG¹. *VEphr.* 46.840A DION²¹. *CH.* 145B, al. etc.
 ἀγγελόσεις -εσσα -εν ICRET. 2 XXIV 13.7 (IVP), see ἀγγελικός.
 ἀγγελοθεσία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγελος, τίθημι] **condition of an angel, angelic condition** CLEM. *Str.* 7.2.9.3, al.
 ἀγγελομαρτύρητος -ον [ἀγγελος, μαρτυρέω] **testified by the angels** [Io.] *Ador.* 11.824B
 ἀγγελομιμήτος -ον [ἀγγελος, μιμέομαι] **imitating the angels** MAX². *SchDion.* *DN.* 4.204B etc. ◆ *adv.* ἀγγελομιμητῶς in imitation of the angels, similarly to the angels DION²¹. *DN.* 1.5
 ἀγγελοπλήρωτος -ον [ἀγγελος, πληρόω] **full of angels** TIMOTH³. *NatBapt.* 1 (29.808D)
 ἀγγελοπρεπής -ές [ἀγγελος, πρέπω] **suiting the angels** DION²¹. *DN.* 1.5, al. etc. ◆ *adv.* ἀγγελοπρεπῶς as suiting a messenger DION²¹. *CH.* 181D || **like the angels** DION²¹. *epist.* 10
 ἀγγελοπρεπῶς *adv.*, see ἀγγελοπρεπής.
 ἀγγελος -ου, ὁ, ἡ **A** **messenger, emissary, envoy**

IL. 1.334, *al.* XEN. *An.* 1.2.21 *etc.*; δι' ἄγγέλων through messengers AESCHN. 3.95 | **female messenger** IL. 24.561; *epith.* of *Iris* IL. 2.786, 3.121, *al.* | *of birds of augury* IL. 24.292, *al.* PLUT. 25.405d | ► *with gen.* ὁ πρῶτος νύχιος ἄγγελος πυρός the first nocturnal messenger of fire (*fig.*) AESCHL. *Ag.* 558; ἄγγελον κακῶν ἐπῶν messenger of bad news SOPH. *Ant.* 277; ἄγγελον γλώσσαν λόγων tongue, messenger of words EUR. *Suppl.* 203 [B] angel VT. *Gen.* 28.12, *al.* NT. *Mat.* 1.24, *al.* ORIG. *Cels.* 5.4.3 *etc.* | *philos.* semi-divine being IUL. 4.141b IAMB¹. *Myst.* 2.6 *etc.* • *neut. pl.* ἄγγελα NONN. *D.* 34.226.

*Ἄγγελος -ου, ὁ Angelos PLUT. *Pyr.* 2.1 | *fem.* Ἄγγε-λος Messenger, *epith.* of Artemis at Syracuse HSCH

ἄγγελότης -ητος, ἡ [ἄγγελος] being an angel [ATHANAS.] *Def.* 1.8 (PG 28.540A).

ἄγγελτήρ -ήρος, ὁ [ἀγγέλλω] OR. *Sib.* 2.214, *al.* *etc.*, see ἄγγελος.

ἄγγελτικός -ή -όν [ἀγγέλλω] announcing, pre-monitory PORPH. *Abst.* 3.3 *etc.*

ἄγγέλτρια -ας, ἡ [ἀγγέλλω] female messenger OR. *Sib.* 8.117 • *v.l.* ἄγγέλτρια ORPH. *H.* 78.3 (*doub.*).

Ἀγγελιδας -α, ὁ Angenidas, Spartan XEN. *Hel.* 2.3.10

Ἀγγήιον, τό Ion. see ἄγγειον.

Ἀγγίτης -ου, ὁ Angites, river in Macedonia HDT. 7.13.2

ἄγγοθήκη -ης, ἡ [ἄγγο, θήκη] receptacle for vessels ATH. 5.210C

ἄγγος -εος, *contr.* -ους, τό [A] gener. vessel, container, for liquids IL. 16.643 OD. 16.13 | *thus* vat HES. *Op.* 613, *al.* | pitcher HDT. 5.12.2 *etc.* | bucket HDT. 4.62.3 | cup, bowl EUR. *IT.* 953, 960 [B] chest, casket, coffin SOPH. *Tr.* 622 | for fish NT. *Mat.* 13.48 | basket HDT. 1.113.1 EUR. *Ion.* 32, 1337 | *funerary urn* SOPH. *El.* 1118, 1205 [C] *analog.* of the body uterus HP. *Epid.* 6.5.11 *etc.* | of the stomach τρόφιμον ἄ. nourishing vessel TIMOTH. 15.73 | cell, in honeycomb DIOD³. (AP. 9.226.5) [D] covering, shell, of the crab OPP. 2.406

ἄγγοςθε [ἄγγος] *adv.* in the vessel, of the clepsydra EMPED. B 100.12

ἄγγουριον and ἄγγουρον -ου, τό watermelon AN. *Med.* (PhMG 2.323.13) *al.*, *etc.*

*Ἄγγουρον -ου, τό Angouron, mountain on the Ister AP. 4.323

Ἀγγουστία Angoustia, city in Dacia PROL⁴. *Geog.* 3.8.7

ἄγγρεσις -ιος, ἡ inclination, choice, *Thess.* for ἀίρεσις IBCH 59.56

ἄγγριζω [see ἀγγρίζω] *aor.* ἡγγρισα ROM¹. 3.17.8; to irritate VT. (Sym.) *Prov.* 15.18 (*conject.* ἀγγρίζω, see) HSCH. L. EM

ἄγγρις L. *Sud.*, see ἄγγρισμός.

ἄγγρισμός -ου, ὁ [ἀγγρίζω] irritation GLOSS
ἄγγριστής -ου, ὁ [ἀγγρίζω] one who irritates GLOSS

*Ἄγγρος -ου, ὁ Angros, river in Illyria HDT. 4.49.2 ἄγγροφά, ἡ IIG 4².103.140 (IV^a), see ἀναγραφή.

ἄγγροφύς see ἀναγραφεύς.

ἄγγων -ωνος, ὁ javelin AGATH. 2.5

ἄγδαβᾶτης -ου, ὁ member of a Persian class AESCHL. *Pers.* 924 (*codd.*)

ἄγδην [ἄγω] *adv.* by carrying, by bringing LUC. 46.10

*Ἀγιδισίς, ἡ Phrygian title of Kybele MEN. *Th. fr.* *dub.* 20 (*Ἀγιδισί) Str 10.3.12 (*Ἀγιδισί) ISEG 36.1201 (ca. 200^p) (*dat.*) *etc.*

1. ἄγε, ἄγετε *pres. imper. act. 2. sg. and pl.*, see ἄγω | *as an exhortation come on!*, let's go! *sg.* ἄγε, often *strengthened*. ἀλλ' ἄγε, εἰ δ' ἄγε, ἄγε δὴ, νῦν δ' ἄγε, Att. ἄγε νυν | ► *with another imper. 2. sg. or pl.* εἴπ' ἄγε come now, speak! IL. 3.192; ἄγε

τάμνετε come on, cut! OD. 3.332 | *rar. 3. pl.* IL. 2.437 | ► *with subj. rar. 1. sg.* OD. 13.215, *esp. 1. and 2. pl.* IL. 3.441, 11.348 AESCHL. *Pers.* 140, *Eum.* 307 XEN. *Cyr.* 5.5.15 | ► *with ὅπως and fut.* ARISTOPH. *Nub.* 489 PLUT. 11.135d | *abs.* EUR. *Cycl.* 590 | ► *with ptc.* PLUT. *Aem.* 31.10 | *pl.* ἄγετε, *strengthened*. ἀλλ' ἄγετε *common*. | ► *with another imper. 2. sg.* AESCHL. *Ch.* 803 | ► *with subj. rar. 1. sg.* OD. 22.139, *esp. 1. pl.* IL. 2.139 OD. 1.76 *etc.*

2. ἄγε *impf. ind. act. 3. sg. poet.* see ἄγω.

ἄγε *impf. ind. act. 3. sg. Dor.* see ἄγω.

*Ἀγεάναξ -ακτος, ὁ Ageanax, male name THEOCR. 7.52, *al.*

ἀγέγωνος -ον [γεγωνός] speechless IGV 1279.1 (II-III^p)

ἄγεως -ον [γῆ] landless AESCHL. *Suppl.* 858 (*f.l.*) | Christ. beyond this world, celestial MACMGN. *Apocr.* 3.14

ἄγεισχα *pf. act.*, see ἄγω.

ἄγεiras CORIN. 1.iii.25, Boeot. for ἀγήρας • *acc.* -ρω.

ἄγεiras -ον [γέρας] poet. HDN. 2.269.4, see ἀγέραςτος.

ἄγειρω *impf.* ἡγειρον, *mid.* ἡγειρόμην | *fut.* ἀγερῶ, *later mid.* ἀγεροῦμαι | *aor.* ἡγειρα, *mid.* ἡγειράμην | *pf. act. in compd.* -αγγήρεχα, *mid. pass.* ἀγγήρεμαι | *ppf. mid. pass.* 3. sg. ἀγγήγερτο, 3. pl. ἀγγήγερατο | *aor. pass.* ἡγέρθην | *fut. pass.* ἀγερθήσομαι HSCH. ① *active* [A] to collect, gather, *with acc.* IL. 2.438, *al.* THUC. 1.9.1 XEN. *An.* 3.2.13 *etc.* | of things to collect, take provisions OD. 3.301, *al.* [B] to collect by begging, beg: ὡς ἂν πύρνα κατὰ μνηστῆρας ἀγείροι that he beg bits of bread from the suitors OD. 17.362; ὥσπερ τινὰ τῶν ἀγειρουσῶν like a beggar HLD. 7.7.6; *subst. ptc.* οἱ ἀγείροντες the beggars CELS. (ORIG. *Cels.* 1.50.10) | *abs.* to make a collection of money, for the gods AESCHL. *fr.* 168.16 HDT. 4.35.3 PLAT. *Rp.* 381d LUC. 42.13 | to go about begging PHILOSTR. *Ap.* 5.7 *etc.* [C] to bring together, accumulate arguments, in a speech τί τῶν δ' οὐκ ἐνδίκως ἀγείρω; which of these examples do I not justly gather? AESCHL. *Ch.* 638 [D] to knit one's brows PL. (AP. 5.300.1) ② *middle* to collect, by begging: ἀγειρόμενοι κατὰ δῆμον gathering among the people OD. 13.14 ③ *passive* to gather, assemble IL. 2.52, *al.* OD. 2.8, *al.* • *rare in prose* | *pres. Aeol.* ἀγέρρω | *imper. 3. pl.* ἀγειρόντων | *poet. impf.* ἀγειρον | *aor.* ἡγειρα, *ep.* ἀγερῶ, *aor.* ἡγειρα, *ep. mid.* 3. sg. ἡγερτο (v.l. ἔγερτο IL. 7.434, 24.789), 3. pl. ἀγέροντο (pass. IL. 18.245) | *inf.* ἀγέρεσθαι (or *pres.* ἀγέρεσθαι OD. 2.385, cf. ἀγέρονται AP. 3.895) | *ptc.* ἀγρόμενος | *aor. pass.* 3. pl. ep. ἡγερθεν, ἀγερθεν.

ἄγεισωτος -ον [γείσων] without a cornice L. EM. 8.55

ἄγεitων -ον [γεitων] neighborless, solitary EUR. *El.* 1130: οὕτως ἀγεitων οἶκος ἵδρυται φίλων; is this house so deprived of neighbors and friends?

AESCHL. *Pr.* 270 (*conject.*); οὐκ ἀφίλον οὐδ' ἀγείτονα not without friends nor neighborless PLUT. 26.423d • *gen.* -ονος.

*Ἀγελάα, ἡ Agelaa, *epith.* of Athena, ISEG 21.527.90 (IV^a), see ἀγελείη.

*Ἀγελᾶδης -α, ὁ Ageladas, male name AP. 16.220.3 *etc.*

*Ἀγελᾶδης -ου, ὁ Hagelades, male name POSIDIP¹. *PMil.* 10.10 • Dor. -δας ICEG 380 (V^a) *etc.*

ἄγελαδόν Dor. *adv.* THEOCR. 16.92 (v.l.), see ἀγελή-δόν.

ἄγελάζω [ἀγέλη] *aor. inf.* ἀγελᾶσαι HSCH. ① *active* to guard the flock, pasture APOLLIN². *MetPs.* 77.158 ② *middle* to live in a flock, flock ARISTOT. *HA.* 597b 7, 610b 2 *etc.*

ἀγελαιαστός -ον [ἀγελαιός] common EUDEM³. 3.23

ἀγελαιοκομικός -ή -όν [ἀγελαιοκόμος] pertaining to cattle breeding | *subst.* ἡ ἀγελαιοκομική (sc. τέχνη) cattle raising PLAT. *Pol.* 275e, *al.*

ἀγελαιοκόμος -ου, ὁ [ἀγελαιός, κομέω] keeper of cattle, herder PALL. *Io.* 4.77 (*mss.* ἀγελοκόμων).

ἀγελαιός -α -ον [ἀγέλη] [A] belonging to a herd, grazing freely, of oxen IL. 11.729 OD. 10.410 SOPH. *Al.* 175; *subst.* αἱ ἀγελᾶιαι those grazing freely: αἱ αὖ τῶν ἱππων broodmares XEN. *Hip.* 5.8 [B] in herds, in flocks, gathered in a group: ἄ. ἱχθύες fish that live in schools HDT. 2.93.1 | of pers. τοὺς συναχθέντας ἀγελαιούς ὄχλους the crowds that had gathered in a group VT. *Mac.* 2.14.23 | *subst.* τὰ ἀγελᾶια cattle, animals that live in herds PLAT. *Pol.* 264d ARISTOT. *HA.* 487b 34 (*opp.* τὰ μοναδικά), *Pol.* 1256a 23 (*opp.* τὰ σποραδικά)

[C] gregarious, ordinary, common, vulgar, of pers. PLAT. *Pol.* 268a (*opp.* τὰ ἄρχοντες) ISOCR. 12.18 | of things EUR. 374 PLAT¹. 76 *etc.*

ἀγελαιοτροφία -ας, ἡ [ἀγελαιοτρόφος] keeping of herds PLAT. *Pol.* 261e

ἀγελαιοτροφικός -ή -όν [ἀγελαιοτροφία] pertaining to the keeping of herds: *subst.* ἡ ἀγελαιο-τροφική (sc. τέχνη) raising herds PLAT. *Pol.* 261e

ἀγελαιοτρόφος -ον [ἀγέλη, τρέφω] keeper of herds MAX¹. 26.6, *al.*

ἀγελαιών -ώνος, ὁ [ἀγελαιός] place for herds, pasture L. *Sud*

ἀγέλαοι -ων, οἱ [ἀγέλη] members of an ἀγέλη, band of youths on Crete ICRET. 1 IX 1.11 (III-II^a)

Ἀγέλαος -ου, ὁ Agelaos, male name IL. 8.257, *al.* *etc.* • *ep. Ion.* -εως.

ἀγέλαρχεω, *contr.* [ἀγέλαρχης] to lead a herd PHIL². *Somm.* 2.153 | *fig.* τῶν παλλακίδων τὴν ἀγελάρχουσαν she in charge of his concubines PLUT. *Galb.* 17.7 | to hold the office of ἀγελάρχης IXANTH. 21.5 (*aor. ptc.* ἀγελάρχης).

ἀγελάρχης -ου, ὁ [ἀγέλη, ἄρχω] leader of a flock, group leader, captain LUC. 49.22 PLUT. *Rom.* 6.4 LONG. 2.31.2 *etc.* | Christ., of spiritual guides EUS¹. DE. 4.6.9 (angels) *etc.*

ἀγελάρχης -εως, ἡ [ἀγελάρχέω] command, leading of the flock (*fig.*) PHIL². *Somm.* 1.255

ἀγελαρχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγελάρχης] leadership of an ἀγέλη (see) IIGR 3.648.15 *al.* (II^p) | command of a crowd DION²¹. CH. 137C

ἀγελαρχιανός -όν [ἀγελάρχης] of the leader of an ἀγέλη (see) IIGR 3.648.4 (II^p)

ἀγελαρχικός -όν [ἀγελάρχης] of the leader PROCL. in *Tim.* 1.467.29

ἀγελάρχος -ου, ὁ [ἀγελάρχης] PORPH. *ad Il.* 2.478, see ἀγελάρχης.

ἀγέλασμα -ατος, τό [ἀγελάζω] gathering, crowd PROCL. *Hym.* 7.44

ἀγέλαστέω, *contr.* [ἀγέλαστος] to not laugh HERACLIT⁴. 7.2.9 *etc.*

ἀγέλαστι [ἀγέλαστος] *adv.* without laughter PLAT. *Euthyd.* 278e *etc.*

ἀγελαστικός -ή -όν [ἀγέλη] living in flocks, in groups, social PHIL². *Dec.* 132, *Spec.* I 162 MAX¹. 21.7

ἀγέλαστος -ον [γελᾶω] [A] not laughing, serious, grave HOM. 2.200 VET. 72.19; ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα grim faces AESCHL. *Ag.* 794; ἡ ἄ. πέτρα the laughless rock, of Demeter at Eleusis APOLLOD⁷. 1.5.1; ἀγέλαστος ... καὶ σκυθρωπός with a severe, frowning look PLUT. *Cic.* 38.2 | *nickname* of Crassus CIC. *Fin.* 5.30 [B] not to be laughed at, dire: ἀγελάστοις ξυμφοραῖς πεπληγμένων struck by grave misfortunes AESCHL. *Ch.* 30

ἀγελάτας, ὁ [ἀγέλη] Dor. chief, overseer, of youths HERACL⁶. 15

ἀγελεία -ας, ἡ [ἀγελαιός] [A] mystical name of

the number seven [Iambl¹.] 42.30 [B] plunderer, epith. of Athena IL. 4.128 etc. • Ion. -εἰη.

Ἀγέλεως, ὁ Ion. see Ἀγέλαος.

Ἀγέλη -ης, ἡ Agele, daughter of Daphnis and Chloe LONG. 4.39.2

ἀγέλη -ης, ἡ [see ἄγω] [A] flock, herd, of oxen IL. 11.678, al. SOPH. OT. 26 XEN. Mem. 1.2.32 etc. | of horses IL. 19.281 | of swine HES. Sc. 168 NT. Mat. 8.30, al. | of camels VT. Is. 60.6 | of birds flock SOPH. Ai. 168 LONG. 2.3.5 | of fish school OPP. 3.639 | of pers. group PIND. fr. 112 VT. Mac. 4.5.4; ἀγέλαν ... τῶν μοινάδων troop of maenads EUR. Bac. 1022 | Christ. flock of the church ADAM¹. Dial. 2.22 etc. || fig. πόνων ἀγέλαι heaps of pains EUR. HF. 1276 || ἄστρων ἄ. the heavens SYN. H. 4.17 [B] band of youths, in Crete and Sparta PLUT. Lyc. 16.7 HERACL⁵. 15 etc. [C] pl. celestial spheres [Iambl¹.] 43.6

ἀγγελήθᾶ [ἀγέλη] adv. ARAT. 965, 1079, see ἀγγεληδόν.

ἀγγεληδόν [ἀγέλη] adv. in herds, in groups, en masse IL. 16.160 HDT. 2.93.1 etc. • Dor. -ᾶδόν THEOCR. 16.92.

ἀγέληθεν [ἀγέλη] adv. from a herd AP. 1.356, 406 ἀγελῆσις -ιδος, ἡ [ἀγελῆσις] [A] plunderer CORN. 20, see ἀγγελεῖα [B] NUM. (ATH. 7.327b), see ἀγγελαῖος.

ἀγγεληκόμος -ον [see ἀγγελαιοκόμος] keeping herds NONN. D. 47.208

ἀγγελημαῖος -ον [ἀγέλη] concerned with herds, thus vulgar MAC. Hom. 15.45, al.

ἀγγελήτης -ου [ἀγέλη] belonging to a herd (ox) L. Sud

ἀγγελητρόφος -ου, ὁ [see ἀγγελαιοτρόφος] horse-tender POLL. 1.181

ἀγέληφι [ἀγέλη] in the herd IL. 2.480, al., see ἀγέλη.

ἀγγερίζω [ἀγέλη] to aggregate GLOSS

ἀγγελικός -ή -όν [γελῶσις] of the flock PSB 4322.9 (IP) | gregarious BAS. Hex. 8.3 (172A)

ἀγγελαῖος -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγγερίζω] group, flock SCH. OPP¹. 1.240, see τὸ ἀγγελαῖον.

ἀγγελοῖος -ον [γελῶσις] not laughable: οὐκ ἀγγελοῖον ἐστ' ὥς it is perhaps not unfunny HE-NIOCH. 4.6 • adv. ἀγγελοῖως without laughing ARISTOPH. Ran. argum. 1

ἀγγελοκομικός -ή -όν [see ἀγγελαιοκομικός]: ἡ ἄ. (sc. τέχνη) leading to pasture CLEM. Str. 1.7.37.5

ἀγγελοκόμος PALL. Io. 4.77 (mss.), see ἀγγελαιοκόμος.

ἀγγελος -ου, ὁ [ἀγέλη] celestial spheres [Iambl¹.] 43.6 (cf. ἀγέλη).

ἀγγελοτροφ- later for ἀγγελαιοτροφ-.

Ἀγγελόχεια -ας, ἡ Agelochēia, female name HEGESIP¹. (AP. 6.266.1)

ἀγέμεν ep. pres. inf. act., see ἄγω.

ἀγέμιτος -ον [γεμίζω] not loaded (on board a ship) PAVROM. 1b 34 (1^a)

ἀγεμον-, ἀγεμών Dor. see ἡγεμν-.

ἄγεν aor. ind. pass. 3. pl. ep. see ἄγνυμι.

ἀγενεᾶλόγητος -ον [γενεαλογέω] without genealogy NT. Heb. 7.3 ORIG. Io. 1.4.21 etc.

ἀγένεια -ας, ἡ [ἀγενής] low birth ARISTOT. Pol. 1317b 40 • cf. ἀγένεια, with which it is sometimes confused.

ἀγένειος -ον [γένειον] [A] beardless: pl. οἱ ἄ. beardless youths, adolescent boys PIND. O. 8.54 ARISTOPH. Eq. 1373 PLAT. Leg. 833c PAUS. 6.6.3 etc. || of a thing puerile LUC. 21.29 [B] subst. neut. τὸ ἀγένειον lack of beard LUC. 47.9 • adv. ἀγενείως without a beard: ἄ. εἶχειν to be beardless PHILOSTR. VS. 1.8.1

ἀγενεσία -ας, ἡ [ἀγενής] uncreatedness, of the world [IUSTIN.] QuChr. 6.1445C, al. etc.

ἀγενής -ές [γίγνομαι] [A] unborn, uncreated PLAT.

Tim. 27c [B] of low birth, ignoble, base SOPH. fr. 84; τὰ ἀγενή τοῦ κόσμου the base things of the world NT. Cor. 1.1.28 || of things SCH. OD. 11.568 etc. [C] childless IS. (HARP.)

ἀγενησία -ας, ἡ [ἀγενήτος] uncreatedness SIMP. in Cael. 139.24

ἀγενητογενής -ές [ἀγενήτος, γίγνομαι] created without generation (of the Son) ARIUS (EPIPH. Haer. 69.6.3) (v.l. ἀγεννη-).

ἀγένητος [γίγνομαι] [A] unborn, unoriginated HERACLIT. B 5.1 PLAT. Phaedr. 245d ARISTOT. Cael. 281b 26, al. || Christ. theol. uncreated CLEM. Protr. 6.68.3 (of God) etc. [B] nonexistent, unreal AGATHO 5; τὸ γὰρ φανθὲν τίς ἂν δύναιτ' ἂν ἀγένητος ποιεῖν; who could make nonexistent what has already come to light? SOPH. Tr. 743; αἰτίαι ἄ. groundless charges AESCHN. 3.225 || not having happened, not done ISOCR. 20.8 • adv. ἀγενήτως without origin, without birth PLUT. 68.1015b SYR. in Metaph. 146.1 etc. | Christ. without creation EUS¹. DE. 5.1.19 etc.

ἀγένεια -ας, ἡ [cf. ἀγενής] [A] lack of nobility, meanness ARISTOT. VV. 1251b 16 PLUT. Comp. Demosth. Cic. 5.1 etc. [B] misery DIOD. 33.7.4 (v.l. ἀγένεια) • sometimes confused with ἀγένεια.

ἀγενής -ές [γέναν] low-born, not noble, lowly HDT. 1.134.1 (comp.) PLAT. Prot. 319d, al. ARISTOT. Pol. 1296b 22 etc. | of things ignoble, base, sordid HDT. 5.6.2 PLAT. Gorg. 465b, al. DEMOSTH. 21.152; ἄγριον ... βλάστημα καὶ ἀγεννές a wild weed PLUT. 38.529b | of style AN. Subl. 3.4 || compar. -έστερος | superl. -έστατος • adv. ἀγεννῶς vilely EUR. IA. 1457 MEN. Sam. 633 etc.; οὐκ ἄ. nobly PLAT. Ch. 158b, boldly PLAT. Phaedr. 246b

ἀγενησία -ας, ἡ [ἀγενήτος] unbegottenness CH. exc. 9 etc. || Christ. theol. uncreatedness: ἰδιον δὲ πατὴρς μὲν, ἡ ἀγενησία but particular to the Father is that he was not created GREG. Or. 25.16.29 etc.

ἀγενητογενής -ές v.l. for ἀγενη-.

ἀγέννητος -ον [γεννάω] [A] unborn, unbegotten, not having happened SOPH. OC. 973 PLAT. Tim. 52a; ποιεῖν ἀγέννητον to do what has not happened PLUT. 10.115a; ἀγεννήτοις ὅμοια things which resemble those never having happened PLUT. Cor. 38.1 | Christ. theol. uncreated, attribute of divinity CYR³. Cat. 11.13 etc. || nonexistent ARET. SD. 2.11 [B] new: ἀγέννητόν τι (καὶ ἀγνοούμενον) something which has ever been heard (or known), in music PLUT. 76.1135b [C] not noble, mean: καὶ ἀγενήτων even from the humble SOPH. Tr. 61 [D] not productive, sterile THPHR. CP. 6.10.1 • adv. ἀγενήτως Christ. without generation, of God GREG¹. Eun. 1.261.5 etc. (v.l. of ἀγενήτως), see • dual Dor. -ᾶτω.

ἀγεννία -ας, ἡ POL. 30.9.1 etc., see ἀγγένεια.

ἀγεννίζω [ἀγεννής] to act ignobly TEL. 6.4

ἀγεννῶς adv., see ἀγεννής.

ἀγέομαι Dor. see ἡγέομαι.

ἀγέραστος -ον [γέρας] unrewarded, not honored IL. 1.119 HES. Th. 395; τύμβον ἄ. tomb without offerings EUR. Hec. 115; ἄ. ἔχων δνομα having a name without honor EUR. Bac. 1378; with gen. θυῶν ἄ. without honor of sacrifices AP. 3.65 || lacking, with gen. PLUT. 63.976c, see ἀγείρατος.

ἀγερῆσθαι (or ἀγέρ-) aor². (pres.) ep. inf. mid. see ἀγείρω.

ἄγερθεν aor. ind. pass. 3. pl. ep., see ἀγείρω.

ἀγερμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγείρω] [A] collection, begging, mendicancy for the gods DION. 2.19.2 (v.l.) ATH. 8.360d POLL. 3.111 || fig. collection AEL. VH. 4.20 [B] recruitment, call to arms ARISTOT. Poët. 1451a 27

ἀγερμοσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγείρω] OPP¹. 4.251, see ἀγερ-σις.

ἀγέρομαι AP. 3.895 OPP. 3.378, later ep. for ἀγείρω (pass.) || only pres. deriv. from Hom. inf. ἀγέρεσθαι -έσθαι.

ἀγέροντο aor². ind. mid. 3. pl. ep., see ἀγείρω.

Ἀγεράνιος Aeol. for Ἀγριάνιος IIG 12.2.527.45

ἀγεροκύβηλις, ὁ [ἀγείρω, κύβηλις] mendicant priest CRATIN. 66

ἄγερσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγείρω] mustering, of an army HDT. 7.51.48

ἀγέρτας, ὁ [ἀγείρω] Dor. collector of duties IIG 14.423.1.35

ἀγερωπέω, contr. to hold dear, be concerned with HSCH. cf. L. EGud. EM

ἀγερώσσω [ἀγείρω] to keep watch HSCH. L. EGud ἀγεωρχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγέρωχος] [A] pride, arrogance SAPPH. 7.4 POL. 10.35.8 [CALLISTH.] 3.25 LONG. 2.4.2 etc. [B] festivity, revelry VT. Sal. 2.9 [C] pl. feats of mastery PHILOSTR. Ap. 2.28

ἀγέρωχος -ον [ἀ- cop., γέρας, ἔχω ?] [A] proud, high-minded, noble, of pers. IL. 3.36, al. OD. 11.286 BATR. 145 ICGE 200.1 (VI^a) etc. || of things PIND. N. 6.34 (deeds), O. 10.79 (victory) etc. || adv. neut. ἀγέρωχα proudly AP. 16.127.3 [B] arrogant, haughty, insolent ARCHIL. 261 ALC. 402 VT. Mac. 3.1.25 etc. | subst.: τὸ ἀγέρωχον τῆς ἡλικίας the cockiness of youth HLD. 7.8.5 | of an ass LUC. 39.40 | of things [Anacr.] 55.42 • adv. ἀγερώχως proudly, high-mindedly PLUT. 2.8.7, al. ANYT. (AP. 9.745.1) || compar. -χότερον.

ἀγεσίλ-, Ἀγεσίλ- see ἀγησίλ-, Ἀγησίλ-.

ἀγεσκον iter. impf. Ion. see ἄγω.

ἀγεστα -ας, ἡ heap of earth (used in sieges) PROC.

B 226.29, cf. Lat. aggestus, aggestum

ἀγέστον -ου, τό EVAGR¹. HE 4.27, see ἄγεστα.

ἀγέστρατος -ον [ἄγω, στρατός] leading the hosts HES. Th. 925 NONN. D. 26.15, 28.28

Ἀγέστρατος -ου, ὁ Agestratos, male name QS. 3.230

ἀγετ- Dor. see ἡγετ-.

ἀγευστέω [ἀγευστος] aor. ptc. ἀγευστήσας; to not taste: ζωῆς life METH. Res. 1.39.6 (EPIPH. Haer. 64.31.9) (but conject. ἀγευστον METH. Res. 1.39.6 (GCS)).

ἀγευστία -ας, ἡ [ἀγευστος] fasting SCH. ARISTOPH. Nub. 621a

ἀγευστος -ον [γεύω] [A] not tasting, not having tasted ► with gen. PLAT¹. 113 LUC. 67.28 | fig. PLAT. Rp. 576a XEN. Mem. 2.1.23 etc.; εὐδαίμονες οἱσι κακῶν ἀγευστος αἰῶν blessed are those whose lives have not tasted evil SOPH. Ant. 583 || ► abs. without eating: ἄποτοι καὶ ἄ. without drinking and eating LUC. 25.18 [B] tasteless ARISTOT. An. 422a 30 [C] untasted PLUT. 46.731d PORPH. Abst. 2.27

ἀγέχορος -ου, ὁ [ἄγω, χόρος] leading the chorus ARISTOPH. Lys. 1281 (corr.)

ἀγεωμέτρητος -ον [γεωμετρέω] ignorant of geometry ARISTOT. ApO. 77b 13 ELIAS in Cat. 118.18 || of problems extraneous to geometry ARISTOT. ApO. 77b 17 etc. • adv. ἀγεωμετρήτως without notions of geometry AN. in SE. 29.35

ἀγεωργησία -ας, ἡ [ἀγεώργητος] bad cultivation THPHR. CP. 2.15.1 etc.

ἀγεώργητος -ον [γεωργέω] uncultivated THPHR. CP. 1.16.2 PLUT. Cor. 12.2 | Christ. obtained without cultivation GREG¹. VMos. 2.140 etc. || uncultivated, neglected, of the soul BAS. Is. 147 etc. • adv. ἀγεωργήτως without cultivation HYMNAN. (KIT. p. 22).

ἀγεωργία -ας, ἡ [ἀγεωργίον] lack of cultivation, fig. neglect, abandonment EUS¹. DE. 7.1.91

ἀγεωργίον [γεωργός] *adv. neut. without cultivating*: ἀ. δικάζεσθαι to bring a legal action for neglected care of land PHRYN². SP. 33B

2. ἀγή *aor. ind. pass. see* ἄγνυμι.

3. ἀγή *neut. pl. see* ἄγος.

1. ἀγή -ης, ἡ [cf. ἄνα-] **A** wonder, amazement, admiration: ἀγή μ' ἔχει wonder grips me IL. 21.221 OD. 3.227, *al.* **B** envy, jealousy HDT. 6.61.1 *etc.*; ἀγα θεόθεν envy of the gods AESCHL. Ag. 131 • Dor. ἄγα AESCHL. Lc.

ἀγή -ης, ἡ [ἄγνυμι] **A** breaking, fragment, wreckage EUR. Suppl. 693; ἀγαίσι κωπῶν with pieces of oars AESCHL. Ag. 131 **B** breaker, shore, beach SOPH. fr. 969 AP. 1.554 *etc.* **C** curve, bend, inlet ARAT. 668, 729 (v.l.) • Dor. ἄγαν *f.l. for* ἄταν PIND. P. 2.82.

ἀγγεράται ἀγγεράτο *pf. and ppp. ind. mid. 3. pl. Ion.*, *see* ἀγείρω.

ἀγγής -ές [γῆθος] joyless SOPH. Tr. 869 (*conject.*), *fr.* 583.10 (*conject.*)

ἀγγίλλαι *aor. inf. act. see* ἀγάλλω.

ἀγγιλάττω, *contr.* [ἄγος, ἐλαύνω] *fut.* ἀγγιλάτῃσιν; to reject as impure, drive out, purify, expiate HDT. 5.72.1 NICOM. fr. 14 *etc.*; κλαίων δοκεῖς μοι ... τάδε ἀγγιλάτῃσιν I think that you will atone for this with your tears SOPH. OT. 402

ἀγγιλατίζω L. EM., *see* ἀγγιλάττω.

ἀγγιλάτος -ον [ἀγγιλάττω] purifying LYC. 436

ἀγγημα -ατος, τό [ἡγεομαι] army corps, division, at Sparta XEN. Lac. 11.9 *etc.* | Macedon POL. 5.65.2, *al.* ARR. An. 1.1.11, *al.* PLUT. Eum. 14.8 *etc.* ἀγγημα *pf. ind. mid. Dor. see* ἡγεομαι.

Ἀγῆν -ῆνος, ὁ Agen, title of a satyr play ATH. 2.50f ἀγγινία -ας, ἡ attack, assault: τὴν καλουμένην ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις μιμησάμενοι ἄ. having imitated that which in wars is called assault ASTAM. Hom. 12 (40.348A)

ἀγνηορέω, *contr.* [ἀγνήνωρ] to be courageous NONN. D. 12.206, 37.338, *al.* • 2. sg. ἀγνηορέεις NONN. D. 37.338 | *subj.* ἀγνηορέωσι EUPHOR. 38 c 51 *ptc.* ἀγνηορέων GREG. Carm. (PG 37.1393.9) NONN. Ev. 3.170, *al. etc.*

Ἀγνηορίδης -ου, ὁ [Ἀγνήνωρ] descendant of Agenor AP. 2.178 *etc.* | οἱ Ἀ. Thebans EUR. Ph. 217

ἀγνηορίη -ης, ἡ [ἀγνήνωρ] *ep.* **A** courage, valor IL. 22.457 | of a boar or lion IL. 12.46 **B** pride, arrogance IL. 9.700 (*pl.*) NONN. D. 42.384 *etc.*

Ἀγνηορίς -ίδος, ἡ [Ἀγνήνωρ] daughter of Agenor, Ino OPP¹. 4.237

ἀγνήνωρ -ορος [ἄγω ?, ἀνήρ] **A** manly, courageous, heroic IL. 9.635, *al.* | of a lion IL. 24.42 **B** proud, arrogant IL. 2.276, *al.* OD. 1.106, *al.* HES. Th. 641 AESCHL. Sept. 124 HLD. 4.5.5 *etc.* **C** magnificent, splendid, noble PIND. O. 9.23 (*horse*), P. 3.55, 10.18, I. 1.43 • Dor. ἀγῆνωρ.

Ἀγνήνωρ -ορος, ὁ Agenor, male name IL. 4.467 SOPH. Or. 268 *etc.*

ἀγήνοχα *pf. ind. act. see* ἄγω.

ἀγήραντος -ον EUR. *epigr.* 2.1 (*conject.*) ANTIP¹. (AP. 7.6.3) (v.l.), *see* ἀγήραος.

ἀγήραος -αον, *contr.* ἀγήραως -ων [γῆρας] unaging, eternally young IL. 8.539, *al.* OD. 5.136, *al.* HES. Th. 955; ἀγήραως δὲ χρόνῳ δυνάστας ruler to whom time does not bring old age SOPH. Ant. 608 | of things imperishable, eternal IL. 2.447 (*aegis*) SIM. (AP. 7.253.4) PIND. P. 2.52 THUC. 2.43.2 PLAT. Phil. 15d *etc.*; χάριν τ' ἀγήρων ἐξομεν and we shall have eternal gratitude EUR. Suppl. 1178 | of a plant perennial: ἀγήρω καὶ χλοερά luxuriant and evergreen PLUT. 46.649d | Christ. immune to aging, eternal (of God) CLEM. Str. 5.11.68.2 *etc.* | *subst.* τὸ ἀγήραον unaging part, of man METH. Symp. 2.7.47 • *contr.*: *acc. sg.* -ων and -ω | ἀγείρω CORIN. 1.3.25 | *nom. pl.* -ω, *dat.*

-ως ARISTOPH. Av. 689, *acc.* -ως | *nom. dual* -ω || ἀγήρος HES. HSCH.

ἀγήρασία -ας, ἡ [ἀγήρατος 2] eternal youth SCH. IL. 11.1-2

ἀγήρατον -ου, τό [ἀγήρατος] *bot.* marjoram DIOSC². 4.58 | *savory* (*see* θύμβρα) DIOSC². 3.37a GAL. 11.814

1. ἀγήρατος -ου, ὁ [γῆρας ?] abrasive stone, for polishing shoes GAL. 12.201, 12.962, *al.* ASCLEP³. (AET¹. 8.43)

2. ἀγήρατος -ον [γῆρας] unaging, imperishable, eternal SOPH. fr. 972 XEN. Mem. 4.3.13 PLAT. Ax. 307d *etc.*; κλέος ἀγήρατον imperishable fame EUR. IA. 567

ἀγήραος -ον HES. fr. 25.28 HSCH., *see* ἀγήραος.

ἀγήραως, *contr. see* ἀγήραος.

ἀγής -ές [ἄζω] **A** pure, holy, of the sun EMPED. B 47 **B** cursed, guilty HIPPO. 19 (*doub. read.*)

Ἀγηςανδρίδας, ὁ Agesandridas, male name THUC. 8.91.2

Ἀγῆσανδρος -ου, ὁ Agesandros, male name THUC. 1.139.3, *al. etc.*

Ἀγισιάνναξ -ακτος, ὁ Agesianax, male name PLUT. 60.920d

Ἀγισίας -ου, ὁ Agesias, male name PIND. O. 6.12, *al. etc.*

Ἀγισίδαμος -ου, ὁ Agesidamos, male name PIND. O. 10.18, N. 1.29, *al. etc.*

Ἀγισίλαος -ου, ὁ Agesilaos XEN. Hel. 3.3.4 CAL. LIM. H. 5.130 *etc.* | *pl.* οἱ Ἀ. men like Agesilaos PLUT. Fl. 11.5 • Ion. and Att. Ἡγησίλειος | Dor. Ἀγισίλας (Ἀγες-) *gen.* Ἀγισίλα PIND. fr. 123.15.

ἀγισίλαος -ου, ὁ [ἡγεομαι, λαός] leader of the people, leader, *epith.* of Hades AESCHL. fr. 406 • ἄγ- *codd.* | *ep.* ἡγεσίλαος NIC. fr. 74, 72, Ion. ἡγησίλειος HEGESIP². (AP. 7.545.4), Dor. ἄγεςίλας.

Ἀγισίμαχος -ου, ὁ Agesimachos, athlete of Aegina PIND. N. 6.22

Ἀγισίπολις -ίδος, ὁ Agesipolis, male name XEN. Hel. 4.2.9 *etc.*

Ἀγισσιπιδῆς -α, ὁ Agesippidas, male name THUC. 5.52.1

Ἀγισιστράτα -ας, ἡ Agesistrata, female name PLUT. Agis 4.1

Ἀγισιστράτος -ου, ὁ Agesistratos, male name XEN. Hel. 2.3.10 *etc.*

Ἀγισίχρορα -ας, ἡ Hagesichora, female name ALCM. 1.77

ἀγισίχορος -ορος [ἄγω ?, ἀνήρ] leading the chorus or dance PIND. P. 1.4

ἀγῆτηρ, ὁ Dor. *see* ἡγήτηρ.

ἀγῆτορεύω [ἀγῆτωρ] to occupy the office of ἀγῆτωρ (*see*) IBSA 56.37 (II-1a)

ἀγῆτὸς -ῆ -όν [ἀγαμαι] admirable, wonderful IL. 22.370, *al.*; εἶδος ἀγῆτοί admired only for (your) physical appearance IL. 5.787, 8.228 | *with dat.* SOL. 5.3 THEOCR. 1.126 OPP¹. 1.364 | of things [Anacr.] 55.36

Ἀγῆτος -ου, ὁ Agetos, male name HDT. 6.61.5 *etc.*

Ἀγῆτωρ -ορος, ὁ Agetor, *epith.* of Zeus XEN. Lac. 13.2

ἀγῆτωρ, ὁ Dor. office of priest of Aphrodite on Cyprus HSCH., *see* ἡγήτωρ.

ἀγι, ἀγίτε [ἀγ' ἴτε ?] ALC. 38.4, *al.* SAPPH. 27.5, 43.8, *al.* Lesb. for ἀγε, ἀγετε.

Ἀγιάδαι -ών, οἱ Agiadaí, royal Spartan line PLUT. Lys. 24.3

ἀγιάζω [ἀγιος] *impf.* ἡγιάζον, *mid. pass.* ἡγιάζομαι || *fut.* ἀγιάσω, *inf. mid.* ἀγιάσεσθαι PROC. Is. (PG 87.2029.13) || *aor.* ἡγίασα, *mid.* ἡγιάσασθαι [ATHANAS.] (PG 28.932.6) || *pf.* ἡγίασα, *mid. pass.* ἡγίασμαι || *aor. pass.* ἡγιάσθην || *fut. pass.* ἀγιασθήσμαι **1** active to make sacred, consecrate VT. Gen. 2.3, *al. etc.*; ▶ ἄ. τί τιτι to

consecrate sthg. to s.o. VT. Esd. 2.22.47 || to glorify CLEM. Str. 4.23.148.1 *etc.* **2** passive to be consecrated, be sacred VT. Ex. 29.21; ἀγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου hallowed be thy name NT. Mat. 6.9 | Christ. by means of the sacraments: ὁ δὲ ἱερεὺς ... ἀγιάζεται the priest is consecrated DION²¹. EH. 5.2 (509B) *etc.* | *subst. ptc. pf. pass.* οἱ ἡγιασμένοι the Nazarites, Hebrews who consecrated themselves completely to God and observed a series of prohibitions VT. Am. 2.12

Ἀγίας (and Ἀγίας) -ου, ὁ Agias, male name XEN. An. 2.5.31 PLUT. Arat. 29.6 *etc.*

ἀγιασμα -ατος, τό [ἀγιάζω] **A** holiness, consecration VT. Ps. 92.5 CLEM. Paed. 3.13.98.1 *etc.*

B consecrated place, sanctuary VT. Ex. 15.17, Am. 7.13, *al.* **C** sacred object VT. Iez. 20.40 DOR². Doct. 77.8 (of the chrism) *etc.*; ἀγιασμα ἐστίν it is a sacred thing VT. Ex. 29.34, *al.*

D sacrament, sacrifice CAP. 2.28.7

ἀγιασμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγιάζω] consecration, sanctification, holiness VT. Iudic. 17.3, Mac. 2.2.17, *al.* IO. Hlo. 8.380A *etc.*; ἐν ἀγιασμῷ πνεύματος through the sanctifying work of the Spirit NT. Thes. 2.2.13, EPe. 1.1.2; πηγὴ ἀγιασμοῦ fount of sanctification, of the Holy Spirit BAS. Eun. 3.2.53 || *liturg.* acclamation of the Holy, "Holy" GREG. Or. 38.8.22 *etc.*

ἀγιαστεία [ἀγιάζω] EPIPH. Haer. 69.64.2 *etc.*, *see* ἀγιαστία.

ἀγιαστήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἀγιάζω] consecrator IDE-FIX.AU. 16.10.7 (III^p)

ἀγιαστήριον -ου, τό [ἀγιαστήρ] sanctuary VT. Lev. 12.4, *al. etc.*

ἀγιαστής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγιάζω] one who sacrifices POXY. 2068.3 (IV^p)

ἀγιαστὶ, *adv.* in a pious manner PPGM Suppl. 87.6 (III-IV^p)

ἀγιαστήρ -ας, ἡ [ἀγιάστης] holiness VT. Mac. 4.7.9, *see* ἀγιαστία.

ἀγιαστικός -όν [ἀγιάζω] sanctifying BAS. *epist.* 214.4.14, *al. etc.*

Ἀγιατίς -ίδος, ἡ Agiatís, daughter of Gylippos PLUT. Cl. 1.1, *al.*

ἀγιαφόρος -ον [ἄγιος, φέρω] bearing sacred objects IIG 2².477.13 (III^p), *see* ἱεραφόρος.

ἀγίγαρτος -ον [γίγαρτον] without seed, without pit THPHR. CP. 5.5.1 GAL. 13.205 (of grapes) AET¹. 9.30 *etc.*

ἀγιάζω [ἀγιος] *impf.* ἡγιάζον || *aor.* ἡγίασα EPIGR. 2.245.2 || *pf. mid. pass.* ἡγίσμαι L. EGud. || *aor. ptc. pass.* ἀγισθείς; **1** active to sanctify, consecrate, with sacrifices ARISTOPH. Pl. 681 *etc.*; Ποσειδανίῳ θεῷ βοῦθυτον ἐστὶν ἀγιάζων consecrating to the god Poseidon an altar with the sacrifice of a bull SOPH. OC. 1495

2 middle to venerate ALCM. 128 **3** passive to be consecrated PIND. O. 3.19 DION. 1.38.2

ἀγινέω, *contr.* [ἄγω] **1** active to lead, bring, carry IL. 18.493, *al.* OD. 17.294, *al.* HDT. 3.89.3, *al.* CALLIM. H. 2.82 *etc.*; πλοῦτον ἄ. ... εἰς ἀρετὴν to bring wealth to virtue CRAT¹. 18; παγινύην ἀγινύτε to take vacation, at school HEROD. 3.55 **2** middle to have brought HDT. 7.33 **3** passive to be led, be brought ARR. Ind. 32.7 *etc.* • *esp. ep. and Ion. pr. and impf.* || *ep. pres. inf.* ἀγινέμεναι || *Ion. impf.* ἡγίνεον, ἄγ- *iter.* ἀγίνεσκον (ἡγίνεσκον ARAT. 111) || *fut.* ἀγινήσω.

ἀγιόβλαστος -ον [ἀγιος, βλαστάνω] having holy buds EPHR. 3.529F

ἀγιόγραφος -ον [ἀγιος, γράφω] written under divine inspiration, scriptural DION²¹. EH. 1.4 (376B), *al.* | *subst.* τὰ Ἀγιόγραφα holy books, definition of the historical books of the VT. EPIPH. Mens. 4 (43.244B) *etc.*

ἀγιόλεκτος -ον [ἅγιος, λέγω] **chosen in holiness** [SOPHRON]. *Triod.* 87.3880D
 ἀγιολόγος -ον [ἅγιος, λέγω] **speaking of holy things** ENOCH 1.1.2 (*dub.*).
 ἀγιοποιέω, *contr.* [ἅγιος, ποιέω] **to sanctify** PHOT. *Lex.* LEONTH. *Nest.* 3.12 (86.1648B), *al.*
 ἀγιοποιός -όν [ἀγιοποιέω] **sanctifying** CYR³. *Cat.* 16.14 (*of the Holy Spirit*) *etc.*
 ἀγιοπρεπής -ές [ἅγιος, πρέπω] **holy** CLEM¹. *Ep.* 13.3 *etc.* || **worthy of a saint** CYR¹. *Ps.* 9.36, *al.* ♦ *adv.* ἀγιοπρεπῶς **in a manner befitting the saints or holy things** DION²¹. *CH.* 144B, *al.* *etc.*
 ἀγιοπρεπῶς *adv.*, *see* ἀγιοπρεπής.
 ἀγιορίζω -ον [ἅγιος, ρίζα] **of holy root** TIMOTH³. *Descr.* 1 (28.944B)
 ἅγιος -α -ον [*see* ἄζομαι] **A sacred, holy, venerated, of things** THESP. 4.5 (*altars*) XEN. *Hel.* 3.2.19 VT. *Ex.* 3.5; αἱ γραφαὶ ἅ. **holy scripture** NT. *Rom.* 1.2 || **with gen.** PLAT. *Crit.* 116c; Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν ἅγιον **the holy temple of Aphrodite** HDT. 2.41.5 || **of pers. holy, pious, pure** ARISTOPH. *Av.* 522 VT. *Deut.* 7.6, *al.*; πνεῦμα ἅ. **Holy Spirit** NT. *Mat.* 3.11, *al.* || **of the church** SOPHRON. *EpSyn.* 87.3196B *etc.* || **subst. masc.** ὁ ἅγιος **Holy, said of God** VT. *Ps.* 77.41; *plur.* οἱ ἅγιοι **the faithful, believers** NT. *Apost.* 9.32, *al.*; *neut.* τὸ ἅγιον **sacred thing, holy place, temple, tabernacle** VT. *Ex.* 36.1, *al.* NT. *Heb.* 8.2, *al.* | τὰ ἅγια (τὸ ἅγιον) (τῶν) ἁγίων **Holy of Holies** (*Lat.* sancta sanctorum) VT. *Ex.* 26.33, *al.* NT. *Heb.* 9.3, *al.* | τὰ ἅγια **holy things, of the eucharist** DION²⁰. (*EUS*¹. *HE.* 7.9.4) *etc.* || **execrable, cursed** (*cf.* *Lat.* sacer) CRATIN. 402 *etc.* || *superl. adv. neut.* -ώτατα DEMOSTH. 23.74 ♦ *adv.* ἁγίως **in a holy manner** ISOCR. 11.25 *etc.* • *not in* IL. OD. HES.
 ἁγιότης -ητος, ἡ [ἅγιος] **holiness** VT. *Mac.* 2.15.2 NT. *Heb.* 12.10, *al.* GREG. *Or.* 34.13.2 *etc.* || **honorific title of bishops** SOPHRON. *EpSyn.* 87.3196B *etc.*
 ἀγιοτρισιολογέω, *contr.* [ἅγιος, τρισός, λέγω] **to acclaim with the triple "Holy"** DID¹. *Trin.* 2.8 (92b) (*aor. inf.* ἀγιοτρισιολογήσαι).
 ἀγιότροπος -ον [ἅγιος, τρέπω] **living a holy life** AGATHANG. *Greg.* 62 (p. 32)
 ἀγιοφανής -ές [ἅγιος, φαίνω] **appearing holy** EUST¹. *Eng.* 4
 ἀγιοφόρος -ον [ἅγιος, φέρω] *fig.* **bearing holy things, of Christians** IGN. *Eph.* 9.2, *al.*
 Ἄγης -ιδος, ὁ Agis, *male name* THUC. 3.89.1 *etc.* • *acc.* -iv || *Ion.* Ἠγίς -ιδος HDT. 7.204.
 ἀγιομύς -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγίζω] **purification, funeral offering** DIOD. 4.39.1
 ἀγιστ(ε)ία -ας, ἡ [ἀγιστεύω] **A sacred ritual, religious ceremony, worship pl.** PLAT. *Ax.* 371d ISOCR. 11.28 *etc.* || *sg.* STRAB. 9.3.7 PLUT. *Rom.* 22.1 IUL. 5.178d *etc.* || **Christ. glory, holiness** ISID⁴. *epist.* 3.326 *etc.*
 ἀγίστευμα -ατος, τό [ἀγιστεύω] **sanctuary** PROC¹. *Aed.* 1.4.17
 ἀγιστεύω [ἅγιος] *fut.* ἀγιστεύσω || *aor. ptc.* ἀγιστεύσας ❶ **active** **A to perform a sacred rite** PLAT. *Leg.* 759d || **with acc. DION. 1.40.3 || **to purify; φόνον χειρᾶς hands of murder** OR. (PAUS. 10.6.7) || **to live devoutly; βιοτάν one's life** EUR. *Bac.* 74 || **to be holy** PAUS. 6.20.2, *al.* ❷ **passive** **A to be performed or celebrated, of sacred rites** PHIL². *Spec.* 1.125 || **to be considered holy, of places** STRAB. 9.3.1 DION. 1.40.6
 ἀγιστήριον -ου, τό [ἀγίζω] **vessel for holy water** 1PERG. 255.9, *see* περιρραντήριον.
 ἀγιστός -ή -όν [ἀγίζω] **sanctified** L. *EGud.* (s.v. ἀγιστεία)
 ἀγιστός -ος, ἡ [ἀγίζω] **ceremony** CALLIM. *fr.* 178.3 (*acc.* -ύν).
 ἀγιοδῶς [ἅγιος] *adv.* **in a sacred manner: only****

superl. -έστατα **in the most sacred manner** PHIL². *Somn.* 2.123 (*doub.*)
 ἀγιοσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἅγιος] **A holiness** VT. *Mac.* 2.3.12 NT. *Rom.* 1.4 *etc.* || **of a bishop, as honorific title** THEODORET¹. *epist.* 82 (92v) || **chastity** AAP. *Thom.* A 97 (p. 210.10) || **sanctuary** CYR³. *Cat.* 2.17
 ἀγκ- *poet. for* ἀνακ- (*see*)
 ἀγκάζομαι [ἀγκάς] **A to take in the arms** IL. 17.722 CALLIM. *fr.* 236.1 NONN. *D.* 7.318 || **to embrace** EUPHOR. *Sh.* 415.1.9 • *impf.* 3. *pl.* ἀγκάζοντο *and* ἡγκάζοντο HSCH. || *fut.* 3. *sg.* ἀγκάσσειται P¹. *Soph.* 375 || *aor.* ἀγκασάμην *and* ἡγκασ(σ)άμην.
 ἀγκάθεν [ἀγκάς] *adv.* **in the arms:** παλαιὸν ἄγκαθεν λάβων βρέτας **having held in (your) arms the sacred image** AESCHL. *Eum.* 80 || **on the elbows:** κοιμώμενος ἄγκαθεν **leaned on my elbows** AESCHL. *Ag.* 3 (*oth.* = ἀνέκαθεν **up above** HSCH. *AG.* *Bek.* 337).
 Ἀγκαῖος -ου, ὁ Ankaïos, *male name* IL. 2.609, 23.635 *etc.* • *epic gen.* -οιο IL. 2.609.
 ἀγκάλω *poet. for* ἀνακαλέω.
 ἀγκάλη -ης, ἡ [*see* ἀγκών] **A arm, bent, gener. pl.** ἐν ἀγκάλαις λαβὼν **having taken in (your) arms** AESCHL. *Suppl.* 481; τινὰ φέρειν ἐν τῇ ἀγκάλῃ **to carry (s.o.) in one's arms** HDT. 6.61.4 = ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις περιφέρειν τινὰ XEN. *Cyr.* 7.5.50 = ἀγκάλαις περιφέρειν EUR. *Or.* 464; ἀγκάλαις ἔχειν **to hold in one's arms** EUR. *IT.* 289; ἐπ' ἀγκάλαις λαβεῖν **to take in (your) arms** EUR. *Ion.* 761; δέχεσθαι εἰς τὰς ἀγκάλαις **to take in the arms** NT. *Lu.* 2.28 || *fig.* ἀγκάλαις ἀσμενίζειν **to receive with open arms** SOPHRON. *EpSyn.* 87.3188B || *fig.* **embrace, envelop, grip:** κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις **in the grip of the waves** ARCHIL. 213; πόντιαι ἅ. **the embraces of the deep (the sea)** AESCHL. *Ch.* 587; πετραία δ' ἀγκάλη σε βαστάσει **a rocky embrace will hold you tight, of a cave** AESCHL. *Pr.* 1019 || *of the air* ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις **in its soft arms** EUR. *fr.* 941 || **extens. pl.** breast SYN. *Ep.* 5 || **bend of the knee** CAEL. *TP.* 5.1.3 || **meton. that which is held in the arms, thus bundle** EPIPH. *Haer.* 51.31.8 • *dat. pl.* ἀγκάλησι Corinn. 7.2.
 ἀγκαλιδαγωγέω, *contr.* [ἀγκαλιδαγωγός] **to carry a bundle** PAUS². α 13 (11)
 ἀγκάλιδιδαγωγός -όν [ἀγκαλῖς, ἄγω] **carrying sacks, of animals** POLL. 2.139
 ἀγκάλιδι -ης I GVI 1712.1 (II-III^p), *see* ἀγκαλῖς.
 ἀγκάλιδιφορός -ον [ἀγκαλῖς, φέρω] **carrying sacks** POLL. 7.109
 ἀγκάλιζομαι [ἀγκάλη] *impf.* ἡγκάλιζόμεν || *fut.* (προσ)αγκάλισμαι OLYMP². *in Gorg.* 10.2, 20.2 || *aor.* ἡγκάλισάμην || *pf. ptc.* ἡγκάλισμένος || *ppf.* ἡγκάλισμην || *aor. ptc. pass.* ἀγκάλισθῆς EUSTATH. 626.42; **to embrace, take in the arms, clasp** SEM. 7.77 LYC. 142 *etc.*; ἀγκάλισμένους clutched, *said of wrestlers* PLUT. 46.638f || *pass.* AESOP. 243 • *later also act.* L. *EM.* 12.15.
 ἀγκάλισμα -ατος, τό [ἀγκάλιζομαι] **A that which is carried in the arms or embraced** LUC. 49.14 || **favorite, of pers.:** τερπνὸν ἀγκάλισμα **syngónōn sweet darling brothers** LYC. 308 || **embrace, of the air** TIMOTH. 15.80-1 ACH. 2.37.6 (*pl.*)
 ἀγκάλισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγκάλιζομαι] **assembling into bundles** POXY. 1631.9 (III^p)
 ἀγκάλως -ον, ὁ [*see* ἀγκών] **armful, bundle** HOM. 4.82 POXY. 3354.9
 ἀγκάς [*see* ἀγκών] *adv.* **into the arms, in the arms** IL. 14.353, *al.* OD. 7.252, *al.* THEOCR. 8.55 AP. 1.27.6 *etc.*
 ἀγκάσιν *see* ἀγκών.
 ἀγκείται *poet. for* ἀνάκειται: *see* ἀνάκειμαι.
 ἀγκηθής HSCH., *see* ἀβλαβής.
 ἀγκιστρεία -ας, ἡ [ἀγκιστρεύω] **fishing with a**

hook PLAT. *Leg.* 823d AEL. *NA.* 12.43 || *fig.* ARISTAEN. 1.17
 ἀγκιστρευτικός -ή -όν [ἀγκιστρεύω] **pertaining to fishing** GAL. 5.861 || *subst.* τὸ ἀγκιστρευτικόν **fishing** PLAT. *Soph.* 220d
 ἀγκιστρεύω [ἀγκιστρον] *fut. mid.* ἀγκιστρεύομαι || *aor.* ἡγκιστρεῦσα, *mid.* ἡγκιστρευσάμην PHIL². *Spec.* 4.67, *al.* || *pf. mid. pass.* ἡγκιστρευσμαι GAL. 19.102 || *aor. pass.* ἡγκιστρεύθην; **to fish, thus fig. to lure, snare** ► τινα s.o. ARISTAEN. 1.5 CLEM. *Paed.* 3.5.31.3 (*of women*) *etc.* || *mid.* = *act.* PHIL². *Op.* 166, *al.*
 ἀγκιστρίον -ου, ὁ [ἀγκιστρον] **small hook** THEOCR. 21.57 PLUT. 58.777f BIT. 51.1
 ἀγκιστρόδετος -ον [ἀγκιστρον, δέω 1c] **to which a hook is bound, of a fishing line** THEAET. (AP. 6.27.2)
 ἀγκιστροειδής -ές [ἀγκιστρον, εἶδος] **like a hook, hooked** AET. 1.3.18 *etc.*
 ἀγκιστροθηρευτής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγκιστρον, θηρευτής] **fisherman** THEODORET¹. *Is.* 19.8
 ἀγκιστρον -ου, τό [*see* ἀγκών] **A hook, fishing hook** OD. 4.369, *al.* HDT. 2.70.1 *etc.* || **hook, of a spindle** PLAT. *Rp.* 616c || **hook, for surgery** GAL. 19.69 PHILUM. *Ven.* 2.6 CAEL. *TP.* 5.1.19 PAEG. 4.53.1, *al.* || **hook** DCASS. 60.35.4 || *fig.* **for a snare** hook BAS. *Hom.* 7.7 *etc.* || *with accept. posit.* GREG¹. *OrCat.* 24 *etc.* • *Dor.* *crasis* τῶγκ. < τοῦ ἅ. *and* τῷ ἅ.
 ἀγκιστροπώλης -ου, ὁ [ἀγκιστρον, πώλης] **seller of hooks** POLL. 7.198
 ἀγκιστροφάγος -ον [ἀγκιστρον, φαγεῖν] **biting the hook** ARISTOT. *HA.* 621b 1
 ἀγκιστρόω, *contr.* [ἀγκιστρον] *aor. ptc.* ἀγκιστρῶσας HLD. 9.15.2 || *pf. ptc. mid. pass.* ἡγκιστρωμένος PLUT. *Cr.* 25.5 ❶ **active to fasten as with hooks** HLD. 9.15.2 ❷ **middle to be furnished with barbs** PLUT. *Cr.* 25.5 ❸ **passive to be caught by a hook** LYC. 67 (*fig.*)
 ἀγκιστρώδης -ες [ἀγκιστρον] **like a hook** POL. 34.3.5 *etc.*
 ἀγκιστρωτός -ή -όν [ἀγκιστρώω] **hooked** POL. 6.23.10 *etc.*
 ἀγκλ- *poet. see* ἀνακλ-.
 ἀγκλάριον -ου, τό [κλήρος] *Dor.* **for ἀνακλήριον distribution** ICIG 2562.13
 ἀγκονα -ης, ἡ [ἀγκών] **A arm (folded), only pl.** IL. 14.213 HOM. 2.141, *al.* *etc.* || *fig.* **embrace, grasp** IUL². (AP. 9.398.2) OPP. 3.34.2 • *ep. Ion.* -νῃ | *poet. for* ἀγκάλη.
 ἀγκονίωζω POLL. 3.155 (*doub.*), *see* ἀγκάλιζομαι.
 ἀγκομ- *poet. see* ἀνακομ-.
 ἀγκονίω **to agitate:** *pres. ptc.* ἀγκονίωαι ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 1311 (*connect.*)
 ἀγκος -εος, *contr.* -ου, τό [*see* ἀγκών] **bend, hollow, valley** IL. 20.490 OD. 4.337 HES. *Op.* 389 HDT. 6.74.2 EUR. *Bac.* 1051 THEOCR. 8.33 *etc.*; ἡδ' ἀγκος ὑψίκερμονον ὄρεσι περιδρομον **and a valley with high crags surrounded by mountains** TRAG. 445a
 Ἄγκος -ου, ὁ Ankos, *Roman* PLUT. *Cor.* 1.1 *etc.*
 ἀγκρ- *poet. see* ἀνακρ-.
 ἀγκτεира, ἡ [ἀγκτήρ] **suffocating** OR. *Chald.* *fr.* 161
 ἀγκτήρ -ήρος, ὁ [ἀγκω] **A fastener, clip, used for closing wounds** CELS. 5.26 PLUT. 30.468c GAL. 1.385 *etc.* || **part of the throat** POLL. 2.134 || **bandage, dressing** HLD². (ORIB. 48.28.5) || *fig. pl.* bonds PROCL. *in Eucl.* 20.25 • *also* ἀκτήρ.
 ἀγκτηριάω [ἀγκτήρ] *aor.* ἡγκτηρίασα || *aor. pass.* ἡγκτηρίσθην; **to bind a wound with a fastener**, *see* ἀγκτήρ CRIT². (GAL. 13.878) • v.l. ἀγκτηρίζω; *impf. mid. pass.* 3. *sg.* ἡγκτηρίζετο GAL. 18(1).823.
 ἀγκυλένδετος -ον [ἀγκύλη, ἐνδέω] **bound with straps, of a javelin** TIMOTH. 15.22

ἀγκυλέω, *contr.* [ἀγκυλή] *impf.* ἡγκύλουν HSCH.; **to fold (the arm)** ATH. 15.667a,b CRATIN. 299 || *mid.* **to hurl like a javelin, thunderbolt** SAT. (ATH. 12.534e) (*pf. ptc.* ἡγκυλημένος).

ἀγκυλή -ης, ἡ [see ἀγκών] **[A] bend, folding, ligament, joint, of the arm or wrist** CRATIN. 299 HSCH. A 575 etc.; ἀπ' α. ἵεναι *to cast from the wrist, of the way in which the wrist was bent when casting the cottabus* BACCHYL. fr. 17.2 | *of the knee* HP. Fract. 30 PHILOSTR. Im. 2.6.4 || *med.* **ankylased joint** HP. Liq. 6 ASCLEP⁴. (GAL. 13.968, 13.967) **[B] strap, thong, cord, of a bow** SOPH. OT. 204 | *of a javelin* STRAB. 4.4.3 PLUT. Phil. 6.9 | *extens.* **javelin** EUR. Or. 1476 etc. || **loop, knot:** πλεκτάς ἐξανήπτεν ἀγκύλας grasped the woven loops EUR. IT. 1408 | *in a leash* XEN. Cyn. 6.1 | *in a bandage* GAL. 18(1).790 | *in a torsion engine* HERO BEL. 83.1 || **lace, for sandals** ALEXIS 32 || **ring or hook, for a curtain** VT. Ex. 38.18, al. || *on the end of a chain* GREG¹. Prof. 3.244 (PG 46.244B).

ἀγκυλήτος -ή -όν [ἀγκυλή] **[A] thrown, in the game of kottabos** AESCHL. fr. 179 **[B] subst.** τὸ ἀγκυλήτον **javelin** AESCHL. fr. 16

ἀγκυλίδιον, τὸ [ἀγκυλῖς] *dim.* of ἀγκυλή (see) IDÉLOS 1442 B 59 (II^a)

ἀγκυλιδωτός -όν [ἀγκυλῖον, δίδωμι] **having a loop** HP. (GAL. 19.69)

ἀγκυλίον -ου, τὸ [ἀγκυλῖς] **[A] loop, of a knot** HERACLA. (ORIB. 48.2.1) || **ring, of a chain** AG. Bek. 329 **[B] med.** **ankyloglossia, reduced mobility of the tongue** ANTYLL. (ORIB. 45.15.2) **[C] pl.** **small shields** (Lat. ancilia) PLUT. Nu. 13.9

ἀγκυλῖς -ίδος, ἡ [ἀγκυλή] **pike, for hunting** OPP¹. 1.155

Ἀγκυλίον -ωνος, ὁ **Ankylion, male name** ARISTOPH. Vē. 1397

ἀγκυλῶ [ἀγκυλός] **to bend back** ARET. SA. 1.6.6 ἀγκυλοβλέφαρος -ον [ἀγκυλός, βλέφαρον] **with contracted eyelids:** *subst.* τὸ ἀγκυλοβλέφαρον **adhesion of the eyelids** CELS. 7.7

ἀγκυλόγλωσσος -ον [ἀγκυλός, γλῶσσα] **suffering from ankyloglossia, i.e., reduced mobility of the tongue** AET¹. 8.38; τὸ α. πάθος **ankyloglossia** ORIB. 45.15 (title) PAEG. 6.29.1

ἀγκυλόγλωχιν -ίνος, ὁ [ἀγκυλός, γλῶχίς] **with hooked spurs, of a cock** BABR. 17.3

ἀγκυλόδειρος -ον [ἀγκυλός, δειρή] **with a crooked neck** OPP. 4.630

ἀγκυλόδους -οντος [ἀγκυλός, δούς] **[A] with crooked teeth, of a scimitar** QS. 6.218; *of an anchor* NONN. D. 3.50 **[B] barbed** MACED¹. (AP. 6.176.1) NONN. D. 6.21

ἀγκυλοειδής -ές [ἀγκυλός, εἶδος] **winding, sinuous** L. Sud⁴ • *adv.* ἀγκυλοειδῶς EROT. 76.3 (*conject.*).

ἀγκυλοειδῶς *adv.*, *see* ἀγκυλοειδής.

ἀγκυλοκοπέω, *contr.* [ἀγκυλός, κόπτω] Byz. *aor.* ἡγκυλοκόπησα; **to lame** PLOND. 2.415.15 (IV^p) etc.

ἀγκυλόκυκλος -ον [ἀγκυλός, κύκλος] **in coils, of a tail** NONN. D. 35.217

ἀγκυλόκωλος -ον [ἀγκυλός, κῶλον] **with deformed limbs** ARCHESTR. fr. 172.3 SH

ἀγκυλομαχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγκυλός, μάχη] **contest with the javelin** IPE². 435.9

ἀγκυλομήτης -ιος, ὁ [ἀγκυλός, μήτις] **of crooked counsel, wily, epith.** of Kronos IL. 2.205 OD. 2.1415, al. etc. | *of Prometheus* HES. Th. 546, Op. 48 • *gen. Ion.* -εω || *Boeot.* ἀγκυλομεΐτας -αο CORIN. 1.1.14-15.

ἀγκυλόμητις -ιος [ἀγκυλομήτης] NONN. D. 21.255, *see* ἀγκυλομήτης.

ἀγκυλόπους -ουν, *gen.* -ποδος [ἀγκυλός, πούς] **with**

curved feet: α. δίφρος curule chair PLUT. Mar. 5.2, 10

ἀγκυλόπυρμος -ον [ἀγκυλός, πύρμνα] **with crooked stern** PHIB. 172.116 (III^a)

ἀγκυλόρρινος -ον [ἀγκυλός, ῥίς] **with curved nose** IOMAL. Chron. 5 p. 106

ἀγκυλός -η -ον [see ἀγκών] **[A] curved, crooked** IL. 5.209, al. OD. 21.264 etc.; ἀρότριοι ἀγκυλοῖς *with curved plows* MOSCHIO fr. 6.9 | *of an eagle* α. κάρα beaked head PIND. P. 1.8 | ἀγκυλαῖς ταῖς χειρσίν *with hooked hands* ARISTOPH. Eq. 205

[B] fig. wily, cunning LYC. 344 ALCIPHR. 3.28.1 **[C] of style** contorted, intricate DION. Thuc. 35.3 LUC. 29.21 | **concise, incisive, terse:** α. φράσις too terse expression DION. Thuc. 25.4 (*comp.*) | *compar.* -ώτερος • *adv.* ἀγκυλῶς **with concise style** DION. Thuc. 31.1, al. DAMASC. in Parm. 187

ἀγκυλοτομος -ου, τὸ **hooked instrument (used for tonsillectomy)** PAEG. 67.18

ἀγκυλότοξος -ον [ἀγκυλός, τόξον] **with curved bow** IL. 2.848 etc.

ἀγκυλόχευλις -ου [ἀγκυλός, χεῖλος] **with curved beak** IL. 16.428 (vultures) BATR. 294 (v.l.) HES. Sc. 405 (*codd.*) || *prob. always f.l. for* -χίλης.

ἀγκυλόχευλος -ον GREG. Carm. 1.2.2.625 etc., *see* ἀγκυλόχευλις.

ἀγκυλόχηλις -ου [ἀγκυλός, χηλή] **with curved claws** ARISTOPH. Eq. 197 (v.l. -χελίης), 204 BATR. 294 (v.l. -χελίης).

ἀγκυλῶς, *contr.* [ἀγκυλός] *aor. ptc.* ἀγκυλώσας Dicaeare. 97 || *pf. mid. pass.* ἡγκύλωμαι || *aor. pass.* ἡγκυλώθην; **to bend** PLAT¹. 47; ὄνυχας τις ἡγκυλωμένος *with curved talons* ARISTOPH. Av. 1180

ἀγκυλώμα -ατος, τὸ [ἀγκυλόω] **loop, knot** GAL. 18(1).798

ἀγκυλώσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγκυλόω] **stiffness of the joints, ankylosis** PAEG. 4.55.1 || **ankyloglossia** ANTYLL. (ORIB. 45.16.4) || **adhesion of the eyelids** [GAL.] Intr. 14.772

ἀγκυλωτός -ή -όν [ἀγκυλόω] **furnished with a strap** EUR. Bac. 1205

ἀγκυρά -ας, ἡ [cf. ἀγκών] **[A] anchor:** ἀγκυραν καθιέναι *to cast anchor* HDT. 7.36.2 = βάλλεσθαι PIND. I. 6.13 = μεθιέναι AESCHL. Ch. 662 = ἀφιέναι XEN. An. 3.5.10; ἀγκυραν αἰρεῖν *to weigh anchor* PLUT. Pomp. 50.2 = αἰρεσθαι PLUT. Pomp. 80.1 = ἀνελέσθαι LEON. (AP. 10.1.5) = ἀναλαμβάνειν PLUT. Mar. 37.8 = ἀνασπένειν ACH. 2.32.2; ἐπ' ἀγκυρῶν ὁρμεῖν *to lie at anchor* HDT. 7.188.1 = ἀποσαλεύειν DEMOSTH. 50.22 etc. || *fig.* **anchor of salvation, support, hope** EUR. Hel. 277, Hec. 80 HLD. 4.19.9 PLAT. Leg. 961c; ἀλλ'εἰσι μητρὶ παῖδες ἀγκυραὶ βίου *but children are a mother's hope of life* SOPH. fr. 685; ἐπὶ θυσὶν ἀγκυραῖν ὁρμεῖν *to ride at two anchors, i.e. to have it both ways* DEMOSTH. 56.44 (*cf.* PIND. O. 6.101 ff.); ἄ. ἱερὰ holy anchor, i.e. last hope PLUT. 52.815d LUC. 21.51; ἀγκύρας δίκην like an anchor LYD. Ost. 16 (*prob. f.l. for* ἀγκυτήρος; *see* ἀγκυτήρ) **[B] pruning hook**, THPHR. CP. 3.2.2 **[C] genitals** EPICHR. 191 • *Ion.* ἀγκυρή | *Aeol.* ἀγκυρρα.

ἀγκυρεῖος -α -ον [ἀγκυρα] **of an anchor** IIG 2.2.1609.101 (IV^a)

ἀγκυρήβλιον -ου, τὸ DEMOCR. B 148, *see* ἀγκυροβόλιον.

ἀγκυρίζω [ἀγκυρα] *aor.* ἡγκύρισα; **to trip** ARISTOPH. Eq. 262 • *Cret.* ἀγκυρίτω HSCH.

ἀγκυρίον -ου, τὸ [ἀγκυρα] **small anchor** PLUT. 41.564c LUC. 19.1 etc. (*only sg.; for the pl., see* ἀγκύριος).

ἀγκύριος -ον [ἀγκυρα] **of an anchor:** *subst.* τὰ ἀγκύρια **anchor cables** DIOD. 14.73.4

ἀγκυρίς -ίδος, ἡ [ἀγκυρα] **small anchor** IIG

22.1550 (III^a) || *a theatrical device* PLUT. Prov. 2.16 || *name of a plant* HSCH.

ἀγκυρίσμα -ατος, τό [ἀγκυρίζω] **trip** HSCH

ἀγκυρίτης λίθος [ἀγκυρα] **anchor stone** HSCH. s.v. μασχάλην

ἀγκυρίττω [ἀγκυρα] *Cret.* **to defeat** HSCH.

ἀγκυροβόλῶ, *contr.* [ἀγκυρα, βάλλω] *aor.* ἡγκυροβόλησα EROT. || *pf. mid. pass.* ἡγκυροβόλημαι; **to anchor, fasten securely** HP. Os. 18

ἀγκυροβόλιον -ου, τὸ [ἀγκυροβόλῶ] **anchorage** STRAB. 3.4.7 PLUT. 35.507b etc.

ἀγκυροειδής -ές [ἀγκυρα, εἶδος] **anchor-shaped** GAL. 2.766 DIOSC². 3.158 etc. • *adv.* ἀγκυροειδῶς **like an anchor** EROT

ἀγκυροειδῶς *adv.*, *see* ἀγκυροειδής.

ἀγκυρόμαχος, ὁ [ἀγκυρα, μάχη ?] *a type of boat* ISIDO. 19.1.16

ἀγκυρομήλη -ης, ἡ [ἀγκυρα, μήλη] **hooked probe** HP. (EROT. in Gal. 19.69) *μήλη*

ἀγκυρουχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγκυρα, ἔχω] **lying at anchor:** ἐν ἀγκυρουχίαις *being at moorings* AESCHL. Suppl. 766

ἀγκυρωμα, -ατος, τὸ **anchor** SCH. ARISTOPH. Eq. 762

ἀγκυρωτός -ή -όν [ἀγκυρα] **curved like an anchor** PHIL. 85.36 || *subst.* ὁ Ἀγκυρωτὸς **Ancoratus, title of a work by Epiphanius** EPIPH. Haer. 69.27.2, al.

ἀγκών -ώνος, ὁ [IE *ank-, cf. Lat. ancus, Skt. āncati] **[A] elbow** IL. 10.80 OD. 14.494 HP. Fract. 3, al. etc.; εἰς ἀγκῶνα διαναστὰς *raising himself on his elbow* PLUT. Br. 11.3 || **arm** PIND. N. 5.42

SOPH. Ant. 1237 etc. | *of animals* **joint, of the legs** XEN. Cyn. 4.1 **[B] curve, bend, angle** IL. 16.702 HDT. 1.180.2 || **bend, of a river** HDT. 2.99.2 || **bay, recess, of a region** SOPH. Ai. 805 || **inlet, bay** STRAB. 12.8.19 **[C] ballist. arm, lever, bar** HERO BEL. 78.4, 81.9 PHIL. 53.40 etc. || **arm, of a throne** VT. Cret. 2.9.18 etc. || *a type of vase* ARTEMID. 1.74 **[D] prov.** γλυκὺς α. sweet bend, euphem. *of a difficulty* PLAT. Phaedr. 257d | *sweet nook, of a brothel* CLEAR¹. 43a | *sweetheart, darling, of a lover* PLAT¹. 178 || *bot.* **abrotonon, plant** DIOSC². 3.24 • *dat. pl.* -ώνεσι PIND. N. 5.42 || *prob. dat. pl.* ἀγκάσιν *to the arms* OPP. 2.315.

Ἀγκών -ώνος, ἡ **Ankon, city in central Italy** STRAB. 5.4.2 PTOL⁴. 5.31.21 etc.

ἀγκώνη -ης, ἡ SCH. DION⁶. 191.37, *see* ἀγκοῖνα.

ἀγκωνίζω [ἀγκών] *aor. mid.* ἡγκωνισάμην ❶ *active* **to recline at table** GLOSS. ❷ *middle fig.* **to use circumlocutions** COM. CGFP 252.8 • *other tenses only in compd.: see* ἐξ-, παρ-, περιαγκωνίζω.

ἀγκώνιον -ου, τὸ [ἀγκυρα] **elbow** GAL. 4.452

ἀγκωνίσκιον -ου, τὸ [ἀγκυρα] **small hinge, hook** HERO Ph. 1.42

ἀγκωνίσκος -ου, ὁ [ἀγκυρα] **HERO Ph. 1.42 VT. Ex. 26.17, see** ἀγκωνίσκιον || **wooden board, of the tabernacle** COSM¹. 5.23

ἀγκωνισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγκωνίζω] **stretch, of an estuary** EUSTATH. 1712.29

ἀγκωνόδεσμος [ἀγκών, δέω] **cushion, for leaning the elbow on** (Lat. cubital) GLOSS

ἀγκωνοειδής -ές [ἀγκών, εἶδος] **curved, bent** BIT. 58.88 (v.l.)

ἀγκωνοφόρος -ου, ὁ [ἀγκών, φέρω] **vase-bearer** (see ἀγκών) IIG 2.2.2361.8 (III^p)

ἀγλαέθειρος -ον [ἀγλαός, ἔθειρα] **bright-haired** HOM. 19.5

Ἀγλαΐα -ας, ἡ **Aglaia, one of the Graces** IL. 2.672 HES. Th. 909 etc. • *Ion.* -ῆη.

ἀγλαΐα -ας, ἡ [ἀγλαός] **[A] splendor, beauty** IL. 6.510 (pl.) OD. 15.78, al. etc. || **pride, vanity** OD. 17.244 (pl.), 310 EUR. Hel. 192, al. **[B] joy, triumph, festivity, mirth** HES. Sc. 272, 285 (pl.) PIND. O. 13.14 etc.; μηδὲ ποτ' ἀγλαΐας ἀποναίαιο *may they*

never enjoy triumph SOPH. *El.* 211 ☐ **ornament** XEN. *Hip.* 5.8 (*mane*) AEL. *NA.* 10.13 (*oyster*) etc. • *Ion.* -ῖν *ep.* -ῖν *epi.*

ἀγλαΐζω [ἀγλαός] *impf.* ἡγλαΐζον, *mid.* ἡγλαΐζο-
μην || *fut.* (ἐπ)αγλαΐω, *mid.* ἀγλαΐομαι IL. 10.331 ||
aor. ἡγλαΐσα, *mid.* (ἐν)ηγλαΐσάμην EUSTATH. 9.44 || *pf.* *mid.* pass. ἡγλαΐσμαι || *ppf.* *mid.* pass. ἡγλαΐσθην in *compd.* || *fut.* *pass.* (κατ)αγλαΐσθήσομαι IO. *HPs.* (PG 55.675-34) • **active** ☐ **to make splendid, glorify** BACCHYL. *Epin.* 3.22 ISYLL. 28 PLUT. 63.965c AEL. *NA.* 8.28; πολλοῖς μὲν ἐνά-
λου, ὅρειον δὲ πολλοὶς ἄγρως ἀκροθίνιοις ἀγλαΐ-
σας having glorified the hunts with much spoils of the sea, much from the mountains TRAG. 415a || **to adorn** IL. 10.331 SEM. 7.70 ☐ **to offer as an honor** ▶ τί τινα sthg. to s.o. LYR. *CP* 5(b).1 THEOCR. *epigr.* 1.4 ☐ **intrans.** to shine ANTIPH. 294 (*codd.*) • **middle and passive** (*ep.* and *lyr.*) **to adorn oneself, take delight in** IL. 10.331; ▶ τινι (with) sthg. SEM. 7.70 = ἐν τινι PIND. *O.* 1.14 • *never in trag. or Att. prose* || *fut.* *mid.* 3. *sg.* *Byz.* (ἐν)αγλαΐσεται || *poet.* *aor.* ἡγλαΐσα.

Ἀγλαΐς -ίδος, ἡ Aglaïs, *female name* AEL. *VH.* 1.26 etc.

Ἀγλαίων -ωνος, ὁ Aglaion, *male name* PLAT. *Rp.* 439e

ἀγλαόβοτρυς -υ [ἀγλαός, βότρυς] **with splendid bunches** NONN. *D.* 18.4 • *gen.* -υος.

ἀγλαόγυις -ον [ἀγλαός, γυῖον] **with beautiful limbs** PIND. *N.* 7.4

ἀγλαόδενδρος -ον [ἀγλαός, δένδρον] **with beautiful trees** PIND. *O.* 9.20

ἀγλαοδίνης -ου, ὁ [ἀγλαός, δίνη] **with beautiful eddies** PHIB. 172.106 (III^a)

ἀγλαόδωρος -ον [ἀγλαός, δῶρον] **of splendid gifts** HOM. 2.54, *al.* IEG 1062.5 (*Mary*)

ἀγλαοειδής -ές [ἀγλαός, εἶδος] **of noble aspect** PLOND.LIT. *N.* 38.26 (III^p)

ἀγλαοεργός -όν [ἀγλαός, ἔργον] **of splendid deeds** MAX. 68

ἀγλαοθηλές [ἀγλαός, θήλυς] **tender, delicate** HSCH

ἀγλαόθρονος -ον [ἀγλαός, θρόνος] **with splendid throne** PIND. *O.* 13.96, *N.* 10.1 (*Danaids*) BACCHYL. *Dith.* 17.124 (*Nereids*)

ἀγλαόθυμος -ον [ἀγλαός, θυμός] **with noble heart** COMET. (AP. 15.40.25)

ἀγλαόκαρπος -ον [ἀγλαός, καρπός] ☐ **with splendid fruits** OD. 7.115, *al.* HOM. 2.4, 23 etc. ☐ **with beautiful wrists** PIND. *N.* 3.56 (*Tethys*: v.l., see ἀγλαόκολπος)

ἀγλαόκοιτος [ἀγλαός, κοίτη] **very precious, dear** PHOT. *Lex.* L. *Sud*

ἀγλαόκολπος -ον [ἀγλαός, κόλπος] **with splendid bosom** PIND. *N.* 3.56

ἀγλαόκουρος -ον [ἀγλαός, κούρος] **with splendid youth, of Corinth** PIND. *O.* 13.6

Ἀγλαοκρέων -οντος, ὁ Aglaokreon, *male name* AESCHN. 2.20, 126

ἀγλαόκωμος -ον [ἀγλαός, κῶμος] **giving splendor to the feast, of a voice** PIND. *O.* 3.6

ἀγλαομειδής -ές [ἀγλαός, μεῖδω] **with a splendid smile, of Eros** IBULG. 1579.5 (II^p)

ἀγλαόμητης -ου, ὁ **of rare wisdom** ISEG 36.1198.8 (IV^p)

ἀγλαομητία -ας, ἡ [ἀγλαόμητις] **great wisdom** L. *Sud*

ἀγλαόμητις -ιος [ἀγλαός, μήτις] **of rare wisdom** GREG. *Carm.* 1.2.339.3 TRIPHOD. 183 PROCL. *Hym.* 5.10

ἀγλαόμολπος -ον [ἀγλαός, μολπή] **of beautiful song** PHARRIS 7.8 (II-III^p)

ἀγλαομορφέομαι, *contr.* [ἀγλαόμορφος] *pass.* to be endowed with beautiful forms PPGM 13.143

ἀγλαόμορφος -ον [ἀγλαός, μορφή] **of beautiful form** AP. 9.524.2 etc.

Ἀγλαονίκη -ης, ἡ Aglaonike, *female name* HEDYL. (AP. 5.199.1) etc.

ἀγλαόπαις -παιδος [ἀγλαός, παῖς] **with beautiful children** OPP. 2.41 | **with beautiful offspring** IEG 896.1 || *fig.* **splendid**: ἄ. ἀοιδῇ marvellous song P¹. *Amb.* 112

ἀγλαόπεπλος -ον [ἀγλαός, πέπλος] **with a beautiful veil, of a peplos** QS. 11.240

ἀγλαόπηγης -υ [ἀγλαός, πήγυς] **with splendid arms** NONN. *D.* 32.80 • *gen.* -εος.

ἀγλαόπιστος -ον [ἀγλαός, πιστός] **splendidly faithful** HSCH

ἀγλαοποιέω, *contr.* [ἀγλαός, ποιέω] **to make famous** AMMI¹. 17.4.19 (*aor. ptc.* ἀγλαοποιήσας).

ἀγλαΐος -α -ον [ἀγλαός] **splendid** /MAMA 3.79.2, see ἀγλαός.

ἀγλαΐός -ῃ -όν [see γέλαω ?] ☐ **splendid, magnificent, beautiful, of water** IL. 2.307 | *of limbs* IL. 19.385 HES. *Op.* 337 BACCHYL. *Dith.* 17.103 | *of gifts* IL. 1.213, *al.* | *of works* OD. 10.223 | *of a wood* IL. 2.506 etc. | ἀγλαὸν ἀνδρὶ μάχεσθαι it is fair (glorious) for a man to fight CALLIN. 1.6 ☐ **il-lustrious, noble, glorious, of pers.** IL. 2.736, *al.* BACCHYL. *Dith.* 17.2 etc. | *iron.* κέρει ἀγλαέ you, proud of your horn i.e. bow IL. 11.385 • *fem.* -ός THGN. 985 EUR. *Andr.* 135 || *ep.* and *lyr.* in *trag.* only SOPH. *OT.* 152 (*lyr.*) and EUR. *Lc.* | *Aeol.* ἄγλαος THEOCR. 28.3 • *adv.* ἀγλαῶς **splendidly** ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 640.

Ἀγλαός -οῦ, ὁ Aglaos, *male name* DION¹². (AP. 7.78.5) etc.

ἀγλαότευκτος -ον [ἀγλαός, τεύχω] **splendidly built** OR. *Sib.* 14.130

ἀγλαότιμος -ον [ἀγλαός, τιμή] **splendidly hon-ored** ORPH. *H.* 12.8

ἀγλαοτρίαινα [ἀγλαός, τρίαινα] *epith.* **lord of the bright trident, of Poseidon** PIND. *O.* 1.40 (*acc.* -αινάν).

Ἀγλαόφαμος, ὁ Dor. Aglaophamos IAMBLL¹. *Pyth.* 28.146 etc.

ἀγλαόφαντον, τό [ἀγλαός, φαίνω] *bot.* **peony, plant** CCA 8.35.154

ἀγλαοφάρης -ές [ἀγλαός, φᾶρος] **with splendid clothing** OR. *Sib.* 3.454

ἀγλαοφάργης -ές [ἀγλαός, φέγγος] **with vivid splendor** MAX. 189 etc.

ἀγλαόφημος -ον [ἀγλαός, φήμη] **of splendid fame** SIM. IEG 10.5, *al.* ORPH. *H.* 31.4

ἀγλαόφοιτος -ον [ἀγλαός, φοιτάω] **living splendidly** MAX. 403

ἀγλαοφορέω, [ἀγλαός, φέρω] **to bear splendid gifts (of earth)** VETT. 330.19

ἀγλαόφορτος -ον [ἀγλαός, φορέω] **carrying a splendid load** NONN. *D.* 7.253

Ἀγλαοφῶν -ώντος, ὁ Aglaophon SIM. (AP. 9.700.1) PLAT. *Gorg.* 448b, *Ion* 532e

ἀγλαόφωνος -ον [ἀγλαός, φωνή] **with a beautiful voice** PROCL. *Hym.* 3.2 etc.

ἀγλαοφῶτις -ιδος, ἡ [ἀγλαός, φῶς] *bot.* **peony, plant** DIOSC². 3.140 PLIN. 24.160 AEL. *NA.* 14.24 • *also* -όφωτις.

ἀγλαοχαίτας -α [ἀγλαός, χαίτη] **with splendid locks** PIND. *Pae.* 7e.2

ἀγλαόχαρτος -ον [ἀγλαός, χαίρω] **radiant with joy** AP. 15.11.8 (*doub.*)

Ἀγλαΐπιος, ὁ Lac. Asklepios IIG 5.1.1313 (V^a)

ἀγλασινός -όν [ἀγλαός] **beautiful** HSCH

ἀγλαΐσμα -ατος, τό [ἀγλαΐζω] **splendor, beauty, ornament, offering** AESCHL. *Ag.* 1312 (*perfume*) SOPH. *El.* 908 EUR. *El.* 325, *Hel.* 11 etc.; εἶναι τόδ' ἀγλαΐσμά μοι τοῦ φιλάττου βροτῶν Ὀρέστου that this is an offering of Orestes, dearest to me of mortals AESCHL. *Ch.* 193; τό ἄ. τό ἐμὸν τε καὶ

Δελφῶν my pride and that of Delphi HLD. 3.6.2 | *of a rose* ACH. 2.2 • *poet.* and *later*

ἀγλαΐσμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγλαΐζω] **ornament** PLAT. *Ax.* 369d

ἀγλαΐστός -ῃ -όν [ἀγλαΐζω] **adorned, splendid** [IO.] *HPs.* 76.4 10.745C

Ἀγλαΐτάδας -α, ὁ Aglaítadas, *male name* XEN. *Cyr.* 2.2.11

ἀγλαυρός -ον [ἀγλαός] NIC. *Th.* 62, 441, see ἀγλαός.

Ἀγλαυρός -ου, ἡ Aglauros, *female name* HDT. 8.53.1 PLUT. *Alc.* 15.7 etc. | *in an oath* μὰ τὴν Ἀγλαυρον by Aglauros ARISTOPH. *Th.* 533 • v.l. Ἀγραιν-.

ἀγλαφύρος [γλαφυρός] *adv.* **inelegantly** ATH. 15.677f etc.

ἀγλαῶψ -ώπος [ἀγλαός, ὤψ] **shining** SOPH. *OT.* 214

ἀγλευκής -ές [γλεύκος] **without sweetness, sour, harsh** XEN. *Hier.* 1.21 (*compar.*) ARISTOT. *Pr.* 877b 25 LUC. 46.6 (*wine*) || *fig.* **sour, irritable, of pers.** EPICHR. 140 || **harsh, of style** HERMOG. *Id.* 195.16 LGN. *Rh.* 410.16 || *compar.* -έστερος • *irreg. acc.* ἀγλευκην NIC. *Al.* 171 • *adv.* ἀγλευκῶς **harshly** PHILOSTR. *Ap.* 4.39.

ἀγλευκος -ον SCH. NIC. *Al.* 171a, b, see ἀγλευκής.

ἀγλευκῶς *adv.*, see ἀγλευκής.

ἀγληνός -ον [γλήνη] **without eyes, blind** NONN. *En.* 9.6

ἀγλίδια [ἀγλῖς] **cloves of garlic** HSCH. *L.* *EM.*, see ἀγλῖς.

ἀγλιθᾶριον -ου, τό [ἀγλῖς] **small clove of garlic** RUF. (ORIB. 8.39.10)

ἀγλῖς -ίδος, ἡ [see γέλγῖς] **clove of garlic** HP. *Mul.* 2.188 ANTYYL. (ORIB. 8.16.3) DIOSC². 2.152 etc. || *pl.* **head or bulb of garlic** ARISTOPH. *Ach.* 763, *Ve.* 680 CALLIM. *fr.* 495, 657 etc. • *gen.* -ίδος CHOEROB. *Theod.* p. 327.9 | *pl.* -ίδες -ίδων CALLIM. *ll. cc.* NIC. *Th.* 874.

ἀγλισχρός -ον [γλίσχρος] **not sticky** HP. *Prorrh.* 1 GAL. 4.528 (v.l.) etc.

ἀγλίτης -ου, ὁ **inhabitant** L. *EM*

ἀγλυ *swan* HSCH

ἀγλυκής -ές [γλυκύς] THPHR. *CP.* 6.14.12, 6.18.8, see ἀγλυκή.

ἀγλύφος -ον [γλύφω] **uncut, rough, of stone** SCH. *SOPH.* *OC.* 100

Ἀγλωμάχος -ου, ὁ Aglomachos HDT. 4.164.2

ἀγλωσσία, *Att.* ἀγλωσσία -ας, ἡ [ἀγλωσσο] **lack of eloquence** EUR. *fr.* 56 ANTIPH¹ 97b

ἀγλωσσο, *Att.* ἀγλωστος -ον [γλωσσο] ☐ **without a tongue, of the crocodile** ARISTOT. *PA.* 690b 23 || **without a reed, of a flute** POLL. 2.108 ☐ **lacking eloquence** PIND. *N.* 8.24 etc. || **dumb** ARCH. (AP. 7.191.5) ☐ **barbarous, i.e., not knowing the Greek language** SOPH. *Tr.* 1060

Ἀγλωχαρτος -ου, ὁ Aglochartos AP. 15.11.8 (v.l.) IIG 12.1.783 (*priest*)

1. ἄγμα -ατος, τό [ἀγνυμι] **fragment** IIG 2².1648.12 (IV^a) PLUT. *Phil.* 6.10 || **fracture** PALL¹. in *Fract.* 18.9

2. ἄγμα, τό **nasalized g (sound)** Ion. 3a PRISC¹. 2.30.16 (Varro) • **doubtful accentuation.**

ἀγμῆρος -όν *tranquil* HSCH

ἀγμῆς -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγνυμι] ☐ **fracture** HP. *title* GAL. 16.532 (*title*) ☐ **crag** EUR. *IT.* 263, *Bac.* 1094 NIC. *Al.* 391 etc.

Ἀγναίος -ου, ὁ Agnaios, *name of a month in Halos* IIG 9.2.109a 28 (II^a)

ἀγναιώτης -ου, ὁ **burned to a great extent** HSCH

ἀγνᾶκρος -ου, ὁ SCH. NIC. *Th.* 71 (*doub.* for -κοπος), see ἀνᾶγυρος.

ἀγναμπτοπόλεμος [ἀγναμπτος, πόλεμος] **unbending in war, invincible** HSCH

ἀγναμπτος -ον [γνάμπτω] **inflexible, unaffected** BACCHYL. *Epin.* 9.73 (*doub.*) AESCHL. *Pr.* 163

PLUT. *CMi.* 11.4 (*subst. neut.*) P¹. (AP. 16.278.3) etc. • also ἀκ-.

ἀγναπτος -ον [κνάπτω] **A** not fulled, new, of fabrics PLUT. 46.691c etc. **B** not washed PLUT. 14.169c

ἀγνατικός -όν [Lat. agnaticus] pertaining to relatives, on the father's side: *subst.* τὰ ἀγνατικά rights of relatives ATHANAS¹. coll. 3.4

ἀγναφάριος maker of fabrics I MAMA 3.252 etc., also ἀκνα-.

ἀγναφος -ον [see ἀγναπτος] not fulled NT. Mat. 9.16, Mar. 2.21 P^{CAIR}.ZEN. 92.16 (III^a) etc., see ἀγναπτος.

ἀγναφρχης -ου, ὁ [ἀγνός, ἀρχω] religious official at Ephesos IEPH. 1045.5 (II^p) (list of κούρητες).

ἀγνεία -ας, ἡ [ἀγνέω] **A** purity, chastity ANTIPHO 2.1.10 GAL. 11.808: εὐσεπτον ἀγνείαν λόγων reverent purity of words SOPH. OT. 864 etc. | **Christ. chastity, virginity** ORIG. Hler. 20.4 etc. **B** pl. consecration, purification PLAT. Leg. 909e ISOCR. 11.21 HP. MS. 1 etc. **C** name of the number seven ARISTID². 3.6

Ἀγνε(τ)ών -ώνος, ὁ (sc. μῆν) Agneion, name of a month in Magnesia IMAGN. 100a 2 al.

ἀγνευμα -ατος, τό [ἀγνέω] chastity EUR. Tr. 501; ἄ. θεῖον vow of chastity EUR. El. 256

ἀγνευτήριον -ου, τό [ἀγνέω] place of purification CHAEREM¹. 6 AG. Bek. 267 etc. | **Christ., of a monastery** GREG. Or. 4.111.8; of a church GREG. Carm. 1.2.34.224

ἀγνευτικός -ή -όν [ἀγνέω] **A** inclined to chastity ARISTOT. HA. 488b 5 **B** purificatory, expiatory PHIL². Deus 8, Mos. 2.149

ἀγνεύτρια -ας, ἡ [ἀγνέω] female purifier GLOSS ἀγνέω [ἀγνός] *impf.* ἡγνεύον || *fut.* ἀγνεύσω || *aor.* ἡγνευσα || *pf.* ἡγνευκα || *ptc.* *mid. pass.* ἡγνευμένος POLL. 1.25 || *ppf.* ἡγνεύκεν THEODORET¹. QuReg. (PG 80.576.27) **A** ► *abs.* to be pure AESCHL. Suppl. 226 PLAT. Leg. 837c HP. MS. 1 etc.; χεῖρας ἄ. to have pure hands EUR. IT. 1227, al. | ► *with gen.* to keep oneself pure ► τινος from sthg. DEMOSTH. 2.78 LUC. 49.5 etc. | ► *with inf.* to consider it pure (as religious duty) HDT. 1.140.3 **B** to purify ANTIPHO 3.2.11; ► τινος of sthg. PHILOD. LL. 55.11 **C** **Christ.** to live in chastity CLEM. Hom. 40.5 etc.

ἀγνέω Dor. IIG 9².1.79.5 (II^a). (*pf.* *ptc.* ἀγνηκώς), see ἀγω.

ἀγνεών -ώνος, ὁ [ἀγνός] place of purification CLEAR¹. 43a (iron.)

Ἀγνιάδης -ου, ὁ [Ἀγνίας] son of Hagnias AP. 1.105 etc.

Ἀγνίας -ου, ὁ Hagnias, male name DEMOSTH. 43.3 etc.

ἀγνιασμός -ου, ὁ VT. Num. 8.7 (v.L.), see ἀγνισμός.

ἀγνίζω [ἀγνός] *impf.* ἡγνίζον, *mid. pass.* ἡγνιζόμεν || *fut.* ἀγνίσω, Att. ἀγνίω CYR¹. Is. (PG 70.40.36) || *aor.* ἡγνισα || *pf.* ἡγνικα, *mid. pass.* ἡγνισμαι || *aor. pass.* ἡγνίσθην || *fut. pass.* ἀγνισθήσομαι **1** act. **A** to purify, cleanse, wash SOPH. Ai. 655 EUR. IT. 1039 PLUT. 18.263e (= καθαίρειν "with fire"); χεῖρας σὰς ἀγνίσας μιάσμα-τος after having purified your hands from pollution EUR. HF. 1324 | **Christ.** to purify, through baptism IUSTIN. Dial. 86.6 (PG 6.68C) **B** with fire to burn, destroy SOPH. Ant. 545, fr. 116 etc. **C** to sacrifice EUR. fr. 314 **2** *mid.* **A** to purify oneself PLUT. 73.1105b VT. Chr. 1.15.12, al. NT. Apost. 21.24 **B** to abstain: ἀπὸ οἴνου from wine VT. Num. 6.3 **C** **Christ.** to offer oneself in expiatory sacrifice: ὑπὲρ τινος for s.o. IGN. Eph. 8.1, al. **3** *pass.* **A** to be purified: ἵνα ... σώμασ' ἡγνίσθῃ πυρὶ where their bodies were purified by fire EUR. Suppl. 1211 | **Christ.**: *subst. ptc.* οἱ ἀγνιζόμενοι the purified (through baptism) METH. Symp.

8.9.194 **B** to be consecrated ARISTONOUS 1.17; ἀμφὶ βωμὸν ἀγνισθεὶς φόνω consecrated with blood at the altar EUR. IT. 705

ἀγνινος -η -ον [ἀγνός] of chaste tree PLUT. 46.693f etc.

ἀγνισμα -ατος, τό [ἀγνίζω] means or object of purification, expiation AESCHL. Eum. 327 VT. Num. 19.9

ἀγνισμός -ου, ὁ [ἀγνίζω] DION. 3.22.8 VT. Num. 6.5 PLUT. 26.418 b etc., see ἀγνισμα || **Christ.** purification of baptism METH. Symp. 8.9.192 etc. || **purity, sanctity** GREG. Carm. 1.2.34.171 etc.

ἀγνιστέος -α -ον [ἀγνίζω] *verb. adj.* it is necessary to purify EUR. IT. 1199

ἀγνιστήριον -ου, τό [ἀγνίζω] instrument for purification HERO Ph. 2.32

ἀγνιστής -ου, ὁ [ἀγνίζω] purifier GLOSS

ἀγνιστικός -ή -όν [ἀγνίζω] purificatory EUSTATH. 43.6

Ἀγνίτας -α, ὁ Dor. Hagnitas, *epith.* of Asklepios PAUS. 3.14.7

ἀγνίτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγνός] **A** purifier LYC. 135 POLL. 1.24 **B** one who requires purification AG. Bek. 338 HSCH

ἀγνόδικος -ον [ἀγνός, δίκη] conscious of the just HSCH. PHOT. Lex. AG. Bek. 338

Ἀγνόδορος -ου, ὁ Agnodoros, male name LYS. 13.55

ἀγνόεω, *contr.* [γῆγνώσκω] *impf.* ἡγνόουν, *mid. pass.* ἡγνούμεν || *fut.* ἀγνοήσω *mid.* ἀγνοήσομαι (*with pass. signif.*) || *aor.* ἡγνόησα || *pf.* ἡγνόηκα, *mid. pass.* ἡγνόημαι || *ppf.* ἡγνόηκεν, *mid. pass.* ἡγνόημεν || *aor. pass.* ἡγνόηθην || *fut. pass.* ἀγνοηθήσομαι **1** act. **A** ► *gener.* with acc. not to know, not recognize OD. 20.15, al. PLAT. Phaedr. 228a HP. VM. 21 etc. **B** not to know, not perceive, be ignorant of HDT. 4.156.1 SOPH. Tr. 78, al. etc. | not to understand NT. Mar. 9.32 etc. | ► *with other constr.* ἄ. περί τινος to be ignorant of sthg. PLAT. Phaedr. 277d | ► *with gen. and rel. cl.* ἀγνούοντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέγομεν (we never ceased) failing to understand what the other was saying PLAT. Gorg. 517c | ► *with ptc.* τίς ... ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκείθεν πόλεμον δευρ' ἤξοντα who does not see that the war begun there will be transferred here? DEMOSTH. 1.15 | ► *with ὅτι or ὡς* that DEMOSTH. 2.115.6 etc. | ► *with εἰ* if XEN. An. 6.5.12 | ► *with inf.* VT. Sal. 7.12 | ► *with pred. ptc.* agreeing with subj. ἡγνόουν αἰτοῦσα ... κατ' ἐμαυ-τὴς φάρμακον without knowing it I asked for the potion (prepared) against me ACH. 5.25.3; ἀγνῶν ἐποίησα I acted ignorantly NT. Tim. 1.1.13 **C** ► *abs.* to be in error (out of ignorance) HP. Art. 46 ISOCR. 8.39 etc.; ἀγνῶν by mistake XEN. An. 7.3.38; ἀγνούοντες ἀμαρτάνουσιν they err out of ignorance ARISTOT. Rh. 1402b 10 | *mor.* VT. Lev. 4.13, al. NT. Heb. 5.2 POL. 5.11.5 etc. **D** often with neg. not to be ignorant of, know well VT. Sal. 12.10 etc. **2** *mid.* to err GAL. 14.630 **3** *pass.* not to be known, be unknown PLAT. Euthyph. 4a etc.; δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνούμενα ὅπη ποτέ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν the just and the beautiful, if their relation to the good is not known PLAT. Rp. 506a; ἡγνοῖσθαι (φημί) σύμπασιν ὅτι I say that all are ignorant that PLAT. Leg. 797a • *contr. pres.* ἀγνώω, *epic* ἀγνοίεω, *pres. subj.* 3. sg. *epic* ἀγνοίῃσι || *epic aor.* ἡγνοίησα, *iter.* 3. sg. ἀγνώσασκε.

ἀγνόημα -ατος, τό [ἀγνόεω] **A** error (through ignorance), oversight GORG. 11.19 THPHR. HP. 9.4.8 VT. Tob. 3.3, al. NT. Heb. 9.7 PLUT. 46.698a etc. **B** ignorance STRAB. 7.2.4 etc. || **object of ignorance** DAMASC. Pr. 7

ἀγνοηματιζω [ἀγνόημα] to fail to observe VT. (Aq.) Ps. 118.10 (*aor. subj.* 2. sg. ἀγνοηματίσης).

ἀγνόησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγνόεω] ignorance PHILOD. D. 1.7.32

ἀγνοητέον [ἀγνόεω] *verb. adj.* with neg. οὐκ it is necessary to not fail to note DIOSC². pref. 7 PHIL². Abr. 53, al.

Ἀγνοητής -ου, ὁ [ἀγνόεω] Agnoetes, member of a Monophysitic sect LEONTB. Sect. 10.3 etc.

ἀγροητικός -ή -όν [ἀγνόεω] erroneous (through ignorance) ARISTOT. EE. 1246a 38

ἀγρόητος -η -ον [ἀγνόεω] ignored DAMASC. Pr. 6 (*subst. neut.*) ♦ *adv.* ἀγρόητως mistakenly, wrongly THEODORET¹. Trin. 23

Ἀγρόθεμις, ὁ Agnothemis, male name PLUT. Alex. 77.3

Ἀγρόθεος -ου, ὁ Agnotheos, male name Is. 4.1 etc.

ἀγροια -ας, ἡ [ἀγνόεω] **A** ignorance AESCHL. Ag. 1596 SOPH. Tr. 350 THUC. 8.92.11 XEN. Cyr. 3.1.38 etc. || *philos.* PLAT. Rp. 477a, al.; ἡ τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄ. ignorance of the method of refutation (= ignoratio elenchi) ARISTOT. SE. 168a 18, al. || *opp.* to γνώσις: φωτισμός ... ἡ γνώσις ἐστίν, ὁ ἐξαφανίζει τὴν ἄ. knowledge is an illumination which effaces ignorance CLEM. Paed. 1.6.29.4, al. etc. **B** lack of knowledge, innocence: ἐγρωσαν ... ὅρκοις πιστοῦσθαι τὴν ἀγροίαν they decided ... to affirm with oaths their own innocence HLD. 9.11.4 **C** mistake, mistaken conduct DEMOSTH. 18.133, *epist.* 2.19 VT. Esd. 1.9.20 POL. 27.2.2 **D** med. loss of consciousness HP. Epid. 7.85 • *poet.* (Att.) -οία | Ion. -οίη.

ἀγροίησι *pres. subj.* act. 3. sg. *ep.* see ἀγνόεω.

ἀγρόκοικκος -ου, ὁ [ἀγνός, κόικκος] fruit of the chaste tree GAL. 14.55a etc.

ἀγροσύντως [ἀγνόεω] *adv.* from the pres. *ptc.* act. out of ignorance ARISTOT. Top. 114b 10

ἀγροποιός -όν [ἀγνός, ποιέω] making pure or holy CYR¹. Is. 2.776B, al. etc.

ἀγροπολέωμαι, *contr.* [ἀγροπόλος] to be purified HSCH. PHOT. Lex

ἀγροπόλος -ον [ἀγνός, πέλομαι] purifier ORPH. H. 18.12, A. 38

ἀγροούτος -ον [ἀγνός, ῥέω] with pure flow AESCHL. Pr. 434

1. ἀγνός -ου, ὁ, ἡ bot. chaste tree HOM. 4.410 PLAT. Phaedr. 230b (*masc.*) HP. NatMul. 32, al. DIOSC². 1.103 GAL. 11.807 etc. | **Christ.** symbol of chastity METH. Symp. 9.4.252

2. ἀγνός, ὁ ornit. agno, bird L. Sud. titiol. fish DIPHT². (ATH. 8.356a: *corr.* in ἀγνός).

ἀγνός -ή -όν [see ἄζω *signif.* 2] **A** pure, holy, sacred, chaste, of places and things HOM. 4.187 (wood) PIND. P. 4.204 (*sanctuary*) AESCHL. Pr. 280 (*ether*) SOPH. EL. 86 (*light*), Tr. 287 (*sacrifices*) EUR. Ion 243 (*oracle*) etc. | *subst.* τὰ ἀγνά chastity: τὰ ἀγνά τῆς παρθενίας chaste virginity VT. Mac. 4.18.8 || **upright, honest** XEN. Symp. 8.15 (*friendship*) etc.; μεγάλων ἀθέλων ἀγνὴν κρίσιν the pure (correct) judgment of the great games (at Olympia) PIND. O. 3.21; ὅσα ἀγνά ... ταῦτα λογίζεσθε give thought to whatever is pure NT. Phil. 4.8 **B** pure, holy, sacred, casto, of gods and men OD. 5.123, al. (Artemis) HOM. 2.203 (Demeter) PIND. P. 9.64 (Apollo) AESCHL. Suppl. 653 (Zeus) SOPH. Ph. 1289 (Zeus) EUR. Hip. 102 (Hippolytus) NT. Io. 1.3.3 (God), Cor. 2.11.2 (*virgin*) etc. || **free of guilt, innocent** SOPH. Ant. 889, al. EUR. Or. 1604, al. NT. Cor. 2.7.11; ἀγνάς χεῖρας αἵματος hands pure of blood EUR. Ph. 316; φόνου ἄ. not guilty of murder PLAT. Leg. 759c; Δάματρος ἀκτάς ... ἄ. pure from Demeter's grain, i.e. fasting EUR. Hip. 138 **C** of animals never yoked AESCHL. Pers. 611 (*heifer*) ♦ *adv.* ἀγνώως purely, holily HOM. 3.121 HES. Op. 337 XEN. Mem. 3.8.10 etc.

ἀγρόστομος -ον [ἀγρός, στόμα] **with pure mouth** TZ. *Hist.* 6.36
 ἀγροσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγρός] **purity** PHILOD. *D.* 3 fr. 76
 ἀγροτελής -ές [ἀγρός, τέλος] **with holy rites, of Themis** ORPH. A. 549
 ἀγρότης -ητος, ἡ [ἀγρός] **purity, chastity** NT. *Cor.* 2.6.6 DION²¹. *EH.* 6.1.3 (532D) etc.
 ἀγροτόκος -ον [ἀγρός, τίκτω] **bearing purification, of the waters of baptism** SOPHRON. *Carm.* 5.98
 ἀγροτάφης -ές [ἀγρός, τρέφω] **raised in purity** PSB 6647.9
 Ἀγροῦς -οῦντος, ὁ **Agnous, Attic deme** SOL. fr. 473 M. (STEPH¹. s.v.) • **also with rough breathing** A.
 Ἀγροῦσιος -ου [Ἀγροῦσιος] **of Agnous** AESCHN. 2.1.13 PLUT. *Thes.* 13.4 etc. • **also with rough breathing** A.
 Ἀγρόφιλος -ου, ὁ **Hagnophilos, male name** DEMOSTH. 47.60 etc.
 ἀγρόφυτος -ον [ἀγρός, φύω] **of pure stock** IGVI 1245.1 (II-III^p)
 ἀγρύμι [cf. *Toch.* A, B wak-] ❶ **act. to break, smash** IL. 7.270, al. OD. 3.298, al. ACHAE. fr. 26.1 AP. 16.250.1 ❷ **mid. and pass. and pf. act. to break, be smashed** IL. 3.367, al. OD. 10.123, al.; *περί δέ σφισι δέ γυρτο ἡχώ and around them an echo crashed* HES. Sc. 279, 348; *ποταμός περί καμπάς πολλάς ἀγρύμιενος river breaking into many turns, i.e. with a winding course* HDT. 1.185.6; *ἀγρυμένη δ' ὑπ' ὀδόντι (bait) broken with its teeth* APOLLON¹. (AP. 7.702.5) • **impf. mid. (κατ)εαγρύμινη, 3. sg. poet. ἀγρυτο || fut. ἄξω IL. 8.403 (in tm.: κατ-) || aor. ἔαξε, ep. Ion. ἦξε || subj. 3. sg. ἄξη || opt. 2. sg. ἄξαις, 3. pl. ἄξειαν || inf. ἄξει || ptc. ἄξας || pf. ἔαγα (with pass. signif.). Ion. (κατ)έγγα, mid. pass. (κατ)έαγμα || aor. pass. ἔαγην; ἔαγην IL. 11.559, epic 3. sg. ἄγη, pl. ἄγεν || *gener. poet.: act. never in prose, mid. pass. only* HDT. *l.c.*; *ordin. used in compd. κατ'ἀγρύμι.*
 ἀγρύς -ύθος, ἡ **stone for weaving** PLUT. 13.156 (pl.)
 ἀγρώδης -ες [ἀγρός] *f.l.* THPHR. *HP.* 3.18.4, *see ἀκανθώδης.*
 ἀγρωμονεύω PLUT. 31.484a (ἀγρωμονούμενος) (*codd.*), *see ἀγρωμονεύω.*
 ἀγρωμονέω, *contr.* [ἀγρώμων] **impf. ἡγρωμόουν, mid. pass. ἡγρωμονούμην** SEVER. in «ZKTh», 31 (1907), p. 153.21 || *fut. ἀγρωμονήσω || aor. ἡγρωμόνησα || pf. ἡγρωμόνηκα || ppf. 3. pl. ἡγρωμόνηκεσαν* DEMOSTH. 18.94 || *aor. pass. ἡγρωμονήσθην || fut. pass. ἀγρωμονήσῃμαι* ❶ **act. [A] to be imprudent, inconsiderate, to act disloyally, unfeelingly** XEN. *Hel.* 1.7.33; ► *εἰς τινα towards s.o.* DEMOSTH. *Lc.* MEN. *Sam.* 637 = ► *πρός τινα* MEN. *Sam.* 248 etc. = ► *περί τινα* PLUT. *Alc.* 19.4; *τῶν δέ Κελτῶν περὶ τὸν σταθμὸν ἀγρωμονούντων because the Gauls cheated concerning the weight* PLUT. *Cam.* 28.5 [B] **to treat unjustly, badly, with acc.** HIM. 6.31 ❷ **pass. to be mistreated** PLUT. 17.249e, *Cam.* 18.7
 ἀγρωμοσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγρώμων] [A] **ignorance** PLAT. *Theat.* 199d [B] **lack of discernment, stupidity** THGN. 896 etc. || **senseless severity** HDT. 2.17.2, al. EUR. *Bac.* 885 [C] **insensitivity, harshness** DEMOSTH. 18.252; ἄ. τύχης iniquity of fortune DEMOSTH. 18.207.2 [D] **ingratitude** LUC. 38.16 CYR³. *Cat.* 7.2 etc. [E] **misunderstanding, incomprehension** XEN. *An.* 2.5.6 (pl.) etc.
 ἀγρώμων -ον, *gen.* -ονος [γνώμη] [A] **imprudent, inconsiderate, senseless** PIND. *O.* 8.60; *καρτερὸς ἀγρώμων στέφανος a hefty crown of foolishness* THGN. 1260; *τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ τὰ ἀγνώμονα voiceless and senseless objects* AESCHN. 3.244; *ἐνδύσθων ὡς παντάπασιν ἀγρωμον ποιεῖς consider how utterly unreasonably you are acting* LUC. 54.24 [B] **unfeeling, harsh, ungrateful****

XEN. *Mem.* 2.8.5 (*sup.*), CYR. 8.3.49 (*comp.*) || *of things: σε ... φρονούσαν θνητὰ κοῦκ ἀγνώμονα that you have mortal (human) and not unfeeling thoughts* SOPH. *Tr.* 473 [C] **headstrong, arrogant, cruel, ruthless** HDT. 9.41.4 (*comp.*) SOPH. *OC.* 86 XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.26; ὦ θάνατε, σωφρόνισμα τῶν ἀγνώμων οὐ death, warning to the arrogant! ARISTAR. fr. 3; ὦ θάλασσα ἀγρωμον οὐ cruel sea! ACH. 3.23.4 [D] **ignorant, inexperienced** HP. *Vict.* 1.6. PLAT. *Phaedr.* 275b, al. || *compar. -έστερος || superl. -έστατος* • **adv. ἀγρωμόνως imprudently, inconsiderately, disloyally** DEMOSTH. 2.26 XEN. *Hel.* 6.3.11 PLUT. 38.352d || **ungratefully, thanklessly** GREG¹. *VMacr.* 21.4 etc. • ἄγν- MEN¹. 5.338.
 Ἀγρων -ωνος, ὁ **Hagnon, male name** THUC. 2.58.1 etc.
 Ἀγρωνίος -α -ον [Ἀγρων] **of Agnon** THUC. 5.11.1 Ἀγρωνίδης -ου, ὁ **Hagnonides, male name** PLUT. *Phoc.* 29.4 etc.
 ἀγνώριστος -ον [γνώριζω] **not recognized, unknown** THPHR. *HP.* 1.2.3
 ἀγνώς -ῶτος [γινώσκω] [A] **unknown, unfamiliar** OD. 5.79 ARISTOPH. *Ec.* 640 THUC. 1.137.2; ἀγνώς πρὸς ἀγνῶτ' εἶπε a man, unknown to me, spoke to me, unknown to him AESCHL. *Ch.* 677; *παῖδα τόνδ' ἀγνῶτ' ἐμοί this boy unknown to me* SOPH. *Ph.* 1008; ἀγνώς δέ πατρί unknown to her father EUR. *Ion* 14 || **not known, obscure** PIND. *I.* 2.12 EUR. *IA.* 18; ἐκ βίου ταπεινοῦ καὶ ἀγνώτος from his lowly and obscure existence PLUT. *Sul.* 3.8 etc. [B] **incomprehensible, obscure: ἀγνώτα φωνήν βάββαρον an unknown barbarous tongue AESCHL. *Ag.* 1051; ἀγνώτα ... φθόγγον ὀρνίθων an unintelligible noise of birds SOPH. *Ant.* 1001 [C] **not knowing or recognizing, ignorant: ἀγνῶτ' ἀναμνήσω νιν I shall remind him, even if he does not remember SOPH. *OT.* 1133; σοῦ μὲν τυχὼν ἀγνώτος having found you incapable of understanding me SOPH. *OT.* 677; εἰ δέ τις ... ἀγνώς εἴη τι δύναται φέρειν ἡ γῆ if one is ignorant about what the earth can produce XEN. *Oec.* 20.13 || ► **with gen. not knowing, unaware** THUC. 3.53.4 ARISTOT. *SE.* 178a 26; οὐτ' ἀγνώτα θηρῶν (land) not acquainted with wild animals PIND. *P.* 9.58
 ἀγνώσασκε *iter. aor. ind. see ἀγνώσεω.*
 ἀγνώστια -ας, ἡ [ἀγνώς] [A] **ignorance (opp. to γνώσις)** PLAT. *Soph.* 267b HP. *MS.* 14, al. | **with gen.** THUC. 8.66.3; *συμφορὰς ἀγνώσις not knowing the circumstances of the misfortune* EUR. *Med.* 1204 etc. || *theol. as a super-rational and mystical knowledge of God: ἡ κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον παντελής ἡ γνώσις ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ γινωσκόμενα perfect ignorance in a good sense-is the knowledge of him who is above all known things* DION²¹. *epist.* 1 [B] **obscurity** PLAT. *Menex.* 238d [C] **lack of acquaintance: ἀμίζια ... καὶ ἀγνώστια keeping to oneself and not having acquaintances** LUC. 25.42
 ἀγνώσσω [ἀγνώς] **not to know** MUS¹. 249 COLUTH. 8 LUC. 70.25 etc., *see ἀγνώεω* • **only pres., gener. poet.**
 ἀγνώστεος -α -ον [ἀγνώσω] **it is necessary to ignore: οὐκ ἀγνώστεον it is necessary to not ignore** DID¹. fr. Ps. 563.3
 ἀγνώστῃ [ἀγνώστος] **adv. secretly** [CALLISTH.] 3.19.2
 ἀγνώστος -ον [ἀγνώεω] [A] **unknown, unheard of, ignored** EUR. *IT.* 94 (land) GAL. 1.82; *διὰ τὸ ἀγνώστον τῆς γυναικὸς because the woman was unknown* CHARIT. 3.2.15 || ► *τινι to s.o.* OD. 2.175 || **not recognized: ἦν ... ἔτι ἀγνώστος αὐτοῖς they did not yet recognize her XEN¹. 5.12.3 || *personif. Ἀγνώστος, ὁ the unknown god*******

LUC. 82.9 [B] **unknowable, incomprehensible, invisible** OD. 13.191 THUC. 3.94.5 (*sup.*) PLAT. *Theat.* 202b | *gnost., attribute of God* HIPPOL. *Haer.* 7.28.1 etc. || **unrecognizable** MIMN. 5.7; *κατασκευάσασα Σαβῖνον ἐσθῆτι ἀγνώστον having dressed Sabinus so that he be unrecognizable* PLUT. 47.771a [C] **not knowing, ignorant** ► **with gen.** PIND. *O.* 6.67 (v.l.) GAL. 1.352 | ► **with πρός and acc.** ORIG. *fr. Io.* 17. | ► **abs.** LUC. 72.3 || *compar. -ότερος || superl. -ότατος* • **adv. ἀγνώστως [A] without knowing** PROCL. in *Alc.* 52 etc. || **secretly** CLEM. *Str.* 7.13.81.5 || **philos. without discursive reasoning** DION²¹. *Myst.* 1.1, al. [B] **greatly** [Clem¹.] *Hom.* 9.20
 ἀγνώτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγνώεω] **one who is ignorant** MAX². *Opusc.* 91.57B
 ἀγρωτίδιον -ου, τό [ἀγνώεω] *ichthyol.* fish ATH. 3.118d, *see μύλλος.*
 ἀγνώτων -ον [ἀγνώεω] **unknown** ► **with dat.** ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 926 CALLIM. fr. 620; *γνώτὰ κοῦκ ἀγνώτὰ μοι things known to me and not unknown* SOPH. *OT.* 58
 Ἀγξάνων -ον, ὁ **Anxanum, city in Latium** PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 3.1.65
 ἀγξήραίνω *see ἀναγξήραίνω.*
 ἀγξής -εως, ἡ [ἀγχω] **strangling** L. *EM.* 194.50 GLOSS
 ἀγόγγυστος -ον [γογγύζω] **not murmuring or muttering** CYR¹. *HDiv.* 14 (5².415C) etc. • **adv. ἀγογγύστως without murmuring** SOR. 2.19.13
 ἀγοήτευτος -ον [γοητεύω] **not to be deceived, beguiled, cheated** PLOT. 4.4.44 etc. || **not subject to magic** SYN. *Opusc.* 4.3 • **adv. ἀγοητεύτως without guile** CIC. *ad Att.* 12.3.1
 ἀγόμφιος -ον [γομφίος] **without teeth (molars)** DIOC. 14.4
 ἀγόμφωτος -ον [γομφώ] **not connected** [IO.] *Marth.* 10.757E
 ἀγόνᾶτος -ον [γόνυ] [A] **without a knee** ARISTOT. *IA.* 709a 3 || **fig. not bending the knee, inflexible** SOCR³. *HE.* 6.15.9, al. [B] **without knots or joints, of plants** THPHR. *HP.* 4.8.7 etc.
 ἀγονέω, *contr.* [ἀγονός] **aor. ἡγόνησα; to be sterile, unfruitful** PHIL². *Virt.* 157, al.
 ἀγονία -ας, ἡ [ἀγονός] **sterility** ARISTOT. *GA.* 746b 20 PLUT. *Rom.* 24.1 (pl.) IAMB¹. *Math.* 15. Ios. *BI.* 4.453 DIOSC². 2.179 etc.
 ἀγονοποιός -όν [ἀγονος, ποιέω] **making sterile** DID¹. *Trin.* 2.14 (123a)
 ἀγονος -ον [γίγνομαι] [A] **unborn** IL. 3.40 EUR. *Ph.* 1598 etc.; γόνος ἄ. offspring that is not offspring, because born of incest, of a horse OPP¹. 1.260 [B] **sterile, infertile, of animals and plants** HP. *Aph.* 5.59, *Art.* 41 ARISTOT. *GA.* 726a 3, al. THPHR. *HP.* 1.13.4, al. | ► **with gen.** PLAT. *Menex.* 237d; *χώραν καρπῶν ἀγονον unfruitful region* PLUT. *Art.* 24.2 | **childless** EUR. *HF.* 886 HLD. 4.12 || *fig. ἄ. ἡμέρα (odd-numbered) day unlucky for conceiving children* HP. *Epid.* 2.6.8; ἄ. ἔτος (odd-numbered) year unlucky for conceiving children HP. *Epid.* 2.6.10; ἄ. σοφίας not productive of wisdom PLAT. *Theat.* 150c; ἄ. κακῶν without evils PLAT. *Ax.* 370d (v.l.); ἄ. γέγονε he ceased to produce, of a poet PLUT. 22.348b || **astr. impeding generation, of a sign of the zodiac** VETT. 10.2, 14.11 [C] **bot. subst. ἡ (ῥ) ἄ. chasteberry, plant** DIOSC². 4.103a, *see ἄγνος* | τὸ ἄ. **butcher's broom, plant** DIOSC². 4.144a, *see μυρσίνη ἀγρία || compar. -ώτερος.*
 ἀγοντι *Dor. pres. ind. act. 3. pl. of ἄγω || Att. pres. ptc. act. dat. sg. of ἄγω.*
 ἄγοος -ος [γός] **unmourned** AESCHL. *Sept.* 1063 (lyr.)
 Ἀγορά -ας, ἡ **Agora, locality in Thrace** DEMOSTH. 7.39 etc.

ἀγορά -ας, ἡ [see ἀγείρω] ① **A** assembly, meeting, of the pop. (= βουλή, of the leaders) IL. 2.51, al.; OD. 2.26, al.: ἀγορὴν ποιεῖσθαι to have an assembly IL. 8.2; ἀγορὴν δε καλεῖσθαι to summon to assembly IL. 1.54 = κηρύσσειν IL. 2.51; ἀγορὴν λύειν to dissolve the assembly IL. 1.305 OD. 2.69; ἀγορὰν ποιῆσαι to hold a meeting AESCHN. 3.27; ξυναγαγεῖν ... ἀγορὰν to call a meeting (of soldiers) XEN. An. 5.7.3; ἀγορὰν δικῶν προτιθέναι to hold a judicial session, administer justice LUC. 29.4 = καταστήσασθαι LUC. 29.12 || **esp.** assembly of demes, at Athens DEMOSTH. 44.36 etc.; ἀγοραὶ Πυλάτιδες gatherings at Pylae, of the Amphictyonic Council SOPH. Tr. 638 || fig. μυστήριον α. assembly of ants LUC. 24.19 **B** address, speech, given before an assembly, gener. pl. IL. 2.275 etc.; οἱ δ' ἀγορὰς ἀγόρευον they were delivering speeches IL. 2.788 ② **A** place of assembly, square, agora (at Athens), forum (at Rome), common. GAL. 2.57, 11.311; ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ in the public square, in the agora XEN. Oec. 7.1; εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλειν to go into the agora, i.e., to be an Athenian citizen LYCURG. 5; ἐν τῇ πόλει σύνεγγυς τῆς ἀγορᾶς in the city (Rome) near the forum DION. 5.48.3 ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ βοῶν ἀγορᾷ in the so-called Forum Boarium PLUT. Marc. 3.6 || **marketplace**, market HOM. epigr. 13.5 etc.; ἀγορὰν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποιήντο they had opened a market outside the city THUC. 1.62.1; ἐξ ἀγορᾶς εἰ you're from the marketplace ARISTOPH. Eq. 181; οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς the merchants XEN. An. 1.2.18; ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐργάζεσθαι to work in the market, trade goods DEMOSTH. 57.31 **B** market, commerce, merchandise, supplies THUC. 6.50.1 ARISTOT. Pol. 1331a 31; αὐτοῖς ἀγορὰν παρείχον they allowed them a market (commerce) THUC. 6.44.3; ἡ ἀ. παρεσκευασμένη the market was furnished for supplies THUC. 7.40.1 ἀγορὰν παρασκευάζειν to prepare the provisioning XEN. Hel. 3.4.11; ἀγορὰν πέμπειν to send victuals (to market) XEN. An. 5.5.19 = κομίζειν to bring XEN. Cyr. 6.2.11; ἀγορὰν ἄγειν to bring goods, trade XEN. Cyr. 2.4.32 etc.; ἀγορᾷ χρῆσθαι to have supplies, provisions XEN. An. 7.6.24 etc.; τὸ ἔλαιον καὶ τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγορὰν olive oil, wine, and other goods ARISTOT. Oec. 1347b 6; ἐλπίζω ἀγορᾷ χρῆσθαι to have supplies DION. 10.43.6; μικρόλογος εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν to be fussy about the price HLD. 2.30.2 || **market**, sale: τῶν βιβλίων of books LUC. 31.19; ἀγορὰν προκηρύττειν to proclaim a public sale AEL. VH. 4.1 **C** often indicating time of day: ἀγορὰς πληθούσης when the market is full, i.e., in the morning HDT. 4.181.3 HP. Epid. 7.31; XEN. Mem. 1.1.10 = ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ PLAT. Gorg. 469d = ἀγορῆς πληθούρῃ HDT. 2.173.1; περὶ ἀγορὰν πληθούσαν around the time when the market is full XEN. An. 2.1.7 = ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πληθούσαν XEN. An. 1.8.1 etc. | ἀγορῆς διάλυσις the winding down of the market, just after midday HDT. 3.104.2 etc. || **later market day** (= [Lat. nundinae]) DION. 7.58.3; εἰς τρίτην ἀγορὰν the third market day PLUT. Cor. 18.9 • **Ion.** ἀγορή -ῆς | **Lesb.** gen. ἀγόρας ALC. 130.18.

ἀγοράσθε pres. ind. mid. 2. pl. ep. see ἀγοράομαι. ἀγοράζω [ἀγορά] **impf.** ἡγόραζον, **mid. pass.** ἡγοράζομαι DEMOSTH. 50.25 || **fut.** ἀγοράσω || **aor.** ἡγόρασα, **mid. pass.** ἡγορασάμην DEMOSTH. 50.55 || **pf.** ἡγόρακα, **mid. pass.** ἡγόρασμαι || **ppf.** ἡγόρακεν || **aor. pass.** ἡγοράσθην || **fut. pass.** ἀγορασθήσομαι ① **active** **A** to be at or go to the marketplace

HDT. 2.35.2, al. THUC. 6.51.1 etc. || **to wander the agora, loiter** PIND. fr. 94d ARISTOPH. Eq. 1373 **B** to buy, at the market ARISTOPH. Ach. 625, al. XEN. An. 1.5.10 || **abs.** to trade goods HLD. 5.18.3 || **fig. Christ.** to redeem, ransom NT. Apoc. 5.9 CLEM. Ecl. 20 etc. ② **middle** to buy for oneself XEN. An. 1.3.14 DEMOSTH. 35.19 || **fig.** to acquire, obtain: ἵν' ἐνταῦθα βασιλείαν οὐράνιον ἀγοράσῃς so that you acquire here the kingdom of heaven CLEM. Hom. 32.2 etc. ③ **passive** to be bought DEMOSTH. 50.25 IS. 8.23 MEN. fr. 805, al. || **fig. Christ.** to be redeemed, ransomed GREG¹. Inst. (PG 46.297C) etc. • **Dor.** pres. inf. ἀγοράσθην THEOCR. 15.16 || **later fut.** 1. pl. ἀγορώμεν VT. Esd. 2.20.32 | **Meg. ptc.** ἀγορασούντες ARISTOPH. Ach. 750.

ἀγοραῖος -ον [ἀγορά] **A** of the assembly, of the agora, of the market, of patron gods AESCHL. Ag. 90 | of Zeus HDT. 5.46.2 AESCHL. Eum. 973 etc. | of Hermes ARISTOPH. Eq. 297 etc. | of Athena PAUS. 3.11.9 | of Artemis PAUS. 5.15.4 | **subst.** of things τὰ ἀγοραῖα market affairs PLAT. Rp. 425c || of pers. frequenting the market, trading XEN. Hel. 6.2.23 ARISTOT. Pol. 1291a 4, al. etc. | **subst.** οἱ ἀγοραῖοι traders, merchants HDT. 1.93.2 XEN. Vect. 3.13 **B** wandering the marketplace, idle, vulgar, common ARISTOPH. Eq. 218, Ran. 1015 PLAT. Prot. 374c etc. | of meddlers NT. Apost. 17.5 PLUT. Aem. 38.4 | of rabble PTOL¹. 3 (comp.) || of things ARISTOT. EN. 1162b 26; σκώμμασιν οὐκ ἀγοραῖος with no vulgar jokes ARISTOPH. Pax 750; ψυχὴ μὴδὲν ἀγοραῖον ἔχουσα soul without vulgar features LUC. 64.17; ἀ. ἄρτοι common bread ATH. 3.109d **C** concerning the agora or the forum, political, forensic, of an orator or advocate PLUT. Per. 11.1, al. etc. || **subst.** ὁ ἀγοραῖος advocate PHILOSTR. Ap. 6.36 | **notary** ARISTID¹. Or. 50.94 etc. | **fem.** ἡ ἀγοραῖος (sc. ἡμέρα) day of hearing, hearing, of court STRAB. 13.4.12 NT. Apost. 19.38 etc. || **compar.** -ότερος ♦ **adv.** ἀγοραῖως **A** vulgarly DION. Rh. 10.11 **B** in forensic style PLUT. CG. 4.5, Ant. 24.7 • **fem.** -αῖα PAUS. Il.c.c., al.

Ἀγοράκριτος -ου, ὁ Agorakritos, male name ARISTOPH. Eq. 1257 etc.

Ἀγοράναξ -ακτος, ὁ Agoranax, poet AP. 6.31.1 ἀγορανόμιον -ου, τὸ PMERT. 75.12 (IIP) etc., see ἀγορανόμιον.

ἀγορανόμιος, **contr.** [ἀγορανόμος] **fut.** ἀγορανόμῃσω || **aor.** ἡγορανόμῃσα DCASS. 36.43.5, al. || **pf. ptc.** ἡγορανόμῃς || **ppf.** ἡγορανόμῃκειν DCASS. 76.8.6; **to be market overseer** ALEXIS 249.1 etc. || **at Rome** to be aedile DION. 10.48.3 PLUT. Caes. 5.9 APP. 14.1 etc.

ἀγορανομία -ας, ἡ [ἀγορανόμος] **office** of market overseer ARISTOT. Pol. 1331b 9 etc. || **at Rome** office of aedile ([Lat. aedilitas]) POL. 10.41 DION. 5.18.1 etc.

ἀγορανομικός -ῆς -ὄν [ἀγορανομία] **concerning the market overseer** PLAT. Rp. 425d ARISTOT. Pol. 1264a 31 etc. || **at Rome** of the aedile ([Lat. aedilicius]) PLUT. Pomp. 53.3 DION. 6.95.4 ἀγορανόμιον -ου, τὸ [ἀγορανομία] ① **office** of market overseer PLAT. Leg. 917e (connect.) ② **public register** POXY. 238.3 (IP)

ἀγορανόμιος -ον [ἀγορανομία] **forensic** IPERG. 333 A 6

ἀγορανόμος -ου, ὁ [ἀγορά, νόμος] **market overseer** HP. Epid. 4.24 ARISTOPH. Ach. 723, al., LYS. 16, 22 PLAT. Leg. 849e etc. || **at Rome** aedile ([Lat. aedilis]) DION. 7.14.2

ἀγοράομαι, **contr.** [ἀγορά] **A** to participate in an assembly IL. 4.1 **B** to speak in an assembly, harangue IL. 1.73, al. OD. 7.185 HDT. 6.11.1 || **extens.** to speak, say, with acc. IL. 8.230 THGN.

159 | τινι with s.o. SOPH. Tr. 601 • **pres.** 2. pl. ἀγοράσθε IL. 2.337 || **impf.** 2. sg. ἡγορώ pl. ἀγοράσθε, 3. pl. ἀγορόωντο || **aor.** 3. sg. epic ἀγορήσατο.

ἀγοράσθω Dor., see ἀγοράζω.

ἀγορασία -ας, ἡ [ἀγοράζω] **acquisition, purchase** TELECL. 54 DIOG. 2.78 (pl.) etc.

ἀγορασιαστικός -ῆς -ὄν [ἀγοράζω] **commercial** PLOND. 1727.32 (VIP), see ἀγοραστικός.

ἀγοράσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγοράζω] **acquisition, purchase** PLAT. Soph. 219d

ἀγοράσμα -ατος, τὸ [ἀγοράζω] **merchandise, wares, gener. pl.** AESCHN. 3.223 DEMOSTH. 34.9 PCAIR.ZEN. 16.1 (III^a) etc.

ἀγορασμός -ου, ὁ [ἀγοράζω] **acquisition, purchase, as an act of buying** PHINT. (STOB. 4.23.61a) etc. | as a thing bought VT. Gen. 42.33 etc.

ἀγορασστής -ου, ὁ [ἀγοράζω] **A** slave in charge of making purchases XEN. Mem. 1.5.2 **B** extens. buyer MEN. fr. 433 AEL. VH. 12.1 etc.

ἀγοραστικός -ῆς -ὄν [ἀγοράζω] **commercial** PLAT. Crat. 408a || ἡ ἀγοραστική (sc. τέχνη) commerce PLAT. Soph. 223c

ἀγοράστρια -ας, ἡ [ἀγοράζω] **female buyer** PBGU 907.11 (IIP)

Ἀγοράτος -ου, ὁ Agoratos, male name LYS. 13.1, al. etc.

ἀγοράτρος -ου, ὁ [ἀγοράομαι] **delegate to the Amphictyonic Council** IIG 2².1132.8 (III^a)

ἀγοράρχος -ου, ἡ [ἀγορά] **priestess at Sparta** IIG 5.1.589.2

ἀγόρευσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγορεύω] **speech** L. EM. 13.51 etc.

ἀγορευτήριον -ου, τὸ [ἀγορεύω] **place for speaking** IIG 14.742 (I-IP)

ἀγορευτής -ου, ὁ [ἀγορεύω] **speaker** (doub. signif.) POXY. 1590.1 (IVP)

ἀγορευτός -ῆς -ὄν [ἀγορεύω] **verb. adj.** expressible IUSTIN. Dial. 4.1 (PG 6.484A).

ἀγορεύω [ἀγορά] **impf.** ἡγόρευον, **mid.** ἡγορευόμην **Lib.** Or. 31.15 || **fut.** ἀγορεύσω || **aor.** ἡγόρευσα, **mid.** ἡγορευσάμην || **pf.** ἡγόρευκα, **mid. pass.** ἡγόρευμαι SCH. IL. 18.319b || **aor. pass.** ἡγορεύθην ① **active** **A** to speak in public, harangue IL. 8.542, al. ARISTOPH. Ach. 45 DEMOSTH. 18.170 | **with int. obj.** IL. 2.788, al. | **with dat.** IL. 1.571, al. **B** **gener.** to speak, say ► τι τινι sthg. to s.o. HDT. 6.97.1 = ► τι πρὸς τινα IL. 24.142; κακόν τι ἀ. τινὰ to abuse s.o. with words OD. 18.15 = κακῶς ἀ. τινὰ ARISTOT. fr. 417 PLUT. Sol. 21.1; ὑπὲρ τίνος ἀ. to speak about s.o. PLAT. Leg. 776e; μὴ τι φόβον δ' ἀγορεύ(ε) do not talk of flight IL. 5.252 | ► **with** ὡς or ὅτι that IL. 1.109 HDT. 3.156.1 ARISTOPH. Pl. 102 | ► **with inf.** ἀ. μὴ στρατεῦσθαι to say (advise) not to undertake the expedition HDT. 7.10.22 || **to narrate** PLUT. 57.874b **C** to proclaim, declare, enjoin IL. 1.385 etc.; ὁ νόμος ἀγορεύει the law declares ANTIPH. 3.3.7 ARISTOT. Rh. 1354a 22; ἀγορεύω τινι ἐμὲ μὴ βσσανίζειν I command anyone whatsoever not to torture me ARISTOPH. Ran. 628 **D** to count PLAT. Leg. 950e ② **middle** to say, proclaim HDT. 9.26.3 ③ **passive** to be said, pronounced, proclaimed THUC. 2.35.1; κακῶς ἀγορευέσθω let him be declared guilty PLAT. Leg. 917d • **poet.** **impf.** ἀγόρευον || **epic aor.** 3. sg. ἀγόρευσε || in Att. prose only pres. and impf.; others in compd.

ἀγορή -ῆς, ἡ **Ion.**, see ἀγορά.

ἀγορηγός, ἡ [ἀγορά, ἄγω] **conveying provisions (ship)** L. EM. 13.52

ἀγορήθεν [ἀγορά] **adv.** from the assembly IL. 2.264, al.

ἀγορήσιος **Ion.**, see ἀγοραῖος.

ἀγορήνδε [ἀγορά] **adv.** to the assembly IL. 1.54

ἀγορητής -ου, ὁ [ἀγοράομαι] **speaker** IL. 1.248, *al.* TIMO 30.1 *etc.*

ἀγορητὺς -ός, ὁ [ἀγοράομαι] **eloquence** OD. 8.168 ἀγορήφι [ἀγορά] **epic in the assembly** HES. *Th.* 89 ἀγορός -ου, ὁ [see ἀγορά] **group, gathering, assembly (pl.)** EUR. *IT.* 1096, *El.* 723, *Andr.* 1037; ἀγορον ἄλίσας φίλων having gathered a band of companions EUR. *HF.* 412 (*only sg.*) • *only in* EUR. (*lyr.*).

2. ἄγος -εος, τό [ἀγνυμι] **fragment** HSCH. L. *EM.* 418.2

ἄγος -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγω] **leader, chief** IL. 4.265 PIND. *N.* 1.51 AESCHL. *Suppl.* 248, EUR. *Rh.* 29 *etc.*; πόλεως ἄγροι πρόμοι foremost men of the city AESCHL. *Suppl.* 905

1. ἄγος -εος, *contr.* -ους, τό [ἄζομαι] **A pollution, sacrilege, guilt, impurity**; ἐν τῷ ἀγεί ἐνέχεσθαι to incur sacrilege HDT. 6.56; ἄ. φυλάσσου guard against guilt AESCHL. *Suppl.* 375; ἄ. φεύγειν to escape pollution SOPH. *Ant.* 256; παντὸς ἄγρους καθαρῶν to purify of all impurity HLD. 9.15 || **filth, execrable or impious person** SOPH. *OT.* 1426; τό ἄ. ἐλαύνειν to drive out the foulness, *i.e.*, those guilty of sacrilege THUC. 1.126.2 **B expiation, expiatory sacrifice** SOPH. *fr.* 689; ὡς ἄ. as expiation SOPH. *Ant.* 775 • ἄγος L. *Egud.* *etc.*

ἄγοστός -οῦ, ὁ **A palm (of the hand)**: ἔλε γαίαν ἄγοστῶ he clutched the ground with his hand IL. 11.425, ἄ. χειρὸς ἄ. hollow of the hand AP. 3.120 || **arm, folded** THEOCR. 17.129 P1. (AP. 5.255.15), *al. etc.* | *fig.* ἐν ἄγοστῶ in the bosom (of the Academy) AP. 6.144.3 **B dirt** SCH. IL. 6.506

ἄγουρος, ὁ **youth** EUSTATH. 1788.56

ἄγρα -ας, ἡ [see ἀγρεύω?] **A hunt** OD. 22.306 TRAG. 415a (*pl.*); ἄγρην ἐφέπεσκον they turned to hunting OD. 12.330; ἐς ἄγρας ἵεναι to go hunting EUR. *Suppl.* 885; ἐπὶ τὰς ἄγρας on hunting expeditions ACH. 2.34.1 | *of men* PLAT. *Leg.* 823c | *of fish* **fishing** SOPH. *Ai.* 880 (*lyr.*) || **way of catching** HDT. 2.70.1 (*pl.*) **B game, prey, quarry** HES. *Th.* 442 AESCHL. *Eum.* 148 SOPH. *Ai.* 64; θαυροῖν ἄγραν bleeding prey PIND. *N.* 3.81; ἐπὶ τῇ ἄγρᾳ τῶν ἰχθύων at the catch of fish = fishing NT. *Lu.* 5.9 | *fig.* δορὸς ἄγραν spear-prey || *of a city* AESCHL. *Sept.* 322 (*lyr.*) • *Ion.* -ῆ -ης.

*ἄγρα -ας, ἡ **Agra, place in Attica** PLAT. *Phaedr.* 299c *etc.*; τὰ πρὸς Ἄγραν the mysteries of Agra PLUT. *Demetr.* 26.3 || *pl.* αἱ Ἄγραι Agrai, sanctuary of Artemis PAUS. 1.19.6 *etc.*

ἄγραδὲ [ἀγρός] CALLIM. *fr.* 72, see ἀγρόνδε.

Ἄγραῖοι -ων Agraioi, *pop. of Aetolia* THUC. 2.102.2 *etc.*

ἀγραῖος -α -ον [ἄγρα] **of the hunt, epith. of Apollo** PAUS. 1.41.6 | *of Artemis* PAUS². 220 | *of gods* OPP. 3.27 (*v.l.*)

Ἀγραῖς -ίδος, ἡ [Ἀγραῖοι] **region of the Agraïans** THUC. 3.111.4

Ἀγραϊκός -ῆ -όν [Ἀγραῖοι] **of the Agraïans** THUC. 3.106.3 *etc.*

ἀγραμμάτια -ας, ἡ [ἀγράμματος] **lack of education, ignorance** PHIL². *Her.* 210 AEL. *VH.* 8.6 *etc.* ἀγράμματος -ον [γράφω] **A illiterate, ignorant** PLAT. *Tim.* 23a XEN. *Mem.* 4.2.20 *etc.* || **without words, of a song** PHILOD. *Poem.* 2.25 III 22 **B unwritten** PLAT. *Pol.* 295a || **incapable of being written** PORPH. *Abst.* 3.3 *etc.* **B inarticulate, of sound** ARISTOT. *Int.* 16a 29 DIOG. 3.107 | **unable to utter articulate sounds, of animals** ARISTOT. *HA.* 488a 33 ♦ *adv.* ἀγραμμάτως without education PHIL. 1.195; γράφειν ἄ. to write incorrectly ARR. *EpictD.* 2.9.10

ἀγρόνδης [ἀγρός] *Dor. adv.* THEOGNOST. 163.33, see ἀγρόνδε.

ἀγραπτός -ον [γράφω] **unwritten**: ἀγραπτα θεῶν

νόμια the unwritten laws of the gods SOPH. *Ant.* 454; περὶ ἄλλου μηδενός ... πράγματος ἐνγράφου μηδὲ ἀγράφου by no other transaction, written or verbal PMICH. 5.352.10 (IP) || ἄ. δίκη annulled judicial action POLL. 8.57

ἀγραρεύω [ἀγραρία] **to be on garrison** PCAIR.MASP. 22.1.8 (VIP), *cf.* ἀγραρεύεις περιέρχῃ HSCH.

ἀγραρία -ας, ἡ [Lat. agraria] **garrison** PLOND. 1889 r 12 (VIP) *etc.*

Ἀγραστῶν -ώνος, ὁ (scil. μὴν) **Agrastyon, name of a month in Locris** IIG 9.1.331 *etc.* • *also* Ἀγρεσ-, Ἀγροσ- IGDI 1757, 1880.

ἀγρατέρα see ἀγρότερος *signif.* b.

ἀγραυλῆω, *contr.* [ἀγραυλος] *impf.* ἡγραύουν; **to live in the open, spend the night outdoors** ARISTOT. *Mir.* 831a 29 PLUT. *Nu.* 4.1 STRAB. 4.4.3 | *of shepherds* NT. *Lu.* 2.8

ἀγραυλός -ές [ἀγραυλος] **rural, rustic** NIC. *Th.* 78 ἀγραυλία -ας, ἡ [ἀγραυλος] **living outdoors, service in the field** DIOD. 16.15.1 *etc.*

Ἀγραυλίδες -ων, αἱ [Ἀγραυλος] **daughters of Agraulos** EUR. *Ion* 23

ἀγραυλίζω [ἀγρός, αὐλίζω] **to camp in the open** THEOPHYLACT. *Hist.* 5.1.10 (*impf.* ἡγραυλίζεν), *al.*

ἀγραυλος -ον [ἀγρός, αὐλή] **living or spending the night in the fields, of shepherds** IL. 18.162 HES. *Th.* 26 AP. 4.317 *etc.*; ἄ. ἀνήρ boor P1. (AP. 11.60.3) | *epith. of Pan* ARCH. (AP. 6.179.1) || **rustic, of animals** IL. 10.155 OD. 12.253 SOPH. *Ant.* 349 (*lyr.*) EUR. *Bac.* 1188 (*lyr.*) *etc.* | **wild, savage** LYC. 893, 990 | *of things* **rustic**: ἀγραύλους πύλας rustic gates EUR. *El.* 342

*Ἀγραυλος -ου, ἡ see Ἀγλαυρος.

ἀγραφής -ές [ἀγραφός] **unwritten, on one's word** PBGU 895.31 (*loan*) (IP)

ἀγράφιος -ον [ἀγραφος] **A perhaps not suited for writing, of papyrus** (= ἀγραφος unwritten, new) PMICH. 2.123 v 7.25 (IP) **B subst. registry** (for commercial transactions) PHARR. 104.12 PMERT. 24.17

ἀγράφιον γραφή, ἡ [ἀγραφος] **accusation of false inscription or illicit debt cancellation, in the list of debtors of the state** DEMOSTH. 58.51 ARISTOT. *Ath.* 59.3 *etc.*

ἄγραφος -ον [γράφω] **A unwritten**: ἄ. μνήμη unwritten record THUC. 2.43.3; ἄ. δόγματα unwritten doctrines (of Plato) ARISTOT. *Phys.* 209b 15; ἄ. διαθήκαι verbal, nuncupatory will PLUT. *Cor.* 9.3; ἀγραφα λέγειν to speak without written text PLUT. *Demosth.* 8.5; ἄ. κληρονομός heir not written (in the will) LUC. 57.23 || ἄ. νόμοι or νόμια unwritten laws, *i.e.*, natural laws DEMOSTH. 18.275 *etc.* or traditions, customs THUC. 2.37.3 PLAT. *Leg.* 793a *etc.* or religious traditions LYS. 6.10 || ἄ. δίκαιον moral justice, equity ARISTOT. *EN.* 1162b 22 **B not written, not registered** IO¹. *in Phys.* 513.30 PBGU 1782.15 (I^a); ἄ. πόλεις unregistered cities, *i.e.*, not included in a treaty THUC. 1.40.2 || *Christ.* **not scriptural, not recorded, in Holy Scripture** BAS. *Spir.* 27.66.20, *al. etc.* **C not capable of being represented or expressed** [GREG.] *ChrPat.* 923 ♦ *adv.* ἀγράφως **not in writing, without written text, verbally** CLEM. *Str.* 5.10.62.2 PROCL. *in Parm.* p. 553 *etc.* || *Christ.* **not scripturally, without reference to Scripture** [Clem¹.] *Hom.* 17.15, *al.*

ἄγρει, ἀγρεῖτε *pres. imper. act. 2. sg. and 2. pl., see* ἀγρέω.

ἀγρεῖος -α -ον [ἀγρός] **rural, rustic** LEON. (AP. 6.35.2) || *fig.* **rough, coarse** ALCM. 16.1 ARISTOPH. *Nub.* 655, *Th.* 160 || *adv. neut.* ἀγρεῖον **coarsely** CALLIM. 24.13

ἀγρεισύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγρεῖος] **rusticity, uncouthness** AP. 6.51.10

ἀγρεῖφνα -ης, ἡ [γριφάω] **harrow, rake** PHAN. (AP. 6.297.1) (*v.l.*)

ἀγρεῖλκτης -ου, ἡ [ἄγρα, ἐλαύνω] **gamekeeper** POXY. 1917.41 (VIP)

ἀγρέμιον -ου, τό [ἀγρεμῶν] **quarry, prey** THEODOR. (AP. 6.224.2)

ἀγρεμῖον -όνος, ὁ [ἀγρέω] **hunter** L. *EM.* 13.56 || **lance** (*unc. signif.*) HSCH. AESCHL. *fr.* 141 (*prob.*)

ἀγρενον *see* ἀγρονον.

ἀγρεσίη -ης, ἡ [ἀγρέω] *Ion.* **hunt** LEON. (AP. 6.13.2)

ἀγρεται -ών, αἱ [ἀγρέω] **Agretai, priestess of Athena on Cos** IBM 968 A 6 HSCH

ἀγρετέρα *prob.* for ἀγροτέρα, *epith. of Artemis* IIG 2².4573 (IV^a)

ἀγρετεύω [ἀγρέτης] **to hold the office of ἀγρέτας** (Att. ἀγρέτης) IIG Lacon. 5.1.1346 (IP) (*aor. ptc.* ἀγρετεύσας).

ἀγρέτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγρέω] **leader, chief** AESCHL. *Pers.* 1002 (*corr.* for ἀγρόται) | *epith. of divinities* IGDI 5666 (Apollo) HSCH

ἀγρευμα -ατος, τό [ἀγρεύω] **A quarry, prey** EUR. *Bac.* 1241 | *fig.* XEN. *Mem.* 3.11.7 **B net, for hunting, gener. fig.**: ἀγρευμα θηρὸς snare for a beast, *said of the peplos in which Agamemnon was killed* AESCHL. *Ch.* 998; ποικίλοις ἀγρεύμασιν with crafty nets AESCHL. *Eum.* 460; ἐντός ... μορσίμων ἀγρευμάτων in the nets of fate AESCHL. *Ag.* 1048; τύχης ἀγρεύμασιν by the tricks of fate GORG. B 11.19

ἀγρεύς -έως, ὁ [ἄγρα] **A hunter, epith. of gods** PIND. *P.* 9.65 (Aristaeus) EUR. *Bac.* 1192 (Bacchus) | *of Poseidon* **fisherman** LUC. 28.47 || ἄ. ἡέρος ἢ ξυλόχου hunter in the air (of birds) or in the wood P1. (AP. 6.75.6) **B ornith. agreus, bird** AEL. *NA.* 8.24

ἀγρεύσιμος -ῆ -ον [ἀγρεύω] **easy to catch** SCH. SOPH. *Ph.* 863

ἀγρευσις -έως, ἡ [ἀγρεύω] **hunting, catching** HSCH

ἀγρευτήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἀγρεύω] **hunter** CALLIM. *H.* 3.218; ἰχθύος ἀγρευτήρες fishermen THEOCR. 21.6 || *adj.* **hunting (dogs)** OPP¹. 3.456 | **fishing (net)** MAN¹. 5.279

ἀγρευτήριον -ου, τό [ἀγρεύω] **trap, snare** [PROC.] *Prov.* 6.5 *etc.*

ἀγρευτής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγρεύω] **hunter** SOPH. *OC.* 1091 (Apollo) | *fig.* MELEAG. (AP. 12.125.6) || *adj.* **hunting (dogs)** SOL. 13 | *in fowling, of reeds covered with birdlime* MNASALC. (AP. 7.171) • *Dor. acc.* -τάν SOPH. *L.c.*

ἀγρευτικός -ῆ -όν [ἀγρεύω] **of hunting, skilled in the hunt** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Ve.* 368a,c; ἀγρευτικόν (ἐστὶ) it is useful for ensnaring (an enemy) XEN. *Hippar.* 4.12 ♦ *adv.* ἀγρευτικῶς **in a manner suited to hunting** POLL. 5.9

ἀγρευτίς -ίδος, ἡ [ἀγρεύω] **female hunter** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Ve.* 368a,c

ἀγρευτός -ῆ -όν [ἀγρεύω] **caught** OPP. 3.541

ἀγρεύω [ἀγρεύς] *impf.* ἡγρευον, *mid. pass.* ἡγρευόμην || *fut.* ἀγρεύσω, *mid.* ἀγρεύσομαι LYC. 655 || *aor.* ἡγρευσα, *mid.* ἡγρευσάμην || *pf.* ἡγρευκα, *mid. pass.* ἡγρευμαι || *aor. pass.* ἡγρευθην || *fut. pass.* ἀγρευθήσομαι **1 active A to catch, to take by hunting or fishing** ► *with acc.* HDT. 2.95.2 *etc.* | φιλεῖ πόλεμος ἀγρεῖν νέους war loves to catch young men SOPH. *fr.* 554; ἄγραν ἄ. to catch prey EUR. *Bac.* 434 || ► *abs.* **to go hunting, hunt** XEN. *Cyn.* 12.6 **B fig.** **to pursue, go after** EUR. *Bac.* 138 MELEAG. (AP. 7.196.7) *etc.* || **to catch in error** NT. *Mar.* 12.13 **C Christ. in neg. sense to entice, snare, seduce, of sin** VT. *Prov.* 5.22; τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὁ διάβολος ἡγρευσε the devil ensnared man METH. *Symp.* 10.5 *etc.* **2 middle = active to catch, by hunting or fishing** EUR. *IT.* 1163, *Andr.* 841 **3 passive A to be hunted** XEN. *An.* 5.3.8 || **to**

be caught, by fishing LSID². (AP. 9.94.5) etc. [A] to be attracted, to the good EUS¹. fr.Th. 6 (19.29) etc.

ἀγρέω, contr. [see ἄγρα ?] [A] to take, seize, get hold of ► with acc. AESCHL. Ag. 126 (city) etc.; ἄγρει δ'οἶνον ἐρυθρόν take red wine ARCHIL. 4.8; τρόμος δὲ παῖσαν ἄγρει a trembling seizes all of me SAPPH. 31.14; ἄγρει ... ῥίζαν take a root NIC. Th. 534 || to catch, by fishing PHAN. (AP. 6.304.3) [B] Hom. imper. ἄγρει, ἀγρέιτε come on!, gener. with other imper. IL. 5.76.5 OD. 20.149 (pl.) AP. 1.487 • contr. pres. ἀγρώ.

ἀγρη -ης, ἡ Ion. see ἄγρα.

ἀγρηγόρος -ον [γρηγόρεω] from which there is no awakening, of sleep ICIG 9449.1 (VIP)

ἀγρηθεν [ἄγρα] adv. from the hunt AP. 2.938

ἀγρηγόν -ου, τό [see ἄγρα, ἀγρέω] net HSCH. || net-like fabric POLL. 4.116 • ἀγρενον DION⁹. 9.20 (corr).

ἀγρησθῶσιν, αἱ μήτραι f.l. HP. Mul. 2.154 (v.l. προσθέωσι), cf. EROT. (ἄγρας χρῆζουσιν: perhaps from ἀγρησθῶσιν ?) HSCH. (συνειληθῶσιν)

ἀγρία -ας, ἡ [ἄγρα] hunt PBGU 1123.9 (I^a), see ἄγρα || bot. spear grass SCH. THEOCR. 13.42b, see ἄγρωστις.

ἀγριαγγούριον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, ἀγγούριον] wild cucumber, as an explanation of ἀγριοσίκυνον AG. Bek. 1097 (ἀγρανγγούρη cod.).

ἀγριαίνω [ἄγριος] impf. ἡγρίαίνον, mid. pass. ἡγριαίνω || fut. ἀγριαίνω PLAT. Rp. 501e || aor. ἡγρίαναι || aor. pass. ἡγριάνην || fut. pass. ἀγριανθήσεται VT. (Th.) Dan. 11.11 • active [A] to be or become wild, be angry, rage ► τιμι at s.o. PLAT. Symp. 173d = ► πρὸς τινα PORPH. Abst. 3.12 || of animals ARISTOT. HA. 608b 31 || of a river PLUT. Caes. 38.4 || med. to be inflamed, of sores ARET. SD. 2.11.4 etc. [B] causat. to enrage, make angry, provoke DCASS. 44.47.1 ACH. 2.7 • passive [A] = active to become wild, rage: τῆς θαλάσσης ἀγριανθείσης the sea having become stormy DIOD. 24.1.2 [B] to be irritated PLUT. Ant. 58.3 DION. 9.32.4 etc. • in Att. the pass. is supplied by the pass. of ἀγρίω.

Ἀγριάνες -ων, οἱ Agrianes, pop. of Macedonia HDT. 5.16.1 THUC. 2.96.3 etc.

Ἀγριάνης -ου, ὁ Agrianes, river in Macedonia HDT. 4.90.2

ἀγριάνθρωπος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, ἄνθρωπος] wild man [CALLISTH.] 3.28

Ἀγριάνιος -ον, ὁ ([Scil. μὴν]) Agrianios, name of a month at Sparta, Rhodes, etc. IG 5.1.18 B 8

ἀγρίαπις -ιδος GLOSS., see ἀγριοαπιδιον.

ἀγριάς -άδος [ἄγριος] wild, fem. AP. 1.28 CALLIM. fr. 75.13 (goat) PHILIP¹. (AP. 9.561.2) (vine) OPP¹. 3.139 (bears) etc.

ἀγριαχράς, ἡ [ἄγριος, ἀχράς] bot. wild pear ZOP². (ORIB. 14.61.1)

ἀγριάω, contr. [ἄγριος] to be wild OPP¹. 2.49 (ptc. ἀγριώοντα).

ἀγριδιον -ου, τό [ἀγρός] small field ARR. EpictD. 1.10.9, al. MAUR. 4.3 etc.

ἀγριελαία -ας, ἡ [ἄγριος, ελαία] bot. wild olive HP. Mul. 2.112 DIOSC². 3.105 etc.

ἀγριελάντος -ον [ἀγριελαία] of wild olive ISYLL³. 972.188 (II^a)

ἀγριέλαιος -ον [ἀγριελαία] of wild olive ERYC. (AP. 9.237.6) || ἡ. ἄ. wild olive THPHR. HP. 2.2.5 THEOCR. 7.18 NT. Rom. 11.24 etc.

ἀγριεύω [ἄγρα] to catch by hunting or fishing PRYL. 98a 8 (III^p) etc.

Ἀγρίζαμα Agrizama, city in Galatia PTOL⁴. Geog. 5.4.8

ἀγρίζω [ἄγριος] act. to irritate VT. (Sym.) Prov. 15.18 (conject. for ἀγρίζω, see).

ἀγρινυός -ῆ -όν [ἄγριος] wild OR. Sib. 7.79 (bird)

Ἀγρικώλας -α, ὁ Agrikolas ([Lat. Agricola]) AP. 9.594.3

ἀγρικός -ῆ -όν [ἄγρος] POXY. 1675.4 (III^p), see ἄγριος.

Ἀγρίλιον -ου, τό Agrilion, city in Bithynia PTOL⁴. Geog. 5.1.14

ἀγριμαίος -α -ον [ἄγρα] wild || τὰ ἄ. game PTOL¹. 9 ἀγριμέλισσα, ἡ [ἄγριος, μέλισσα] wasp HSCH. (fig.) • -ττα GLOSS.

ἀγρινος -ου, ὁ iMAMA 3.663 HSCH., see ἀγρονόμος. ἀγριοαἰξ -αιγος, ἡ [ἄγριος, αἶξ] wild goat RHETOR. in CCA 7.225.9

ἀγριοαπ(π)ιδιον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, ἀπιδιον] wild pear GEOP. 8.37.3

ἀγριοβάλανος -ου, ἡ [ἄγριος, βάλανος] bot. ilex, wild oak VT. (Aq., Th.) Is. 44.14

ἀγριοβουλος -ον [ἄγριος, βουλή] of wild purposes ADAM. 1.18

ἀγριοβους -βους, ὁ [ἄγριος, βούς] wild ox, yak COSM¹. 11.5

ἀγριογνώμων -ονος [ἄγριος, γνώμη] of wild nature AGATHANG. Greg. 151 (p. 77)

ἀγριοδαίτης -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, δαίωμα] eating wild fruits OR. (PAUS. 8.42.6)

ἀγριοειδής -ές [ἄγριος, εἶδος] wild in appearance APOCDAN. C 45 (p. 117)

ἀγριοεἶς -εσσα -εν NIC. AL. 30, al., see ἄγριος. ἀγριοθύμος -ον [ἄγριος, θυμός] of fierce temper ORPH. H. 12.4 GREG. (AP. 8.104.5)

ἀγριοκάνναβος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, κάνναβος] bot. hemp mallow, plant HSCH

ἀγριοκάρδαμον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κάρδαμον] water-cress (see ἰβηρίς) GAL. 13.353

ἀγριοκάρδον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κάρδος] Egyptian acacia AG. Bek. 1096

ἀγριοκάρυον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κάρυον] wild nut HSCH

ἀγριοκινάρα -α, ἡ [ἄγριος, κινάρα] white acacia DIOSC². 3.12a || thistle GLOSS

ἀγριοκοκκύμηλον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κοκκύμηλον] wild plum GAL. 6.619

ἀγριοκρόμμυον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κρόμμυον] bulb, onion SCH. ARISTOPH. Pl. 253.1

ἀγριοκύμινον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κύμινον] bot. wild cumin, plant SCH. NIC. Th. 710, 713

ἀγριολάχχαν -ων, τὰ [ἄγριος, λάχανον] wild vegetables SCH. THEOCR. 4.52

ἀγριολεον, τό [ἄγριος] bot. Alexanders, plant DIOSC². 3.67 (see ἱπποσέλινον).

ἀγριομάλαχη -ης, ἡ [ἄγριος, μάλαχη] bot. althea, plant SCH. NIC. Th. 89a

ἀγριομέλιττα -ης, ἡ [see ἀγριμέλισσα] wasp GLOSS., see ἀγριομέλισσα.

ἀγριομόρφος -ον [ἄγριος, μορφή] f.l. for συναγριομόρφος ORPH. A. 979

ἀγριομύρμηχ -ης, ἡ [ἄγριος, μύρμηχ] bot. wild tamarisk, plant VT. Ier. 17.6

ἀγριομυρική -ον [ἀγριομυρική] of tamarisk PHAMB. 12.19 (III^p)

ἀγριομύρμηξ -ηκος, ὁ [ἄγριος, μύρμηξ] weevil GLOSS

ἀγριομωρός -ον [ἄγριος, μωρός] savagely foolish CYR¹. Is. 2.834C

ἀγριόνους -ουν, τό [ἄγριος, νοῦς] with a fierce mind IG 12.7.115.4 (II^a)

ἀγριοπήγανον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, πήγανον] bot. wild rue, plant AEL¹. 1.295, al.

ἀγριοπηγός -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, πήγνυμι] wheelwright SCH. ARISTOPH. Eq. 464a

ἀγριοποιός -όν [ἄγριος, ποίεω] [A] poet of ferocity, of savage characters, Aeschylus ARISTOPH. Ran. 837 [B] making savage, fierce SCH. AESCHL. Pers. 614 SCH. NIC. AL. 30c

ἀγριορέγανος -ου, ἡ, ὁ [ἄγριος, ὀρέγανος] bot. marjoram, plant DIOSC². 3.29

ἀγριορροδον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, ῥόδον] nard (see Κελτική νάρδος) GLOSS

Ἀγριος -ου, ὁ Agrios, centaur IL. 14.117 etc.

ἄγριος -α -ον [ἀγρός] [A] of the fields, wild, savage, of animals (opp. to τιθασός, ἡμερός) IL. 3.24, al. HDT. 7.86.1, al. ARISTOT. HA. 488a 26, al. etc. |

of men in a wild state HDT. 4.191.4 | of trees and fruits AESCHL. Pers. 614 SOPH. Tr. 1197 HP. Mul. 1.75.78, 79; μέλι ἄγριον wild honey NT. Mat. 3.4 ||

uncultivated, of lands PLAT. Phaed. 113b, Leg. 905b | of a hairstyle ACH. 3.12.1 [B] fig. savage, violent, cruel, of pers. IL. 6.97, al. OD. 1.199, al. PLAT. Gorg. 510b, al. THEOCR. 23.19; ἄγριον εἰς ἡμὰς ἔχεις you cause (your husband) to be cruel to me EUR. EL. 1116; ἄ. κυβευτήν keen dice player MEN. fr. 705; οὐ χαλεπὸς ἐστίν οὐδ' ἄγριος ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ he is neither rude nor harsh towards a friend PLUT. 4.69b || of temper ἄ. χόλος fierce anger IL. 4.23 = ἄ. θυμός IL. 9.629; ἀγριώτατα ἦθεα most savage customs HDT. 4.106; φιλία ἄγρια fierce friendship PLAT. Leg. 837b | of things HDT. 8.13 (night) AESCHL. Pr. 175 (bonds) PLAT. Rp. 564a (slavery) etc.; νοσεῖ μὲν νόσον ἄγριαν he suffers from a fierce (malignant) disease SOPH. Ph. 173 (cf. 265) | subst. τὸ ἄγριον savageness PLAT. Crat. 394e [C] adv. neut. ἄγρια savagely, cruelly HES. Sc. 236 MOSCH. 1.11; ἄγριον HLD. 2.13.1 || compar. -ώτερος | superl. -ώτατος • adv. ἄγριως savagely, cruelly AESCHL. Eum. 972 PLAT. Leg. 867d, Symp. 218a (comp.) || compar. -ωτέρως and -ώτερον • ἄγ- AESCHL. SOPH. (lyr.); ἄγ- EUR.; -ρῖ- IL. 22.313 for the meter || fem. -ος IL. 19.88 PLAT. Leg. 824a etc.

ἀγριοσέλινον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, σέλινον] bot. Alexanders, plant DIOSC². 3.67

ἀγριοσίκυνον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, σίκυνος] bot. squirting cucumber, plant HIPPIATR. 4.3, al.

ἀγριοσκόρδον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, σκόρδον] wild garlic PAEG. 260.25.

ἀγριοσταφίδες e ἀγριοσταφύλιες [ἄγριος, σταφίς] wild grapes HSCH

ἀγριοσταφυλίτης -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, σταφυλή] from wild grapes: οἶνος wine DIOSC². 5.6

ἀγριοσυκέα and ἀγριοσυκή -ης, ἡ [ἄγριος, συκέα] wild fig HORAP. 2.77 al.

ἀγριότης -ητος, ἡ [ἄγριος] savageness, wild nature, of animals XEN. Mem. 2.2.7 ISOCR. 12.163 | of plants THPHR. HP. 3.2.4 | of uncultivated land GENP. 7.1.4 || fig. harshness, ferocity, cruelty, of men PLAT. Symp. 197d, al. DEMOSTH. 26.26 (pl.) etc.

ἀγριοφάγρος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, φάγρος] ichthyol. wild porgy, fish OPP. 1.140

ἀγριοφάνης -ές [ἄγριος, φαίνω] appearing wild CORN. 27

ἀγριοφρων -ονος [ἄγριος, φρῆν] wild CYR¹. Iul. 9 (6².297D)

ἀγριοφυλλον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, φύλλον] bot. hog's fennel DIOSC². 3.78a (see πευκεδάνος).

ἀγριοφύτα -ων, τὰ [ἄγριος, φυτόν] wild herbs SCH. NIC. AL. 429

ἀγριοφωνος -ον [ἄγριος, φωνή] with savage voice (language) OD. 8.294 EPIGR. 3.74.22

ἀγριοχηνπρυμνίς -ιδος, ἡ [ἄγριος, χήν, πρύμνα] sc. ναῦς, ship with a wild goose as acrostolion PMON. 4.9 al. (VIP) (-πρήμνης pap.).

ἀγριοχίφος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, χίφος] wild hog SCH. ARISTOPH. Pl. 304

ἀγριοψωρία -ας, ἡ [ἄγριος, ψώρα] chronic itch HSCH

ἀγριώω, contr. [ἄγριος] impf. mid. pass. ἡγριοῦμην || aor. ἡγρίωσα || pf. mid. pass. ἡγρίωμαι || ppf. mid. pass. ἡγρίωμην || aor. pass. ἡγρίωθην • act. (only aor.) to make savage, provoke, irritate ► πρὸς τινα against s.o. PLUT. Per. 34.5; ἡ

Contact

If you would like to get in touch with the Brill publishing team please feel free to contact us.

Irene van Rossum, *Acquisitions Editor*
rossum@brill.com

For questions about our marketing please contact Els van Egmond, *Marketing Manager*, at egmonde@brill.com.

BRILL
P.O. Box 9000
2300 PA Leiden
The Netherlands
VAT number NL 001539243 B01
Commercial Register Leiden 28000012

Where to Order

Journal Orders Worldwide & Book Orders outside the Americas

BRILL
c/o Turpin Distribution
Stratton Business Park
Pegasus Drive
Biggleswade
Bedfordshire SG1 8 8TQ
United Kingdom
T +44 (0) 1767 604-954
F +44 (0) 1767 601-640
brill@turpin-distribution.com

Book Orders in the Americas

BRILL
c/o Books International
P.O. Box 605
Herndon, VA 2017 2-0605
USA
T (800) 337-9255
(toll free, US & Canada only)
T +1 (703) 661-15 85
F +1 (703) 661-15 01
brillmail@presswarehouse.com

Online Products & Primary Source Collections

sales-nl@brill.com (outside the Americas)
sales-us@brill.com (in the Americas)

Or contact your Library Supplier

For sales information and contact details of our sales representatives, please visit brill.com/services/trade

For General Order Information and Terms and Conditions please go to

brill.com

brillonline.com

Brill's VAT registration number is NL8088.46.243 B01

Printed in the Netherlands

All given prices are subject to change without prior notice. Prices do not include VAT (applicable only to residents of the Netherlands and residents of other EU member states without a VAT registration number). Prices do not include shipping & handling. Customers in Canada, USA and Mexico will be charged in US dollars. Please note that due to fluctuations in the exchange rate, the US dollar amounts charged to credit card holders may vary slightly from the prices advertised.

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek is the English translation of Franco Montanari's *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*. With 140,000 entries this is the most important modern dictionary for Ancient Greek and an invaluable tool for students and advanced scholars alike.

Franco Montanari is Professor of Ancient Greek Literature at the University of Genoa (Italy), Director of the *"Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica"*, of the *"Centro Italiano dell'Année Philologique"* and of the *"Aristarchus"* project online, and is a member of numerous international research centers and associations. Apart from the *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca* he has published many other scientific works on ancient scholarship and grammar, archaic Greek epic poets and other Greek poets of the Classical and Hellenistic periods, including *Brill's Companion to Hesiod* (2009).

"For a number of years now, scholars at ease in Italian have benefitted enormously from the riches, layout, concision, and accuracy of Professor Montanari's *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*, with its added advantage of the inclusion of names.

Hence classicists in general will welcome the English version of this very valuable resource."

Professor Richard Janko, *University of Michigan*

"Franco Montanari is a giant in our field, and his Dictionary is a major leap forward for us...."

Professor Gregory Nagy, *Harvard University*