RTReview.org

SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books



Robert Tenor, editor
3-15-2023

New Series Number 108

EDITORIAL

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.
Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.
Each issue should surprise.

Contents: Buddhist Philosophy & Ethics

0

The Penguin Book of Spiritual Verse 110 Poets on the Divine edited by Akbar Kaveh [Penguin Classics, Penguin UK, 9780241391587] 4

Liebe und Leerheit: Eine komparative Verhältnisbestimmung des Liebesbegriffs bei Hans Urs von Balthasar und des Leerheitsbegriffs bei Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki von Daniel Rumel [Series: Beiträge zur Komparativen Theologie, Brill | Schöningh, 9783506760685] 12

Abschlussbetrachtung 13

Translation: **[Love and Emptiness: A comparative determination of the concept of love in Hans Urs von Balthasar and the concept of voidness in Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki** by Daniel Rumel [Series: Beiträge zur Komparativen Theologie, Brill | Schöningh, 9783506760685] text in German 15

Buddhism and Modernity: Sources from Nineteenth-Century Japan edited by Orion Klautau, and Hans Martin Krämer with contributions by Orion Klautau, Hans Martin Krämer, Micah Auerback, James Baskind, Nathaniel Gallant, G. Clinton Godart, Seiji Hoshino, Mami Iwata, Jason Ananda Josephson Storm, Mitsuhiro Kameyama, Stephan Kigensan Licha, Michel Mohr, Fabio Rambelli, Erik Schicketanz, Jeff Schroeder, James Mark Shields, Jacqueline I. Stone, Jolyon Baraka Thomas, Dylan Toda, Ryan Ward, Garrett L. Washington [University of Hawaii Press, 9780824884581] 18

Buddhism and Modernity in Japan, An Introduction by Orion Klautau and Hans Martin Krämer... 19

Buddhism in Nineteenth-Century Japan: An Overview 20

The Age of Negotiation (1868–1872) 20

The Age of Kyōdōshoku (1872–1884) 22

Establishing the Modern Buddhist Institution (1884–1900) 23

Into the Twentieth Century 24

The History of Research on Modern Japanese Buddhism in Western Languages 24

History of Research of Modern Japanese Buddhism in Japanese 26
Major Issues of Modern Japanese Buddhism 28
Sectarian Reform 29
The Nation 30
Science and Philosophy 31
Social Reform 33
Japan and Asia 34

SECULARIZING BUDDHISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON A DYNAMIC TRADITION edited by Richard Payne [Shambhala, 9781611808896] 36

Distinguishing the Secularizing of Buddhism from Buddhist Modernism 37
The Intent of This Collection 39

MYSTICISM AND INTELLECT IN MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY AND BUDDHISM: ASCENT AND AWAKENING IN BONAVENTURE AND CHINUL by Yongho Francis Lee [Lexington Books, 9781793600707] 39

Review 39

THE TATTVASAṂGRAHA OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA: SELECTED METAPHYSICAL CHAPTERS translated with Commentary by Charles Goodman [Oxford University Press, 9780190927349] 44

Contextual Introduction 45
Methods of Reasoning in the Tattvasangraha 48
Note on the Translation 56

BRILL'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUDDHISM. VOLUME TWO: LIVES Edited by Jonathan A. Silk, and Vincent Eltschinger, Richard Bowring, and Michael Radich [Series: *Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia*, & *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Brill, 9789004299375] 61

EARLY BUDDHIST ORAL TRADITION: TEXTUAL FORMATION AND TRANSMISSION by Bhikkhu Analayo [Wisdom Publications, 9781614298274] 68

ROAMING FREE LIKE A DEER: BUDDHISM AND THE NATURAL WORLD by Daniel Capper [Cornell University Press, 9781501759574] 73

A Critical Examination of Buddhist Environmentalism 74
Vegetarianism, Religious Practice, and Nature Mysticism 76

BUDDHIST ETHICS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION by Jay L. Garfield [Buddhist Philosophy for Philosophers, Oxford University Press, 9780190907631] 77

Review 77
Methodological Introduction 80
The Foundations of Buddhist Ethics 80

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUDDHIST ETHICS edited by Daniel Cozort and James Mark Shields [Oxford University Press, 97801987461 40] 82

BUTON'S HISTORY OF BUDDHISM IN INDIA AND ITS SPREAD TO TIBET: A TREASURY OF PRICELESS SCRIPTURE by Buton Richen Drup, translated by Lisa Stein and Ngawang Zangpo [Tsadra, Snow Lion, 97815593941 30] 85

The Book: Buton's History of Buddhism 87

A History of Buddhism in India and Tibet: An Expanded Version of the Dharma's Origins Made by the Learned Scholar Deyu edited and translated by Dan Martin [Library of Tibetan Classics, Wisdom Publications, 9780861714728] 89

Review 90

The Gathering of Intentions: A History of a Tibetan Tantra by Jacob P. Dalton [Columbia University Press, 9780231176002] 96

Reviews 96

The Place of this Study Within the Field of Tibetan Studies 99

Summary of contents 100

Dharmakīrti on the Cessation of Suffering: A Critical Edition with Translation and Comments of Manorathanandin's Vṛtti and Vibhūticandra's Glosses on Pramāṇavārttika II.190-216 edited and translated by Cristina Pecchia and Philip Pierce [Series: Brill's Indological Library, Brill, 9789004293410] 103

A Note on the Translation of ãryasatya and nirodhasatya 107

Competing Dharmas and Philosophical Traditions 108

Soteriology and Apologetics 108

Dharma and moksha as Subjects of Philosophical Debate 109

The Authentication of the Dharma 110

The Nobles' Truths in Dharmakïrti's Work 111

The Penguin Book of Spiritual Verse 110 Poets on the Divine edited by Akbar Kaveh [Penguin Classics, Penguin UK, 9780241391587]

Poets have always looked to the skies for inspiration, and have written as a way of getting closer to the power and beauty they sense in nature, in each other and in the cosmos. This anthology is a holistic and global survey of a lyric conversation about the divine, one which has been ongoing for millennia.

Beginning with the earliest attributable author in all of human literature, the twenty-third century BCE Sumerian High Priestess Enheduanna, and taking in a constellation of figures — from King David to Lao Tzu, from the Epic of Gilgamesh to the Malian Epic of Sundiata — this selection presents a number of canonical voices like Blake, Dickinson and Tagore, alongside lesser-anthologized diverse voices going up to the present day, which showcase the breathtaking multiplicity of ways humanity has responded to the divine across place and time.

These poets' voices commune between millennia, offering readers a chance to experience for themselves the vast and powerful interconnectedness of these incantations orbiting the most elemental of all subjects — our spirit.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Enheduanna, from 'Hymn to Inanna' Unknown, 'Death of Enkidu; from The Epic of Gilgamesh
Unknown, from The Book of the Dead
Unknown, Song of Songs, chapters 1 and 2
King David, Psalm 23
Homer, from The Odyssey
Sappho, Fragments 22 and 118
Patacara, 'When they plow their fields'
Lao Tzu, 'Easy by Nature; from Tao Te Ching
Chandaka, Two Cosmologies
Vyasa, from the Bhagavad Gita
Lucretius, from The Nature of Things
Virgil, from The Aeneid
Shenoute, 'Homily'
Sengcan, 'The Mind of Absolute Trust'
From the Quran
Kakinomoto Hitomaro, 'In praise of Empress Jito'
Li Po, 'Drinking Alone Beneath the Moon'
Rabi'a al-Basri, 'O my lord'
Ono No Komachi, `This inn
Hanshan, `Hanshan's Poem'
Al-Husayn ibn Ahmad ibn Khalawayh, 'Names of the Lion'
Unknown, Anglo-Saxon charm
Izumi Shikibu, `Things ^ Want Decided'
Li Qingzhao, 'Late Spring'
Hildegard of Bingen, 'Song to the Creator'
Mahadeviyakka, `I do not call it his sign'
Attar of Nishapur, `Parable of the Dead Dervishes in the Desert'
St Francis of Assisi, `Canticle of the Sun' Wumen Huikai, from The Gateless Gate Rumi, 'Lift Now the Lid of the Jar of Heaven'
Mechthild of Magdeburg, 'Of all that God has shown me'
Saadi Shirazi, `The Grass Cried Out' Thomas Aquinas, `Lost, All in Wonder' Moses de Leon, from The Sepher Zohar Dante Alighieri, from Inferno, Canto I^I from the Sundiata
Hafez, Ghazal 17
Yaqui people, 'Deer Song'
Nezahualcoyotl, `The Painted Book'
Kabir, `Brother, I've seen some'
Mirabai, 'O friend, understand'
Yoruba people, from A Recitation of Ifs
Teresa of Avila, `Laughter Came from Every Brick'
Gaspara Stamps, `Deeply repentant of my sinful ways'
St John of the Cross, 'O Love's living flame'
Mayan people, from the Popol Vuh
Christopher Marlowe, from Faustus

William Shakespeare, Sonnet 146
John Donne, `Batter my heart, three-person'd God'
Nahuatl people, `The Midwife Addresses the Woman'
George Herbert, `Easter Wings'
Walatta Petros/Galawdewos, from The Life and Struggles of Our Mother Walatta Petros
John Milton, from Paradise Lost, Book 4
Basho, `Death Song' and `In Kyoto'
Juana Ines de la Cruz, `Suspend, singer swan, the sweet strain'
Yosa Buson, `A solitude'
Olaudah Equiano, `Miscellaneous Verses'
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, `Wanderer's Nightsong II'
Phillis Wheatley, `On Virtue'
William Blake, `Auguries of Innocence'
Kobayashi Issa, `All the time I pray to Buddha'
John Clare, `I Am!'
John Keats, `Ode on a Grecian Urn'
Mirza Ghalib, 'For the Raindrop'
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, `Grief'
Frederick Douglass, 'A Parody'
Emily Dickinson, 'I prayed, at first, a little Girl'
Uvavnuk, 'The Great Sea'
Gerard Manley Hopkins, `God's Grandeur'
Rabindranath Tagore, `The Temple of Gold'
Constantine Cavafy, `Body, Remember'
W. B. Yeats, `The Second Coming'
Rainer Maria Rilke, `The Second Duino Elegy'
Muhammad Iqbal, `These are the days of lightning'
Yosano Akiko, 'T^ punish'
Sarojini Naidu, `In the Bazaars of Hyderabad'
Delmira Agustini, `Inextinguishables'
Gabriela Mistral, `The Return'
Anna Akhmatova, from `Requiem'
Osip Mandelstam, 'o Lord, help me to live through this night'
Edith Sodergran, `A Life'
Marina Tsvetaeva, from Poems to Czechia
Maria Sabina, from `The Midnight Velada'
Xu Zhimo, `Second Farewell to Cambridge'
Federico Garcia Lorca, `Farewell'
^^zim Hikmet, `Things I Didn't Know I Loved'
Leopold Sedar Senghor, `Totem'
Faiz Ahmed Faiz, `Before You Came'
Czeslaw Milosz, `Dedication'
Edmond Jabs, `At the Threshold of the Book'
Aime Cesaire, from Notebook of a Return to the Native Land

Octavio Paz, `Brotherhood: Homage to Claudius Ptolemy'
Oodgeroo Noonuccal, `God's One Mistake'
Paul Celan, `There was Earth in Them'
Paul Laraque, `Rainbow'
Nazik Al-Malaika, 'Love Song for Words'
Wislawa Szymborska, `Astonishment'
Zbigniew Herbert, `The Envoy of Mr Cogito'
Yehuda Amichai, `A Man in His Life'
Ingeborg Bachmann, `Every Day'
Kim Nam-Jo, `Foreign Flags'
Kamau Brathwaite, 'Bread'
Adonis, `The New Noah'
Christopher Okigbo, 'Come Thunder'
Ingrid Jonker, `There Is Just One Forever'
Jean Valentine, `The River at Wolf'
Kofi Awoonor, 'At the Gates'
Adelia Prado, `Dysrhythmia'
Lucille Clifton, 'my dream about God'
Venus Khoury-Ghata, from She Says
Mahmoud Darwish, `I Didn't Apologize to the Well'
M. NourbeSe Philip, from Zong!
Inrasara, from Allegory of the Land
Sources
Acknowledgements
Index of First Lines
Index of Titles

I was born in Tehran in 1989; my first two languages were Farsi and English. My third was Arabic, but Arabic gets an asterisk because I never really spoke it, I just learned to pray in it. Arabic was a private tongue reserved for God, God's own tongue, and I understood that if I spoke it to God earnestly, mellifluously, it would thin the membrane between us.

Today I have no idea what I mean when I say God, and I say it a lot.

The earliest attributable author in all of human literature is an ancient Sumerian priestess named Enheduanna. The daughter of King Sargon, Enheduanna wrote sensual, desperate hymns to the goddess Inanna: 'My beautiful mouth knows only confusion. / Even my sex is dust: Written around 2300 BCE, Enheduanna's poems were the bedrock upon which much of ancient poetics was built. And her obsession? The precipitating subject of all our species' written word? Inanna, an ecstatic awe at the divine.

A year after I got sober, I learned from a routine physical that my liver was behaving abnormally, teetering on the precipice of pre-cirrhosis. This was after a year of excruciating recovery, a year in which nothing harder than Ibuprofen passed through my body. If it's this bad after a year of healing, a nurse told me, imagine how bad it must have been a year ago when you quit.

My earliest formulation of prayer was in Arabic, that beautiful, mysterious language of my childhood. I'd be called away from whatever trivia book I was reading or Simpsons episode I was watching to join my family in our ritual of collectively pushing these enigmatic sounds through our mouths.

Moving through the postures of devotion in our kitchen, watching my older brother, my mother, my father, I had no idea what any of it meant, but I knew it all meant intensely.

When I got sober it wasn't because I punched a cop or drove my car into a Wendy's or anything dramatic like that. I had a dozen potential bottoms that would have awakened any reasonable person to the severity of the problem, but I was not a reasonable person. The day I finally lurched my way towards help was a day like any other. I woke up alone on my floor still drunk from the night before. I remember taking a pull or two from the nearly empty bottle of Old Crow bourbon by my mattress, then searching for my glasses and car keys. Finding them, I calmly drove myself to help.

Sappho was by all accounts one of history's greatest poets, but the entire corpus of her work burned with the great Library of Alexandria, so today we only know her through the bits other writers quoted. We know that in Fragment 22 she wrote:

> because I prayed
> this word:
> I want

but we don't have the entirety of the poem preceding it, her 'because' hanging there to explain some now unimaginable consequence of desire.

If my liver function was still so erratic after a year of healing, then at the end of my active addiction I must have been near some sort of Rubicon from which there could be no return. Some awareness permeated my dense fog of destruction. That awareness might have been bodily, the way an iron deficiency sometimes provokes in someone an unconscious desire to eat dirt. It might have been fatigue, a cumulative sense that the status quo of my living had become untenable. Or it might have been something else. I'll never know, which I think is the point.

From a poem of the Nahuatl people:

> This flesh, this clay of ours, is starved and trembling.
> And we, poor prisoners of our stomachs!
> There is nothing we can do.

A common formulation states that prayer is a way of speaking to the divine and meditation is a way of listening for it. Poetry synthesizes these, the silence of active composition being a time even the most sceptical writers describe using the language of the metaphysical, saying `such-and-such a phrase just came to me, or `those hours just flew by: And then reading, a process through which dark runes on a page or strange vocalizations in the air can provoke us to laugh, weep, call our mothers, donate to Greenpeace or shiver with awe.

It is wrong to think of God as a debt to luck. But I could have died, and then I didn't. I haven't. When so many around me, like me, did and have.

One of the questions you can ask a poem is: to what do I owe my being here? Li Po: `I sing, and moon rocks back and forth; / I dance, and shadow tumbles into pieces: Gabriela Mistral: 'Sleeping, we made journeys / and arrived at no place: Is it any wonder my former loadout of addictions, all narcotic, were sublimated into this new set of poetic obsessions and compulsions?

My working definition of sacred poetry rises directly out of my experience as a child praying in Arabic: earnest, musical language meant to thin the partition between a person and a divine, whether that divine is God or the universe or desire or land or family or justice or community or sex or joy or. . . As with my early prayers in Arabic, a one-to-one denotative understanding of the language isn't important — what matters is the making of music and the sincerity of the making.

When I was getting sober, I found no easy prayers, no poems to sing me well. What I did find was that, during the early days of my recovery, when sobriety was minute to minute — white knuckles and endless pacing and cheap coffee by the pot — poetry was a place I could put myself. I could read a book of poems and for an hour, two hours I didn't have to worry about accidentally killing myself. I could write a poem and the language for what was happening would just come to me. Hours would just fly by.

Rabi'a al-Basri, writing in the eighth century CE:

> Kings have locked their doors
> and each lover is alone with his love.
> Here, I am alone with You.

My active addiction was a time of absolute certainty — certainty of my own victimhood, of my convictions, of what I was owed by a universe that had split me from the land of my birth and dropped me into an America that was actively hostile to my presence. That certainty destroyed whatever it touched, corroding my own life and the lives of people who loved me. In recovery, when I threw myself into poetry, I was drawn to poems that were certain of nothing, poems that embraced mystery instead of trying to resolve it. Yeats:

> The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.
> Surely some revelation is at hand.

Today the great weapon used to stifle critical thinking is a raw overwhelm of meaningless language at every turn — on our phones, on our TVs, in our periphery on billboards and subways. So often the language is passionately absolute: immigrants are evil, climate change is a hoax, and this new Rolex will make you sexually irresistible. Poetry opposes these things, asks us to slow down our metabolization of language, to become aware of it entering us. Sacred poetry teaches us to be comfortable with complexity, to be sceptical of unqualified certitude. In reminding us that language has history, density, integrity, such poetry is a potent antidote against a late-capitalist empire that would use empty, vapid language to cudgel us into inaction.

It is impossible to separate the part of me that is an addict-alcoholic from the part of me that experiences spiritual yearning, just as it's impossible to separate the part of me socialized as a Muslim American man. The same organ that wants me to drink controls my breathing and the contractions of my intestinal muscles. That same organ also reads the Quran and the Tao and the Psalms. It processes images of a rubbled Damascus, of a drone struck wedding in Iraq. It also desires my spouse's touch, and marvels at the stars. There are no partitions between these realms of my consciousness, which is why my conception of sacred poetry includes not only explicitly metaphysical poets like Rabi'a and King David, but also poets like Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetaeva, Edmond Jabs, Mahmoud Darwish and Lucille Clifton, poets for whom an exploration of the divine necessarily included explorations of the body and the body politic.

The great Persian poet Hafez wrote: `Start seeing God everywhere, but keep it secret.' I still have no idea what I mean when I say God, but I see it everywhere. I mean it intensely. I write poems and, yes, books about it. I read about it constantly, which seems, counter-intuitively, only to deepen its secret.

I wanted to make this anthology because I wanted all these texts in one place. I claim no objectivity. These are 110 of my favourite attributed poems, texts that have been variously important and useful and illuminating for me across my living. Many will no doubt scan the table of contents and object to the omission of their favourite poet of the spirit, asking, 'Why Adelia Prado instead of Carlos

Drummond de Andrade? Why Dickinson instead of Whitman?' Sometimes, the answer is boring: a finite permissions budget. But more often, such decisions are purely a function of which poets and poems have felt most essential to me, Kaveh Akbar, in my one vast and unprecedented life. I will say it again: I claim no objectivity.

Given this confession, though, I will say it was a goal to try to at least make a pass at accounting for the vast complexity of the human project of spiritual writing. Not to represent it, which, again, would take an Alexandrian Library or two. But to try to show confluences, overlaps of time and tone. In this anthology you'll find, for instance, that Dante Alighieri was born while Rumi was still alive and writing. Or that `American spiritual poetry' didn't begin with Dickinson or Whitman or anyone else writing in English, but with the Meso-American and Native people who inhabited the land that would be later called America; passing their sacred texts along for centuries. Relative to how long those texts were a part of the earth's spiritual history, Anglo-American texts are relatively brand new; the texts within this anthology are curated in rough proportion to that fact.

To flatten the project of 'spiritual poetry' to a bunch of white Romantic and Metaphysical poets is to erase the Bhagavad Gita, to wash away Li Po and Rabi'a and Mahadeviyakka and Teresa of Avila and Bashi and Nazim Hikmet. It's a colonization, one that erases not only the bodies and lands, but actual spirits. To the extent that there is any grand unified curatorial theory governing the content of this book, it exists in opposition to the colonial impulse.

Another load-bearing belief at work here: it's impossible to separate a spiritual poetics from the body that conceives it. Consider this moment from the Popol Vuh, the sixteenth-century Mayan creation narrative:

> It was simply the pure spirit
> and glinting spark of insight
>
> of the Framer and the Shaper,
> of Sovereign and Quetzal Serpent,
>
> of She who has borne children,
> and He who has planted them,
>
> that framed and gave them shape.
> They looked like true people,
>
> and true people they became.
> They spoke and they conversed.
>
> They looked and they listened.
> They walked and they grasped things,
> and they held them in their hands.
>
> They were excellent people,
> well made and handsome.
>
> They appeared with manly faces
> and began to breathe,
> and so they became

Often explorations of the divine move outwards with the language used to relay them — as our attention travels beyond our immediate bodily stations, so too do our voices, so too does our breath. The Arabic word ruh means both 'breath' and 'spirit; as does the Latin spiritus.

Collected here are 110 voices, each orbiting what G. K. Chesterton called the 'vertigo of the infinite; what Lucille Clifton called 'the lip of our understanding: Not all of these poems are drawn from antiquity. Even today, when irony is the default posture of the public intellectual, many poets remain relentlessly sincere in their explorations of spiritual yearning (and spiritual doubt). Inquiries into the divine still connect contemporary poets to their ancestors. In one poem, the twelfth-century Kannada poet-saint Mahadeviyakka writes:

> When the body becomes Your mirror, how can it serve?
> When the mind becomes your mind, what is left to remember?

In her `Astonishment; written over 800 years later, the twentieth-century Polish titan Wislawa Szymborska seems almost to pick up where the ancient poet left off, wrapping question after question around the immobilizing strangeness of being anything:

> Why after all this one and not the rest?
> Why this specific self, not in a nest, but a house?
> Sewn up not in scales, but skin?
> Not topped off by a leaf, but by a face?

The mission of this anthology is to organize these connections not to gather poets around geography or race or gender or belief or historical period, but instead around a shared privileging of the spirit and its attendant curiosities. In this way, readers might begin to hear a kind of conversation, one that has been ongoing for forty-three centuries and counting, a conversation into which countless young poets begin whispering every day.

Of course, no spirit lives in a vacuum. Some poets included in these pages, like Edmond Jabs, Anna Akhmatova and Nazim Hikmet, fortified their spiritual poetics with blistering social critiques. Such poets, Carolyn Fouche writes in Poetry of Witness, `don't easily extricate morality, ethics, the sacred, and the political.

For them, it's not possible to think of these as isolated categories, but rather as modes of human contemplation and action which are inextricably bound to one another: An attuned permeability to wonder compels the curious poet to rigorously examine their stations, both cosmic and civic. .

For other poets like Sappho, Rumi and Adelia Prado, divine and erotic loves braid together, creating a fully embodied devotion. Martin Buber wrote that God could be found only in other people — these poets would seem to agree. Consider Rumi, who wrote:

> The stars will be watching us,
> and we will show them
> what it is to be a thin crescent moon.
> You and I unselfed.

Or Prado:

> The brush got old and no longer brushes.
> Right now what's important
> is to untangle the hair.
> We give birth to life between our legs

and go on talking about it till the end,
few of us understanding:
it's the soul that's erotic.

The idea that ecstatic experience might (or must!) include the body is central to these poets; a quick glance at a dervish's whirling or a yogi's contorted meditation or shuckling during Jewish prayer will reveal several theological expressions of the same idea.

I have tried to account for these and countless other perspectives within the pages of this anthology. But comprehensively cataloguing forty-three centuries of spiritual writing is a fool's errand — there's too much to read in this or any lifetime, much less to accurately account for. Again, in just the thirteenth century alone, Mechthild of Magdeburg, Rumi and Dante were living at the same time, gasping at the same stars — the mind reels!

Thus this anthology does not aim to represent holistically the entire corpus of human spiritual writing (the size of such a collection would be measured in libraries, not pages). Instead, it will attempt to call forth pivotal samples from my own reading and discovery that might present for readers a scale model of an ongoing human conversation. Other anthologies of sacred poetry have been mostly Eurocentric or male-dominated, in both poets and translators. This anthology aims to achieve a more universal perspective, privileging no single belief system or vantage point. In curating the anthology this way, I hope to advance for inspection a modest study in how poets across time and civilizations have wrapped language around our species' constant collective unknowable obsessions — doubt, the divine, and the wide, mysterious gulfs in between. — Kaveh Akbar, Indiana, 2022 <>

Liebe und Leerheit: Eine komparative Verhältnisbestimmung des Liebesbegriffs bei Hans Urs von Balthasar und des Leerheitsbegriffs bei Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki

von Daniel Rumel [Series: Beiträge zur Komparativen Theologie, Brill | Schöningh, 9783506760685]

Das Gespräch zwischen Buddhismus und Christentum gelangte an fast allen Punkten seiner älteren und jüngeren Geschichte an einen zentralen Konfliktpunkt: Der christliche Gott der Liebe schien dem buddhistischen Begriff der absoluten Leerheit jeder Person bisher immer unvereinbar gegenüberzustehen.

Die vorgelegte Studie unterzieht diese Ansicht einer eingehenden Lektüre, indem anhand zweier, den jeweiligen Diskurs leitend prägender Autoren die Begriffe von Liebe und Leerheit tiefenanalytisch ausgearbeitet und ins Verhältnis gesetzt werden.

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

Epigraph
Danksagung
Kapitel 1 Einführung
Kapitel 2 Der Liebesbegriff bei Hans Urs von Balthasar
Kapitel 3 Der Leerheitsbegriff bei Teitarō Suzuki
Kapitel 4 Komparative Zusammenschau

Kapitel 5 Abschlussbetrachtung
Literaturverzeichnis

Abschlussbetrachtung

Im Verlauf dieser Arbeit hat sich zunächst die in der Einleitung angeführte Zentraldifferenz der beiden Bezugsstrukturen des christlichen Liebesbegriffs und des buddhistischen Leerheitsbegriffs als unhaltbar erwiesen. Sie beruht auf einem Missverständnis, welches vor allem im angesetzten Personenbegriff und seiner Gleichsetzung mit dem modernen Subjektbegriff besteht. Diese führt aber bereits innerchristlich in große Spannungen.

Was sich im Durchgang ebenfalls gezeigt hat, ist, dass der christliche Liebes-begriff eine innere Korrelation zu einem Denken der Leerheit besitzt. Diese besteht vor allem darin, dass der christliche Liebesgedanke im Sinne von Balthasars kenotisch gedacht und mit dem Leitbegriff der Hingabe entwickelt wird. Dies übersetzt den Personenbegriff in eine apophatische Struktur, indem sie das, was eine Person zuinnerst ausmacht, als Hingabe denkt. Somit entspricht ein Mensch seinem eigenen Wesen umso mehr, wie er sich der Wirklichkeit Gottes in kenotischer Weise hingibt, die selbst Hingabe ist. Übersetzt man Hingabe an dieser Stelle nochmals mit dem Wort Leerheit, so ist es nicht zu viel gesagt, wenn man im Sinne von Balthasars die Wirklichkeit des Menschen als Leerheit beschreibt, in die der Mensch hineinfindet, wenn er seine Differenz-Einheit mit der letzten Wirklichkeit Gottes, die selber Leerheit ist, einsieht. Wie dargestellt kann aber ein solches Einsehen ebenfalls nur in einem Akt der Entleerung bestehen, in der der Mensch als Geist-Wesen in die Offenbarungsgestalt Christi eingestaltet wird.

Gerade diese Struktur resoniert auf beeindruckende Weise mit dem buddhistischen Leerheitsbegriff, wie er bezüglich der Explikation Suzukis entwickelt wurde. Bemerkenswert dabei ist vor allem, dass bei aller apophatischen Zurückhaltung die letzte Wirklichkeit der Leerheit personelle Explikationen besitzt, die im Modus des unbedingten Mitgefühls eine Weise aufzeigen, wie sich eine Person in Einklang mit der letzten Wirklichkeit der Leerheit bringen kann. Dieser Modus ist gerade der des allumfassenden Mitgefühls, der in einer Form von Hingabe für die fühlenden Wesen resultiert. Dieser Vorgang wird von Suzuki als descend into hell beschrieben.3 Diese Beschreibung zeigt nochmals auf beeindruckende Weise, wie nah sich die Gedanken von Balthasars und Suzukis eigentlich kommen, wenn man ihre selbstverständlichen lexikalischen Differenzen in die Tiefengrammatik überführt.

Es hat sich somit gezeigt, dass bei bleibender Treue zur eigenen Tradition die zentralen Momente der eigenen religiösen Explikation nicht angepasst oder aufgegeben werden müssen, um in eine innere Resonanz zu kommen. Dies ist insofern wichtig, als der Ansatz der Wirklichkeit Jesu als universale concretum im Sinne von Balthasars ja gerade besagt, dass die Struktur der Wirklichkeit Gottes, wie sie sich in Christus gezeigt hat, als einziges Kriterium interreligiöser Urteilsbildung angesetzt werden muss.4 Diesbezüglich ist es nun gelungen, aus christlicher Perspektive die Möglichkeit zu einer tieferen Offenheit zu buddhistischen Denkstrukturen zu eröffnen, weil gezeigt wurde, dass scheinbare tiefe Widersprüche gerade bei präziser Analyse enorme Resonanzen aufweisen. Dies kommt nicht zuletzt dem Anliegen von Balthasars selbst entgegen, für den die Wahrheit symphonisch war. Die aufgezeigte Möglichkeit, gegenüber buddhistischen Denkstrukturen eine größere Offenheit zu zeigen, kann das seitens von Balthasars angeführte ökumenische Orchester vielleicht um einige weitere Stimmen erweitern und somit neue Tiefenstrukturen der Partitur der Wirklichkeit aufzeigen.

Was ebenfalls gezeigt werden konnte, war die produktive Sichtweise, die das Denken Suzukis in das Denken von Balthasars einbringen kann. Diese lag vor allem in der Radikalität des Denkens der Nicht-Zweiheit, aus der heraus einige Spannungen im Denken von Balthasars sich neu betrachten ließen. Speziell die Spannung zwischen der Tatsächlichkeit des Du in der Begegnung der Liebe und der tatsächlichen Entzogenheit der Wirklichkeit ihres Wesens konnte als eine Spannung aufgewiesen

werden, die in beiden Traditionen vorhanden ist. Dabei wurde deutlich, dass die christliche Seite in Vertretung von Balthasars bemüht ist, die Tatsächlichkeit des Du zu betonen, teilweise ohne gesichert aussagen zu können, worin diese Tatsächlichkeit eigentlich besteht. Die buddhistische Seite in Vertretung Suzukis verlegt hierbei das Geheimnis der Differenz-Einheit der begegnenden Person mit der absoluten Wirklichkeit der Leerheit in eine apophatische Perspektive, was sie zwar für akademische Kontexte weniger attraktiv macht, in gewisser Hinsicht jedoch inhaltlich stringent bleiben lässt.

Beide, sowohl Suzuki als auch von Balthasar, wählen als Begriff zur Beschreibung der letzten Wirklichkeit das Wort Leerheit, bzw. Kenosis. Dies soll nun nicht heißen, dass die beiden Verwendungen gänzlich äquivalente Strukturen aufweisen. Neben den enormen Resonanzen wurden die vor allem lexikalischen Differenzen im Zuge dieser Arbeit nie ausgeblendet. Diese liegen vor allem im Schöpfungsbegriff begründet, der letztlich auch im Sinne von Balthasars mit dem Liebesbegriff konnotiert ist. Für beide bildet der Begriff der Leerheit, bzw. der Kenosis, eine Chiffre für die begrifflich nicht zugängliche letzte Wirklichkeit. Die praxeologische Entsprechung zu dieser Wirklichkeit besteht ebenfalls für beide in einer Form von Hingabe zum Nächsten, die auf der Einsicht in der Differenz-Einheit allen Seins begründet ist, die selbst als eine Form von dynamischer Hingabestruktur beschrieben werden kann.

Fraglich bleibt vor allem, ob aus der christlichen Schöpfungsperspektive nach von Balthasar der Begriff der Kenosis eine vorhergehende Fülle voraussetzt. Es wurde jedoch durch die gesamte Arbeit deutlich, dass zumindest für von Balthasar jenseits der Leerheit, jenseits der Hingabe, keine Fülle besteht. Bereits der Vater fand ja seine gesamte Fülle in der Hingabe und besaß keine wie auch immer geartete Fülle, die er hingibt. Dennoch bleibt die Grammatik des Begriffs der Kenosis in der angegebenen Spannung bestehen. Wenn der Vater mit seiner Hingabe an den Sohn ein Wagnis eingehen soll, wie von Balthasar dies beschreibt, dann muss zumindest eine Form von Quasi-Fülle angenommen werden, die hingegeben wird, weil ohne diese der Begriff des Wagnisses seinen Sinn verlieren würde. Doch gleichzeitig ist für von Balthasars der Vater selbst nichts anderes als Hingabe, besitzt somit keinerlei Fülle, die nicht selber Hingabe wäre. Man könnte somit folgern, dass das Sein des Vaters selbst Wagnis ist. Die Fülle ist die Hingabe, oder, mit aller Vorsicht, im Sinne Suzukis formuliert: Die Form ist die Leerheit.

Es ist ein Ergebnis dieser Arbeit, dass gerade diese Spannung durch den stringenten Begriff der Leerheit, wie er von Suzuki präsentiert wurde, neu gedacht werden kann. Die strikte Methodik des Nicht-Zweiens erschließt der theologischen Sprache ein Moment, in dem gerade die Nichtunterscheidung zweier Aspekte auf etwas Konkretes verweist, in diesem Fall die Nicht-Zweiheit von Fülle und Leere im Sinne des Wesens des Vaters bei von Balthasar. Der zentrale Satz des Herz-Sutra, wie ihn Suzuki anführt und auslegt: „Form ist eben diese Leere — Leere ist eben diese Form", lieferte dafür den entscheidenden Schlüssel. Wie für Suzuki bezüglich der gesamten Wirklichkeit kein Unterschied zwischen Form und Leere besteht, so führt es hinsichtlich der Darstellung von Balthasars in enorme Spannungen, wenn man einen Unterschied zwischen Form und Leere, zwischen Fülle und Kenosis ansetzt. Das heißt nicht, dass man dies überhaupt nicht tun kann. Von Balthasar selbst formuliert diese Spannung. Doch die buddhistische Perspektive Suzukis kann dabei helfen, sie ein wenig abzuschwächen.

Fraglich bleibt weiter, wie der Ertrag dieser Arbeit hilfreich für zukünftige komparative Projekte im buddhistisch-christlichen Kontext sein kann. In dieser Arbeit wurde sich weitestgehend auf die beiden Positionen von Balthasars und Suzukis beschränkt. Diese wurden zwar in ihren Kontext eingebettet und die beiden Begriffe von Liebe und Leerheit wurden weitläufig hergeleitet, aber für eine großräumige Einbettung in die Gesamttradition war der Raum dieses Projektes zu begrenzt. Somit bleibt festzuhalten, dass der dargestellte Ansatz gezeigt hat, dass zwei Grundmomente des

buddhistischen und des christlichen Denkens bei bleibender Treue zur Tradition durchaus in einer bemerkenswerten Resonanz stehen. Resonanz heißt an dieser Stelle, dass sich bei steigender Aufhellung tiefengrammatischer Strukturen ein Zusammenklang ergibt, der beiden Seiten zunächst als Verständnisbasis dienen kann, aber auch als kritische Herausforderung für ein Weiterdenken der eigenen Position. Für zukünftige Studien bleibt die Aufgabe, neben von Balthasar und Suzuki weitere Leitfiguren der jeweiligen Diskurse ins Gespräch zu bringen, aber vor allem die primären kanonischen Texte durch eine tiefgreifende Exegese auf ihre inneren Resonanzen und die Möglichkeiten wechselseitiger Bereicherung hin zu befragen. <>

Translation:

[Love and Emptiness: A comparative determination of the concept of love in Hans Urs von Balthasar and the concept of voidness in Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki by Daniel Rumel [Series: Beiträge zur Komparativen Theologie, Brill | Schöningh, 9783506760685] text in German

The conversation between Buddhism and Christianity reached a central point of conflict at almost all points in its older and recent history: the Christian God of love always seemed to be incompatible with the Buddhist concept of the absolute emptiness of each person.

The presented study subjects this view to an in-depth reading by working out and relating the concepts of love and emptiness in depth analytically on the basis of two authors who shape the respective discourse.

CONTENTS

Epigraph
Acknowledgement
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Hans Urs von Balthasar's concept of love
Chapter 3 The concept of voidness in Teitarō Suzuki
Chapter 4 Comparative Survey
Chapter 5 Conclusion
Bibliography

In the course of this work, the central difference between the two reference structures of the Christian concept of love and the Buddhist concept of voidness mentioned in the introduction has initially proven to be untenable. It is based on a misunderstanding, which consists above all in the assumed concept of person and its equation with the modern concept of subject. However, this is already leading to great tensions within Christ.

What has also been shown in the passage is that the Christian concept of love has an inner correlation to a thinking of voidness. This consists above all in the fact that the Christian idea of love in the sense of Balthasars is thought kenotically and developed with the guiding concept of devotion. This translates the concept of person into an apophatic structure by thinking of what constitutes a person at its core as devotion. Thus, a person corresponds to his own nature all the more as he surrenders himself in a kenotic way to the reality of God, which is itself devotion. If one translates devotion at this point again with the word emptiness, it is not too much to say, in the sense of Balthasars, to describe the reality of man as emptiness, into which man finds his way when he sees

his unity of difference with the ultimate reality of God, which is itself emptiness. As described, however, such an insight can also only consist in an act of emptying, in which man is shaped as a spirit being into the manifest form of Christ.

It is precisely this structure that resonates impressively with the Buddhist concept of voidness as developed with regard to Suzuki's explication. What is particularly remarkable is that despite all apophatic restraint, the ultimate reality of voidness has personal explications that, in the mode of unconditional compassion, show a way in which a person can bring himself into harmony with the ultimate reality of voidness. This mode is precisely that of all-encompassing compassion, which results in a form of devotion to sentient beings. This process is described by Suzuki as descend into hell. This description once again impressively shows how close the thoughts of Balthasars and Suzukis actually come when their self-evident lexical differences are transferred into deep grammar.

It has thus been shown that with lasting fidelity to one's own tradition, the central moments of one's own religious explication do not have to be adapted or abandoned in order to come into inner resonance. This is important insofar as the approach of the reality of Jesus as a universal concretum in the sense of Balthasars states precisely that the structure of the reality of God, as it has manifested itself in Christ, must be used as the only criterion for interreligious judgment.4 In this regard, it has now been possible to open up the possibility of a deeper openness to Buddhist thought structures from a Christian perspective. because it has been shown that seemingly deep contradictions have enormous resonances, especially with precise analysis. This accommodates not least the concern of Balthasars himself, for whom the truth was symphonic. The possibility of showing greater openness towards Buddhist thought structures can perhaps expand the ecumenical orchestra led by Balthasars by a few more voices and thus point out new deep structures of the score of reality.

What could also be shown was the productive view that Suzuki's thinking can bring to Balthasar's thinking. This lay above all in the radicality of the thinking of non-duality, from which some tensions in Balthasar's thinking could be reconsidered. In particular, the tension between the actuality of the "you" in the encounter of love and the actual deprivation of the reality of its essence could be shown as a tension that is present in both traditions. It became clear that the Christian side, representing Balthasars, is trying to emphasize the reality of the you, sometimes without being able to say with certainty what this fact actually consists of. The Buddhist side, representing Suzuki, shifts the mystery of the difference unity of the encountering person with the absolute reality of voidness into an apophatic perspective, which makes it less attractive for academic contexts, but in some respects remains stringent in terms of content.

Both Suzuki and Balthasar choose the word voidness or kenosis as a term to describe the ultimate reality. This is not to say that the two uses have completely equivalent structures. In addition to the enormous resonances, the mainly lexical differences were never ignored in the course of this work. These are mainly based on the concept of creation, which is ultimately connoted with the concept of love in the sense of Balthasars. For both, the concept of voidness, or kenosis, forms a cipher for the conceptually inaccessible ultimate reality. The praxeological correspondence to this reality also consists for both in a form of devotion to one's neighbour, which is based on insight into the difference unity of all being, which itself can be described as a form of dynamic devotion structure.

Above all, it remains questionable whether, from Balthasar's Christian perspective of creation, the concept of kenosis presupposes a preceding abundance. However, it became clear throughout the work that, at least for von Balthasar, there is no abundance beyond emptiness, beyond devotion. Already the Father found all his fullness in devotion and possessed no abundance whatsoever that he gives. Nevertheless, the grammar of the concept of kenosis persists in the specified tension. If the

father is to take a risk with his devotion to the son, as described by Balthasar, then at least a form of quasi-abundance must be assumed, which is surrendered, because without it the concept of risk would lose its meaning. But at the same time, for von Balthasars, the father himself is nothing more than devotion, thus possessing no abundance that would not itself be devotion. One could thus conclude that the existence of the Father itself is a risk. Fullness is devotion, or, with all due care, formulated in the sense of Suzuki: form is emptiness.

It is a result of this work that precisely this tension can be rethought by the stringent concept of voidness as presented by Suzuki. The strict methodology of non-twoness opens up to theological language a moment in which it is precisely the non-distinction of two aspects that points to something concrete, in this case the non-duality of abundance and emptiness in the sense of the essence of the father in von Balthasar. The central sentence of the Heart Sutra, as Suzuki cites and interprets it: "Form is precisely this emptiness — emptiness is just this form", provided the decisive key to this. Just as for Suzuki there is no difference between form and emptiness with regard to the whole of reality, so it leads to enormous tensions with regard to the representation of Balthasars if one sets a difference between form and emptiness, between abundance and kenosis. That's not to say you can't do it at all. Von Balthasar himself formulates this tension. But Suzuki's Buddhist perspective can help tone it down a bit.

It remains questionable how the yield of this work can be helpful for future comparative projects in the Buddhist-Christian context. This work was largely limited to the two positions of Balthasars and Suzukis. Although these were embedded in their context and the two concepts of love and emptiness were widely derived, the space of this project was too limited for a large-scale embedding in the overall tradition. Thus, it must be noted that the approach presented has shown that two basic moments of Buddhist and Christian thought with lasting fidelity to tradition are quite resonant in a remarkable resonance. At this point, resonance means that with increasing brightening of deep-grammatical structures, a harmony results that can initially serve both sides as a basis for understanding, but also as a critical challenge for further thinking of one's own position. For future studies, the task remains to bring other leading figures of the respective discourses into conversation in addition to Balthasar and Suzuki, but above all to question the primary canonical texts through a profound exegesis for their inner resonances and the possibilities of mutual enrichment. <>

Buddhism and Modernity: Sources from Nineteenth-Century Japan edited by Orion Klautau, and Hans Martin Krämer with contributions by Orion Klautau, Hans Martin Krämer, Micah Auerback, James Baskind, Nathaniel Gallant, G. Clinton Godart, Seiji Hoshino, Mami Iwata, Jason Ananda Josephson Storm, Mitsuhiro Kameyama, Stephan Kigensan Licha, Michel Mohr, Fabio Rambelli, Erik Schicketanz, Jeff Schroeder, James Mark Shields, Jacqueline I. Stone, Jolyon Baraka Thomas, Dylan Toda, Ryan Ward, Garrett L. Washington [University of Hawaii Press, 9780824884581]

Japan was the first Asian nation to face the full impact of modernity. Like the rest of Japanese society, Buddhist institutions, individuals, and thought were drawn into the dynamics of confronting the modern age. Japanese Buddhism had to face multiple challenges, but it also contributed to modern Japanese society in numerous ways. **Buddhism and Modernity: Sources from Nineteenth-Century Japan** makes accessible the voices of Japanese Buddhists during the early phase of high modernity.

The volume offers original translations of key texts—many available for the first time in English—by central actors in Japan's transition to the modern era, including the works of Inoue Enryō, Gesshō, Hara Tanzan, Shimaji Mokurai, Kiyozawa Manshi, Murakami Senshō, Tanaka Chigaku, and Shaku Sōen. All of these writers are well recognized by Buddhist studies scholars and Japanese historians but have drawn little attention elsewhere; this stands in marked contrast to the reception of Japanese Buddhism since D. T. Suzuki, the towering figure of Japanese Zen in the first half of the twentieth century. The present book fills the chronological gap between the premodern era and the twentieth century by focusing on the crucial transition period of the nineteenth century.

Issues central to the interaction of Japanese Buddhism with modernity inform the five major parts of the work: sectarian reform, the nation, science and philosophy, social reform, and Japan and Asia. Throughout the chapters, the globally entangled dimension—both in relation to the West, especially the direct and indirect impact of Christianity, and to Buddhist Asia—is of great importance. The Introduction emphasizes not only how Japanese Buddhism was part of a broader, globally shared reaction of religions to the specific challenges of modernity, but also goes into great detail in laying out the specifics of the Japanese case.

CONTENTS

Buddhism and Modernity in Japan An Introduction by Orion Klautau and Hans Martin Krämer
PART I SECTARIAN REFORM
Chapter 1 Questions and Answers from Beneath a Snowy Window (1876) by Fukuda Gyōkai
Chapter 2 On Religious Revolution (1889) by Nakanishi Ushirō
Chapter 3 "Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists: Our Manifesto" (1900)
Capter 4 "Discussing the Kanrenkai" (1897) by Kyōkai Jigensha
PART II THE NATION

Chapter 1 On Protecting the Nation through Buddhism (1856)
Chapter 2 "Upholding Faith in the Buddhadharma and Repaying the Nation" (1863) by Ogawa Taidō
Chapter 3 "Lectures on the Three Articles of Instruction" (1873) by Higuchi Ryūon
Chapter 4 Laughing at Christianity (1869) by Kiyū Dōjin
Chapter 5 On the National Doctrine of Greater Japan (1882) by Shaku Unshō
PART III SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Chapter 1 A Buddhist Book of Genesis (1879) by Sada Kaiseki
Chapter 2 "The Gist of Indian Philosophy" (1887) by Hara Tanzan
Chapter 3 Prolegomena to an Argument for the Revival of Buddhism (1887) by Inoue Enryō
Chapter 4 Discourse on Buddhist Unity (1901) by Murakami Senshō
PART IV SOCIAL REFORM
Chapter 1 "On Civilization" (1876) by Ōuchi Seiran
Chapter 2 "Publishing Goals of Hanseikai zasshi " (1887) and "Living the Pure Life" (1887) by Hanseikai Zasshi
Chapter 3 "On the Relationship Between Man and Woman" (1888) by Shimaji Mokurai
Chapter 4 On Buddhist Marriage (1894) by Tanaka Chigaku
Chapter 5 The Problem of Faith (1904) by Chikazumi Jōkan
PART V JAPAN AND ASIA
Chapter 1 "A Plan to Protect the Dharma" (1874/1903) by Ogurusu Kōchō
Chapter 2 "A Record of Niuzhuang" (1895) by Yamagata Genjō
Chapter 3 "The Japanese People's Spirit" (1912) by Shaku Sōen
Chapter 4 A Travelogue in Tibet (1904) by Kawaguchi Ekai
About the Editors and Contributors

Buddhism and Modernity in Japan, An Introduction by Orion Klautau and Hans Martin Krämer

The challenges faced by Japanese Buddhists since the middle of the nineteenth century were in many respects homegrown. The iconoclastic movement to "abolish the Buddha and smash Sakyamuni" (haibutsu kishaku) was certainly a local phenomenon, as was the particular configuration of state and religion during the early Meiji period, when the new government still grappled with a religious policy for the young nation-state. Yet, Japanese Buddhism also shared many of the difficulties modernity brought to religions worldwide. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was the new type of secularism that went along with Enlightenment. This was not necessarily an objective process of secularization, but certainly brought with it a change in attitudes toward and expectations from religion(s), primarily from the modern natural sciences and philosophical materialism. None of the major religious traditions around the world remained unaffected by this new challenge. The type of reaction that took place in each religion—internal reform, conservative reassertion, creation of eclectic new religions, or religious universalism—varied, as did its timing.

While this new secularism may be seen as an indirect effect of the ascent of industrial capitalism, another of its consequences, the imperialist encroachment upon the rest of the world by the West, made possible a new solution to the threat felt by Christianity at home: reaching out globally through missionary efforts. It was through this—mainly Protestant—mission that Asian countries including Japan first met religious modernity head-on. Asian religions such as Japanese Buddhism had to react to the competition posed by Protestant Christianity, which came with the market advantage of representing modernity. Debates about the reconfiguration of the relations between state and religion were heavily tinged by the question of what to do with Christianity.

Japanese Buddhists—or at least some of them—were acutely aware of the changes around them. Since the 1850s, Buddhist authors had addressed the new threat posed by Christianity, and some

sects even introduced "enemy studies" into the curricula of their academies. Buddhist authors were among the first in Japan to write about evolutionary theory and the particular problems this new scientific theory implied for revealed religion. Buddhist authors also introduced modern historiographic methods into the writing of religious history. Although different sects adjusted in different ways, there was a general mood of readiness for reform almost unparalleled in other major religious traditions around the world, where conservative attempts at reassertion usually played a much larger role—be it in South Asian Hinduism and Islam, Southeast Asian Islam, European Christianity, or Middle Eastern and North African Islam—where reform attempts frequently entailed a split from the mainstream religious institutions and the creation of new religious movements. In contrast to these cases, Japanese Buddhists enthusiastically embraced the changes necessitated by the modern age, which they interpreted as new possibilities.

Japanese Buddhism as we know it today was formed in this era of tremendous change. The modern period, largely the decades between the middle of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, has nonetheless received scant attention in historical research on Japanese Buddhism. In Japan, it has been dwarfed by doctrinally oriented sectarian studies and the towering attention devoted to the late ancient and medieval periods, supposedly the time when Buddhism in Japan flourished and engendered its most original innovations under the great reformers of the Heian (Saichõ and Kükai, the founders of the Tendai and Shingon, sects, respectively) and Kamakura periods (Hõnen, Shinran, Dõgen, and Nichiren the founders of the Jõdo, Jõdo Shinshü, Sõtõ Zen, and Nichiren sects, respectively). Together with the niche subjects of early modern Buddhism (i.e., that of the Tokugawa period) and contemporary Buddhism (since 1945), modern Buddhism has only slowly taken ground as an accepted field within Buddhist Studies since Yoshida Kyüichi Ámat^ (1915–2005) pioneered work on the Meiji period, emphasizing its "modernity," in the late 1950s. In Western-language scholarship on Japan, the transformative era of the nineteenth century has taken even longer to catch on, despite the importance of the Meiji period more generally in European and North American scholarship on Japan since the early postwar period. In the following sections, we will first trace the major transformations Buddhism underwent at an institutional level in nineteenth-century Japan, especially in connection with the broader religious policy of the Meiji state. With those factors in mind, we will move to an overview of how scholarship on the topic developed in both the West and in Japan, before identifying the major issues that Japanese Buddhists faced in the nineteenth century, which will also inform the makeup of this volume.

Buddhism in Nineteenth-Century Japan: An Overview

Before we enter into the history of scholarship on modern Japanese Buddhism proper, it will be useful to gain a general insight into the main institutional changes experienced by the Japanese schools of Buddhism after the Meiji restoration of 1868. Historian of religion Hayashi Makoto (b. 1953) has recently proposed, in response to an earlier division by Yoshida Kyüichi, a new periodization for the history of modern Buddhism in Japan. Diverging from the more Marxist-influenced classification of Yoshida, Hayashi asserts the need to understand the history of nineteenth-century Japanese Buddhism not only as the making of something new—or in other words, of the "modern" itself—but also as the gradual process of dismantling a centuries-old religious system with its own intrinsic rationale.3 That is, we can only begin to comprehend the "modernization" of Buddhism in Japan if we take into consideration the adaptational struggles that came with the sudden abolishment of Tokugawa institutions, then indissociable from the Buddhist establishment itself. From that perspective Hayashi divides the history of post-Restoration Buddhism into three periods, which will function as a guide for the brief historical overview below.

The Age of Negotiation (1868–1872)

In 1868, after over a decade of complicated internal debates among the political elites and a few years of actual military conflict, the young Mutsuhito ^^ (1852–1912) was crowned emperor of

Japan. Although fighting against Tokugawa forces would continue in northern Japan well into the following year, in areas already under Imperial authority the process of "restoring" institutions of the ancient ritsuryõ state—or rather, idealized versions thereof—had begun. This meant, of course, the abolition of social and legal structures then considered by different factions within the new government as being both impediments to the "restoration" of Imperial power and "former evil practices" associated with the Tokugawa regime. The Buddhist institution was, unmistakably, one such structure, and for Meiji ideologues it had to be dealt with accordingly. The government thus issued the many individual directives that became known in later historiography as the shinbutsu bunri {edicts). These, as John Breen explains, were aimed at putting "an end to all state privileges" enjoyed by Buddhism and transferring those social functions to "Shinto." While their most immediate objective seems to have been to prompt all involved parties to "clarify" (hanzen, i.e., distinguish between the worship of buddhas and kami at a mostly material and ritual level), they eventually led to the sometimes violent outbursts known as the haibutsu kishaku move-ment.6 However, the foremost preoccupation of Buddhists was that the Meiji state, seeking friendly relations with Western countries, would now allow the free practice of Christianity in Japan. The social role of keeping Japan a "Jesus-free" land was perceived by many late-Edo Buddhists as the main raison d'être of their institution, a trend readers can verify in several texts included in this sourcebook.

The way Buddhists reacted to these policies was, however, not as one would at first expect: although some of the government actions could be read as unmistakably anti-Buddhist, the most representative part of the clergy did not act with contempt nor did it engage in direct protest. Rather, they proceeded to acknowledge their "past mistakes" and proposed a renewed relationship with their new secular leaders. During the early months of 1869, clerics representing different Buddhist schools— a number of them included in this volume—came together and founded the League of United Buddhist Sects (Shoshü dõtoku kaimei), the first supra-sectarian Buddhist association of modern Japan.

They drafted a joint document in which they declared the "inseparability of secular law and Buddhist law," the "critique and proscription of heresies" and, most significantly, the "sweeping away of the past evils of each sect," among other items.

The proposal set forth by the League of United Buddhist Sects was not to set themselves against the new government, but to assert that the Buddhist institution, despite its numerous problems, could still be useful in the years to come—for instance in keeping away the "heresy" of Christianity, still forbidden in Japan at the time. Between 1869 and 1872, however, state policies aimed at disestablishing the Tokugawa regime would continue to shake the very foundations of Buddhist institutions: in early 1871, in preparation for the abolition of the domain system that would take place a few months later, the Meiji state confiscated all land that had been granted to both Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines by the shogun and daimyo. Although this remains an understudied topic, the confiscation had a far larger material impact on the Buddhist institution than any of the isolated haibutsu kishaku events. By mid-1871 the government had also issued a new state-centered family registration system. This led, a few months later, to the official abolition of the Buddhist-controlled religious census that had formed the basis of the danka system, a feature characteristic of Tokugawa Japan. In 1872, a law was issued decriminalizing clerical marriage and meat eating, both of which had been considered illegal in the Tokugawa context. Later that year members of the clergy were also made to take surnames, and were now, in essence, no different from commoners (heimin).

By the end of 1872, Buddhism had been stripped of both its main sources of income and of its social status. It was also on the verge of seeing the decriminalization of Christianity, perceived as its great enemy. Indeed, in the beginning of 1873, the Meiji state decided to withdraw the centuries-long

prohibition against the "heretic teaching." Although by this point many a cleric was convinced that the government was truly setting out to "eradicate" Buddhism, others continued to seek state approval, emphasizing the myriad ways the dharma could contribute to the national goal of enriching the country and strengthening the army (fukoku kyõhei) and, as we will see below, to the emperor-centered national promulgation campaign.

The Age of Kyõdõshoku (1872–1884)

In order to eliminate Buddhism from the public sphere and transfer its social functions to Shinto, the government had promulgated, in early 1870, the Imperial decree on the Great Promulgation Campaign (Taikyõ senpu no mikotonori). This edict asserted the unity of ritual and government (saisei itchi), and established the office of senkyõshi (propagandists), who were supposed to elucidate to the nation the "Great Way of obedience to the gods." Nativist and Confucian scholars were recruited for the position, while Buddhist priests were deliberately excluded from participating. However, for a number of reasons, which included lack of consensus regarding what these officials should in fact "propagate," by mid-1872 the senkyõshi had been abolished; now under a different ministry, the Kyõbushõ their role was reformulated and incorporated into the newly created office of doctrinal instructor (kyõdõshoku). The latter now included not only Nativist and Confucian scholars, but also Buddhist priests and whoever else was considered to have experience with audiences, such as haiku poets and rakugo storytellers.

The main role of the kyõdõshoku was to preach to the population based on the "Three Standards of Instruction" (sanjõ kyõsoku) which were as follows: "To embody reverence for the deities and love of the country," "To clarify the principles of heaven and the way of humanity," and last, "To revere and assist the emperor and obey the will of the court." These aimed at inculcating into the population the ideal of a new tennõ-centered Japan. With a few notable exceptions, most of the Buddhist world revealed a rather positive attitude toward these standards, even contributing to the formation of an entire exegetical genre surrounding them. This national proselytization plan focused on the Three Standards was further expanded in the following year, with the opening of the Great Teaching Institute (Daikyõin), set up on the grounds of Zõjõji temple in Tokyo. One should note that 1872 was also the year of the promulgation of Japan's first Code of Education (gakusei). At this early stage, there was not yet a clear differentiation between kyõka ^^, which would be a duty of the Kyõbushõ, and kyõiku, which would be the responsibility of the Monbushõ (Ministry of Education).

Nevertheless, this relationship did become an issue after 1873, when Monbushõ officials returned from Europe at least partly convinced of the ideal of separating religion and education.13 From around this time, Monbushõ bureaucrats began advocating a clear distinction between the roles of proselytizers and schoolteachers, which eventually led to the exclusion of Buddhist priests from public education. This ban was later relaxed, and then ultimately lifted in 1879, when it became clear that the Buddhist clergy was essential in terms of persAonnel for the Monbushõ enterprise. Note that although the Daikyõin had been dissolved in 1875 (and the Kyõbushõ itself abolished in 1877), the kyõdõshoku system itself continued well into the following decade. This meant that the time between the late 1870s and early 1880s was one of accommodation for Buddhists, who now had to find their role amid this new division between "education" and "religion." In fact, while kyõdõshoku members of the Buddhist clergy still had a public role, the office also increasingly lost importance, making it clear that it was just a matter of time until it was abolished altogether. In the "enlightened" environment of Meiji Japan, asserting themselves vis-à-vis the old "enemy" of Christianity as a positive force for the state became the highest commitment for most Buddhists.

From the early 1880s, as Japan embarked on the journey to become a constitutional state, Buddhists strove at the intellectual level to adapt to the myriad new discourses required by current times. Besides the abovementioned concept of "education," the concepts of "science" and "religion" also

posed their challenges, as did those of "individual" and "faith." Another important development at this time was the rise of lay Buddhist movements. Whereas until the early Meiji years nonclerical persons in positions of leadership in Buddhist institutions were virtually unheard of, laypeople began playing a major role around this time, as we can observe in the work of individuals such as Õuchi Seiran (1845–1918) and Nakanishi Ushirõ (1859–1930). Their less directly engaged position—or in other words, the fact that they were not as committed to institutional demands—was also important in overcoming, when necessary, the sectarianism so characteristic of Japanese Buddhist schools. This in turn became an essential tool for reframing Buddhism as a "religion."

Establishing the Modern Buddhist Institution (1884–1900)

Between the late 1870s and early 1880s, as the Freedom and People's Rights Movement (Jiyü minken undõ) gained strength, so did the demand for a constitution. The idea of a constitutional environment—and the possibility of Japan adopting a state religion— provided Buddhists with a new type of awareness, which can be observed, for instance, in the work of Shaku Unshõ (1827–1909) included in this sourcebook. At the same time, the realm of religious policy also experienced its own crisis. With the demise of the Daikyõin in 1875— due mainly to the lack of cooperation by Jõdo Shin priests prompted by Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911)—a new Shinto-centered bureau took over much of its role. A dispute arose between the chief priest of the Ise Shrines, who had been appointed the head of this new Office of Shinto Affairs (Shintõ jimukyoku), and the chief priest of Izumo Shrine over which deities to enshrine in the office. As a consequence of this "Pantheon Dispute" (saijin ronsõ), which could only be solved by the arbitration of the Imperial court, in 1882 the government forbade priests working in national and Imperial shrines (kankoku heisha) from serving as kyõdõshoku. They were also forbidden to perform funerals. The dissatisfied factions went on to establish their own institutions, giving rise to the distinction between "Shrine Shinto" and "Sect Shinto."

This internal dispute, intrinsically related to the very issue of Imperial authority, constituted the final blow to the already moribund kyõdõshoku system. Between March and April 1884, Inoue Kowashi (1844–1895), one of the architects of the Meiji Constitution, proposed the elimination of the office. He emphasized the ideal of religious freedom alongside a legal framework for regulating religious corporations. Indeed, a few months later in August 1884, the Council of State promulgated a directive abolishing the position of kyõdõshoku, an event of utmost importance for Buddhism. The proclamation not only ended the twelveyear existence of the office, but also reformulated the sectarian administrator system (kanchõ seido), giving religious institutions the autonomy to appoint and dismiss their own clergy. Furthermore, it also stipulated that Buddhist schools had to prepare, according to the principles of their own foundational doctrines (rikkyõ kaishü no shugi), a sectarian constitution (shüsei), laws for governing temples (jihõ), and rules for appointing clerics for various positions. These would be submitted to the minister of home affairs (naimukyõ), who would then authorize the sects' provisions.

This right to self-determination affected Buddhist sects in very different ways. Some sects had to come up with solutions for long-term internal rivalries, such as the centuries-old friction between the Sõjiji and Eiheiji temples in Sõtõ Zen, or even give consideration to what would, in essence, be their "foundational doctrine." Others had relatively little trouble developing a centralized administration based on the tenets of modern bureaucracy. This newly gained autonomy, albeit limited by the boundaries set by the home minister, introduced yet another sense of crisis for Buddhists—they needed a clear "doctrine," which, as per contemporary requirements, had to accord with ideals such as "science" and "rationality." That is, in a context in which the influence of Christianity grew each day, Buddhists emphasized that their "religion," despite its many flaws, was still in harmony with the moral goals of the Japanese nation and could, therefore, contribute to

uniting people's spirits. Buddhism, they held, was a better aid than Christianity for the national enterprise not only because it had been in Japan for longer, but because "rationally," it made sense.

The 1890s, however, brought yet new developments. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 and Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 both settled the idea of religious freedom alongside the understanding of emperor worship as civic duty. The 1891 lèse-majesté incident involving Uchimura Kanzõ (1861–1930), who as a Christian had hesitated to fully bow during a ritual reading of the Rescript, provided the Buddhist world with further ammunition to question the role of their old enemy in the new constitutional framework. Could Christians uphold their beliefs without compromising their duties as subjects? The Buddhist answer was obviously "no." This became a still more pressing issue in 1894, when the government signed, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (Nichiei tsüshõ kõkai jõyaku). By the terms of the agreement, scheduled to come into force five years later in July 1899, British nationals in Japan would be subject to local laws, which implied an end to the system of extraterritoriality and the enactment of what the Japanese referred to as "mixed residence" (naichi zakkyo). At a time when Japan was becoming more aggressive in its colonial enterprises, the new system meant that foreigners were no longer limited to inhabiting specific settlements such as Kobe or Yokohama, but could now live anywhere in Japanese territory as long as they complied with the law. The idea of Christians roaming around as they wished felt like a threat to many, which prompted the government to begin considering a law of religions.

Into the Twentieth Century

Such a law of religions was proposed in 1899, the same year in which the mixed-residence system was scheduled to begin. It established somewhat equal regulations for Sect Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity, but as scholars have pointed out, failed to satisfy any of the representatives of the different groups. While it did find some advocates among Buddhists, most schools united against the law,20 claiming that Buddhism, as the religion of the majority of the Japanese, should be granted a special legal status, akin to what Catholic and Protestant churches experienced in France and Germany, respectively. They were successful in their lobbying efforts, as in early 1900 the law, which had been approved by the (lower) House of Representatives, was rejected by the (upper) House of Peers. This caused the government to revise its plans and establish, in April 1900, two new offices within the Home Ministry: the Shrine and Religion Bureaus. The latter was supposed to oversee all "religions" (including Sect Shinto), whereas the former would be in charge of official "Shrine Shinto" (jinja shintõ) affairs. This division, which in a sense formalized the influential discourse of Shrine Shinto as "non-religious," is considered by scholars as a major turning point in the establishment of what we now refer to as "State Shinto" (kokka shintõ).

The late nineteenth century was, as seen above, a time of rapid change not only for Buddhism, but for the entire Japanese religious landscape. For Buddhist schools, in particular, it was a time of adaptation and negotiation, a time of finding new justifications for their existence vis-à-vis the state and in relation to each other. Indeed, although Hayashi Makoto mentions the years between 1900 and 1945 as the last stage of his periodization, he does imply that the impact of the above challenges continued to influence the way Buddhists acted and thought well into the twentieth century, a point readers can confirm in several of the texts included here. In the following section, we will provide a brief history of how scholarship has dealt with this complicated period, after which we will provide an overview of how this volume relates to some of these questions.

The History of Research on Modern Japanese Buddhism in Western Languages

Although the question of modernity was in a way one of the defining issues in postwar Western-language scholarship on Japan, religion was conspicuously absent from research in modern Japanese history long after 1945. The paradigm of modernization theory that dominated the field well into the

1970s implied that secularization had rendered religion more or less obsolete in the modern age. The Japanese case seemed to bear out this assumption particularly well, given the aggressively secularist stance of Japanese elites.

The role of religious institutions or religious thought within modern Japanese history was not entirely absent in Western scholarship, but it did not become a main focus of studies until around 1980. The first important monographic study, Kathleen Staggs's 1979 dissertation In Defense of Japanese Buddhism remains unpublished, yet it is still often cited. It was not until 1990 that a landmark study of Meiji Buddhism with a legitimate claim to present a comprehensive picture introduced the importance of this subject into English-language scholarship with force. James Ketelaar's Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan to this day remains the point of departure for anyone dealing with Meiji Buddhism in the English language, given that it effectively covers central aspects including Tokugawa-period preconditions, the haibutsu kishaku narrative central to the book's title, attempts of intra-Buddhist reform in response to the crisis of the first years of the Meiji period, and the early years of the global spread of Japanese Buddhism.

This groundbreaking work has since then been complemented by more specialized studies in a number of important subfields. One of these has been the introduction of individuals important to the story of modern Buddhism. In 2002, Peter Kleinen contributed to this genre with a study on the bakumatsu priest Gesshõ (1817–1858), including a full German translation of his Buppõ gokoku. The same author had already penned a monograph on Tanaka Chigaku earlier, although this was written more within the context of the Japanese ultranationalism and fascism of the 1930s. More recently, Hans Martin Krämer has produced a study of the early Shimaji Mokurai, a pioneer of many modernist innovations, particularly in the field of the relationship of religion and the state. Mokurai's contributions were to characterize modern Buddhism, and especially the modern Jõdo Shinshü institutions, throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Even before Ketelaar's study, interest in the history of Christianity in modern Japan had led to the publication of Notto Thelle's Buddhism and Christianity in Japan in 1987. For the bakumatsu and the late Meiji period, Thelle offers a comprehensive account of the changing character of the relationship between the two religions, introducing a plethora of historical actors and texts from both sides. A work of similar character was written by Monika Schrimpf in German, extending the time frame somewhat up to the end of the Meiji period. More recently, Michel Mohr has complicated the picture of Buddhist-Christian relations by looking beyond the mainline denominations and focusing on the cooperation between Unitarians and Japanese Buddhists toward the end of the Meiji period.

Another focus of Western-language studies has been the internal institutional changes of Buddhist sects in the Meiji period. Two dramatic changes stand out, especially when viewed in comparison to the preceding Tokugawa period. One concerned the way of dealing with death. While Buddhism had had a virtual monopoly on entombing the dead and conducting funeral rites up to 1868, this was now challenged by competition from Shinto shrines. The challenge was more than symbolic, as the livelihood of priests largely depended on the funerary business. In his 2006 Modern Passings, Andrew Bernstein has looked into how Buddhism weathered these difficulties in the early Meiji period. Richard Jaffe has researched the other great change imposed upon Buddhist priests by the new government in 1868, namely the rescission of the prohibition of marriage that had been upheld by the state until then. This is also one of the few works in English that has taken up the question of monastic rules, the future of which was a hotly contested issue in Buddhist circles in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

One of the major topics pioneered by Ketelaar's Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan was the beginnings of the propagation of Japanese Buddhism in Europe and North America, especially through the participation of Japanese priests in the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago.

The Japanese activities at the Parliament have been the subject of two monographic studies, Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West by Judith Snodgrass and Mahayana Phoenix by John Harding. In contrast, the introduction of Japanese Buddhism to Europe has not been a central object of scholarship so far and has mostly been treated either marginally within the framework of the introduction of Buddhism overall or within Japanese religions more broadly, such as in the case of Frédéric Girard's book on Émile Guimet and Japanese religions.

Surprisingly, despite the groundwork laid by Kathleen Staggs, the vicissitudes Buddhist thought underwent in modern Japan have not been the central subject of monographic studies, although they do play some role in many of the studies mentioned already. Galen Amstutz's diachronic study of Pure Land thought in Japan includes a substantial chapter on the modern period. Similarly, Clinton Godart's recent study of evolutionary theory in modern Japan includes an in-depth consideration of how Buddhists situated themselves vis-à-vis this specific challenge of the modern natural sciences.

Another subject that until very recently was marginal is the connection that emerged, since the 1890s, between Buddhism and progressive politics. While some scholarship on the later twentieth-century movement of Engaged Buddhism had been available for some time, two recent English-language monographs have now advanced our understanding of this movement's Meiji-period precedents. While Melissa Curley's Pure Land, Real World focuses on the Jõdo Shinshü, James Mark Shields's Against Harmony casts a slightly wider net to include Zen as well as Nichiren Buddhism. Both works only partially deal with the Meiji period and include events up to 1945 and even the early postwar period. Equally marginal, but perhaps even more important, is the subject of Japanese Buddhism in relation to "Asia." Although, as we will see in the section below, a number of volumes on that subject have been published in Japanese in recent years, there is still very little work on it in other languages. Notable exceptions are Micah L. Auerback's unpublished PhD dissertation and Hwansoo I. Kim's Empire of the Dharma, both focusing on the role of Japanese Buddhism in colonial Korea. Although Richard Jaffe's recent Seeking Šākyamuni addresses the issue of Japanese connections with South and Southeast Asia, there is, other than in Japanese, still no monograph-length study in English (or any other European language) of the position of Japanese Buddhist schools in either continental China or colonial Taiwan, for instance.

Lastly, a number of recent studies are already beginning to have great impact on the field of the history of modern Japanese Buddhism, despite being of a more synthetic character. The most important to mention in this context is Jason Ã. Josephson's 2012 monograph The Invention of Religion in Japan, the first work to take up the question of how the concept of religion was "invented" in modern Japan and what consequences its appropriation yielded, including its effects on modernizing Buddhism. A similar work with a greater focus on the relationship between religious groups and the state is Trent Maxey's 2014 monograph The "Greatest Problem." Finally, there is Isomae Jun'ichi's Religious Discourse in Modern Japan of the same year, which also sets its main focus on the complicated consequences of the introduction of the modern concept of "religion" into Japan, but this time with a focus on its effects within the academy, especially the emerging field of religious studies in Japan.

Almost all of the studies mentioned above stand in close relationship to Japanese scholarship on the same subject, in that they were prompted by or developed in close cooperation with Japanese scholars of modern Buddhism. In fact, although relatively marginal within Japan, Japanese scholarship on the history of modern Buddhism predates that in Western languages by several decades and may be thought crucial for the agenda setting of the latter.

History of Research of Modern Japanese Buddhism in Japanese

Domestic considerations of the post-Restoration development of Buddhist history began during the 1890s and became both more frequent and robust around 1930. For instance, in 1894 the journal

Bukkyõ (Buddhism) published a call for papers on historical sources of "Meiji Buddhism," which was followed, from the next issue, with contemporary accounts by important figures such as Nanjõ Bun'yü (1849–1927) and Maeda Eun (1855–1930). Ten years after this early attempt, Õuchi Seiran would publish, in the pages of the journal Shin Bukkyõ (New Buddhism), an article titled "Lectures on the History of Meiji Buddhism," which in a vein similar to the papers mentioned above, relied on the contemporary eyewitness character of its author.46 The establishment of the journal Bukkyõ shigaku (Studies in Buddhist history) in 1911 meant yet another important step in the historical study of Buddhism, and served as a catalyst to the gathering of sources that would, in the following decade, culminate in the Meiji ishin shinbutsu bunri shiryõ (Historical sources on the separation of Shinto and Buddhism during the Meiji Restoration), a true tour de force in five volumes published between 1926 and 1929.

Although important works on the Restoration's impact on Buddhism were published from the mid-1920s, the following decade saw far more important developments in terms of monographic studies on the topic. For instance in 1933, Tomomatsu Entai (1895–1973), encouraged by French orientalist Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935), established in Tokyo the Historiographical Institute for Meiji Buddhism (Meiji bukkyõshi hensanjo, which, despite being only a minor influence at the time, did help pave the way for a whole generation of scholars focusing on the modern history of Buddhism, and revealed the then increasing preoccupation to save as many primary sources from the Meiji period as possible.

After 1945, the postwar generation would build upon this documentary groundwork and, based on a new interpretation of the meaning of "modernity," turn the study of "Meiji Buddhism" on its head. The generation of scholars represented by Yoshida Kyüichi and Kashiwahara Yüsen (1916–2003), who had lived through the Pacific War as male adults in their late twenties and were influenced by Marxism, presented a narrative of modern Japanese Buddhism critical to the role of religious institutions in the formation of the so-called Emperor System (tennõsei). This group of scholars, active mostly between the 1950s and 1980s, understood the collaborationist attitude of Buddhist schools in the modern war efforts as marks of a "feudal character" that somehow survived into the Meiji period. They saw an exception to this affirmative position only in the few instances when Buddhists openly defied the state or, rather and more frequently, proposed alternatives to what these postwar scholars perceived as a totalitarian system.

In this sense, to the point that they served to affirm state ideology, the majority of Buddhist activities was criticized as "feudal," whereas innovative and sometimes "anti-establishment" movements such as Kiyozawa Manshi's (1863–1903) Seishinshugi (Spiritualism) or Sakaino Kõyõ's (1871–1933) Shin Bukkyõ (New Buddhism) were deemed worthy of the rubric "modern," or kindaiteki. These early postwar scholars followed the mainstream of non-Marxist social science and historiography in Japan. Associated with names such as Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) or Õtsuka Hisao (1907–1996), the concern with Japan's modernity—or rather its lack thereof—dominated those disciplines well into the 1970s and even 1980s.

Despite this modernist view of history, scholars such as Yoshida and Kashiwahara, alongside their junior Ikeda Eishun (1929–2004), produced important works that remain authoritative in the field to this day, and were responsible for encouraging a new generation of younger students of modern Buddhism. Indeed, while these earlier scholars saw the history of modern Japanese Buddhism as the process of the realization of their own postwar ideal of modernism—and criticized everything that was not part thereof as "feudal"—the following generation, represented by Okada Masahiko (b. 1962), Fukushima Eiju (b. 1965), Moriya Tomoe b. 1968), and Õtani Eiichi (b. 1968), would take yet a different stance. Influenced by the discursive approach that had a decisive impact upon the Japanese humanities from the 1990s onward, this generation of scholars was less interested in the issue of

war responsibility and more focused on understanding the strategic self-styling of the historical actors—that is: what did it mean, in the context of modern Japan, to be a "Buddhist"?

The research results presented by those younger scholars need to be understood in connection with the handful of studies on the establishment of the modern concept of "religion" (shükyõ) published after the mid-1990s. Despite some earlier works on the topic, monographs such as those by Haga Shõji, Yamaguchi Teruomi, and Isomae Jun'ichi, as well as the edited volume Reconsidering "Religion" by Shimazono Susumu and Tsuruoka Yoshio, showed that issues of self-identification were as much at the core of the so-called modernization process as were institutional changes. The attention to identity formation included a new focus on how Japanese national identity was shaped vis-à-vis Asia, and this translated into new studies focusing on cultural aspects of Buddhist proselytization in China and Korea. Moreover, research into the activities of Japanese Buddhists on the mainland, and other aspects of accommodation of sectarian institutions with the wartime state, now aimed less at facile criticism of these instances of "collaboration," but rather at identifying the inner logic behind it.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, enough works had been published that the first critiques of the field itself started to appear. Spearheaded by the abovementioned Hayashi Makoto—who also served for several years as president of the Society for the Study of Modern Japanese Buddhist History (Nihon Kindai Bukkyõshi Kenkyükai the main hub for scholars in the field)—these critiques sometimes pointed to how the field had changed in terms of self-identification, in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, from Meiji Buddhism to Modern Buddhism, and how the actual contents of these studies had shifted along with our very understanding of "modernity." He alluded, for instance, to the lack of studies on the transition between the Edo and Meiji periods, on the early Shõwa period, and on the transition into the postwar period.

Consciously or not, more recent scholars have produced studies that, in many ways, fill in at least some of the gaps pointed out by Hayashi. Having experienced graduate education in an environment where the dialogue with non-Japanese scholarship was already the norm, studies by Tanigawa Yutaka (b. 1973), Hoshino Seiji (b. 1973), Õsawa Kõji (b. 1975), Iwata Mami (b. 1980), Shigeta Shinji (b. 1980), Kondõ Shuntarõ (b. 1980), and Õmi Toshihiro (b. 1981) have more explicitly connected Buddhism and its institutions with other areas of social activities, thus expanding the narrower traditional "History of Buddhism" into broader historiographical inquiries. For instance, what was the role of Buddhism in the development of modern education or the modern disciplinary institutions? How did the idea of "Buddhism" function in the establishment of "religion" or "art" as modern discourses? What was the ideological and practical role of Buddhism in the formation of panAsianism? How did Buddhism connect with the reception of Marxist theory in modern Japan? How did Japanese Buddhism negotiate the role of women within the emerging modern gender relations? These are, obviously, not simple questions to be answered in a single monograph; nonetheless, they show us that in terms of both perspective and scope, the field is now thriving as never before.

Major Issues of Modern Japanese Buddhism

As already emphasized, during the nineteenth century Japanese Buddhists faced a number of challenges, ranging from their identity as Buddhists (i.e., the very reconception of Buddhism as a "religion") to their role as subjects of an increasingly larger empire. With that in mind, and for the purposes of this volume, we have divided the voices of nineteenth-century Japanese Buddhists, represented by the twenty-two chapters of this book, into five sections. These sections reflect major issues they faced, as identified in the scholarship summarized above, namely: 1) sectarian reform; 2) the nation; 3) science and philosophy; 4) social reform; and 5) Japan and Asia. The bulk of non-doctrinal writing by Japanese Buddhist authors was in one way or the other devoted to one or

several of these themes, which also came to inform their identity, be it primarily sectarian or more integrally Buddhist. Furthermore, none of these issues can be analyzed in a national vacuum; the role of Western precedent, competition, or cooperation is prominent throughout.

Sectarian Reform

The role of comparisons to the West is clear even with regard to the most inward of the five themes, that of sectarian reform. Undoubtedly, the most important trigger of inner reform was the severe criticism Japanese Buddhism faced from a variety of quarters. Confucian-inspired critique had been a mainstay of Tokugawa-period elite discourses since the early seventeenth century. Confucianists attacked the clergy as corrupt and the Buddhist teaching as otherworldly, a distraction from the paramount concerns of real life, that is, ethics. From the eighteenth century onward, the Nativist school of Kokugaku added to the mix with its vitriolic emphasis on the foreignness of Buddhism, supposedly unsuited for Japan. There was not much that was substantially new in the movements of the Late Mito School and Restoration Shinto, which sprang up in the first half of the nineteenth century. They were, however, important conduits for transporting and amplifying older critiques of Buddhism and translating them into action, such as the anti-Buddhist policies of the late Edo period.

A number of these points of criticism were grudgingly accepted by members of the Buddhist clergy, and a precept revival movement, aimed at rooting out the most widespread degenerations that had become the target of criticism, emerged from the mid-eighteenth century, associated with the names of Jiun Onkō (1718–1804) and Fujaku (1707–1781), among others. This movement was prominently continued in the Meiji era by the Pure Land priest Fukuda Gyōkai (1809–1888). Indeed, the concern with monastic rules and the interference of the government into priestly life is the main concern of the first text introduced in this volume, Gyōkai's 1876 "Questions and Answers from Beneath a Snowy Window" (part I, chapter 1), which includes a pointed critique of the contemporary focus of Buddhist priests on conducting funerals for securing their livelihood, a very appropriate object for reform in his eyes.

Institutional reforms were spurred on by the haibutsu kishaku policies and the disestablishment of Buddhism immediately following the Meiji Revolution of 1868. An early example was the establishment of a new regional school for priests by a reform group of the Jōdo Shinshū in Yamaguchi in 1866. The older academies also slowly took up the cause of reform, such as the Takakura Gakuryō of the Ōtani branch of the same sect, which established a Department for the Protection of the Dharma (gohōjō) in 1868, where for the first time texts from other religions, especially Christianity, were studied.

These early reform initiatives, however, were dwarfed by the inner changes the sects underwent during the course of the Meiji period, which some observers have called a "Protestantization" of Japanese Buddhism. Among the observable transformations were standardizations and unifications (such as of the Zen rituals for school founders or of koan phrasebooks) and simplifications and abridgements (such as those rituals in the esoteric schools now deemed too superstitious, or making Shugendō into a distinct institution). Many of these concrete reforms were notionally based on a new understanding of Buddhism as a "religion," that is, a social system of action fairly clearly delimited, no longer encompassing all walks of life, but restricted to the spiritual dimension. It was by living up to its full potential as an "ideal religion" that Japanese Buddhism might also prove its superiority to the rival Christianity, as Nakanishi Ushirō argued in his 1889 On Religious Revolution (part I, chapter 2). While this rethinking of the nature of Buddhism by Buddhists themselves began in the early Meiji period, it gained considerable momentum with the formation of the The Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists (Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai) in 1899 and establishment of its journal Shin Bukkyō in the following year. As the editorial from the inaugural issue of that journal introduced in this volume

(part I, chapter 3) shows, the "New Buddhists" literally derided the "Old Buddhism" as superstitious, while calling for the "improvement of inner character through religious faith."

A genuinely new element of anti-Buddhism had come into play when Christian missionaries began proselytizing and publishing in Japan. They mainly took aim at Buddhist cosmology, rituals, and elements of faith that they viewed as superstitions. A potent weapon they employed in doing so was the historicization of what used to be elements of revelatory religion, following recent trends of liberal theology in Europe and North America. It took Japanese Buddhists until the 1890s to come to grips with this challenge, and only then did a historical approach to scriptural commentary and interpretation begin to take hold. As the authors—it is attributed to Kiyozawa Manshi—of an 1897 editorial for the journal Kyõkai jigen argued (introduced in this volume as part I, chapter 4), the independent study of scripture, unmediated by traditional commentaries, actually aided in understanding the core meaning of sacred texts.

In this way, Japanese Buddhist reform in the Meiji period pervaded both form and content. Institutional reform, educational reform, and the reform of the idea of and scholarship on Buddhism were intimately intertwined. Reform also had from the very beginning an eminently political dimension, which will be explored in the next section.

The Nation

The early modern period in Japan has been characterized as an era of budding nationalism. First articulated as the call for emancipation from Japan's "unforgettable other," China, the incursions by Russia and other Western powers into Japanese territory from the late eighteenth century onward markedly accelerated articulations of proto-nationalism. From the 1830s onward, tracts on national defense appeared, and religion also became a prominent topic in writings on national independence, as a Christian infiltration was seen as a first step toward conquest by the Western nations. Japanese Buddhists were not part of this discourse until the 1850s, when some of them began portraying Buddhism as the ideal bulwark against the spiritual onslaught of Christianity. More than anyone else, it is the Jõdo Shinshü priest Gesshõ who is associated with this movement that sought to protect both the dharma (gohõ) and the nation (gokoku). In his On Protecting the Nation through Buddhism, posthumously published in 1858 and introduced in this volume (part II, chapter 1), Gesshõ explained how Buddhism, and the Jõdo Shinshü in particular, was the best means to provide spiritual guidance in order to repel the Westerners whose strategy it was to weaken Japan spiritually through the introduction of Christianity.

Efforts at proving the utility of Buddhism in the face of national crisis were prominent in, but not limited to, the Jõdo Shinshü. Given its historically strong rhetorical emphasis on saving the nation, it is no wonder that similar positions could be found in the Nichiren sect in the years immediately preceding the Meiji Revolution. A good example of this is the tract "Upholding Faith in the Buddhadharma and Repaying the Nation" penned by the layman Ogawa Taidõ (1814–1878) in 1863 (part II, chapter 2). He traced the origins of the contemporary political crisis in Japan, its existence threatened by foreign powers, to a "neglect of the Buddhadharma." Tellingly, the way to protect the nation for Ogawa lay in correct practice, which first meant internal reform. This was necessary given the dismal situation Ogawa thought much of current Buddhism to be in.

However, as we have seen above, much to the chagrin of the Japanese Buddhist establishment it was to Shinto that the young government turned as the main building block of post-Restoration religious policy. The separation of the Tokugawa-era link between state and temples and the turmoil in religious policy in the first few years of the Meiji period prompted some of the more perceptive among the clergy to fundamentally rethink the relationship between religion and state, or indeed, to think through this relationship in those terms for the very first time, given that the conceptual framework to do so was just emerging in the Japanese language. It was in particular the Three

Articles of Instruction that prompted debate and invited criticism by Buddhists who felt that it was time that Buddhism was recognized as a vital force by the new Meiji state. An already very senior scholar priest joining the debate over the Three Articles of Instruction was Higuchi Ryüon. (1800–1885) of the Jõdo Shinshü. In his 1873 "Lectures on the Three Articles of Instruction" (part II, chapter 3), he argues that the hearts of the people need to unite in order to form a strong nation. Just as the Western nations were built on Christianity, the Japanese nation needed a religious foundation. Concurrently with Higuchi, the idea that Shinto is unsuitable for this task was spelled out most aggressively and most prominently by his fellow Jõdo Shinshü cleric Shimaji Mokurai. This mostly intra-Buddhist discussion coincided in the early 1870s with the debates among the secular intellectuals of the Meiji Six Society (Meirokusha). Although these intellectuals agreed in principle that religion might be useful for uniting the nation, they also saw that a situation of religious plurality might best be dealt with by establishing the separation of religion and state and the freedom of religion. Given the tendency of the early Meiji state to prefer Shinto, this position was attractive to Buddhists, since it promised the protection of their creed, if not as a state cult, then at least as a private religion. This status came to be enshrined in the Meiji Constitution of 1889.

Throughout these early years of the Meiji period, the other predominant political issue that religious groups in Japan were faced with was the question of Christianity. Pressure by the Western imperialist nations to lift the ban against Christianity had grown since the first unequal treaties had been signed beginning in 1854. Finally, its practice was permitted generally since 1873. For most Buddhists, the question was not whether to repel Christianity or not, but how to do so most effectively. A prominent representative of Buddhist intellectuals devoted to the antichristian cause was Ugai Tetsujõ (1814–1891), who (under the pseudonym Kiyü Dõjin) published his textbook for Buddhist priests Laughing at Christianity in 1869 (part II, chapter 4). Ugai largely relies on the old Sino-Japanese tradition of anti-Christian pamphlets dating back to the seventeenth century, which is visible both in the items of Christian doctrine he singles out for attack as well as in his positive advocacy of a cooperation between Buddhism, Shinto, and Confucianism, which would soon be replaced by a more self-confident stance arguing on the basis of the strength of Buddhism alone.

Refutations of Christianity remained acute for Buddhist scholars well into the Meiji period. They were frequently articulated within a political argument for the predominance of Buddhism, especially before the compromise of the Meiji Constitution. The Shingon priest Shaku Unshõ (1827–1909), for instance, argued that Buddhism had always been the main religion of the Imperial house and was thus fit to be the national doctrine of Japan. In his 1882 work "On the National Doctrine of Greater Japan" (part II, chapter 5), Unshõ, like many of his contemporaries, stressed the need for moral reform of Buddhists themselves before Buddhism could serve as the religion of the nation.

The emphasis on the need for inner reform receded somewhat after the 1880s and was replaced by a more openly articulated support of the new nation-state. A further self-confident Buddhism also began to engage in social reform of society at large. The most pressing concern of Buddhist intellectuals in the 1880s, however, was the commensurability of Buddhism with modern forms of thought, especially modern academic philosophy. This ushered in a debate that was to dominate Buddhist writing in Japan in the 1880s and 1890s, which will be taken up in the next section.

Science and Philosophy

No scholar of religion is a stranger to the old adage that "Buddhism" is a religion compatible with "Science." As Donald S. Lopez Jr. has repeatedly pointed out, the history of this relationship overlaps, in many ways, with the very story of how we came to understand ourselves as "modern."68 In Japan, in particular, this is certainly the case, as both concepts of "science" and "philosophy" were only established in the archipelago through the mediation of a type of "Buddhism" that was, more than a mere "religion," also both "scientific" and "philosophic."

As explained in the previous section, the nineteenth-century (re-) encounter with Christianity functioned for Buddhists everywhere in Japan as a call to arms of sorts. Although earlier critiques such as those by Ugai Tetsujõ had been based on late medieval anti-Christian tracts, and even later works by the likes of Shaku Unshõ still grounded themselves on a highly idealized primeval relationship between Buddhism and the Imperial court, several Buddhists began dabbling in what they regarded as far more sophisticated methods for criticizing Christianity, which in the mid-Meiji context now "threatened" Japan in yet a different way.

With the establishment of European-inspired political institutions in the 1870s and into the 1880s, the question was always present as to which religion Japan should adopt as a nation—or whether it should do so at all. Japanese Christians emphasized that if Japan were to follow in the footsteps of Euro-American nations, it needed Christianity, which was the very ethical cornerstone of those regions. Buddhists, on the other hand, naturally rejected this idea, but the gist of their argument now was no longer Christianity's belligerent character, but its philosophical unsoundness in terms of "science." Sada Kaiseki (1818–1882) (in part III, chapter 1), argued for a uniquely Japanese idea of progress that did not rely on things Western, which led him to dispute the very core of Christian cosmology, suggesting it presented a demiurgical idea of God. Although in some respects disparate even for contemporary eyes, Sada's text does pose questions related to theodicy that, in essence, are meant to convince the reader of the usefulness of Buddhist science as an alternative to the Christian paradigm of modernization.

Although not yet explicitly present in Sada, the recurrent issue of whether Buddhism is a "religion" or "philosophy" was considered in depth by one of his contemporaries, fellow cleric and University of Tokyo instructor Hara Tanzan (1819–1892) (see part III, chapter 2). In the late 1880s this author would claim that, to the extent it cares little about the existence of "ghostly realms" and rather focuses on the elimination of affliction and sickness, Buddhism is not a "religion" but a "philosophy." Influenced by the Japanese translation of Henry S. Olcott's Buddhist Catechism (orig. 1881), Tanzan's statement was a clear reaction against the type of faith-centered concept of "religion" that was starting to take root at the time. That is, in the sense that it is essentially a scientific endeavor, Buddhism was not supposed to be even considered in the same framework as Christianity, a system based entirely on what he regarded as blind belief.

Having attended Tanzan's classes at the University of Tokyo, Inoue Enryõ (1858–1919) (see part III, chapter 3), would take the above discussion one step further and claim that Buddhism was indeed a "religion," albeit a "philosophical" one. In a context in which it was common knowledge that a constitution was in the works—and it was still unknown whether a political system with a state religion would be adopted—attempts to assert Buddhism as superior to Christianity became all the more frequent. The latter was but a "religion" based on emotion, whereas Buddhism, in turn, did share that aspect but went beyond, also constituting what Enryõ dubbed an "intellectual religion" (chiryokuteki shükyõ). He did acknowledge, however, that the Buddhism present in his time was not Buddhism as it should be, and for it to actually function as the true religion of Japan, it needed to be appropriately "revived." What Enryõ argued for, then, was the (re)construction of a Buddhism rooted in reason, which unlike Christianity could guide the nation on the path of modernity.

The issue of constructing Buddhism as a sound "religion" was, therefore, one of the most pressing of Meiji Japan. However, the question also arose of what was, precisely, the scope of this religion: while Christianity was, in the late nineteenth century, presented to the Japanese as a more or less well-defined system, Buddhists still struggled in that regard. Amid the myriad schools and sects of Buddhism, there was no historical consensus as to what should be the core of their teachings, a fact that prompted Meiji Buddhists to distill their canon(s) and produce textual compilations reminiscent of the Christian Bible.

This contemporary demand to present Buddhism as a single religion was, however, not a struggle solely devoted to finding common doctrinal grounds, but also in terms of convincingly presenting the internal consistency of these teachings. It is precisely this issue that Murakami Senshō (1851–1929), professor of Buddhist Studies at the then Tokyo Imperial University, attempted to address in the intended five volumes of his Discourse on Buddhist Unity, published from 1901. Murakami's work is also, in many senses, a response to contemporary European Buddhologists who presented as most authoritative a version of Buddhism centered on the Pali Canon, dismissing Mahāyāna developments as latter-day corruptions. Murakami, therefore, not only endeavored to produce a synthesis of Buddhist thought, explicating the connection between contemporary Japanese forms and their purported Indian past, but also, as the text translated in this volume (part III, chapter 4) reveals, strove to show the meaning of this unified doctrine in terms of a sound "faith."

From the turn of the century, as Christianity settled in Japan, discussions over the legal status of religion moved toward a consensus. Moreover, European scholars became more receptive to the Mahāyāna as a form of Buddhism worthy of respect, and thus the need to present (Japanese) Buddhism as a philosophical religion in accordance with the principles of science decreased. The new idea of a reformed, "unified" Buddhism was connected, as seen in the previous section, not only to the rise of harsh critiques of sectarian identity, but also led, ultimately, to the ways in which Buddhists related to society as a whole.

Social Reform

As explained above, internal sectarian reform was a crucial element in the modernization of Japanese Buddhism. Even statements challenging Christianity or Shinto were frequently accompanied by the caveat that only a reformed, modern Buddhism would be able to wield a superiority over other religions. This reformist zeal, however, also affected Buddhist attitudes toward the broader society. Although endeavors in social reform can be seen as reactions to conventional critiques of Buddhism as of a purely otherworldly orientation, they were certainly also driven by genuine religious convictions.

Social engagement by Meiji-period Buddhists took many shapes. One of the earliest, and somewhat less explicit, was their involvement in the movement now referred to as "civilization and enlightenment" (bunmei kaika). The Meiji Six Society included in its ranks important sectarian leaders such as Ishikawa Shuntai (1842–1931) and Shimaji Mokurai, the latter of whom established, with Ōuchi Seiran, the journal Hōshi sōdan, one of the first dedicated Buddhist periodicals of modern Japan. Seiran was also the editor of important publications such as the Kyōzon zasshi and the Meikyō shinshi, as well as an active performer of the enzetsu type of public lecture characteristic of the bunmei kaika era. The translation in part IV, chapter 1 is an example of one such speech by Seiran, in which he emphasizes, from the perspective of a Buddhist, the "spiritual" values of "Eastern Civilization" vis-à-vis its then overestimated "Western" counterpart.

Another early form of social engagement was the establishment of schools. Building on both the early modern heritage of running temple schools and experiences with institutions of priest training, individual Buddhist clerics as well as sects started establishing general schools, as opposed to schools geared toward training the clergy, from as early as the 1870s. As in so many other instances in Meiji-period Buddhist history, the Christian challenge again looms large in the background: Christian missionaries in Japan had founded general purpose non-theological schools since the 1870s. Many of these were schools for instruction in English at first (such as Channing Moore Williams's [1829–1910] English School in Osaka [1870] and Niijima Jō's [1843–1890] Dōshisha English School in Kyoto [Dōshisha eigakkō, 1875]), but the net was soon cast wider. Women's education, perceived as lacking by Christian missionaries and converts, was targeted especially. Schools such as Meiji jogakkō

(1885) were set up with Protestant backing, albeit without Christian ceremonies on campus or even overtly Christian educational content.

Given the experience of Buddhist institutions in the field of education, it did not take long before similar institutions with a Buddhist background appeared, such as in the field of women's higher schools. An early example of the latter was Joshi bungei gakusha, founded in 1888 by Shimaji Mokurai. The former Buddhist academies were gradually transformed into modern universities, many of which are still in existence today. Their role for training the future clergy diminished while an increasing majority of students enrolled in general degree programs.

Another Jõdo Shinshü school, the Futsü kyõkõ had opened in 1885 and would be, through new media in general, the breeding ground for several other influential Buddhist social reform organizations in the realms of temperance and outreach to society. Indeed, the proliferation of Buddhist journals—in the 1890s, over a hundred of them existed—points toward the trend of Buddhism interacting with society in this era. Created by Futsü kyõkõ members, one of these journals, the Hanseikai zasshi (see part IV, chapter 2), made temperance, but also a more general humanism, its goal. Avoiding alcohol was just one step toward moral improvement, this time not aimed at priests, but rather as a movement aimed at society broadly defined.

The conceptual—and practical—jump from reforms of the clergy, to those of laypeople, and eventually those of society at large had to include a reconsideration of the role of women within Buddhism. In a time when universal education became the norm, a number of Buddhists felt the need to address the issue of (in)equality between the sexes, a phenomenon of which the 1888 text by Shimaji Mokurai included in this volume is a clear example (see part IV, chapter 3). Also intended as a critique of the idea that the type of equality between men and women observed in the West was a result of Christian values, Shimaji's text asserted that for Buddhism (and Confucianism) true equality lay in accepting the different roles of both genders. The question of women was also addressed by Tanaka Chigaku, himself a lay follower of Nichiren Buddhism who developed his own organization after having broken with orthodoxy. Tanaka's 1894 On Buddhist Marriage (part IV, chapter 4) not only argues for the marriage of clerics, but more broadly aimed at "correcting the image of Buddhism as unworldly, emphasizing its connectedness to life, society, and the modern state."

By the turn of the century, Buddhist social outreach had multiplied. In theoretical terms, Buddhist thinkers began to grapple seriously with the profound social change wrought by industrialization and with the major political schools already developed in reaction to this in Europe, such as social democracy or state socialism. The Western-educated Shinshü priest Chikazumi Jõkan (1870–1941) situated Buddhism within these trends in his 1904 text The Problem of Faith (part IV, chapter 5). He argued that the historical Buddha had been a social reformer, preaching the equality of people regardless of caste. Among the Buddhists of contemporary Japan, Chikazumi continued, social justice should not remain theoretical but translate into social activism, and he clearly enumerated "workers' education, illness insurance, family assistance, and so on" as fields of action.

Indeed, by the turn of the century, Buddhists had reached out to society in numerous ways. They had founded hospitals and other welfare institutions, employed prison chaplains, sent out military chaplains (see also part V, chapter 2), and engaged heavily in mission work in (mostly) other Asian countries, especially China and Korea. This was part of a more general turn toward Asia, as will be taken up in the next section.

Japan and Asia

Since the Heian period (794–1185), people on the main islands of the Japanese archipelago understood the world as being constituted of three "nations" or "realms." This cosmology is obviously connected to a narrative of how Buddhism reached Japan and can be traced back at least

as far as to the works of Saichō (767–822). This idea was, for the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago, an essential element in the ingraining of traditional Buddhist cosmology that placed Mt. Sumeru (Shumisen) at the center of the universe. Humankind would reside on a continent located in the southern part of this mountain, of which Tenjiku (which included, but was not necessarily limited to, the Indian subcontinent) occupied the center. Neighboring Tenjiku was Shintan (that is, China) and far in the periphery, almost falling off the edge of the world, was the realm of Japan, or Honchō *fl. The story of Buddhism, which had its origins in Tenjiku, spread through Shintan, and was then propagated into Honchō, was itself, in this sense, a narrative of global history.

Although the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century— and consequently of modern European cartographic knowledge—did bring new developments to this cosmology, the essential narrative of Buddhist history remained. That is, far before the Western idea of "Asia" spread throughout Japan in the course of the Edo period, the story of how Buddhism came to the Japanese islands was already intrinsically connected to imagined versions of the continental mainland. The bakufu's isolationist policy meant, however, that Buddhists in Japan were not allowed more than the imagining of India and China, save perhaps for sporadic contact with visitors from the continent in limited quarters of cities such as Nagasaki. With the "reopening" of the country in the 1850s, along with the easier access to transoceanic transportation, however, Buddhists could now experience the mainland themselves, without the textual filter imposed thus far. That is, besides the encounter with "religion" and a new sense of their role within society, Japan's relationship with "Asia" was one of the issues that would (re)define the character of Buddhism in modern Japan.

The first case of a Japanese Buddhist priest visiting China was that of Ogurusu Kōchō (1831–1905), who traveled not long after the ratification of the Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty in June 1873. However, contrary to the vigorous practice he might have expected, he found Chinese Buddhism to be decadent, a reality that prompted him to draft the text partially translated here (part V, chapter 1), meant to revive Chinese Buddhism on his terms. Calling for cooperation against the common Western enemy, On Protecting the Dharma in Beijing is an essential text that represents the transformation of a theretofore subservient relationship: Japan is no longer the student, but now the teacher, who can save the Chinese dharma from its downfall.

This self-representation as the leader of East Asia was ideologically fundamental for the colonial enterprise, in which Buddhists were to play an important role. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Buddhist priests were sent to the continent in order to serve as chaplains, an activity they would continue to perform over the course of all Japan's modern wars. Yamagata Genjō (1866–1903), whose The Iron Scepter is partly translated here (part V, chapter 2), was one such chaplain. A scholar-priest within the Shingon tradition, Yamagata recorded his accounts of the battlefield in diary form, which reveal cooperation with Chinese Buddhists in what he then regarded as "new Japanese territory." A clearer picture of how Buddhist rhetoric was used in order to justify Japan's colonial enterprise can be seen in Shaku Soen's (1860–1919) "The Japanese People's Spirit," a talk given in Manchuria but two years after Japan's 1910 annexation of Korea (see part V, chapter 3). The lecture, obviously aimed at a Japanese audience, presents Japanese superiority in racial overtones that would become all the more frequent over the course of the following decade, alongside discourses on the nation's kokutai.

Yet, the Asian experience was also important in a doctrinal sense. The appropriation of European buddhological knowledge during the late nineteenth century helped to conclusively establish in Japan the idea that Chinese was not the "original" language of Buddhism, and that Sakyamuni's "golden words" were to be found elsewhere. This led Rinzai priest Kawaguchi Ekai (1866–1945) to leave Kobe in 1897 in search of these authentic texts, becoming the first Japanese to enter the "hermit nation" of Tibet in 1901. He recorded his impressions in A Travelogue in Tibet, partly translated in

part V, chapter 4. A widely popular text at the time, it shows that, besides his will to garner the "sacred texts" of his tradition, Kawaguchi also saw Tibet as a somewhat inferior nation in terms of civilization, which could again be "illuminated" by the wisdom of his native Japan.

The increasing contact with the Asian reality ultimately changed the way Japanese clergymen and laypeople alike understood their own selves as "Buddhists," in terms not only of their role as leaders of an imagined Asian coalition, but also in the sense of refashioning "Buddhism" as the most essential Pan-Asian construct.

***

Many of the chapters actually concern several of the five dimensions that we have presented and which inform the structure of the book. Anxiety about the nation could fuel sectarian reform; social reform measures were taken up within the framework of the mission in mainland Asia; through educational efforts, the pursuit of new trends in science and philosophy were thought to contribute to sectarian reform. Moreover, the challenge posed by the encounter with the (Christian) West was a contributing factor in all of the instances discussed here, so it will be treated as present within and throughout the five chapters instead of dealing with it separately. We hope that the diversity of the challenges of modernity and of Japanese Buddhists' answers to these challenges becomes palpable in the volume, thus leading to a better understanding of where Japanese Buddhism stands today and how it arrived there. <>

SECULARIZING BUDDHISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON A DYNAMIC TRADITION edited by Richard Payne [Shambhala, 9781611808896]

A timely essay collection on the development and influence of secular expressions of Buddhism in the West and beyond.

How do secular values impact Buddhism in the modern world? What versions of Buddhism are being transmitted to the West? Is it possible to know whether an interpretation of the Buddha's words is correct?

In this new essay collection, opposing ideas that often define Buddhist communities—secular versus religious, modern versus traditional, Western versus Eastern—are unpacked and critically examined. These reflections by contemporary scholars and practitioners reveal the dynamic process of reinterpreting and reimagining Buddhism in secular contexts, from the mindfulness movement to Buddhist shrine displays in museums, to whether rebirth is an essential belief.

This collection explores a wide range of modern understandings of Buddhism—whether it is considered a religion, philosophy, or lifestyle choice—and questions if secular Buddhism is purely a Western invention, offering a timely contribution to an ever-evolving discussion.

Contributors include Bhikkhu Bodhi, Kate Crosby, Gil Fronsdal, Kathleen Gregory, Funie Hsu, Roger R. Jackson, Charles B. Jones, David L. McMahan, Richard K. Payne, Ron Purser, Sarah Shaw, Philippe Turenne, and Pamela D. Winfield.

CONTENTS

Editor's Introduction
1 Has Secularism Become a Religion? Some Observations on Pali Buddhism's Movement to the International Stage SARAH SHAW

2 Buddhism and Secular Subjectivities: Individualism and Fragmentation in the Mirrors of Secularism DAVID L. MCMAHAN
3 American Cultural Baggage: The Racialized Secularization of Mindfulness in Schools FUNIE HSU
4 Curating Culture: The Secularization of Buddhism through Museum Display PAMELA D. WINFIELD
5 Establishing the Pure Land in the Human Realm CHARLES B. JONES
6 The Shared Origins of Traditionalism and Secularism in Theravada Buddhism KATE CROSBY
7 Manifesting the Buddha Dharma in a Secular Age BHIKKHU BODHI
8 Buddhism without a View: A Friendly Conversation with Stephen Batchelor's Secular Buddhism PHILIPPE TURENNE
9 Secular Buddhism in a Neoliberal Age RON PURSER
10 The Modern Mindfulness Movement and the Search for Psychological Redemption KATHLEEN GREGORY
11 Avoiding Rebirth: Modern Buddhist Views on Past and Future Lives ROGER R. JACKSON
12 Naturalistic Buddhism GIL FRONSDAL
13 Conscious and Unconscious Dynamics in the Secularizing Discourse RICHARD K. PAYNE
Notes
About the Contributors

Distinguishing the Secularizing of Buddhism from Buddhist Modernism

Buddhist modernism is a descriptive category, grouping together a number of different phenomena, both in Asia and the West, and stretching across the last century and a half. It is rooted in Asian resistance to colonialism and in Western responses to the rise of science as an explanatory system displacing religion, together with an increasing awareness of religious diversity. Such resistance "generated the need for anticolonial national movements to reformulate their own collective representations in terms of the dominant Western paradigms." Buddhist reformers recast local forms of Buddhist praxis in the mold of "religion," and in doing so they adopted not only models of organization but also the values of liberal Protestant thought widespread in England and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. Buddhist modernism "has been shaped by an engagement with the major discourses of Western modernity—science, Romanticism, and liberal Protestantism—and is marked by a number of distinctively modern values such as individuality, democracy, pluralism, and the privileging of meditation experience as the core of the tradition." Natalie Quli provides a summary list of twelve interrelated features of Buddhist modernism that are said to derive from the influence of the West:

1. the extolling of reason and rationality,

2. a rejection of ritual, "superstition," and cosmology,

3. an understanding of doctrine and text as more authentically Buddhist than practices such as relic veneration or Buddha-name recitation,

4. laicization and democratization,

5. a valorization of meditation and an optimistic view of nirvana, culminating in the hitherto unprecedented widespread practice of meditation among the laity,

6. an ecumenical attitude toward other Buddhist sects,

modernizing movements, such as the Mahasi Thathana Veiktha in Burma/Myanmar, originated in South and Southeast Asia as well.

The Intent of This Collection

The intent of this collection is "critical" in the sense of attempting to look closely at the ways in which particular sets of ideas are used, including their background in Western religious and philosophical culture. It is not criticism in the sense of making an overall negative value judgment. Some readers may mistake a critical approach as being an implicit accusation of inauthenticity. Claims of authenticity or accusations of inauthenticity are simply strategic moves for the acquisition of power. This collection is not, therefore, a project about authenticity—it is not the goal here to either promote or to discredit the movement toward a secularized Buddhism. Rather, the intention is to contribute toward a deeper understanding of its characteristics and sources by highlighting a range of topics and views, contributing to a maturing discourse on the dynamic process of secularizing trends in Buddhism. <>

Mysticism and Intellect in Medieval Christianity and Buddhism: Ascent and Awakening in Bonaventure and Chinul by Yongho Francis Lee [Lexington Books, 9781793600707]

Mysticism and Intellect in Medieval Christianity and Buddhism explores two influential intellectual and religious leaders in Christianity and Buddhism, Bonaventure (c. 1217–74) and Chinul (1158–1210), a Franciscan theologian and a Korean Zen master respectively, with respect to their lifelong endeavors to integrate the intellectual and spiritual life so as to achieve the religious aims of their respective religious traditions. It also investigates an associated tension between different modes of discourse relating to the divine or the ultimate—positive (cataphatic) discourse and negative (apophatic) discourse. Both of these modes of discourse are closely related to different ways of understanding the immanence and transcendence of the divine or the ultimate. Through close studies of Bonaventure and Chinul, the book presents a unique dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism and between West and East.

Review

Through his work Fr. Lee draws out where east meets west and where these spiritual traditions are distinct. This is the type of study critically needed today, especially since the western Christian mystical tradition has in the past overpowered the rich spirituality of the east, and Buddhism in particular. I encourage everyone interested in the mystical quest for ultimate reality to read this book and reflect on the spiritual capacity of the human person, for east needs west and west needs east, if we are to see the human spiritual experience within the unity of cosmic life. -- Ilia Delio

Yongho Francis Lee's **Mysticism and Intellect in Medieval Christianity and Buddhism** is an impressive and much-needed contribution to our understanding of spiritual and mystical theology, and thus to the emerging field of comparative theology. We are invited to learn from two great European and Korean thinkers never studied together before—but also to think anew about the integration of religious learning and practice in our time and place. -- Francis X. Clooney, SJ, Parkman Professor of Divinity, Harvard University

Fr. Lee has brought to his study both the meticulous attention to text and argument that one expects of a careful scholar and the sensitivity to the spiritual resonances and nuances of those sources that one can expect to find in a Franciscan friar. Thus, both historical theologians and those

pursuing their own personal spiritual paths are likely to find this study a valuable resource. -- Robert M. Gimello, University of Notre Dame du Lac

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Bonaventure's Integration of the Intellectual and Spiritual Life
2 Chinul's Integration of Buddhist Doctrinal Teachings and Son Practices
3 The Spiral Dialectics of Cataphasis and Apophasis in Bonaventure
4 The Tension between Moderate and Radical Subitism: Chinul's Integration of Soen and Kyo and Advocacy of Kanhwa Son
Conclusion
Appendix: Further Reading
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

Most would agree that prayer, ritual, charity, and scriptural and doctrinal study are all essential parts of religious life, but there have been debates among adherents of religious traditions as to which of these should take precedence. Should the intellectual endeavors of scriptural and doctrinal study or experiential practices like meditation and contemplation be emphasized? Those who emphasize learning and study argue that without a proper intellectual understanding of a religion's fundamental teachings, not only might practitioners fall prey to errors and heresies, but their practice might not be fruitful because it would be directed toward an improper end far from salvation and liberation. On the other hand, advocates of contemplative or mystical experience and practice often insist that any attempts to comprehend the ultimate truth of a religion by intellectual effort alone are insufficient, and perhaps even harmful. Intellectualism, they insist, hinders a sincere practitioner from having a direct encounter with the absolute reality. The tension between those who advocate intellectual study and those who advocate meditative practice is associated with different views about the role of language and intellect and even how to understand the nature of the religious ultimate. Is it to be attained by a process of negation, for which apophatic or negative discourse, which relates more to what God is rather than what God presumably is, and practices of denial are required and the transcendence of the religious ultimate is stressed. Or is it to be attained by processes of affirmation, for which cataphatic or affirmative discourse and affirmative modes of piety and practice are required, as part of which the immanence of the religious ultimate is emphasized?

This book deals with these fundamental issues by exploring how they have been grappled with by two major world religions, Christianity and Buddhism. Christianity, historically the dominant religion in the West, has attracted a large number of followers from every region of the world. It is a theistic religion that distinguishes the creator (or God) from the created. The unbridgeable gulf between God and the human being is addressed in various ways in theistic world religions, and differentiated degrees of emphasis on that gulf entail different approaches to various challenges facing these religions, including striking a proper balance between the intellectual and spiritual life. Buddhism, which has been the dominant religion in the East, is extending its intellectual and spiritual influence in the West. This nontheistic religion rejects the idea of an absolute being like God—although its cosmology includes heavenly deities, these celestial beings are not considered to be much different from human beings; they are certainly not seen as absolute beings in the way that Christians understand God. Despite denying the existence of God, Buddhism too is challenged by a tension between different understandings of the ultimate reality of the world, a tension that is arguably analogous to the Christian tension between the transcendence and immanence of God. This tension is at the root of varying approaches to study and meditation in Buddhism.

It is the intention of the author that this comparative investigation of Christianity and Buddhism will promote a better understanding of these religions generally. This is accomplished through a close study of two particular religious masters, one Christian and one Buddhist, against the broader backdrop of the religious reality pertaining to each religion and of the religious dynamics within their religious orders. Moreover, it is hoped that this focused study of the tensions embedded in the theoretical and practical realms of religious life of these two world religions—one theistic and the other nontheistic—will lead committed religious practitioners in both to acknowledge the complexity of religious life as it manifests itself in the course of pursuing seemingly unattainable religious goals. It will also invite scholars and practitioners to a further and ongoing conversation with other religions, in which they may gain new insights for deepening their understanding of their own religious tradition.

By focusing on Christianity and Buddhism, it is hoped that this study will also facilitate connections between East and West, not only of a cultural, religious, and social nature, but also connections within the personal experience of individuals. Numerous Easterners and Westerners have had meaningful encounters with both religions in the course of their religious practices or intellectual pursuits; for example, Asian Christians who grew up in a Buddhist society or Western scholars of Buddhism whose cultural and religious identity has been formed in the Christian environment of the West.

The tensions between different modes of religious discourse, practice, and doctrine can first be noted in relation to Buddhism. For Buddhists, the ultimate goal of religious practice is to come to know the true nature of reality, for Buddhists believe that in this quest craving is eliminated, and that with the elimination of craving comes the cessation of suffering. Although every religious activity in Buddhism is essentially directed toward this end, most Buddhists insist that true reality is ineffable and inconceivable, beyond the reach of language and conceptual thought, and therefore accessible only to highly advanced practitioners. Some Buddhists argue that there exist two kinds or levels of truth—absolute or ultimate and relative or conventional—and that mere learning and study through the medium of language and the function of intellect leads a practitioner only to the second. Some go so far as to warn that any reliance on language in the pursuit of the ultimate (or at least reliance on affirmative language) may actually lead one to mistake relative truth for absolute truth and turn the pragmatic value of relative truth into an object of attachment and thus into an impediment to liberation. From these considerations arise pressing questions; for example, what use can be made of scriptural reading and speculative study in the religious life of a Buddhist practitioner, or, for that matter, of a practitioner of any religion? And if use of language as is required in scriptural study and doctrinal argument is to be dispensed with or devalued, how can Buddhism or any religion communicate its essential teachings to the whole of humanity, not to mention its own followers? If the inefficacy of verbal and intellectual comprehension of the ultimate or infinite should be overemphasized, neither Buddhism nor any other religion would be able to sustain itself. Religion would lose a necessary tool to develop and spread its teachings, and for Buddhists in particular, would in the end fail to attain its soteriological goal of enlightenment and saving humanity from the incessant cycle of suffering.

Among the various Buddhist traditions, questions about the relationship between language and reality and between intellectual study and spiritual advancement were especially urgent and subject to controversy in Chan Buddhism (the Chinese term for Son in Korean and Zen in Japanese). Whereas some Chan traditions were quite forceful in their denigration of learning and doctrinal theorizing as paths to enlightenment, others recognized their practical utility as propaedeutics, and rather than discarding them, advocated for their incorporation into meditative practice. One of the two focuses of this book, the medieval Korean Son monk Pojo Chinul (1158-1210), chose the latter route and urged the reconciliation of learned Buddhism with Chan practice. By Chinul's time in the

twelfth century, Korean Buddhism had grown weary of the long-standing conflict between Soen, the meditative school, and the various schools of learned Buddhism, collectively known as Kyo, especially Hwaom (C. Huayan).

Chinul devoted much of his career to effecting a reconciliation of these two competing groups. He saw the conflict between them as futile and wasteful, and argued that, despite their seeming differences, it was possible to bring them into harmony with each other. Specifically, he strove to show that the Son emphasis on contemplative practice and the Kyo emphasis on doctrinal and scriptural study were not really antithetical, but were, instead, actually complementary insofar as study was a necessary foundation for Son practice.

This complicated relationship between scriptural and theoretical study and meditative practice in Buddhism has an analog in Christianity in the tension related to different levels of emphasis on intellectual and spiritual life. Implicit in this tension are two deeper ones. The first involves an understanding of the divine as immanent versus an understanding that it is transcendent, and the second relates to the differences between positive and negative modes of discourse about the divine. Whereas an emphasis on the immanence of God would seem to support the use of affirmative or cataphatic discourses, an emphasis on His transcendence would seem to demand the privileging of apophatic discourse and negative theology.

In reality, the Christian tradition has always found value in both positive and negative theological discourse. After all, Christians believe that God, transcendent though he surely is, made Himself manifest in Christ and spoke, His speech having been recorded in scripture, in which He told human beings both what He is and what He is not. No one saw this more clearly than the great fifth/sixth-century Syrian theologian known as Pseudo-Dionysius, renowned as the father of "negative theology," as exemplified in his work The Mystical Theology. Pseudo-Dionysius is also revered for his cataphatic theology as developed in two other surviving works, The Divine Names and The Celestial Hierarchy.

These two strains of theology, both explicated by Pseudo-Dionysius, have, with varying degrees of emphasis on each, greatly contributed to the development of Christian theological and practical traditions. While both cataphatic and apophatic theologies are employed in the speculative theology and spiritual practice of Christianity, it may be said that spirituality, and especially what is commonly called "mysticism," tends to have an affinity with apophatic theology, while cataphatic theology is usually seen in connection with more speculative, constructive, and systematic modes of theology. The relationship between speculative theology and spirituality may be said to be analogous to the relationship between cataphasis and apophasis (though not completely so). For this reason, the tension between theology and spirituality resonates with the tension between cataphasis and apophasis.

Buddhism somewhat resembles Christianity in this regard, for it harbors a similar historical tension, that between its emphasis on scriptural, doctrinal study on the one hand and on meditative practice on the other. As briefly mentioned, Chinul, the Son master, strove to resolve this tension, and Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (ca. 1217-1274), the thirteenth-century Franciscan master, could be considered his Christian counterpart. Bonaventure exerted himself toward reconciling two contending groups within his own Franciscan Order (the Order of Friars Minor): one group, holding to the ideal of poverty and simplicity, insisted on a life full of spiritual zeal, whereas the other, mindful of the church's need to preach and minister, was engaged in learning and in the intellectual training of friars. As both a talented theologian who was educated and taught at a prestigious university in Europe and a man of deep mysticism who was inspired by the life of St. Francis of Assisi

(1181/1182-1226), it was Bonaventure's task to show that theology and spirituality can be integrated in the service of the one soteriological goal of union with God.

This book is a comparative study of Christian and Buddhist attempts to reconcile the two competing models of religious life. It demonstrates that, for both Bonaventure and Chinul, respectable masters well versed in religious knowledge who emphasized meditative and spiritual practice, scriptural and theological study do not impede such practice, but rather can be an aid to it by providing necessary theoretical grounding. Both men demonstrated that a contemplative life does not preclude a life of learning. These integrative endeavors are explored in relation to doctrinal tensions and different modes of discourse within each religion.

Chapters 1 and 2 explore the ways in which these two figures applied learned teachings to spiritual practice: Bonaventure's synthesis of theology and spirituality in chapter 1, and Chinul's incorporation of Kyo into Son practice in chapter 2. In their investigation of the integrative efforts of the two masters, these chapters analyze the tensions between and the complementarity of study and spiritual life, understood as the two essential dimensions of the religious life.

Chapter 3 proceeds by investigating the analogous underlying tension between cataphatic and apophatic religious discourses, showing its relationship to the tension between study and practice. After surveying the historical development of the Dionysian distinction between cataphasis and apophasis, this chapter further analyzes Bonaventure's articulation of the spiritual exercises set forth in the Itinerarium, examining how his emphasis on cataphasis and apophasis changes throughout the successive stages of the spiritual journey described in that work.

Chapter 4 examines the Buddhist analog of the Christian distinction between cataphasis and apophasis, and the relationship between various doctrinal understandings of ultimate reality in Buddhism, most importantly the differences between the doctrines of "buddha-nature" and "emptiness." This chapter also explores the correlations and relationships between the different modes of discourse and different styles of meditative practice in Buddhism. The relationship among various religious elements—textual and theoretical study, meditation, modes of discourse, and doctrines—will be discussed from the general perspective of the historical development of Chan, and also from the particular perspective of Chinul's Son theory and practice.

Following from these four chapters, the conclusion, after summarizing what has been discussed, shows how Buddhism and Christianity, specifically the representative figures of Chinul and Bonaventure, have negotiated three different tensions within their respective traditions: first, between intellectual and spiritual practice; second, between cataphasis and apophasis; and third, between the doctrines of immanence and transcendence, examining also how these three tensions relate to each other in both traditions.

***

The ascent to intimate union with God in Christianity and the awakening to the true nature of reality in Buddhism are the ultimate religious experiences of these two religions. These final aims of each religion's spiritual quest are inconceivable and ineffable, beyond intellect and words, and most practitioners of the two religions have not reached this ultimate state. The ideas that God is transcendent and beyond our reach, and that the nature of absolute reality cannot be grasped due to its empty nature, may give rise to pessimism in Christians and Buddhists in that their vigorous intellectual efforts to understand God and absolute reality may ultimately be in vain. What would be the use of studying and intellectual meditation if it is necessarily to no avail? An answer to this despairing question could be that the transcendence of God and the emptiness of absolute reality are not the last word—practitioners must try to be encouraged by the doctrine of the immanence

of God and the teaching of buddha-nature with their affirmative views of the accessibility of God and the potential for enlightenment.

The historical development of the Christian and Buddhist traditions demonstrate that these two seemingly contradictory points of doctrine have led in both traditions to varying levels of emphasis on the different modes of theological discourse (cataphasis and apophasis) and different forms of religious practice (spiritual and intellectual). Both Bonaventure and Chinul inherited these divergent discourses and practices and then incorporated the tensions they imply into their own spiritual and intellectual development. They both recognize and stress the efficacy of study and intellectual meditation, but also the importance of spiritual life and nonintellectual meditation.

It is easy for religious practitioners who are heavily engaged in the academic study of religion or in intellectual tasks to be caught up in this particular aspect of religious practice, and they may risk neglecting other aspects. Bonaventure and Chinul could be wise guides for these practitioners by encouraging them through the example of their lives and their writings to balance their intellectual and spiritual lives, and by reminding them that the ultimate goal of their studies is not mere intellectual satisfaction, but rather spiritual fulfillment. Furthermore, the fact that the doctrine of transcendence and the apophatic attitude are incorporated in the intellectual and spiritual life of these two figures might remind intellectuals to be humble, but not discouraged, in the course of their work.

Comparative studies of religions always lead to a recognition of similarities and differences. These recognitions have the potential to positively impact one's attitude toward other religions, and even toward one's own. As discussed in this book, the tension between the intellectual and spiritual life and endeavors to integrate them are found in both Christianity and Buddhism. The study of this tension leads to other related tensions, such as seemingly contradictory understandings of God or the ultimate reality and the tension between the use of affirmative language in religious discourse and an acknowledgment of the limitations of employing human words and concepts to understand God or the ultimate reality. The similarities highlighted here may first of all encourage people of these two religious traditions to reach out to each other, and the differences highlighted here may provide adherents of both religions an opportunity to not only gain a better understanding of the other religion, but also of their own: the significant aspects of their own traditions might stand out as never before when compared to another tradition. <>

THE TATTVASAṂGRAHA OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA: SELECTED METAPHYSICAL CHAPTERS translated with Commentary by Charles Goodman [Oxford University Press, 9780190927349]

The *Tattvasamgraha*, or *Encyclopedia of Metaphysics*, is the most influential and frequently studied philosophical text from the late period of Indian Buddhism. Its authors-Santaraksita and his commentator and student, Kamalasila-both played key roles in founding the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. In the *Tattvasamgraha*, they explain, discuss, and critique a range of views from across the South Asian philosophical and religious spectrum, including ideas drawn from Buddhism, Jainism, and traditions now incorporated into Hinduism. The *Tattvasamgraha* also includes the earliest discussion of Advaita Vedanta in any Buddhist text.

In *The Tattvasamgraha of Santaraksita*, Charles Goodman translates chapters of the text that deal with fundamental philosophical issues like the existence or nonexistence of God and the soul; the

nature of matter and causal relationships; the connection between words and their referents; rules of logic; sources of human knowledge; and the compatibility of beliefs about karma with Buddhism's fundamental claim that there is no self. Goodman's introductory chapters discuss translation choices and explain the arguments and reasoning employed by the *Tattvasamgraha's* original authors.

Together, Goodman's accessible translations and introductory chapters give readers an ideal way to familiarize themselves with the argumentative methods and logical principles of Buddhist epistemology, as well as the intellectual and cultural context of Buddhist philosophy.

- Includes new translations of texts that were most recently translated in 1937
- Introduces Santaraksita and Kamalasila's methods of reasoning for clearer background information
- Contextualizes South Asian Buddhism intellectually, culturally, and historically

Contextual Introduction

In Sanskrit, **pramana** generally signifies "means of knowledge," or "valid knowledge," defined technically as a consciousness that is not deceived with regard to its object. Many schools of Buddhism posit two forms of valid knowledge: direct perception (PRATYAKSA^) and inference (ANUMANA), with the former deriving from correct sense perception and the latter deriving from correct reasoning. Dharmakirti states in his PRAMANAVARTTI that there are two forms of valid knowledge (pramana) because there are two objects of comprehension (prameya). The two types of objects are the manifest (ABHIMUKHI) and the hidden (PAKOSA), with the former referring to objects that can be known through direct sense perception, the latter referring to those things that can be known only through inference. His limitation of forms of valid knowledge to only two is meant to distinguish Buddhist epistemology from that of the Hindu schools, where sound (sabda), especially in the sense of the sound of the Vedas, is counted as a valid form of knowledge. Discussions of these two forms of valid knowledge, especially as set forth in the works of DIGNAGA and DHARMAKIRTI, encompassed a range of topics in epistemology and logic that became very influential in medieval India (among both Buddhists and non-Buddhists), and then in Tibet; its influence was less strong in East Asia. Thus, although the term pramana technically refers to one of these two valid forms of knowledge, it comes by extension to refer to medieval and late Indian Buddhist epistemology and logic, in the latter case, especially as it pertains to the formal statement of syllogisms (PRAYOGA) to an opponent.

The project of harmonizing the preoccupations of pramana with the orientations of the Buddhist spiritual quest found a culmination of sorts in the Gathering of the Ouiddities (Tattvasamgraha), the masterwork of the great eighth-century philosopher Santaraksita. In some 3,600 verses in 26 chapters, SSantaraksita dissects the world of Indian philosophy in his time, examining the full range of topics that had been disputed between Buddhists and their opponents over the preceding centuries:

1 the Samkhya doctrine of "nature" (prakrti) — that is, prime matter (pradhana);
2 the Nyaya-Vaiseika conception of God as creator;
3 whether nature and God are "co-creators" of the world;
4 the notion that the world is a chance occurrence;
5 the linguistic philosopher Bhartrhari's theory of sabdabrahma — that is, the absolute as Word;
6 the Vedic myth of the primordial Cosmic Man (Purusa);

7 the nature of the self (atman) and the Buddhist "non-self" (anatman) doctrine;
8 whether there are persisting entities;
9 the relationship between act and result;
10-15 the six Vaisesika categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), act (kriya), universal (samanya), particular (visesa), and inherence (e.g., of quality in substance, samavaya);
16 the relationship between word and meaning;
17 perception (pratyaksa);
18 inference (anumana);
19 whether there are other means of knowledge besides perception and inference;
20 the Jain logic of "may be" (syad^ada);
21 past, present, and future time;
22 materialism;
23 the existence of an external world corresponding to the objects of sensory perception;
24 scriptural authority;
25 the self-validation of religious claims;
26 the seer's extrasensory perception.

The sustained focus throughout the work on the refutation of non-Buddhist positions corresponds closely with the description we have seen earlier of logic as intended primarily for the "correction" of others. But Santaraksita, who was inspired by Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka teaching no less than by Dharmakirti's approach to pramana, gives this a novel twist; for the grand tour on which he guides us through the myriad pathways of Indian thought has as its stated theme the proper characterization of the compassionate and omniscient Buddha's cardinal teaching of "conditioned origination" (pratityasamutpada).

The intentions and aims informing Santaraksita's work are explored in the detailed introduction to the commentary authored by his prominent disciple Kamalasila. Several of the points he underscores here have a direct bearing on our understanding of the relationship between philosophy and spiritual cultivation for medieval Indian Buddhists.

In accord with a broadly accepted understanding of the hierarchy of values, Kamalasila affirms that it is freedom, or liberation (moksa), that is the "supreme value for persons" (paramapurusartha). For ^ahayana Buddhists, such as Santaraksita and Kamalasila, this is normally conceived, as the latter makes quite explicit, as embracing the two ends of "elevation" (abhyudaya) — that is, birth as a human being or divinity, who is free from the torments of infernal, ghostly, or animal realms — and the summum bonum (nihsreyasa), nirvana, complete emancipation from the painful round of rebirth, or samsara. Above all, as it is understood here, nirvana is valued as no mere extinction, but is characterized by the compassion and omniscience of the Buddha. Of course, no one pretends that the immediate aim of studying Santaraksita's book is the attainment of these lofty ends. The purpose of the work, rather, is to facilitate easy understanding of the "quiddities" (tattva), the nature of things as set forth in the various philosophical systems and, in particular, the manner in which these contribute to comprehending the key Buddhist teaching of conditioned origination. By achieving such comprehension, one is freed from error with respect to the Buddha's teachings, and this carries two cardinal entailments: (1) because conflicting emotions (klesa) are rooted in error, one may abandon them and the self-defeating patterns of action they provoke, thereby ensuring one's "elevation"; and, (2), because freedom from error involves insight into the two aspects of "selflessness" (nairatmya) — that of persons (pudgala) and that of fundamental phenomena (dharma) — one thus approaches the realization constituting the highest good. Though these ends are not achieved just by mastering the

contents of Santaraksita's work, they may be won through the progressive cultivation of that mastery in accord with the three degrees of discernment. These supreme values, therefore, are the final aims (prayojananistha) to which the immediate purpose of the work — namely, the achievement of a philosophical understanding of the teaching of conditioned origination — is itself directed.

In summarizing the individual chapters of his master's text, Kamalaśīla reinforces this perspective by regularly pointing to relations between the philosophical topics treated and themes pertaining to conditioned origination as they are encountered in the discourses attributed to the Buddha. Thus, for example, the first seven chapters, in which Santaraksita investigates a range of metaphysical concepts from the Samkhya notion of prime matter to the notion of an enduring self, are referred to the critique of causation offered by the Buddha in the Salistambha Sútra: "This shoot is neither self-produced, nor produced by another, nor produced by both, nor emanated by God, nor sprung from nature; it is neither dependent upon a single cause, nor causeless." In this manner, Kamalasila affirms that the Gathering of the Quiddities offers not just refutations of the erroneous beliefs and opinions of non-Buddhists but, much as Vasubandhu had urged in his Principles of Commentary, also a hermeneutical use of dialectics as a means to get clear about the meaning of the Buddha's teaching. Philosophical refinement is here intimately tied to demands of spiritual cultivation on the Buddhist path — the path, that is, as characterized by one's progressive development of the three degrees of discernment. <>

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

Introduction: Methods of Reasoning in the *Tattvasamgraha*
Note on the Translation: The *Tattvasamgraha* of Santaraksita with commentary by Kamalasila

I. An Inquiry about Prime Matter
(Prakrti- pariksa)

II. An Inquiry about God
(Isvara- pariksa)

III. Part 1. An Inquiry about the Soul as Postulated by the Nyaya- Vaisesikas
(Nyaya- vaisesika- parikalpita- atma- pariksa)

IV. Part 2. An Inquiry about the Soul as Postulated by the Mimamsakas
(Mimamsaka- parikalpita- atma- pariksa)

V. Part 3. An Inquiry about the Soul as Postulated by the Followers of Kapila
(Kapila- parikalpita- atma- pariksa)

VI. Part 4. An Inquiry about the Soul as Postulated by the Sky- Clad
(Digambara- parikalpita- atma- pariksa)

VII. Part 5. An Inquiry about the Soul as Postulated by the Followers of the Upanisads
(Aupanisadika- parikalpita- atma- pariksa)

VIII. Part 6. An Inquiry about the Soul as Postulated by the Vatsiputriyas
(Vatsiputriya- parikalpita- atma- pariksa)

IX. An Inquiry about the Relation between Action and Its Results
(Karma- phala- sambandha- pariksa)
Translated with Wenli Fan

XX. An Inquiry about Perspectivalism
(Syadvada- pariksa)

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Methods of Reasoning in the Tattvasangraha

This volume presents a series of translations of works by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Śāntaraksita (c. 725– 788 ce) and by his student and commentator Kamalaśīla (c. 740– 795 ce). The source texts are taken from an immense compilation known as the Tattvasangraha (or TS), whose title could freely be translated as the Encyclopedia of Metaphysics, and from its commentary (the Tattvasangraha-pañjikã, or TSP). Much of the time, the text comes off as a kind of manual or handbook for Buddhists participating in formal public debates. But its vast comprehensiveness, along with the authors' tolerance for repetition and redundancy between sections, gives the unmistakable impression of a reference work; hence, "encyclopedia." In at least some of the systems criticized in the text, a tattva is an ontologically real thing or sometimes a type of real things. Śāntaraksita himself uses the word, as he indicates in the introductory material of the treatise, to refer to truths about how things in general actually are. On either interpretation, the study of tattvas would constitute what we in the West call "metaphysics."

For the most part, my goal has been to allow the authors of this classic work to speak for themselves through this translation. I have tried my best to keep my use of interpretive exposition to a minimum. However, readers unfamiliar with the conventions of Buddhist epistemology may benefit from an exposition of the types of arguments found in the volume. A number of these may initially seem unfamiliar, though almost all of them have some parallel in the works of Western philosophers.

Śāntaraksita approach to philosophical argument is based on the system of Dharmakirti, who was perhaps the most influential figure in the whole tradition of Buddhist epistemology in India. Much uncertainty and disagreement persist about the dates of this great philosopher, although it can be definitively stated he worked between the middle of the sixth century and the middle of the seventh. But his immense impact on the South Asian philosophical landscape is generally accepted.

Dharmakïrti, in turn, worked out his ideas in the context of a longstanding conversation of Indian epistemology, shaped largely by the interplay between Buddhist and non- Buddhist philosophical ideas. Much of the innovation in logic and epistemology that reshaped Indian philosophy during the middle of the first millennium CE was driven by the contributions of Buddhist scholars, starting with such pioneering figures as Vasubandhu (fifth century ce) and Asanga, and receiving further impetus from the work of Dignãga (also written Dignaga, c. 480– 540). Dharmakïrti's single most influential text, the Pramãna-vãrttika or Commentary on Warrants (henceforth PV)— a work frequently cited in the TSP— presents itself as an interpretation of the Pramãna-samuccaya of Dignãga. Many scholars suggest that at least part of the impetus for Dharmakïrti and others to work on the foundations of Buddhist epistemology was provided by the criticisms leveled against Dignãga by non- Buddhist authors, especially the brilliant and incisive Mïmãmsaka philosopher Kumãrila, who is discussed briefly later in this chapter. Dharmakïrti's reformulation of Buddhist epistemology seems to have rapidly become highly influential in the great centers of monastic learning in and around Bihar that were the last major strongholds of Buddhism in India. His works were essentially unknown in China

and other parts of premodern East Asia. But they would become central to the systems of Buddhist education and scholarship that soon began to emerge in Tibet.

Dignãgás logic is based on the crucial concept of trairüpya, a discovery whose basic formulation was not original to him but that, in his hands, was built into a persuasive and powerful system for assessing arguments. The idea is that, in order for an inference to be valid, its reason property must have three specific characteristics: the reason property (Skt. hetu or sãdhana-dharma) must be present in the topic of inference; the reason must be present in at least some cases exhibiting the target property (sãdhya-dharma); and the reason must be absent in every case where the target property is absent. The class of cases relevant to the second characteristic, those where the target property is present, is called the "similar class" (sapaksa); that relevant to the third characteristic, where the target property is absent, is known as the "dissimilar class" (vipaksa). The topic of the inference is not included in either of these classes.

To demonstrate that the reason property is present in some cases in the similar class, it is sufficient to provide a supporting example. (Normally this is called the drstãnta; occasionally, as in TS 189, it is referred to as the "illustration," Skt. nidaršana.) Sometimes a "dissimilar example" will also be presented; this is a case in which the reason property and the target property are both absent.

It will be evident that the basic structure of this approach to logic is somewhat different from that of the system of Aristotelian syllogisms. A paradigm example of the latter would be

> All men are mortal.
> Socrates is a man.
> Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

South Asian syllogisms accomplish a similar result, but in a somewhat different way. The most famous paradigm example of such a syllogism is

> There is fire on the mountain,
> there is smoke there,
> As, for example, in the kitchen.

Like the Aristotelian one, this inference depends on a universal claim, but, unlike in that context, the universal claim is not explicitly stated here. It is, however, accepted as a condition of the validity of the inference that it should hold. This universal claim, in this case "Where smoke is present, fire is present," is known as the pervasion (Skt. vyãpti). Whereas the major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism is fundamentally a relation between classes or sets, the pervasion in a South Asian inference is thought of as a relation between properties. Here an Indian philosopher would say that the inference is a good one partly because the reason property, "the presence of smoke," is pervaded by the target property, "the presence of fire."

These inferences are often designed to be presented within a very specific type of social context. South Asian canons of logic envisage a highly structured public debate unfolding between a proponent (Skt. vãdin), who advances a positive thesis and supplies a formal argument in its support, and a respondent (prativãdin), who must identify specific problems (dosa) with the formal argument.2 These problems may fall within a large number of types, which are laid out in detail in manuals of debate logic, but if no such problem can be identified and maintained in discussion, the judges will deem the proponent's thesis to have been established. A major objective of the TS and its commentary is to indicate what problems a Buddhist debater could raise in response to various formal arguments for non- Buddhist philosophical views.

Most of the problems on which Śāntaraksita and Kamalašīla rely are based on the basic regulative norm that, to rationally persuade an opponent, all the elements of an argument must be acceptable to that opponent. Arguments are then classified into reductio arguments (in the full Latin, reductio

ad absurdum; Skt. prasanga) and arguments based on one's own system (Skt. svatantra). In the present context, the main difference between these two is that, to be successful, the elements of an argument based on one's own system must be acceptable to both parties. A reductio argument, whose purpose is only to show the untenability of some particular view and not to establish any positive conclusion, succeeds when the elements of the argument are acceptable to the opponent, regardless of whether the party advancing the argument endorses them.

One of the most basic criteria for assessing a South Asian– style argument is that the topic of the argument, the logical subject that the argument is about, must exist— or, at least, that the party to whom the argument is directed must believe that it exists. If the existence of some entity is controversial, as is often the case in the debates discussed in the TS, then arguments for its existence will typically be structured to be about a topic acceptable to both sides. Thus if the two sides do not agree whether a soul exists, a philosopher might propose an argument for the claim that ideas (whose existence is acceptable to all) belong to a soul. If the respondent does not accept the existence of the argument's topic, it can be said that "the basis of the reason is not established" (Skt. ãšraya-asiddha hetor). For instance, if the proponent were to argue, "The unicorn in this room is beautiful, because it is bright purple," the respondent could base her reply on the problem that the basis is not established.

Similarly, the party to whom an argument is directed must agree that the proposed reason property is actually present in the topic. Otherwise, they cannot take it to justify accepting any conclusion. So, for example, if the proponent were to argue, "Grass is beautiful, because it is bright purple," the respondent could reply that "the reason is not established" (Skt. asiddha or related forms).

If the topic exists and the reason property is present in it, the argument may still fail if that property does not constitute a good reason to believe that the target property is present as well. In other words, the pervasion needs to obtain; a problem with the pervasion constitutes a problem with the argument. In extreme cases, Kamalašïla asserts that his opponent's reason is contradictory: as if the proponent were to claim that "Fido is a dog because he has six legs." In this type of case, the reason property and the target property are never found together. More frequently, Kamalašïla claims that a particular reason is inconclusive (Skt. anaikãntika). If the proponent were to argue that "Fido is a dog, because he has four legs," the respondent could reply that the reason is inconclusive, supporting that reply with the example of a horse.

When a reason is inconclusive, a particular type of strategy can be employed to repair it: namely, introducing what is called a "specification" (Skt. više^ana) of the reason. Thus, the proponent could replace the previous formulation with "Fido is a dog, because he has four legs and barks." While the reason "has four legs" may be inconclusive, the specification could repair the problem by producing a version of the reason that does not apply to anything that is not a dog. In the technical language employed by Kamalašïla, the effect of a successful specification is to ward off the reason property from the dissimilar class, which is the class of cases that lack the target property.

The similar example in an Indian syllogism plays the crucial role of demonstrating that there are at least some cases in which the reason property and the target property are found together. Thus Śāntaraksita and Kamalašïla devote considerable effort to criticizing the examples offered by other philosophers. Most often, the critique presented is that the example lacks the target property and so is not suitable to perform its role in the argument.

Thus the system of debate that Dharmakïrti inherited from Dignãga was impressive in its abstraction and generality and able to represent and rigorously evaluate a wide variety of inferences.4 Unfortunately, the rules of Dignãgás system were susceptible to manipulation, in the form of arguments whose reason properties were artificially gerrymandered to block the construction of

uncontroversial counterexamples, but without actually providing any legitimate reason to believe their conclusions. As I have shown in previous work, a large class of examples of such problematic inferences can be found in the writings of the prominent Madhyamika commentator Bhãvaviveka. One of the most prominent (and, to some scholars today, the most puzzling) instances of this kind of manipulation is Xuanzang's argument for idealism, which can be summarized as follows:

Ultimately, form is not separate from visual consciousness, because it is not the sense of sight, but is included in the first three components (dhãtus).

Here "form" translates Sanskrit rüpa, which can in some contexts mean "color" in the sense of what the eye perceives, and is in other contexts the closest equivalent in the Abhidharma worldview to what we today call "matter." To say that "form is not separate from visual consciousness" is to assert that the physical world has no existence apart from our perception of it, and thus may plausibly be considered a statement of idealism.

The first Western scholar to explain how the Xuanzang argument works seems to have been Eli Franco in an insightful 2004 article. The reason is as follows: "is not the sense of sight, but is included in the first three components." The first three components are form, the sense of sight, and visual consciousness; so these are the only cases to be considered. In virtue of the specification "is not the sense of sight," the reason property does not apply to the sense of sight, leaving only form and visual consciousness. Obviously, visual consciousness is not separate from itself, and the reason applies to it, so there is a supporting example. Form is the topic of the inference, so it cannot be used either to support or to oppose the pervasion. And there is nothing else to which the reason property applies. So it is impossible in principle to produce a counterexample. In other words, the argument is a clever sophistry, whose reason property has been carefully gerrymandered to make it appear valid by the standards of Dignãgás system.

By the time of Šãntarak^ita, the South Asian epistemological tradition, both in Buddhist and in other versions, had evolved defenses against the use of such unilluminating tricks. Perhaps the most important of these is the requirement to specify the nature of the "invariable connection" (Skt. pratibandha) between the reason property and the target property. If no such connection can be specified, then the argument is suspect, even if we cannot produce an uncontroversial counterexample. At TS 207– 8, for example, Šãntarak^ita appeals to this idea to help him resist the "breathing argument" used by Naiyãyika philosophers to argue for the existence of a soul.

Dharmakïrti proposed that there are just two types of invariable connections that can be relied on for this purpose, characterized as causal dependence (tadutpatti) and identity (tadãtmya). This distinction bears some resemblance to Hume's claim in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that "abstract reasonings," if we want them to yield knowledge, are limited to mathematics and to drawing out the logical consequences of definitions, and that our only other source of knowledge is "experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence." Like Dharmakïrti, Hume thinks that our empirical knowledge is fundamentally a matter of discovering causal relationships between particulars that arise in our experience. Invariable connections based on identity, for both of these philosophers, are fundamentally about verbal inferences made possible by the structure of the conventional system of concepts we have created to make sense of our experience. In view of these considerations, the framework of two types of invariable connections also bears a strong resemblance to the Kantian distinction, immensely influential in twentieth-century philosophy, between analytic and synthetic judgments. As the Xuanzang argument does not fit well into either of these categories, a follower of Dharmakïrti would have a reasonable basis for rejecting it as invalid.

Another aspect of Dharmakïrti's methodology, as applied by Śāntaraksita, provides additional resources with which to resist sophistical tricks. I refer to the requirement that the proponent of an argument should be prepared to supply a bādhaka-pramāna: literally, a "warrant that rules out," but in at least most of its usage cases, specifically a warrant that rules out the presence of the reason property in the dissimilar class. Since the dissimilar class is defined as that class of examples in which the target property is not present, the job of the "warrant that rules out" is to give us some philosophical reason to believe that there are no counterexamples to the pervasion on which the argument relies. And it is just this that is unavailable in cases like the Xuanzang argument. Thus it can be reasonably argued that Dharmakïrti solved the problem with the system of syllogistic logic in India that allowed such arguments to gain prominence.

There are some arguments in the TS and TSP that do not fit the structure we have been considering so far, in that they are arguments that rely on the absence of something, rather than on the positive presence of a reason property. For example, Kamalašïla appeals several times to an argument form with the difficult Sanskrit name vyāpaka-anupalabdhi. Here vyāpaka could literally be translated as "a per vader,"8 but given the nature of the relation of pervasion, as described earlier, it is far more intuitive in English to speak of "a more general category." The term upalabdhi is often translated as "perception" in this context; Birgit Kellner, who translates it thus, writes that "upalabdhi means 'cognition' in general, and that more specific meanings can be derived from its use in individual contexts." As Kellner points out, Dharmakïrti defines anupalabdhi as "the non- operation of epistemic warrants." Since I use "perception" to translate Skt. pratyaksa, in this book I render upalabdhi as "observation" and anupalabdhi as "non- observation." The latter term is often used in the context of the perennial epistemological question of the conditions under which the absence of evidence can constitute evidence of absence.

Dharmakïrti was keenly interested in the question, returning to this issue in many of his works. The nature of the vyāpaka-anupalabdhi argument in particular, and of the topic of inferences from non-observation in general, can be greatly clarified by examining his Nyāyabindu, which lists eleven argument forms of this type. Dharmakïrti writes:

I.3. vyāpaka-anupalabdhir-yathā / na-atra šimšapā v k a-abhāvād iti

An argument from the non- observation of a more general category: for example, there is no šimšapā tree there, because of the absence of trees.

This argument seems to rely on two premises of different types. First, we assume that every šimšapā tree is a tree. In the terminology of Indian epistemology, the property "tree" pervades the property "šimšapā tree." Second, we observe the absence of any tree at all in a particular location. If our observation is accurate, we can then infer, validly, that this location contains no šimšapā tree. Once we set aside the question of whether our observation is reliable, the inference does the same work as an Aristotelian syllogism of the form Camestres (AEE-2.) The arguments from the non-observation of a more general category that are found in our text are considerably more abstract than Dharmakïrti's example, but the logical structure is the same.

Another form of argument from absence that is deployed in the TSP is described by Dharmakïrti in these words:

I.6. viruddha-vyāpta-upalabdhir-yathā / na dhruvabhāvï bhütasya-api bhāvasya vināšo hetv-antara-āpek^a^ād iti

An argument from the observation that a more general category is contradicted: for example, the cessation of an existing thing that has arisen is not everlasting, since it depends on other causes.

And Kamalašïla uses one other type of inference from the list in the Nyãyabindu, known as the vyãpaka-viruddha-upalabdhi:

I.8. vyãpaka-viruddha-upalabdhir yathã / na-atra tu^ãra-sparšo'gner iti

An argument from an observation that contradicts a more general category: for example, there is no contact with frost there, because of fire.

Drawing on Dharmottarás commentary, we may explain this inference as follows: Suppose I observe fire in a particular location. I know that fire is incompatible with the presence of cold and that the property "the presence of frost" is pervaded by the property "the presence of cold"— that is, in more familiar terms, wherever there is frost, it is always cold. I may infer that there is no frost to be encountered in that location.

Philosophically informed readers may have noticed that the Indian ideas about argumentation that we have been discussing often combine pure logic with considerations that Westerners would consider as belonging rather to epistemology. There is also some information in the TS and TSP that bears on questions that Westerners would see as more narrowly and strictly logical.

This material may be of interest, as the role of logic in Buddhism has perennially been a topic of interpretive difficulties and no little controversy. Recently, some well- informed scholars of Buddhist philosophy, for whose work I have great respect, have suggested that Nãgãrjuna was a dialetheist: in other words, he believed there could be true contradictions. Mark Siderits has protested, against this reading, that a philosopher who abandons the principle of non- contradiction should then be in no position to offer reductio ad absurdum arguments against others. So the dialetheist reading would have the effect of crippling Nãgãrjunás main polemical strategy.

I will not discuss here the merits of these arguments as regards the works of Nãgãrjuna himself. But the views on this matter of Śāntaraksita and Kamalašïla— who identify themselves as, among other things, followers of Nagarjuna— are quite clear: they are strict logical conservatives.

Indeed, TS Chapter XX, the "Inquiry about Perspectivalism," is in large part an attempted defense of a strict reading of the law of non- contradiction. Kamalašïla often appeals to forms of this principle and sometimes states versions of it, as in TSP ad. 1770:

If you say that one thing is, with respect to one single effect, a producer and not a producer, then how can affirmation and negation be reasonably attributed to a single bearer? But if the referents are different, there is no contradiction.

The principle is asserted also in TSP ad. 28:

But how is it possible for one thing to have, at the very same time, the mutually contradictory [properties] of "being the cause" and "not being the cause," since the possession of contradictory qualities indicates distinctness between things?

In the same commentarial passage, TSP ad. 28, there is a clear formulation of the principle we call "excluded middle," together with an inference that straightforwardly depends on it. Here Kamalašïla notes that "the effect preexists" and "the effect does not pre- exist" are contradictory, and he infers that these are the only two possibilities: if one is false, the other must be true. There is no third option in between these.

Of course, this evidence is subject to a kind of doubt that will be helpful to acknowledge here. Śāntaraksita and Kamalašïla do not always say what they really think. As several passages in the TSP make clear, they reject the real existence of the physical. Yet many of their arguments are presented

from the perspective of the Abhidharma tradition, and they thus presuppose a view of the physical world that is both realist and reductionist. The evidence in this book does nothing to rule out the possibility that the authors of our text are employing logical conservatism only as a dialectical tool for addressing the particular interlocutors with which the text is concerned, and not because they really believe in that conception of logic.

Philosophers today also sometimes disagree about whether identity is transitive: if A = B and B = C, must it be the case that A = C? Most philosophers think it is reasonable to presuppose this rule, but a few do have their doubts. As it happens, TSP ad. 1721– 22 contains an explicit statement of the principle of the transitivity of identity, or at least a close relative of that principle.

Chapter I of the TSP also contains two explicit statements of the indiscernibility of identicals: if A is identical to B, then every property of A is a property of B. Strictly speaking, what Kamalašīla states is the contrapositive of this proposition, or perhaps a slightly restricted version of the contrapositive, namely: if A has a property, and B has an opposed property, then A and B are not identical, but distinct. We can find this principle at work in TSP ad. 16 and in the passage quoted earlier in this chapter from TSP ad. 28. The indiscernibility of identicals is a bedrock methodological commitment of Śāntaraksita philosophy as interpreted by Kamalašīla. Interpreted strictly and deployed relentlessly, it plays a crucial role in many of the arguments of the TSP.

The indiscernibility of identicals may plausibly have been the source of a philosophical and methodological principle that can be seen at work in several places in the TSP: namely, that physical things are spatiotemporally individuated. The idea of spatiotemporal individuation is that a particular spatial and temporal location is part of the identity of a given physical entity: it could not have been elsewhere or at a different time than it in fact is (or was or will be.) This principle also implies that no two physical things (of the same kind) can be in the same place at the same time.

The most straightforward, if partial, evidence for the spatiotemporal individuation of physical entities comes from TSP ad. 259: "material word- referents never occur in the same place, since it would unacceptably follow that they would be identical." It is, of course, possible to accept this claim while not being fully committed to spatiotemporal individuation. Better direct evidence comes from the reply to Uddyotakara at TSP 507–8:

If the existing earth and so on exist in the next arrangement without having given up their earlier intrinsic natures, then it is impossible for them to give up their previous configuration and enter into a different configuration, because of identity, as before.

Here Kamalašīla maintains that atoms cannot enter into a new spatial configuration without giving up their identities— a statement that clearly presupposes spatiotemporal individuation.

Further evidence for attributing this view to our authors is indirect and comes from vv. 78– 79, in which Śāntaraksita advances the counterintuitive claim that "a potter / is a maker of atoms." Suppose that a potter digs some clay from a hillside and makes it into a jar. We would ordinarily say that the atoms of the clay would have existed even if the potter had not done his work. But if we assume that atoms are both momentary and individuated spatiotemporally, we will get a different conclusion. If, due to the potter's work, a particular atom now occurs in the house, it is not numerically identical with the one that would have occurred in the hillside had the potter taken the day off. Such a commitment to spatiotemporal individuation of material particles plausibly flows from Śāntaraksita reliance on the strictest possible interpretation of the indiscernability of identicals.

On the whole, it is striking how familiar, from the perspective of modern philosophy, Śāntaraksita and Kamalašīla canons of argumentation turn out to be. Only a few of the argument forms in the TS

and TSP are, in any sense, distinctively Buddhist. One example is the often- repeated argument for the conclusion that an unchanging, permanent thing could not be causally efficacious. Śāntaraksita relies heavily on this argument, especially in the Chapter VII. Another example appears in TSP ad. 31, which contains a brief instance of the important Madhyamaka argument known as the "neither one nor many." Another of Šāntarakstá's works, the Madhyamakãlarkara, focuses entirely on this argument form.

The arguments in the TS and its commentary are directed against an impressively wide variety of philosophers and doctrines. Many of the authors who developed the non- Buddhist views that Śāntaraksita and Kamalašïla seek to criticize have been identified in footnotes where their names first appear. But it seemed appropriate here to introduce two of the most important philosophical opponents considered in the work whose ideas appear in several chapters: Uddyotakara and Kumãrila.

Uddyotakara is one of the most important figures in the history of the Nyãya tradition of Brahmanical Indian thought. The Sanskrit word nyãya means, among other things, both "logic" and "a good argument," which are major preoccupations of the influential theistic tradition of philosophical reflection that adopted the word as its name.

Uddyotakara is believed to have lived in Šrughna, in the Punjab region in the northwest of the subcontinent. There is continuing disagreement about his dates; for example, Karl Potter's Encyclopedia regards him as having lived in the first half of the seventh century ce, whereas a more recent article by Monima Chadha offers 540– 600 ce as his dates. Although Kamalašïla often spells his name "Udyotakara," I have adopted the spelling that is standard among scholars today.

Uddyotakara is a major source for, and may have been the originator of, some of the most famous criticisms Buddhist philosophers in India had to face. He pointed out that the commonsense view that objects are accessible to multiple sensory modalities presents a serious problem for the Buddhist position that the things we directly perceive are sensible qualities. He astutely pointed to certain problems about interpreting the early canonical statements of the doctrine of no- self that still trouble modern scholars of the Buddhist tradition. He also provided an interesting and powerful reply to the standard Buddhist argument that an unchanging, eternal God would be unable to act in time. Śāntaraksita seems to have taken the trouble to quote (or sometimes paraphrase) some of his key arguments both accurately and at length.

Kumãrila Bhatta, by far the most influential figure in the history of the Mïmãmsã tradition, seems to have been regarded by Śāntaraksita and Kamalašïla as the single greatest philosophical opponent Indian Buddhism ever faced. A fierce critic of Dignãga and rough contemporary of Dharmakïrti, Kumãrila must have flourished during the seventh century CE. He exercised a major influence on the thought of Šañkara, whose Advaita system is briefly considered in the TS and who would eventually come to be regarded as the greatest of Hindu philosophers. The connection between the two figures was sufficiently close that Šañkarás system is sometimes referred to as the "Later" (Uttara) Mïmãmsã, leading the views of Kumãrila to be classified within the "Earlier" (pürna) Mïmãnsã.

As John Taber has aptly written, Kumãrila "belonged to a tradition that placed everyday piety— the practice of prescribed public and domestic rituals and the observance of social and ethical norms— above mysticism." Yet, whereas Uddyotakarás worldview has several important features that are recognizably similar to Western theistic religions, Kumãrilás system is far stranger. As a deeply conservative thinker, Kumãrila is above all else concerned to uphold the authority of the ancient Vedic scriptures as regards questions of dharma. Yet he is also an atheist, whose dialectical role in the TS and TSP is often shaped by his position that there is no omniscient knower. Both Uddyotakara and Kumãrila are defenders of robust and uncompromising versions of metaphysical

realism, holding (albeit in quite different ways) that there are objectively existing universals and that our words typically succeed in referring to objective features of the world around us. And yet the TS and TSP classify Kumãrila as an advocate of syadvada, or "perspectivalism," a view typically associated by scholars only with the Jains.

Kumãrila is perhaps best known for his advocacy of the doctrine of intrinsic epistemic authority (svata^-pr'm'^ya). On this view, a cognition that is of the same type as genuine epistemic warrants— as it might be, inferential, perceptual, testimonial, or the like— is to be taken as reliable unless and until we have some positive reason to reject it. This doctrine results in a very surprising argument for the authority of the Vedas. The Vedas are testimony, and testimony can rationally be rejected only on the basis of some defect in the speaker, such as dishonesty or ignorance. Yet the Vedas have no speaker; they are inscribed into the very fabric of the universe itself. Thus there can be no reason to doubt them, and their absolute authority must be accepted without delay.

Kumãrilás conclusions are so odd to modern readers that it can be hard, at first, to read him with the respect he deserves. Yet on topic after topic, his criticisms of Buddhist teachings are incisive, precise, on target, and delivered in a magnificent style. Kumãrilás searching critiques of Buddhist philosophical psychology, philosophy of perception, mereology, epistemology, and philosophy of language would give the intellectuals of the monasteries material to chew on for hundreds of years. There are scholars who say that among the problems Kumãrila posed for the Buddhist tradition are some it never solved.

Note on the Translation

The Tattvasangraha of Śāntaraksita with commentary by Kamalaśīla

My goal in this translation has been to produce an English rendering of several key chapters of the Tattvasangraha (TS) together with its canonical commentary (the TSP) that will be useful and instructive not only to professionally trained scholars of Buddhist philosophy but also to advanced undergraduate and graduate students and to philosophers working within the Western tradition. Given the considerable importance of this text as one of the last great works of Indian Buddhist thought, putting the Buddhist tradition into conversation with a vast range of interlocutors from the subcontinent's rich and varied philosophical traditions, making at least substantial portions of the work widely available to a range of readers seems a valuable goal.

The first major decision I faced concerned which parts of the text to translate. The TS is an immense text, with twenty- six chapters covering a wide variety of topics. These can be classified roughly into four topical groups. One group of chapters that clearly belong together is Chapter XVII– XIX, which deal with epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge. This inquiry takes the distinctively South Asian form of trying to discover the basic, irreducible types of epistemic warrants (pramãna). There is one chapter each on the two warrants accepted by Buddhists, perception and inference; Chapter XIX then deals with a variety of cognitions that are asserted by other systems to be epistemic warrants.

A second important group of chapters, Chapter X– XV, offer pointed criticisms of the six most important categories of the Nyãya-vaišesika philosophical system. Yet another group of chapters is Chapter XXIV– XXVI, which deal with religious topics, focusing mainly on the issue of whether, and in what sense, the Buddha is omniscient. These are the focus of a major study by Sarah McClintock.

The remaining chapters deal mainly with questions that we would classify as metaphysical. These were the topics on which I wanted to focus, but even within this group, it was necessary to be selective. The present book contains translations of five metaphysical chapters. These include what is perhaps the most influential and frequently cited part of the entire TS: the immense Chapter VII,

which criticizes six South Asian traditions that affirm some kind of soul or self. This chapter, which is commonly taught to monks in the Tibetan tradition, is one of our most important sources for the mature philosophical articulation of the Buddhist teaching of no self.

It was obvious to me that Chapter VII should be included, but which other chapters to translate was a more difficult judgment call. Chapters I and II address foundational issues about the nature of matter and the existence of God; I realized, moreover, that these chapters lay out some of the key argumentative methods to be employed in the rest of the work. So these chapters are translated here, but with the exception of the beginning of Chapter I, the commentary on verses 1– 6. These are introductory in nature, discussing the purpose of the work, and are of limited philosophical interest today.

Before I had read Chapter IX, on karma, I guessed that it might contain teachings about aspects of premodern South Asian mythology that would be of little philosophical interest today. I was pleasantly surprised to find a strikingly sophisticated and impressive treatment of questions about causality with which philosophers still wrestle today. The chapter also addresses important objections to the teaching of no self that are not covered in Chapter VII.

Originally I intended to prepare a translation of Chapter XXIII, the "Inquiry about External Objects." But I then heard about the work of Serena Saccone in this chapter, and chose to focus my efforts elsewhere. I therefore turned my attention to Chapter XX, which examines the Jain teaching of perspectivalism (syãd-vãda, literally the "it- may- be doctrine"). Jain philosophy has not received the attention or study from Western philosophers that it deserves. By examining a Buddhist critique of this tradition, I hope to have contributed in some small way to help remedy this inattention.

The objective of making the TS and TSP more widely accessible to Western readers clearly requires that untranslated Sanskrit words be kept to an absolute minimum. Yet some of the most important technical terms in the TS are stubbornly resistant to translation, as their range of meanings does not exactly correspond to any single word in English (or other modern languages). Keeping to a single consistent translation therefore risks misleading readers who are not well versed in Buddhist thought, while using different translations according to context makes the result less useful to scholars and invites charges of inconsistency. I therefore offer this brief note to clarify some of the most difficult translation questions faced in rendering the present work into English and to explain some of the reasons behind the decisions I have made.

The Sanskrit word ãtman occupies a very prominent place in the TS: it occurs in the titles of Chapter VII and its six subsections and names a key theme of the entire work. Unfortunately, it is not possible to translate this term with complete consistency. In philosophical contexts it mostly refers to a soul, a permanent spiritual substance that defines the essence of an individual person. On the other hand, in many genres of Sanskrit literature, it can mean "self" in a perfectly ordinary, colloquial sense. In the TS and TSP, this issue is relevant mainly in the context of the discussion of the Vãtsïputrïyas, who believe in a person (Skt. pudgala) that plays the role of a self but is not quite the same as a soul. In this book, both "self" and "soul" translate ãtman, with the latter translation having been used much more frequently.

Another common word that causes all kinds of trouble for scholars of Buddhism is Sanskrit rüpa. The term has a variety of meanings, most of which can be arranged in a broadening series by level of generality: it can mean "color," "form," or "entity." In this series, the first refers only to the specific sensible qualities perceived by the sense of sight. The second corresponds very roughly to what we in English call "matter": it is everything physical. In the third meaning, rüpa can refer to anything at all, just conceived of as something that, in some sense, exists. To make things even worse, rüpa can also mean the "nature" of something else; thus Kamalašïla tells us that the "own- form" (svarüpa) of

something is the same as its intrinsic nature (svabhãva). I have translated rüpa in all of these four ways, as the context seemed to require.

It is widely recognized that the crucial and extremely common technical term pramãna (Tib. tshad ma) is very difficult— some say, impossible— to translate properly into English. Scholars of Buddhist studies have often used "valid cognition" to render this term, but that option causes problems in any conversation with Western academic philosophers, who are trained to say that only arguments can be valid and never individual cognitions. The older translation "instrument of knowledge" is less flawed, as it does not invoke a technical term with an already established meaning, and it is based on Indian texts' explications of pramãna. But it does not connect well with the language of contemporary philosophy. Dan Arnold's proposal "reliable epistemic warrant" is far superior and indeed expresses the intended philosophical meaning quite precisely. But this three- word phrase is too long and clumsy for a term that occurs constantly in the text. Readers who are sympathetic to Arnold's proposal are invited to interpret the rendering adopted here, "warrant," as a kind of abbreviation for his phrase. Although most occurrences of pramãna have been translated this way, in a few contexts where the warrant in question is an inference, I have found that the text can be made clearer by translating the term as "argument."

Another Sanskrit technical term presenting formidable difficulties is ãkãra, which in its nontechnical uses means "aspect, appearance." It is also used in a specific way in the Buddhist philosophy of mind, where prominent authors seem to have disagreed about whether cognitive and perceptual states have any ãkãra. The rendering I have adopted here, "phenomenal form," is based on an interpretation offered by Matt MacKenzie. MacKenzie connects the nir-ãkãra-vãda, the "doctrine of no phenomenal form," with the idea of a radical transparency of experience. On this view, we perceive external objects directly, and our perceptions of them have no subjectively accessible nature or form of their own, but simply present the external object to us. On MacKenzie's reading, the opposite position, known as the sa-ãkãravãda, involves maintaining that our awareness of objects is phenomenologically and/ or epistemically mediated by inner states that appear to us in a certain way. There will then be room for doubt about the extent to which the phenomenal form of our awareness does or does not correspond to anything in the objects themselves.

Some scholars who examine this work may be surprised by the way I have decided to translate the Sanskrit noun vyavasthã and the causative verb forms related to it. In this book these come out sometimes as "framework" and sometimes as "present in [a, your, our] framework." I must confess that I struggled with these Sanskrit words for a long time; it was Douglas Duckworth who suggested "framework" to me as a translation of the Tibetan equivalent rnam par gzhag pa. To understand why this somewhat odd choice ends up making sense, it helps render the pieces of the verb forms literally into English and put them together into a phrase, which would sound like "cause to stand apart and down"— or, more idiomatically, "lay it all out [for you]." Those experts who may still be skeptical should examine how well this translation choice works in the particular contexts in which the words appear.

Many translation problems are presented by Šãntaraksitás and Kamalašïlás uses, in Chapter I, of technical terms from one of the oldest forms of Indian philosophy, the Sãmkhya. The primary focus of their critique is the Sãmkhya-kãrikãs (henceforth SK) of Ïšvarakrsna. This famous text, which may have been composed between 350 and 450 CE, became the most authoritative and definitive expression of the Sãmkhya philosophical position for almost all later authors within that tradition. As the title indicates, the official target of criticism is one of that text's most important postulates: that everything that arises in our experience is a manifestation of a single real cause called "prime matter." In practice, though, the primary focus of debate turns on disagreements about the nature of causality and, specifically, about the "doctrine that the effect pre- exists" (Skt. sat-kãrya-vãda.)

The TSP uses two distinct words, which Kamalašïla explicitly tells us are synonyms, to refer to prime matter as postulated by the Sãmkhyas: prak^ti and pradhãna. I have chosen to render the first of these in almost all of its occurrences as "natural basis," a translation which seems to work well for uses of prak^ti in other chapters of the TS. In particular, prak^ti is sometimes used to mean "cause" in general; hopefully, "natural basis" fits this usage. In the chapter title, however, it was clearer to translate "prime matter." The Tibetan translation adopts rang bzhin as its equivalent for prak^ti—a confusing choice, as the crucially important Sanskrit word svabhãva, also translated as rang bzhin, makes a number of appearances in our chapter as well. The second of the synonyms, pradhãna, means in Sanskrit something like "the principal or most important thing," making the English phrase "prime matter" — often used by scholars of Aristotle— a reasonably close fit as to both colloquial and philosophical meaning.

Sã^khya texts teach that prime matter can also be understood as the equilibrium state of the three gu^a, or "strands," reproduced here in transliteration as sattva, rajas, and tamas. This ancient framework presents several intractable translation problems. As the Bhagavad Gïtã points out, "The word SAT is used in the sense 'true' and also in the sense 'good.' " The result is that no English word can fully convey the range of meanings that Sã^khya philosophers were trying to indicate by naming one of the strands sattva. The name of the second strand, rajas, is at least as problematic, since it brings a collection of meanings and associations that hang together well in its Indian context, but which can seem quite disparate to us. Thus rajas can mean "desire" or "passion," as well as the suffering that inevitably results from desire; but as Apte's dictionary tells us, it also has a commonly encountered meaning of "dust, powder, dirt." Moreover, the root ^ra^j from which it is derived often means "to be colored" or, specifically, "to be red," giving rise to an important secondary meaning for rajas, "menstruation, menstrual blood." All of these meanings must be kept in mind as we try to understand the role rajas plays in Sã^khya thought.

The Tibetan translators can hardly be faulted for not having completely resolved these problems. They chose snying stobs, which means "fortitude, determined courage" for the name of the sattva strand. This is an odd choice, though it at least has a strongly positive connotation. Their chosen translation rdul, "dust," for rajas is more accurate, but hardly conveys the full complexity of the semantic range of this term. The rendering mun pa, "darkness," for tamas must have been a far easier choice to make.

Yet another serious difficulty arises in relation to the Samkhya technical term caitanya. The Tibetan renders this word as sems pa can, "that which possesses sentience." This choice makes sense, as caitanya often refers unambiguously to the individual soul or spirit; in contrast to the Advaita Vedãnta tradition, classical Samkhya thinkers were committed to the claim that there were many different such souls. There are, however, passages in this chapter where caitanya refers, equally unambiguously, to conscious mental phenomena.

The approach I have adopted renders caitanya as "consciousness," thus allowing "a consciousness" to refer to a particular sentient being. This choice does create a conflict with the crucial Buddhist technical term vijñãna, which I and many other scholars also translate as "consciousness." Fortunately vijñãna is not a theme of this chapter. Besides, the English word "consciousness" is a far better fit for caitanya than for vijñãna, where the translation can be a bit misleading.

The term liñga normally means a "mark" or "sign" in philosophical Sanskrit. Here it is used in an unusual way because, it appears, of a complex intellectual history. A rich vein of information about this history can be found in Welden 1910. Welden argues that, in the Sãmkhya-kãrikãs and related texts, the term often refers to an "organ" or "instrument," consisting of the intellect and the ten faculties. When combined with the five subtle elements, it forms what I shall refer to as the "subtle

body" that wanders in cyclic existence . The translation "subtle body" for liñga is also used by Geoff Ashton and is adopted here.

Kamalašīlás explanation is based on another interpretation of the meaning of this term, an interpretation advanced in Samkhya texts and based on a folk etymology; that is, a forced and scientifically ungrounded explanation of the derivation of the word. As seen in the text, this folk etymology is intended to convey that a liñga is something that can merge or dissolve into something else; to express this meaning in English, Welden proposes the term "mergent." The Tibetan translations render the word, strangely, as 'gro ba— which I can interpret only as a reference to the role of the liñga in rebirth and thus as indirectly supporting the translation "subtle body."

The Sanskrit words svasamvitti and svasamvedanã, rendered here as "reflexive awareness," name one of Śāntaraksita most important positive doctrines: that in addition to illuminating (what appears to be) an external object, each cognition also makes itself manifest at the same time. Many South Asian Buddhist philosophers endorsed this kind of view; among them, Šãntarak^ita is known for having explained reflexive awareness as the characteristic responsible for the distinction between what is sentient and what is insentient. The idea of reflexive awareness appears several times in the chapters translated here. Near the end of Chapter I, for example, Šãntarak^ita relies on this doctrine to help him show the absurdity of regarding the external world as composed of the three strands, which are characterized in Samkhya thought as having properties that properly belong only to conscious states. Though Śāntaraksita argument certainly comes off as reasonable in context, the premise on which it rests would be the target of incisive criticisms by philosophers in Tibet, above all Tsong kha pa.

In Chapter XX, the "Inquiry on Perspectivalism," especially severe translation difficulties are presented by the term anvaya and its grammatical relatives. This family of terms seems to be used there to describe situations in which one thing remains the same in various contexts. Crucially, they are used both for a universal, which is held to be (in some sense) present in various different particulars, and a continuant substance, which is held to remain the same across various times. In English we do not have a single term that expresses both of these relations, or, at least, I have not found one. It has thus been impossible to translate the chapter in such a way that the surface of the language displays, as it does in the Sanskrit, the deep philosophical connections between these two issues that Śāntaraksita, Kamalašīla, and their Jain opponents seem to have seen and wished to point out.

Please note that "ad." means "[in the commentary] on." So, for example, the notation "ad. 285– 6" would mean "in the prose commentary on verses 285 and 286 of the TS."

Several scholars provided valuable assistance in early stages of the development of this translation. I must especially acknowledge the valuable help provided at the beginning of the project by Wangchuk Dorje Negi, who read much of Chapter VII with me in 2007 at the Central University of Tibetan Studies (then the CIHTS) in Sarnath, UP, India. I then set the TS aside for almost ten years. Wenli Fan then came to Binghamton University wishing to read the karma chapter with me. It was by working on that text with her, on the way to producing the co- authored translation that appears here, that I realized for the first time just how sophisticated and impressive Śāntaraksita philosophy really was, and I was thus motivated to return to the study of the TS, a process that resulted in the production of the rest of this book.

Others kindly helped me with various aspects of the translation. I have already acknowledged a valuable suggestion by Douglas Duckworth. Sonam Kachru discussed a very difficult passage from Chapter XX with me and identified a mistake I had made in translating it. Antoine Panaïoti kindly went over the God chapter with great care and made a number of valuable suggestions. Drawing on

his immense knowledge of the whole Indian tradition, Mark Siderits clarified some difficult issues and helped improve my renderings of several problematic passages. The remaining flaws in the translation, of which I am sure there must be many, are my responsibility and not that of these outstanding scholars. <>

Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Volume Two: Lives Edited by Jonathan A. Silk, and Vincent Eltschinger, Richard Bowring, and Michael Radich [Series: *Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia*, & *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Brill, 9789004299375]

Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism is the first comprehensive academic reference work devoted to the plurality of Buddhist traditions across Asia, offering readers a balanced and detailed treatment of this complex phenomenon in six thematically arranged volumes: literature and languages (I, publ. 2015), lives (II, publ. 2019), thought (III), history (IV), life and practice (V), index and remaining issues (VI).

Each volume contains substantial original essays by many of the world's foremost scholars, essays which not only cover basic information and well-known issues but which also venture into areas as yet untouched by modern scholarship. An essential tool for anyone interested in Buddhism.

An online resource will provide easy access to the encyclopedia's ever-growing corpus of information. All those interested in religions in South Asia, the history of Buddhism, as well as Indologists and historians of religions.

Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism is under the general editorial control of Jonathan Silk (Leiden University, editor-in-chief), Richard Bowring (University of Cambridge) and Vincent Eltschinger (École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris). In addition, each volume has a dedicated board of specialist editors.

There is no Buddhism without Buddhists, without the monks, poets and philosophers who constituted Buddhist communities of every time and place. In the same way, there is no Buddhism without the Buddha and the hosts of figures who populate the Buddhist universe, bodhisattvas, gods, deities and so on. This second volume of Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism, devoted to **Lives**, offers a wide array of entries devoted both to the Buddhist pantheon and to historical Buddhists from throughout Asia in the pre-modern period. Folllowing on the 2015 publication of **Volume I, dedicated primarily to Buddhist literature,** this volume offers in its first section entries on transhistorical and translocal figures, while the second section presents accounts of historical or semi-historical individuals, organized by geographic region, from India through Central, Southeast, and East Asia, in almost 200 substantial separate entries.

CONTENTS

Prelims
- Contributors
- Editors and Editorial Board
- Primary Sources Abbreviations
- Books Series and Journals Abbreviations
- General Abbreviations
- Introduction

Section One:
Sakyamun^: South Asia
Barlaam and Josaphat

Sections Two:
South & Southeast Asia:

Ajatasatru
Aryade^a
Aryasura.
Asañga/Ma^treya(nátha)
^ha^i^eka
Brahmá, Sakra, and Mára
Buddhaghosa
Buddhas of the Past: South Asia
Buddhas of the Past and of the Future: Southeast Asia
Candragomin
Candrakirti
Dáldni
Devadatta
Dharmakirti
Dharmapala
Dharmottara
Dignaga
Early Sar^asti^ada Masters
Gavampati in Southeast Asia
Gopadatta
Gunaprabha
Haribhadra
Haribhatta
Harivarman
Harsa
Hayagriva
Indian Tantric Authors: Overview
Jñanagarbha
Jnanapada
Jnanasrimitra
Kamalasila
Karunamaya
Ksemendra
Kumáralata
Mahadeva
Maitreya
Marici
Matrceta
Nagarjuna
Paccekabuddhas/Pratyekabuddhas in Indic Sources
Phra Malai in Thailand and Southeast Asia
Prajnakaragupta
Ratnakarasanti
Ratnakirti
Saghabhadra
Sañkaranandana

Sañkarasvamin
Santaraksita
Santideva
Sarasvati/Benzaiten
Sariputra
Scholars of Premodern Pali Buddhism
Seers (rsi/isi) and Brahmanas in Southeast Asia
Siddhas
Srilata
Sthiramati
Subhagupta
Tantric Buddhist Deities in Southeast Asia
Thera/Theri in Pali and Southeast Asian Buddhism
Udbhatasiddhasvamin
Upagupta
Vagisvarakirti
Vasubandhu
Vinayaka
Yama and Hell Beings in Indian Buddhism

East Asia:

Akasagarbha in East Asia
Arhats in East Asian Buddhism
Asvaghosa (East Asian Aspects)
Avalokitesvara in East Asia
Dizang/Jizo
Jianzhen (Ganjin)
Mahakala in East Asia
Mahakasyapa in Chan-inspired Traditions
Mañjusri in East Asia
Maudgalyayana (Mulian)
Musang (Wuxiang)
Tejaprabha
Yinyuan Longqi (Ingen)

China:

Amoghavajra
An Shigao
Chengguan
Daoxuan
Falin
Faxian
Fazun
Hanshan Deqing
Hongzhi Zhengjue
Huihong (see Juefan Huihong)
Huineng (see Shenxiu)
Huiyuan (see Lushan Huiyuan)
Jigong
Juefan Huihong
Liang Wudi
Lokaksema
Luo Qing

Lushan Huiyuan
Mazu Daoyi
Mingben (see Zhongfeng Mingben)Nagarjun in China
Nenghai
Ouyang Ji^gwu
Ouyi Zhixu
Paramartha
Qian Qianyi
Qisong
Shenhui (see Shenxiu)
Shenxiu, Huineng, and Shenhui
Subhakaras^mha
Wumen
Wuxiang (see East Asia: Musang)
Wuzhu
Xiao Ziliang
Yinshun
Yixing
Yuan Hongdao
Yuanwu Keqin
Zhanran
Zhi Qian
Zhili
Zhixu (see Ouyang Zhixu)
Zhiyi
Zhongfeng Mingben
Zhuhong

Korea:

Chinul
Hyujong
Ich'adon
Kihwa
Kim Sisup
Kyongho
Kyunyó
Muhak Chach'o
Musang (see East Asia)
Pou
Toson
Uich'on
Uisang
Wonch'uk
Wonhyo
Yi Nunghwa

Japan:

Amaterasu Omikami
Armen
Benzaiten (see South and Southeast Asia: Sarasvati)
Dogen
Dohan
Eisai (see Yosai)

Eison
En no Gyoja
Enchin
Ennin
Ganjin (see East Asia: Jianzhen)
Genshin
Hachiman
Hakuin
Honen
Ikkyu Sojun
Ingen (see East Asia: Yinyuan Longqi)
Ippen Chishin
Jakusho
Jiun Sonja
Jizo (see East Asia: Dizang)
Jojin
Jokei
Kakuban
Keizan Jok^n
Komyo
Kukai
Kiiya
Menzan Zuiho
Monkan
Mugai Nyodai
Mujaku Dochu
Muso Soseki
Myoe
Nichiren
Nonin
Raiyu
Ryogen
Saicho
Saigyo
Shinran
Shot^ku Taishi
Tenjin
Tenkai
Yosai/Eisai
Zad

Tibetan Cultural Sphere
Atisa and the Bka' gdams pa Masters
Ge sar of Gling
Gter ston: Tibetan Buddhist Treasure Revealers
Gtsang smyon Heruka
Lcang skya Rol pa'i Rdo rje
Mi la ras pa
The Mongolian Jebdzundamba Khutugtu Lineage
Padmasambhava in Tibetan Buddhism
The Sa skya School's Five Forefathers
Spirits of the Soil, Land, and Locality in Tibet
Ston pa Gshen rab: The Bon Buddha

Tibet's Crazy Yogins
Tsong kha pa and his Immediate Successors
Worldly Protector Deities in Tibet

Appendix To Volume I:
Buddhist Narrative Literature in Japan
Poetry: Japan
Korean Son Literature

Buddhism, it need hardly be said, does not exist without Buddhists, without sages and teachers, preachers and scholars, poets, kings and philosophers, and many more. Similarly, Buddhist traditions do not exist without their ideal figures, their buddhas and bodhisattvas, gods and spirits, paragons and figures of legend. The present volume, the second in the thematically arranged volumes of the BEB, treats both historical and ahistorical figures of Buddhist traditions, and is roughly arranged according to this division.

This distinction is, of course, both somewhat arbitrary and often problematic. There is an old joke that Shakespeare's plays were not written by Shakespeare but rather by another writer, equally named Shakespeare (with a citation as old as 1860, an extended and amusing discussion is found at https://quote investigator.com /2014/08/19/same-name/). Was Nagarjuna the author of the works attributed to this name? How is he related to the alchemist Nagárjuna? It might be possible, in some cases, to tease apart the historical and the ahistorical, although often it would not. But what is more important is that to introduce such a distinction would—again, more often than not—fly in the face of the tradition's own self-understandings. For if we are interested—as we are—in Buddhism in all of its diversity and variations, we cannot approach Buddhist "Lives" by focusing our attention on some sort of demythologization, by seeking the human Buddha behind the tradition's many Buddhas of story, or for that matter by seeking after only the human Nagarjuna. In almost all cases, the tradition is the story itself, and the temptation of the historian to separate the wheat from the chaff, if this is understood to mean the true from the false, is fraught with difficulty, and leads to an impoverished diminution of the subject. We are, then, in other words, at least as interested here in "legend" as we are in "fact," understanding that the meaningful identity of figures in Buddhist traditions is much more often located in the former than in the latter.

Another way of saying this is to explain that we are at least as interested in "afterlives" as we are in lives—in the creative, usually expansive, retellings of lives after an individual is dead (or has in some other way left this earth). This said, it is equally true that some Asian traditions paid more attention to "history" than did others, and the closer we come to modern times, the more we can know of the "factual" and "historical" In this light, there is on the whole much more "legendary" in the lives of Indian figures than there is, for instance, in the lives of Japanese, and this distinction in our sources is also reflected in the tenor of our entries.

Ideally, the entries presented in this volume, then, represent a picture of both traditional (let us say, for ease, ahistorical) images alongside what can be known of "factual history." This, in any event, is what we aimed for. It may perhaps have been possible to arrange the volume with a first section of figures of overwhelmingly mythical status, and a second section, geographically ordered, presenting more historical figures. In fact the editors considered this, but in the end the abovementioned unity of the two aspects of "Lives" determined that we simply could not reasonably draw such a distinction. We therefore begin, as we must, with Sákyamuni, followed by a sketch of one way in which his life storied entered Western consciousness as a Christian saint, namely in the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat. In the second portion of the volume, which makes up almost all of its bulk, we divide the treatments geographically, and then further arrange the entries simply in alphabetical order of the romanized name of the figure in question.

It is worth emphasizing that some figures whom one might expect to find do not appear here, one example being the buddha (^ahá)Vairocana. The reason for this is that we have decided that while there is much to say about this figure, little to nothing of it has to do with his "life," or anything approaching biography (or perhaps better, hagiography). This figure exists in a more abstract realm, and will receive a full treatment in the forthcoming volume on Doctrines.

This volume, then, has as its aim the presentation of Lives, that is, accounts of persons and personages. Of course, an individual's life cannot be separated from the literary works that person composed, the rituals they advanced, the works of art they patronized or produced, and so on. Therefore, to separate out a "biography" (or, as above, hagiography) is at best unnatural. Yet, the same could be said for virtually any topic taken up in the BEB; mutual embeddings and associations link persons and texts and practices and all the rest. We have had to be selective in choosing our foci, and that selectivity has sometimes the appearance of the arbitrary. Inevitably, therefore, there is something of the arbitrary here too, but it is, we would like to think, an "informed arbitrariness."

In the first place, even aside from decisions such as that concerning Vairocana, we did not aim to be representative. Since 1937, scholars have had access to the superb Dictionary of Pali Proper Names authored by G.P. Malalasekera, the substance of which is available now not only online (http://www.palikanon.com/english/pali_names/aa/ai_ad.htm) but also fully scanned (on https://archive.org/). We saw no point in revisiting individuals from the Pali tradition who are adequately treated in this wonderful resource. Less well known outside of Japan is Akanuma Chizen's 1931 work, Indo Bukkyó koyii meishijiten repr.: Kyoto: Hozokan,1967), likewise a biographical dictionary of Indian Buddhist figures, but unlike Malalasekera's Pali-based work, reliant primarily on Chinese sources. Also unlike Malalasekera, however, Akanuma does not present a narrative, but instead a basic, sparsely annotated listing of sources—the beginning of a life account, rather than the account itself. It is, however, a remarkable and extremely valuable work. Had we been able to find scholars both interested in the figures treated here and able to make use of the vast treasury of the Chinese Buddhist canon, we would have been delighted to have presented more entries similar to those dealing with figures such as Ajatas^tru, Devadatta or Sariputra. But the unfortunate reality is that at present few scholars utilize both Indic and Chinese materials, and the field will have to wait for further sketches of monks, nuns, patriarchs and other figures, particularly those of earlier Indian Buddhism, as found portrayed principally in Chinese sources.

Another choice we made was motivated by the existence of another valuable resource, the website **The Treasury of Lives: A Biographical Encyclopedia of Tibet, InnerAsia, and the Himalaya.** While entries in this resource often do not refer to critical secondary scholarship in a fashion that the BEB would find necessary, the sheer breadth of its coverage discouraged us from attempting to duplicate its presentations. There is, however, as with figures from earlier Indian Buddhism, certainly room in the future for scholarship with goes beyond the already-utilized source materials, or treats them with a more critical and scholarly eye, and we fully expect that as scholarship continues to examine these traditions, new insights will be forthcoming.

So much for intentional gaps, so to speak, or at least gaps that we, the editors, anticipated. Another set of gaps was beyond the control of the editors. Anyone familiar with the breadth of Buddhist traditions cannot help but notice that we do not offer entries on Amitabha, Asoka, Bhaisajyaguru, Buddhapalita ... all the way down to Zaya Pandita, a veritable A to Z. And the simple explanation here is that in most of these cases we simply could not find scholars willing and/or able to write such entries for us. We must also take into account the reality that it is rare to find a single scholar who can control the geographic, cultural and linguistic vastness of some of these subjects. In some cases, we have managed to pool our resources in the form of jointly written entries. We console ourselves with the thought that such an attempt has not been made before, and that even though our coverage

of, for instance, Maitreya is by no means complete, it represents a considerable advance over what has been attempted before. In distressingly many cases, however, we simply could not locate a suitable author at all. We have, for instance, not a single entry in this volume, nor in BEB I, on Vietnam. This is not because Vietnam was not historically Buddhist, nor because we think Vietnamese Buddhists unworthy of inclusion, but because we have not been able, so far, to locate specialists willing to cooperate with us in making the wealth of the Vietnamese Buddhist tradition available. Our treatment of Mongolia is also inadequate; in fact, there is no point in offering here a list of what is "missing," because such a list would be depressingly long. Perhaps it will suffice to say that the editors are well aware of many of the gaps in our coverage, just as we expect that we remain unaware of absences some readers will discern, based on their own particular areas of expertise. And we can say little more than that we aspire to do better, something that we will only be able to accomplish with your help.

We appeal, in this regard, to a remark with which Prof. Daniel Boucher closed his review of BEB I (BSOAS 80/3 [2017], 639-642). Boucher wrote that "scholars can only have reference works as good as the ones they are willing to contribute to. The BEB will succeed only to the degree that scholars heed this call." We could not agree more, and we appeal, therefore, to our colleagues, and to all those who toil to research the Classical Buddhist traditions of Asia, to help us make the ^^^ the kind of resource we would all like to have. <>

Early Buddhist Oral Tradition: Textual Formation and Transmission by Bhikkhu Analayo [Wisdom Publications, 9781614298274]

A fascinating investigation into the formation and transmission of the early Buddhist oral tradition.

For hundreds of years after his death, the Buddha's teachings were transmitted orally, from person to person. In this volume, acclaimed scholar-monk Bhikkhu Analayo examines the impact of such oral transmission on early Buddhist texts, be these monastic rules, verses, or prose portions of the early discourses. He scrutinizes various oral aspects of these texts, surveying evidence for memory errors, the impact of attempts at systematization, and instances of additions and innovations. Finally, he explores the implications of the nature of these texts as the final product of centuries of oral transmission and evaluates the type of conclusions that can—and cannot—be drawn based on them.

In-depth but still accessible, **Early Buddhist Oral Tradition** is an engrossing and enlightening inquiry into the early Buddhist oral tradition.

CONTENTS

Introduction.
I. The Recital of the Monastic Rules
1. After the Buddha's Demise
2. The Growth and Recitation of the Code of Rules
3. Concatenation and Waxing Syllables
4. Different Monastic Lineages
5. Communal Recitation
6. The Group of Six
7. The Ruling on a Breach of Celibacy
8. The Ruling Against Killing a Human Being
9. Vinaya and Discourse Literature

10. Memorization and Improvisation
11. Summary
II. Discourse and Verse Collections
1. The Four Discourse Collections (Agama)
2. The Long Discourse Collections
3. The Collections of Discourses of Medium Length
4. Topic-wise Collections
5. Numerical Discourse Collections
6. Discourses Without Parallels
7. The Textual "Limbs"
8. Verse Collections
9. Two Early Verse Collections
10. The Chapter on Eight
11. Inspired Utterances
12. Textual Memory
13. Summary
III. Memory Errors
1. The Explanatory Model of Intentionality
2. Innocent Variations
3. Sequence Errors
4. Meaningless Additions
5. Conflations
6. Loss of Text
7. Lack of Homogenization
8. Oral Recitation and Memory
9. The Limitations of Memory
10. Summary
IV. Systematization
1. Repetition
2. Abbreviation
3. Concatenation
4. The Structure of the ^ali Medium-Length Collection 5 The Sequence of Long Discourses
6. Structural Aspects of the Collections of Short Discourses
7. Delimiting the Four Discourse Collections
8. Variations of Formulas
9. Summary and Exposition
10. Repetition Series
11. Systematization and Orality
12. Summary
V. Additions and Innovations
1. Creative Dimensions of Abbreviation
2. Remembering Lists
3. Substantial Additions
4. The Providing of a Commentary
5. Evidence for the Incorporation of a Commentary
6. The Implications of Parallelism
7. A Key Element for the Bodhisattva Path
8. An Abhidharma Treatment
9. The Problem of Accurate Source Monitoring 10. Summary
VI. Implications of Orality
1 In Quest of the Original
2. Pre-canonical Buddhism
3. The "Word of the Buddha"

4. Comprehensive Coverage
5. Intentional Change
6. A Shift of Perspective
7. Dynamics of Orality
8. Summary
Conclusion
Abbreviations
Notes
References
Index
About the Author

In the following pages I examine the early Buddhist oral tradition from the viewpoint of its formation and transmission. The central question I intend to explore is how best to understand its dynamics: What is the most appropriate model for interpreting the existence of numerous variations between versions of a discourse preserved by different reciter lineages, given that these same parallels also show a remarkable degree of similarity and correspondence (together with exhibiting features of memorization that point to a concern with accurate transmission)? The present book is meant to express my current understanding of this topic in a way accessible to the general reader.

The presentation in what follows is the outcome of some twenty years of studying the relevant textual records, leading to about four hundred publications mainly based on comparative studies of parallel versions of these texts as transmitted by different oral recitation lineages. Central among these publications is my habilitation research, a comparative study of some one hundred fifty ^ali discourses of medium length in the light of a broad range of parallels extant in Chinese, Gandhari, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and at times even other languages.' Taking up such a range of texts in a single study had the obvious disadvantage that the sheer amount of material prevents the precision regarding details that is possible when doing a comparative study of a single text, ideally based on translating the different parallels. In this respect, my habilitation research can only offer a humble starting point for those wishing to do a closer study of a single discourse.

The advantage, however, is that surveying a broad range of parallels evidences general patterns of orality. This does not happen in a comparable way when doing only a few selected and more detailed comparative studies, where quite naturally the at times erratic nature of variations between parallels can leave a puzzling impression. It is only through an examination of many such cases that patterns behind the apparent muddle become clearer.

My exploration in the following pages begins with the key text recited regularly at fortnightly monastic observances, the code of rules (Pali patimokkha, Sanskrit pratimoksa), and its relation to the narratives purporting to record the circumstances under which a particular rule was promulgated.

Patterns that emerge when studying the code of rules and the respective narratives recur in relation to verses embedded in prose narrations that similarly relate the circumstances believed to have led to the proclamation of the verse(s) in question. I explore these in the second chapter, after providing a brief overview over the different discourse collections. The third to fifth chapters are dedicated to various oral aspects of the early discourses, surveying evidence for memory errors, the impact of attempts at systematization, and instances of additions and innovations. Based on the material examined in this way, in the sixth chapter I explore the implications of the nature of these texts as the final product of centuries of oral transmission and evaluate the type of conclusions that can (and cannot) be drawn based on them, followed by presenting a sketch of the dynamics of early Buddhist orality.

^ chief problem in studying the evidence provided by the early texts is the almost inevitable tendency to think in terms of modern modes of producing written texts. Yet, textual production in an oral setting differs substantially and needs to be considered on its own terms. My attempts to do justice to this requirement have benefitted from my experience of living many years in Sri Lanka, where the oral dimension of communication is still considerably more important than in the West, as well as from staying for some time on another occasion with tribal people living in the traditional way of hunting and gathering, a way of life in which communications were still entirely oral. Such personal experiences have helped me in my struggle to step out of the framework of thinking exclusively in terms of the written medium.

My presentation here is meant to provide an introduction to the relevant themes rather than an exhaustive survey, which within the limitations of a single monograph is not possible. Based on excerpts from my own more detailed studies of the respective points, I present a few selected examples to illustrate patterns of more general relevance. My aim throughout is to render academic research by myself and others more widely accessible, for which reason I try my best to explain ideas and concepts that are not necessarily familiar to the general reader. I have also endeavored to keep the main text as accessible as possible by relegating the more academic type of information to annotation. In addition, each chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main points of my discussion. In this way I trust it will be possible for the general reader to ignore the annotation and just read the main text, whereas my academic colleagues will hopefully still find in the annotations the information required to substantiate my presentation.

Whatever worth there may be in the following pages, none of it would have come into existence without the help of innumerable friends and colleagues over the past twenty years. Adequately naming each is no longer possible, hence I here express my deep gratitude in general to all and everyone who has, directly or indirectly, contributed to the growth of my understanding and the continuity of my research leading up to the present publication.

***

The present study will hopefully have brought home the remarkable complexity of the early Buddhist oral tradition. At the same time, however, what at first sight may appear just erratic, on closer study and through familiarity with the working mechanisms of orality can be seen to follow its own rules and patterns. Recognizing these substantially enhances our ability to understand this type of material and to interpret as well as contextualize variations between parallel versions of a particular text.

The fortnightly recitation of the monastic code of rules requires a fixed text to be memorized, whose oral performance could hardly have been a matter of improvisation. Nor does its function throughout Buddhist monastic history make it reasonable to assume that the contents of the rules were open to intentional change. Nevertheless, the extant versions of the code of rules show variations, in line with the natural fluctuations to be expected of orally transmitted material. Given the absence of written records to determine the "correct" reading, if the leader of the ceremonial performance of the code of rules is a highly respected senior, chances are that a slip of memory will not be corrected by others, which in turn can result in a change of the code of rules committed to memory by the students of this teacher and thereby impacting the next generation of reciters. From this perspective, the fortnightly recitation of the monastic code of rules as a model for the functioning of early Buddhist oral transmission can be seen to exemplify at the same time patterns ensuring accurate recall as well as the potential for variations to occur.

The need to inculcate proper monastic behavior can rely on narratives purporting to record the circumstances under which a rule was promulgated. These narratives were evidently not considered fixed in a manner comparable to the rules, leaving room for improvements of a particular tale to

enhance its function in a teaching context. Variations between such narratives in different transmission lineages can serve as indicators for the teaching concerns of the reciters.

The above points to two complementary modalities of oral transmission, where a core text of a more fixed type is embedded in a more fluid narrative purporting to record the circumstances under which the core text in question was spoken. Similar patterns can be discerned in textual collections of verses and the respective prose narrations as well as in relation to the discourses.

The evidence presented in the preceding pages counters the assumption that variations between parallel versions of a text must invariably reflect some form of intentional intervention. Mistakes in sequence and meaningless additions, together with substantial textual loss, point much rather to the limitations of textual memory as crucial for understanding the nature of early Buddhist orality. The indications given in various discourses regarding a concern for accuracy among those responsible for the early Buddhist oral transmission need to be appreciated in light of the following two influences: the lack of systematic training of the Buddhist reciters in a way comparable to their Vedic predecessors and an emphasis on understanding the meaning of the transmitted texts as opposed to rote memorization of the material without contextual understanding. Both of these aspects tend to interfere with precise memorization.

In an apparent attempt to deal with the resulting difficulties, the Buddhist reciters relied on various modes of systematization, such as textual repetition, listings of synonyms for a particular term, the employment of formulaic descriptions, stereotyped lists, and abbreviations. Such systematization appears to have been an ongoing process, with some elements quite probably being used from the outset. The textual evidence shows how several of these elements, although originally quite probably intended to provide an element of stability for the purpose of memorization, in the course of time became more creative and thereby productive of change and new developments.

Another important contribution to textual expansion and change appears to have its origin in the providing of a commentary alongside the source text in a teaching situation. The lack of a clear dividing line between these two types of text, memorized by successive generations of reciters, combined with the problem of accurate source monitoring as a potential failure of human memory, appear to have resulted in the gradual integration of new ideas and perspectives into the source text. Comparative study of the early discourses enables discerning instances of the integration of such commentarial explanations. Due to a tendency to reflect later thought, such instances are of particular interest, as they enable reconstructing in more detail historical developments during an early period in the development of Buddhist thought and practice.

Although comparative study of parallel texts from different reciter lineages has a remarkable potential to shed light on the evolution of early Buddhism, it is impossible for it to yield access to the original or Ur-text. The nature of oral transmission is such that, even though the parallel versions now extant must have had a common starting point in the past, this initial oral expression is forever beyond reach. The actual words spoken by the Buddha can no longer be determined with certainty. What can definitely be determined are later developments, whose identification requires a comprehensive coverage of all relevant sources.

By way of concluding on a more personal note: An attempt to carry out such comparative study, within the limits of my abilities, stands in the background of many of my other publications, including an examination of a feature shared by different Buddhist traditions, comprising the Theravada, Mahayana, and secular Buddhist traditions. This is the polemic move of pretending to be the sole authentic representative of the Buddha's words. For exposing the lack of a sound foundation for such claims, I relied precisely on comparative study of the early discourses. Such comparative study can help to dismantle the claims made on behalf of this type of Buddhist textual fundamentalism,

showing what kind of teachings can definitely not be attributed to the Buddha. At the same time, comparative study also undermines the alternative of propounding an early Buddhist fundamentalism, due to the inability to reconstruct the precise and authentic original of the Buddha's words. All such claims collapse in the face of the very means that have preserved the teachings at all: centuries of oral transmission. <>

ROAMING FREE LIKE A DEER: BUDDHISM AND THE NATURAL WORLD by Daniel Capper [Cornell University Press, 9781501759574]

By exploring lived ecological experiences across seven Buddhist worlds from ancient India to the contemporary West, Roaming Free Like a Deer provides a comprehensive, critical, and innovative examination of the theories, practices, and real-world results of Buddhist environmental ethics. Daniel Capper clarifies crucial contours of Buddhist vegetarianism or meat eating, nature mysticism, and cultural speculations about spirituality in nonhuman animals.

Buddhist environmental ethics often are touted as useful weapons in the fight against climate change. However, two formidable but often overlooked problems with this perspective exist. First, much of the literature on Buddhist environmental ethics uncritically embraces Buddhist ideals without examining the real-world impacts of those ideals, thereby sometimes ignoring difficulties in terms of practical applications. Moreover, for some understandable but still troublesome reasons, Buddhists from different schools follow their own environmental ideals without conversing with other Buddhists, thereby minimizing the abilities of Buddhists to act in concert on issues such as climate change that demand coordinated large-scale human responses.

With its accessible style and personhood ethics orientation, **ROAMING FREE LIKE A DEER** should appeal to anyone who is concerned with how human beings interact with the nonhuman environment.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Note on Transliteration
Introduction
1. Some Methods in Buddhist Environmental Ethics
2. The Buddha's Nature
3. The Clever Bee of Sri Lanka
4. Beautiful Thai Buffaloes
5. Eating the Enlightened Plants of China
6. Japanese Water Buddhas
7. Releasing Animals in Tibet
8. Natural Persons in the West
Conclusion
Glossary of Terms and Concepts
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Because of his compassion for nonhuman creatures, the Chinese Buddhist master Zhuhong (1535-1615 CE) regularly practiced and strongly encouraged others to practice the Buddhist ritual of fangsheng, or animal release. In this custom, animals otherwise destined for harm lovingly receive liberation into what are thought to be more beneficial conditions. Zhuhong and his followers, for

instance, purchased live fish from human food markets and then, while chanting Buddhist scriptures, released them unharmed into rivers rather than eating them. In freeing animals like this, Zhuhong followed a couple of strategies. First, at the market Zhuhong would buy as many captive animals as he could afford. In addition, according to Zhuhong the deed of releasing is more fundamental than the size or number of animals released, preventing attachment to counting the animals freed.' Based on these policies, the Buddhist teacher Zhuhong enthusiastically insisted on performing such animal releases because, in his words, Ás a human values her or his life, so do animals love theirs."'

Zhuhong obviously intended his animal release practices to benefit the animals themselves, thus bringing a greater sense of sustainability to his environment. In today's world such an intention may be most welcome, given the ecological troubles that beset us so vividly that they almost require no recounting. Temperatures across our globe are currently rising problematically, and, as a result, so are water levels from lost glaciers. The air is so polluted in many cities that citizens wear masks over their mouths for this reason alone. Giant patches of nonbiodegradable plastic clog our world's oceans. Along with ills like these, we are losing animal and plant species at alarming rates.

Ecologically concerned as he was, perhaps if the Buddhist master Zhuhong were with us at present he could help us with some of our environmental travails. Certainly he would seem to fit in well with many contemporary animal rights or environmentalist organizations. Sadly, though, problems lurked even in his own ecological world. For instance, a couple of his followers liberated ten thousand eels from harm but did so believing that the accrued virtue helped them pass their civil service exams early. This created suspicion (which can never be proven) that these followers were motivated more by their own economic benefit than they were for the welfare of eels. Also, as I examine more fully in chapter 7 of this book, animal liberation practices like Zhuhong's at times have resulted in struggles with invasive species, such as native turtles in Guangzhou, China, that have nearly gone extinct as an effect of many released Brazil turtles. There also have been mismatches between comfortable habitats and actual release sites, such as with the birds of prey that have strategically waited downstream in order to devour fish that have just been released in a bunch.' Further, counterproductive market arrangements have emerged at times, such as hunters who capture wild animals precisely so that they can be sold to animal releasers. Zhuhong's Buddhist example therefore instructs us that even such an apparently innocuous activity as freeing animals from human dinner bowls can produce ecologically troublesome results.

This book is about environmental tensions like the problems that can arise while freeing fish, even if one is compassionately motivated. Today more than ever, we need a robust set of environmental ethics that can steer us in positive directions, and Buddhism, with its practices like Zhuhong's animal release rituals, can provide us with at least some of the moral ecological guidance that we require. Yet, like with all systems of ethics, Buddhist environmental practices like Zhuhong's sometimes do not lead to the most satisfying results. Hence, a synthetic analysis of how Buddhism may help us move forward appropriately in the climate change age as well as a clear-sighted understanding of the limits of Buddhist environmental ethics may provide great ecological value. Over the rest of this book, I pursue precisely such value while I explore a comprehensive, critical, and analytical investigation of the theory, practice, and real-world ecological performance of Buddhist environmental ethics. I begin this examination by turning to some Buddhist environmental ethical voices in order to gain a greater context.

A Critical Examination of Buddhist Environmentalism

Many environmentalists like the motivational factor that religiosity can provide, and therefore there exists plenty of discussion of Buddhism as a religion that supports twenty-first-century ecological initiatives. In fact, because Buddhism describes the universe as dependent arising (in the scriptural language of Pali: paticca-samuppáda), or cosmically interconnected across time and space, and

emphasizes the importance of compassion for nonhumans in ways unlike some other religions, Buddhism makes a popular choice for religion-based environmentalist discussions.

But, to date, there remain some significant shortcomings within this fertile field of inquiry. First, a great number of environmentalist writings investigate Buddhist approaches to nonhuman nature primarily in terms of the ideals of the tradition, thereby overlooking some rather serious real-world limitations. In addition, many environmentalist works are not set in fruitful critical dialogue nor are they subjected to synthetic analysis, leading to confusion and perhaps limiting beneficial actions. Let me further explore these two shortcomings so that my reader can more clearly see the place of this book.

As for existing environmental literature regarding Buddhist values, it is in no way difficult to find paeans to Buddhist nature-friendliness. A common argument of this literature holds that extending compassion through an interconnected universe, as Buddhism asks one to do, makes Buddhism an intrinsically environmentalist religion, with the occasional rejoinder that simply following the Buddhist path automatically makes one more ecofriendly. Because of this perceived environmentalist potency, Buddhism quite often is acclaimed as the form of religion most likely to aid the pursuit of a more sustainable human future. The scholar of Buddhism Grace G. Burford, for instance, states that the Buddhist precept against intoxicants, when applied metaphorically to intoxicating consumerism, could diminish resource needs in a sustainable way. The ethicists David E. Cooper and Simon P. James argue that Buddhism is an environmentally friendly religion because of the virtues of humility, self-mastery, equanimity, solicitude, nonviolence, and sense of responsibility that Buddhism engenders. Peter Harvey characterizes Buddhism's ideals of relationship with the natural world as embodying "harmonious cooperation," a view echoed by Francis H. Cook with his claim that Buddhism possesses a "cosmic ecology." The founder of the Deep Ecology movement, the ecophilosopher Arne Naess, lauds Buddhism for its denial of the idea that entities possess abiding and independent essences as well as for its emphasis on the importance of self-realizati^n. Finally, Leslie E. Sponsel and Poranee Natadecha-Sponsel assert that "some of the basic principles of Buddhism parallel those of ecology."

Unfortunately, despite many praises of Buddhist ecofriendliness, Buddhism sometimes fails to deliver in terms of practical realities rather than philosophical ones. When one steps back from Buddhist ideals and examines the material lives of Buddhists, one sometimes fmds severe problems in realizing Buddhism's many supportive ecofriendly endorsements. As the scholar of Buddhism Duncan Ryúken Williams states, "When one reviews the history of the interface of Buddhism and environmentalism, the overwhelming tendency has been to define the Buddhist contribution to environmentalism in terms of the most idealized notion of what Buddhism is," while ignoring real-world difficulties. For Buddhists, therefore, "the belief in harmony with nature at the philosophical level is no blueprint for creating and maintaining such harmony on a day-to-day level," as Williams claims.

In the same vein as Williams but with alternative concepts, the environmental ethicist William Edelglass expresses a similar insight in saying, "When environmental philosophy takes place primarily at the level of metaphysics and abdicates the realm of policy to the social and natural sciences, it abandons much of its capacity to contribute to a more sustainable future." 15 Phrasing this outlook in terms of Zhuhong's animal-loving fish releases, attending only to the commendable values of compassion and lovingkindness that drive such releases obscures unintentional negative real-world impacts like introducing invasive species.

***

Vegetarianism, Religious Practice, and Nature Mysticism

Along with exploring some of Buddhism's sustainability credentials, throughout this book I have probed three touchpoints for comparison: Buddhist vegetarianism, the practice of religion by animals and other natural beings, and nature mysticism. As for the vegetarian comparative touchpoint, the Buddhist personhood approaches that aid the creation of some sustainable practices, especially toward animals, also help determine vegetarianism, or a lack of it, in the Buddhist world. In the Theraváda Buddhist universe, for example, it is easy to argue on the basis of personhood that one should not eat animals since they were our kin in previous lives, and some Theraváda Buddhists make this argument. However, Theravada scriptures do not deliver this plea as substantially as some Maháyána texts do. Instead, the Páli scriptural Buddha and his disciples took meat eating for granted, leaving meat a standard ingredient in many Theraváda Buddhist diets. Due to historical changes in Indian culture, however, some authoritative Maháyána sources that appeared later than the Theravada texts, such as the Nirvana, Súrañgama, and Sislkásamuccaya Sutras, do make strong pleas for Buddhist vegetarianism based on a variety of factors, especially including personhood arguments. Perhaps the most influential among these is the Lañkávatára Siltra, which, in personhood fashion, implores Buddhists to avoid eating animals in part because they embody our parents from previous lives.

Indian Maháyána scriptural personhood arguments such as those of the Lañkávat&a Siltra seem to have proven themselves insufficient in establishing much vegetarianism. For instance, they exist in Tibetan literature, yet to date they have affected only a minority of Tibetan vegetarians. Instead, in creating the greater vegetarian atmosphere that marks the world of Chinese Maháyána Buddhism and its offshoots, the role of the Chinese text Fanwangjing, with its own kin personhood arguments for vegetarianism, is crucial. Armed with this document, the sixth-century Chinese king Wu of Liang mandated vegetarianism among Buddhist monastics by government decree rather than decision by the religious community, and this ethic continues to reverberate throughout the East Asian Buddhism that stems from China. Wu of Liang's vegetarian mandate therefore makes Wu one of the more influential Buddhists in history, even if his decree did not necessarily affect nonmonastics and perhaps has become a bit forgotten in China influenced Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.

The personhood of natural entities that fuels some vegetarian pleas also leads in a different direction in which animals or other natural beings, in their own species-specific ways, are said to practice Buddhism. Of course, the mainstream of the tradition denies the ability of any being other than a human to practice Buddhism, as we saw clearly in Tibet's Mani Kabum. However, numerous stories from across the Buddhist world including Tibet nonetheless indicate the spurious practice of religion by a broad array of natural entities. Animals frequently practice religion in ^taka tales and even winds, the moon, trees, and the earth expressed devotional grief at the Buddha's passing. Buddhism was not established in Sri Lanka without the help of a sambar deer, a couple of holy elephants, and some rather remarkable pious trees. A variety of nonhuman spirits are Buddhist practitioners themselves in Thailand, where insightful elephants may found monasteries and personally serve Buddhist monastics. Even plants practice religion, according to the Chinese masters Jizang and Zhanran, as they do for the Japanese masters who think that all of nature constantly preaches like a monastic. Tibetan natural entities share souls with enlightened beings, and liberated animals receive teachings for the sake of their future lives. Moreover, to ecocentric Western Buddhists like Kaza and Snyder, all beings in nature, even fictional natural beings like Smokey the Bear, practice religion like a Buddha. These instances in themselves, of course, do not rigorously establish that nonhuman beings practice Buddhism, coming as they do from folk stories, scriptural proclamations, and philosophic speculations that sometimes complicate things by including anthropomorphic impulses, Nonetheless, with interest in the possible practice of religion by animals growing within the academic community, these examples could provoke a practice to generate fearlessness. The monk asked if Shalipa feared

the sorrows of samsara, and Shalipa replied that everyone fears samsara, but his own personal problem concerned his terror of howling wolves. The monk then urged Shalipa to move to the center of the cemetery and to "meditate unceasingly on the fact that all the various sounds of the world are identical to the howl of a wolf." Shalipa followed the monk's advice and practiced for some time. Eventually, he became free of his fear of wolf howls when "he realized that all sounds were inseparable from emptiness," thereby producing "an unbroken state of great joy." Continuing to meditate until he realized full enlightenment, the eccentric Buddhist thereafter carried a wolf on his shoulders, earning him the name Shalipa, or Wolfman.

Luckily, the Buddha did not prescribe the wearing of wolves like Shalipa donned, so that Buddhists can overlook that part of Shalipa's example in favor of his greater lesson. Shalipa, deeply mired in what Buddhism considers to be false views regarding the natural world, at first embodies a profoundly negative attitude toward wolves. Then, with the help of Buddhist practices, he enriches his consciousness regarding the character of the universe and especially of wolves. In this way, his negative attitude toward natural beings disappears, thus dramatically shifting the consciousness that he inhabits and sponsoring for him a sense of intimacy with wolves. Although Abhayadatta's version of the story does not give the reason why Shalipa wore a wolf, one may imagine that he did so to cement his newfound sense of spiritual identity with wolves, not unlike some Native American usages of spirit animal talismans. But whether this last speculation is true or not, Shalipa shows Buddhists that even quite strong-rooted and problematic approaches to nonhuman nature can be overcome, perhaps inspiring Buddhists to look both within and outside of themselves in order to help create worlds that are more sustainable and friendly toward humans and nonhumans alike. <>

Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration

by Jay L. Garfield [Buddhist Philosophy for Philosophers, Oxford University Press, 9780190907631]

Buddhist Ethics presents an outline of Buddhist ethical thought. It is not a defense of Buddhist approaches to ethics as opposed to any other, nor is it a critique of the Western tradition. Garfield presents a broad overview of a range of Buddhist approaches to the question of moral philosophy. He draws on a variety of thinkers, reflecting the great diversity of this 2500-year-old tradition in philosophy but also the principles that tie them together. In particular, he engages with the literature that argues that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a species of virtue ethics, and with those who argue that it is best understood as consequentialist. Garfield argues that while there are important points of contact with these Western frameworks, Buddhist ethics is distinctive, and is a kind of moral phenomenology that is concerned with the ways in which we experience ourselves as agents and others as moral fellows. With this framework, Garfield explores the connections between Buddhist ethics and recent work in moral particularism, such as that of Jonathan Dancy, as well as the British and Scottish sentimentalist tradition represented by Hume and Smith.

Review

"As a teacher and student of Buddhist thought, I am tremendously grateful for this vivid introduction to the full edifice of Buddhist ethics. Garfield sets upright and tightens the bolts on the structure of Buddhist ethics, adds dimension with rich readings of Buddhist narrative and path literature, paints upon it a fascinating, pioneering interpretation of Buddhist vows, and opens the door for contemporary applications." —JONATHAN GOLD, Princeton University

"In this accessible, clear, and constructive engagement with Buddhist moral phenomenology, Jay Garfield continues his program to render contemporary philosophy's neglect of Asian thought rationally indefensible. Students and scholars alike will learn much from this book." —MARIA HEIM, Amherst College

"Garfield's book offers a bold statement of Buddhist ethics that eschews attempts to assimilate it to familiar Western ethical approaches like consequentialism and deontology. Instead, Garfield argues that Buddhism promotes a very different model of ethics focused on cultivating how we experience ourselves rather than on what outcomes we seek in the world. Garfield builds a clear and engaging case for this interpretation of Buddhist ethics as a kind of moral phenomenology. Buddhist Ethics demands that we rethink not just Buddhist philosophy, but the familiar assumptions about the very form moral philosophy might take." —SHAUN NICHOLS, Cornell University

"Garfield's comprehensive presentation of Buddhist ethical thought is an invaluable contribution not only to philosophy, ethical theory, and theology but also a fascinating read for anyone wondering how to relate Buddhism to Western philosophy. Showing how Buddhist ethics aims for 'the trans-formation of our moral perception,' Garfield presents a compelling reading of Buddhism as a call for greater interconnectedness and universal moral responsibility." —DR. PHIL. CAROLA ROLOFF, Academy of World Religions, University of Hamburg

CONTENTS

Preface
PART I: STRUCTURE
1. Methodological Introduction
2. The Broad Structure of Buddhist Ethics
3. Buddhist Ethics as Moral Phenomenology
4. Agency and Moral Psychology
5. Narrative in Buddhist Ethics
PART II: DOCTRINE
6. The Four Noble Truths
7. Path as a Structure for Buddhist Ethics
8. The Six Perfections in the Maháyána
9. The Brahmaviharas and the Achievement of Nonegocentricity
10. The Importance of Vow
PART III: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
11. Naturalism
12. Engaged Buddhism
13. Coda: What Buddhist Ethics Brings to the Table
References
Index

This volume is one of a series of monographs on Buddhist philosophy for philosophers. In Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy (OUP 2015), I argued that Buddhist philosophy can enrich contemporary Philosophical discourse. The volumes in this series are attempts to introduce Western philosophers to Buddhist thought in specific philosophical domains, such as metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, etc., in order that they might be better equipped to address Buddhist literature and to consider Buddhist perspectives in their own philosophical reflection. This volume presents an outline of Buddhist ethical thought. It is not a defense of Buddhist approaches to ethics as opposed to any other; nor is it a critique of the Western tradition. Moreover, it cannot pretend to completeness or to depth: Buddhist philosophers have been thinking about ethics for 2,500 years, have developed diverse ways to address ethics, and often disagree among themselves, just as Western ethicists do. This volume can only provide the broad outlines of that project.

My aim is to provide these outlines, and to present Buddhist ethical reflection as a distinct approach—or rather set of approaches—to moral philosophy; while ^ do not pretend to completeness, ^ deliberately draw on a range of Buddhist philosophers to exhibit the internal diversity of the tradition as well as the lineaments that demonstrate its overarching integrity. The integrity and diversity are each important. The Buddhist intellectual world, like the Western intellectual world, is heterogeneous, and it is important not to generalize too hastily. Nonetheless, there are overarching ideas and approaches to moral reflection that give Buddhist ethics a broad unity as well, and I aim to articulate that unity despite the diversity in detail. Where intramural philosophical differences are important, I will note them; but many of the ideas I am articulating are either common to many or most Buddhist traditions, or are at least suggested, and constitute a reasonable rational reconstruction of a broadly Buddhist approach to ethics.

^ emphasize that this is an exercise in rational reconstruction. It has to be. Neither Indian Buddhist philosophy as a whole nor Buddhist philosophy, per se, distinguishes ethics as it is understood in the West as an independent domain of study, and Buddhist literature that addresses ethics does not do so in a metaethical voice. The metaethical commitments that lie behind ethical thought in Buddhist literature must therefore be reconstructed and tested against textual material. Many of the formulations I offer will not correspond exactly to how things are put in any single Buddhist text, although they will be grounded in readings of a variety of texts. My goal is thus to provide a more systematic presentation of Buddhist ethical thought than is provided in the Buddhist canon, At times I will be reconstructing the implicit theoretical perspective of a single philosopher, text, or school; at others, I will be presenting views I take to be implicit in the tradition as a whole.

My approach is to remain faithful to the ideas articulated in the texts I address, but to be philosophical, not historical or anthropological. So, the fact that some of what I say might be rejected by some canonical Buddhist philosophers, some Buddhist practitioners, or some scholars of Buddhist studies does not necessarily count against the broad picture I am painting. Just as we would not write a treatise in Western ethical thought by observing the behavior or intuitive ethical commitments of a sample of European and American people, but rather would consult the texts on ethics written by philosophers, I will not be surveying the practices and beliefs of a range of those who identify themselves religiously as Buddhists; instead, I will be addressing the texts written by or taken as reflective touchstones by important Buddhist philosophers.

I reject the strict dichotomy that some draw between "classical" and "modernist" readings of Buddhism, a dichotomy that often leads to valorizing

the ancient as canonical and disparaging contemporary Buddhist theory as merely Buddhist modernism. I take Buddhism to constitute a living tradition,

and while I will spend most of my time with very old texts, I will address the

work of recent and contemporary Buddhist philosophers as well. I take 21st-century Buddhist thought to be no less a part of the Buddhist tradition than

1st-century Buddhist thought, and I hope to represent not only the diversity

but also the progressivity of the tradition. So, once again, the fact that a recent interpretation or idea goes beyond—or even conflicts with—classical

formulations does not, in my view, constitute a reason to ignore or to reject it.

This presentation is not comparative. That is, I do not systematically identify Buddhist ideas with Western ideas; nor do I systematically contrast them. I think that the comparative approach to philosophy is passe, and that

it tends to distract us from the task of engaging with another tradition on its own terms. I therefore simply present Buddhist ethics to the reader as

I understand it, adopting a voice meant to articulate the tradition, or at least certain parts of that tradition relevant to the perspective that Buddhism gives us on ethics. My approach is grounded in readings of texts that I take to be central to that tradition, in the hope that by doing so I can introduce a distinctive voice to contemporary ethical thought.

Nor is my survey of the tradition complete. That would be impossible, given its vastness. For one thing, as this is a philosophical investigation, I have confined myself to written textual resources, eschewing both oral tradition (except to the degree that I am a grateful recipient of some of that oral tradition, which therefore informs my reading) and anthropological evidence. My aim, once again, is to provide an account of Buddhist ethics as it is explicitly represented in texts Buddhists take to be more or less canonical, and not to describe how actual Buddhists act or think about their own moral lives. This is reasonable: when discussing Western ethical theory, we do the same thing. I have tried to draw on a wide variety of Buddhist voices, principally from India and from Tibet.

I have given less attention to classical texts from East Asia or from Southeast Asia than to those from India and Tibet, simply because there is in those literatures less explicitly ethical reflection than we find in Indian and Tibetan literature, and what there is tends to follow Indian sources, not adding a great deal to what we find in the Indian and Tibetan literature. Given the fundamental role that Indian texts play in these traditions, and the fact that the literature in East Asia that does address ethical issues is largely devoted to glossing terminology, I do not think that this is a serious lacuna in my presentation, but it is a lacuna that must be acknowledged. There is more attention to East Asian and Southeast Asian contributions in the chapter on Engaged Buddhism, a movement in which scholars and activists from these regions have been central.

The fundamental idea that guides all Buddhist philosophy is prattyasamutmada, or dependent origination, the idea that every event or existent depends upon countless causes and conditions. As we will see in this book, that idea has not only metaphysical but moral implications. One of those is that reflection on the links of dependence that govern one's own life generate gratitude. My own study of Buddhist philosophy—and of Buddhist ethics in particular—we owe an enormous amount to a number of teachers and colleagues.

***

Methodological Introduction

The Foundations of Buddhist Ethics

Buddhist ethics, as we will see in far more detail in subsequent chapters, constitutes a moral phenomenology grounded in core Buddhist doctrines concerning the nature of our life in the world and the existential problem the world poses for us.1 The most fundamental of these doctrines is pratityasamut^ada, or dependent origination: the thesis that every phenomenon is dependent for its existence or occurrence on countless other phenomena in a vast web of interdependence. That web is multidimensional, comprising different kinds of causal relations as well as relations of mereological dependency, and dependency on human conventions and conceptual imputation.

Moral reflection must take all of these dimensions of dependence into account. The complexity of interdependence is one of the principal reasons for the untidiness of Buddhist moral discourse. As

we will see in what follows, to focus merely on motivation, or on character, or on the action itself, or on its consequences for others, would be to ignore much that is important. We will also see, however, that the principal unifying strands in Buddhist moral philosophy—a focus on moral perception and experience as well as an emphasis on a path to moral cultivation and the transformation of character—arise from reflection on interdependence.

The doctrine of dependent origination is closely associated with a second core doctrine: anátman, or no-self the idea that neither persons nor anything else have a core self or identity that makes us what, and who, we are; that we are nothing but an open set of causally linked psychophysical processes with a merely conventional identity. The boundary between self and others is regarded as conventional and as inadequate to underwrite a special role of self-interest in prudential reasoning. While recognizing the importance of this distinction in our ordinary ethical thought and our need to recognize it in practical reasoning, many Buddhist ethical theorists argue that we assign too much importance to this boundary.

Personal identity itself is, on a Buddhist view, a conventional matter. The relations between distinct stages of these continua are merely relations of causality and resemblance, not identity. The only actual identity we have is one that is imputed to us by ourselves and by others—a narrative, or conventional, identity. This identity, as we will see, is ethically significant, but it is constructed, not discovered. This is one of the reasons that, as we will see in Chapter 5, so much of Buddhist ethics is encoded in stories. The widespread use of narrative in Buddhist ethical literature also reflects the sense that moral reflection is part of the way that we make sense of ourselves and others, as characters in a jointly authored narrative.

Moreover, causal chains are porous. Our personal stages are not only caused by, and do not only cause, other states regarded conventionally as internal to our continua; we are also, and must be, causally open to the world, including those with whom we associate, through links of perception, action, cooperation, group membership, and so forth. But inasmuch as these are the very relations that constitute our conventional identities, they suggest that those identities themselves are porous. Subjectivity and agency may be dispersed; our sense of individuality and distinctness from our environment is an illusion that masks both a thorough embeddedness and the incoherence of any independent existence—a situation that Thich Nhat Hanh (1987) has aptly called interbeing. As we will see, Buddhist moral thought takes this interbeing very seriously, as seriously as most Western philosophy takes individualism.

This grounding in the fact of thoroughgoing interdependence takes us to one important difference between Buddhist and most Western moral reflection. Many Western moral theorists begin by taking a kind of ontological and axiological individualism for granted in several respects. First, agency is taken to reside in individual actors, with an attendant focus on moral responsibility, rights, and duties as the central domains of moral concern.

Second, what is in one's interest is taken to be, au fond, an individual matter; even when the self is consciously deconstructed, as it is by Parfit (1986), interest is taken by most Western theorists to attach to individual stages of selves. Third, and consequent on these orientations, a conflict between egoistic and altruistic interests and motivations is regarded in the West as at least prima facie rational, even if not morally defensible or ultimately rational. As a consequence, an important preoccupation of Western ethics is the response to egoism, an answer to the question, "why be good?;' a question which barely arises in a Buddhist context, and, when it does, is quickly answered with a burden of proof shift, as we will see in Chapter 9.5

For this reason, one important difference between Western and Buddhist approaches to morality is that agency is not taken as a primary moral category, at least when that term is understood to

indicate a unique point of origin of action in an individual self. While Buddhists recognize that any action requires an agent, Buddhist moralists recognize no special category of agent causation that privileges that locus as a center of responsibility. Instead, action, intention, and results of actions and intentions are often seen as causally distributed. We will also see that interest is seen as a shared phenomenon. Therefore, we will see that in Buddhist ethics, moral progress and moral experience, rather than moral responsibility, are foregrounded in moral reflection. Moreover, that progress and experience are not the progress and experience of a substantial or continuing self, but rather of the kind of open continuum of psychophysical processes we call a person. We will work out the ramifications of these views as we proceed. <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUDDHIST ETHICS edited by Daniel Cozort and James Mark Shields [Oxford University Press, 9780198746140]

In the past twenty years, the sub-discipline of Buddhist ethics has expanded in terms of the breadth of methodological perspective and depth of inquiry. Scholars have used Buddhist resources to analyse a number of contemporary controversies, including human rights, women's rights, animal rights, sexuality, war, terrorism, violence, social, economic and retributive justice, as well as various issues of concern to biomedical and environmental ethics. Beyond matters of philosophical and applied ethics, anthropologists and sociologists have studied the effect of Buddhism upon various cultures of Asia.

Many forms of Buddhism, divergent in philosophy and style, emerged as Buddhism filtered out of India into other parts of Asia. Nonetheless, all of them embodied an ethical core that is remarkably consistent. Articulated by the historical Buddha in his first sermon, this moral core is founded on the concept of karma--that intentions and actions have future consequences for an individual--and is summarized as Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood, three of the elements of the Eightfold Path. Although they were later elaborated and interpreted in a multitude of ways, none of these core principles were ever abandoned. The Oxford Handbook of Buddhist Ethics provides a comprehensive overview of the field of Buddhist ethics in the twenty-first century.

THE HANDBOOK discusses the foundations of Buddhist ethics focusing on karma and the precepts looking at abstinence from harming others, stealing, and intoxication. It considers ethics in the different Buddhist traditions and the similarities they share, and compares Buddhist ethics to Western ethics and the psychology of moral judgments. The volume also investigates Buddhism and society analysing economics, environmental ethics, and Just War ethics. The final section focuses on contemporary issues surrounding Buddhist ethics, including gender, sexuality, animal rights, and euthanasia. This groundbreaking collection offers an indispensable reference work for students and scholars of Buddhist ethics and comparative moral philosophy.

The **OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUDDHIST ETHICS** is intended as a comprehensive overview of the state of the field of Buddhist ethics in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Contributions by twenty-nine international scholars provide balanced and critical review essays on particular aspects of Buddhist ethics related to their current research. This handbook will serve as a leading resource for current and future scholars in this burgeoning field of study but will also be of interest to anyone interested in multiple perspectives on ethical issues.

CONTENTS

Dedication
List of Abbreviations

List of Contributors
Introduction by Daniel Cozort and James Mark Shields
Part I Foundations
Karma by Peter Harvey
The Bodhisattva Precepts by Paul Groner
Ethics, Meditation, and Wisdom by Justin S. Whitaker and Douglass Smith
Part II Ethics and Buddhist Traditions
Moral Development in the Jātakas, Avadānas, and Pāli Nikāyas by Martin T. Adam
The Vinaya by Charles S. Prebish
Bhikṣuṇī Ordination by Bhikkhu Anālayo
The Changing Way of the Bodhisattva: Superheroes, Saints, and Social Workers by Barbra Clayton
Madhyamaka Ethics by Bronwyn Finnigan
Ethics in Pure Land Schools by Michael Conway
A Perspective on Ethics in the Lotus Sūtra by Gene Reeves
Ethics in Zen by Christopher Ives
Tantric Ethics by Gareth Sparham
Buddhist Ethics in South and Southeast Asia by Juliana Essen
East Asian Buddhist Ethics by Richard Madsen
Buddhist Ethics in Contemporary Tibet by Holly Gayley
Part III Comparative Perspectives
Buddhist Ethics Compared to Western Ethics by Sīlavādin Meynard Vasen
The Psychology of Moral Judgment and Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Ethics by Emily McRae
Ethics without Norms?: Buddhist Reductionism and the Logical Space of Reasons by Dan Arnold
Part IV Buddhism and Society
The Buddhist Just Society by Peter Harvey
Buddhist Economics: Problems and Possibilities by James Mark Shields
Buddhist Environmental Ethics: An Emergent and Contextual Approach by Stephanie Kaza
Buddhism, War, and Violence by Michael Jerryson
The Ethics of Engaged Buddhism in Asia by Sallie B. King
The Ethics of Engaged Buddhism in the West by Christopher Queen
Part V Contemporary Issues
Human Rights by Damien Keown
Buddhism and Women by Alice Collett
Buddhism and Sexuality by Amy Paris Langenberg
Buddhist Perspectives on Abortion and Reproduction by Michael G. Barnhart
Euthanasia by Damien Keown
Being and Its Other: Suicide in Buddhist Ethics by Martin Kovan
Buddhism and Animal Rights by Paul Waldau
Index

Many forms of Buddhism, divergent in philosophy and style, emerged as Buddhism filtered out of India into other parts of Asia. But all of them embodied a moral or ethical core that was, and remains, remarkably consistent. Articulated by the historical Buddha in his first sermon, this moral core is founded on the concept of karma—that intentions and actions have future consequences for an individual—and is summarized as Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood, three of the eight elements of the Eightfold Path. Although they were later elaborated and interpreted in a multitude of ways, none of these core principles was ever abandoned. Inasmuch as the Buddhist ideal is one of human perfection—or perfectibility—ethics is an important, arguably central, concern. This is complicated, however, by the fact that the early texts also indicate that achievement of nirvāṇa

involves a transformation or purification of consciousness, which links ethics closely to meditation, epistemology, and even metaphysics.

Ethical conduct is emphasized in Buddhism as in few other religions in part because it has historically been a tradition led by renunciants, the monks and nuns of the saṅgha. They operate under the guidance of an elaborate set of rules: 227 for fully ordained monks and 311 for nuns in the Theravāda tradition. The saṅgha collectively is Buddhism's moral exemplar. Ethics are also particularly important in Buddhism because its religious ideal is not submission or obedience to a particular deity, but rather the perfection of virtue and the attainment of insight. Hence, although in practice many Buddhists merely observe the Five Precepts (against misconduct) and support the saṅgha's material needs, they admire and aspire to higher ethical standards. In the modern period, more explicit forms of 'lay Buddhism' have emerged in various parts of Asia and the West. Here too, ethics is considered a central aspect of living the Dharma, though in its encounter with the West Buddhist ethics often takes on new forms—or at least adopts new terms—including the discourse of 'rights' and 'social justice'.

The academic study of Buddhism has existed in the West for several centuries, and for much longer, perhaps up to two millennia, in the various regions of Asia in which Buddhism has flourished. The past forty years in particular have witnessed a flourishing of Buddhist scholarship within both Western and Asian academies. However, recognition of the importance of ethics within Buddhism has not, at least until recently, resulted in much critical, scholarly treatment. In the past twenty years, the sub-discipline of Buddhist ethics has expanded in terms of the breadth of methodological perspective and depth of inquiry.

Scholars have used Buddhist resources to analyse a number of contemporary controversies, including human rights, women's rights, sexuality, war, terrorism, violence, social, economic, and retributive justice, as well as various issues of concern to biomedical and environmental ethics. One area that has seen significant development is the scientific study of the effects of meditation on the brain, which has been accompanied by a growth of studies connecting Buddhist thought and practice to psychotherapy and psychology more generally. Although this work is still very much ongoing, it has already produced some fascinating results, many of which have direct implications for ethics. Finally, beyond matters of philosophical and applied ethics, anthropologists and sociologists have studied the effect of Buddhism upon various cultures of Asia, an area of research that we feel should also be included in the broader field of Buddhist ethics.

Setting aside a number of non-academic works written from the standpoint of a particular sect or tradition such as Zen or Tibetan Buddhism, few books have attempted a cross-cultural and pan-sectarian analysis of ethics in Buddhist traditions. Two early English-language works on Buddhist ethics were Winston King's In the Hope of Nibbana (La Salle, 1964) and Sinhalese scholar-monk Hammalawa Saddhattissa's Buddhist Ethics (Boston, 1970; republished 1997). Yet the former is focused entirely on Theravāda (and specifically Burmese) tradition, while the latter, though more comprehensive than anything previously written, is primarily concerned with early Buddhism. Neither deal with contemporary issues or critical, historical scholarship. Damien Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (Basingstoke, 1992; reprinted with minor revisions 2001) may be the best single introduction to Buddhist ethics from a philosophical perspective. But because its primary concern is elucidating the 'structure' of Buddhist ethics, it does not deal with contemporary moral and ethical issues. Among Keown's other works is Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2005), an excellent, but 'very brief' survey/guide.

The standard in the field is Peter Harvey's **AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST ETHICS** (Cambridge, 2000). It addresses many social, biomedical, and other ethical issues. However, it is, as

its title suggests, an introduction and as such does not go deeply into the complexities of its subject. It is also now seventeen years old and hence is missing recent scholarship. Other notable recent books on Buddhist ethics are specialized to a particular subfield of ethics (Buddhism and Bioethics; Buddhism and Human Rights; Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics; etc.).

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUDDHIST ETHICS differs from Harvey—as well as the other works mentioned above—in the following ways. First, it aspires to be comprehensive. With thirty-one essays in different areas, it covers most if not all of the important topics of Buddhist ethics. Among the topics not treated by Harvey, for instance, are 'Buddhism and the Psychology of Moral Judgments'; 'Buddhist Ethics and Cognitive Sciences'; and 'Tantric Ethics'. Second, its topics receive a much deeper treatment than was possible in an introductory text. Third, many topics are updated by more recent developments such as Asian movements for social justice and environmental protection, Tibetan self-immolations, and the revival of the order of Bhikkhunīs (fully ordained nuns). Fourth, it is organized not by Buddhist traditions but by major topic areas that can treat subjects across traditions and over time; the topic areas have been adapted from the successful model of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics. Finally, the Handbook is not the work of a single scholar attempting to master the entire Buddhist tradition; it is a collaboration of twenty-nine authors who are specialists in their assigned areas and who represent the finest standards of scholarship in Buddhist studies.

We hope that this volume will be of the greatest interest to those scholars around the globe working in the areas of Buddhist ethics and comparative moral philosophy. However, because of its scope it will also be of interest to anyone concerned with contemporary ethical problems and the social, psychological, economic, and political ramifications of religious doctrines. This volume could furnish the 'Buddhist perspective' for anyone interested in comparing the views of various religions on particular topics such as those of biomedical ethics. The Oxford Handbook of Buddhist Ethics is intended as a comprehensive overview of the state of the field of Buddhist ethics in the second decade of the twenty-first century. <>

BUTON'S HISTORY OF BUDDHISM IN INDIA AND ITS SPREAD TO TIBET: A TREASURY OF PRICELESS SCRIPTURE by Buton Richen Drup, translated by Lisa Stein and Ngawang Zangpo [Tsadra, Snow Lion, 978155939413O]

This 14th century lively history introduces basic Buddhism as practiced throughout India and Tibet and describes the process of entering the Buddhist path through study and reflection. In the first chapter, we read about the structure of Buddhist education and the range of its subjects, and we're treated to a rousing litany of the merits of such instruction. In the second chapter, Butön introduces us to the buddhas of our world and eon, three of whom have already lived, taught, and passed into transcendence, before examining in detail the fourth, our own Buddha Shakyamuni. Butön tells the story of Shakyamuni in his past lives, then presents the path the Buddha followed (the same that all historical buddhas, including future ones, must follow). Only at the conclusion of the discussion of the result—enlightenment—do we return to the specific case of the Buddha and his twelve deeds. This marks the start of the history of the Buddha as most of us imagine it.

After the Buddha's story, Butön recounts three compilations of Buddhist scriptures, and then quotes from sacred texts that foretell the lives and contributions of great Indian Buddhist masters, which he then relates. The chapter concludes with the tale of the Buddhist doctrine's eventual demise and disappearance, a concept and a tale squarely within the Mahayana. The final chapter, the shortest of

the three, gives an account of the inception and spread of Buddhism in Tibet, focused mainly on the country's kings and early adopters of the foreign faith. The watershed debate at Samyé Monastery between representatives of Chinese and Indian styles of Buddhist practice is given the most attention in this chapter. An afterword by Ngawang Zangpo, one of the translators, discusses and contextualizes Butön's exemplary life, his turbulent times, and his prolific works.

CONTENTS

Translator's Foreword by Lisa Stein
Translator's Introduction by Ngawang Zangpo
Buton's History of Buddhism in India and Its Spread to Tibet 1. A Buddhist Education
2. A General History of Buddhism in This World and in India
3. A History of Buddhism in Tibet
Translator's Afterword: Buton's Life, Work, and Times by Ngawang Zangpo
Appendix I: An Outline of the Text
Appendix 2: A Short Biography of Buton Rinchen Drup
Appendix 3: A Catalog of the Collected Works of Buton Rinchen Drup
Notes
Bibliography
Index

At the end of my appointment, the doctor walked me to the reception area. Perhaps just to make small talk, he asked what book I was carrying.

"Dante, The Divine Comedy."

"Dante, hmmm. I've never read him, but I've often thought I should." The receptionist, a Hispanic woman in her forties, nodded, conveying that she too knew the book and the author.

Who among persons educated in Western countries has not heard of Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), whether or not we have read him? T. S. Eliot proclaimed, "Dante and Shakespeare divide the world between them—there is no third."

The author of the present translation, Buton Rinchen Drup, occupies somewhat the same position in the literary world of Tibetan educated persons (a world divided among more than two towering masters). Not everyone has taken the time to read Buton, but it is unthinkable that any educated Tibetan might not immediately know his name and have some idea of his contribution to their cultural evolution. And should a Tibetan doctor hear that a patient is reading Buton, the assumption he or she would automatically make is that the book would be this, a volume rarely referred to in Tibetan by its proper title, but almost always by the generic "Buton's History of Buddhism" (incidentally a book completed the year after Dante's death).

This book is also well known and regarded among Western scholars of Buddhism: bibliographies of many important works of Buddhist studies in English include E. Obermiller's two-volume translation of two-thirds of the Tibetan original. The jewelry of Scripture, the first translated volume, was published in 1931; the second, The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, arrived the following year. The present volume contains a retranslation of those books' portions of the text.

Books we consider classics can be read and enjoyed without a lengthy introduction; such seems to be the case with this text. Buton, one of the ten foremost scholars of the first thousand years of Tibetan Buddhism, wrote this book in a semischolarly fashion. Yes, he delves into the lives of the Buddha and his foremost commentators, for example, but he manages to be informative without overwhelming us with ideas and terminology that only a specialist could love or fathom. In working on this translation, I kept marveling at his choice of words—both the language he used and what he chose to leave out—and came to the conclusion that although Buton never explained for whom he

wrote this book, it seems most likely that he intended his readership to include persons not unlike us: those who want to know more about Buddhism but not too much more. His writing is as reader friendly as one could reasonably hope for from a fourteenth-century classic.

Buton's History of Buddhism in India and Its Spread to Tibet (that is, the first three-quarters of the original work in Tibetan) provided a template for much of the Buddhist history genre in Tibet for at least the next five hundred years after it was published. In the last fourth of the original (which does not appear here in translation), Buton departs from his role as a congenial tour guide to the Buddhist universe and reveals himself as a scholar confident enough to assert that the 3,100-^l^s texts he lists—these, and none else—constitute those that belong in the sacred and treasured Tibetan Buddhist canon of the Buddha's word and authentic Indian Buddhist treatises. That list stands as the inescapable model of the canon's and treatises' catalogs: even modern scholars still add to the work of this monk who lived as a genuine renunciant and meditator, who wrote as a gentle scholar, and who might be startled that his words echo so powerfully to the present day.

The Book: Buton's History of Buddhism

A Treasury of Priceless Scripture is the formal title of the text that has become known in Tibetan and English by an apt nickname,Buton's History, or Buton's History of Buddhism. It is well loved, both by readers who find the language generally simple, straightforward, and charming despite occasional archaic words or phrases, and by centuries of Tibetan authors who have heaped upon Buton the sincerest form of flattery by copying this book's format if not the words themselves. If Buton himself plagiarized others, the renown of his antecedents has faded, whereas everyone still reads Buton. A Western scholar, the translator of Buton's biography, D. S. Ruegg, states:

> One of the best known of [Buton's] works is [A History of Buddhism] (vol. [24]). Though this work is not altogether without antecedents in Tibet, being preceded by such works as [The Royal Narrative concerning the Bringing of the Buddha's Doctrine to Tibet] and the chronicles of [Drakpa Gyaltsen] (1147-1216) and [Pakpa], it is probably the most famous and widely used of the earlier histories. In it [Buton] mostly omits the legendary and partly allegorical biographies so characteristic for instance in [Taranata's] [History of Buddhism in India] and of [Pema Karpo's] chapters on India, and instead gives a summary of Buddhist literature and doctrine and an outline of the traditional history of Buddhism in India and Tibet. This work came to be accepted as a standard source and was extensively used by later authors of historical works.

Buton's History ofBuddhism in India and Its Spread to Tibet has four chapters. The first chapter presents an overview of Buddhism, and the fourth lists all of its authoritative scriptures and treatises translated into Tibetan; the second and third chapters describe the history of Buddhism in India and Tibet.

Chapter 1, "A Buddhist Education," gives a rousing positive appraisal of the what, why, and how of Buddhist studies. We sense the author's enthusiasm for the subject—one of his many "hats" was that of a college professor. Buton's words here and his deeds as a successful lifelong teacher provided a template for Tibetan Buddhist writers and teachers up to the present day. His model of education, in theory and practice, was improved upon over the centuries; yet even if other educators later wrote more eloquently on this subject, this chapter stands as an important early articulation of the principles of Buddhist education.

Chapter 2, "A History of Buddhism in This World and in India," treats Buddhism as a recurring fact of life beyond specific worlds and times. Buton introduces us to the buddhas of our world and aeon, three of whom have already lived, taught, and passed into transcendence, before examining in detail the fourth, our own beloved Buddha Shakyamuni. This is a welltrodden path in Tibetan texts; it is always interesting to see which stops each author visits along the way. Here, Buton introduces us to

Shakyamuni in his past lives, then digresses into an abstract presentation of the path the Buddha followed (the same that all historical buddhas, including future ones, must follow). Only at the conclusion of the discussion of the result, enlightenment, do we return to the specific case of the Buddha and his twelve deeds. This marks the start of history as most of us imagine it—events portrayed as having taken place in a world and in a time that could plausibly be identified on researchers' maps and calendars, although neither of those are forthcoming from Buton.

After the Buddha's story, Buton recounts three compilations of Buddhist scriptures and then quotes from some sacred texts that foretell the lives and contributions of great Indian Buddhist masters, which he then relates. Although these men also gained high degrees of realization, Buton's persons of interest are entirely those who composed important treatises in the field of Buddhism's great way (although some also composed works on tantra). The chapter concludes with the tale of the Buddhist doctrine's eventual demise and disappearance, again a concept and a tale squarely within the great way. Buton does not write for Buddhist scholars at his level nor for those who principally practice tantra.

Chapter 3, "A History of Buddhism in Tibet," is the book's shortest and most curious chapter. The section on Buddhism's early spread in Tibet centers on the country's kings and early adopters of the foreign faith. The watershed debate at Samye Monastery between representatives of Chinese and Indian styles of Buddhist practice is given the most attention in this chapter. G. W. Houston in Sources for a History of the bSam yas Debate has collected and translated many versions (including this chapter's) of the same event, a Tibetan Roshomon, except that the Chinese side of the story has never been told or defended, to my knowledge.

The second part of the chapter on Buddhism in Tibet reaches Buton's teacher without having mentioned Padampa Sangye, Machik Labdron, Kyungpo Naljor, or Orgyenpa Rinchen Pal, four now-important figures of that early era but of whom Buton seemed to feel the less said the better. Further, after describing the temples and monasteries of the very early second-wave masters in numbing detail, he does not intimate that other institutions existed, just lamas and their disciples. And we get no sense of Buddhism in eastern Tibet. Buton's history of Indian Buddhism is a generous, enjoyable account appropriate for a general, nonscholarly audience; in the Tibet chapter, the same author seems the more ill at ease, the closer he gets to his own era. Holes gape in his narrative, his silences are obvious but inscrutable. When I read the last few pages of the chapter, I was left with an unusual sensation: I felt sorry for the author—the omniscient Buton of all people!—who is so uncomfortable with his subject, as if I were painfully witnessing a public speaker barely suppress a panic attack. I honestly believe that he wanted to avoid offending anyone, and his strategy for dealing with controversy was to avoid it altogether, if possible. How else to explain his anemic treatment of this rich cast of Tibetan characters as engaging as the Indians he so well described just a few pages before?

These three chapters appeared in English long ago, in the 1930s, and have been often read and referred to in scholars' texts. Chapter 4, "A Catalog of Canonical Texts and Treatises Translated into Tibetan;' not yet available to those who do not read Buddhist languages, contains list upon list of texts, close to 3,500 in all. For those who read this book in Buton's time, these pages amounted to a revelation: here was the first full accounting of Buddhism's sacred source texts in Tibetan translation. It was only a virtual list—it would take some years before an actual, physical collection of such texts would be amassed, let alone printed—and Buton offered no real glimpse into the titles he transcribed.

So what is the point of it?

As practicing Buddhists, we spend a lot of time reciting the names of buddhas and bodhisattvas. We thereby comfort ourselves in the knowledge that other options exist besides wallowing in our small dramas: others have gained enlightenment using as their fuel exactly the same problems and predicaments that so vex us. They went before us; we rejoice in their victory; we're following their path as best we can. Further, we are told it is good for us to associate with even just those names, by seeing them, reading them, hearing them, reciting them aloud, or touching them. Similar claims are not explicitly made for book titles, yet these books are exactly what Buddhists think of when we take refuge in one aspect of the Dharma—the path to enlightenment expressed in human language.

A single name of a buddha, just that, can pierce the din of our dualistic chaos and afford us just enough light and space that we can take our next step. Likewise, these books are what exist as the foundations of scriptural Dharma on this planet in our time. I have so many dear Buddhist friends around the world who live good, deep, and meaningful lives due in some part to their having taken the time to assimilate the Buddha's teaching. The vast majority of them cannot read a Buddhist language; as a result, they've never been able to read the list of texts that makes up the Buddhist canon, even after decades of daily taking refuge in it and living their faith. They have genuine faith in Buddhist scripture, which remains something anonymous, nebulous, and unquantified. So it was for Tibet's Buddhists until Buton's work.

Someday, the lists of Buddhism's canonical texts will find their way from Sanskrit, Tibetan, or Chinese into non-Buddhist languages. Later, during our children's or grandchildren's time, perhaps the entire collection will be translated into English. Then we can hope that someday, sooner or later, those translations will be sufficiently revised and polished so that the Dharma will sing in English as it does in Tibetan. Let us pray. <>

A History of Buddhism in India and Tibet: An Expanded Version of the Dharma's Origins Made by the Learned Scholar Deyu edited and translated by Dan Martin [Library of Tibetan Classics, Wisdom Publications, 9780861714728]

The first complete English translation of an important thirteenth-century history that sheds light on Tibet's imperial past and on the transmission of the Buddhadharma into Central Asia.

Translated here into English for the first time in its entirety by perhaps the foremost living expert on Tibetan histories, this engaging translation, along with its ample annotation, is a must-have for serious readers and scholars of Buddhist studies. In this history, discover the first extensive biography of the Buddha composed in the Tibetan language, along with an account of subsequent Indian Buddhist history, particularly the writing of Buddhist treatises. The story then moves to Tibet, with an emphasis on the rulers of the Tibetan empire, the translators of Buddhist texts, and the lineages that transmitted doctrine and meditative practice. It concludes with an account of the demise of the monastic order followed by a look forward to the advent of the future Buddha Maitreya.

The composer of this remarkably ecumenical Buddhist history compiled some of the most important early sources on the Tibetan imperial period preserved in his time, and his work may be the best record we have of those sources today. Dan Martin has rendered the richness of this history an accessible part of the world's literary heritage.

Review

"This book is a treasure and a work of great service to those of us who are fascinated by Tibet's history and culture. Martin's translation—a massive achievement—allows readers to access a fascinating thirteenth-century Tibetan Buddhist history that has become a touchstone in Tibetan studies. The introduction is superb, and the notes throughout the work, in Martin's inimitable voice, include some great insights into this text's many delights and riddles." -- Brandon Dotson, Associate Professor and Director, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Georgetown University

"Dan Martin's translation of this capacious history of Buddhism in India and Tibet by the thirteenth-century Tibetan intellectual Deyu is in every sense of the word an amazing achievement. It is a veritable tour de force that has no rivals in the field of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist studies. Martin's informative introduction reveals the depth and breadth of his own profound scholarship and illuminates the religious and socio-literary environment of Deyu's work. The translation itself is simply a treat to read, and the easy-flowing diction of his English makes this remarkable work come to life in unexpected ways. Indeed, Martin's diction belies the difficulties of the original text and goes to show how impossibly well he is equipped to translate this work. One notices at every step his exquisite control over the subject matter, and the copious notes that inform the translation never interfere with the text. This is a superb accomplishment!" -- Leonard van der Kuijp, Professor of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies, Harvard University

"The history of Buddhism in India and Tibet by the mysterious scholar Deyu is one of the most important Tibetan works on early Tibet. This translation is the ideal meeting of text and translator, as Dan Martin's lifetime study of Tibetan history, and historians, bears fruit in his clear translation and fascinating introduction and notes. For those interested in understanding how Tibetans created a way of telling stories of the past that reflect Buddhist principles and thus continue to illuminate the present as well, this is an ideal place to start." -- Sam van Schaik, Head of the Endangered Archives Programme, The British Library; author of Tibet: A History

CONTENTS

General Editor's Preface
Translator's Introduction
Identity of the Compiler and the Threefold Authorship Problem
Literary Sources Made Use of by the Author
The Author's Allegiances
The Author's Purpose
Historical Significance and Impact
Unique Subject Matter
The Prostration Passage
Kingship
The Incidental Kings
according to Seven (or Six and One-Half) Documents
The Revolts of the Civil Work Corps
Previous Literature about the Deyu Histories
Thoughts on Translation
Aims of the Notes
Concluding Remarks
Translator's Acknowledgments
PART 1: INDIA
The Two Truths and Scripture
Introduction
The Origins of the Dharma with an Account of the Three Bodies

The Account of the 1,002 Buddhas
The Biography of the Enlightened One, Sakyamuni
How the Scriptures Were Taught
How the Treatises Were Composed (i)
Tantra Collections and Their Divisions
Making Distinctions
How the Compilers Collected the Scriptures How the Treatises Were Composed (a)
PART 2: TIBET
Homage and Prostration
Statement on the Subjects Covered
Kingship and the History of Kings
The Sovereign Power of the Wheel-Turning Kings
Iksvaku Line
An Account of the Birth of Rajyananda
Wonders of the Sakya Clan
How the Line of Rahula Came to an End
Appointed Kings
Primordial Rulers of Tibet
Incidental Kings
Accounts of Indian Origins for the Tibetan Royal Dynasty
The Seating Order of Divinities in the Firmament
The Two Upper Kings
The Royal Dynasties after Gri gum btsan po
Reign of Srong btsan the Wise
Law and Administration: The Short Catalog
Law and Administration: The Expanded Catalog
Erecting the Jokhang
Between Srong brtsan the Wise and Khri srong Ide brtsan
Emperor Khri srong Ide brtsan
The Earlier Translation Period and Its Ten Phases
Bsam yas Temple
The Decline of the Dharma
The Period of Fragmentation
The Revolt of the Civil Work Corps
Accordion-Style ^an^script with Stack of Nine
Confidential Sealed Document
Registry of Royal Tombs
Period of Fragmentation
The Royal Line of Yum brtan
The Later Spread of Monastic Ordinations
The Tail of the Old Translations
The New Translations
The Future Decline of the Teachings
The Duration of the Teachings
The Arrival of Maitreya
Colophon
Appendix on the Authors' Spiritual and Family Lineages
Bibliographies
Textual Resources
Tibetan-Language Texts
Kangyur
Tengyur
Tibetan-Language Texts Outside the Kangyur and Tengyur

Publications in Other Languages
Internet Research Resources
Index
About the Contributors

I started waking up thinking of myself as a translator in 2010. That was when the monumental Tibetan text I had been translating in bits and pieces over the course of twenty years or so took on my full devotion. I was immersed in something I loved. Practically every day for a year I worked on the initial draft, and in the next year I gave the translation a thorough going over. By year three, no longer on cloud nine, I was left with the difficult problems that have preoccupied me ever since.

To begin with, what is the book behind this book? The original Tibetan-language long Deyu is quite long, a little over four hundred pages in its first publication in 1987. The title in the front of the one and only manuscript might be translated An Expanded Version of the Dharma's Origins in India and Tibet Made by the Learned Scholar Deyu. Half of it is a history of Buddhist India; the second half a history of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. The history of India is above all else a biography of the Buddha, followed by later Indian Buddhist history, including especially the writers of scriptural commentaries. The history of Tibetan Buddhism is more about Tibetan royalty than you might expect from a Buddhist history. It presents some shocks to our present-day historical knowledge for incorporating several texts of the imperial period and, in fact, provides us the best surviving witnesses we have for them. Known as the Five Can, they will receive their due in due course. The composition of the long Deyu dates to 1261 CE or very soon after, a date supplied in the chronological section that brings it to an end.

"Authorship" is a complicated concept regardless of where we happen to sit, and the authorship of our history is a real and continuing problem. The apparent author is best known to the world by now as "Mkhas pa Lde'u," a name I once amused myself by translating as "Professor Riddle." The riddle part does suit nicely, if we consider just how difficult it is to know who the author was or what exactly that person wrote. The author's identity and role in the production of the Deyu histories are riddles we'll have to try to answer later on. I believe there are sufficient hints to connect the author of our long Deyu, along with the other authors involved in the production of all the Deyu histories, to an especially rare and esoteric Zhije (Zhi byed) lineage, with perhaps even stronger connections to an obscure but specific Dzogchen lineage with a pivotal twelfth-century master, that extends further back to a tenth-century figure named Aro and beyond. Remarkably ecumenical in their outlook and coverage, we may justly classify these histories and their authors as belonging to the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism. Different types of evidence point in that direction.

All of these matters will be covered in this introduction, but if you think you are ready, I suggest you plunge straight into the translation. If later on you get curious to know more about the work and its author, you can always return to the dry ground of this introduction. Or if you are not quite ready to risk the dive, you could stay where you are for a while to gain some impression of how the Deyu histories might fit into a larger corpus of literature. I suppose whenever we place something into a larger class of things, we naturally find that they share common features, otherwise we wouldn't engage in this kind of classification to begin with. At the same time there are interesting dissimilarities, areas of uniqueness, that are bound to draw our attention.

The core of this introduction is patterned after a set of five topics often used in Tibetan commentarial literature. This is a tradition that goes back to a work of the fourth-century Indian Buddhist Vasubandhu, although I've modified and interpreted it to more closely suit my own ends. It is this part of this introduction that is meant to elaborate on the unique aspects of the Deyu histories. The five topics cover roughly (i) the identity of the author-compiler, (^) the sources drawn

upon and works with close affinities, (3) the allegiances or tendencies of thinking displayed by the author, (4) the purposes for which it may have been written, and (5) the significance of the text as a whole, attempting to answer the question, Why is this text meaningful or useful for readers of past and present? The last part of this introduction moves beyond the five topics and discusses studies and bits of translation work that have been done in the past. Then I end by saying a few words about my own attitudes about translation, my methods for overcoming obstacles, what I hope to accomplish in my footnotes, and other such practical matters. Information on existing publications of the basic textual material, essential mainly to Tibetan readers, is found at the end of the volume in a section of the bibliography entitled "Textual Resources." But before moving on to our five-topic outline, we should first say something about Tibetan histories overall.

In an effort to situate our history within the longer span of Tibetan history writing, I attempt a brief and sweeping survey of works set down in writing very approximately between the years 650 and 1946 CE. I do have another goal here, and that is to indicate that the genres, intentions, and contents of these books are varied and vast, and that the entire corpus of history writing cannot be reduced to single-adjective descriptions or dismissed with prejudicial stereotypes. We will for now bypass historical sources that lie outside the traditional genres, as well as works composed in languages other than Tibetan.

Some of the stereotypes about Tibet and its historical traditions might just vanish into thin air by simply picking up and looking into what everyone believes is the oldest historical work, the one generally awarded the title The Old Tibetan Annals. Like annals in other times and places, it is a kind of annual register of matters of state, quite dry and laconic, yet outstandingly important for knowing about Tibet's early history. This work had little or no influence on Tibetan history writing, since it was not available to any post-imperial writer before being brought out of the Mogao Caves near Dunhuang in the early twentieth century. To see the original documents you will need to visit Paris and London, and it is much easier to consult the impressive new edition and English translation by Brandon Dotson. It has a later added preface, as Dotson determined, with some entries added only retrospectively, so the first entry to be written down is probably the one for 650 CE. Basically we may say that the first available bit of historical writing was simultaneous with the first well-established date in Tibetan history, the death of Emperor Srong btsan the Wise.

The first history where we find a more detailed narrative of events is yet another Dunhuang document we know as the Old Tibetan Chronicle. It is very relevant to our Deyu history, since there are parallels in its account of Emperor Dri gum btsan po. Next in our list is the Statements of Sba (TH1).

It contains detailed narratives of events from the time of Emperor Khri srong Ide brtsan in the last half of the eighth century. It has survived in distinctly different versions that continue to surface today, some with an appendix that sustains the history right up into the eleventh century. So far only one of those versions has been entirely translated into English.

It was only after the return of monastics to Central Tibet in the late tenth century that the typical Tibetan ways of distinguishing genres of historical writings emerged and took on meaning. The earliest history from that time is Story of the Later Spreading of the Teachings by one of the new monastic leaders named Klu mes Tshul khrims shes rab (^^3). It is one of several monastic histories from this era that we know only by their titles, even if one of them, Great Account by Khu stun Brtson 'grus g.yung drung (^^7), is partially preserved in the Deyu histories. Later in the same century we have The Testimony Extracted from the Pillar (TH 4). As the name suggests, it was drawn from a pillar at Jokhang (Jo khang) Temple in Lhasa in around 1048 CE. This work, with its amazing stories about the founding of Jokhang, among other matters, has never been translated,

although it had a marked effect on the later writing of history, as did a text excavated in the next century called the Compendium of Yanis. Involved in its revelation was Nyang ral Nyi ma d zer, the same Nyang ral who wrote a rather disordered but devout and always fascinating Buddhist history called Dharma Origins, the Essence of Honey at the Heart of the Flower (TH 33). I believe this may be the first of many Tibetan histories to be titled with the genre term "Dharma Origins" (rhos byung). These tend to take the life of Buddha and Indian Buddhism as their basis, even if they do then go on to speak of the introduction and spread of Buddhism in Tibet.

Because we have a lot of ground to cover, we won't discuss the eleventh-century emergence of a Bon historical tradition, or the beginnings of histories of medicine and other traditional sciences toward the end of the twelfth century. Gateway to the Dharma by the Sakyapa master Bsod nams rtse mo (^^37), written in 1167 CE, deserves mention not only for its general importance but also because it was a source the author of the long Deyu especially relied upon.

Entering into the thirteenth century and the period of Mongol dominance in Eurasia, Bcom ldan Rig ral composed a not very long history of Buddhism in India and Tibet (TH 66) in 1261 CE, just about the same time as the long Deyu's composition. Rig nil introduced a notion of a "Middle Spread (Bar Dar) period" that later generations hardly ever make note of, let alone follow.

9 I mention this just to show that there were dead ends and disagreements among the traditional historians. In 1283 Nel pa pandi to did yet another history of Buddhism, with emphasis on the monkhood (TH 96), but it was only in 1311 that one of the most justly celebrated writings appeared, that of Bu ston Rin chef grub (TH 116). Bu stun demonstrates real skill as a writer and, although he often quotes his sources directly, he also knew how to speak with his own voice. Given the work's merits, it is a pity he didn't care very much about Tibet's own history and passes over it very lightly, almost as if the only Tibetans who mattered were the translators.

Now when we reach into the middle of the fourteenth century as Mongol influence was waning, we find more politically motivated history writing, as for example the Testimony of the boastfully militant ruler Byang chub rgyal mtshan (TH 105), and the Red Annals (TH124) with its partial emphasis on the political. It isn't very surprising to find politics in these writings, given their authors were very much players in the political intrigues of their day. We have to mention the excavation in that same era of the Five Sets of Scrolls (TH 125), which, in its glorification of imperial sponsorship of Buddhism, incorporated some ancient materials but also, whenever possible, transformed prose into verse.

The highlights of the fourteenth and following centuries include the Clear Mirror of Dynastic History (^^149), a work of outstanding literary value, and the Blue Annals, completed in 1476 (TH223), which doesn't fit the definition of an annals at all. At the time of its writing the Blue Annals was the longest and most comprehensive nonsectarian history of post-imperial Tibetan Buddhism. Large sections of it are directly copied out from earlier sources, but you would hardly know this without close research. Even today, most people knowingly or unknowingly rely on the dates its author gives tor various Tibetan notables, and since he was truly quite careful about his chronological calculations, its authoritative reputation is well deserved.

We should not let the seventeenth century go by without mentioning ^aranatha's famous history of Indian Buddhism (TH 312), the Fifth Dalai Lama's 1643 religio-political history (^^340), and his regent's triumphal chronicle of the success of the Gelukpa school in converting monasteries that had belonged to other schools (TH367). The same regent put together a medical history that became the standard one, so much so that earlier ones practically faded from memory.

Already at the end of the eighteenth century and into the first decades of the nineteenth, we have a sudden upsurge in texts that incorporate a new world geography, with descriptions of foreign continents like Africa and the Americas, signaling a significant stage in Tibet's preexisting yet growing awareness of its presence within a larger global community. The last history writer on our agenda is the poet-philosopher Gendun Chomphel. Some put him forward as the most iconic figure of emerging Tibetan modernity, but he was more surely one of Tibet's most accomplished Indologists of his day. When he wrote his White Annals, he applied a perceptibly heightened critical sense in his approach to the Old Tibetan period. He was the first Tibetan writer to make use of the recovered Dunhuang documents, and this brings us full circle to the place where our survey began. Of course, it would be desirable to go into more detail about what makes these compositions different from one another, but I think this will have to do for now. Tibetan history writers had different ideas, made use of different sources, approached those sources with varying levels of trust and critical sense, and hoped to serve different purposes—which does, to be sure, make them look a lot like contemporary historians.

I would be the last one to insist that every single thing the histories have to say should be taken on faith at face value, although I do think there is much in them that is believable and valid. I believe, based on historical research by others as well as my own, that there are a few basic tendencies that, whether through natural developments or intentional design, tend to tug away at historical truth, pulling it in other directions. These often overlapping tendencies I call "family concerns," "condensation," "time travel," and "displacement" In place of long arguments supporting their validity, I simply supply references that I believe convincing enough without much commentary. This is not a call to skepticism or disbelief, but a warning to be wary of these particular problem areas.

Family based: I think the most obvious place where Tibetan history is altered by family concerns is in the list of the first seven Tibetan monks. Giuseppe Tucci long ago did an impressive comparative study of how over the centuries different clan names have slipped in and out of the different lists. Obviously particular writers had reasons to make sure that certain clans were included, whether their own or the clans of their patrons. It was a matter of family honor and prestige.

Condensation: In one way or another narratives may come to cluster or condense around major figures. One good example was given by Geza Uray, showing how legislative activities of other emperors came to be credited to Srong btsan the Wise. In fact, quite a number of narratives come to be associated with him, some of them coming from as far afield as Byzantine-Persian Solomonic lore. ^ story about one ruler famed for justice and wisdom can be used to describe another such ruler. Yet the story in our history about Srong btsan and the two Khotanese monks was in fact taken from elsewhere, from a Buddhist scriptural source. Condensation, or if you prefer, consolidation, could be regarded as a kind of simplification that forms part of an understandable attempt to communicate and educate an audience, as for example when people today generalize about historical periods or history-writing tra ditions without investing too much effort in deciding what actually belongs where.

Time travel: Persons and episodes from later Tibetan history can be displaced back into the imperial period. Perhaps the best example is the list of nine physicians. Mentioning them gives me the opportunity to point to an example of how certain traditional Tibetan authors could indeed engage in source-critical thinking. Both Pawo and Kongtrul could see through an error that had been, and still is, so commonly committed by other historians who transferred an entire group of eleventh-to-twelfth-century medical figures back into the imperial period. One of those nine physicians, Yon tan mgon po actually had a biography written about him in the sixteenth century that makes his doppelganger active in the eighth.

Displacement: Something odd-seeming and unfamiliar can be replaced with something more readily recognizable and relevant to a later audience. Our history has, in separate contexts, two different examples of a list of nine translators. The one filled with lay names of the type used in Old Tibetan times would be displaced and finally entirely replaced with a list of monk-translators whose works were still available to the generations that followed.

There are some who will see in all these examples deliberate attempts to falsify history, and to this I have objections. Motives are all too easily imputed, but smoking guns can be hard to find, and I suggest that textual transformations took place and changes occurred for a wide variety of reasons, no doubt including some I haven't mentioned. Of course, there is the general principle that history is written by winners, and this always goes with a process of textual attrition for sources about figures and movements that were of so successful. Their historical sources tend to disappear just because there is no institution to value and preserve them. Direct suppression doesn't have to play any part in it. Motives of deceit can hardly be imputed when the writer isn't actually there, by which I mean to say, when the "writer" in question expresses minimal originality and at the same time is so very difficult to identify. <>

The Gathering of Intentions: A History of a Tibetan Tantra by Jacob P. Dalton [Columbia University Press, 9780231176002]

The Gathering of Intentions reads a single Tibetan Buddhist ritual system through the movements of Tibetan history, revealing the social and material dimensions of an ostensibly timeless tradition. By subjecting tantric practice to historical analysis, the book offers new insight into the origins of Tibetan Buddhism, the formation of its canons, the emergence of new lineages and ceremonies, and modern efforts to revitalize the religion by returning to its mythic origins. The ritual system explored in this volume is based on the Gathering of Intentions Sutra, the fundamental "root tantra" of the Anuyoga class of teachings belonging to the Nyingma ("Ancient") school of Tibetan Buddhism. Proceeding chronologically from the ninth century to the present, each chapter features a Tibetan author negotiating a perceived gap between the original root text—the Gathering of Intentions—and the lived religious or political concerns of his day. These ongoing tensions underscore the significance of Tibet's elaborate esoteric ritual systems, which have persisted for centuries, evolving in response to historical conditions. Rather than overlook practice in favor of philosophical concerns, this volume prioritizes Tibetan Buddhism's ritual systems for a richer portrait of the tradition.

Reviews

The Gathering of Intentions makes a valuable contribution to the field of Tibetan and Buddhist studies and will attract nonacademic readers who are interested in learning about the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. The organization of the book is thoughtfully crafted, the content coverage thorough and wide-ranging, the scholarship superb, and the arguments clear and persuasive. — **Bryan J. Cuevas, author of *Travels in the Netherworld: Buddhist Popular Narratives of Death and the Afterlife in Tibet***

The Gathering of Intentions is an essential contribution to the study of Tibetan Buddhism. This learned and lucid book is an important, insightful, and groundbreaking study of a worthy subject that takes a valuable historical approach to interpreting the development of a Tibetan Buddhist tradition over an extended period of time. In so doing, it provides critical perspectives on both the distinctive

moments it explores and the long-term impact of a quietly influential scriptural tradition. —**Christian K. Wedemeyer, author of *Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism: History, Semiology, and Transgression in the Indian Traditions***

The Gathering of Intentions takes a single tantra and shows how it has been at the center of the religious life of practitioners of the Nyingma tradition of Tibet, from the wandering yogins of the tenth century to the Fifth Dalai Lama in the seventeenth and the Tibetan exile communities of the present day. One of the best things about this fascinating book is how Dalton brings together the earliest sources for understanding Tibetan Buddhism with the living, breathing tradition as it exists today in Tibet and across the world. —**Sam van Schaik, author of *Tibet: A History***

Dalton illuminates an important and understudied Buddhist tradition.... A useful case study for those interestd in the history of religions in general as well as a valuable resource for students and scholars of Tibetan religion and history. Highly recommended. —**CHOICE**

Dalton deserves great praise for his scholarship, historical research and crisp writing. —**Sumeru**

This volume prioritizes Tibetan Buddhism's ritual systems for a richer portrait of the tradition. —**Buddhism Now**

This book [is] a very valuable contribution to the study of Tibetan Buddhism.**BizIndia**

Without a doubt this is a highly recommended book and a very successful exploration of the life and vicissitudes of a single tantra. —**H-Buddhism**

A valuable, information-packed resource for the study of canon, institution, and ritualism in Tibet. —**Reading Religion**

The Gathering of Intentions is required reading for scholars of Tibetan religious history, particularly those interested in the Nyingma School's distinctive tantric system. —**Jake Nagasawa, University of California, Santa Barbara, Religious Studies Review**

An extremely engaging, perspicacious, and elegantly written book on the history of the production and development of a Tibetan text . . . Dalton's book provides a fundamental road map and guidance for scholars interested in Anuyoga and the development of the Bka' ma lineages in Tibet. —**Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies**

CONTENTS

Preface
Introduction
1. Origins: Myth and History
2. The *Gathering of Intentions* in Early Tibetan Tantra
3. The Spoken Teachings
4. The Rise of the Sutra Initiation
5. Dorjé Drak and the Formation of a New Lineage
6. The Mindröling Tradition
7. Returns to the Origin
Appendix: The Four Root Tantras of Anuyoga
Notes
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

> The Spoken Teachings provide the structure and the treasures the ornaments. (*bka' ma khob 'bubs gter ma zur rgyan*) —a well-known Nyingmapa saying

As anyone encountering Tibetan Buddhism for the first time will soon discover, the panoply of tantric ritual systems can be overwhelming. Tibetan culture has been shaped by some of the most elaborate and esoteric ritual systems in the world. Already in early medieval India, the tantras had introduced into Buddhism a plethora of ritual practices, but only in Tibet were so many of them preserved, transmitted through countless lineages, and interwoven to produce still further systems. Given the complexity of the situation, where should the interested student begin? What are the historical relationships among these many varied tantric systems? Between the *Guhyasamāja* and the **Guhyagarbha*?[1] Between the *Cakrasaṃvara* and the *Hevajra*? Between the revelations of Jikmé Lingpa's *Seminal Heart of the Great Expanse* and those of Chogyur Lingpa's *New Treasure of Choling*? And, for that matter, what is the relationship between tantric treasure revelations and the canonical tantras in the first place? How do ritual practices correlate to the canonical tantras upon which they are supposedly based? Which parts of all this are originally Indian and which Tibetan? Why are there so many methods, each enshrined in its own manual or *sādhana*, for performing a single rite? What are the histories behind the various esoteric classes of tantric practice? Where did all of this come from? None of these fundamental questions has yet been answered.

In part, Western scholars' own historical prejudices have not helped the situation. As is now well documented, the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment inspired many Western scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to downplay Tibetan Buddhism's ritual side in favor of its "higher," more philosophical elements, or even to dismiss tantric ritual outright as priestly hocus-pocus. Still today, a surprising number of scholars working on early Indian or Chinese Buddhism continue to see Tibet, and especially its bewildering rites, in a somewhat dismissive light. Such prejudices, of course, are often reflections of our own ignorance more than of Tibetan Buddhism and its rituals themselves.

Nor do Tibetans always help. Many lamas are extraordinarily generous with their time and knowledge, but others can be rather proprietary when it comes to the particulars of their rituals. This may be understandable, as foreign scholars often ignore the tradition's own values, ask the wrong kinds of questions, or are eager to historicize certain unassailable truths. In addition, there is the secrecy in which tantric ritual has been shrouded throughout its history, an esotericism that is still maintained for a variety of reasons. Mystery and the element of surprise can be spiritually powerful, and in a tradition that is suspicious of conceptuality and its detrimental effects on meditation, care must be taken not to dampen the practitioner's experiences. Considerable too are the economic effects of secrecy. Proprietary expertise in a given ritual system can be a marker of a Tibetan Buddhist teacher's authority and is therefore not readily given away. Over the centuries, some Tibetans have struggled hard to maintain control over certain tantric lineages.

But beyond all of this, teachings on a given ritual system, even when offered openly, can themselves obscure as much as reveal that system's *history*; these teachings are construed as eternal, after all, their forms written into the very fabric of the universe. Despite the long-standing Buddhist insistence on the impermanence of all things, the Buddhist tantras are widely held to be temporal manifestations of enormous ur-tantras that are held eternally in the heavens. To subject tantric ritual to a critical historical gaze is sometimes to work at odds with such deeply held beliefs.

For all of these reasons, the study of Tibetan tantra is a daunting task, yet it is also an important one. For centuries, tantric ritual has ensured the endurance of Tibetan culture. When Genghis Khan and his descendents swept across central Asia, they are purported to have supported Tibet's lamas in exchange for regular performances of powerful tantric rites. Even today, Tibetan lamas and their esoteric rituals continue to attract wealthy patrons from around the world, from New York and Hollywood to Taiwan and Beijing. Indeed, it may not be going too far to say that tantric Buddhism has provided the primary language through which Tibetans have articulated their culture. It has

shaped the language of Tibet's art, its politics, and its very identity. Without some sense of this ritual world, the modern student of Tibet cannot grasp the full import of fundamental events. When the Dalai Lama and the Paṇchen Lama meet, it is not just a carefully scripted meeting of two dignitaries; it is a ritualized encounter between Avalokiteśvara, the bodhisattva of compassion, and Amitabha, the father of the Lotus buddha family; it is the eighth-century king Trisong Detsen prostrating to the tantric master Padmasambhava; it is Dromtön requesting initiation from Jowo Atiśa in the eleventh century. If we are ever to understand this rich and layered culture, we must come to terms with its ritual universe and intricate ritual histories.

This book takes a small step in that direction by tracing the vicissitudes of a single ritual system—that of the *Gathering of Intentions Sutra* (*Dgongs pa 'dus pa'i mdo*)—from its ninth-century origins to the present day. The *Gathering of Intentions* (as it will be called here) is often referred to as the fundamental "root tantra" of the Anuyoga class of teachings belonging to the Nyingma ("Ancient") school of Tibetan Buddhism. Its odyssey offers unique insights into the history of Tibet, and the Nyingma School in particular.

The study is divided into seven chapters, each of which focuses on another reworking of the *Gathering of Intentions*' ritual tradition. They proceed chronologically and thereby depict a tantric system in constant negotiation with the events of Tibetan history. Each chapter presents an encounter, perhaps even a confrontation, between the original root text—the *Gathering of Intentions* itself—and the latest political or religious concerns. Each Tibetan author wrote his new commentary or ritual manual to negotiate a perceived gap between the original tantra and the lived tradition. The shifting relationships between past and present, between the enduring structures of Tibetan religion and the changing conditions of history, therefore constitute the central theme of this study. Which parts of a given tradition remain fixed and which parts are available for adaptation? As a tantra enters a new phase in its history, does it remain the same text? Or has it in some way died out, become obsolete? Such questions are raised in each chapter, as the *Gathering of Intentions* is reborn again and again, taking new forms generation after generation, amid the dominant paradigms of Tibetan history.

The Place of this Study Within the Field of Tibetan Studies

The Nyingma School is often regarded as a disparate grouping of wild-eyed antinomian visionaries, lone hermits meditating in caves, or at most, lay village lamas working as local priests in small communities. Such images are juxtaposed to those of the other three New (*Gsar ma*) schools—the Kagyu, Sakya, and Geluk—which, according to stereotype, comprise strictly disciplined Buddhist monks ensconced in great hierarchical institutions where lofty scholarship and large-scale state rituals are the primary focus. Such stereotypes have exercised a significant effect on Western scholarship. As long ago as 1895, in his seminal work on Tibetan religions, L. Austine Waddell described a variety of what he saw as "monster outgrowths" within Tibetan "Lamaism," with the Geluk School at one end, being "the purest and most powerful of all," and the Nyingma School at the other, exhibiting "a greater laxity in living than any other sect of Lāmas." Sixty years later, in another major survey of Tibetan Buddhism, this dim view of the Nyingma School persisted. Helmut Hoffman described the school, which traces its roots back to the arrival in Tibet of the Indian master Padmasambhava, as a "Padmaist religion" that deviated so far from Buddhism into tantric excess that it required repeated purges by the followers of the reformist New Schools. More recently, however, as Tibetan Studies has come into its own as a legitimate field, the popularity of the Nyingma School has improved dramatically. In 1993, Geoffrey Samuel turned the earlier prejudices on their head by removing the negative judgments that accompanied them. Noting the damage already done by such views throughout "popular texts on the history of religion," Samuel placed "the Nyingmapa yogin in his or her mountain hermitage" on an equal footing with "the Gelukpa scholar with

his *geshé* diploma." Despite his rehabilitation of the Nyingmapa, however, Samuel maintained the common characterization of the school as "shamanic," as opposed to the "clerical" Geluk School. "The most 'shamanic,'" he writes, "and least centralized and hierarchical of these [Tibetan Buddhist] orders are the Nyingmapa." To be a Nyingmapa means, according to Samuel, to be tantric, nonmonastic, to act primarily through "analogy and metaphor," and *not* to be engaged in scholarship, textual analysis, and centralized monasticism.

Like all stereotypes, such characterizations are not without their truths. They have persisted in part because they mirror our own familiar dichotomies of the mystic versus the scholar, the ecstatic versus the rational, the profligate versus the celibate, but they are not entirely Western constructions. Tibetans themselves have long espoused similar views, portraying the Nyingmapa as mindlessly absorbed in meditation and the Gelukpa as obsessed with scholarship. Indeed, the Nyingmapa and the Gelukpa often see themselves in similar terms. The problem is that the stereotype also conceals much. Many of the Nyingma School's most significant characteristics are occluded by its standard portrayals. The present study is a history of the Nyingma School as seen through a single ritual system, and the picture that emerges stands in stark opposition to the one so often presented. The *Gathering of Intentions* is without doubt a thoroughly "tantric" work, yet counter to the suppositions of some, every time it is reworked in some new commentary or ritual manual, the purpose is precisely to bring greater centralization and hierarchization to the Nyingma School. The writings on the *Gathering of Intentions* are rigorous works of scholarship and textual analysis, even as they delve deeply into the mysterious realms of tantric myth and ritual. The school revealed in these pages is intimately involved in highly complex and carefully constructed hierarchies, its practitioners often housed in large monastic institutions.

Admittedly, this is partly a reflection of the institutional nature of the *Gathering of Intentions* in particular. This text is fundamental to the so-called Spoken Teachings (*bka' ma*), a class of tantras that are traditionally juxtaposed to the Treasure Teachings (*gter ma*), the revelatory writings that began to emerge in the eleventh century and went on to take the Nyingma School by storm; today the vast majority of rituals performed by the Nyingmapa have their roots in treasure revelation. Notwithstanding the popularity of the Treasure Teachings, the Spoken Teachings have long formed the canonical backbone of the Nyingma School. Today's practitioners can choose from any number of treasure-based ritual systems, which share in common the ritual structures in the Spoken Teachings. The Spoken Teachings are thus foundational, and as a central text, the *Gathering of Intentions* represents an especially institutional aspect of the Nyingma School. Nonetheless, the current popularity and the fascinating origins of the Treasure Teachings have brought them considerable scholarly attention, while the Spoken Teachings have only recently begun to receive the notice they deserve.

Summary of contents

Almost all Tibetan canonical works—sutras and tantras—are supposed to have been translated from Sanskritic originals. The *Gathering of Intentions* represents a rare exception, for it purports to have been translated into Tibetan from Burushaski (Tib. *Bru sha skad*), a linguistically exotic language spoken today in just one remote valley in Kashmir. Given internal evidence, there may be some limited truth to the *Gathering of Intentions*' claim, but the bulk of its pages were more likely composed directly in Tibetan. This probably occurred around the middle of the ninth century, at the beginning of Tibet's "age of fragmentation" (*sil bu'i dus*), a period of social disintegration that saw the gradual collapse of the Pugyel empire that had ruled Tibet and much of Central Asia from the seventh through the ninth centuries.

The *Gathering of Intentions*' original purpose was to provide Tibetans with a comprehensive system for organizing all of the Buddhist teachings—and especially the tantric teachings—that had so far

arrived in Tibet. It wove together many of the day's most popular myths, doxographical schemes, rituals, and doctrines into a single, elaborate structure. In constructing their comprehensive system, its authors deployed a range of strategies, perhaps most importantly a scheme of nine "vehicles" (i.e., methods for traversing the Buddhist path to enlightenment) that gathered all the Buddhist teachings into a single organizational hierarchy. The *Gathering of Intentions*' initiation ceremony, whereby the disciple was ritually inducted into the mandala and taught its secret rites, could grant initiation into some or all of the nine levels of the teachings. The mandala palace had nine stories, one for each vehicle, with spaces for all the deities relevant to that vehicle to dwell. The *Gathering of Intentions*' Gathered Great Assembly Mandala thus provided room for all nine vehicles of its doxographic scheme. Its authors included the exoteric teachings of the sutras, but their attentions were clearly focused on the esoteric tantras, and particularly the three highest vehicles, Mahāyoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga. They developed new tantric equivalents for some of the best-known exoteric doctrines of the Buddhist sutras—ten tantric levels (*bhūmi*) through which the practitioner must ascend, five "yogas" corresponding to the five paths of the Mahāyāna sutras, and so on. The result was a massive work, meant to encompass no less than the entirety of the Buddhist dharma.

Chapter 1 of the present study begins at the beginning, with the *Gathering of Intentions*' presentations of tantric myth and its own mythic origins. The authors integrated the two principal myths that had emerged in India to explain the origins of the Buddhist tantras—that of King Dza (sometimes called Indrabhūti), who supposedly first received the tantras through a series of visions atop his palace, and that of the demon Rudra's subjugation by the buddhas, a violent act that required the extreme methods taught only in the tantras. The *Gathering of Intentions* combined these two narratives through a creative reading that would be formative for later Tibetans' approaches to both myth and ritual, at least within the Nyingma School. According to this reading, the tantric teachings always appear in the world on multiple levels at once. Every time, the tantras' "way of arising" (*byung tshul*) unfolds on three planes simultaneously—that of the primordial buddha who dwells beyond all concepts, that of pure beings who play out symbolic patterns through mythic activities, and that of worldly beings who communicate through ordinary language. Of particular significance is the second, symbolic level, for within this realm of unresolved paradoxes and multiple interpretations, Buddhists may glimpse the primordial patterns that structure their tantric practice. The chapter ends with a reading of this intermediary level according to which the tantric ritualist, on the symbolic plane, replays the multiple mythic narratives of the *Gathering of Intentions*' origins through her every reading and ritual performance.

Chapter 2 turns to the early Tibetan master Nupchen Sangyé Yeshé's late ninth-century work, the *Armor Against Darkness* (*Mun pa'i go cha*), and looks at how early Tibetans understood the *Gathering of Intentions* and its place within the larger world of tantric Buddhist ritual. At the time, the three classes of Mahāyoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga tantras were highly popular. Nupchen's writings make clear that he, at least, did not understand the *Gathering of Intentions* as a tantra of Anuyoga alone. Later Tibetan exegetes would come to classify it as such, but Nupchen saw it as encompassing all three classes. His commentary thus provides valuable insights into early Tibetan tantric Buddhism when it was still very much a tradition in the making.

Chapter 3 moves to the eleventh and twelfth centuries to take up the issue of canon formation in Tibet, focusing on the *Gathering of Intentions*-related materials written by Dampa Deshek (1122–1192), an early disciple of the influential Zur clan and founder of Katok monastery. This was a period of intense competition among the various Buddhist communities emerging at the time. Each group sought to ensure its survival by codifying and securing exclusive control over its own set of teachings; the same pressures were likely behind the very creation of the Nyingma School as such. The *Gathering of Intentions* came under attack from Tibetans who accused it of being a Tibetan

forgery, and not at all the Indic (or even Burushaski) work it claimed to be. Those who defended the work—the Zur clan and its spiritual descendents in particular—responded by canonizing it within a wider triad of tantras. They recast the *Gathering of Intentions* as a uniquely "Anuyoga" work that functioned alongside two other tantras of the Mahāyoga and Atiyoga classes, respectively. In this way, the *Gathering of Intentions* was at once downgraded, pigeonholed, and enshrined at the canonical heart of the Nyingma School.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the *Gathering of Intentions*' *apparent* influence continued to wane. Chapter 4, on initiation, traces this decline through a series of ritual manuals written for the performance of the initiation ceremony. As mentioned above, the *Gathering of Intentions*' initiation structure is unusually elaborate, as it grants initiation into any or all of nine vehicles. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, three major initiation ritual manuals were composed, each reflecting the lessening influence of the *Gathering of Intentions* to little more than a sacred placeholder within the Nyingma School. The chapter is technically dense, but for good reason: the development of tantric ritual is inherently complex, sometimes intentionally so, but it is also the language within which many aspects of Tibetan history and politics unfold. In order to gain an appreciation of the kinds of subtle shifts and competitions at stake, it is necessary to delve into this world and reckon with its complexities.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the *Gathering of Intentions*' role in the tumultuous political events of the seventeenth century. In 1642, the Fifth Dalai Lama gained control of Tibet and began consolidating the early modern Tibetan state. The *Gathering of Intentions* became a kind of pawn in the politics of the day. With the Dalai Lama's support, large new Nyingma monasteries began to spring up throughout central and eastern Tibet. The first of these was Dorjé Drak, founded just outside Lhasa in 1632. The power of Dorjé Drak grew swiftly, thanks to the combined efforts of the Fifth Dalai Lama, his regent successor, and the monastery's second head, Pema Trinlé (1641–1717). All three figures were politically astute, and all recognized the benefits of making the *Gathering of Intentions* a jewel in the crown of Dorjé Drak. To install it there, however, a new third lineage had to be created, to wrest control of the *Gathering of Intentions* away from Katok monastery and the inheritors of the Zur system in central Tibet, both longtime enemies of the Dalai Lama and Pema Trinlé. Chapter 5 therefore turns to the writings of Pema Trinlé, and in particular his collection of biographies of the past masters of the *Gathering of Intentions*' "Sutra Initiation" lineage. Through this work, Pema Trinlé sought to construct a new lineage that would put his monastery at the heart of the Nyingma School. The chapter examines his motivations and exposes the deep involvements of Nyingmapa religious masters in the politics of this formative period in Tibet's history.

Chapter 6 turns to another set of *Gathering of Intentions*-based innovations that played perhaps an even greater role in the politics of the seventeenth century. These occurred at Mindröling monastery, located just across the river from Dorjé Drak. Mindröling's founder, Terdak Lingpa (1646–1714), together with his brother, Lochen Dharmaśrī (1654–1717), embarked on a mission to unite the Nyingma School through rigorous historical investigation and the creation of new, large-scale ritual performances. Their strategies closely mirrored the Dalai Lama's own use of public festivals in his construction of the nascent Tibetan state, and their efforts marked a turning point in the identity of the Nyingma School. Late into their lives, they worked assiduously to export their new vision, inviting lamas from all over Tibet to grand festivals at their monastery, during which they would transmit their new ritual systems.

Finally, chapter 7 examines the tensions between conservation and modernization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the mid-nineteenth century, an elaborate new Spoken Teachings festival (*bka' ma'i sgrub mchog*) was created at Pelyul monastery in eastern Tibet. Within a few years, all the largest "mother" monasteries in Kham had adopted the festival, and today it is perhaps the

largest uniquely Nyingma event to be observed on an annual basis at almost all of the school's major monasteries, both within Tibet and in exile. In this form, the *Gathering of Intentions* has been preserved into the modern day, yet the tantra itself plays an incongruous role. On the one hand, it defines the ritual space for, and thus the basic structure of, the entire festival; on the other hand, its own rituals are strangely absent from the proceedings. This incongruity reflects the tensions inherent in canonization and preservation. The chapter concludes with an account of the remarkable events of the twentieth century, a series of adventures that included the magical rediscovery of a long-lost text, the self-conscious reenactment of the *Gathering of Intentions*' mythic origins atop a remote mountain in eastern Tibet, and the fateful smuggling of a manuscript across the world's highest mountain range. Each is another tale of preservation, another example of how Tibetans struggled to maintain their religious traditions in the face of possible extinction.

Today, the *Gathering of Intentions* and its commentaries are almost never read and its rites are rarely performed, yet its organizational strategies, especially its nine vehicles schema and its elaborate mythologies, continue to be highly influential from behind the scenes. In a sense, the *Gathering of Intentions*' gradual demise was written into its nature, made inevitable by its very success. Back in the ninth and tenth centuries, the *Gathering of Intentions* was meant to provide Tibetans with an elaborate system for organizing all the doctrines and practices that were flooding in from India. In this it succeeded, but after its systems had been widely adopted (in the eleventh and twelfth centuries), the *Gathering of Intentions* itself, as a read text, began to fade away. Its purpose had been achieved. Its innovations and structures had become so ubiquitous as to disappear from sight. Today, the *Gathering of Intentions* continues to be fundamental to the identity of the Nyingma School, but its structures are so familiar to the Nying-mapa that they are usually overlooked. To look for them is like the eye looking for the eye, to use a traditional Buddhist metaphor. And in this sense, the *Gathering of Intentions*' influence functions very much on the symbolic level, beyond the ken of ordinary beings involved in routine religious practices. Few, if any see or read the tantra itself, yet they repeat its mythic patterns daily, patterns that continue to work on an invisible plane, providing the structures and the shared archetypes that Tibetans of the Nyingma School inhabit.

Dharmakīrti on the Cessation of Suffering: A Critical Edition with Translation and Comments of Manorathanandin's Vṛtti and Vibhūticandra's Glosses on Pramāṇavārttika II.190-216 edited and translated by Cristina Pecchia and Philip Pierce [Series: Brill's Indological Library, Brill, 9789004293410]

Liberation is a fundamental subject in South Asian doctrinal and philosophical reflection. This book is a study of the discussion of liberation from suffering presented by Dharmakīrti, one of the most influential Indian philosophers. It includes an edition and translation of the section on the cessation of suffering according to Manorathanandin, the last commentator on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika in the Sanskrit cosmopolis. The edition is based on the manuscript used by Sāṅkṛtyāyana and other sources. Methodological issues related to editing ancient Sanskrit texts are examined, while expanding on the activity of ancient pandits and modern editors.

CONTENTS

Preface
PART
Introductory Study
General Introduction
A Note on the Translation of ãryasatya and nirodhasatya
1 Competing Dharmas and Philosophical Traditions
Dharma and moksha as Subjects of Philosophical Debate
Soteriology and Apologetics
The Authentication of the Dharma
The Nobles' Truths in Dharmakïrti's Work
2 Dharmakïrti on the nirodhasatya
Causation
The View of a Self
3 The Texts of the Present Edition-Cum-Translation and Their Authors
Dharmakïrti
Manorathanandin
Vibhüticandra
Dharmakïrti's Pramãmavãrttika
Manorathanandin's Vrtti on the Pramã^avãrttika
Vibhüticandra's Glosses on Manorathanandin's Vrtti
4 The Pramã^asiddhi Chapter
Dharmakïrti on the Opening Stanza of Dignãga's Pramãdasamuccaya
Structuring the Pramã^asiddhi Chapter: A Historical Overview
The nirodhasatya Section in the tãyin Section
PART 2
Prolegomena to the Edition of the Texts
5 Scope, Methodology, and Aims of the Present Edition
6 Transmission of Texts and Editorial Practices
7 The Transmission of Manorathanandin's Vrtti and Its Related Texts
Vibhüticandra's Manuscript Copy (VZh)
The Printed Editions of the PVV
The Edition of Vibhüticandra's Glosses
The Kãrikãs of the PV in the Printed Editions of the PVV
8 The Sources for the Constitution of the Texts and Their Treatment
Direct Witnesses
Manorathanandin's Vrtti
Vibhüticandra's Glosses
The Kãrikãs of the PV according to Manorathanandin's Vrtti
Tibetan Translations as Sources for the Constitution of a Text
The Reference Sources 1
9 Description of the Witnesses
Manuscripts (of the PVV, PV, and PVA)
Modern Printed Editions (of the PVV, PV, and PVA)
10 Editorial Policy and Conventions
The Edited Texts
The Apparatuses
Reference Sources
Folio and Line Changes in the Manuscripts
Variant Readings
Endnotes to the Sanskrit Texts
Sigla of the Witnesses
Abbreviations and Editorial Signs Used in the Apparatuses

The Translations and the Comments
PART 3
Edition, Translation, and Comments
SECTION 1
Manorathanandin's Vrtti together with Vibhüticandra's Glosses—Sanskrit Text and English Translation
Endnotes to the Edition of Vibhüticandra's Glosses Endnotes to the Translation of the PVV
SECTION 2
The PV according to Manorathanandin's V^tti, together with Other Witnesses—Sanskrit Text and English Translation
Endnotes to the Edition of the PV Kãrikãs
Comments upon the Kãrikãs 190–216 of the Pramãmasiddhi Chapter in the PV, according to Manorathanandin's Vrtti
Appendix A—Texts in the Margins of VZh
Appendix B—Metrics in the PV
Appendix C—Synopsis of the Pramãdasiddhi Chapter according to Manorathanandin's Vrtti
Appendix D—Translations of PV ii.190–216 in Modern Publications
Abbreviations and Bibliography
Index Locorum
General Index

'Suffering is not endless.' Thus begins the section on the Truth of the cessation of suffering (nirodhasatya) in the Pramãdasiddhi chapter of Dharmakïrti's Pramã^avãrttika. This simple statement and the section opened with it form part of a most influential phenomenon in the intellectual history of South Asia, namely anchoring a specific stance on the aims of human life to systematic philosophical reflection. Liberation from suffering is, in fact, one of the underlying subjects in the works composed by Dharmakïrti, Kumãrila, and Uddyotakara, to mention just some of the protagonists of the philosophical debate.

The present work is a study of Dharmakïrti's discussion of liberation according, in the main, to the interpretation offered by Manorathanandin, the last commentator on the Pramãdavãrttika in the Sanskrit cosmopolis. His view of how the Pramãdasiddhi chapter is structured—by no means the only view in the history of the reception of the text—has determined the extent of the text presented here, namely kãrikãs 190 to 216.1 Their contents and textual forms are examined in an introductory study, preparatory to offering a translation of the commentarial text (and ancillary texts) and then my own comments thereon. The latter serve the purpose of illustrating the doctrinal and philosophical thrust of Dharmakïrti's arguments and, more particularly, Manorathanandin's explanations of them—this in view of the cultural and historical distance between these texts and us.

A critical edition of Manorathanandin's Vrtti and Vibhüticandra's annotation, together with a record of the corresponding kãrikãs of the Pramã^avãrttika, was born, so to speak, in the margins of an initial translation-cum-interpretation project, which first necessitated identifying the versions of the texts in question. Returning to the text of the manuscript and comparing individual passages with their possible sources proved useful for improving on Sank^tyayana's pioneering edition of 1938–1940 and subsequent editions. Since methodological problems related to editing ancient Sanskrit texts are still insufficiently appreciated and the superfluousness of this type of work, in spite of authoritative justifications, is repeatedly asserted, it seemed necessary to me to precede the present edition of the texts with prolegomena—maybe rather too lengthy ones—that explain the reasons for and methods applied to the edition itself, while expanding more generally on the activity of both ancient pandits and modern editors.

***

In the thirties of the 20th century, Pandit Rãhula Sãakatyãyana visited a number of Tibetan monasteries, where he discovered manuscripts containing, in some cases, major texts in Sanskrit of the Indian Buddhist logical-epistemological tradition. Among these texts were Dharmakïrti's Pramã^avãrttika along with Prajñãkaragupta's and Manorathanandin's commentaries on it, which texts Sãakatyãyana himself would edit in the coming years.

One chapter of the Pramã^avãrttika—the Pramã^asiddhi—analyzes specific epithets that characterize the Buddha and are related to the authoritativeness of his teaching. Within this context, approximately the second half of the chapter presents something unique in comparison with both previous and later works of the logical-epistemological tradition: a systematic discussion of the four Nobles' Truths, ãryasatyas, possibly the most common subject in the innumerable incarnations of what since the 19th century has been called Buddhism. The present book investigates the section on the Truth of the cessation of suffering (nirodhasatya) in the Pramãdasiddhi chapter, and particularly according to the interpretation that Manorathanandin, the last commentator on the Pramãavãrttika in the Sanskrit cosmopolis, gave to it.

Passages from this part of the chapter have been examined in previous studies that have concentrated upon larger topics, as in Tilmann Vetter's pathbreaking Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakïrti (1964) and Vincent Eltschinger's series of articles from 2005 onwards, which focus on Dharmakïrti's religious philosophy. Further contributions are Vetter's German translation from 1984, along with Masatoshi Nagatomi's (1957) and Eli Franco's unpublished English translations (both of which, given their 'unofficial' character, have irregularly leavened the past few decades of studies). In short, then, Dharmakïrti's discussion of the nirodhasatya and, more generally, of the four Truths has hitherto not been analyzed separately, nor have the Indian commentaries on it been adequately considered.

The four Nobles' Truths are the basic framework into which, traditionally, the Buddha condensed his direct experience of liberation from du^kha (suffering or unsatisfactoriness), and indeed they form the subject of his first discourse, the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta ('The discourse on the setting into motion of the wheel of the dharma'). A succinct restatement of the ^ryasatyas is "(1) that worldly existence coincides with du^kha ... ; (2) that this condition has an origin (samudaya); (3) that it has also an end or cessation (nirodha); and (4) that there is a way leading to this goal" (m^rga). Based on the four satyas and other fundamental lists such as the three lak^a^as ('characteristics') or the five skandhas ('constituents'), early Indian Buddhist communities developed a systematic body of thought that, importantly, includes a theory of liberation. Early Canonical texts testify to the fact that such a development resulted in different accounts of nirv^^a and a variety of explanatory models.8 In general, as Steven Collins writes:

> Nirvana is indeed the ultimate religious goal, a state of release from all suffering and impermanence, but no language or concepts can properly describe it. It is atakk^vacara, "inaccessible to (discursive) thought" .... In particular, it cannot be described as the state of a (or the) self.

In the traditional language, nirv^^a is unconditioned (asa^sk^ta), since it does not arise from any cause, but is attained only when the causes and conditions of suffering are extinguished. The Sarvãstivãdins, in contrast with other currents, maintained that this special feature characterized two kinds of nirvã^a (pratisadkhyãnirodha and apratisa^khyãnirodha) in addition to space (ãkãša), and that nirvãna is a real entity. Rejecting the models of the final goal of Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas, Yogãcãra and Mahãyãna circles elaborated other models of nirvã^a based on the Bodhisattva ideal, whose special goal of attaining full awakening involves helping all other living beings towards the same attainment. This latter provision, based on the notion of compassion, is as conspicuous by its

absence in Canonical texts as it is constitutive of the conception of the ultimate goal of the Bodhisattva in Mahãyãna texts.

This is Dharmakïrti's doctrinal point of view in his discussion of the nirodhasatya and, more generally, of the ãryasatyas: a defence of the Bodhisattva ideal against other Buddhist and non-Buddhist views of liberation. He himself seems to emphasize this at the end of the Pramã^asiddhi chapter, where, echoing Dignãga's text, he refers to the Buddha's superiority over outsiders as well as Šaik^as and Ašaik^as (namely Šrãvakas). Within a speculative approach which does not indulge in the use of doctrinal definitions, he clearly takes position on major doctrinal issues, revealing—unlike his predecessor Dignãga in the Pramã^asamuccaya—an exacerbation not only of the intellectual intertradition debate, but also of the intra-tradition one. Various factors allows us to speculate that around the middle of the first millennium of the Christian era the relationships between the supporters of the Bodhisattva ideal and those of the Šrãvaka ideal were less harmonious than at the time of the early Mahãyãna Sütras, from which a peaceful co-existence of bodhisattvas with šrãvakas can be inferred. The nirvana section of the Viniščayasamgrahadï in the YBhü, for example, describes Šrãvakas as able to stretch the lifetime determined by their karman and remain many kalpas in sa^sãra, with ample possibility to engage in the Mahãyãna spiritual praxis. Turning against Šrãvakayãna and Pudgalavãda models of liberation and in favour of the Bodhisattva ideal seems, instead, to have become urgent in Dharmakïrti's environment.

The topics he selects in his discussion of the Truth of the cessation of suffering show the need to insist on a specific interpretation of the teaching of the Buddha regarding liberation, and not merely on the acceptance of such teaching, although this constitutes the first and foremost point he makes. His broader project includes indeed the intra-tradition debate, as showed by the Pramã^asiddhi chapter, where the target is not only the virtual intellectual community as a whole, which questioned the Buddhist dharma and asked for a sound justification of it, but also various trends within the Buddhist doctrine.

A Note on the Translation of ãryasatya and nirodhasatya

'Noble Truths' has become the standard English translation of the compound ãryasatyãni, or ariyasaccãni in Pãli. Nonetheless, as K.R. Norman has noted, this is a most unlikely rendering of the compound, in that it makes of it a karmadhãraya. Pãli and Sanskrit sources, in fact, largely attest a tatpuru^a in the sense of 'Truths of the Noble One(s)' or 'Truths for the Noble One(s)'. One of Dharmakïrti's sources, the Abhidharmakošabha^ya, contains an explanation to this effect when it says "ãryã^ãm etãni satyãni tasmãd ãryasatyãni". As observed by Peter Masefield with regard to the Pali compound ariyamagga,

the ariyan path is ariyan, not because it is 'noble', but because it is trodden by those who are themselves ariyans and who have undergone the ariyan (re-)birth at the culmination of a progressive talk with the arising of the Dhammacakkhu. The Pali expression ariyamagga should thus be better rendered 'the ariyans' path' or 'the path of the ariyans'.

However, according to the context, a range of meanings is found to be associated with the term ãrya ('noble'), from the Buddha to anyone who has attained a certain state of realization; satya, on the other hand, may denote a propositional truth or a type of reality, but it may also be used in a non-univocal sense. However, in the case of the ãryasatyas, satyas are not truth claims made on behalf of a set of beliefs, as the word 'truth' might erroneously lead one to think; rather, they are that which is true for those who have attained the status of Noble Ones. In view of this, scholars have suggested translations such as "Principles or Realities of the Nobles" (Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 175), "realities to nobles" (Enomoto 1996: 317), or "true realities for the spiritually ennobled" (Harvey

2009). The translation adopted in the present book is 'Nobles' Truths', which has appeared in the past years as a practical rendering of the tatpuru^a compound ãryasatya/ariyasacca.

Nirodha in nirodhasatya is here translated as 'cessation', which calls for a word of caution. In the source languages, nirodha merely denotes bringing something to an end (e.g. suffering), whereas 'cessation', or analogous terms in other European target languages, can be also used without a direct object to indicate the fact or process of something coming to an end. Other renderings of nirodha are, for example, 'extinction', in the sense of the process or result of something being or becoming extinguished, or 'suppression', which has an inappropriate psychological connotation.

Competing Dharmas and Philosophical Traditions

The Buddha's teaching of the four Truths brought a novel dharma into the culture of his time, a dharma standing antagonistically second to that of the predominant Brahmanical tradition. With its guidelines on how to break free from suffering, it had a definite soteriological orientation based on an ideal of moksa. The Brahmanical dharma, on the other hand, was concerned with every aspect of life, "the cosmic, ritual and ethical-juridical". It represented the "complex" or "totality of binding norms" of a communal religion with a ritualistic orientation. Among its prominent features, there is its acknowledgement of the authority of the prescriptions contained in the Vedic samhitãs, or šruti, a corpus of revealed texts regarded as independent of an author (apau-rudeya).

The tension between traditions that set themselves up as transmitters of a specific type of dharma has affected various aspects of the history of South Asia, from the socio-political to the intellectual, and has led in particular, over time, to a variety of distinct notions associated with the word dharma. As Patrick Olivelle has observed, the term itself, far from denoting a uniform and constant concept in an "unchanging" India (as the orientalist image had it), "has been subject to deep evolution and change as it was appropriated, challenged, and sometimes even rejected by different groups and traditions."

Soteriology and Apologetics

As the debate on dharma, extended to include mok^a, is the backdrop against which Indian philosophical traditions develop their reflections upon the means of knowledge, these traditions are also typically engaged in the discussion of soteriological matters even while exploring epistemological issues. For this reason, in the terms common to Western culture, they can be considered with good reason soteriologies or religious philosophies. With regard to the Buddhist tradition of epistemological thought, Ernst Steinkellner has stated:

> While in many aspects, to be sure, many theories and ideas of this philosophical tradition appear deceptively emancipated from their religious origins, nevertheless they cannot be separated from their Buddhist presuppositions and purposes, just as medieval European logic cannot be separated from Christianity. STEINKELLNER 2010: xxi

Mutatis mutandis, the same can be stated with regard to other Indian philosophical traditions. If Dharmakïrti can be considered to have understood his work as a "rational complement to the progress towards liberation", Kumãrila, too, can be considered to have aimed at providing a rational complement to the Brahmanical dharma.

In the same vein although in other spheres of intellectual production, Ašvagho^a, for example, can be considered to have provided a literary complement to the progress towards liberation, and the Dharmašãstra's authors a new "cultural grammar" that complements the Brahmanical dharma—one to which soteriological concerns could remain extraneous. The Buddhacarita and the Mãnavadharmašãstra can be interpreted—Patrick Olivelle has argued— as instances of an apologetic proposition. The former represents a Buddhist response to Brahmanical attacks and the latter an accentuated pro-Brahmanical rhetoric, which inter alia derives from a reaction to the threat posed

by rival religious groups, notably the Buddhists. They are examples of how various types of texts, while performing their genre-determined function— literary, normative, etc.—in some periods also perform the meta-function of defending a specific dharma and soteriological view.

Indian philosophical traditions naturally assumed an apologetic attitude, their approach being to defend a specific view of dharma and mok^a against perceived competitors (negative apologetics) and to explain the reasons why that dharma and that view of mok^a is to be preferred to those of the competitors (positive apologetics). Texts from the middle of the first millennium of the Christian era testify to an intense apologetic drive in connection with the elaboration of a discourse on the means of knowledge. A case in point is Dharmakïrti's work. Eli Franco has remarked that some crucial statements of the Pramã^asiddhi chapter of the Pramã^avãrttika are made within an apologetic framework since Dharmakïrti "aims at anchoring his own epistemology in the original message of the Buddha". Furthermore, Vincent Eltschinger has observed that Dharmakïrti was "the intellectual who provided epistemology (i.e., Dignaga's philosophical programme) with a full-fledged positive/direct apologetic commitment", linking "within a single apologetic concern, theoretical elaborations on logic/dialectics to a soteriological enterprise." An apologetic attitude is particularly evident in the Pramã^asiddhi chapter, where Dharmakïrti presents a defence of specific Buddhist views of soteriological import. In doing so, he shows how his work performs the argumentative and philosophical functions expected of it against a distinct doctrinal backdrop, and sheds light on the backdrop itself by providing a philosophical key to interpret it. The intellectual (but also socio-political) situation of his time were what most likely spurred on Dharmakïrti to do so, that is, to provide a response to renewed challenges that the Buddhist community had to face with regard to some crucial points of contention.

Dharma and moksha as Subjects of Philosophical Debate

The tension and interplay between competing dharmas triggered an intellectual debate in which the notion of moksha (liberation from the cycle of rebirths and, thus, from suffering) eventually became integral to the problematics associated with the notion of dharma. This debate was the background against which important Sutras and commentaries were redacted or composed anew around the middle of the first millennium of the Christian era. They attest the arising and development of distinct philosophical traditions, in the manner defined by Ben-Ami Scharfstein: individual thinkers, or the group that they represent, subtly articulate a number of specific points, going beyond common reflection as a trait of human activity. They do so by formulating "principles—if only principles of interpretation—and ... conclusions reasonably drawn from them". Further, they formulate "reasonable arguments—even those that deny reason"—that serve to put one's own view across to opponents, "and understand and explain how they try to be reasonable."

Philosophical texts from the middle of the first millennium undergo a primary shift from investigating about the principles of debate to exploring the means of knowledge and logical tools of analysis, and in doing so gradually develop a consistent epistemological and logical approach under specific doctrinal presuppositions. Such an approach characterizes Dignãga's and Dharmakïrti's Buddhist philosophical work, and is central to other philosophical traditions as well. They all mainly identified themselves with their particular methodology, and labelled themselves accordingly. Vãtsyãyana Pak^ilasvãmin (ca. 400 CE) and Uddyotakara, for example, state that Nyãya is the science of the self (ãtmavidyã) and serves the purpose of guiding one towards the goal of final liberation (apavarga), but it differs from the Upani^adic science of the self in its method of examination, calling for the means of knowledge to be systematically thematized. Sã^khya and Vaiše^ika, on the other hand, respectively exemplify a 'vertical' and 'horizontal' type of enumeration of world constituents. Mïmãmsã, which the opening verse of the Mïmãmsãsütra defines as "inquiry into dharma" (dharmajijñãsã), is eminently

concerned with textual exegesis as a continuation of its original task of furnishing a science of the Vedic ritual.

Mutual influence intensified as arguments were pressed in favour of specific epistemological stances among the various currents of thought, with participants being challenged to defend their point of view, including their methods and presuppositions. The Yogasütras, for example, present a fourfold division that clearly reflects the four Truths of Buddhism (namely sa^sãra, sa^sãra- hetu, mok^a, and mokaopãya), and Nyãyasütra 1.1.2 contains a list very similar to that of the dependent origination of phenomena as described in the Buddhist tradition. The phenomenon of Tantrism, which appears around the middle of the first millennium of the Christian era, brings into the intellectual history of premodern India a fully new attempt to reconcile the mok^a ideal with forms of theodicy, based on a special revelation different from the Veda, and with a strong ritualistic orientation. On the other hand, however, the Mïmã^sã—as Wilhelm Halbfass has observed—preserves its ritualistic orientation, primarily dealing "with dharma, not with mok^a", and "with the specific efficacy of the Vedic sacrificial works." Currents such as the Lokãyata or Cãrvãka, which modern Western scholars have subsumed under the general rubric of materialism, represent a special case. For they radically reject the value of the Vedic tradition and the related Brahmanical prescriptions, and at the same time reject any mok^a-based ideal, maintaining that the physical body, as the only truly existent thing, does not return once it has been burnt to ashes. Thus, uniquely to them, they deny karman and any belief in the ãtman or in the existence of consciousness independently of the body.

The Authentication of the Dharma

One of the crucial issues related to the question of why the (pre-existing) Brah-manical dharma should be abandoned and trust placed in another (novel) dharma is the authority of the dharma, which involves the authority of its source. This issue has characterized since the beginning the religious-philosophical discussion in South Asia, creating a tension between 'absolute' authority and authority based on experience—a tension that in the course of history has taken various forms, including that of dogmatic belief as against mysticism. Whereas the Brahmanical tradition claims 'absolute' (i.e. unconditional) authority on behalf of the Veda because of its independence from the "intentions and experiences" of an author, discourses in the Pãli Canon have the Buddha (whose word is the source of the dharma) emphasizing the role of experience with regard to the dharma. In the Brahmajãlasutta, for example, he is said to have stated that he sets forth what he has realized—a point that Dharmakïrti will mention at the beginning of his discussion of the four Truths. Furthermore, whereas the Buddha recommends testing personally the dharma he has expounded, the Brahmanical tradition questions the very possibility of attaching any value to a dharma that has the word of a Buddha as its source, in view of his entanglement in the worldly condition.

Objections to the authoritativeness of the Buddhist dharma because of its source were not only raised at an intellectual level, but also at a socio-political level, and evidently to such a degree that some redactors added a nidãna (introduction) to the Canonical Suttas. The formula "eva^ mayã suta^" that routinely opens the Suttas served the purpose of certifying that the Sutta in question had been heard/learnt (šruta) directly from the Buddha and then transmitted—what Sheldon Pollock has called "the historical authentication of the text". An analogous strategy was very likely applied in Mahãyãna environments, where specific texts were made to assume the form of Sütras by the hand of redactors who introduced references to the authorial function of the Buddha. Either they credited him with discourses that in previous versions of the same text were ascribed to named individuals, or else they claimed authoritativeness for an individual's discourse in virtue of the authority of the words of the Buddha referred to in it.

Dharmakïrti by contrast provides a 'rational' authentication of the dharma. For, by demonstrating which content remains valid after rational scrutiny, he also demonstrates that the content of the

Buddha's teaching (the four Truths) is valid. In doing so, he shows how the epistemological method he is developing and refining entails an engagement with central theoretical questions concerning the dharma.

The Nobles' Truths in Dharmakïrti's Work

Dharmakïrti's rational authentication of the dharma includes a lengthy presentation of the four Truths in the Pramã^asiddhi chapter, as part of the explanation of an epithet of the Buddha, tãyin, within the larger frame of the proof of the Buddha's epistemic reliability. Dharmakïrti opens his discussion of the four Truths stating that they are what the Buddha personally saw and, out of compassion, decided to explain to others. In PV i.215–21743 Dharmakïrti had already defined the Truths as an object of inference that acts with the force of real entities (vastubalaprav^tta) and is not dependent on ãgama. In the same context, he terms them pradhãnãrtha, 'main content', and characterizes them as reliable (avisa^vãda), since—Manorathanandin comments— realizing them conduces to attaining nirvã^a. The rest of the Buddha's teaching consists in radically inaccessible (atyantaparok^a) contents, such as the details of the law of karma or his description of heaven, contents which are ascertained through an inference that is scripturally based (ãgamãšritãnumãna).

As remarked by the commentators, Dharmakïrti refers to the four Truths elsewhere, in particular, in PV i i.33, when he uses the term tattva in connection with what the Buddha sees, or at PV iii.285–286 and NB i.11, when he speaks of the object of the yogi's direct perception—an object that he calls a bhüta, vastu, or bhütãrtha.49 In the Pramãaviniścaya, Dharmakïrti will explicitly mention the four Truths as the object of the yogi's perception.

Furthermore, once the yogis (they who practise mental cultivation) have grasped the contents [of knowledge] in virtue of the wisdom resulting from hearing/learning [and] have ascertained [these contents] in virtue of [the wisdom resulting from] reflecting [upon them] by means of reasoning, they practise the mental cultivation [of these contents]. At the completion of this [process], what appears as vividly as, for example, in the case of fear, is a cognition that is not conceptual [and] does not have something unreal as its object; [that is, it is] direct perception, just as the vision of the Nobles' Truths—as we explained in the Pramãavãrttika. <> <>