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SCRIPTABLE

A Bispectral Review of Recent Books

Robert Tenor, editor

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Editorial

Scriptable is an irregular review of what was once called the belles-lettres, where we essay upon a wide assortment of current books and articles with an eye open for "the beautiful jumble of discordant congruencies" derived from the authors and titles under discussion. We cast a wide academic net through the social sciences and humanities, with a strong orientation toward current events, social theory, religious and cultural studies.

With this number we move away from a simple reportage of current scholarship to something more ambitious. The body of each issue includes editorial essays examining themes inspired by the works under consideration. The sum of our reviews are carefully pruned excerpts from the books themselves so as to preview the style and technicality of the text itself.

Our purpose is to inform and entertain. Through the review essays we hope to visit new and timeworn places through unsettled ideas in currency newly minted. Perhaps to see the outlandish as intimate and to show up the familiar as stranger than before thought.

Each issue should surprise.

Contents: Catholic Ethics & Scottish Philosophy

A History of Catholic Theological Ethics by James F. Keenan SJ [Paulist Press, 9780809155446]

An introduction to Catholic theological ethics through the lens of its historical development from the beginning of the church until today. Starting with the Scriptures, and in particular the New Testament, the author looks at the inspiration and foundational values and virtues that emerge from its moral instruction.

This is a comprehensive study of every period in the history of the tradition, from the early Patristic period to the history of the Penitentials and Confessionals, to the founding of religious orders and universities, the emergence of scholasticism, the birth of modern casuistry, the Council of Trent and the subsequent moral manuals, to contemporary Reformers within the Global Church.

Reviews

"The task of writing a history of moral theology is daunting. James Keenan has written a superb history. The breadth and depth of this work are stunning. The narrative is clear, logically developed, and convincing. We are all in his debt."
—Charles Curran. author, Sixty Years of Moral Theology (Paulist Press, 2021)

"James F. Keenan, SJ, is among the most important Catholics in the world today writing on theological ethics. In this book, he displays his dazzling knowledge of the breadth of the Catholic tradition as it stretches from the New Testament to the present, and he combines that knowledge with compelling insights into its relevance for our times. Indispensable for the professional, the book is, despite its great learning, accessible to the general reader. I congratulate James Keenan on the landmark achievement of *A History of Catholic Theological Ethics*."
—John W. O'Malley, SJ, University Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University

"The inimitable James Keenan has provided us with another moral-theological tour de force—surfacing twenty centuries of theological innovation in a tradition better known for its attachments to the past. Carried by Keenan's signature themes of mercy, conscience, spirituality, and virtue, this history moves ever forward into the diversity of perspectives,

emergence of women, and reverse of direction from the local to the universal, that characterize this century's global church. This far-reaching and learned work will educate, stimulate, and provoke, all in a highly readable style with existential power."
—Lisa Sowle Cahill, Donald Monan, SJ, Professor of Theology, Boston College

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True story.

In late March 1981, a year before I would be ordained a priest, I was living in Cambridge, Massachusetts, studying theology at what was then called Weston Jesuit School of Theology. The phone in the hallway rang and I answered it. The caller asked, "Can I speak to Jim Keenan?" "Speaking." "Jim, it's Al. I'd like to see you." "Al? Al, who?" "Al Bartlett, your vice provincial for formation." "Oh, hi, Al. You want to see me? When?" "Today or tomorrow if necessary." "But I'm in Cambridge and you

are in New York." "No, I'm in Cambridge." "Why?" "To see you." "But, Al, everybody else from the province is away" "No matter, I only came to see you."

In the history of religious life, unannounced visits by religious superiors are rarely a cause for joy.

"Where are you?" "Across the street, at the superior's office." My anxiety surged. "I will be right there."

When I met with Al Bartlett, he told me he had come because the previous day the provincial consultors met and, during the meeting, the provincial made the decision I was to do doctoral studies. "Since we made the decision yesterday, we thought you should be the first to know"

In 1981 I had been a Jesuit for eleven years, facing one more year before ordination. This was the first time I had ever considered doctoral studies. "In what?" I asked. "We thought maybe urban studies, maybe political science. Does not matter. We want you to a get doctorate and you and I are meeting tomorrow right here at the same time, and you are going to tell me what you will study."

Ignatian discernment for Jesuits is a lot more rushed than when it is offered to our lay colleagues.

I decided I would wait until dinner to ask my community members what they thought. I need to mention that among the dozen community members were two superb theologians: Brian Daley and John O'Malley. In my years at Weston Jesuit, I effectively became John's disciple. I took several courses with him, but it was by living with him that I learned what living scholarship was like. His influence on my way of articulating and pursuing both pedagogical and research goals, as a theologian, is without parallel.

When told my community about my day, to my astonishment, there was an immediate consensus on two points: thank God somebody told me to do a doctorate (O'Malley was the loudest on this point), and that I should study moral theology. Why? According to them, whenever I spoke up in class on any matter related to moral theology, I was insightful and interesting.

I never had such validation in one day.

The next day, I went to see Al. Moral theology, I told him.

"Where?" he asked. I said, "Probably the Gregorian University in Rome, I want to study the tradition and I want to study with Josef Fuchs."

And so I did.

I went to study in Rome because I believed that the Catholic moral tradition was richer and more complex and less repressive and more responsive than most thought it was. In 1981, in the United States, I believed progressives were not much interested in the tradition, while conservatives were very interested in keeping it tethered to the past. I believed only by going to Rome could I learn the tradition well.

In hindsight, I do not know if the Gregorian University was the best place to learn the tradition, but I got what I wanted. I studied especially with two exceptional moralists, Klaus Demmer, MSC (1931-2014)1 and Josef Fuchs, SJ (1912-2005).2 I did my licentiate with Demmer and my doctorate with Fuchs, being the last student who enrolled with him. Besides their direction, I studied several courses with wonderful teachers like Louis Vereecke, CSsR (1920-2012), Edouard Hamel, SJ (1920-2008), Wilhelm Ernst (1927-2001), Francis A. Sullivan, SJ (1922-2019), Jared Wicks, SJ (1929—), and Jean Zizioulas (1931—). Every one of these faculty members was interested in an understanding of theology as rooted in a living and ongoing tradition.

In my years of teaching since starting in 1987, I have been trying to share with my students an appreciation for the humane complexity and giftedness of the tradition. Therein along the way I have been trying to put together a narrative of that tradition.

To fashion that narrative, I have developed over the past thirty-three years a repertoire of graduate courses that might give you an idea of how I have worked to write these pages that you have now in your hand. One was a reading of the Pars Secunda of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. This course covers the entire middle part of the Summa, which singularly focuses on moral theology: the 114 questions of the first section, which provides the foundations, and 189 questions of the second section, which covers the specifics of morals according to the seven virtues. I enjoy watching graduate students eventually engage scholastic language as they grow in familiarity with it and then begin to appreciate the development of Aquinas's theology, to say nothing of the breadth, depth, and nuance of it.

I have also developed a course entitled "Catholic Theological Ethics: 1300-1900." Here I taught basically a major text each class: Peter Abelard's Ethics, Peter Lombard's Fourth Book of the Sentences, major questions from Thomas's Summa, disputation texts of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Erasmus's Enchiridion and The Complaint of Peace, Francisco de Vitoria's Political Writings, Bartolomé de las Casas's In Defense of the Indians, The Catechism of the Council of Trent, Francisco Suarez's A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, a number of texts on Jesuit casuistry such as Friederich Spee's Cautio Criminalis, and Alphonsus Liguori's On Conscience.

I have also taught a history of the twentieth century, studying how a century that so definitively began with little inclination for any kind of change became a century not unlike the sixteenth century, a time of enormous challenge and accompanying innovation. This allowed me to get a sense of what it was like to slow down the narrative and descend into the particular.

My favorite graduate course has remained the same for these thirty-three years, "An Introduction to Fundamental Morals," in which I take fundamental concepts like sin, conscience, intentionality, and virtue and try to show the historical/traditional claims they have on us. This book is born out of that course.

In the middle of offering these courses, around 1994, DanielHarrington invited me to team-teach a course on the New Testament and ethics. Dan and I taught together for more than twenty years, first teaching the Synoptic Gospels, then Paul, and finally the Gospel of John. That experience with Dan convinced me that this history needed to start with the New Testament.

Now, at this point, I offer you a brief history of Catholic theological ethics and I need to conclude with three points of explanation. First, let me say a word about the difference between moral theology and theological ethics. Until the end of the last century, moral theology was about the formation of judgment for one's personal and interpersonal conduct. As such, basic courses on moral theology have been taught from the time seminaries were designed, that is, in the wake of the Council of Trent. At the start, this area was quite comprehensive. In time, other separate fields of investigation arose, notably sexual ethics, in part because the hierarchy dedicated so much time to this topic, and then in the late nineteenth century, social ethics, which effectively developed when Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903) promulgated the first social encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891). Later, another field developed in the 1950s

known as medical ethics. Later, after Vatican II, questions were raised about how moral theology taught its foundational anthropology or vision about the person. Rather than emphasizing the person's uniqueness, a significant turn developed about the person as constitutively relational or social. In time, moral theology needed to be integrated not only with sexual and medical ethics but also with social ethics. This more comprehensive, inclusive view, which in fact is how the field started in the beginning of the seventeenth century, is what we now call theological ethics.

Second, though this work is called a history, I am not a historian and in fact most of those who have already tried to offer a history were, like me, theological ethicists. Here I think of John Mahoney's The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition,' John Gallagher's Time Past, Time Future: An Historical Study of Catholic Moral Theology,4 and Renzo Gerardi's Storia della Morale: Interpretazioni teologiche dell'esperienza Cristiana.' My attempt is different from theirs. Gallagher was very much focused on the proprium of moral theology. As we will see in the fifth chapter, moral theology does not become an actual field of inquiry until the Council of Trent and its subsequent formation of seminary education. Gallagher superblytook us through the accomplishment of Trent and its legacy from the so-called moral manuals, or textbooks. Rather than Gallagher's explication of these texts, Mahoney's interests were to name and study some of the sources of the moral tradition that may have compromised a more Spirit-based moral theology that could more faithfully serve the people of God. His was a work aiming at reform. Gerardi framed a variety of theological interpretations of Christian experience and presented them in a historico-encyclopedic fashion. His was a foundational resource for teachers in the field.

I take from Mahoney and Gerardi the belief that moral theology is more than the moral manuals, but unlike Mahoney I believe that the tradition was founded on the pursuit of holiness and not, as he believed, on the confession of sin. Unlike Gerardi's more episodic focus, I attempt more of a narrative.

Moreover, in crafting a narrative, I am less interested in the historical development of particular moral concepts like sin, conscience, authority, or the virtues, nor in particular teachings on divorce, marriage, abortion, and the like. These later topics have been done already by, among others, John T. Noonan Jr. I am trying, instead, to make sense out of why at different times particular ways of thinking about the moral

life arose, crested, and ebbed, and why other topics, stances, and methods subsequently replaced them.

I develop this narrative aware of you the reader. I am welcoming you into my classroom. Here as a teacher, I am not only presenting why these historical cultures happened, but I am giving my particular read on them. In a word, I am trying to teach you the moral tradition as I understand it, and I believe that you the reader come to this text with a set of presuppositions that I very much am interested in engaging. Hopefully what I offer takes you beyond your present understanding of the tradition. Still, the narrative that I offer is neither seamless nor complete. Rather it's fragmentary, as Mahoney's and Gerardi's were as well.

While studying at Weston Jesuit, I learned that the work of theology is to bring the tradition forward so that the people of God have the resources to respond and to anticipate the challenges that they encounter. There, I learned that bringing the tradition forward made sense; the very word tradition comes from the Latin tradere, "to deliver, hand over, or bring forth." In a word, the tradition is something that you pass on, but as you do, it has to be adaptable, able to address what it will encounter in the future. There I learned that the tradition has to develop and adjust if it is going to help us live out our connection not only to the past but to the future.

When I studied theology in Rome, I learned that working with the tradition was fundamentally a progressive work; progress is constitutive of the tradition. From Demmer and Fuchs I learned that while history narrates the development of the tradition, theological ethics must occasion such a development.

This book is about those who occasioned such developments; it is about those responsible for the progress of theological ethics. That is how I teach theological ethics, as an enterprise that literally responds ethically to the emerging signs of the times.

Many histories about the development of thought highlight the masterpieces within a tradition. We will do that, certainly by looking at Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, but more than the-magnificent achievements within the tradition, I want to introduce you to the innovators. I want you to meet those who took the long view of the future, proposing a new approach, method, insight, or strategy to go forward.

I want to introduce you to those who have been long overlooked because they did not do a masterpiece like the Confessions or the Summa Theologiae. Yet until you understand the innovators, you will not understand how theological ethicists really

think, and if you do not know how they think, you will not learn the history of moral theology.

I believe, as you will see, that history was formed not by the grand achievers but more by the innovators: they took the first step; the achievers perfected those steps.

Take, for instance, Abelard's Sic et Non. Probably most of you do not yet know it, but once you understand what Abelard did there, you will realize how Aquinas and others conceptualized a Summa.

Abelard's text was the first blueprint for Aquinas's. Similarly, the casuistry of the mid-sixteenth century was ignited when John Mair, years before anyone else, argued through the case method in his Commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences. And, although everyone knows the achievement of Jesuit Francisco Suarez, the canvas on international law was well developed by Francisco de Vitoria, seventy years earlier.

In the last chapter that leads us to the incredible transitional period of the twentieth century, we will see one innovator after the other. We start with Alphonsus Liguori who brought advocacy, pastoral care, and moral theology together in a way that no one in theological ethics did before and conclude the book with two other innovators, William Spohn and Yiu Sing Lucas Chan, who chartered the field of biblical ethics, which, thanks to them, is just now emerging.

My narrative is then a corrective, by finally recognizing the oft-overlooked innovators who had the imagination, vision, diligence, and fortitude to carry the tradition forward. I am interested in you learning about these innovators; learning from innovators, we learn too to anticipate tomorrow by reading the indicators today.

Finally, forty years after Al's surprise visit, I am ready to share this first attempt of my understanding of the tradition that I have been so interested in knowing. It is very much a first attempt. I hope that it generates others to try to do similar projects, that by offering my reflections, others will subsequently want to develop theirs, by correcting, negating, ing, or critiquing what I have done here. I hope that this project empowers others who want to give a more global approach or a less Eurocentric one than what I provided here, though I hope they find in this offering a worthy cornerstone, or better, a foundational slab.

Indeed, hopefully this will yield other histories of theological ethics that highlight more effectively the voices and arguments of women or the thoughts and practices of particularly inspired movements. These are all much needed.

I close noting that a colleague and friend of mine in Vienna, Sigrid Muller, is working now on a similar history that likewise begins with the Bible and ends with Pope Francis. Hers, I suspect, will be more "academic" than mine. Still, we both believe that such works are needed now, believing that we can be assisted in living the moral life as Roman Catholics by appreciating the developments of the tradition. And therein hopefully by understanding the rich and complex ways that our predecessors pursued and lived the moral life, we might also, like them, understand the call to "Go and do likewise." <>

Genesis and Cosmos: Basil and Origen on Genesis 1 and Cosmology by Adam Rasmussen [Bible in Ancient Christianity, Brill, ISBN 9789004396920]

In Genesis and Cosmos Adam Rasmussen examines how Basil and Origen addressed scientific problems in their interpretations of Genesis 1. For the first time, he offers an in-depth analysis of Basil's thinking on three problems in Scripture-and-science: the nature of matter, the super-heavenly water, and astrology. Both theologians worked from the same fundamental perspective that science is the "servant" of Christianity, useful yet subordinate. Rasmussen convincingly shows how Basil used Origen's writings to construct his own solutions. Only on the question of the water does Basil break with Origen, who allegorized the water. Rasmussen demonstrates how they sought to integrate science and Scripture and thus remain instructive for those engaged in the dialogue between religion and science today.

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Scripture and Science

The question of the relationship between the Bible and science is current but not new. There are many aspects to the question, but then as now Genesis 1, which describes the origin and nature of the cosmos, plays an outsized role. The earliest interpreters of Scripture, such as Philo, grappled with the problem of cosmology. Two of these interpreters were Origen of Alexandria and Basil of Ceasarea (also known as St. Basil the Great), Greek theologians of the third and fourth centuries, respectively. They are a natural pair: each received a secular education, studying the writings of the Greek philosophers and scholars, but eventually left their secular studies behind in order to pursue a life dedicated to theological controversy and preaching. Both experienced the problem of the relationship between the Bible and secular knowledge personally, not just theoretically. This personal aspect of the question makes them excellent subjects for study, as they engaged questions of cosmology with interest and knowledge. Basil’s writings show clear signs that he took inspiration from Origen, whom he studied and admired. It is my belief, which has motivated this study, that their approach to the problem of Scripture and science has something to teach those of us today who still try to answer it.

The horns of the Bible–science dilemma are well known and well worn: one gives way to the other. Christian fundamentalists reject science, while atheistic scientists (and scientistic atheists) reject the Bible. A saying of the third-century Latin

theologian Tertullian has become, rightly or wrongly, the textbook slogan for the fundamentalist rejection of secular knowledge: "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" The rejection of religion on the basis of science has seen something of a resurgence this century, as illustrated by the massive success of The God Delusion by Oxford biologist Richard Dawkins.3 Although the masses gravitate toward either of these two extremes (science vs. Scripture), it is possible to find a middle ground. Many Christians today seek a mediation or conciliation between science and their faith. The same was true of Christians of the past. Some scholars of early Christianity have already examined the question of how some notable early Christian theologians dealt with the problem of the Bible and cosmology. It is within this field of inquiry that this book belongs.

For Basil's thoughts on cosmology, one must especially study his nine sermons called the Hexaemeron, which means "six days," i.e., Genesis 1. They are a fertile field for cosmology and theology because Basil sprinkled them with numerous references to the physics, cosmology, and biology of his day. In them, Basil drew upon his own education in Greek philosophy and science, discussing a number of different theories and hypotheses, usually weighing in with his own opinion. Although a bishop, he was well versed in secular studies. He also used, without saying so, writings of Origen. The vast majority of Origen's works, unfortunately, have been lost. Thankfully, some crucial excerpts of his commentary on the book of Genesis have survived, as well as a sermon on Genesis 1. In these and other works of his he, no less than Basil, displayed his profound erudition, both secular and scriptural.

In the hexaemeral sermons Basil encountered three specific cosmological problems that Origen also encountered, namely, the nature of matter (Gen 1:2), the water above the sky (Gen 1:6–7), and astrology (Gen 1:14). These three problems are the focus of this book, and make up its third, fourth, and fifth chapters. They do not, of course, exhaust every statement Origen and Basil ever made about cosmology, let alone ancient science generally.6 In addressing these three problems, Basil drew upon his knowledge of Origen, though he did not always agree with him. The method of this study is to specify how Basil's responses to the questions compare and contrast with the ones Origen gave to the same questions.

In the first chapter, I will look at Origen and Basil's upbringings and early career decisions. They had much in common: both received a classical, secular education while also being instructed in the Bible by their Christian families. Basil even had a familial connection to Origen. He says that his religious formation came primarily

from his grandmother, Macrina. She, in turn, was converted to Christianity during the evangelization of Pontus by St. Gregory the Wonderworker. Basil believed (and many still do) that this Gregory was the same Gregory who wrote a panegyric to Origen, and to whom Origen wrote a letter advising him to pursue theology rather than law. This connection helps explain why Basil drew so heavily upon Origen's theology, even while maintaining a guarded distance due to the brewing controversies over "Origenism." The life trajectories of the two theologians were similar. Upon attaining adulthood, each embarked upon a secular career: Origen as a "grammarian" (literature teacher) and Basil as a rhetor, who for a time pursued advanced studies in Athens. Later, they abandoned their secular careers in favor of theology, and both men were ordained presbyters (and in Basil's case bishop).

Their shared attitude toward the secular education they received was ambivalent. It is best expressed through a metaphor coined by Origen: secular studies (especially philosophy) are the "servants" of Christianity. As a servant, education helps the interpreter to discover the correct interpretation of Scripture. Nevertheless, also as a servant, it always remains subject to its mistress, Christianity. Each theologian worked out the details from this common, theoretical starting point. Basil, a bishop and polemicist, had a more conservative mindset than Origen. He placed the accent on the subordination of secular knowledge to divine revelation. In his rhetoric, Basil often excoriated philosophers for their convoluted and mutually exclusive opinions, which fell short of simple biblical truth. Despite this rhetoric, he often used secular knowledge in his sermons and treatises. Origen, a speculative thinker, placed the accent upon the usefulness of secular knowledge. He was freer and bolder than Basil, though by no means captured by philosophy (as has sometimes been claimed about him). In fact, he was just as willing as Basil to reject a philosophical idea if it contradicted Christian doctrine.

The second chapter is an examination of both authors' scriptural hermeneutics: how do they interpret the Bible? This is a necessary prelude to looking at the particular interpretations they give of Genesis 1. We cannot understand specific biblical exegeses without first understanding an exegete's methodology. Basil adopted the same system that Origen developed. Origen drew upon the thought of Philo, a Jewish contemporary of St. Paul whose views were rejected by rabbinic Judaism at the same time they were being taken up by some Christian theologians. Origen divided the Bible into three parts, which he likened to the three components of humanity: body, soul, and spirit.

The "body" is the plain, literal meaning of a passage. This meaning is expressed to the general, "simple" reader. Origen adds a major caveat, which has led to much controversy: according to him, some passages do not have a "body." That is, they should not be taken literally. For example, Gen 3:21 says that God made garments of skin for Adam and Eve. Origen thought this and similar passages to be absurd or impossible if taken literally. God put such absurdities and falsehoods into the Bible in order to alert the discerning, spiritual reader to search for a higher meaning. This kind of allegorical approach had precedent in some interpreters of Homer, who also struggled with difficult and offensive passages.

The "soul" of Scripture, according to Origen, is a nonliteral (figurative, allegorical) interpretation that speaks about virtue and vice. It is a way of reading the Bible designed to provide moral instruction. Rather than being just history lessons and ancient Israelite legislation, the stories and laws in the Bible tell us how to live, if only we can decode them properly. Origen's classic example of this kind of "psychic" exegesis is Paul's interpretation of Deut 25:4 in 1 Cor 9:9–10. Paul took a statute about not muzzling oxen and turned it into a moral instruction about paying missionaries for their labor. According to Origen, every passage of the Bible contains such a hidden, psychic meaning, though these meanings can only be discovered by readers who have begun to progress in the spiritual (ascetic) lifestyle.

Finally, the highest (or deepest) level of Scripture is its "spirit." This is a second, distinct allegorical interpretation, concerned not with morality but with theology. Deep truths about God and Christ are hidden beneath every biblical passage. Such spiritual messages can be puzzled out only by the "perfect," that is, those (like Origen) fully practicing the ascetic lifestyle. Although this sounds very esoteric, in reality Origen often delivered these spiritual interpretations in his sermons preached in church, right alongside literal and moral interpretations. Since his congregations must have been made up of ordinary, married people, they at least had access to the spiritual meaning of the Bible through him.

In his various sermons, particularly those on the Psalms, Basil uses Origen's threefold system. His friend St. Gregory Nazianzen also confirms that this was Basil's hermeneutic. Yet in Basil's nine sermons on Genesis 1, Basil eschewed allegorical readings in favor of a literal approach. In the final homily, he responds to criticism by deriding allegorical exegesis, likening it to the interpretation of dreams! Did he turn his back on Origenian exegesis after so many years? No. Although his rhetoric does give that misleading impression, the issue is one of biblical genre. In his

struggle against dualistic theologies and cosmologies (associated with Gnosticism), Basil insisted that Genesis 1 should be taken literally. The reason was that dualists supported their worldview by appealing to allegorical readings of the "darkness" and "abyss" of Genesis 1, which they interpreted to be the cosmic principle of Evil, locked in an eternal struggle with Good (God). Against this, Basil maintained that Genesis 1 means what it says: everything God made, including the darkness, the abyss, and the sea creatures that live in it, is intrinsically good. There is no cosmic Evil. The scriptural cosmogony is not a cryptic myth in need of allegorical deciphering. It is a straightforward, true account of the origin of the universe. Basil's insistence upon a literal reading brings him into conflict with Origen, for whom the first three chapters of Genesis were quintessential examples of texts not meant to be taken literally.

In chapter 3, I will look at the first issue Origen and Basil encountered in reading Genesis 1, which is the "unformed earth" of v. 2. The word unformed (^^^^^^^^^^^^^^) suggested to Christians as early as St. Justin the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of "formless matter." The idea was that everything in the universe is constituted from some undifferentiated, shapeless stuff. This "prime matter" was the passive principle that, when it encountered the active principle (God), became everything we see—the physical cosmos. This matter became perceptible only when it took particular "forms," like a rock, a tree, or an animal. (This theory is called "hylomorphism.") Interpreting Gen 1:1–2 in the light of this scientific theory made for a neat harmony of science and Scripture.

The danger of this neat idea, first perceived by Theophilus of Antioch in the late second century, was that such a view of matter, if not carefully qualified, would make matter equal to God. The universe would draw its beginning, not from one eternal principle, but two: God and matter. Indeed, Plato compared God to a father and the "receptacle" (which ancient philosophers assimilated to Aristotle's "matter") to a mother. It was necessary for Christians to state, as Theophilus did, that prime matter itself must first have been made by God out of nothing (ex nihilo). By the standards of philosophy, this qualification seemed absurd, since nothing can come from nothing.

We know from Origen that some educated Christians took this objection seriously. In order to get around the problem of having nothing come from nothing (it can't come from God, since God is one and uncompounded), they rejected the theory of hylomorphism. According to them, only the "forms" exist: there is no such thing as

"matter." This allowed them to postulate a single principle of being (God) without having to argue that nothing could come from nothing. Origen acknowledged the cleverness of this point of view but rejected it. Hylomorphism was just too useful a theory to be thrust aside. Without it, how can we understand how one thing becomes another (for example, sand becoming glass)? It is the matter that remains constant throughout all changes of "form." (Hylomorphism is the ancient equivalent to the law of conservation of energy.) Hylomorphism was a useful "servant." Nevertheless, the "apostolic preaching" (Christian dogma) was clear that God made the universe from nothing—there are not two first principles of existence.

Origen's solution was to argue that prime matter was not eternal and really did come from nothing. His argument essentially depended upon two concepts: God's power and God's providence. If prime matter could exist without God having made it, then, he argues, the "forms," too, should be able to come into existence without God—in which case God is not Creator! Furthermore, it is rather lucky that God happened to find all this prime matter just lying around, ready to be made into a good universe. Had he not, he would have been powerless to make it, if matter is uncreated. If we entertain this hypothesis, then God's providence is meaningless. God did not provide the matter needed, but simply got lucky. Either that, Origen says, or there is a providence higher than God that made the matter available to him—which is ridiculous blasphemy. The bottom-line for Origen was that philosophers failed to grasp the scope of God's unlimited power. God can do what seems impossible: to make matter out of nothing.

Basil tackles this same problem in his second homily on Genesis. Unlike Origen, he divorces the scriptural text from the theory of hylomorphism. It's not a question of explaining how God made prime matter but of showing that the text is not talking about that at all. "Unformed" means that God first made the earth in an incomplete state, because it was not yet furnished with all the plants and animals that would later make it complete. Only after clearing that up could Basil refute the idea that matter is eternal. Here he clearly shows his dependence upon Origen. He uses the same arguments, although in a more compact and rhetorical form. His goal was not to write a philosophical argument as Origen did, but to inform and entertain his hearers. By focusing on the false analogy people make between God and human craftsmen, who must make from a pre-existing material (an analogy Origen mentions), Basil effectively derides the view of the philosophers as foolish. They

should have listened to the plain teaching of Scripture instead of trying to reason about God based on human analogies.

In his exuberance to refute the idea of uncreated, eternal matter, Basil nevertheless maintained the theory of hylomorphism. Like Origen, he had no interest in attacking philosophical theories as such. In fact, he at one point even uses hylomorphism to help explain what we can and cannot know of God. Just as we cannot in any way perceive prime matter itself, but only the particular "forms" it takes, neither can we know God is—his essence. We can perceive only God's attributes as revealed through his works, which are thus analogous to the "forms" that matter takes. Not only does Basil not reject the philosophical theory of hylomorphism, he uses it, like a servant, to help in theological disputation.

In chapter 4, I will examine Gen 1:6–7 and the perennial problem of the water above the sky. The Hebrew cosmology imagined water above the sky, from which comes rain. The standard Aristotelian cosmology of the Greeks was incompatible with this. According to it, each of the four elements had a natural position, and thus they settle into four concentric spheres, which taken together constitute the cosmos. At the bottom, the "heaviest" element is the earth, which naturally forms a sphere (a point Basil makes). Just above that is the sphere of water (the oceans). Next is the sphere of the air (the atmosphere), above which is the sphere of fire. According to most (including Basil himself), the sphere of fire is heaven. Within this physical system, it makes no sense for there to be water above the air, let alone above heaven.

Origen was aware of this problem, and it helped guide his entire interpretation of the opening verses of Genesis 1. On this matter, he closely followed Philo. According to Philo, there were actually two creations: first a spiritual, eternal creation, and then a physical, temporal creation. The first five verses of Genesis refer to this spiritual creation: the "heaven" of verse 1 is the spiritual realm where God and the angels live. The "earth" of verse 2 is the spiritual archetype (Platonic "idea") of the physical earth God will make later in vv. 9–10. The "abyss" of verse 3 is hell. The "waters" of v. 3 are spiritual powers (angels and demons). Since Origen's system included room for two distinct allegorical readings, he adds a psychic interpretation of these "waters": the spiritual person, who spends their time contemplating heaven, partakes of these waters, as Jesus himself says (John 4:14; 7:38). The wicked person, in contrast, partakes of the waters of the abyss: they are plagued by demons. The light of vv. 4–5 is the divine light, perceptible to the mind alone, not the eyes.

Naturally, Origen connects the divine light to Jesus Christ (John 1:4–5,8–9; 8:12; 9:5). The "day one" of v. 5 refers to eternity. Everything changes with v. 6. Now God makes a physical earth and sky—the cosmos. These are patterned after the aforementioned spiritual heaven and earth. Because the physical sky is the boundary (^^^^) between the worlds, it is also given the name "heaven" (^^^^^^^), even though it is only a copy.

If we possessed Origen's commentary on Genesis, we would be able to say more about how Origen took all this. But it is clear from what we do possess that he accepted Philo's general framework. When the physical sky was created, the spiritual "water" (the angels) remained above. For Origen, the lower "water" here does not refer to physical water at all, but to the "water" of the underworld (the demons). Those are the two "waters" kept separate by the physical cosmos made in vv. 6–7. Actual, physical water is not mentioned until v. 9, when it is gathered into the seas, right where it belongs above the earth.

In a major departure from Origen, Basil rejected the whole idea of a twofold creation in Genesis 1. Consistent with his view that it should be taken literally, he defended the scriptural cosmology and cosmogony at face-value. Basil did not interpret the opening verses of Genesis as being about spiritual things. There is, however, one exception: he refers to a traditional interpretation of "day one" as meaning eternity. This is the only instance in all nine homilies of him allowing for a more-than-literal interpretation of Genesis 1. He permitted it only because it was traditional. It stood alongside his own literal interpretation of "day one," which was that it was simply the first day. One day, by itself, is a symbol of eternity, Basil concedes.

Basil distinguishes the heaven of v. 1 from the later "firmament" that God makes in vv. 6–7, but in a different way than Philo and Origen. The former heaven is the actual, physical sky, which Basil says has a smoke-like substance. The second "heaven" is called the "firmament" only because it is firm compared to the proper heaven. Rejecting the Philonian-Origenian etymology that derived heaven (^^^^^^^) from boundary (^^^^), Basil says it came from see (^^^^). This "firmament" or "heaven" is nothing more than the clouds that we see when we look up! The water above this "heaven" is not liquid but gaseous ("aerial water"), which explains how it stays aloft. Since water on the Greek view was inherently cold, this massive body of "aerial" water keeps the earth from being burned up by the sun. This global cooling system will eventually run out of water, which is when the earth will be dissolved by fire, just as Scripture says. Basil's solution to the problem is

ingenious. It is unclear how he thought it fit with ancient physics: if the water were actually air, all would be well, but air was defined as hot, not cold like water. As water, it is out of place above air. In any case, Basil did not reject the standard physics and tried to make the scriptural account work with it. If he had been a fundamentalist, he would have rejected physics.

Basil was aware of Origen's view: he says that he has a bone to pick with "some from the Church" who allegorize the waters of Genesis. He means either Origen himself or perhaps fourth-century Origenists, who in any case only built upon what he already had written. Here Basil mentions that they connect the physical oceans to the demons by saying that the turbulent waves of the ocean are an image of the chaotic madness of the demons. It is probable, though uncertain, that Origen made this connection in his lost commentary. Even though Basil criticizes Origen here, he omits his name—a sign of respect for his master. Basil distinguishes Origen's interpretation, which he personally rejects, from the heretical interpretations of the Gnostics. This is an inter-Church dispute in which Basil's literal exegesis conflicted with the Philonian-Origenian tradition. By no means did Basil associate Origen with heretics. Nevertheless, Basil's peculiar view of Genesis 1 as a literal cosmology required him to reject Origen's view on principle.

In chapter 5, I will examine the third and final scientific problem that Origen and Basil confronted in their exegeses of Genesis 1: the role of the stars—astrology. Verse 14 says that they were made "for signs." To Origen (again following Philo), this suggested astrology: the regular but complex movements of the stars and planets contain information about the future. In the ancient world, astrology was considered a legitimate science, indistinguishable from what in modernity has come to be called "astronomy." As one of the four basic sciences, it, too, was a servant of Christianity. Consequently, Origen accepted astrology on a basic level. However, he radically qualified its nature in the light of Christianity, to make the servant submit to its mistress.

For Origen, there were two problems with astrology: fatalism and genethlial-ogy (the casting of nativities, today called "horoscopes"). Fatalism is incompatible with free will, which Origen considered part of the "apostolic preaching." After all, if people do not have free will, there is no possibility for moral responsibility and divine judgment. And yet do not biblical prophecies prove that the future is pre-determined? Origen argues that, paradoxical as it may seem, God's foreknowledge does not cause the future, but rather the event (future to us) is the cause of God's

foreknowledge. The fact that information about the future may occasionally be revealed to some people changes nothing. It is the same way with the stars: the information they contain about the future does not cause that future, but only signifies it.

The second problem is the casting of nativities, which Christians rejected as a forbidden form of divination. Rather than just condemning it as taboo magic, as a fundamentalist would do, Origen disproved its practicability by drawing upon arguments made by philosophers, notably Sextus Empiricus. The bottom-line of the refutation is that the sky rotates much too quickly to be measured accurately. Origen makes several points, all of which he had read in philosophers before him. For example, how does an astrologer explain cultural customs, such as circumcision, that occur to all people of a given race, regardless of when each individual is born? Or, on the other hand, why of all the people born at a certain time does one become a king and another a pauper? Upon intellectual scrutiny, the practice of genethlialogy is shown to be impossible.

Nevertheless, Origen accepted the idea that the stars contain information about the future. This is proof of the high esteem that he accorded secular studies. The idea that the two worlds—heavenly and earthly—were interconnected was an intellectual commonplace prior to modern science. Even though astrologers were incapable of making accurate horoscopes, Origen believed that the angels were able to read the stars in order to learn about God's plans. In addition, God gave this angelic power to certain extraordinary spiritual individuals, such as the patriarch Jacob. This example Origen took from a lost apocryphal work called the "Prayer of Jacob." In this way, he maintained the theory of astrology in an intellectualized, spiritualized form that bore no resemblance to the popular practices Christians condemned and that eschewed fatalistic implications.

Basil launches into a polemic against astrology when he encounters Gen 1:14 in his hexaemeral sermons. First, though, he deconstructs the connection between the biblical verse and astrology. The "signs" that the Bible refers to have nothing to do with astrology and future events, but only with the weather. People experienced with the sky, like sailors and farmers, make predictions about the weather based on its appearance as well as that of the sun and moon. The way he separates the biblical text from the problem of astrology is exactly the same thing he did when he dealt with the "unformed earth," which he believed had nothing to do with prime matter. As for astrology itself, he recycles Origen's arguments, much as he did when refuting

the eternity of prime matter. In explaining how the sky moves too quickly to be measured accurately, Basil reproduces two sentences from Origen's commentary almost verbatim, a clear sign of dependence upon his Genesis commentary fragment preserved in the Philocalia. Since he also makes some points not found in Origen, we know that he had other sources of information as well, similar to Sextus Empiricus. Basil had no new arguments but deployed the standard ones he learned from his studies with his usual rhetorical skill.

On the basic theory of astrology—the correspondence between heaven and earth—Basil is conspicuously silent. We cannot infer from his separation of Gen 1:14 from astrology, nor from his rejection of genethlialogy and fatalism, that he rejected it. In fact, Basil mentions astrological questions specifically when giving examples of the legitimacy of secular studies. This, combined with his general esteem for Origen, make it likely that he accepted the view that the movements of the stars have significance for life on earth. Furthermore, he says nothing of Origen's theory of angelic astrology. If he rejected it, he never says so. Admittedly, this is an argument from silence.

There is, however, one astrological idea of Origen's that Basil explicitly rejected: that the stars are alive. Like other aspects of astrology, this was a notion widely accepted by ancient thinkers (though not Aristotle). For Philo, Origen, and many others, the beauty of the stars and their perfectly-regular movements indicated that they, too, possessed spirit like us: they are alive. The cosmic fall caused all spirits to become embodied: the better ones became the heavenly bodies, superior to human, earthly bodies. This was not a punishment, but a form of service, since the rest of the physical cosmos needed their light, as well as their movements to mark time. To Origen, it was "beyond all stupidity" to doubt that these astral bodies are alive. Basil rejected this notion. In fact, he seems to turn Origen's own words against him: to imagine that the stars are alive, Basil says, is "more than madness." (Since Origen's words here are today preserved only in Latin translation, we do not know if this was an exact quotation.) Basil was not alone among Christians in rejecting this concept. It was one of several points of "Origenism," already becoming controversial in the 370's, that were eventually condemned by the authorities of the fifth century. That Basil chose to speak out against this view (albeit in passing) shows again that he was aware of and agreed with the growing criticism of Origen on this point. That he, at the same time, chose not to name Origen shows he still admired the great theologian.

My study of these three problems proves that the theory of secular education as "servant" held true for both Origen and Basil in practice. In each case, both accepted secular theories and even used them to promote their theology: hylomorphism, elemental physics and cosmology, and astrology. The limits to which they both held were imposed by Christianity. Prime matter, while real, was made by God and not eternal. Astrological fatalism is contrary to free will, moral responsibility, and divine judgment. Casting horoscopes was shown to be impossible (rather than simply condemned as a form of demonic magic).

Where the two really disagreed was on the super-heavenly water and, more broadly, the nature of Genesis 1 as a text. Here we see Basil's more conservative bent: for him, Genesis 1 had to be taken literally, which meant there really must be a body of water in the sky. Even here, though, Basil labored to make sense of such a notion through an explanation that, while still literal, strayed far from what seems to be the text's plain meaning. Basil ruled out Origen's allegorical solution to the problem, but not as though it were heretical. Basil's reason is not so much that it lacked plausibility but that he was determined to maintain the literal validity of Genesis over against dualisms. The best way to do that was to insist on the literal reasonableness of Genesis 1. That the two disagreed on this point is a salutary reminder that the "servant" metaphor is not a system that provides ready-made answers to difficult questions. It is a way of thinking intended to integrate two different spheres of knowledge: scientific and divine. How one actually squares them in particular cases can vary widely.

I conclude this introduction by stating that, like all historical theologians, I undertake my study in the belief that what we can learn from the Fathers of the Church has something useful to say to Christians today. This is not a work of purely antiquarian interest (as if any work of history ever were). Richard Norris has noted the profound impact modern science and technology have made on Christians and turned to the Fathers for answers. He writes:

> The question of the Christian appropriation of secular scientific and philosophical ideas [has] been canvassed before, most notably perhaps in the early centuries of the Church's existence, and not without constructive result. It may be, therefore, that some light can be shed on the modern problem by study of its ancient analogue.

Likewise, Peter Bouteneff, referring to the perennial debate about whether Genesis 1 should be taken literally, writes: "The evolution of the early Christian interpretation of Genesis 1–3 is of more than antiquarian interest: like all good history, it has the potential to illuminate the present." Their sentiments are my own. <>

Origen: An Introduction to His Life and Thought by Ronald E. Heine [Cascade Companions, Cascade Books, ISBN 9781498288958]

The late second and early third century was a turbulent time in the Roman Empire and in the relationship between the empire and the church. Origen was the son of a Christian martyr and was himself imprisoned and tortured in his late life in a persecution that targeted leaders of the church. Deeply pious and a gifted scholar, Origen stands as one of the most influential Christian teachers in church history, and also one of the most controversial.

This introduction to Origen begins by looking at some of the circumstances that were formative influences on his life. It then turns to some key elements in his thought. The approach here differs from that taken by most earlier studies by working from the central position that Scripture had for Origen. Heine argues that Origen's thought, in his later life especially, reflects his continual interaction with the Bible.

Review

"Heine's book provides an excellent entree into Origen, the towering scholar and churchman who flourished in the early third century. For those who wish to learn about Origen's life, how he engaged Scripture, or key themes in his thinking, Heine offers a clear, concise, and accessible orientation. I especially recommend it for readers who are beginning their study of the church fathers." --Peter W. Martens, Professor of Early Christianity, Saint Louis University

"Origen rightly remains ever fascinating and ever controversial. There is no better guide to the great Alexandrian than Ron Heine, and this book displays on every page the deep erudition and skills of precise observation that we have come to expect. There simply is no better short introduction." --Lewis Ayres, Professor of Catholic and Historical Theology, Durham University

"The overflowing biblical treasures of Origen, for so long misunderstood, forgotten, and even suppressed, are slowly being rediscovered. This book offers a master class conducted by one of the world's foremost Origen interpreters, who here condenses a lifetime of closely reading Origen's texts into an attractively accessible introduction. A gift to students and teachers, Ron Heine's Origen is a model of crystalline clarity and evocative insight."" --Michael Cameron, Professor of Historical Theology, University of Portland

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One can only wish or dream that her or his own intellectual work on understanding Scripture or setting forth its theological meaning will endure so long or reach so far as that of Origen of Alexandria. While he was dead by the middle of the third century, Origen's work has continued to stir deep admiration and animosity down to the present time, although much of the animosity has abated since the work of some significant scholars in the twentieth century. His influence has crossed all boundaries in the church from the ancient Greek and Latin speaking East-West boundaries to the modern ones of Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant. Much of his extensive work was lost or destroyed soon after his lifetime, but a large corpus has continued to exist, either in its original Greek or in later Latin translations. In more recent times additional texts have been recovered through fortuitous discoveries, first that of the Tura papyri in Egypt in the mid-twentieth century, which yielded

two previously unknown texts: the Dialogue with Heraclides and the Treatise on the Passover, along with portions of texts already possessed, and more recently, in 2012, the discovery of twenty-nine Greek homilies on the Psalms in a twelfth-century codex in the Bayerischen Staatsbiblio-thek in Munich. New editions and translations of Origen's works continue to be produced in numerous countries and languages. They can be found in series and in individual translations in German, French, Italian, Spanish, and English, and probably in others of which I am unaware.

In the last decade of the twentieth century I was director of a small research institute called the Institute for the Study of Christian Origins sponsored by the Disciples of Christ in Tübingen, Germany. I recently revisited Tübingen to participate in a symposium. In a conversation with one of the participants at the symposium I was asked who was teaching theological subjects at the University when I was working in Tübingen. When I began to list a few of the theologians who were at the University at that time—Martin Hengel, Jürgen Moltmann, Hans Küng—my conversation partner interrupted me and said, "O, you were here when the giants were here!" I had not thought of them in that particular way when I was living and working in Tübingen, but that is a good descriptive term for the collection of notable theological scholars who were clustered at the Eberhard Karls University in Tübingen at that time. And that is a good descriptive term for Origen.

Origen was a giant in the early church. When one thinks beyond the first century and the apostles, there was no one comparable to him until one gets to Augustine in the late fourth century. Origen moved like a colossus over the intellectual life of the early church, whether one thinks of biblical interpretation, theological insight, doctrinal development, or influence on subsequent leaders of the church. He had a lasting influence on how the church read Scripture, especially the Old Testament, and on how it thought about and formulated its doctrines. His pervasive influence spread through his immediate contact with students and the publication of his numerous writings.

Origen was greatly admired and intensely disliked during his lifetime and afterwards. Both of those reactions were often elicited by the fact that his thought was frequently "outside the box," so to speak. At a time when the majority in the church, including its bishops and presbyters, believed that Scripture must be read and understood in the simple, literal meaning of the words, Origen deftly practiced a non-literal way of understanding Scripture's words that rankled the feelings of many of his readers or listeners. This can often be detected by remarks he makes in

his homilies and commentaries. His teachings about the basic Christian doctrines of the creation of the universe, the incarnation of Christ, and the consummation of history also diverged, significantly in many cases, from views held by multitudes in his time. Aspects of these same views, nevertheless, would later become incorporated into the general faith of the church in the West as well as the East. Many of the most important leaders of the western church in the fourth century were strongly influenced by Origen's way of interpreting Scripture and by his theological insights, including Augustine of Hippo, Ambrose of Milan, and Jerome of Bethlehem.

Origen did not develop his thought in an academic context nor did he envision his many treatises serving such an audience. He developed his thought in the context of the church and he produced his treatises to serve the church— to protect it from straying from what he considered to be the truth of the message of Christ and to enable it to understand this message in its diverse Scriptural expressions. In one of his earlier works, written while he was still living in Alexandria, Origen notes that he has undertaken to write books interpreting the Scriptures because numerous such books were being produced by heterodox Christians that threatened to confuse or mislead those faithful to the common understanding of the church. Origen was always concerned about the faith of the church, both in protecting it and in interpreting it to help others grasp its obvious and less obvious meanings. He was a practicing Christian all his life. He commented in one of his homilies that he wanted to be and be called a Christian in his action as well as his thought. In modern jargon one could say that he did not just talk the talk; he walked the walk. He was a man of deep faith and prayer. He often requested the prayers of his listeners to help him in his preaching, and he considered prayer to be the most important element in interpreting Scripture.

This book begins by sketching the more important influences on the formation of Origen's thought, including the circumstances of his life, so far as that is knowable. The sources for depicting Origen's life are scarce. While a large number of his writings have been preserved, he says very little about himself in them. His letters, which would be an important source of information, have largely perished. Eusebius refers to more than a hundred letters that he had seen—letters to an emperor and his wife, to bishops, and to various other persons—and arranged in separate "roll-cases" to preserve them, but they seem to have perished in antiquity. Only two have been preserved in the Greek language in which Origen wrote them; one to a former

student named Gregory, and another to a scholar named Africanus. There is also a letter to some friends in Alexandria preserved in a Latin translation of the fourth century by Rufinus of Aquileia. Besides these three letters, we have only occasional sentences from letters quoted in Eusebius' Church History. The Apology for Origen written by Pamphilus—an early fourth-century priest, martyr, and devotee of Origen—would also have been a good source for information about Origen. Pamphilus wrote the Apology in Caesarea, where Origen spent the latter part of his life. Origen's library was there, which would have contained his own works as well as others he had gathered for his work. Pamphilus had a passion for collecting books. He had copied many of Origen's works with his own hand. He was later imprisoned and while in prison he wrote the five books of his Apology with the help of Eusebius. After Pam-philus' martyrdom, Eusebius added a sixth book. These books too, with the exception of the first, have perished.

There are only a few sources from which we derive our biographical information about Origen, all from the fourth century. Jerome and Rufinus, Latin authors of the Western church, both translated numerous works of Ori-gen from Greek into Latin and in the process provided some information about his life. The first book of the Apology for Origen by Pamphilus is another source of information. The Apology, however, is primarily a defense of Origen's thought and says very little about his life in general. This, too, has been preserved only in a Latin translation by Ru-finus in the fourth century. The two main sources from antiquity that provide biographical information about Origen's life are both from the Eastern Greek-speaking church: works of Eusebius of Caesarea and Epiphanius of Salamis. The sixth book of the Church History of Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, is the most important source. Origen was a kind of hero of the faith in Eusebius' eyes. The other source is section sixty-four of the Panarion (Medicine Chest) of Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, for whom Origen was a heretic.

Eusebius, as bishop in Caesarea, had ready access to important resources about Origen's life. Origen had spent the last portion of his life in Caesarea, and Pamphilus, who had studied Origen's works thoroughly, was presbyter there before Eusebius. Furthermore, it is generally recognized that a unique feature of Eusebius' historical works is his wide use and careful quotation of written sources. We do not know, on the other hand, where Epiphanius got his biographical information about Origen. For some of the views he presents he seems to be dependent on impressions he has drawn about Origen from a group of monks who claimed to be Origen's

followers. Epiphanius considered these monks to be an heretical sect. He has very little to say about Origen's life in his account. Most of the rather lengthy section on Origen in the Panarion is devoted to refuting some controversial doctrines Epiphanius attributed to Origen. So, while Eusebius may give a rosy tint to his account of Origen's life, on the whole it is better to trust a person's friend for accurate information about him, especially if he has had access to reliable information, than trust an avowed enemy who wants to cast him in the worst possible light. The general approach to Origen's life in this book is structured by the information given by Eusebius.

This book is not an attempt to say everything that can be said about Origen, especially in the chapter on his thought. It is an introduction and as such hopes, beyond simply making him known to those who are unfamiliar with his life and thought, to elicit an interest in reading some of Origen's texts and wrestling with their complexities. I have also tried to allow Origen to speak for himself as much as possible, and in this way to give the reader access to Origen's own words (in English translation, of course). As I indicated at the beginning of this introduction, Origen was one of the most important and influential thinkers in the early church. Throughout his life he worked diligently at the interpretation of Scripture in his commentaries that covered most of the books of the Bible and in the application of Scripture to life in these commentaries as well as in his homilies. The extent of his influence on the church's faith makes an acquaintance with his life and thought essential to anyone who wants to understand the roots of Christian faith. <>

THE SAYINGS AND STORIES OF THE DESERT FATHERS AND MOTHERS: VOLUME 1; A–H (ÊTA) translated and introduced by Tim Vivian [Cistercian Studies Series, Liturgical Press, 9780879071097]

THE SAYINGS AND STORIES OF THE DESERT FATHERS AND MOTHERS: VOLUME 2: TH–O (THETA–OMÉGA) translated and introduced by Tim Vivian [Cistercian Studies Series, Liturgical Press, 9780879072926]

2022 Catholic Media Association second place award in theology: history of theology, church fathers and mothers

THE SAYINGS AND STORIES OF THE DESERT FATHERS AND MOTHERS offers a new translation of the Greek alphabetical Apophthegmata Patrum, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers. For the first time in an English translation, this volume provides:

- extensive background and contextual notes
- significant variant readings in the alphabetical manuscripts and textual differences vis-à-vis the systematic and anonymous *Apophthegmata*
- reference notes to both quotations from Scriptures and the many allusions to Scripture in the sayings and stories.

In addition, there is an extensive glossary that offers information and further resources on people, places, and significant monastic vocabulary. Perfect for students and enthusiasts of the desert tradition.

Review

"A wonderful book. The introduction on its own ought to be required reading in all theological schools and for those interested in literature generally. This collection of *The Sayings and Stories of the Desert Fathers and Mothers* (Vol. 1) is an edition that is destined to become a classic standard. To situate his material, Tim Vivian offers a generous and reflective introduction to the desert tradition that is both scintillating in its intellectual brilliance and moving in its spiritual profundity. The scholarly translations are accompanied at every step by commentary and insight that demonstrate Vivian's fluent mastery and his status as one of the world's preeminent leaders in the field. It is a book that scholar and student alike will treasure."

V. Revd. Prof. John A. McGuckin, Faculty of Theology, Oxford University

“The flow and precision of Tim Vivian’s translation allows for the personalities, messages, and worldview of the *Sayings* to resonate poignantly today. Moreover, his masterful notes reveal the complex linguistic and spiritual layers of these texts, as well as the degree to which scriptural language and imagery permeated monastic thought. Whether read for academic or spiritual purposes, one will encounter fresh insights and the distilled results of decades of research and reflection on every page of this remarkable volume.”
Maged S. A. Mikhail, Professor of History, California State University, Fullerton

“To understand the parabolic and paradigmatic nature of the *apophthegmata* (wise sayings) of the desert ammas and abbas, it is best to have a guide as gifted in the ancient languages of the sayings as Vivian, but also to enter into these stories with the contemplative framework of *lectio divina*, as Vivian recommends in his introduction. In the process, the hidden depths of these elders open up layers in one’s own search for the Holy One and the blessings and pitfalls of the spiritual life.”
Mary Forman, OSB, Prioress, Monastery of St. Gertrude, Idaho

"A consummate scholar, deft translator, and skilled wordsmith, Tim Vivian links ancient insights to contemporary spirituality and the work for justice. In this collection of sayings and stories, he offers a wealth of detail to feed the mind of any scholar and an abundance of wisdom to fill the soul of every seeker."
The Rev. Gary Commins, DD

“Bringing a depth of experience as a translator of early monastic texts, Tim Vivian offers not only a new, vivid translation of the *Apopthegmata Patrum*, but also a rare window into the process, and challenge, of translation itself. With an introduction that not only orients the reader to this complex literature but also draws our attention to its contemporary spiritual significance, and a set of tools to decode the language of the desert fathers and mothers, this two-volume work offers rich resources for lovers of the desert monastic tradition and for those encountering for the first time.”
Revd. Dr. Jane Foulcher, Associate Head of School and Senior Lecturer in Theology, School of Theology, Charles Sturt University, Australia

“Professor Tim Vivian has dedicated much of his academic career to bringing out the jewels of Coptic Monasticism that provided the inspirational and functional foundation for monasticism worldwide. His latest work brings the writings of the Mothers and Fathers in a model that serves both the benefit of their teachings as well as collectively the personality of those that said them. Bringing this systematic grouping from its original Greek to the English-speaking world is not only a blessing but a guide for those that seek

holiness in their lives whether in the world or in seclusion away from it. The additional distinctive reflections of the author add that much value for the work. We pray that the complete collection will soon be in the hands of so many of us that waited for it for untold years."
Hany N. Takla, President. St. Shenouda the Archimandrite Coptic Society

"The desert fathers and mothers are still popular today, fifteen or sixteen centuries after their deeds and words were recorded. People are inspired by these pithy sayings, and perhaps at times amused by them. But in either case, the context in which they lived and worked and prayed is vague and general, usually limited to a brief introduction to the sayings themselves. Tim Vivian's book supplies this context and more. His introductions to each of the monks and nuns give what historical information is available, and he allows us to appreciate their individuality. He takes the time for personal reflection on the sayings of each one as a whole, rather than as separate quotes, and relates these ancient sayings to our world, brings them into our time, with wise lessons to teach us. In his notes, he gives more background, scriptural echoes and sources, and his exploration of the Greek behind the translation illuminates aspects of the sayings which would otherwise be lost in translation. This is a book which general readers will thoroughly enjoy, and scholars will appreciate. I look forward to the next volume in this series."
Fr. Lawrence Morey, OCSO
"We should be grateful for this beautiful new translation of real treasures of the spiritual life that still speak to, yes convict, us."
Cistercian Studies Quarterly
"When the publication of this translation is complete it will certainly be the most comprehensive and thorough resource for encountering and appreciating this fundamental compendium of early monastic teaching."
Catholic Books Review

"What Vivian does here is invite the reader to take up and read the sayings. He also shows the ongoing relevance of monastic desert spirituality by pairing the teachings of the *apophthegmata* nicely with the contemporary spiritual teachings of Gregory Boyle (of Homeboy Industries) and the always-relevant Thomas Merton. It is clear that Vivian has not only translated the sayings but internalized their spiritual message, and he is eager to see the same transformation occur in his readers."
Greg Peters, Biola University, *American Benedictine Review*

"This volume explores a little known source of Christian spirituality. It offers an excellent excavation of the desert mystics and those regarded as early Christian parents of monastic type spirituality."

Catholic Media Association

"The Introduction is a masterpiece. Church historians will appreciate the new translation, which gives an authentic flavor to the sayings and stories that are fundamentally part of the oral tradition.
The Downside Review

"Speaking to us over a distance of some 1700 years, Tim Vivian continues to bring to life the profound but truly human stories and personalities of the Desert Fathers and Mothers. With his fresh translation and extensive footnotes and commentary, this volume, like the first, provides nourishment for the mind and spirit and transports us to an exciting new place that is strangely compelling! 'For those who are capable of understanding these words and keeping them, there is joy and great profit' (Barsanuphius of Gaza)."
Lisa Agaiby, St. Athanasius College, University of Divinity
Published On: 2023-02-24

"In our time of division, fear, and constant moving, the desert mothers and fathers tell us otherwise. Sit in your place/cell. Don't run here and there. Tim Vivian's lucid translations and discerning commentary brings us the life-giving wisdom of these early monastics, a tremendous gift. We are in their debt, and his!"
The Rev. Michael Plekon, PhD, Professor Emeritus, The City University of New York - Baruch College

"The early ascetics spoke of direction and signposts along the spiritual way. I could think of no better guide in the 'sayings and stories' of the desert fathers and mothers than Tim Vivian. With meticulous veneration and observation, Vivian helps put together fundamental pieces of that distinctive, albeit intriguing puzzle of the fourth- and fifth-century *Apophthegmata* in a way that brings them to life for our admiration, education, and emulation in the twenty-first century."
John Chryssavgis, author of *In the Heart of the Desert* and *Desert Wisdom for Everyday Life* Published On: 2023-03-27

"First-rate scholarship paired with a contemporary idiom. These enigmatic, provocative, and deeply perceptive 'sayings' of the Desert Christians come to life in Tim Vivian's work. Like reading graffiti on a subway wall and pondering the wisdom of the ages at the same time. The desert weaves through these pages with characteristic ferocity and unexpected compassion. I love it."

Belden C. Lane, author of *The Solace of Fierce Landscapes: Exploring Desert and Mountain Spirituality*

Published On: 2023-03-30

“Tim Vivian has accomplished something extraordinary: a technical translation that is also user-friendly for those studying the early Christian movement. He has enriched this resource with his discussions around important early monastic/desert themes; footnotes that often provide more than technical information; and his excursuses. This is a great resource. I highly recommend it.”
Laura Swan, OSB, author of *The Forgotten Desert Mothers*
Published On: 2023-04-11

“A wonderful book. The introduction on its own ought to be required reading in all theological schools and for those interested in literature generally. This collection of *The Sayings and Stories of the Desert Fathers and Mothers* is an edition that is destined to become a classic standard. To situate his material, Tim Vivian offers a generous and reflective introduction to the desert tradition that is both scintillating in its intellectual brilliance and moving in its spiritual profundity. The scholarly translations are accompanied at every step by commentary and insight that demonstrate Vivian’s fluent mastery and his status as one of the world’s preeminent leaders in the field. It is a book that scholar and student alike will treasure.”
V. Revd. Prof. John A. McGuckin, Faculty of Theology, Oxford University Published On: 2023-04-11

"Tim Vivian’s translation of *The Sayings and Stories of the Desert Fathers and Mothers* offers both scholarly and pastoral insights using contemporary language. The annotations provide valuable revelations into the abstruse aphorisms, rendering it an essential resource for scholars and seekers alike. Vivian emphasizes the practical application of the sagacious wisdom of the desert fathers and mothers in everyday life, making it an indispensable volume for spiritual leaders seeking a profound understanding of early Christian spirituality."
Father Macarius Refela, Presbyter, Coptic Orthodox Diocese of Los Angeles and Hawaii
Published On: 2023-04-12

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Prologue with Stories

It is impossible to separate the teller from the telling: that whatever I say . . . is a way of saying something about myself.

Given that this present volume contains numerous early monastic stories, I want to begin here with one. Once upon a time I received an invitation to go to Egypt. Since as a scholar I was publishing on the early Christian monks of that country (4th-7th centuries) and had not yet been there, this was, to say the least, an exciting offer.' A group was going to the Wadi Natrun north from Cairo, about halfway between that city and Alexandria, on the Mediterranean, "Scetis" in the sayings and stories in this volume. The Wadi Natrun today has four active ancient monasteries.' This journey was to be a combined archeological-teaching (ad)venture; I was going to teach the course on early monasticism to students from Evangelical Christian colleges.

We met for the first class in a room spare but replete with beautiful Coptic icons. The texts we were studying was The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, the translation of the alphabetical Apophthegmata Patrum by Benedicta Ward. I opened the first meeting with a question: "When you hear the word monk or monks, what first comes to mind?" One young woman responded, "They're agents of Satan." This, I thought, was going to be a tough audience.

As I studied early monasticism more, I came to see that some scholars, to varying degrees, shared that student's reservations, even alarm. The great eighteenth-century historian Edward Gibbon is scurrilous: "the monastic saints, who excite only the contempt and pity of a philosopher," and "The Ascetics [sic], who obeyed and abused the rigid precepts of the Gospel, were inspired by the savage enthusiasm which represents man as a criminal, and God as a tyrant." Protestant scholars are conflicted:

- C. Wilfred Griggs is in general positive towards monasticism; he states that monasticism, "adopted as a way of life for devotional purposes, is a gift of the Egyptian church to the Christian world." But immediately before this, in discussing pre-monastic asceticism, especially with regard to Clement* and Origen,* he calls monasticism "an extreme form of asceticism."

- Kenneth Scott Latourette is first positive: "Monasticism has displayed many variations and has been one of the chief ways in which the vitality of the Christian faith has found expression." But, two sentences later, he declares, "To a certain degree monasticism represented the triumph of ideas which the Catholic Church had denounced as heretical. Into it crept something of the legalism, the belief that salvation can be earned and deserved, which is opposed to grace."
- To his credit, Justo L. Gonzalez devotes chapter 15 of volume 1 of The Story of Christianity, "The Monastic Reaction," to early monasticism, but he places that discussion in "Part II: The Imperial Church" and, as the chapter makes clear, sees monasticism incompletely and too simply as primarily a reaction against the Constantinian Church. He correctly states that "Monasticism was not the invention of an individual," but adds that it was "rather a mass exodus," which is uncertain. But then he calls this "mass exodus" a "contagion," and later says that stylites (pillar saints) used "ostentatious acts."

The above sources, which I read later, helped me understand that student, at least partially, though fortunately Satan does not make an appearance in these scholarly assessments. I don't remember anything else about our first discussion that morning in Egypt, but I clearly remember the decision I made later that day: I decided to abandon traditional classroom pedagogy. Instead, I was going to teach, or try to teach, the students about lectio, lectio divina, which the late Terrence Kardong discusses in his Foreword to this volume: attentive silent reading of a text—not so much for information but for transformation. The next day we met in the same room, under the benevolent watch of those sacred icons. We sat on the floor in a circle, with teacher as one of the students (student: Greek mathetes, "disciple," is cognate with mathánomai, "to learn" [English math]). Their assignment, and mine, had been to read some of the sayings from Ward's book, so I now asked them to take five to ten minutes, sitting in silence (squirming allowed), to look again at that day's sayings. I asked them to go back to a saying, or even a line or a word, that particularly said something to them—whatever that something was, and then we would share with one another.

It worked. I don't recall any details of the working, but I remember assuredly that it was a great class, that day and thereafter, that we shared with one another, and that, by the end of the course, all of us, even the young woman on the lookout for Satan, had a deeper understanding of the early monastic impulse, its desires and efforts, its

hopes and dreams and goals. And, dare one say, its continuing relevance, even necessity? My hope is that you reading this volume will, at least metaphorically, sit within a circle of silence and read both for information and for inspiration, even transformation.

As Kathleen Norris writes in her Preface to this volume, she once had the same experience as I, and the same results. When she was teaching an honors course at Providence College, all of her students, unlike mine, "had attended Catholic elementary and high schools, and had read many Christian classics, such as the Confessions of St. Augustine. . . . Not one of them had heard of the desert fathers and mothers, and they were not excited about studying them." That is, "until they began to read the stories." Those students intuited something deeply human: "people learn by story," a Native American elder tells Kent Nerburn, "because stories lodge deep in the heart." In talking with Native elders, Nerburn says, apropos of the early Christian monastics, that "what struck me most deeply was the almost sacred value the elders placed on the importance of stories. . . . Stories were not mere entertainment to them, nor were they simple reminiscences; they were the traditional way of handing down the values and the memories of their culture—the way they had been taught by their elders—and they approached the task with something close to reverence."

As we've seen, story matters. With regard both to the stories in the gospels and those in the first centuries of Christianity, including early-monastic tellings and tales, scholars once placed too much emphasis on the Ur-text (the oldest, primal text) and ipsissima verba (the very words that Jesus or the early monks spoke), and not enough emphasis on what the stories are telling (present tense). Scholarship now more humbly acknowledges that we have very little access to Ur-texts or -speech. We have, metaphorically, a Big Bang (the origins of Christianity) and Smaller Bangs (the origins, say, of monasticism). The emphasis shifts, therefore, to what the speakers and writers are saying: What did they want their audiences to hear? What in fact might the audiences have heard?

Jacques van der Vliet has put this very well:

> these often colorful stories . . . offer far more and far better than history. . . . storytelling was a common device in late-antique literature in general and in monastic literature in particular. Such stories are not an inferior kind of literature, but an effective means of spiritual communication geared towards communion. . . . they were embedded in the social practices of the communities that selected, acquired, adapted and recited them in order to pass on the shared values of the group. In addition to reproducing these communities, they defined them socially, vis-à-vis other communities, but also

> teleologically, in a historical perspective, and theologically, in their relation to the supernatural. . . .
> Well-told stories allow us to empathize with the heroes of the story and to share a common experience, through an almost physical process designated as "embodiment" in the modern psychology of narrative. Drawing on a repertoire of shared topoi and formulas, such stories were a forceful means to forge community. Indeed, as we all know, communities, societies and nations live by stories, and the authors . . . were well aware of this fact, creating their own narrative universe."

Well-told stories. Sacred stories. Religious Studies can help us here: the discipline understands myth not as "falsehood," but as story, sacred stories that religious folk pass on because the stories still have meaning. (People and countries also have "secular" myths, which are often sacred to them.) Claudia Rapp, with many others, has made us more aware of the power(s) of story and stories' transformative abilities, "the impact the Holy Scriptures could have in bringing about immediate transformation of the reader." Rapp focuses on hagiography/ies, but her insights are appropriate here: we can say that the sayings and stories of the desert fathers and mothers are "little hagiographies," literally "sacred writings," or, more for our purposes here, stories with holy intent, the making of the sacred (or the transforming of the already sacred): "Hagiographical texts play a significant and very particular role in the process that joins the author and his [or her] audience in their participation in the sanctity of the holy man and woman. It is this process which I would like to call 'spiritual communication.' " The spiritual elder, the amma or abba, she observes, is both "beneficiary and proclaimer" of a story, a miracle, a parable, or counsel.

Rapp points to the noun diegesis and the much more common verb diegeomai, "to explain, interpret," and / or "to give a detailed account of something in words, tell, relate, describe." For the sayings and stories here, the noun diegema, "narrative, account," is apposite. In much of the Septuagint (LXX), the third-century BCE Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, the verb means "to tell," but, as in Exodus 24:3, it carries deeper import—and impact: Moses came and told [tldiegeomai] the people all the words of the LORD and all the ordinances; and all the people answered with one voice, and said, "All the words that the LORD has spoken we will do." Perhaps "Moses came and communicated to the people" is better. In the New Testament the verb, not surprisingly, occurs almost exclusively in Mark, Luke, and Acts, and almost always in connection with Jesus. In Acts 9:27, Barnabas takes Paul, brings him to the apostles, and describes [diegeomai] for them how on the road to Damascus Paul saw the Lord, who had spoken to him, and how in Damascus Paul spoke boldly in

the name of Jesus. Diegeomai continues this narratival, relational partnership (as in to relate something in relationship) in the sayings and stories here and 106 times in the systematic Apophthegmata.'

Appropriately, Latin translates diegesis as narratio, "narrative," "a brief account." "But in the Christian literature of Late Antiquity," diegesis, Rapp emphasizes, "refers specifically to an anecdote or story that is of edifying character."' She cites Palladius's Lausiac History and the anonymous Historia Monachorum: "Accordingly," the author of the latter says, "since I have derived much benefit from these monks, I have undertaken this work to provide a paradigm and a testimony for the perfect and to edify and benefit those who are only beginners in the ascetic life." The Prologue to the alphabetical Apophthegmata (AlphAP) translated in this volume puts it this way: "Most of these who labored, therefore, at different times, have set out in detail [diegema] both the sayings and accomplishments of the holy elders, in simple and straightforward language, with only this one thing in view—to benefit as many as possible."

Rapp observes that other Classical and Late Antique genres, such as the panegyric, also sought "to edify and benefit," but she contrasts hagiography and apophthegm; the latter is storytelling, "characterized by two features in particular . . . : its simple and unadorned style and its intrinsic truth-value. The absence of stylistic embellishment enables the audience to focus on the content of the story without the distractions of a lofty style." "What is being communicated," she adds later, "is not simply a story"—and, this is very important—"but a way of life [politeia], and it ought to be perpetuated not in words, but in deeds."

Such understandings, ancient and modern, probably to our surprise, connect the early monastics with many modern writers: transformation through story. I don't remember where I first heard or read the term "transformational reading." That is, reading that is not opposite to but includes and transcends informational reading. Because I was fortunate to have a small enrollment in my Native American Religion class the semester I began writing this Introduction, I asked the students to write twice-weekly brief reflections on the reading for each class. We were reading, studying, and discussing the revelatory, insightful, hilarious, moving, and heart-breaking stories about Nerburn, a white author, and his transformational journey with Dan, a Lakota Sioux elder.

This class, like the apophthegmata, illustrated for me Claudia Rapp's insights, what M. M. Bakhtin calls "the dialogic imagination." Four of Bakhtin's statements, I believe, can help us better understand the monastic sayings and stories in this volume:

> Every word is directed toward an answer . . . it provokes [that is, calls forth] an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer's direction. . . . [Linguists] have taken into consideration only those aspects of style determined by demands for comprehensibility and clarity—that is, precisely those aspects that are deprived of any internal dialogism, that take the listener for a person who passively understands but not for one who actively answers and reacts. (280, emphasis his)
>
> The more intensive, differentiated and highly developed the social life of a speaking collective, the greater the importance attaching, among other possible subjects of talk, to another's word, another's utterance, since another's word will be the subject of passionate communication, an object of interpretation, discussion, and evaluation, rebuttal, support, further development and so on. (337)
>
> The tendency to assimilate others' discourse takes on an even deeper and more basic significance in an individual's ideological becoming, in the most fundamental sense. Another's discourse performs here no longer as information, directions, rules, models and so forth—but strives rather to determine the very bases of behavior; it performs here as authoritative discourse, and an internally persuasive discourse. (342, emphases his)
>
> The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. (342)

I discovered Bakhtin after that Native American class had ended, but it's clear to me now that those students—and I—were discovering discourse that was both authoritative and internally persuasive. At the beginning of the class one day I looked at each student and praised the group for its brave and insightful reflections on Dan and Nerburn—and themselves: they'd been inspired and given permission by the sacred stories of the Native Americans and the hallowing account of the growing relationship between Nerburn and Dan to tell their own stories vis-à-vis those in the books. By reflecting and writing, the students were informing themselves of their own journeys and transformations, and sharing them with the class. Their stories are sacred. As one student in that class, a young Latina, wrote about Nerburn, and herself: "It's as if somehow his heart has become his eyes to the world in front of him. I don't see the change only in Nerburn, I see it in myself. Ever since I began the first book, I started to see the world with my heart; it's as if a piece of my heart has become Indian, too."

My hope with this volume is that some of our hearts can become monastic, at least in spirituality. I've read and reread, reflected on, and written about the literature and politeia (way of life*) of the early monks over the last thirty years; like that young Latina, I've more and more come to see the ammas* (mothers) and abbas* (fathers) as transformational. Thus, this volume is a result of "contemplative scholarship," scholarship that has sat with others listening to the words in this volume and then reflecting on them within a discipline of silent translation. Without hesitation, even heartily, I can say that they have a great deal to say to us today. Of course, not everything about them is transferable, or even translatable, but if we go beyond the superficial and dive deep, we can see that much of what they lived and tried to live and worked hard at living still speaks to us today—to monastics, yes, but also, potentially, to many, many others.

In Thomas Merton: The Noonday Demon, Donald Grayston raises a point apropos here. A reader of the book in manuscript "took issue with the orientation of the book, with what kind of book it was to be. Was it to be a solid piece of scholarship, or, conversely, did it run the risk of being a work of excessive empathy, a work in which I might be perceived as claiming a closeness with Merton which I don't possess?" The reader's (false) assumption is that "solid scholarship" and empathy are dichotomous, even oppositional. When I read the above, I paused, and then substituted "the desert fathers and mothers" for "Merton," and felt kindred with Grayston. His reader's either / or question assumes that scholarship and empathy can't wed and then bear, nurture, and raise a healthy family. As I hope to show below, scholarship and one's own life and spirituality intertwine.

The Sayings of the Desert Fathers and Mothers (Apophthegmata Patrum)

> In the desert
> dryness promotes the formation
> of flower buds. This is not aesthetics,
> but survival."

The alphabetical Apophthegmata Patrum, the Sayings of the Desert Fathers [and Mothers], is a misnomer—actually, three misnomers: (1) the sayings are not strictly in alphabetical order.29 Under "A," for example, Antony and Arsenius, probably as the most eminent worthies, are first; strictly alphabetically, a number of their brethren whose names begin with A and who follow them should come before them. The other chapters occasionally have similar ordering. (2) The sayings are not just sayings; they're both sayings and stories. In fact, aren't sayings compressed stories, inviting de compression? (3) In addition to the fathers (abbas), three desert

mothers (ammas) have sayings in the alphabetical collection; one, Theodora, is in volume 2, forthcoming.' Hence the subtitle of the present volume is The Sayings of the Desert Fathers and Mothers.

The Sayings of the Desert Fathers and Mothers: the key word in this title may be "desert."* Greek eremos, "wilderness" or "desert," is where humans do not normally live and where demons* often do. As Susanna Elm says, "These charismatic Sayings were of fundamental importance and are the expression of one of the most vital aspects of desert asceticism." Asceticism.* A knotty word—and, as with many key monastic words in this Introduction and in the sayings and stories translated here—one on probably few lips and tongues today. The origins of ascesis from Greek are athletic: "exercise, practice, training," and by the time of Lucian in the second century CE could mean "mode of life, profession," which fits the way of life* of the ammas and abbas." Inbar Graiver makes a key observation: asceticism is indeed "a practical phenomenon," but, more important, it is "a method for promoting inner transformation" (discussed earlier, and often later; see IV.2, "Paths to Transformation"). Geoffrey Galt Harpham calls this "the ascetic imperative": "the broadest description of the project of asceticism is that it recognizes and manages drive or impulse, commonly called desire [for the early monks the "passions"*], by harnessing and directing resistance?"

Two modern writers make important observations about the desert. As Gail Fitzpatrick says, "It is the very nature of the desert to introduce the monk to its element of the wild. Those who seek its peace find instead a raw encounter with all that is untamed and unregenerate in their hearts."34 In conversation with her, I would suggest that "those who seek only its peace," in other words, spiritual short-time visitors, will be very disappointed. She is absolutely right about what's "untamed" in our hearts, but the monks in this volume would not say that some things in their hearts are "unregenerate." As we'll see, regeneration and transformation are key to early Christian monasticism. Teresa M. Shaw summarizes the matter very well:

> Although modern studies of early Christian asceticism have tended to emphasize self-denial of bodily pleasures and the battle between flesh and spirit, it should become clear that such a view does not do justice to the complex meaning of such terms as askesis and enkrateia." Rather, ancient in sights concerning the control of desires that lead to pleasure (and pain) and concerning the careful management and training of the body with the soul . . . give much of the shape and contours to early Christian understandings of the body, creation, and, indeed, salvation.

Within a comparative religion context, one can think of these ammas and abbas, as Shaw shows, going on a vision quest, as some Native Americans do as the passageway from childhood to maturity. For the early monastics, the quest is lifelong.

As with so much of the vocabulary of the Egyptian and Palestinian monks of the fourth and fifth centuries, terms such as áskesis and enkráteia, grams, "wilderness, desert," are biblical: this is where John the Baptist emerges from, the voice of one crying out in the wilderness [erernos] (Matt 3:3; Isa 40:3). Matthew Kelty expresses well the monastic understanding of John and desert: "John the Baptist has always been a favorite of those in monastic life. His feast comes at the time when the sun first begins its journey down [June 24]. We know this dying will lead to eventual life, and the monks see in the plunge into night their own way into the darkness of God. The inward journey has all the dressings of death, a decrease, which like death hides the truth of growth in life. John was prelude to Jesus also in this: there is no greater road." The literal and spiritual wilderness is where Jesus goes out to a deserted place (eremos) to pray (Matt 14:13, 15). In the late-nineteenth century, indefatigable scholars published the monumental series The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 1 and 2, in twenty-eight volumes.) The desert fathers and mothers have no place in them, not even the Life of Antony, well-known among post-Nicene Christians. In 1960 Thomas Merton was prophetic, at least in English, when he published The Wisdom of the Desert. There are now in English hundreds of articles and dozens of books on early Christian monasticism, with as many more in French and German, both scholarly and for a wider audience outside the academy. <>

A Companion to Saint Therese of Lisieux: Her Life and Work & The People and Places In Her Story by Joseph P. Kochiss [Angelico Press, ISBN 9781621380689]

The product of twenty years of research and writing, this extraordinary new work is the most comprehensive portrait of Thérèse ever published, and the ultimate reference to her life and spirituality. A Companion to Saint Thérèse will appeal to all devotees of Thérèse, as well as those approaching her for the first time, who will find it a fascinating introduction. There is abundant material concerning her autobiography as well as her other literary and artistic works, and a treasury of information on all the people and places in her life story. Finally, the author revisits the steps leading to her beatification, canonization, and the proclamation of her as a

Doctor of the Church, and provides a history of the Carmelites and the origin of the Lisieux Carmel. As a source of biographical detail and photographs it is unsurpassed in any language and will remain the most authoritative work on Thérèse for many years to come.

Reviews

"A remarkable book!"--**Fr. Benedict Groeschel**, C.F.R., Co-founder of Franciscan Friars of the Renewal

"Obviously a labor of love. If one were making a movie about the Little Flower, this would be the perfect book to provide the background material to help understand St. Thérèse and all the people who touched her life."--**Fr. Robert J. Boyd**, Ph.D., F.S.S.P., Third Order Carmelite

"An astounding achievement in the annals of Catholic hagiography. There has never been a work like this regarding the life and times of 'the Little Flower.' It will be an essential acquisition for every theological library, every Catholic school and homeschooling co-op, and every member of the lay faithful with a devotion to Saint Thérèse."--**Christopher A. Ferrara**, President, American Catholic Lawyers Association

"In *A Companion to Saint Thérèse of Lisieux* we are given the opportunity to study Thérèse in a novel way, through the optics of the people and places associated with her. I exhort all of you to come to appreciate she who identified her vocation as Love." --**Fr. Frank Pavone**, National Director, Priests for Life

"This is an encyclopedia of information on the life and spirituality of St. Thérèse of Lisieux. Here you will find information and photos concerning the Saint that have not been published anywhere else. The author is to be congratulated for his diligence and persistence in assembling all this material for the many Catholics devoted to the saint of the small and simple way to God."--**Fr. Kenneth. Baker**, S.J., Editor Emeritus, *Homiletic & Pastoral Review*

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18. Sœur Saint-Jean Baptiste du Cœur de Jésus
19. Soeur Saint-Jean de la Croix
20. Sœur Saint-Raphael du Cœur de Marie
21. Sœur Saint-Stanislas des Sacrés-Cœurs
22. Sœur Thérèse de Jésus du Cœur de Marie
23. Sœur Thérèse de Saint-Augustin

SŒURS CONVERSES (Converse Sisters —Lay Sisters)

1. Sœur Marie de l'Incarnation
2. Sœur Marie-Madeleine du Saint-Sacrement
3. Sœur Marthe de Jésus de Bienheureux Perboyre
4. Sœur Saint-Joseph de Jésus
5. Sœur Saint-Pierre de Sainte Thérèse
6. Sœur Saint-Vincent de Paul

SŒURS TOURIÈRES (Extern Sisters)

1. Sœur Marie-Antoinette
2. Sister Mary Elizabeth of Saint Thérèse

C. IN OTHER ORDERS

1. Mère Marie-Adélaid Costard
2. Sœur Marie-Aloysia

CHAPTER 5 CHURCHMEN

A. IN THÉRÈSE'S CHILDHOOD

1. Abbé Jean-Baptiste Crêté
2. Abbé Victor-Louis Domin
3. Abbé Alcide-Leoida Ducellier
4. Abbé Lucien-Victor Dumaine
5. Abbé Frédéric-Auguste Hurel
6. Abbé Jamot

> I love the reading of the lives of the saints very much, the account of their heroic deeds sets my courage on fire and attracts me to imitate them; but I admit that, at times, I happen to envy the blessed lot of their relatives who had the joy of living in their company and of enjoying their conversations. — Thérèse

People have often asked me why I like St. Thérèse and write about her. In a way my answer surprises even me: "I don't know." I guess I have a special affection for her because I have known about her since childhood, have found her story appealing and her philosophy simple but profound. Why I am writing about her is an enigma too because I do not like to write prose. For me doing so is a real chore, a burden, and frustrating. Most gifted writers of prose I presume have little difficulty in transferring their thoughts into words on paper with rapid facility. Practically every page in this book somehow required a great deal of revisions, corrections, struggles over elements of style, and choice of vocabulary, let alone involving an enormous amount of factual research, not only from English sources but also French—a language in which I am a neophyte. I must confess, though, that when I wrote three published plays for children (one with my own music), I did not face these problems. The style is different and my imagination flowed easily with no annoying restraints interfering or slowing me down. Furthermore, and this I can't quite fathom, there is the strong desire and persistence I have maintained for so many years to work at and finish this book.

My introduction to St. Thérèse originated when I was in "grammar" school where those kind, dedicated, and pedagogically eminent nuns in the order of School Sisters of Notre Dame taught. I can't remember actually when any of them specifically talked about Thérèse, but I believed that they, in their habits and holy demeanor, epitomized St. Thérèse. In fact, all of us thought our sixth grade teacher, Sister Mary Teresa, resembled St. Thérèse in her aspect and in her holiness.

As an altar boy, I spent much time in our parish church, St. John Nepomucene (c. 1350 – 1393, patron saint of Bohemia / Czechoslovakia). Here I really encountered her in the form of a statue on a shelf next to the altar of St. Joseph. Above her another significant object struck me and also made a lasting impact: a large mural of Christ preaching from a boat just off shore by an artist who has become one of my favorite religious painters, Heinrich Hofmann (1824 – 1911). This painting ignited my abiding interest in art and its history. In addition, what intrigued me a great deal was, recessed in the wall of the left transept, a life-sized diorama of the Lourdes grotto with water gently trickling over a large stone from Lourdes below the feet of a statue of Our Lady, and kneeling figure of St. Bernadette nearby. Therese, Hofmann, and Lourdes remain to this day deeply engraved in my psyche.

The next vital step in my life-long fascination with Therese was reading about her. The first book I obtained, and I can't remember how, was Father Albert Dolan's The Living Sisters of the Little Flower in which he recounts his interviews with Therese's four sisters. His other books followed. They all completely enchanted me. The perfume of her sanctity seemed to emanate from the very pages I held in my hands as I read. After I devoured these books, I acquired her life story by Laveille and the one by Piat, followed finally by her own autobiography. From then on I was firmly entrenched in her mystique. My interest in her gradually accelerated to the point at which I decided to jot down names of people and places in her story I wanted to know more about. As a result, I delved deeper and searched wider because not one source contained all the information I craved. It slowly dawned on me that I should record this data methodically. This led me to believe that other people might also want to seek this knowledge contained in just one volume; thus I began to research for material with the aim of producing a book. Incidentally, I understand that of the hundreds of books about St. Therese there is not one that is similar to mine or covers the material in the manner I do.

One simple incident in my early adulthood brought to my consciousness the reality and actual nearness in time in which St. Therese is to us — at least to me. Despite countless visits to my dear grand mother's grave, one day I was startled when I noticed for the first time the significance of the year of her birth —1873, the same as Therese's!

Therese Martin was an actual person who appeared on earth in the last quarter of the 19th century and lived only twenty-four years. Yes, she was human in every sense of the word, but far above the ordinary in her spirituality. She experienced many of

the illnesses, sorrows, and joys of young people her age: intestinal ailments, headaches, rashes, pimples, emotional upsets, extreme sensitivity, and even doubts.

Therese was the product of a family intensely concentrated on personal sanctity. Of the nine children born of Louis and Zelie Martin (who themselves have been beatified and are on the way to canonization), Therese was the youngest, most malleable, and willing clay her holy parents so easily molded into the embodiment of all their hopes and dreams, the apex of which was sainthood followed by the awesome honor of being designated a Doctor of the Universal Church.

I quote a massive amount of material from Therese's writings and others with the conviction that the original words, even though in translation, convey more accurately the essence and immediacy of the situations, and certainly the personality of the characters involved far better than I could possibly do with my own words. I have endeavored to find and copy all the quotations from Thérèse's writings as well as those of others that refer to or are pertinent to each subject on which I write. Some of the banalities of her life and the childish language of her early writings, so natural in little ones —even saints— may seem a bit trite or unnecessary, but they do, nonetheless, merit consideration and evaluation. They are not only imbued with charm but reflect the reality of her humanity. In a way, I consider everything she has written to be a kind of fourth class relic.

Finally, the purpose of this book is to provide facts and other information about Thérèse and the people and places connected with her that have never been collected and compiled into one book. I must emphasize that what I have produced is basically a reference, a source book, a companion, or an addendum, if you will, to the story of St. Thérèse. I do not in any way specifically delve into an analysis of her spirituality or her message to the world. This has all been thoroughly accomplished by expert theologians. At any rate, Thérèse's gems of spirituality permeate all of her writings and conversations, and obviously all that I have included in my book. The illustrations therein further enhance in their own visual manner the understanding and knowledge of each entry. I have traveled to, and recorded on film, the places Thérèse and her family visited and, when possible, I have spoken to the people presently living in the very buildings where Thérèse or her family used to live.

My sincere hope is that this book will be of interest and value to anyone wishing to gain detailed information about the life of St. Thérèse of Lisieux, her works, the

many people and places connected with her, and more, all contained in one volume. <>

A History of Scottish Philosophy Series

A History of Scottish Philosophy is a series of collaborative studies, each volume being devoted to a specific period. Together they provide a comprehensive account of the Scottish philosophical tradition, from the centuries that laid the foundation of the remarkable burst of intellectual fertility known as the Scottish Enlightenment, through the Victorian age and beyond, when it continued to exercise powerful intellectual influence at home and abroad. The books aim to be historically informative, while at the same time serving to renew philosophical interest in the problems with which the Scottish philosophers grappled, and in the solutions they proposed.

Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century edited by Alexander Broadie [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780198769842]

During the seventeenth century Scots produced many high quality philosophical writings, writings that were very much part of a wider European philosophical discourse. Yet today Scottish philosophy of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries is widely studied, but that of the seventeenth century is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves. This volume begins by placing the seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy in its political and religious contexts, and then investigates the writings of the philosophers in the areas of logic, metaphysics, politics, ethics, law, and religion. It is demonstrated that in a variety of ways the Scottish Reformation impacted on the teaching of philosophy in the Scottish universities. It is also shown that until the second half of the century--and the arrival of Descartes on the Scottish philosophy curriculum--the Scots were teaching and developing a form of Reformed orthodox scholastic philosophy, a philosophy that shared many features with the scholastic Catholic philosophy of the medieval period. By the early eighteenth century Scotland was well placed to give rise to the spectacular Enlightenment that then followed, and to do so in large measure on the basis of its own well-established intellectual resources. Among the many thinkers discussed are Reformed orthodox, Episcopalian, and Catholics philosophers including George Robertson, George Middleton, John Boyd, Robert Baron, Mark Duncan, Samuel Rutherford, James

Dundas (first Lord Arniston), George Mackenzie, James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair), and William Chalmers.

Reviews

- Considers such topics as logic, metaphysics, politics, ethics, law, and religion in seventeenth century thought
- Offers new perspectives on famous figures; sheds new light on neglected thinkers
- Explores key intellectual and historical developments in the period
- Situates this area of philosophy in its political and religious contexts
- Will be the standard reference point for this period of philosophy

"Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century makes an outstanding contribution to the understanding of Scottish intellectual and cultural history...In sum, Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century is a must-read for any student of seventeenth-century Scottish church history." -- Nathan C. J. Hood, Scottish Church History

"This volume is a fascinating and rich voyage into the historical, political, social, and religious context in which philosophers of the eighteenth century developed their ideas and philosophical accounts. With authors coming from fields of study ranging from philosophy, to history, and to law and politics, the book offers a wider and deeper account of the world in which Scottish philosophers evolved than what is usually found in current philosophical works." -- Journal of Scottish Philosophy

"...excellent and authoritative." - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

"As the editors acknowledge, the volume is entering a crowded field... This volume nonetheless breaks new ground." --Journal of the History of Philosophy

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Seventeenth-Century Scottish Philosophy by Alexander Broadie

Philosophy was a major part of Scottish high culture during the seventeenth century. Hundreds of writings by Scottish philosophers have survived from this period and they are proof of a lively culture of philosophical discourse in which the protagonists demonstrate skill in argument, creative philosophical imagination, and extensive knowledge of philosophical debates taking place outwith as well as within Scotland. That Scotland should have a rich philosophical culture in the seventeenth century should come as no surprise, for its universities remained on a philosophical trajectory that had been at the heart of Scotland's university life during the preceding two centur es. Yet today the richly coloured tapestry of seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy is known to hardly anyone, even within the community of professional philosophers.

By the end of the fifteenth century Scotland had three universities, St Andrews (founded c.1411), Glasgow (founded 1451), and King's College, Aberdeen (founded 1495), and by the end of the following century there were two further universities in Scotland, Edinburgh (founded 1583) and Marischal College, Aberdeen, founded in 1593 as a degree-conferring institution distinct from King's College.

During the greater part of these two centuries the practice of Scotland's universities was to employ as teachers or 'regents' men (all the academics were men) who had studied at universities in northern Europe and especially Paris, Europe's greatest university and one which routinely was home to a large number of Scottish students, as well as to Scottish regents and professors. The outcome of this Scottish

recruitment practice was that Paris was treated as a model for teaching methods and also for curricula and the books prescribed for study.

Thus, we find that Lawrence of Lindores (1372–1437), the first rector of St Andrews University, had been a student and then a regent at Paris where he commented extensively on Aristotelian texts, before returning to Scotland to take up his post at St Andrews. Many of his writings, including his commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, De anima and De interpretatione, are extant. A similar story may be told regarding Hector Boece (c.1465–c.1536) a native of Dundee, who was a student and then regent at Paris before going to Aberdeen where he was the first Principal of King's College. He likewise left a substantial body of writing, including a formidable work on logic. John Mair (c.1467–1550), the central figure in a prominent circle of Scottish philosophers and theologians at Paris, spent five years as Principal at Glasgow University (1518–1523), returned to Paris, and for the last sixteen years of his life was Provost of St Salvator's College, St Andrews University. A large number of his books on logic and philosophy are extant. Mair's friend William Manderston, who graduated from Glasgow University in 1506, became professor at the College of Sainte Barbe, Paris and was also briefly rector of the university, before returning to Scotland, to St Andrews, where he pursued his academic career. Another member of Mair's circle who should be mentioned here is George Lokert from Ayr, who studied at Paris, graduated in arts and then in theology, and taught in both fields at Paris before returning to Scotland where he was elected rector of St Andrews University. Subsequently he became dean of Glasgow, while maintaining close relations with the university. All these men helped to impose on the Scottish universities a Parisian way of doing things.

Further into the sixteenth century there are other distinguished scholars such as George Buchanan, the great humanist and teacher of young James VI; Robert Rollock, first Principal of Edinburgh University; and Andrew Melville who sought to focus Scottish university philosophy teaching on the writings of Pierre de la Ramée (Petrus Ramus). There is good reason to conclude from their discourses and from the discourses of many others who studied in and who taught in the Scottish universities, that Scots could be taught in Scotland at as high a level as was available anywhere in Europe.

In recent decades a good deal of light has been shed on dark places of sixteenth-century Scottish philosophy, and there is now a strong basis on which to build. But until very recently there has been no attempt to build a corresponding picture of

seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy. This fact prompts questions. Were there no good Scottish philosophers of that century? Was there no ground-breaking work? Did the five Scottish universities come to attach less value to philosophy teaching? Or even abandon it entirely? And to step back in order to have a broader perspective, if no noteworthy philosophical product did appear, what could be the explanation for the blackout following the high-quality philosophy produced during the previous two centuries?

The questions are no less pressing, perhaps more pressing, when coming from the perspective of the eighteenth century, the century of Enlightenment during which Scotland's achievement in philosophy was unsurpassed anywhere in Europe. With boasting rights assured by the presence of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, and others, it is surely difficult to believe that the tremendous achievements of the eighteenth century owed nothing, or the almost nothing, to the philosophy of Scotland of the previous century. But if its origins did not lie in Scotland they must have lain elsewhere. In line with this thought, there is no lack of secondary literature that finds, in seventeenth-century philosophers from other countries, for example, France, the Low Countries, and England, the explanation for the sudden rise and peerless achievement of Scottish thinkers during the Age of Enlightenment.

In light of the facts and claims just aired, it is surprising that there has not previously been a significant investigation of philosophy in seventeenth-century Scotland, with a view to explaining the dramatic differences in levels of achievement between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as also between the sixteenth and seventeenth. It is no less surprising that there had been no serious attempt to determine whether the facts were truly factual.

Now that the work has started it can be reported that seventeenth-century Scotland succeeded in producing a vibrant philosophical culture rich in achievement, with philosophers responsive to each other, responsive to philosophers of other countries, and responded to, in their turn, by philosophers from furth of Scotland. The universities, vested with responsibilities to their disciplines and to their students, discharged their responsibilities at an impressively high level, as also, it should be said, did the schools that provided the students, already competent in Latin, and therefore able both to understand the lectures and also to participate in disputations. With regard to its philosophical culture, the century between the Age of Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment was demonstrably not a mysteriously

dark age. On the contrary, it was an age in which there flourished in abundance the intellectual vigour that one might reasonably have expected given the philosophical achievements of the flanking centuries.

Almost all the literature on Scottish philosophy attends exclusively to the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. This means that in providing a narrative now that embraces philosophical writing antecedent to the Scottish Enlightenment there is likely to be a felt pressure to approach the subject in a teleological spirit, that is, by seeing the earlier century's work in terms of the eighteenth century's and attending to that earlier work on the basis of terms of reference dictated by what came later. Some ideas that were truly important to seventeenth-century philosophy figure less or hardly at all during the following century, and the perspective of seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers was in substantial measure different from the perspective which predominated in the following century. Two points should be noted at this stage; others will emerge as the book progresses.

First: In 1560 Scotland embraced religious Reform. The country, to speak generally, became Protestant, taking up a stance very much more in line with Calvin than Luther, though Lutheranism was prominent in the earlier part of the religious turbulence in Scotland, as witness the stance of Patrick Hamilton, proto-martyr of the Scottish Reformation. But the most important figure in the Protestant leadership in 1560 was John Knox, who had lived in Geneva and had been hugely influenced by Calvin and other theologians in the Genevan leadership. Knox was the principal person in Scotland among those who guided Scottish Protestantism towards a specific confession of faith and a specific concept of church governance, Presbyterianism. These cataclysmic events were bound to impact on Scotland's universities, for each was deeply imbedded within the Catholic culture of medieval Scotland. Each, St Andrews, Glasgow, and King's College, Aberdeen, was founded by papal bull, and each had come into being with the vital help of a local bishop, Henry Wardlaw at St Andrews, William Turnbull at Glasgow, and William Elphinstone at King's College, Aberdeen. All three universities had the task of protecting and promoting the Catholic faith; they were bulwarks against what the Church perceived to be errors. The Reformation was bound to have a transformational effect on Scotland's universities and on the thinking of those engaged in academic studies whether in the groves of academe or not. In terms of their constitution, the universities had to deal with the question of the changes that should be made to

their foundation documents in light of the fact that they would thereafter be protecting and promoting the New Faith, not the Old.

Within this unfolding drama philosophy played a powerful role since philosophy, religion, and theology occupy a large area of common ground, including matters relating to the existence of God, the divine attributes, the concept of creation, the meaning of human life, moral imperatives, and much else. A question arises regarding the implications that the New Faith might have for the teaching, especially the philosophy teaching in the universities. Thus, as regards the Eucharist, Christ's declaration that 'this (bread) is my body, this (wine) is my blood' was given a very precise philosophical interpretation by the Catholic Church. It was based on the concept of transubstantiation and was expounded in terms of the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and accident. The exposition involved the invention of the conception of 'real accident', and Scotland's seventeenth-century Reformed Orthodox philosophers were unanimous in declaring that that Pre-Reformation concept was incoherent, a logical contradiction. This contested area was no longer contested in Scotland by the Age of Enlightenment. Philosophy had moved on.

A further philosophical cum theological concept that changed as a result of the Reformation was that of the Fall, humankind's first disobedience, the corruption of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The concept of the Fall was crucial for an understanding of philosophical anthropology and humankind's moral status. To speak generally, during the period from the early-seventeenth century to the later-eighteenth century the Fall evolved in Scotland from being understood to be a super-terrifying thing to being understood to be something a good deal less fierce. Among the leaders in this process of reassessment was Francis Hutcheson, whose moral philosophy was based on a much gentler and more agreeable picture of human nature.

The second point I wish to make regarding the different perspectives of the earlier philosophers and the later is that eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers, to a greater extent than their immediate predecessors, were engaged with scepticism, whether by wondering how to take it forward or how to refute it, or by wondering with what to replace it. Hume, more than anyone, set the tone, and the common-sense philosophers, Thomas Reid most famously, sought to answer him. These were major issues in the later century and not in the earlier.

To evaluate the philosophers of the seventeenth century simply on the basis of whether their work was or was not helpful to their Enlightenment successors, and to attend to their writings only to the extent that they could be hooked onto the later philosophical texts, is to do those earlier philosophers an injustice and therefore a disservice. It is to write a teleological history of philosophy—not a kind pursued in this volume.

Chapters two and three provide detailed contextualisation of the Scottish uni versities within a period of rapid change in both the political and the religious dimensions of the country, and dwelling particularly on the impact of those changes on the philoso phy taught in the universities. The impact of the conflictual relations between Presbyterians and Episcopalians is noted and the success of the Presbyterians in the late 1630s and the 1640s in taking charge of the universities, including those in Aberdeen where the outcome of the take-over was catastrophic for the Episcopalians, one of whom, Robert Baron, was one of the finest philosophers in Scotland. A wealth of information is provided regarding the teachers and the philosophical works presented to their students.

Chapters four and five both concern Scotland's philosophers as citizens in the international Republic of Letters, travelling furth of Scotland to help in the philosophical education of others, and also appropriating philosophical ideas not originally conceived in Scotland, but perceived to be helpful to Scots in their own philosophical explorations. In chapter four, Scotland's relation with the Huguenots, France's Genevan-inspired Protestant community, is centre stage. From the late-sixteenth century until 1685 the Huguenots had academies whose primary task was the preparation of young men for the role of pastors of the French Protestant communities. The Scottish philosophers and theologians were judged by Geneva to be doctrinally sound and were therefore welcome as regents and professors at the academies at Saumur, Montauban, Orthez, Montpellier, and elsewhere (there were a dozen Huguenot academies in France, all told). The Scots provided a philosophy syllabus that was in close harmony with the teaching done at the Scottish universities. It all ended in tears for the Huguenots in 1685 with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the Huguenots' consequent loss of citizen rights and their departure from France in great numbers to settle in many countries in Europe, including Scotland, in large measure a Calvinist country and therefore one into which the immigrants could the more readily be as simulated, all the more so in

view of the welcome and beneficial influence that the Scots had had in Huguenot population centres in France.

Chapter five also faces outward. It tracks lines of influence by which Scots around 1700 were informed by the work of philosophers elsewhere in Europe, works which in many cases impacted on what was taught at the universities of Scotland. The contributions of Scots to wider philosophical debates is noted, while it is also acknowledged that Scots operated under certain constraints. These included the dearth of printing presses in Scotland, and weaknesses in the system that was in place for the distribution of books, especially books from abroad. There was also the deeper problem of the perceived unacceptability of the teaching and promoting of views that were potentially dangerous to the faith. Nevertheless, despite these various obstacles, Scotland's philosophers did gain access to many or even most of the philosophy books that were causing a stir on the Continent and in England, as witness the Scottish discussions of Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Gassendi, Malebranche, Newton, Locke, Henry More, Johannes Clauberg, Gerard de Vries, Jean LeClerk, and many others. To speak generally, the Scottish philosophers kept abreast of what their Continental colleagues were saying and they were engaged in passing on the new ideas to their students, even if passing them on in such a way as to respect the fact that they, as teachers, had the task of preparing students for a life in the church or in public service.

The Arts Faculty was not the place to teach theology. Theology came later, but the regents in Arts could not teach as if theology were not relevant to the task with which they were charged and that task, as just indicated, included teaching philosophy to young men who would play a part in the ecclesiastical life of the newly Protestant country. The Reformed Church in Scotland therefore needed to have a view on the relation between philosophy and the Reformed faith. Chapter six deals with this question on the basis of the doctrines of Bola fide and Bola Scriptura—'by faith alone' and 'by Scripture alone'. Scripture was seen as a self-sufficient text. Through it and it alone we learn the content of our faith; philosophical reflection could not give us that insight. Of course, there is a need for philosophical reflection but, as is stressed in chapter six, it is necessary to employ philosophy within its natural limits, which are certainly not the limits of a theology that takes Scripture as its starting point.

As to the nature of the philosophy taught in the Scottish universities, chapter six pays attention to the fact that the philosophy of the first half of the sixteenth

century had a scholastic character, in this sense, that it is a version of Aristotle's philosophy, heavily informed by the thinking of the medieval Catholic philosophers, the Schoolmen, and it involved a teaching style of reading of authoritative texts and of conducting disputations on those texts, using theses, objections to the theses, and then a process of weighing the theses and objections in search of an outcome to the disputation that would satisfy reason. Such philosophy was really the only philosophical show in town; it was common to Catholic philosophy and Reformed and had the advantage that it enabled philosophers from different faith communities to talk to each at a high level of mutual understanding. Assuredly Catholics and Reformed thinkers took a different view of what the Eucharist meant, but at least they understood each other very well. The Aristotelian language of substance and accident in terms of which Catholics couched their position was exactly the language that the Reformed also used, even if each side thought the other totally wrong in certain of their doctrines.

The following chapter, seven, on logic, demonstrates that the concept of logic was sufficiently broad in late-sixteenth and in seventeenth-century Scotland to cover grammar, rhetoric, and methodology, as well as the idea of rules governing the relations between premises and conclusion in scientific syllogisms. The regents' logic teaching was also influenced by a wide range of sources, including, in the early part of the period, Aristotle (of course) and Pierre de la Ramée, and, in the later part, Descartes and Francis Bacon, though Aristotle's influence continued to count for something. While Aristotle's influence is shown in the regents' handling of the question of how knowledge should be presented, Descartes and then Francis Bacon are seen as sources of precious insights regarding the logic of scientific discovery, which is the area not of the presentation of knowledge, which is primarily a rhetorical matter, but of the acquisition of knowledge, which is not primarily rhetorical. Behind these concerns there lurk others, of a theological nature, concerning the Fall, a topic that surfaces often in this volume. The Fall left humankind corrupted in the faculties of the mind, but not so corrupted that self-help was ruled out. The regents saw logic as an instrument by which we could rescue ourselves from some of the terrible consequences of humankind's first disobedience.

Chapter eight expounds the concept of 'judgment', a concept that is at home in logic and is also deployed by seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers in their philosophy of mind. Close attention is paid to the discussion on judgment in the

Metaphysica generalis of Robert Baron, where he particularly addresses the idea of judgment as a free act. A notable feature of Baron's treatment of judgment is his contrast between, on the one hand, the logician's concern with judgment as a bearer of truth in inferences in which canons of inference are deployed that ensure that if the judgments serving as premises are true then so also must be the judgment drawn as a conclusion from those premises and, on the other hand, a judgment that is passed by an arbiter, a person agreed upon by two parties in dispute who undertake to accept the judgment he makes as to which party is in the right. The arbiter seeks the right balance in judging the respective merits of the two protagonists. He must be guided by pertinent principles, including the dictates of natural justice, and while his deliberations may be grounded in part on a hunch or a feeling, which he cannot present as a sound intellectual basis for his decision, they must also be grounded, at least in part, on defensible principles.

Baron's rich discussion is further enriched by his thoughts on the location, among the faculties of the mind, of the freedom that is thus exercised by the arbiter, a freedom, Baron notes, that is greater than that of a judge sitting in judgment in a court of law, who is bound by a plethora of laws, regulations, and technical clarifications, that cannot be ignored or transgressed without a failure of due process. In short, the judge pronounces on the question: 'What does the law require in respect of the case now before the court?' This is not a question to which the arbiter has to respond.

The law is also foregrounded in chapter nine, where perhaps the single greatest presentation of Scots law, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, by James Dalrymple, the first Viscount Stair, is discussed with special reference to legal obligation and its normativity. Since natural law is God's law, it seems evident that God's will is the ground or origin of our obligation to obey natural law. Positive law is made by humans, and it might seem that obligation to obey it derives from the human will as the obligation to obey natural law derives from the divine will. However, in Stair's account, positive law is at least in part derivable from natural law, and hence God's will is part of the explanation for the normativity of positive law. But there is a further point here, concerning the role of the Fall. Before the Fall humans naturally willed in concurrence with natural law, but after the Fall, the natural law requirement of equity is in a conflictual relation with the corrupted human will. The fallen human agent will often fail to obey the natural demand for equitable behaviour and, for the sake of a quiet, or at least an easier time, will treat

some individual equitably at the cost of treating the community in equitably. Such is life.

Following the chapter on the great jurisprudentialist James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, chapter ten focuses on Stair's in-law, the Scottish judge James Dundas, the first Lord Arniston, whose 313 page manuscript Idea philosophiae moralis (The idea of moral philosophy) has only recently come to light. Written in 1679, the year of Dundas's death, the Latin manuscript, the only philosophical work he is known to have written, fits squarely within the category of Reformed orthodox scholasticism. Dundas begins in an Aristotelian spirit by expounding a concept of moral philosophy that rather closely resembles the concept that emerges from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, though Dundas believes Aristotle's exposition to be the poorer for its not including a concept corresponding to that of the Fall. Thereafter the book discusses good and evil, happiness, conscience, and the virtues. Dundas discusses the concept of the will, with special reference to the question whether the will necessarily wills in accordance with the last judgment made in a deliberative process by practical reason, and he emerges from his discussion as a determinist who nevertheless believes that we have free will. Chapter ten of this volume takes due note of the theological dimension of Dundas's narrative on the will.

In chapters nine and ten the fact of the Fall plays a prominent part. In chapter eleven the Fall occupies centre stage, as seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy, particularly the philosophy of the university regents, is surveyed. It is shown that the concepts of original sin, the Fall and post-lapsarian corruption frame much of seventeenth-century Scottish thinking on moral philosophy and moral psychology. Among the players whom the Scottish philosophers discuss are Descartes, Hobbes, and the Cambridge Platonist Henry More; and the neo-Stoic moral essays of the Scottish judge (yet another philosophically minded judge) George Mackenzie are also in the foreground, as ways are noted in which the rather hard-edged Reformed orthodox views of human nature gradually soften, at least in some writings, as the century progresses.

During the seventeenth century, Scottish Catholics could not flourish in Scottish universities, whose teachers were almost entirely (if not entirely) Presbyterian or Episcopalian, and outside the universities also that same religious configuration is to be found among those who contributed to academic disciplines in Scotland. There were Scottish Catholics making a significant contribution to philosophy during the seventeenth century, but they were not making their contribution from

within Scotland itself. Perhaps the most important was William Chalmers (surname in Latin: Camerarius) from the village of Fintray in Aberdeenshire. He left Scotland when aged about twelve or in his early teens, studied at the Scots College in Rome, became a Jesuit, left the Order, became an Oratorian, and in his latter days was a secular priest in St Malo. His greatest work, Selectae disputationes philosophicae (Selected philosophical disputations), published in Paris in 1630, demonstrates the influence of the greatest philosopher of medieval Scotland John Duns Scotus, but the work is nevertheless that of an independently minded thinker. Chapter twelve of this book attends to two discussions in the Disputationes, first, on the concept of happiness and the relation of happiness to the role played in its production by the faculties of intellect and will, and secondly, on the concept of doing evil for evil's sake, a concept that Chalmers believes to be instantiated by the actions of persons of several different sorts, the devil, those who are damned (damnati) and those who are very perverse wayfarers (viatores perversissimi) on their pilgrimage through this life. Chalmers' philosophy was read by his contemporaries in Scotland, including Dundas, and their response to him merits a study of its own.

Chapter thirteen turns to political matters, and especially to the doctrines of perhaps Scotland's pre-eminent political philosopher, Samuel Rutherford, regarding the relation of monarchs to the law and to their subjects. Rutherford, with a wealth of subtle arguments, demonstrates that the monarch should be subordinate to the law— hence the ordering of the terms in the title of his greatest work, Lex Rex— and demonstrates also that the monarch should be subordinate to the subjects, in the sense that the monarch is in post by the will of the people, who have the right not only to elect a monarch but also to depose a monarch who proves to be not up to the job of ruling. The chapter also demonstrates that Rutherford's discussion is to be seen in a broad historical-philo soph ic al frame that includes the Scots Hector Boece, John Knox, George Buchanan, and especially John Mair, as well as Jean Gerson and John Mair's former student Jacques Almain. The political issues here dealt with are linked to theological concerns, particularly the Fall, principally because there were no politics before the Fall. It was only with humankind's first disobedience and the consequent depravity, which included, for the first time in human history, a sense of 'mine'—my property — and feelings of greed, that it became necessary for human beings to think of the principles that inform a well-ordered way to live. Sound political thinking must be grounded in a sound anthropology; and an anthropology based on humanity after the Fall is significantly

different from that based on humanity prior to the Fall. Rutherford never loses sight of this thesis.

Indeed, throughout this volume we find religion and theology providing a space within which philosophical activity is carried out, and we must also be aware of the religious and theological dimensions of the places where Scotland's philosophy teachers were working, including the universities all of which had, as a primary task, the preparation of students for a life spent as pastors or ministers, and including also the Huguenot academies whose primary task was the same as that of the Scottish universities. Such facts as these need to be in the open if the aim of the historian of philosophy is, as it should be, not simply to make sense of the writings of past philosophers, but to understand what those writings meant to the philosophers who wrote them. <>

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, VOLUME I: MORALS, POLITICS, ART, RELIGION edited by Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 9780199560677]

This new history of Scottish philosophy will include two volumes that focus on the Scottish Enlightenment. In this volume a team of leading experts explore the ideas, intellectual context, and influence of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Reid, and many other thinkers, frame old issues in fresh ways, and introduce new topics and questions into debates about the philosophy of this remarkable period. The contributors explore the distinctively Scottish context of this philosophical flourishing, and juxtapose the work of canonical philosophers with contemporaries now very seldom read. The outcome is a broadening-out, and a filling-in of the detail, of the picture of the philosophical scene of Scotland in the eighteenth century.

Reviews

- The launch of a new history of Scottish philosophy
- New perspectives on famous figures
- Explores key intellectual and historical developments in the period
- Will be the standard reference point for this period of philosophy

CONTENTS

Introduction, Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris

The philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland, unlike the philosophy of nineteenth-century Scotland, is by now familiar territory. The past forty or fifty years have seen a determined and concerted effort to look beyond and behind the giant figure of David Hume and to recover the full extent of Scottish philosophical achievement from the time of the Glorious Revolution and the Act of Union to the time of the French Revolution and the European wars that followed it. New editions of the complete works of Hume (Beauchamp, Norton, and Stewart (gen. eds.) 1998–), Francis Hutcheson (Haakonssen (gen. ed.) 2002–), Adam Smith (Campbell and Skinner (gen. eds.) 1976–2001), and Thomas Reid (Haakonssen (gen. ed.) 1995–) have been initiated, and in Smith's case completed. Important works by Gershom Carmichael (1724), George Turnbull (1740, 1742), David Fordyce (1748), Adam Ferguson (1767), Lord Kames (1751, 1762, 1774), and John Millar (1771, 1787) have also been freshly edited, and selections from the works of James Beattie (Harris (ed.) 2004), Dugald Stewart (Mortera (ed.) 2007), and Thomas Brown (Dixon (ed.) 2007) have been published. There has also been what demands to be called an explosion of secondary literature on all aspects of the philosophy of Scotland in the eighteenth century. Some of this literature limits its attention to analysis of the arguments of individual philosophers. Some of it explores intellectual relations between different philosophers. There are edited volumes of essays on the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment in general, and on particular themes in Scottish Enlightenment

philosophy (cf. Campbell and Skinner (eds.) 1982; Hope (ed.) 1984; Stewart (ed.) 1990; Wood (ed.) 2000). There are Cambridge Companions to Hume (Norton and Taylor (eds.) 2008), Smith (Haakonssen (ed.) 2006), and Reid (Cuneo and van Woudenberg (eds.) 2004) along with a Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Broadie (ed.) 2003). A major biography of Smith is in its second edition (Ross 2010) and biographical studies of Hume and Reid are soon to appear by contributors to this collection (James Harris and Paul Wood respectively). There are journals dedicated to Hume and to Smith, and a Journal of Scottish Philosophy that started as Reid Studies and tends to be dominated by work on the eighteenth century. New general histories of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century, updating the work of late nineteenth-century historians of philosophy such as James McCosh and Henry Graham, have been published (Rendall 1978; Broadie 2009). There are articles on Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There is also, of course, a large amount of work on Scottish figures and themes in studies of eighteenth-century philosophy considered more generally.1

What, then, is this new history of Scottish philosophy in the Enlightenment period meant to achieve? What does it add to the vigorous and sophisticated conversation about Scottish eighteenth-century philosophy that is already going on? Is there a need for another survey of the field? Our answer to such questions begins with the list of contributors to this volume. There are thirteen contributors in all. Only four (Garrett, Graham, Harris, Heydt) work in philosophy departments. The other nine contributors are based in departments of history (Emerson, Macleod, Sebastiani, Suderman, Tolonen, Wood), political science (Berry, Hanley), and English literature (Carey). It is our hope that this has resulted in new perspectives on the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, that old issues have been framed in fresh ways, and that new topics and questions have been introduced into the debates that historians of philosophy are currently having with each other about the philosophy written in eighteenth-century Scotland. A lot in this volume will of course be familiar to experts. New ground is not broken on every page. But when, for example, it comes to the four major philosophical figures who each have their own chapter—Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and Reid— we believe that this volume looks at well-known philosophical material from new points of view. The focus of these chapters tends to be on the distinctively Scottish context of the philosopher in question, and our hope is that this adds substantially to the understanding of his major texts. In the more thematic chapters, the Scottish context—or rather, a variety of Scottish

contexts—is again prominent, but so is the juxtaposition of canonical philosophers with contemporaries now very seldom read. The outcome is, we believe, a broadening out, and a filling in of the detail, of the picture of the philosophical scene of Scotland in the eighteenth century.

It is a peculiar feature of the history of philosophy that it is written primarily by philosophers. The history of history is written by historians of course but it is a somewhat different case. The history of science is not written by physicists and chemists, the history of literature is (mostly) not written by novelists and poets, the history of economics is (again, mostly) not written by economists. Usually the history of philosophy is the work of those who are philosophers first, and historians second. The result is a kind of history more concerned than is usual in other fields of history with what we might term a usable past. It is often the case that the aim, stated or implied, of an exercise in the history of philosophy is to bring a philosopher of the past into productive conversation with the philosophy of the present. For that to be so much as possible, obviously enough, there needs to be a fundamental continuity in understandings of what philosophy is. Philosophers of the past need to be interpretable as doing more or less the same thing as philosophers do now, as addressing more or less the same questions, using more or less the same methods. And so it is ruled out from the beginning that the philosophy of a particular period in the past might be, in significant respects, different from the philosophy of the present. Yet the fact is that philosophy has in the past been different in important respects from what philosophy is now. This is certainly the case when it comes to the philosophy of the eighteenth century. The literary style used by writers of philosophy, their intended audience, the institutional setting in which they worked—all differed greatly from what is usual among philosophers now. The syllabi taught by university professors, the definitions of philosophy given in dictionaries and encyclopaedias, the way the word 'philosophy', and its cognates, is used—all these things provide evidence that the nature of philosophy has changed considerably over the past two hundred years. Historians of philosophy who are philosophers by training are not always attuned to these differences. It seems a possibility, at least, that historians of philosophy from other disciplines might bring things to the attention of philosophers that they might otherwise miss.

A word is perhaps called for here about our conception of the relation between 'the philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland' and 'the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment'. We believe that these are two ways of talking about the same thing.

That is, we do not believe that in the Scottish context it is useful to distinguish between 'Enlightenment' and 'Counter-Enlightenment' philosophy. It is by now generally accepted that it makes no sense to use definitions of the Enlightenment taken from the Paris of the philosophes in an account of what Enlightenment meant in Scotland. If, for example, to be part of the Enlightenment is necessarily to be anti-clerical, then the only Scot who stands a chance of being part of the Enlightenment is Hume. But to exclude Hutcheson, Ferguson, and Reid, and many others besides, from the Scottish Enlightenment just because they were Christians and church ministers would be plainly absurd. Yet nor is it obvious that it is proper to identify the Enlightenment in Scotland with the cause of the 'Moderate' faction in the Church of Scotland, the faction that Hutcheson helped make possible, the faction to which Ferguson actively belonged, and the faction with which Hume, Smith, and Reid sympathized. Those who opposed and criticized the Moderates in the name of 'Orthodoxy' were not all unthinking bigots. Some did so with the intelligence and wit that is characteristic of paradigm cases of the Enlightenment cast of mind—see, for example, John Witherspoon's Ecclesiastical Characteristics; or, The Arcana of Church Policy. James Beattie's attack on Hume in An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth is an unattractive piece of ad hominem intolerance, but his other writings are perfectly representative of the mainstream of eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy. Beattie, it is worth remembering, was one of the first to criticize the racism in Hume's description of Africans in the essay 'Of National Character'. No one set of philosophical ideas can safely be identified as characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment. For present purposes, then, the Scottish Enlightenment is all that happened in Scotland, intellectually speaking, between around 1700 and around 1800. And the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment is all that happened, philosophically speaking, in that place at that time.

One way of attempting a general characterization of the philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland would be by means of a comparison and contrast with the Scottish philosophy of the seventeenth century. In this connection it is tempting, and many have succumbed to the temptation, to suppose that an age of enlightenment must have been preceded by an age of darkness. The Scottish philosophy of the seventeenth century, it is easy and convenient to suppose, was subservient to the theology of the Westminster Confession, with its emphasis upon original sin and the utter corruption of human nature. Even where that is not true, it might further be assumed, Scottish philosophy was 'scholastic', and therefore unresponsive both to

the humanism of the Renaissance and the new science of Bacon, Galileo, Boyle, and Newton. Either way, so a familiar story goes, the early eighteenth century saw a dramatic and complete rejection of all that had gone before. This story often has it that Hutcheson, in particular, was instrumental in dragging Scotland out of the shadows and cobwebs of the post-Reformation period into the bright modern world of humane morality, polite manners, and empiricist epistemology. Thus, according to Henry Thomas Buckle in his discussion of the 'Scotch intellect' in The History of Civilization in England [sic], the divines who subscribed to the Westminster Confession were 'libellers of their species'. It was 'the peculiar glory of Hutcheson, that he was the first man in Scotland who publicly combatted these degrading notions'. The appearance of Hutcheson's moral philosophy, according to Buckle, 'forms an epoch in the national literature' (Buckle 1861: II.426; cited in Rendall 1978: 74). It is now clear that this story will not do. Hutcheson did not come from nowhere. He was, after all, educated at Glasgow by men who must have done something to shape his philosophical outlook; and he had to be elected to the moral philosophy chair there by men who were sympathetic to his ideas. It may be that no one in, say, 1690, after decades of violent religious conflict in Scotland, could have predicted Hutcheson and the rest of the Scottish Enlightenment. But that does not mean that there are not intellectual roots of Enlightenment thought to be found in the Scottish philosophy of the seventeenth century. We believe that it is too soon responsibly to offer a hypothesis about what those roots may be. Too little is known as yet about the philosophical culture of the pre-Enlightenment period in Scotland.

In place, then, of an account of the intellectual origins of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy, this volume begins with a summary description by Roger Emerson in Chapter 1 both of the kind of country Scotland was around 1700 and of the opportunities, especially the intellectual opportunities, that it afforded its citizens. Emerson sets out the distinctiveness of Scotland and of its institutions, and the consequent impossibility of seeing the Scottish Enlightenment as reducible to an extension of an English Enlightenment. Emerson makes clear that at the turn of the eighteenth century Holland was in important respects a greater influence on Scotland than was the country south of the Tweed. Scots continued to study at Leiden in particular, and the textbooks used in Scottish universities, especially Edinburgh and Glasgow, tended to have a Dutch provenance. Aberdeen and St Andrews were marked more by ideas from Catholic Europe, but 'everywhere educational ideals and texts were mostly continental in origin until about 1730' (p. 23). Holland also had a significant role in shaping the outlook of Scottish lawyers

and medics until the middle of the century. The men Emerson is particularly interested in came back from Europe with the ambition, and also the means, to improve their native country. Some Scots, at least, had a perception of themselves as living in a backward society that needed to be 'changed' and that could be changed. The abolition of regenting in the universities and the creation of a professoriate, for example, was inspired by European practice. This was just one of many institutional reforms that paved the way for the philosophical achievements described in this volume. 'The Scottish Enlightenment', Emerson concludes, 'was not principally about politeness or civic humanism'. It was about 'something more basic, the remaking of a society so that it could produce men able to compete in every way in a rapidly changing world' (p. 31).

Daniel Carey's account of the life and work of Francis Hutcheson in Chapter 2 begins by noting that Hutcheson's status in Scotland in the second quarter of the eighteenth century owed as much to the way he succeeded in adapting his ideas to the needs of a complex and changing society as to sheer conceptual insight and argumentative dexterity. Carey charts Hutcheson's career from its beginnings in Dublin to the attempt to cement his place in British intellectual life that was his posthumously published System of Moral Philosophy. It was at no point the case that Hutcheson's ideas were universally welcomed and acclaimed. Religious conservatives challenged him persistently. They continued to attack him even after he succeeded in getting elected to the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy. At every stage of his career in fact there was controversy, and these controversies have much to tell us about the state of philosophy in Scotland, and in Britain as a whole, in the early Enlightenment period. Carey describes in turn the rationalist critique of Hutcheson's moral sense theory, the criticism levelled at his conception of natural benevolence by those (for instance, the St Andrews professor Archibald Campbell) who remained attached to philosophical egoism, and the complaints of those who, under the influence often of Joseph Butler, believed that Hutcheson's ethics needed to be supplemented by a more substantial account of moral obligation. The third of these lines of argument was especially thoroughly developed in the classrooms of Scottish universities, by for example Fordyce, Smith, Reid, and Dugald Stewart. This shows the extent to which Hutcheson's work constituted one important point of departure for the way moral philosophy was taught in Scotland throughout the century—and further abroad as well, in the dissenting academies of England, and in the colleges in the American colonies, where both his critical treatment of slavery in

the System and his powerful articulation of a right of resistance were especially carefully attended to.

In Chapter 3 Aaron Garrett and Colin Heydt move on beyond Hutcheson to essay a general account of the moral philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of moral philosophy in Scotland at this time. It occupied the entire final year of the arts syllabus. It was the subject that the first three years of college were preparation for. Those who taught moral philosophy were understood to play a vital role in the formation of the minds and characters of the young men who would go on to become Scotland's politicians, church ministers, lawyers, land owners, and businessmen. Of course 'moral philosophy' comprised more in the eighteenth century than it does now. What we call 'aesthetics' (treated in Chapter 3), 'philosophy of religion' (treated in Chapter 5), and 'political philosophy' (treated variously in Chapters 7, 8, and 9) were all within the remit of the professor of moral philosophy. Garrett and Heydt focus on moral philosophy construed somewhat more narrowly as having two main parts, one theoretical, the other practical. In their discussion of the theoretical component of ethics, Garrett and Heydt give particular attention to three topics: (i) the Scottish insistence that moral philosophy is an empirical, or 'experimental', science, grounded in what might now be called a phenomenology of the moral life, and intimately connected with the other elements of the 'science of man'; (ii) the project (introduced in Chapter 2) of combining Hutchesonian moral sense theory with a Butlerian faculty of conscience; and (iii) the attempt to combine an empirical and broadly anti-rationalist moral philosophy, a moral philosophy that moreover had a central place for the concept of virtue, with a natural jurisprudence taken from Grotius and, especially, Pufendorf. In the process, Garrett and Heydt give attention, not only to familiar and obviously important philosophers from Hutcheson through Hume and Smith to Reid, but also to relatively neglected figures such as Carmichael, Archibald Campbell, Turnbull, Fordyce, Beattie, and the Ferguson of the Institutes of Moral Philosophy. Those who taught moral philosophy could not leave theoretical questions alone, but they treated practical issues as being plainly more important. They often claimed that while disagreement was rife with respect to theoretical issues, there was little controversy when it came to the nature of the duties of adult human beings. In their summary description of the way Scottish professors instructed their charges as to their duties to God, to themselves, and to others, Garrett and Heydt make it clear that there was, all the same, no lack of dispute as to the proper way of categorizing those duties, and as to how they are to be related to

the discourse of rights. In the final section of their chapter, Garrett and Heydt bring into focus the question of how eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers reconciled their interest in duty, and in right, with their equally prominent interests in virtue and utility.

There is a tendency among historians of aesthetics to take it as obvious that the subject attained maturity only with the publication of Kant's Critique of Judgment in 1790, and to treat what happened before in terms of the degree to which it anticipated Kantian doctrines. In his survey of Scottish work on beauty, taste, rhetoric, and language in Chapter 4, Gordon Graham resists this tendency, pointing out early on in the chapter a number of respects in which Scottish philosophical aesthetics contrasts significantly with the Kantian approach. Scottish writers on these topics saw themselves as contributing to the larger project of a comprehensive 'science of man'. Their method was avowedly empirical and inductive. They often thought historically, in terms of conjectural accounts of the origins and development of literary and artistic phenomena. And they were intensely concerned with the practical, indeed moral, value and importance of aesthetic matters. In all of these respects, there are affinities between the aesthetics and the moral philosophy the Scottish Enlightenment, and there is consequently no effort made by the Scots to distinguish, as Kant sought to, our interest in the right and the good from our interest in the beautiful and the sublime. The bulk of Graham's chapter explores Scottish writing on two questions of enduring philosophical significance: first, whether beauty (and other aesthetic properties) exists independently of being perceived or is in some sense the product of our perceptual responses to the more 'objective' properties of objects; and second, whether there is a 'standard of taste' against which aesthetic judgements can be measured and found to be true or false. Hutcheson and Hume dominate discussion of these issues in the eighteenth-century context, but Graham draws in also arguments made by others, including Alexander Gerard and Reid. He also introduces related controversies concerning the pleasures of tragedy and the nature of artistic genius. In section VII of his chapter Graham turns toward the practical dimension of the question of taste, and to how taste, conceived of broadly enough to encompass both moral and aesthetic pleasures and pains, was to be cultivated and improved. Rhetoric, or 'eloquence', was understood by eighteenth-century Scots to be essential to the project of the refinement of taste. Rhetoric, needless to say, was important more generally in a culture that attached great importance to the weekly sermon of a minister to his congregation. A science of rhetoric led naturally to a science of language, and Graham describes work on

language by Smith, Lord Monboddo, and Hugh Blair in his chapter's concluding section.

One of the things that makes David Hume unusual when considered in his eighteenth-century context is his lack of interest in the practical questions that mattered so much to so many of his Scottish contemporaries. He was not a university professor (and does not seem really to have wanted to be one), nor lawyer, nor a medic, nor, of course, a minister of the Church. He does not appear to have taken much of an interest in the great projects of improvement that engaged the interests, and time and energy, of men like Henry Home of Kames, William Robertson, and the Earl of Ilay. His goal was to be a man of letters, free of practical responsibilities, free of the need of an income from one of the professions, and free of the need to please a patron. As a man of letters, he took himself to be speaking to a pan-British, and increasingly also a pan-European, audience. He identified with an international intellectual community that had no important connections with any one particular country. All of this raises the question of the extent to which he is properly regarded as a Scottish philosopher at all. It is this question that James A. Harris and Mikko Tolonen address in Chapter 5. They begin with A Treatise of Human Nature and argue that there is little, if any, discernible connection between it and either the education Hume received at Edinburgh or what was going on in Scottish letters in the 1720s and '30s. Hume's first book was deeply idiosyncratic, and was doubtless marked to a degree that it is impossible for us to gauge by the time he spent in France between 1734 and 1737. The Essays, Moral and Political of 1741–2, written as they are in imitation of The Spectator and The Craftsman, are much less idiosyncratic, but, again, their author's nationality barely imprints itself upon them. There is more to be said, however, about the relation between Scotland and the Political Discourses. Certainly they engage with the questions that Scots were discussing in Edinburgh and Glasgow in the aftermath of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745. Indeed, some of the essays published in that collection might well have had their origins in the discussion clubs that flourished in Scotland at this time. When he turned to the writing of narrative history, Hume first took Great Britain as his subject, and so of necessity wrote about Scotland as well as about England. But even after The History of Great Britain became The History of England, Scotland remained prominent among Hume's historical interests. Harris and Tolonen explore ways in which Hume, like William Robertson, engaged with and subverted the usual tropes of Scottish history writing. And in his writings on religious topics, so Harris and Tolonen argue, Scotland was never far from Hume's mind. Hume repeatedly

found himself involved in the struggle between 'Moderate' and 'Orthodox' wings of the Church of Scotland, and this had a significant impact on how he presented his philosophy of religion.

Inevitably, perhaps, Hume is central to Jeffrey M. Suderman's treatment of religion and philosophy in Chapter 6. Suderman does not begin with Hume, however. He begins, rather, with the Calvinist and Presbyterian inheritance that Hume shared with his Scottish contemporaries, an inheritance instilled in each new generation by means of the question and answer of the catechism, and recently consolidated by the religious settlement that followed the Glorious Revolution. In the first instance, Suderman observes, this inheritance was not felt to be threatened by the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century. On the contrary, there were many Scots who regarded the study of nature and its laws as a welcome addition to the means whereby God and his will might be known, and who, furthermore, took themselves to have answers to the deist's question as to why revelation might be needed in addition to a rational religion of nature. But gradually a gap opened up between the preoccupations of Enlightened Scots and those of traditional Calvinists. Providence began to be conceived of, by men like Hutcheson and Turnbull, in terms of God's benevolence and not simply in terms of his inscrutable omnipotence. Then, with the rise of 'Moderatism' in the 1750s, doctrinal questions came to seem to many less important than the practical question of how the Christian lived his life. The philosophy of religion was not neglected altogether—and Suderman describes how texts like Kames's Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion gave the 'Orthodox' ammunition for their fight against the new religion of virtue. Hume's contribution was to explore the limitations of human reason in ways that made both sides of this conflict feel uneasy. He shared the scepticism of the Orthodox as to the philosophical defences offered by the Moderates of their optimistic providentialism, but the way he expressed that scepticism made it plain that he had no sympathy at all with Orthodoxy's credal, and moral, conservatism. Suderman concludes with an account of the 'common sense' reply to Hume's writings on religion, as developed in Aberdeen by George Campbell, Gerard, and Reid. For the Aberdonians, as Suderman puts it, there was no tension at all between Christianity and Enlightenment. Enlightenment, in fact, was 'the fulfilment of the Christian spirit itself' (p. 233).

Chapter 7, on Adam Smith, begins with a brief biography, but focuses principally on two themes central to Smith's corpus taken as a whole: impartiality, and history. The 'impartial spectator' is of course a familiar feature of the moral psychology

developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but Aaron Garrett and Ryan Hanley show that the enlargement of sentiments and opinions that the impartial spectator encourages in us is a feature more generally of Smith's version of Enlightenment thought. Thus Smith's contributions to the short-lived first incarnation of The Edinburgh Review can be seen as a plea for the enlargement of the Scottish literary world via a more comprehensive engagement with what was going on in France and the rest of continental Europe. The manner of Smith's engagement with his intellectual predecessors and contemporaries is also a theme of this chapter. Smith may have taken his understanding of philosophical method from Hume, but he sought to broaden—or enlarge—the Humean philosophy by incorporating within it insights from, for example, Butler, Kames, and (perhaps especially) Rousseau. Eclecticism is a key, Garrett and Hanley argue, to understanding Smith's philosophical project. When it comes to history, this chapter is concerned again with integration, in this case with how historical investigation is not merely, so to speak, bolted onto Smith's philosophy like an optional extra, but rather is an essential part of what we would now call Smith's normative project. Garrett and Hanley present Smith as 'a theorist committed to articulating a particular vision of the flourishing society and describing the actions necessary for its practical realization' (p. 253). Smith the historian wants to engage the reader's sympathy and to modify their reactions and judgements, with the aim of, in Smith's own words, 'bettering our practice'. The chapter traces how this conception of history informs Smith's conjectural reconstructions of the development of legal, political, and economic institutions. The stadial theory of history is deployed by Smith in order to make clear how Europe had deviated from the 'natural' developmental process, the result being a range of economic and political problems that badly needed to be properly addressed.

Christopher J. Berry widens the scope of analysis of the Scottish science of man beyond the case of Smith in Chapter 8, to provide a comprehensive description of what the Scots of the eighteenth century contributed to the understanding of the origins and fundamental structure of human society. Berry begins with the question of method, and with the Scottish rejection of 'individualistic' explanations of social phenomena, such as underlay both the social contract tradition and appeals to the genius of legislators. The Scots sought general causes, but sought also to give such causes specificity by means of a comparative approach that had both a synchronic and a diachronic dimension. Vague appeals to the 'situation' or 'humour' or 'disposition' or 'manners' of peoples did not satisfy them. History and (what we

would now call) anthropology provided ways of isolating what is peculiar to a given society, and also ways of distinguishing between what is due to chance and what can be given an informative explanation. Berry notes that the Scots were in general sceptical of the explanatory capacity of 'physical' causes, such as climate or soil. They concerned themselves with 'moral' causes—which, Berry claims, they regarded as operating in a deterministic fashion. And the moral causes they gave most attention to were manners, or habits and customs, understood, in their full particularity, as the primary means whereby individuals are knitted together into societies, and as both the enabler of government and also a limit on what policies governments can hope to implement. The Scots, of course, did not regard manners as fixed and immutable. They subjected the changes of manners to historical investigation, with the four-stage analysis of social change a prominent explanatory tool in the hands of Smith, Millar, Kames, Robertson, and James Dunbar. Berry gives special attention to the Scottish examination of commercial society. Smith is naturally prominent here, but so is Sir James Steuart. Chapter 8 concludes with an acknowledgement of the fact that the Scottish science of society was not, so to speak, science for science's sake. As Garrett and Hanley argue with respect to Smith in Chapter 7, it was a science with a pronounced normative dimension. The goal was always to distinguish between better and worse 'institutional expressions', to use Berry's phrase, of a universal human nature, and to distinguish progress from the decline and decay that all human institutions are subject to in the end.

Silvia Sebastiani's discussion of the interrelated themes of barbarism and republicanism in Chapter 9 explores the Scottish conception of progress, and the practical question of how the Scots thought progress could be sustained, in more detail. The central issue here, Sebastiani argues, was whether modern commercial societies could escape the fate met with by earlier civilizations—and by Rome in particular. The Scots were deeply divided on this issue. Hume, Smith, and Millar adopted positions that challenged the republican position that had been articulated at the beginning of the century by Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, and that was powerfully reasserted by Adam Ferguson in his Essay on the History of Civil Society. They attached no importance to a civilian militia, they were relaxed about the spread of a taste for luxury goods, and 'corruption' in general was not something they worried about. They were confident that commerce and liberty went together, whether liberty was understood as the security of person and property or as a country's capacity for self-determination on the international stage. Ferguson was sure of none of this.

In describing this debate, Sebastiani shows that general agreement among Scots as to the methodological questions detailed by Berry in Chapter 8 was not sufficient to produce consensus about the fundamental political questions of the day. In the second half of her chapter, Sebastiani turns to the ways in which the debate between Ferguson and the Scottish apologists for commercial society bore on the question of the place of women in the modern world. There was plainly a strongly gendered aspect to Ferguson's critique of commerce. His worry was that commerce inevitably leads to effeminacy, where effeminacy is construed as softness, weakness, cowardice, and a tendency towards depravity. Hume, Smith, and Millar, by contrast, gave to women a positive, progressive role in societal evolution. The refinement of men's manners that resulted from their increasingly open and frequent exchanges with women was something to be welcomed. By the same token, however, it mattered to Hume, Smith, and Millar that women knew their place. Their place was the drawing room. That was where they could play their part in the improvement of taste and habit. Too much freedom for women would be dangerous: it would set Britain on a course towards the decadence of Italy and France. The question of true femininity, Sebastiani then shows, went along with the question of true masculinity, a question she explores in the context of the Ossian controversy. James Macpherson's poems spoke to Scots of a world that had almost disappeared. They wanted to believe that they were descendants and kinsmen of Fingal precisely because they were losing touch with values, barbarous but also heroic and chivalrous, that had no place in the society they were making for themselves. Ossian thus exposed the deepest tensions and ambivalences in the Scottish belief in history as progress and improvement.

Chapter 10 sees eighteenth-century Scots looking out beyond the borders of Great Britain. Emma Macleod describes the ways in which they reacted to the greatest political events of the age, the revolutions in America and in France. First, though, she considers the question of whether, and to what extent, eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers might be said to have crafted arguments that justified revolutionary demands for greater participation of more citizens in the business of government. Scotland did not see the development of an avowedly radical theory of natural rights such as was taken up by Joseph Priestley and Richard Price. They remained preoccupied by the problem of social order and how it was best maintained. Hutcheson may have been confident of the right to resist magistrates who exceed the limits placed upon their office, but most of the Scots who came after him were more cautious. This may have been because they were, as Macleod puts it,

'anxious to dissociate themselves from the Jacobite rebellions and to prove themselves good Hanoverians' (p. 370). It came naturally to them to deny that it had been, properly speaking, a revolution that had put the Hanoverians on the British throne. When war broke out in America, therefore, Scots did not rush to defend the right of the thirteen colonies to govern themselves. Ferguson, for example, went into print attacking Price's Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. Both Hume and Smith, however, the former in his correspondence and the latter in The Wealth of Nations, echoed Price's scepticism as to the wisdom of fighting a war to enforce the subservience of the colonies to the British crown. Most of the Scots viewed the American question as a problem of political prudence. The Americans did not have natural right on their side, but there was no point trying to hold on to the colonies through brute force, and there would be significant benefits to having an independent America as a trading partner. By the time of the revolution in France, many of those who had debated the American question were dead. Millar, who attacked the American revolutionaries for their inconsistency in maintaining the institution of slavery, was unusual in his sustained and outspoken defence of what happened in France in 1789 and afterwards. Ferguson, strikingly, was less critical of the French than he had been of the Americans, though mostly because, so he thought, events in France boosted his case for the revival of the military spirit in Britain. Other Scots, such as James Mackintosh, Reid, and Dugald Stewart, followed what Macleod terms 'the common British trajectory of initial enthusiasm for the French Revolution arcing downwards into revulsion as it progressed' (p. 389).

In Chapter 11 Paul Wood uses the career of Thomas Reid to challenge conceptions of the Scottish Enlightenment that take their lead from Hume's version of the 'science of man'. Hume originally planned a five-volume Treatise of Human Nature comprising accounts of 'logic' (in Book One), 'the passions' (in Book Two), 'morals' (in Book Three), and also 'criticism' and 'politics' (in projected but unwritten Books Four and Five). Much work on the Scottish Enlightenment has assumed that it is in these areas of philosophy that eighteenth-century Scots principally distinguished themselves. Wood wants, to use his own words, to 'put the science back into the Scottish Enlightenment's "science of man"' (p. 405). The case of Reid is critical to this project because of the extent to which, in addition to making major contributions to what Hume calls 'logic', and what we might call epistemology, he had a serious interest in both mathematics and the philosophy of nature. Wood describes early eighteenth-century Aberdeen, where Reid studied, worked as a college librarian, and then taught as a regent, as 'a staunchly defended Scottish

outpost of Newtonianism' (p. 407). Turnbull, Wood points out, was the first Scottish academic to advocate the use of the methods of natural philosophy in the study of the human mind. And from the first, Reid's cast of mind was characterized by an interest in the interplay of natural and moral philosophy, as is illustrated by his first published work, 'An Essay on Quantity', a critique of Hutcheson's attempt to introduce mathematical reasoning into moral philosophy, but also a clarification of the fundamental mathematical concept of quantity. Wood traces the origins of what became known as 'the common sense philosophy' in Reid's (and to a lesser extent Gerard's) teaching at Aberdeen in the 1750s and in the discussions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society from 1758 on. He shows that Euclid, Bacon, and Newton were just as important to the formulation of the common sense approach to the mind and its powers as Cicero and Shaftesbury. The first major fruit of the Aberdonian philosophy was Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, which Wood portrays as 'a work of religious apologetics grounded on a highly technical and extremely sophisticated and philosophical analysis of the mechanisms of sensory perception' (p. 426). It was the proper character of a genuine science of the mind, and of Newton's methodological legacy in particular, that was at the centre of Reid's dispute with Priestley in the 1770s, after Reid's move to the moral philosophy chair at Glasgow in 1764. This dispute carried over into Reid's attack on philosophical necessitarianism in the Essays on the Active Powers. That book joined the earlier Essays on the Intellectual Powers to constitute a fully comprehensive and systematic account of Reid's anatomy of the human mind such as could be, and soon was, used as a teaching text, both by Reid's successors at Glasgow, and more widely in Scotland, Europe, and the new United States of America.

In the concluding Chapter 12, Paul Wood reflects on the historiographical challenge posed by the subject matter of this volume. There is the contentious question of whether there came into being in the eighteenth century a distinctively 'Scottish' philosophy that merits being gathered together into a 'Scottish school'. There is the aforementioned and equally contentious question of what 'Enlightenment' means in the eighteenth-century Scottish context, along with the related question of when, exactly, the Enlightenment in Scotland can be said to have begun and ended. There is in addition the question of, as Wood puts it, 'what type of history the history of the Scottish Enlightenment ought to be' (p. 462). Should it be a social history of ideas, or a political history, or a more purely intellectual history, or a history that speaks directly to the concerns of philosophers of the present day? Wood chronicles in

some detail the debates that these questions have generated. What matters, Wood suggests, is that readers of the present volume be aware that all writing on the Scottish Enlightenment, whether explicitly or implicitly, assumes answers to these questions. There is, in other words, no such thing as the history of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century. As with any area of history, it is always a matter of choice for the historian of the Scottish Enlightenment, how to conceive of the object of study, and what historical method to follow.

Such choices, obviously enough, were made in the planning of this volume. It will be plain to the reader that we are not presenting here a comprehensive account of the philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland. The emphasis is very much upon themes in the moral and political thought of the period. Scottish work in the areas of philosophy that we now call the philosophy of perception, epistemology, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of science is barely covered at all. In other words, half of the Scottish 'science of man', the half that concerns what Thomas Reid termed 'the intellectual powers of man', is largely missing. Moreover, just as in the eighteenth century considered generally it is hard to draw a clear line dividing philosophy from practical ethics, political theory, and history, so also there is (as Paul Wood reminds us) only an indistinct boundary between philosophy and what we now call science. Philosophy and psychology, in particular, are hard to pull apart in an eighteenth-century context. But so are philosophy and the natural sciences. Joseph Black the chemist and James Hutton the geologist were both regarded as 'philosophers'. These are issues that would need to be explored and explained in a genuinely complete history of the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. As we worked on this volume, we came to the decision that another volume would be needed to cover such matters in appropriate depth. That volume is currently under preparation. <>

Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume II: Method, Metaphysics, Mind, Language

edited by Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780198807940]

This is a companion volume to Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume I. Where *Volume I* covered Scottish Enlightenment contributions to morals, politics, art,

and religion, this second volume covers philosophical method, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. It includes a comprehensive account of the teaching of philosophy in Scottish universities in the eighteenth century. Particular attention is given to Scottish achievements in the science of the mind in chapters on perception, the intellectual powers, the active powers, habit and the association of ideas, and language.

David Hume has long been Scotland's most famous philosopher, to the extent of overshadowing all his contemporaries. It was not always so, however, and in the last few decades, philosophers and historians of ideas have come to see Hume once more in the context of debates that occupied a significant number of Scottish Enlightenment figures. Alongside Hume, and partly in response to him, the philosophical and scientific investigations of Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, George Campbell, Dugald Stewart, and many others, set in train a line of inquiry that was vigorously pursued in Scotland and North America for over two centuries. Moreover, it has come to be better understood that though these Enlightenment philosophers were highly innovative, they drew upon a distinctive intellectual tradition embodied in the ancient Scottish universities, where teaching responsibilities shaped research interests.

Reviews

"The Oxford series *A History of Scottish Philosophy* provides unprecedented coverage and depth on the origins and legacy of the Scottish philosophical tradition. The first volume in this series, *Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by James Harris and Aaron Garrett, sheds new light on the ways in which Scottish Enlighteners popularised distinctive features of Scottish philosophy." -- *Journal of Scottish Philosophy*

- State of the art coverage of central elements of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy
- Includes the first comprehensive account of the teaching of philosophy in eighteenth-century Scotland
- Offers detailed discussion of the philosophy of mind
- Features chapters on neglected aspects of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy including language and metaphysics

CONTENTS

When the Edinburgh professor of natural philosophy John Leslie was questioned by the members of a Royal Visitation Commission in October 1826, he remarked that the curriculum at Scottish universities was still what it had been a century before. Then, as now, 'the first year the subject taught was [Greek] grammar; the second the same regent . . . taught Logic; and third Ethics, and the fourth Physics' (Commissioners 1837: I.124). This was indeed much the same list of subjects which Gershom Carmichael at the University of Glasgow had described in an account of his teaching in 1712 (Carmichael 2002 [1712]: 379–89).

The similarities between curricula that were more than a century apart, however, obscure far- reaching changes in the content of the various sub- disciplines that constituted 'philosophy' in this age, and in their relationship with each other. These changes and their consequences for the nature and the teaching of philosophy at Scottish universities are the subject of this chapter. In some cases, these changes prompted calls for a reform of the philosophy course, as some of its previous coherence was lost. Sometimes the changes also gave an impetus to the creation of new professorial chairs and other academic positions, in subjects that did not appear to be adequately covered in the conventional curriculum. But, on the whole, the developments that took place unfolded within the same curricular framework that had been in place from the early eighteenth century onwards.

The period examined in this chapter begins in 1690, when another royal visitation commission was set up in the wake of the so- called 'Glorious Revolution' in order to review teaching at all five Scottish colleges. The members of the 1690 commission did not aim at a fundamental reform of the content of philosophy teaching. They intended, rather, to standardize the philosophy course across all five Scottish institutions, and to create a common curriculum. Different universities were tasked with producing outlines of different parts of the course: Edinburgh was assigned 'pneumatology', the branch of philosophy concerned with immaterial forms of being, including the human soul, angels, demons, and God; St Andrews was given logic and metaphysics; Glasgow ethics; Marischal College in Aberdeen was entrusted with general physics, that is the science of corporeal being in general; and

King's College Aberdeen was to develop the curriculum for special physics, meaning the study of particular kinds of corporeal being, such as plants, animals, or minerals (Mijers 2011: 120). Although various documents were drawn up, the project stalled, and was finally abandoned in 1702. The visitation commission was more effective in achieving its other purpose of purging Scottish universities of teachers with Episcopalian, 'popish', and Jacobite sympathies (Hannay 1916)— though even then it was not entirely successful, as is shown by the persistence of Jacobitism at the Aberdeen colleges (see McLaren 2005: 52–3).

The end of the period discussed here is marked by the Royal Visitation Commission of 1826–30. This later commission has been suspected of attempting to align Scottish teaching with practices at Oxford and Cambridge, and of being part of a broader programme of Anglicizing Scottish culture (Davie 2013: 5). The true reason for the review of university teaching, however, is likely to have been not so much English cultural imperialism as a loss of coherence in the existing curriculum in philosophy, or, as it was by then often known, 'the Literary Faculty' (see e.g. Bower 1822: 9).

In part, this loss of coherence seems to have been the result of changes in the way in which teaching was organized. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, all Scottish universities followed the so- called regenting system, in which a single teacher, the 'regent', guided a cohort of students through all parts of the philosophy course, from its beginning until graduation in the fourth year.1 As students were assigned to a particular regent, this made it more likely that they would study all subjects taught by this person, in the order in which he delivered them (Chamberlayne 1708: 542). The regent also depended on the students in his class for his income. In early eighteenth- century Edinburgh, for example, the fee (praemium) paid to the regent appears to have been 'never less than a Guinea' for the entire year (Chamberlayne 1708: 543). The incentive for regents to take every single student through the entire curriculum therefore was strong.

This changed, however, as regenting was abandoned and replaced with a system of specialized professorial chairs, which was mainly modelled on the example of the contemporary Dutch universities (Mijers 2011), though there were also some Scottish precedents for this reform (Raffe 2019). The incumbents of these new chairs each lectured on one particular branch of philosophy, rather than the entire breadth of the discipline. Their income usually derived from the combination of a salary and class fees paid by the students attending their lectures. The transition to the professorial system occurred at different times, depending on the university: at

Edinburgh in 1708, at Glasgow in 1727, at St Andrews in 1747, at Marischal College in 1753, and, finally, in 1799, at King's College. As students were no longer guided through a defined curriculum by a single lecturer, fewer of them seem to have followed its structure, or even to have taken all of the subjects in it. Financially, the lecturer's main interest lay in attracting as many ticket- buying students as possible to his lectures, not in ensuring that these students took any other courses in philosophy, or even that they graduated at the end of four years of study.

The looser structure of the philosophy course is reflected in the steep decline in the numbers of graduates, which was not caused by an overall drop in student numbers, but a sharp reduction in the proportion of those who graduated. Nongraduating students would not need to have studied all of the courses in the standard curriculum, or to have done so in the conventional order. The decline is evident from the printed graduation theses in philosophy, which, at the beginning of the century, usually included a long list of names of all the graduands. A set of Edinburgh Theses Philosophicae in 1698, for example, displayed the names of more than seventy students (Massie 1698). Numbers varied somewhat from year to year, and between universities. An earlier set of theses in 1676 by the St Andrews regent Alexander Grant, for example, had included the names of only thirty graduands (Grant 1676), similar to the number in a 1686 set of Theses Philosophicae produced at Marischal College in Aberdeen (Burnet 1686).

But as the eighteenth century wore on, lists of graduands disappeared from graduation theses altogether. Instead, title pages identified only a single student respondent, who was sometimes also described as the actual author (auctor), of the text.2 Only a handful of these philosophical theses or disputations were printed each year, implying that most students on the philosophy course did not graduate (a conclusion that is borne out, for example, by the University of Edinburgh's record of degrees and laureations).3 The number of graduations seems to have increased again at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But even then, very few undergraduate students appear to have completed a full degree course. It is not surprising then that one of the most famous eighteenth-century alumni of the University of Edinburgh, David Hume, never took a degree. Requirements might be stricter for students who intended to progress to study in law, medicine, or theology, because they might be expected to have been trained in certain areas of philosophy. Students might also be expected to have completed a particular lecture course before being admitted to another. It is clear, however, that the imperative to follow

a defined course of study in philosophy lessened considerably over the course of the century.

It also seems that the different branches of the traditional philosophy curriculum were no longer seen to be as closely connected to each other intellectually as they had been a century earlier (Anderson 2017). For that reason, too, it was no longer considered as important as before to study every part of philosophy. John Leslie, for example, argued that those students who wanted to study medicine should be allowed to pursue an abridged course in 'Literature and Philosophy'. For them, it was enough 'to rest satisfied with a moderate share of classical knowledge, and an acquaintance with the elements of general science, or the more popular and practical branches of Natural Philosophy' (Commissioners 1837: I.154). At the same time, some subjects which had been part of the philosophy curriculum began to require a degree of specialist knowledge that made them too difficult for many of the undergraduate students. Natural philosophy, for ex ample, increasingly demanded a level of mathematical understanding which not all students were capable of. The relationship between a 'lower' faculty of arts or philosophy, and the 'higher' faculties of law, medicine, and theology, was showing signs of giving way, gradually, to a collection of separate and self-contained dis cip lines, in which students specialized from the beginning of their undergraduate degrees.

In this chapter I shall first discuss briefly some general assumptions in eighteenth-century thought about the nature of philosophical knowledge, before turning in the following sections to each of the main branches of the standard curriculum in philosophy. A discussion of changes in the teaching of logic will be followed by an analysis of developments in metaphysics (the science of being) and pneumatics (the science of immaterial being)—two disciplines which were often closely linked to each other, and which were sometimes even treated as interchangeable. The next section will focus on physics and natural philosophy, in particular the increasing importance of an experimental method, and the separation of the single discipline of physics into several more specialized subjects, such as rational mechanics, chemistry, and natural history. In the final section I shall turn to moral philosophy, which of all the branches of eighteenth- century philosophy is probably the one that has received the most attention, but which has rarely been studied in relation to the other branches of the philosophy course.

A range of views on philosophical questions is to be found among eighteenth-century university teachers. It is possible, however, to identify some broader themes

which run throughout the period, and which help in understanding many of the general changes that occurred. In particular, it will be shown that much of the intellectual motivation for changes in the curriculum was founded on a belief in the corruption of philosophy by 'scholasticism'. 'Scholasticism' was a polemical term, not an accurate description of a particular group of thinkers. But it was often used in expressing dissatisfaction with conventional philosophy. In particular, the term 'scholasticism' was used to describe a supposed tendency towards abstruse and futile intellectual 'speculation'. Around 1700, the term 'speculation' had still been, on the whole, a neutral, value- free term. Philosophical sub- disciplines were routinely classified as either 'speculative' or 'practical', without suggesting any judgement on their worth. Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, 'speculation' increasingly acquired negative connotations, and by the end of the century, as we shall see, the main division within philosophy was no longer between its 'speculative' and its 'practical' branches, but between the study of mind and the study of matter.

Philosophy, Certainty, and the Critique of 'Scholasticism'

The 'speculative' branches of philosophy around 1700 were those concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. Their aim was to provide so- called 'scientific' intellectual certainty, based on demonstrative proof. All argument in these speculative disciplines rested on the instruments of a verbal logic which even at the end of the seventeenth century drew on broadly Aristotelian principles and relied on syllogistic forms of reasoning.

Practical disciplines, on the other hand, were concerned with the direction of human actions. They were not believed to be capable of the same standard of demonstrative proof, because they depended on the prudential evaluation of the particular circumstances of an action and were thus subject to a much greater degree of contingency. The main practical discipline was ethics. Logic, as the instrument for demonstrative reasoning, was also considered a practical discipline by university philosophers around 1700, though Aristotle had not included it in either category, speculative or practical.

The speculative sciences were metaphysics, pneumatology (or pneumatics), and physics. All three of these were, in different ways, sciences of being. Metaphysics was the most abstract. It was usually defined as the science of being as such, or knowledge, as Aristotle had said in his Metaphysics (Aristotle 1026a). The Utrecht professor Gerard de Vries, for example, whose textbook on metaphysics was

reprinted in Edinburgh and used in teaching at Scottish universities, described the discipline as the science of being (ens) in general. Being was the most general attribute that could be discussed, because 'in any thing which offers itself to our consideration, be it a substance or an accident, . . . the real predicate of Being is present'. The Edinburgh regent William Law offered a very similar explanation of the nature and purpose of metaphysics in lectures he gave in the academic year 1699–1700: metaphysics, he stated, set out 'the common notions of things, and the terms which occur everywhere in the other sciences and also in everyday speech'. In particular, metaphysics set out 'what being is, what unity is, what truth is, what philosophers mean by essence, existence, causality, possibility etc.'. Hence, Law said, 'it is that the object of metaphysics is said to be [the nature of] Being in general, insofar as it is being. Those attributes [i.e. essence, existence, causality, possibility, etc.] however pertain to all, or at least most entities.'

The two other speculative sciences were concerned with the essential attributes of the two main types of being: physics with those of material bodies, and pneumatics with those of non- corporeal, that is, immaterial, spiritual beings, which were usually thought to include the human soul and even God, at least to the extent that His attributes could be known through natural reason and experience.

These three 'scientific' philosophical disciplines were supposed to be founded on universal, necessary truths. From the late seventeenth century onwards, however, it was increasingly argued that the very ambition to discover such universal truths was misguided. It reflected an intellectual hubris which was the legacy of ancient Greek philosophers, whose errors were perpetuated by the medieval scholastics. They, as Jean LeClerc argued, had tried to construct intellectual systems in which it was possible to derive everything from a set of universal principles. The result, in the case of natural philosophy for example, was that they had 'indulged too much in conjectures concerning the causes of natural things', so that 'the physical doctrines of most of the Ancients were so stupid, that they either differed from the most inept opinions of the vulgar only by their obscure terms; or if they were put forward more clearly and contained something new, were obviously absurd most of the time'.

LeClerc's works were widely used in teaching at Scottish universities around 1700,9 and it is possible to find views like his in lectures and writings by eighteenth-century Scottish regents and professors. A very similar argument to LeClerc's on ancient physics, for example, was made almost half a century later, by the Edinburgh mathematician and natural philosopher Colin Maclaurin, who died in

1746, having overseen the defences of the city against the approaching Jacobite army. The ancients, he said, 'generally speaking, . . . indulged themselves too much in abstruse fruitless disquisitions concerning the hidden essences of things, and sought after a knowledge that was not suited to the grounds they had to build on' (Maclaurin 1748: 38–9).

The situation deteriorated further when in the Middle Ages 'superstition reigned uncontrouled' and 'liberty of enquiry was proscribed', so that 'a thick cloud seems to have darkened the understandings of men, and to have almost extinguished their natural faculties' (Maclaurin 1748: 40). Philosophers' 'pride and ambition', Maclaurin lamented, had 'led [them] to think it beneath them, to offer anything less to the world than a compleat and finished system of nature; and, in order to obtain this at once, to take the liberty of inventing certain principles and hypotheses, from which they pretend to explain all her mysteries' (Maclaurin 1748: 7). A few years after the posthumous publication of Maclaurin's work, Alexander Gerard at Marischal College in Aberdeen argued in similar fashion that '[t]he chief business of that [scholastic] Philosophy was to express opinions in hard and unintelligible terms; the student needed a dictionary or nomenclature of the technical words and authorised distinctions' (Gerard 1755: 4).

This intellectual hubris of the scholastics was blamed for the parlous state of philosophy around 1700. Although there could only be one truth, philosophy, it was said, had descended into a cacophony of abstruse quarrels which divided phi lo sophers into innumerable rival intellectual sects, whose controversies were about mere words rather than things. The corruption of philosophy had even tainted its most basic part, namely logic. Gershom Carmichael for example criticized the 'scholastics' in his Glasgow logic dictates from 1697 (Carmichael 2002 [1712]: 293, fn. 1), and as late as 1773 the Glasgow professor James Clow remarked that the scholastics had 'pretended to improve Logic greatly, but their systems are full of Darkness & confusion occasioned by their engaging in frivolous disputes, & using a multiplicity of terms, that are now for the most part, unintelligible to us'. Logic supplied the basic tools of philosophical reasoning.

It followed therefore that the reform of philosophy from the corruptions of the ancient Greeks and the medieval scholastics had to begin with logic.

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Moral Philosophy and Ethics

The development of the teaching of moral philosophy over the course of the eighteenth century reflects many of the same broader changes as are to be found in logic, metaphysics, pneumatics, and physics. In particular, there was in moral philosophy, too, a reaction to the 'scholasticism' that had, supposedly, rendered ethics as useless as all other parts of philosophy. Instead of the empty, abstruse speculation of the scholastics, which, it was believed, had little or no effect on the actual conduct of the male, teenage students who attended universities, it was argued that ethics should be about their practical moral formation, or moral culture. The purpose of ethics thus was to develop sound moral habits, just as logic came to be concerned with developing habits of sound reasoning, rather than providing abstract rules which could be learnt by rote, regardless of actual practice.

Moral Philosophy, the Afterlife, and the Summum Bonum

Lectures on moral philosophy around 1700 often began with a discussion of the summum bonum, the 'highest good', as the foundation of ethics. After dismissing the 'bona corporis', such as health and physical strength, and the 'bona fortunae', such as wealth and honour, the lecturers then invariably conclude that the greatest good for human beings is God. Here another, conventional distinction is regularly made between the greatest good in an 'objective' and in a 'formal' sense. God himself is the greatest good in the 'objective' sense: He is the 'object' that humans should strive towards in their efforts to live an ethical life. In a 'formal' sense, the greatest good of human beings is their 'fruitio Dei', the enjoyment of God as the greatest objective good. That enjoyment is believed to be brought about by the cognitio and the amor of God jointly. Cognitio signified the intellectual understanding of God's being and attributes, which, given the limited and broken intellectual faculties of humankind, especially after Original Sin, was possible only by means of a visio beatifica, a 'beatific vision'. Amor, love, was closely linked to cognitio: a realization of the perfections of God (at least to the extent to which that was possible to postlapsarian human beings) engendered the love towards God also.

The fruitio of God was the foundation of the highest possible felicity. Achieving that felicity in this life and by human efforts alone, however, was impossible. It had to wait until the afterlife and depended on support from divine grace 'regaining and remaking' the corrupted faculties that characterized human nature since the Fall from Grace. The overarching framework of this theory was Platonist as much as Aristotelian, as well as Calvinist. God was the supreme truth. Evil, in this system, was

not something actually existing, but the effect of privatio, that is, privation, or the absence of good.47

Although perfect beatitude was impossible in this life, there was a continuity between conduct in this life and the fate of the soul in life after death. As Gershom Carmichael put it in his 1724 'Supplements and Observations' on Pufendorf's influential De Officio Hominis et Civis, which Carmichael used for teaching at the University of Glasgow:

> We are taught by the light of nature as the fruit of acting well, to hope, and indeed to expect, not only felicity in this life in particular (although this is most closely attached to duties enjoined by natural law) but also, in general, some greater happiness or greater alleviations of misery, if not in this, at least in a future life, than evildoers will be able to attain. Furthermore, if any way of obtaining the greatest happiness after this life is left to man, [we are] to conceive of the hope of it as the more probably, the more, in individual actions of life, we render ourselves obedient to the divine law. (Carmichael 2002 [1724]: 30)

Carmichael, like any other Scottish regent or professor at that time, did not suggest that humans could achieve salvation by acting morally in this life. Doing so would have been tantamount to a 'popish' defence of a role for good works in salvation. But it was clear that human conduct in this life was known to affect the fate of the soul in the afterlife. Carmichael admitted that

> [i]t is not very easy to determine from nature how far in this degenerate condition of the human race, any ordering of our actions can contribute to obtaining that beatitude or avoiding an equal misery. But it is clear enough that if any way is left to man to secure the one and avoid the other (and on this matter the kindly dispensation of divine providence toward the human race bids one not simply to despair altogether) each man is able to hope with some prospect of justice that he will obtain it the more he gives evidence of devoted affection toward the Deity in his individual actions. And even the least likelihood of obtaining infinite good or escaping infinite evil ought to have more influence with us than all the considerations opposed to it. (Carmichael 2002 [1724]: 24)

Even to heathens, who were not aware of Christian salvation and therefore could not be striving for it, knowledge of the afterlife was essential for moral phil oso-phy. It was needed, in particular, for a robust and coherent idea of moral obligation in this life, as the Edinburgh regent William Law argued in 1704. Law criticized Samuel

Pufendorf for neglecting the importance of the afterlife in his natural law theory (a point on which Pufendorf had also been criticized by Leibniz [Ahnert 2009: 56–7]). Although Pufendorf did not deny the existence of an afterlife for the human soul, he believed that this truth was not known to humankind on the basis of natural reason, unassisted by revelation, and it could not, therefore, form part of moral philosophy. By contrast, Law, as we have seen, claimed that 'no moral philosophy can be firm, stable, and joined to human nature, unless its foundations are placed not only in the existence and providence of the Deity, but also in the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments of a future life'.49

This did not mean that Law believed moral philosophy to be sufficient to avoid the punishments of the afterlife. Humankind was wholly corrupted by Original Sin and, unless redeemed by faith in Christ, unable to make amends for the many particular sins that followed from the Fall from Grace. The means of salvation, however, were the subject of revealed theology, not moral philosophy, which, as Law put it in one of his lectures 'is founded on natural reason and understanding'.

The importance of philosophical, rational evidence for the immortality of the soul meant that pneumatics or pneumatology was often closely associated with the teaching of moral philosophy. When, for example, regenting was replaced by a system of specialized professorial chairs at the University of Edinburgh, one of the new professorships was in 'Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy', with Law as its first incumbent. But pneumatology not only provided philosophical proof of the natural immortality of the soul. It also covered the main operations of the human mind, namely intellection (or understanding) and volition (or willing). These two were considered essential to analysing the process by which moral choices were made. Moral actions belonged to 'practical' (as opposed to 'speculative') phil osophy, because they issued in action and involved an act of the will, not pure understanding, which was the province of 'speculative' philosophy that concerned only a judgement by the intellect. Of course, moral action had to be informed by the judgements of the intellect, and it was the duty of conscience to determine the conformity of an action with moral principles as they were known to the intellect. Human conscience could of course go astray in a number of ways: it could be erroneous, and the error could be either the agent's fault or not. And it could simply be ignorant of a relevant truth, whether through the agent's fault or not. The important point was that every moral action rested on a judgement by the intellect which was then converted into action by the will.

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Philosophy, Experiment, and Anti-Scholasticism

As has been shown, the changes within university philosophy over the course of the eighteenth century were complex and driven by several concerns. Some of these concerns were specific to certain parts of philosophy, and did not relate to the discipline as a whole. Yet there was a certain degree of overall coherence to the transformation that took place. In particular, change was often presented as a means of correcting the errors of so- called 'scholastic philosophy'. 'Scholasticism' was a highly polemical term, which was used to articulate and focus objections to conventional philosophical doctrines. Criticism was directed, above all, at scholasticism's supposed tendency towards 'speculative' reasoning, that is, reasoning from principles that were supposed to be universally true. But increasingly the belief that truths of this kind were within the reach of human reason was seen as evidence of an intellectual hubris, typical of the pagan philosophers of classical antiquity and the medieval school- men alike.

The result was growing caution, even scepticism, over the capacity of human reason to arrive at any universal truths. It might be possible to do so in mathematics, but, on the whole, it was believed that truths of mathematics did not supply principles of philosophical argument. Newton's natural philosophy, which was heavily mathematical, was of course praised and celebrated, not just by natural philosophers. Thinkers like George Turnbull expressed their hope that other branches of philosophy might be improved by adopting Newton's method. But the broader importance of Newton's method for philosophy was not, in the main, linked to his use of mathematics. Newton's method was, rather, regarded as a non-dogmatic form of reasoning, which emphasized the cautious, gradual accumulation, by means of 'experiments', of particular matters of fact, and which thereby avoided the intellectual pride of ancient Greeks and medieval scholastics alike.

Whereas philosophy at the beginning of the century was divided into 'speculative' and 'practical' branches, by the end of the century the main distinction appears to have been that between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of matter. Both mind and matter, or incorporeal and corporeal entities, were believed to be known empirically, not in a 'speculative' fashion. But each of these two types of being was known empirically in different ways. Corporeal beings were objects of sensory perception, while the only incorporeal, spiritual being of which humans had any direct, empirical knowledge was their own mind, of which they were aware by an

internal sense, through self- reflection. Thus the nature of the object of philosophical knowledge (mind or matter), rather than the nature of the knowledge itself (speculative or practical) became the basis for the distinction between the main parts of philosophy.

Joined to the rejection of philosophical 'speculation' was a growing emphasis on philosophy as a form of 'culture', in the sense of a programme of gradual, incremental improvement through the formation of sound habits. This 'culture' was not the product of intellectual conviction, which might follow only after the right habits had already been established. It was opposed to the empty and abstruse word- games of 'scholasticism', which, it was argued, aimed primarily at persuading the understanding, but led to nothing but interminable intellectual quarrels. Eventually, of course, a programme of 'culture' was no longer sufficient for the highly technical and specialized knowledge required for disciplines like rational mechanics. 'Culture' began to be limited to the new category of discip known as the 'humanities', thus contributing to the emergence of the 'sciences' as a separate branch of learning.

The changes within philosophy during the eighteenth century did not issue in a radical transformation of the structure of the curriculum by the time the members of the University Commission interviewed professors at the five Scottish universities between 1826 and 1830. Yet it is plausible to say that the tensions and strains within the curriculum, which are evident in the records of the interviews, were a prelude to later, more fundamental changes, in particular the development of disciplinary specialization in the undergraduate curriculum, and the end of the traditional relationship between a 'lower' faculty of arts, and the 'higher' faculties of law, medicine, and theology. In this respect, the developments at Scottish universities paralleled those at other European universities (Anderson 2004: 103–18). <>

Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries edited by Gordon Graham [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199560684]

This volume covers the history of Scottish philosophy after the Enlightenment period, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Leading experts explore the lives and work of major figures including Thomas Brown, William Hamilton, J. F. Ferrier, Alexander

Bain, John Macmurray, and George Davie, and address important developments in the period from the Scottish reception of Kant and Hegel to the spread of Scottish philosophy in Europe, America and Australasia, and the relation of Common Sense philosophy and American pragmatism. A concluding chapter investigates the nature and identity of a 'Scottish philosophical tradition'.

Reviews

"This is a remarkable collection of essays. The contributors give ample evidence of the vigour and dynamism of philosophical debate in Scotland during the last two centuries. They also show how much of it was concerned with the impact of German Idealism on the philosophical tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment." -- *The Philosophical Quarterly*

"These essays are of a uniformly high standard; each will repay study for those wishing to familiarize themselves with the leading Scottish philosophers of the period. Representing much fresh research, the volume suggests that figures such as Brown, Ferrier and Bain have been unfairly neglected, perhaps as a result of the greater preoccupation with their eighteenth-century predecessors." -- *Journal of the History of Philosophy*

- ❖ The launch of a new history of Scottish philosophy
- ❖ New perspectives on famous figures
- ❖ Explores key intellectual and historical developments in the period
- ❖ Will be the standard reference point for this period of philosophy

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Nineteenth and twentieth century Scottish philosophy

In the history of Britain, eighteenth century Scotland stands out as a period of remarkable intellectual energy and fertility. The Scottish Enlightenment, as it came to be known, is widely regarded as a crowning cultural achievement, with philosophy the jewel in the crown. Adam Smith, David Hume, William Robertson, Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson are just the best known among an astonishing array of innovative thinkers, whose influence in philosophy, economics, history and sociology can still be found at work in the contemporary academy.

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The phenomenon of Scottish intellectual life in the eighteenth century, and the widespread interest that it continues to attract, makes it all the more surprising that this was not, in fact, the period in which Scottish philosophy achieved its highest international profile. That distinction came in the century that followed. It is in the nineteenth century that Scottish philosophy set the academic agenda for philosophical debate in Europe and America, provided texts for college students across Canada and the United States, and produced a steady supply of university teachers, not only for North America, but Australia and New Zealand as well.

Scottish philosophy in the nineteenth century had intellectual luminaries who, in their own day, shone even more brilliantly than many of their eighteenth century predecessors. The posthumously published lectures that Thomas Brown gave at Edinburgh went into dozens of editions and were studied for decades. Sir William Hamilton, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh, was hailed as possibly the most learned Scot who ever lived, and the greatest metaphysician of his age. James Frederick Ferrier at St Andrews ranked as one of Europe's leading intellectuals. Alexander Bain at Aberdeen laid new and firmer foundations for the emerging science of empirical psychology. Edward Caird at Glasgow inspired a

whole new generation of philosophers, who went on to teach philosophy at home and abroad.

Statue of David Hume, Edinburgh, by TwoWings. Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.

Yet, in sharp contrast to Smith, Hume, and so on, these names are now virtually unknown. The things they thought and why they thought them, the books they wrote, the debates they had, the people they influenced, have all fallen far below the intellectual radar of the twenty first century. The only survivor, arguably, is Bain's friend John Stuart Mill, and though the roots of his philosophical work are easily identified as Scottish, this connection generally goes unnoticed.

Why is there this dramatic difference between these two centuries of Scottish philosophy, one heralded far and wide, the other for the most passed over in silence? Just who were these thinkers and why were they so influential? How did they fall into such neglect? Is their work still worth anything? Did they build significantly upon their Enlightenment heritage, or are they properly relegated to the status of footnotes to it? The existence and social role of Scotland's four ancient universities meant that, for a long period, the professors of philosophy and their students constituted a genuine intellectual community. Over many generations they sought to maintain and to enlarge a tradition of philosophical inquiry that aimed to unite research and education, bringing scholarly inquiry of international relevance to bear directly on the formation and enrichment of Scotland's social and cultural life.

This admirable ambition gradually came under pressure, from a number of directions. In Scotland, increasing familiarity with Kant and Hegel began to change the relatively isolated philosophical world of the Scottish Enlightenment, while the development of academic specialization gave new independence to politics, economics and psychology, subjects that philosophy had previously included. In Britain at large, improved communication and the establishment of new universities in England, Ireland and Wales eroded the distinctiveness of the Scottish university system. In America, the Scottish philosophy of common sense morphed into philosophical pragmatism. In the antipodes, Australia and New Zealand began to forge philosophical traditions of their own.

At the turn of the twentieth century and into its opening decades, those raised in the Scottish philosophical tradition acknowledged its passing with a mixture of hindsight, nostalgia and regret. George Davie's powerful lament, *The Democratic Intellect* published in 1961, may be said to mark its final demise. Yet there is something of importance to be learned from it. The radically altered nature of our institutions of higher education has recently occasioned a flurry of books. Their shared concern is captured by the title of one of the volumes — Stefan

Collini's *What are Universities For*? This is a question with renewed, some would say urgent, interest for the contemporary academy. And Scottish philosophy in the nineteenth century still has much to teach us about how to frame it. <>

TWO TALES OF THE DEATH OF GOD by Stephen LeDrew [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190086886]

In the 19th century Friedrich Nietzsche infamously declared that "God is dead." It turns out he was on to something. Across the western world, churches are emptying out and closing their doors, and more and more people are rejecting organized religion.

In the early 2000s a group of intellectuals who collectively came to be known as the "new atheists" capitalized on this fact, capturing the imagination of young skeptics and igniting a movement for secularism by arguing that religion is the source of most of our social ills. They believed that the decline of religious belief could be attributed to the rise of modern science. This was only the most recent incarnation of a story that has been told since the 18th century Enlightenment, which forged a myth of social progress and western cultural supremacy that has lent legitimacy to the projects of imperialism and global capitalism ever since.

The social sciences have another story to tell. It is the story of secularization: a theory that grapples with the astonishing fact of Christianity's fall from its position at the center of western culture. In this version of the story, God was not killed by science, but by a complex set of social and economic changes that have produced greater overall well-being and equality, and by shifting moral values that lead people to view religious ethics as a relic of a bygone era.

Stephen LeDrew argues that only the social sciences can explain religion's fall from grace--and the dangers of its resurgence. A coalition of far-right religious extremists is currently working to dismantle democracy in order to preserve white Christian privilege. The evidence from secularization shows that only by working to achieve greater security and equality for all can we halt a descent into an abyss of nihilistic greed and intolerance.

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Secularization is real. Not only is it becoming clearer that it is happening, but it may be reaching an inflection point where religion loses its dominant cultural status and non-religion becomes the new norm. Ronald Inglehart suggests as much in noting the rapidity of the transformation we have seen in recent decades:

Although secularization normally occurs at the pace of intergenerational population replacement, it can reach a tipping point when the dominant opinion shifts and, swayed by the forces of conformism and social desirability, people start to favor the outlook they once opposed—producing exceptionally rapid cultural change. Younger and better-educated groups in high-income countries have recently reached this threshold.'

The process of secularization, then, has suddenly accelerated. The reasons for this change are complex, and it is difficult to clearly prove any one of them, but there has definitely been a generational shift away from organized religion. Social and economic conditions that enhance existential security laid the groundwork for this shift, but other important factors have pushed it into a higher gear. These include evolving morals that are at odds with the teachings of many major religious traditions, scandals such as the revelations of widespread sexual abuse by priests and the Catholic Church's attempts to cover it up, and 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror that pitted Christian and Islamic extremists against each other, which opened many eyes to the dangers of fundamentalist faiths. Perhaps most importantly, the internet and social media facilitated the "coming out" of atheists and religious skeptics everywhere by providing a platform for views that were previously unacceptable or inaccessible in mainstream culture.

If Inglehart is correct—and the evidence suggests that he probably is—then current projections of future religious decline may be too conservative, since they rely on intergenerational replacement and birth rates (i.e., religious people having more children and passing their beliefs on to them). These models don't account for the

kind of rapid cultural changes Inglehart describes, which are inherently unpredictable. It is possible that unforeseeable events could instigate a resurgence of religion and a return to the pews, but it is much more likely that we are now in the midst of a radical and lasting cultural transformation by which traditional religious institutions aren't going to disappear entirely (at least not all of them), but their status and authority will continue to evaporate, and their memberships will drastically decline.

Some social scientists object that a rise in "spirituality" has accompanied the decline of religion, which indicates that what we are seeing isn't secularization, but a kind of diversification of beliefs pertaining to our place in the world and where we derive meaning in our lives. In this view, the "nones" have risen roughly in tandem with the "spiritual but not religious" (SBNRs), a group that has captured the attention of scholars in recent years but remains poorly defined. SBNRs typically reject organized religion but hold beliefs and engage in practices that they vaguely define as spiritual in that they relate to how they find meaning in life. They might or might not believe in god(s), and the things they define as spiritual might include yoga and meditation, New Age and neo-Paganism, various elements of Eastern religion and mysticism, a life spent seeking "wellness," or just being in nature and experiencing a connection to it. The list is virtually limitless, which is the problem with the category. It is impossible to measure with any accuracy something so vaguely defined, particularly in surveys. You can ask people, as in a PEW study that claimed one in four Americans to be SBNR, "Do you think of yourself as a spiritual person, or not?"2 But this tells us absolutely nothing about what "spiritual" means to the respondent, and the information is therefore of limited value. It might indicate a kind of liminal phase between being a believer and being non-religious. It might indicate that the religious impulse (if there is such a thing) will persist even in a post-theistic culture, only channeled into things other than supernatural deities. Or it might be mostly meaningless.

Some scholars believe that the SBNR phenomenon points to a "spiritual revolution" where theistic beliefs and churchgoing are being replaced by a turn "towards a life lived by reference to one's own subjective experiences." That is, rather than looking outward to a formal institution and belief structure, people increasingly are turning inward and thinking about their own experience of the world and what it reveals about nature and their place in it. In this sense, what many people mean when they say they are "spiritual" is that they are ego-centric, focusing not on questions

concerning community or group membership, but on understanding (or creating) their own significance in the world and what they personally find meaningful (which can be anything). Steve Bruce argues that this "individuated religion" can't produce the same level of commitment as traditional religion, and therefore is itself a secularizing force.4 That is, the shift to individualized spirituality over collective forms of religious practice and centralized authority over doctrine is a sign of secularization, as people retreat into their own personal beliefs and sources of meaning. This, he believes, is a logical outcome of modernization, liberal capitalism, and belief in the authority of the autonomous individual, which makes collective responses to questions of ultimate significance unlikely. Individual spirituality is inherently aimed at discovering and liberating the authentic self and involves a turn inward and away from organized religious communities. Secularization, then, is irreversible.

While a return to the old faiths may be as unlikely as Bruce suggests, he may be too quick to dismiss the notion of an enduring religious impulse, which can be channeled into an array of belief systems and can bind people together. There are reasons to believe that the social and psychological functions of religion represent a need that must be satisfied somehow, as people adopt new forms of faith and seek new moral communities of the sort previously provided by identification with a church or faith tradition. This process is accelerating as the old ties of faith, nation, and community are severed in an inhuman socioeconomic system that is producing increasing social fragmentation and alienation. The need for meaning, identity, and belonging is as strong now as ever. As traditional religion wanes, new forms are arising to take its place, some involving quasi-supernatural beliefs, some entirely naturalistic. Everything from science to nationalism to yoga to football has been interpreted as a new, modern religion. The rise of new individualistic forms of spirituality, which tempt with promises of transcendence but result in greater anomie, coincides with the breakdown of social bonds under the regime of global capitalism and its culture of nihilism.

The new atheism itself could be interpreted in these terms. More generally, the phenomenon of the absurdly titled "intellectual dark web"—a group of public intellectuals, headlined by Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson, who promote themselves as a vanguard of free speech and open inquiry—is another manifestation of the secularization of religion. This group of celebrity pseudo-rationalists has attracted a following of lost, alienated young people (mostly men)

looking for meaning, direction, and a sense of connection to something in a world where traditional values are going out the window and neoliberal ideology is conditioning us to think of ourselves as individuals rather than members of communities or societies. Critics express amazement at the fact that debates between Harris and Peterson (which are not really debates since the two are advancing a similar agenda) can pack arenas, but it shouldn't be so surprising. Not so long ago, churches were packed every Sunday. The congregation has moved to a new venue, and these debates are the new sermons.

Essentially what these people want is religion: a worldview wrapped in sacredness and supported by a community bound by a common morality. But in the disenchanted world of the twenty-first century, theism and bronze-age myths don't hold up anymore, so we have new secular faiths that reflect the atomistic culture of the late modern age. Rather than going to church and finding meaning in being a member of a congregation—just one piece of something bigger than oneself—people today are more inclined to seek self-actualization in secular faiths and practices. The clearest example is wellness culture, which is both a lifestyle and an individualistic spirituality where the purpose isn't the glorification of God or a community but maximizing one's own personal well-being. The wellness and alternative health phenomenon are religion focused on the individual and crafted in the shadow of neoliberal capitalism. In a secularized form of tithing, you can achieve "wellness" (a new addition to a list that includes Salvation, Nirvana, and Enlightenment) if you have sufficient disposable income to purchase the endless array of products the industry has to offer. For those who are still more group-oriented and inclined to subjection to a higher power, there are political religions and conspiracy theories. QAnon and the Trump phenomenon, and the white nationalism both are attached to, are the pre-eminent examples. Millions of Americans have surrendered their critical faculties in embracing a bizarre post-Christian narrative of a hopelessly corrupt world that will be saved by the most unlikely redeemer. No form of faith is more deserving of the descriptor "blind" than the belief that Donald J. Trump is a selfless hero whose purpose on Earth is to sacrifice himself for the good of humanity.

The cult that Trump established is the clearest possible refutation of the notion that the end of monotheism's reign over our culture will lead to a better world guided by science and liberal values. While Trump's support base is Christian, the motivations of many his supporters are secular: greed, selfishness, bigotry, and xenophobia. At

least one major belief held by his followers is perfectly legitimate: the idea that the American government is corrupt and has sold out the working class (though the target of their ire is ethnic minorities and immigrants, the scapegoats for the corporate interests the government actually serves). The incredible irony that they would choose as their champion Donald Trump—a cartoonishly evil embodiment of the culture of corruption and nihilistic greed engendered by capitalism—is a perfect illustration of the potential for religious impulses in a secularized world to be channeled into equally dangerous ideologies, myths, and false prophets. The decades in which we have seen sudden secularization have also involved accelerating concentration of wealth and an explosive assault on the working and middle classes, a rise in neo-fascist ethnic nationalism, an epidemic of opioid addiction, paralysis on the existential threat of climate change, and a general deterioration of democracy.

Religion may contribute to these problems in various ways, but it clearly isn't the ultimate source of them, so the project of vanquishing religion through scientific enlightenment is fundamentally misguided. There is no sound reason to expect that a world absent of religion must be better than the current one. But there is ample reason to expect that religion won't go away until the massive inequalities produced by our current economy and system of government are dealt with, though it might come in different forms. It may be no coincidence that the ascent of Trumpian political chaos and decline of religiosity have occurred at roughly the same time. One thing religion does—from a sociological point of view, the first and most important thing it does—is bind people together and provide them with a basis for thinking of themselves as part of something greater than themselves, and not only as members of a church, but also members of a society. As more moderate and liberal forms of Christianity have rapidly faded, there has been nothing to replace this socially binding force.

Sociologist Robert Putnam famously made this point in his book Bowling Alone, which charts the decline of participation in civic associations and group activities over the past several decades (religious congregations being a major one), and the corresponding growth of feelings of isolation and depression.5 People feel disconnected from each other, their communities, and their society. This sense of disconnection is to the advantage of global neoliberal capitalism, which works to convince us that any attempt at social engineering is an infringement on individual freedom, and that capitalism itself is a righteous force that has provided us with this

freedom. It is also to the advantage of populists like Trump and other far-Right opportunists who have harnessed the rage and alienation of the masses who have been victimized by this fundamentally unjust system. With no sense of connection to society and believing (correctly) that the system is stacked against them, they place their faith in strongmen who promise to make things better. Outlandish conspiracy theories such as QAnon and the communities that have formed around them are rising to satisfy needs that religion used to satisfy. The world after secularization might be one without God, but that doesn't mean it will be a world without gods.

While secularization may be a reality, then, it would be a mistake to become complacent, as the status quo—defending ideology of scientific atheism would have us do. Just because God is dead doesn't mean all will be well (and there's always the possibility that He might be resurrected). Secularists should not be content with the knowledge that the major monotheistic faiths are in decline. Unless the social and psychological needs it responds to are made obsolete, the religious impulse will be channeled into post-theistic forms of faith that may be just as harmful. The sudden surge of nationalism and far-Right political movements across the Western world are symptoms of alienation and the breakdown in meaning and community that coincides with the destructive force of global capitalism and the fading presence of religion in social life. We need to be vigilant and continue to work toward greater social and economic equality, or we risk giving power back to religious ideas and institutions or enhancing the power of its new secularized alternatives.

One thing that seems clear is that religion's power as a political force isn't about to suddenly end. Secularization today is accompanied by religious and political radicalization. This polarizing effect is a result of the fact that conservative religious groups increasingly see themselves as marginalized in a multicultural liberal society where their traditional cultural dominance is waning (this is especially true in the U.S. but also, to a lesser extent, in other Western countries). Their response is to become both more devout and more politically radical, which is producing a politicization of religion that has made it appear that it is growing stronger and adding Ryan Burge, a professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University, has explained the apparent growth of evangelicals in America (as reported in surveys asking about religious affiliation and identity) as a result of conservatives adopting an evangelical identity due to its association with the Republican Party. Many of those new evangelicals, he argues, might not really be religious in any meaningful

sense, illustrating that "evangelical" is becoming more a political identity than a religious one: "For many Americans, to be a conservative Republican is to be an evangelical Christian, regardless of if they ever attend a Sunday service." Religious moderates (in both the theological and political senses) are being squeezed out as the landscape evolves to a situation where there is a secular majority, and the religious will be a minority but will be highly committed and highly politicized.

This is something like the religious revival that occurred in the 1980s that led Jose Casanova to recant his views on secularization. That wave of deprivatization, bookended by the founding of the Moral Majority and the presidency of George W. Bush, resulted in new power for Christian organizations. That power appeared to falter during the Obama years and its concurrent religious decline, which is now driving another wave of religious groups asserting themselves in the public sphere in even more radical ways. Having taken control of the Supreme Court and overturning Roe v. Wade, the Christian Right is now attempting to take control of government through a strategy of association with Trump (who at the time of writing had just announced his campaign for a second term as president), his acolytes in federal and state legislatures, and their attempt to destroy democracy. But as Burge argues, what is understood as the "Christian" Right isn't exclusively, or even primarily, a Christian movement, but a far-Right one where white nationalists motivated by principles of cultural and ethnic purity join forces with the wealthy people seeking to dismantle public institutions and social welfare and pillage the country for all it is worth, together drawing on the authority of religion to accomplish their goals.

Given these trends, it seems clear that religion isn't in and of itself at the core of the challenges we face today, and there is no good reason to expect that religion's slow fade will necessarily be accompanied by social and moral progress. Murtaza Hussain, a journalist best known for his work for The Intercept, is one of few voices on the Left to recognize the new threats posed by the transition away from the traditional theistic faiths. Like the new atheists, many on the Left see secularization through rose-colored glasses and assume that the demise of Christianity will simply wipe away all the bigotry and backward morality that came with it. In an essay entitled "How the Death of Faith Will Hurt the Left," Hussain challenges this posited inverse correlation between religious decline and social progress, highlighting that we are entering into the unknown: "The slow-rolling death of religion in American life begs the question, then, what type of new world will emerge from the wreckage

of the old?" The answer, he suggests, might not be the enlightened liberal utopia that scientific atheists have prophesied, but rather, "we might end up reviving in new guises the worst aspects of the old religions, including moral censoriousness, judgmentalism, heresy-hunting, and the persecution of those who think differently. Frighteningly enough, these base sentiments would also be unchecked by any countervailing religious imperatives towards mercy or the recognition of human frailty." This is an accurate description not only of the conspiratorial Right, but of the rational Right: libertarian, holding little concern for social welfare, employing abstract scientific reasoning without empathy, and replacing morality with scientific authority (recall Sam Harris's view that science can "determine" moral values—morality would then be whatever a select set of scientific experts tell us is right and wrong).

A result of the dissolution of the moral foundation established by religion, Hussain argues, is that people are "at the mercy of a disorienting permanent moral flux" that new ideologies might rise to take advantage of. This is, in fact, already happening. Moral and political polarization is growing, driven by new ideologies on both Left and Right, as well as the demise of a public sphere in which different perspectives could meet in some kind of meaningful exchange, replaced by the echo chambers and information silos created by social media, which has destroyed public discourse in its pursuit of advertising dollars. Without any absolute moral foundation, anything is possible, and there is little reason to suspect that what follows will be better than what came before. On the contrary, the Right is resurgent, and populists and nationalists are capturing the imagination of alienated people across the full spectrum of society. Leaving their churches behind, the ersatz religions being embraced by many people today are extreme political movements and conspiracy theories. The ideologies and organizations associated with the conspiracy-drenched Right provide what religion provided for people: an explanation for their suffering and marginalization (whether actual or perceived) and the empowerment provided by a community driven by a common purpose. In the absence of anything else coming along to act as a binding force in social life that can provide a sense of meaning and purpose, the polarization and social fragmentation that we are now seeing may lead to unthinkable outcomes.

The situation has been aggravated by the fact that some ostensible opponents of the far-Right are fueling it by attacking common enemies, most significantly higher education in the social sciences and humanities. We are facing a crisis of reason

marked by a populist backlash against the intellectuals who some perceive to be attacking white identity and European cultural heritage. This is most obvious in the manufactured controversy over critical race theory (CRT), which is a direct assault on social-scientific understandings of reality. In an act of modern-day book burning, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed into law a prohibition against teaching critical race theory. The furor over CRT is a witch hunt—best exemplified by the blatantly racist questions Republican Senators directed at Supreme Court nominee Ketanji Browne Jackson about the role CRT plays in her thinking, in a scene reminiscent of the McCarthy hearings aimed at weeding out communists—that at root is directed at the social sciences and humanities, and their critical inquiry into systemic social inequalities. This situation has been enabled by pseudo-rationalists and free speech warriors who have become mouthpieces of regressive right-wing ideology, granting a veneer of scientific legitimacy to intolerance and bigotry. They have become pawns in the war on reason. For Richard Dawkins in particular, this is a sad end to what began as an admirable career as an educator and public intellectual. His legacy forever tarnished, he and his fellow new atheists will be remembered as enemies of reason rather than its champions, and as unwitting allies of the Christian.

The entrenchment of white nationalism and the social fragmentation and polarization produced by these culture wars may, in fact, strengthen overall religiosity. Though evidence suggests that secularization in the Western world is real, research also shows that the world overall is becoming more religious. This is primarily due to demographics: people in more modernized, less religious countries have fewer children, while people in less developed countries who are more religious have more children. As immigration trends continue and the West becomes more culturally and ethnically diverse, there is a critical issue concerning the trend of secularization: if minorities continue to experience disproportionate inequality, and perceptions of racism and cultural bigotry continue, they may defensively retreat into stronger affirmation and identification with the religion of their ethnic group. This is already the case in some respects, as with Muslim women in the West who choose to wear veils as a reaction against white men attempting to control them, or African Americans who rely on their churches for a sense of community and social support, strengthening bonds within that group in the face of feeling excluded or oppressed by a white majority. The general trends of greater equality and higher standards of living that underpin the decline of religion must extend to these minorities and immigrant communities or the process will stall.

Only if fully accepted as equal members of society who merit the same respect and rights as everyone else could they be expected to eventually let go of the faiths that provide a source of strength and comfort in a hostile social environment.

The strategy of new atheism and the movement for secularism that coalesced around it, which is based on exclusivity and hostility against anyone holding a differing opinion or different culturally based values, is therefore not only doomed to fail, but counterproductive. Secularization has not advanced due to popular atheists calling religious people stupid—it has done so despite them. The rise of the nones preceded this movement, which was not cause but consequence of the tide of disaffiliation and a generation seeking voices that confirm their worldview. That generation soon realized that new atheists did not, in fact, speak for them or advance a worldview they supported. Many have left behind the secular movement that was briefly so exciting and promising. But the cause is still worthy, and if anything, the Trump era and its emergent fascism—which is justified by appeals to the exceptional status conferred on America by the grace of God—suggest that it is perhaps more important than ever. Religion as an unquestionable source of moral authority is a pillar of a radical far-Right insurgency that threatens the safety and stability of the entire planet. The way to undermine religion's power is not to say to people that humans and elephants have common ancestors and if you disagree, you're an idiot. Tempering religion's power requires constructing a social environment where its authority can be questioned freely and openly, but more importantly, one that doesn't push people to look to an omnipotent Creator to administer justice because they see no other option. Anti-religious movements that strip away supernaturalism but sub in other "rational" justifications for the current social order are part of the problem, not the solution.

The individualistic secular religions that characterize belief in the twenty-first century are both an effect of the decline of traditional religions and a product of the culture of global capitalism, which encourages personal responsibility rather than looking to society to make your life better. These new spiritualities direct people inward, but according to the theory of religion and secularization outlined in this book, to turn inward is to turn away from the source of our problems. If religion is a response to alienation, oppression, and the fragmentation of social life, then mindfulness or other individualistic practices are no antidote to the spiritual malaise that affects the world today. As Phil Zuckerman has illustrated in his studies of secularity in Scandinavia, the democratic socialism practiced in those countries is

a model of how a system that reduces alienation and inequality also undermines the power and appeal of religion.

This book recounts two tales of the death of God, and with them, two different visions of what a world without religion would look like. One is a world in which social bonds have broken down and been replaced with the ethos of neoliberal capitalism, a worldview that fetishizes wealth and assigns individuals the responsibility to scratch and claw their way through a morass of corporate power and neo-fascism. The other is a world that recognizes the common humanity we all share—in other words, a world guided by a humanism that recognizes the equal worth of all people and the responsibility to create an anti-Darwinian society, as opposed to the "humanism" advanced by popular atheists who advocate for socioeconomic doctrines that exacerbate the inequality that religion feeds on, thereby contributing to conditions where the death of the old gods might produce new ones that are even more terrible. Anyone concerned about the influence of religion in public affairs should think carefully about the motivations of the people promoting these opposing visions and examine the evidence for themselves to discover the path to a world without gods. <>

THOMAS F. TORRANCE AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS edited by Myk Habets, R. Lucas Stamps [Studies in Historical and Systematic Theology, Lexham Academic, ISBN 9781683596936]

Thomas F. Torrance invites evangelicals to think more Christianly

THOMAS F. TORRANCE AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS brings Torrance into closer conversation with evangelical theology on a range of key theological topics. List of essays:

Thomas F. Torrance and the Evangelical Tradition (Thomas A. Noble)

Torrance, The Tacit Dimension, and The Church Fathers (Jonathan Warren P. (Pagán))

Torrance and the Doctrine of Scripture (Andrew T. B. McGowan)

Revelation, Rationalism, and an Evangelical Impasse (Myk Habets)

Theology and Science in Torrance (W. Ross Hastings)

A Complexly Relational Account of the Imago Dei in Torrance's Vision of Humanity (Marc Cortez)

Barth, Torrance, and Evangelicals: Critiquing and Reinvigorating the Idea of a "Personal Relationship with Jesus" (Marty Folsom)

Torrance and Atonement (Christopher Woznicki)

Torrance and Christ's Assumption of Fallen Human Nature: Toward Clarification and Closure (Jerome Van Kuiken)

Torrance, Theosis, and Evangelical Reception (Myk Habets)

Thinking and Acting in Christ: Torrance on Spiritual Formation (Geordie W. Ziegler)

'Seeking Love, Justice and Freedom for All': Using the Work of T.F. and J.B. Torrance to Address Domestic and Family Violence (Jenny Richards)

Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Work (Peter K. W. McGhee)

Torrance and Global Evangelicalism: Some Potential Generative Exchanges with Contemporary Indian Evangelical Theology (Stavan Narendra John)

Thomas Forsyth Torrance (1913–2007) was one of the most important theologians of the twentieth century, yet his work remains relatively neglected by evangelicals.

A diverse collection of contributors engage Torrance's pioneering and provocative thought, deriving insights from theological loci such as Scripture, Christology, and atonement, as well as from broader topics like domestic violence and science. These stimulating essays reveal how Torrance can help evangelical theologians articulate richer and deeper theology.

Review

THOMAS F. TORRANCE AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION is an important addition to the growing secondary literature on T. F. Torrance's theology. The editors and eleven additional scholars craft the definitive critical conversation between Torrance's Trinitarian perspective and evangelical theology across a spectrum of theology topics. Well-researched and written, the book is a must-read for anyone interested in Torrance's theology and evangelical thought. —**Elmer M. Colyer,** professor of systematic theology, University of Dubuque Theological Seminary

Between theological rocks and hard places there is T. F. Torrance, who weaves the early Church Fathers, contemporary theologians, and a reverence for Scripture into a coherent, rigorous, and joyful theology. This is a delightful work in which evangelical scholars discuss T. F. Torrance for the sake of the church in fresh ways, always seeking application and transformation. This is theology as doxology at its best. —**Julie Canlis,** author of Calvin's Ladder and Theology of the Ordinary

This wide-ranging volume reinforces the view that Torrance is the most important English language theologian of the twentieth century. Central to each chapter in this impressive work are Torrance's evangelical views of Christology, the Trinity, and atonement, and how those doctrines invariably mean good news for all when rightly understood. —**Paul D. Molnar,** professor of systematic theology, St. John's University, New York

Full of complexity, challenge, and the embodied love of God in Christ, these thoughtful, discursive essays are a testament to Torrance and his own desire to bear witness to our Incarnate Lord and to share witness across perspectives, disciplines, and eras. In a day when theological fellowship in unity and difference is hard won, this volume succeeds not by setting up straw men or ideas, wearing down the opposition, or building unstable bridges. Rather, it plates a multicourse feast, harmonizing distinctly acquired theological tastes in new ways that invite some serious chewing and savoring. Enjoy! —**Cherith Fee Nordling,** sessional professor of theology, Regent College

Thomas F. Torrance is arguably one of the most important Anglophone theologians of the twentieth century. His work covers an astonishing range of issues and engages an astounding range of sources and conversation partners (including patristic, Reformation, and modern theology along with modern philosophy and advances in the natural sciences), and it has been formative and foundational for many theologians. His work has, however, been criticized and rejected by some evangelicals, and it has been ignored by many others. This volume offers a set of mature reflections that are appreciative but not uncritical. It will serve both the growing guild of Torrance specialists and the broader evangelical theological community. —**Thomas H. McCall,** Timothy C. and Julie M. Tennent Professor of Theology, Asbury Theological Seminary

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Torrance and Evangelical Theology in Conversation by Myk Habets and R. Lucas Stamps

Thomas Forsyth Torrance (1913-2007) was arguably the most important English language theologian of the twentieth century.' Born in Chengdu, China, to missionary parents, Torrance would become one of the most important figures in the Church of Scotland, publishing voluminously, especially from his longtime professoriate at New College, University of Edinburgh. Torrance's theology

represents a creative fusion of theological influences both ancient and modern and both Eastern and Western. Torrance drew upon a wide range of sources from Athanasius to Karl Barth (with whom he completed postgraduate studies at Basel), and from John Calvin to Michael Polanyi. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the theology of Torrance but his exposure in the evangelical world remains relatively subdued. This book aims to bring Torrance into closer conversation with evangelical theology on a range of important theological loci. This introduction sets the stage for the discussion by briefly considering the broad theological commitments of both dialogue partners: evangelical theology and Torrance himself.

EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

As to evangelicalism, many wonder whether the term has outlived its usefulness. In a North American context, "evangelical" is widely seen as apolitical identifier, not a set of theological distinctives. Matters are further complicated—better: enriched! —by the fact that evangelicalism is now a global phenomenon and not limited to the Anglo-American contexts in which it originally developed. As an added complication, one could argue that the term may not even be exclusively Protestant, with some Roman Catholics adopting the descriptor as well. Despite these legitimate qualifications, it is our contention that the term "evangelical" still captures something theologically significant and, therefore, should not be rejected. Evangelicalism has a rich heritage and an enduring power to capture a distinctive theological agenda.

The history of evangelicalism is well-documented, and this is not the place to rehearse every detail. Suffice it to say, evangelicalism's theological roots branch out in several directions. Its taproot, we might say, is the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, but it has been nourished as well by the influence of pietism, Puritanism, the modern missions movement, and especially the Great Awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The current trajectories of evangelicalism have also been definitively shaped by the so-called neo-evangelical movement in the post-World War II era (led by Carl Henry and Billy Graham, among others) that sought to distance evangelicalism from a more culturally quietistic and adversarial fundamentalism (see chapter 4). The movement has now gone global, with some arguing that the center of gravity is no longer in the West but in the majority world.

It is by now a well-worn path to summarize the theological commitments of evangelicalism along the lines of the famous quadrilateral suggested by evangelical Baptist historian, David Bebbington. Bebbington suggests that four characteristics have especially marked the evangelical movement: "con-versionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Together they form a quadrilateral of priorities that is the basis of Evangelicalism."6 This list of emphases is far from exhaustive, and evangelical theologians and historians may want to supplement it. Still, it remains a helpful rubric, at least as a starting point, for understanding the unique cocktail of doctrines that have shaped the evangelical movement. Evangelicalism takes its name from the evangel—the gospel, the good news. So, we might say that evangelicals are gospel people: those who emphasize the good news of salvation (understood in Protestant terms), the necessity of personal conversion that it demands, and the life of holiness and mission that flow from it. The authors in this volume represent the wide geographical spread of evangelicalism—ranging from New Zealand to India, and Britain to North America—but each is committed to these broad theological parameters. There are diverse views represented here, to be sure. The authors do not agree on every doctrinal point nor even on every disputed issue in the interpretation and appropriation of Torrance's work. But for each there is a general identification with the global evangelical movement as stated.

THE THEOLOGY OF TORRANCE

This volume offers an evangelical engagement with some of the major themes in the theology of Torrance. The book aims not so much to provide a comprehensive introduction to Torrance's thought as to explore some of the promises and perils of his impressive theological project from the perspective of evangelical theology (addressed directly in chapter 1). Most of the standard loci communes (common places) of Christian systematic theology are addressed, as are other important aspects of Torrance's methodology and historiography. This introduction certainly cannot adequately capture the whole of Torrance's rich and multi-layered theological program, but a few distinctive and interrelated themes may highlight the important ways his theology interfaces with evangelicalism. No claim is made that these are the most important or the central motifs in Torrance's theology. Indeed, they are somewhat arbitrarily chosen but are, we believe, representative of Torrance's significance for evangelical engagement. Perhaps these will whet the appetite of the reader to explore more in the chapters that follow. While Torrance

obviously did not explicitly work within the categories of Bebbington's quadrilateral, it may be helpful to use this rubric as an organizing principle as we bring our dialogue partners into conversation.

CONVERSIONISM

While critical of forms of holiness and pietistic altar calls and crisis moments of faith, Torrance's theology can be seen to be in sympathy with the evangelical emphasis on conversionism, if by that term is meant, not a focus on technique (Charles Finney et al.) but the need for a personal response to the gospel. In Torrance's hands, conversion is first of all realized by the incarnate Son and only then is it a reality in the life of the believer. Torrance thus emphasizes something called "the vicarious humanity of Christ."

One of the richest themes in Torrance's theology is his understanding of Christ's vicarious humanity and ministry. Christology was a central theme for Torrance's theology. A certain Christocentrism marks all that Torrance touches, from the doctrine of the Trinity to the divinization of humanity in the eschaton (theosis, addressed in chapter ii). And at the heart of Torrance's Christology is a tight connection between the person and the work of Christ, that is, between the incarnation and atonement. These two are really one doctrine in Torrance's thought. Building on Calvin's emphasis on "the whole course" of Christ's obedience, Torrance stresses that Christ began his work of atonement (that is, reconciliation) from the moment he was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary. Humanity is saved not only by Christ's passive obedience (his suffering and death) but also by his active obedience (his whole life of obedience). For Torrance, this means that every step in Christ's journey is vicarious. Torrance ascribes to Christ a vicarious faith, a vicarious obedience, and even a vicarious repentance (not in terms of any personal sin but in terms of his identification with sinners, especially expressed in his baptism). And under all these aspects of Christ's work stands his vicarious humanity itself. Self-consciously building on patristic and Eastern influences, Torrance emphasizes the saving significance of the incarnation (see chapter 9). By taking a concrete human nature into personal union with himself, the eternal Son already effects the reconciliation between God and man. There are universal implications of this doctrine that remain a matter of debate, but the richness of this theme provides fertile ground for evangelical consideration.

ACTIVISM

Dogmatics was not merely a theoretical exercise for Torrance. Rather, dogmatics is the bringing of the human person under the full control of the Triune God in order to be drawn up into worship, out into ministry, and deep into acts of Christian witness. Torrance's Christianity is an active one, which models, in many ways, the evangelical activism Bebbington identified in his historical work. For Torrance, this means the rejection of all invented dualisms that would justify an inactive faith. Torrance calls such dualisms the Latin heresy.

Related to the notion of Christ's vicarious humanity is the critique that Torrance levels against what he calls the "Latin heresy." For Torrance, the Western Christian tradition, especially under Augustine's influence, has held to a gospel of extrinsicism, where Christ's humanity is seen as something external to God's own life and where Christ himself is seen as something external to the humanity that he came to save. In this understanding, the incarnation is merely a prerequisite to the atonement, rather than constitutive of it. And Christ's work is seen in transactional (especially forensic) rather than participatory terms. Torrance sees in the Greek Fathers a more thorough integration of incarnation and atonement that avoids this so-called heresy. Torrance's historical generalizations are certainly open to critique, but his theological insights on these matters are nonetheless worthy of evangelical consideration. When the Latin heresy is avoided, so too are those theologies that would argue for an activism based upon a works-based righteousness (Pelagianism), or those that argue for an inactive form of quietism. Both fall short of an evangelical theology. The addition of essays on work (chapter 13), justice and domestic violence (chapter 12), and personal relationships (chapters 7 and 11) is ample evidence of this.

CRUCICENTRISM

The emphasis on the cross of Christ is often thought to be missing in Torrance, but that is a mistake. Torrance does bring incarnation and atonement together, but not at the expense of the cross. An important theme in Torrance's theology of atonement is the fallen flesh of Christ. One implication of the Latin heresy, for Torrance, is a tendency in Western theology to deny Christ's participation in our concrete humanity in all of its fallenness and misery. Following Edward Irving and Karl Barth, Torrance maintains that Christ assumed a fallen human nature (though he differs with Irving especially in some important ways). Christ himself is sinless, but he assumes humanity in its fallen state in order to heal it and bend it back to God from within. This is perhaps the most controversial aspect of Torrance's

theology from an evangelical perspective, and much ink has been spilled trying to position it biblically, historically, and theologically. One of the leading voices in these debates, Jerome van Kuiken, weighs in on the issue in chapter 10 of this book. The cross is the climax of the work of Christ; it is the most intense moment of the incarnation and is the supreme example of his vicarious ministry. At the cross, Torrance argues, Christ meets and triumphs over sin, evil, and death. This is confirmed in the resurrection and sealed at Pentecost.

BIBLICISM

All his life Torrance held Holy Scripture in high regard as the Word of God. His personal devotional life consisted of reading the Bible daily and reading through the entire Bible annually. Hundreds of sermons by Torrance survive, all displaying what today we might call an expositional style, centered on a single text of Scripture applied to the congregation. Torrance was insistent that the way to hear the voice of God was through Scripture, and he devoted his life to its dogmatic exposition. At times Torrance followed the path of his mentor Karl Barth and found himself off-side with certain evangelical sensitivities regarding the nature of Scripture (see chapter 3); but he was often equally off-side with liberals who thought him too conservative, too biblicist, and too evangelical.

Again, these themes are selective, and while they are not the terms Torrance would likely have chosen, they are representative of key aspects of his thought. Torrance's theology is deeply grounded in Scripture and tradition, but he often synthesizes those source materials in creative and controversial ways, as the essays in this book demonstrate. Rather than preview each of the book's chapters, we invite readers to peruse the table of contents and begin wherever they feel most provoked! However, Thomas Noble's opening biographical essay would be an obvious choice to begin with, since it sketches Torrance's life from the unique perspective of his interaction with evangelicalism. It is our hope and prayer that these essays would send readers back to Torrance's own works, where they will find plenty to challenge and confront but also much to comfort and cheer. To that end, we close with these stirring words of evangelical hope from Torrance himself:

God loves you so utterly and completely that he has given himself for you in Jesus Christ his beloved Son, and has thereby pledged his very being as God for your salvation. In Jesus Christ God has actualised his unconditional love for you in your human nature in such a once for all way, that he cannot go back upon it without undoing the Incarnation and the Cross and thereby denying himself. Jesus Christ

died for you precisely because you are sinful and utterly unworthy of him, and has thereby already made you his own before and apart from your ever believing in him. He has bound you to himself by his love in a way that he will never let you go, for even if you refuse him and damn yourself in hell, his love will never cease. Therefore, repent and believe in Jesus Christ as your Lord and Saviour. <> <>

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